fdget(), more trivial conversions

all failure exits prior to fdget() leave the scope, all matching fdput()
are immediately followed by leaving the scope.

[xfs_ioc_commit_range() chunk moved here as

fdget(), more trivial conversions

all failure exits prior to fdget() leave the scope, all matching fdput()
are immediately followed by leaving the scope.

[xfs_ioc_commit_range() chunk moved here as well]

Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>

show more ...

introduce fd_file(), convert all accessors to it.

For any changes of struct fd representation we need to
turn existing accesses to fields into calls of wrappers.
Accesses to struct fd::flags are ve

introduce fd_file(), convert all accessors to it.

For any changes of struct fd representation we need to
turn existing accesses to fields into calls of wrappers.
Accesses to struct fd::flags are very few (3 in linux/file.h,
1 in net/socket.c, 3 in fs/overlayfs/file.c and 3 more in
explicit initializers).
Those can be dealt with in the commit converting to
new layout; accesses to struct fd::file are too many for that.
This commit converts (almost) all of f.file to
fd_file(f). It's not entirely mechanical ('file' is used as
a member name more than just in struct fd) and it does not
even attempt to distinguish the uses in pointer context from
those in boolean context; the latter will be eventually turned
into a separate helper (fd_empty()).

NOTE: mass conversion to fd_empty(), tempting as it
might be, is a bad idea; better do that piecewise in commit
that convert from fdget...() to CLASS(...).

[conflicts in fs/fhandle.c, kernel/bpf/syscall.c, mm/memcontrol.c
caught by git; fs/stat.c one got caught by git grep]
[fs/xattr.c conflict]

Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>

show more ...

lsm: remove the now superfluous sentinel element from ctl_table array

This commit comes at the tail end of a greater effort to remove the
empty elements at the end of the ctl_table arrays (sentinels

lsm: remove the now superfluous sentinel element from ctl_table array

This commit comes at the tail end of a greater effort to remove the
empty elements at the end of the ctl_table arrays (sentinels) which will
reduce the overall build time size of the kernel and run time memory
bloat by ~64 bytes per sentinel (further information Link :
https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZO5Yx5JFogGi%[email protected]/)

Remove the sentinel from all files under security/ that register a
sysctl table.

Signed-off-by: Joel Granados <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]> # loadpin & yama
Tested-by: Valentin Schneider <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Valentin Schneider <[email protected]>
[PM: subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>

show more ...

lsm: mark the lsm_id variables are marked as static

As the kernel test robot helpfully reminded us, all of the lsm_id
instances defined inside the various LSMs should be marked as static.
The one ex

lsm: mark the lsm_id variables are marked as static

As the kernel test robot helpfully reminded us, all of the lsm_id
instances defined inside the various LSMs should be marked as static.
The one exception is Landlock which uses its lsm_id variable across
multiple source files with an extern declaration in a header file.

Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>

show more ...

LSM: Identify modules by more than name

Create a struct lsm_id to contain identifying information about Linux
Security Modules (LSMs). At inception this contains the name of the
module and an identi

LSM: Identify modules by more than name

Create a struct lsm_id to contain identifying information about Linux
Security Modules (LSMs). At inception this contains the name of the
module and an identifier associated with the security module. Change
the security_add_hooks() interface to use this structure. Change the
individual modules to maintain their own struct lsm_id and pass it to
security_add_hooks().

The values are for LSM identifiers are defined in a new UAPI
header file linux/lsm.h. Each existing LSM has been updated to
include it's LSMID in the lsm_id.

The LSM ID values are sequential, with the oldest module
LSM_ID_CAPABILITY being the lowest value and the existing modules
numbered in the order they were included in the main line kernel.
This is an arbitrary convention for assigning the values, but
none better presents itself. The value 0 is defined as being invalid.
The values 1-99 are reserved for any special case uses which may
arise in the future. This may include attributes of the LSM
infrastructure itself, possibly related to namespacing or network
attribute management. A special range is identified for such attributes
to help reduce confusion for developers unfamiliar with LSMs.

LSM attribute values are defined for the attributes presented by
modules that are available today. As with the LSM IDs, The value 0
is defined as being invalid. The values 1-99 are reserved for any
special case uses which may arise in the future.

Cc: linux-security-module <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mickael Salaun <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Nacked-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
[PM: forward ported beyond v6.6 due merge window changes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>

show more ...

LoadPin: Annotate struct dm_verity_loadpin_trusted_root_digest with __counted_by

Prepare for the coming implementation by GCC and Clang of the __counted_by
attribute. Flexible array members annotate

LoadPin: Annotate struct dm_verity_loadpin_trusted_root_digest with __counted_by

Prepare for the coming implementation by GCC and Clang of the __counted_by
attribute. Flexible array members annotated with __counted_by can have
their accesses bounds-checked at run-time checking via CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS
(for array indexing) and CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE (for strcpy/memcpy-family
functions).

As found with Coccinelle[1], add __counted_by for struct dm_verity_loadpin_trusted_root_digest.
Additionally, since the element count member must be set before accessing
the annotated flexible array member, move its initialization earlier.

[1] https://github.com/kees/kernel-tools/blob/trunk/coccinelle/examples/counted_by.cocci

Cc: Alasdair Kergon <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Cc: James Morris <[email protected]>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>

show more ...

loadpin: simplify sysctls use with register_sysctl()

register_sysctl_paths() is not required, we can just use
register_sysctl() with the required path specified.

Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.jo

loadpin: simplify sysctls use with register_sysctl()

register_sysctl_paths() is not required, we can just use
register_sysctl() with the required path specified.

Reviewed-by: John Johansen <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <[email protected]>

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selinux: remove the runtime disable functionality

After working with the larger SELinux-based distros for several
years, we're finally at a place where we can disable the SELinux
runtime disable fun

selinux: remove the runtime disable functionality

After working with the larger SELinux-based distros for several
years, we're finally at a place where we can disable the SELinux
runtime disable functionality. The existing kernel deprecation
notice explains the functionality and why we want to remove it:

The selinuxfs "disable" node allows SELinux to be disabled at
runtime prior to a policy being loaded into the kernel. If
disabled via this mechanism, SELinux will remain disabled until
the system is rebooted.

The preferred method of disabling SELinux is via the "selinux=0"
boot parameter, but the selinuxfs "disable" node was created to
make it easier for systems with primitive bootloaders that did not
allow for easy modification of the kernel command line.
Unfortunately, allowing for SELinux to be disabled at runtime makes
it difficult to secure the kernel's LSM hooks using the
"__ro_after_init" feature.

It is that last sentence, mentioning the '__ro_after_init' hardening,
which is the real motivation for this change, and if you look at the
diffstat you'll see that the impact of this patch reaches across all
the different LSMs, helping prevent tampering at the LSM hook level.

From a SELinux perspective, it is important to note that if you
continue to disable SELinux via "/etc/selinux/config" it may appear
that SELinux is disabled, but it is simply in an uninitialized state.
If you load a policy with `load_policy -i`, you will see SELinux
come alive just as if you had loaded the policy during early-boot.

It is also worth noting that the "/sys/fs/selinux/disable" file is
always writable now, regardless of the Kconfig settings, but writing
to the file has no effect on the system, other than to display an
error on the console if a non-zero/true value is written.

Finally, in the several years where we have been working on
deprecating this functionality, there has only been one instance of
someone mentioning any user visible breakage. In this particular
case it was an individual's kernel test system, and the workaround
documented in the deprecation notice ("selinux=0" on the kernel
command line) resolved the issue without problem.

Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>

show more ...

LoadPin: Allow filesystem switch when not enforcing

For LoadPin to be used at all in a classic distro environment, it needs
to allow for switching filesystems (from the initramfs to the "real"
root

LoadPin: Allow filesystem switch when not enforcing

For LoadPin to be used at all in a classic distro environment, it needs
to allow for switching filesystems (from the initramfs to the "real"
root filesystem). To allow for this, if the "enforce" mode is not set at
boot, reset the pinned filesystem tracking when the pinned filesystem
gets unmounted instead of invalidating further loads. Once enforcement
is set, it cannot be unset, and the pinning will stick.

This means that distros can build with CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN=y, but with
CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENFORCE disabled, but after boot is running,
the system can enable enforcement:

$ sysctl -w kernel.loadpin.enforced=1

Cc: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Cc: James Morris <[email protected]>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

show more ...

LoadPin: Move pin reporting cleanly out of locking

Refactor the pin reporting to be more cleanly outside the locking. It
was already, but moving it around helps clear the path for the root to
switch

LoadPin: Move pin reporting cleanly out of locking

Refactor the pin reporting to be more cleanly outside the locking. It
was already, but moving it around helps clear the path for the root to
switch when not enforcing.

Cc: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Cc: James Morris <[email protected]>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

show more ...

LoadPin: Refactor sysctl initialization

In preparation for shifting root mount when not enforcing, split sysctl
logic out into a separate helper, and unconditionally register the
sysctl, but only ma

LoadPin: Refactor sysctl initialization

In preparation for shifting root mount when not enforcing, split sysctl
logic out into a separate helper, and unconditionally register the
sysctl, but only make it writable when the device is writable.

Cc: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Cc: James Morris <[email protected]>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

show more ...

LoadPin: Refactor read-only check into a helper

In preparation for allowing mounts to shift when not enforced, move
read-only checking into a separate helper.

Cc: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
C

LoadPin: Refactor read-only check into a helper

In preparation for allowing mounts to shift when not enforced, move
read-only checking into a separate helper.

Cc: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Cc: James Morris <[email protected]>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

show more ...

LoadPin: Ignore the "contents" argument of the LSM hooks

LoadPin only enforces the read-only origin of kernel file reads. Whether
or not it was a partial read isn't important. Remove the overly
cons

LoadPin: Ignore the "contents" argument of the LSM hooks

LoadPin only enforces the read-only origin of kernel file reads. Whether
or not it was a partial read isn't important. Remove the overly
conservative checks so that things like partial firmware reads will
succeed (i.e. reading a firmware header).

Fixes: 2039bda1fa8d ("LSM: Add "contents" flag to kernel_read_file hook")
Cc: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Cc: James Morris <[email protected]>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Ping-Ke Shih <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

show more ...

LoadPin: Require file with verity root digests to have a header

LoadPin expects the file with trusted verity root digests to be
an ASCII file with one digest (hex value) per line. A pinned
root coul

LoadPin: Require file with verity root digests to have a header

LoadPin expects the file with trusted verity root digests to be
an ASCII file with one digest (hex value) per line. A pinned
root could contain files that meet these format requirements,
even though the hex values don't represent trusted root
digests.

Add a new requirement to the file format which consists in
the first line containing a fixed string. This prevents
attackers from feeding files with an otherwise valid format
to LoadPin.

Suggested-by: Sarthak Kukreti <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220906181725.1.I3f51d1bb0014e5a5951be4ad3c5ad7c7ca1dfc32@changeid

show more ...

LoadPin: Return EFAULT on copy_from_user() failures

The copy_from_user() function returns the number of bytes remaining to
be copied on a failure. Such failures should return -EFAULT to high
levels.

LoadPin: Return EFAULT on copy_from_user() failures

The copy_from_user() function returns the number of bytes remaining to
be copied on a failure. Such failures should return -EFAULT to high
levels.

Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Fixes: 3f805f8cc23b ("LoadPin: Enable loading from trusted dm-verity devices")
Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <[email protected]>
Cc: James Morris <[email protected]>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>

show more ...

LoadPin: Enable loading from trusted dm-verity devices

Extend LoadPin to allow loading of kernel files from trusted dm-verity [1]
devices.

This change adds the concept of trusted verity devices to

LoadPin: Enable loading from trusted dm-verity devices

Extend LoadPin to allow loading of kernel files from trusted dm-verity [1]
devices.

This change adds the concept of trusted verity devices to LoadPin. LoadPin
maintains a list of root digests of verity devices it considers trusted.
Userspace can populate this list through an ioctl on the new LoadPin
securityfs entry 'dm-verity'. The ioctl receives a file descriptor of
a file with verity digests as parameter. Verity reads the digests from
this file after confirming that the file is located on the pinned root.
The digest file must contain one digest per line. The list of trusted
digests can only be set up once, which is typically done at boot time.

When a kernel file is read LoadPin first checks (as usual) whether the file
is located on the pinned root, if so the file can be loaded. Otherwise, if
the verity extension is enabled, LoadPin determines whether the file is
located on a verity backed device and whether the root digest of that
device is in the list of trusted digests. The file can be loaded if the
verity device has a trusted root digest.

Background:

As of now LoadPin restricts loading of kernel files to a single pinned
filesystem, typically the rootfs. This works for many systems, however it
can result in a bloated rootfs (and OTA updates) on platforms where
multiple boards with different hardware configurations use the same rootfs
image. Especially when 'optional' files are large it may be preferable to
download/install them only when they are actually needed by a given board.
Chrome OS uses Downloadable Content (DLC) [2] to deploy certain 'packages'
at runtime. As an example a DLC package could contain firmware for a
peripheral that is not present on all boards. DLCs use dm-verity to verify
the integrity of the DLC content.

[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/device-mapper/verity.html
[2] https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/platform2/+/HEAD/dlcservice/docs/developer.md

Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220627083512.v7.2.I01c67af41d2f6525c6d023101671d7339a9bc8b5@changeid
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>

show more ...

loadpin: stop using bdevname

Use the %pg format specifier to save on stack consuption and code size.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
L

loadpin: stop using bdevname

Use the %pg format specifier to save on stack consuption and code size.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

show more ...

LSM: Add "contents" flag to kernel_read_file hook

As with the kernel_load_data LSM hook, add a "contents" flag to the
kernel_read_file LSM hook that indicates whether the LSM can expect
a matching c

LSM: Add "contents" flag to kernel_read_file hook

As with the kernel_load_data LSM hook, add a "contents" flag to the
kernel_read_file LSM hook that indicates whether the LSM can expect
a matching call to the kernel_post_read_file LSM hook with the full
contents of the file. With the coming addition of partial file read
support for kernel_read_file*() API, the LSM will no longer be able
to always see the entire contents of a file during the read calls.

For cases where the LSM must read examine the complete file contents,
it will need to do so on its own every time the kernel_read_file
hook is called with contents=false (or reject such cases). Adjust all
existing LSMs to retain existing behavior.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

show more ...

LSM: Introduce kernel_post_load_data() hook

There are a few places in the kernel where LSMs would like to have
visibility into the contents of a kernel buffer that has been loaded or
read. While sec

LSM: Introduce kernel_post_load_data() hook

There are a few places in the kernel where LSMs would like to have
visibility into the contents of a kernel buffer that has been loaded or
read. While security_kernel_post_read_file() (which includes the
buffer) exists as a pairing for security_kernel_read_file(), no such
hook exists to pair with security_kernel_load_data().

Earlier proposals for just using security_kernel_post_read_file() with a
NULL file argument were rejected (i.e. "file" should always be valid for
the security_..._file hooks, but it appears at least one case was
left in the kernel during earlier refactoring. (This will be fixed in
a subsequent patch.)

Since not all cases of security_kernel_load_data() can have a single
contiguous buffer made available to the LSM hook (e.g. kexec image
segments are separately loaded), there needs to be a way for the LSM to
reason about its expectations of the hook coverage. In order to handle
this, add a "contents" argument to the "kernel_load_data" hook that
indicates if the newly added "kernel_post_load_data" hook will be called
with the full contents once loaded. That way, LSMs requiring full contents
can choose to unilaterally reject "kernel_load_data" with contents=false
(which is effectively the existing hook coverage), but when contents=true
they can allow it and later evaluate the "kernel_post_load_data" hook
once the buffer is loaded.

With this change, LSMs can gain coverage over non-file-backed data loads
(e.g. init_module(2) and firmware userspace helper), which will happen
in subsequent patches.

Additionally prepare IMA to start processing these cases.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: KP Singh <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

show more ...

fs/kernel_read_file: Split into separate include file

Move kernel_read_file* out of linux/fs.h to its own linux/kernel_read_file.h
include file. That header gets pulled in just about everywhere
and

fs/kernel_read_file: Split into separate include file

Move kernel_read_file* out of linux/fs.h to its own linux/kernel_read_file.h
include file. That header gets pulled in just about everywhere
and doesn't really need functions not related to the general fs interface.

Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Scott Branden <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

show more ...

block: move block-related definitions out of fs.h

Move most of the block related definition out of fs.h into more suitable
headers.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens

block: move block-related definitions out of fs.h

Move most of the block related definition out of fs.h into more suitable
headers.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>

show more ...

proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check

In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to
validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This
function us

proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check

In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to
validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This
function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as
minimum and maximum allowed value.

On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some
readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned
to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced.

The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range
boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1,
int_max=INT_MAX in different source files:

$ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l
248

Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some
macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them
instead of creating a local one for every object file.

This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary
compiled with the default Fedora config:

# scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o
add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164)
Data old new delta
sysctl_vals - 12 +12
__kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12
max 14 10 -4
int_max 16 - -16
one 68 - -68
zero 128 28 -100
Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00%

[[email protected]: tipc: remove two unused variables]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
[[email protected]: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c]
[[email protected]: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
[[email protected]: fix fs/eventpoll.c]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

show more ...

treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 282

Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

this software is licensed under the terms of the gnu general public
license version 2 as pub

treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 282

Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

this software is licensed under the terms of the gnu general public
license version 2 as published by the free software foundation and
may be copied distributed and modified under those terms this
program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful but
without any warranty without even the implied warranty of
merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose see the gnu
general public license for more details

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

GPL-2.0-only

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 285 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexios Zavras <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

show more ...

security/loadpin: Allow to exclude specific file types

Linux kernel already provide MODULE_SIG and KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG to
make sure loaded kernel module and kernel image are trusted. This
patch adds a

security/loadpin: Allow to exclude specific file types

Linux kernel already provide MODULE_SIG and KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG to
make sure loaded kernel module and kernel image are trusted. This
patch adds a kernel command line option "loadpin.exclude" which
allows to exclude specific file types from LoadPin. This is useful
when people want to use different mechanisms to verify module and
kernel image while still use LoadPin to protect the integrity of
other files kernel loads.

Signed-off-by: Ke Wu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
[kees: fix array size issue reported by Coverity via Colin Ian King]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>

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LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM

This converts LoadPin from being a direct "minor" LSM into an ordered LSM.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@sc

LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM

This converts LoadPin from being a direct "minor" LSM into an ordered LSM.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>

show more ...