landlock: Add the errata interface

Some fixes may require user space to check if they are applied on the
running kernel before using a specific feature. For instance, this
applies when a restrictio

landlock: Add the errata interface

Some fixes may require user space to check if they are applied on the
running kernel before using a specific feature. For instance, this
applies when a restriction was previously too restrictive and is now
getting relaxed (e.g. for compatibility reasons). However, non-visible
changes for legitimate use (e.g. security fixes) do not require an
erratum.

Because fixes are backported down to a specific Landlock ABI, we need a
way to avoid cherry-pick conflicts. The solution is to only update a
file related to the lower ABI impacted by this issue. All the ABI files
are then used to create a bitmask of fixes.

The new errata interface is similar to the one used to get the supported
Landlock ABI version, but it returns a bitmask instead because the order
of fixes may not match the order of versions, and not all fixes may
apply to all versions.

The actual errata will come with dedicated commits. The description is
not actually used in the code but serves as documentation.

Create the landlock_abi_version symbol and use its value to check errata
consistency.

Update test_base's create_ruleset_checks_ordering tests and add errata
tests.

This commit is backportable down to the first version of Landlock.

Fixes: 3532b0b4352c ("landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features")
Cc: Günther Noack <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>

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LSM: Identify modules by more than name

Create a struct lsm_id to contain identifying information about Linux
Security Modules (LSMs). At inception this contains the name of the
module and an identi

LSM: Identify modules by more than name

Create a struct lsm_id to contain identifying information about Linux
Security Modules (LSMs). At inception this contains the name of the
module and an identifier associated with the security module. Change
the security_add_hooks() interface to use this structure. Change the
individual modules to maintain their own struct lsm_id and pass it to
security_add_hooks().

The values are for LSM identifiers are defined in a new UAPI
header file linux/lsm.h. Each existing LSM has been updated to
include it's LSMID in the lsm_id.

The LSM ID values are sequential, with the oldest module
LSM_ID_CAPABILITY being the lowest value and the existing modules
numbered in the order they were included in the main line kernel.
This is an arbitrary convention for assigning the values, but
none better presents itself. The value 0 is defined as being invalid.
The values 1-99 are reserved for any special case uses which may
arise in the future. This may include attributes of the LSM
infrastructure itself, possibly related to namespacing or network
attribute management. A special range is identified for such attributes
to help reduce confusion for developers unfamiliar with LSMs.

LSM attribute values are defined for the attributes presented by
modules that are available today. As with the LSM IDs, The value 0
is defined as being invalid. The values 1-99 are reserved for any
special case uses which may arise in the future.

Cc: linux-security-module <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mickael Salaun <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Nacked-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
[PM: forward ported beyond v6.6 due merge window changes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>

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landlock: Support filesystem access-control

Using Landlock objects and ruleset, it is possible to tag inodes
according to a process's domain. To enable an unprivileged process to
express a file hie

landlock: Support filesystem access-control

Using Landlock objects and ruleset, it is possible to tag inodes
according to a process's domain. To enable an unprivileged process to
express a file hierarchy, it first needs to open a directory (or a file)
and pass this file descriptor to the kernel through
landlock_add_rule(2). When checking if a file access request is
allowed, we walk from the requested dentry to the real root, following
the different mount layers. The access to each "tagged" inodes are
collected according to their rule layer level, and ANDed to create
access to the requested file hierarchy. This makes possible to identify
a lot of files without tagging every inodes nor modifying the
filesystem, while still following the view and understanding the user
has from the filesystem.

Add a new ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES for UML because it currently does not
keep the same struct inodes for the same inodes whereas these inodes are
in use.

This commit adds a minimal set of supported filesystem access-control
which doesn't enable to restrict all file-related actions. This is the
result of multiple discussions to minimize the code of Landlock to ease
review. Thanks to the Landlock design, extending this access-control
without breaking user space will not be a problem. Moreover, seccomp
filters can be used to restrict the use of syscall families which may
not be currently handled by Landlock.

Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Ivanov <[email protected]>
Cc: James Morris <[email protected]>
Cc: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Cc: Jeff Dike <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <[email protected]>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>

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landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials

Process's credentials point to a Landlock domain, which is underneath
implemented with a ruleset. In the following commits, this domai

landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials

Process's credentials point to a Landlock domain, which is underneath
implemented with a ruleset. In the following commits, this domain is
used to check and enforce the ptrace and filesystem security policies.
A domain is inherited from a parent to its child the same way a thread
inherits a seccomp policy.

Cc: James Morris <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>

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