ptrace_attach: shift send(SIGSTOP) into ptrace_set_stopped()

Turn send_sig_info(SIGSTOP) into send_signal_locked(SIGSTOP) and move it
from ptrace_attach() to ptrace_set_stopped().

This looks more l

ptrace_attach: shift send(SIGSTOP) into ptrace_set_stopped()

Turn send_sig_info(SIGSTOP) into send_signal_locked(SIGSTOP) and move it
from ptrace_attach() to ptrace_set_stopped().

This looks more logical and avoids lock(siglock) right after unlock().

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>

show more ...

__ptrace_unlink: kill the obsolete "FIXME" code

The corner case described by the comment is no longer possible after the
commit 7b3c36fc4c23 ("ptrace: fix task_join_group_stop() for the case when
cu

__ptrace_unlink: kill the obsolete "FIXME" code

The corner case described by the comment is no longer possible after the
commit 7b3c36fc4c23 ("ptrace: fix task_join_group_stop() for the case when
current is traced"), task_join_group_stop() ensures that the new thread
has the correct signr in JOBCTL_STOP_SIGMASK regardless of ptrace.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Biederman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>

show more ...

ptrace: Convert ptrace_attach() to use lock guards

Created as testing for the conditional guard infrastructure.
Specifically this makes use of the following form:

scoped_cond_guard (mutex_intr, r

ptrace: Convert ptrace_attach() to use lock guards

Created as testing for the conditional guard infrastructure.
Specifically this makes use of the following form:

scoped_cond_guard (mutex_intr, return -ERESTARTNOINTR,
&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex) {
...
}
...
return 0;

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20231102110706.568467727%40infradead.org

show more ...

mm: make __access_remote_vm() static

Patch series "various improvements to the GUP interface", v2.

A series of fixes to simplify and improve the GUP interface with an eye to
providing groundwork to

mm: make __access_remote_vm() static

Patch series "various improvements to the GUP interface", v2.

A series of fixes to simplify and improve the GUP interface with an eye to
providing groundwork to future improvements:-

* __access_remote_vm() and access_remote_vm() are functionally identical,
so make the former static such that in future we can potentially change
the external-facing implementation details of this function.

* Extend is_valid_gup_args() to cover the missing FOLL_TOUCH case, and
simplify things by defining INTERNAL_GUP_FLAGS to check against.

* Adjust __get_user_pages_locked() to explicitly treat a failure to pin any
pages as an error in all circumstances other than FOLL_NOWAIT being
specified, bringing it in line with the nommu implementation of this
function.

* (With many thanks to Arnd who suggested this in the first instance)
Update get_user_page_vma_remote() to explicitly only return a page or an
error, simplifying the interface and avoiding the questionable
IS_ERR_OR_NULL() pattern.


This patch (of 4):

access_remote_vm() passes through parameters to __access_remote_vm()
directly, so remove the __access_remote_vm() function from mm.h and use
access_remote_vm() in the one caller that needs it (ptrace_access_vm()).

This allows future adjustments to the GUP-internal __access_remote_vm()
function while keeping the access_remote_vm() function stable.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/f7877c5039ce1c202a514a8aeeefc5cdd5e32d19.1696288092.git.lstoakes@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: John Hubbard <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Richard Cochran <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>

show more ...

ptrace: Provide set/get interface for syscall user dispatch

The syscall user dispatch configuration can only be set by the task itself,
but lacks a ptrace set/get interface which makes it impossible

ptrace: Provide set/get interface for syscall user dispatch

The syscall user dispatch configuration can only be set by the task itself,
but lacks a ptrace set/get interface which makes it impossible to implement
checkpoint/restore for it.

Add the required ptrace requests and the get/set functions in the syscall
user dispatch code to make that possible.

Signed-off-by: Gregory Price <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

show more ...

rseq: Introduce extensible rseq ABI

Introduce the extensible rseq ABI, where the feature size supported by
the kernel and the required alignment are communicated to user-space
through ELF auxiliary

rseq: Introduce extensible rseq ABI

Introduce the extensible rseq ABI, where the feature size supported by
the kernel and the required alignment are communicated to user-space
through ELF auxiliary vectors.

This allows user-space to call rseq registration with a rseq_len of
either 32 bytes for the original struct rseq size (which includes
padding), or larger.

If rseq_len is larger than 32 bytes, then it must be large enough to
contain the feature size communicated to user-space through ELF
auxiliary vectors.

Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

show more ...

freezer,sched: Rewrite core freezer logic

Rewrite the core freezer to behave better wrt thawing and be simpler
in general.

By replacing PF_FROZEN with TASK_FROZEN, a special block state, it is
ensu

freezer,sched: Rewrite core freezer logic

Rewrite the core freezer to behave better wrt thawing and be simpler
in general.

By replacing PF_FROZEN with TASK_FROZEN, a special block state, it is
ensured frozen tasks stay frozen until thawed and don't randomly wake
up early, as is currently possible.

As such, it does away with PF_FROZEN and PF_FREEZER_SKIP, freeing up
two PF_flags (yay!).

Specifically; the current scheme works a little like:

freezer_do_not_count();
schedule();
freezer_count();

And either the task is blocked, or it lands in try_to_freezer()
through freezer_count(). Now, when it is blocked, the freezer
considers it frozen and continues.

However, on thawing, once pm_freezing is cleared, freezer_count()
stops working, and any random/spurious wakeup will let a task run
before its time.

That is, thawing tries to thaw things in explicit order; kernel
threads and workqueues before doing bringing SMP back before userspace
etc.. However due to the above mentioned races it is entirely possible
for userspace tasks to thaw (by accident) before SMP is back.

This can be a fatal problem in asymmetric ISA architectures (eg ARMv9)
where the userspace task requires a special CPU to run.

As said; replace this with a special task state TASK_FROZEN and add
the following state transitions:

TASK_FREEZABLE -> TASK_FROZEN
__TASK_STOPPED -> TASK_FROZEN
__TASK_TRACED -> TASK_FROZEN

The new TASK_FREEZABLE can be set on any state part of TASK_NORMAL
(IOW. TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE and TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE) -- any such state
is already required to deal with spurious wakeups and the freezer
causes one such when thawing the task (since the original state is
lost).

The special __TASK_{STOPPED,TRACED} states *can* be restored since
their canonical state is in ->jobctl.

With this, frozen tasks need an explicit TASK_FROZEN wakeup and are
free of undue (early / spurious) wakeups.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

show more ...

ptrace: fix clearing of JOBCTL_TRACED in ptrace_unfreeze_traced()

CI reported the following splat while running the strace testsuite:

WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3570031 at kernel/ptrace.c:272 ptrace_ch

ptrace: fix clearing of JOBCTL_TRACED in ptrace_unfreeze_traced()

CI reported the following splat while running the strace testsuite:

WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3570031 at kernel/ptrace.c:272 ptrace_check_attach+0x12e/0x178
CPU: 1 PID: 3570031 Comm: strace Tainted: G OE 5.19.0-20220624.rc3.git0.ee819a77d4e7.300.fc36.s390x #1
Hardware name: IBM 3906 M04 704 (z/VM 7.1.0)
Call Trace:
[<00000000ab4b645a>] ptrace_check_attach+0x132/0x178
([<00000000ab4b6450>] ptrace_check_attach+0x128/0x178)
[<00000000ab4b6cde>] __s390x_sys_ptrace+0x86/0x160
[<00000000ac03fcec>] __do_syscall+0x1d4/0x200
[<00000000ac04e312>] system_call+0x82/0xb0
Last Breaking-Event-Address:
[<00000000ab4ea3c8>] wait_task_inactive+0x98/0x190

This is because JOBCTL_TRACED is set, but the task is not in TASK_TRACED
state. Caused by ptrace_unfreeze_traced() which does:

task->jobctl &= ~TASK_TRACED

but it should be:

task->jobctl &= ~JOBCTL_TRACED

Fixes: 31cae1eaae4f ("sched,signal,ptrace: Rework TASK_TRACED, TASK_STOPPED state")
Signed-off-by: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Biederman <[email protected]>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

show more ...

ptrace: fix clearing of JOBCTL_TRACED in ptrace_unfreeze_traced()

CI reported the following splat while running the strace testsuite:

[ 3976.640309] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3570031 at kernel/ptrace.c:

ptrace: fix clearing of JOBCTL_TRACED in ptrace_unfreeze_traced()

CI reported the following splat while running the strace testsuite:

[ 3976.640309] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3570031 at kernel/ptrace.c:272 ptrace_check_attach+0x12e/0x178
[ 3976.640391] CPU: 1 PID: 3570031 Comm: strace Tainted: G OE 5.19.0-20220624.rc3.git0.ee819a77d4e7.300.fc36.s390x #1
[ 3976.640410] Hardware name: IBM 3906 M04 704 (z/VM 7.1.0)
[ 3976.640452] Call Trace:
[ 3976.640454] [<00000000ab4b645a>] ptrace_check_attach+0x132/0x178
[ 3976.640457] ([<00000000ab4b6450>] ptrace_check_attach+0x128/0x178)
[ 3976.640460] [<00000000ab4b6cde>] __s390x_sys_ptrace+0x86/0x160
[ 3976.640463] [<00000000ac03fcec>] __do_syscall+0x1d4/0x200
[ 3976.640468] [<00000000ac04e312>] system_call+0x82/0xb0
[ 3976.640470] Last Breaking-Event-Address:
[ 3976.640471] [<00000000ab4ea3c8>] wait_task_inactive+0x98/0x190

This is because JOBCTL_TRACED is set, but the task is not in TASK_TRACED
state. Caused by ptrace_unfreeze_traced() which does:

task->jobctl &= ~TASK_TRACED

but it should be:

task->jobctl &= ~JOBCTL_TRACED

Fixes: 31cae1eaae4f ("sched,signal,ptrace: Rework TASK_TRACED, TASK_STOPPED state")
Signed-off-by: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2101641
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>

show more ...

sched,signal,ptrace: Rework TASK_TRACED, TASK_STOPPED state

Currently ptrace_stop() / do_signal_stop() rely on the special states
TASK_TRACED and TASK_STOPPED resp. to keep unique state. That is, th

sched,signal,ptrace: Rework TASK_TRACED, TASK_STOPPED state

Currently ptrace_stop() / do_signal_stop() rely on the special states
TASK_TRACED and TASK_STOPPED resp. to keep unique state. That is, this
state exists only in task->__state and nowhere else.

There's two spots of bother with this:

- PREEMPT_RT has task->saved_state which complicates matters,
meaning task_is_{traced,stopped}() needs to check an additional
variable.

- An alternative freezer implementation that itself relies on a
special TASK state would loose TASK_TRACED/TASK_STOPPED and will
result in misbehaviour.

As such, add additional state to task->jobctl to track this state
outside of task->__state.

NOTE: this doesn't actually fix anything yet, just adds extra state.

--EWB
* didn't add a unnecessary newline in signal.h
* Update t->jobctl in signal_wake_up and ptrace_signal_wake_up
instead of in signal_wake_up_state. This prevents the clearing
of TASK_STOPPED and TASK_TRACED from getting lost.
* Added warnings if JOBCTL_STOPPED or JOBCTL_TRACED are not cleared

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Tested-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>

show more ...

ptrace: Always take siglock in ptrace_resume

Make code analysis simpler and future changes easier by
always taking siglock in ptrace_resume.

Tested-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by

ptrace: Always take siglock in ptrace_resume

Make code analysis simpler and future changes easier by
always taking siglock in ptrace_resume.

Tested-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>

show more ...

ptrace: Don't change __state

Stop playing with tsk->__state to remove TASK_WAKEKILL while a ptrace
command is executing.

Instead remove TASK_WAKEKILL from the definition of TASK_TRACED, and
impleme

ptrace: Don't change __state

Stop playing with tsk->__state to remove TASK_WAKEKILL while a ptrace
command is executing.

Instead remove TASK_WAKEKILL from the definition of TASK_TRACED, and
implement a new jobctl flag TASK_PTRACE_FROZEN. This new flag is set
in jobctl_freeze_task and cleared when ptrace_stop is awoken or in
jobctl_unfreeze_task (when ptrace_stop remains asleep).

In signal_wake_up add __TASK_TRACED to state along with TASK_WAKEKILL
when the wake up is for a fatal signal. Skip adding __TASK_TRACED
when TASK_PTRACE_FROZEN is not set. This has the same effect as
changing TASK_TRACED to __TASK_TRACED as all of the wake_ups that use
TASK_KILLABLE go through signal_wake_up.

Handle a ptrace_stop being called with a pending fatal signal.
Previously it would have been handled by schedule simply failing to
sleep. As TASK_WAKEKILL is no longer part of TASK_TRACED schedule
will sleep with a fatal_signal_pending. The code in signal_wake_up
guarantees that the code will be awaked by any fatal signal that
codes after TASK_TRACED is set.

Previously the __state value of __TASK_TRACED was changed to
TASK_RUNNING when woken up or back to TASK_TRACED when the code was
left in ptrace_stop. Now when woken up ptrace_stop now clears
JOBCTL_PTRACE_FROZEN and when left sleeping ptrace_unfreezed_traced
clears JOBCTL_PTRACE_FROZEN.

Tested-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>

show more ...

ptrace: Document that wait_task_inactive can't fail

After ptrace_freeze_traced succeeds it is known that the tracee
has a __state value of __TASK_TRACED and that no __ptrace_unlink will
happen becau

ptrace: Document that wait_task_inactive can't fail

After ptrace_freeze_traced succeeds it is known that the tracee
has a __state value of __TASK_TRACED and that no __ptrace_unlink will
happen because the tracer is waiting for the tracee, and the tracee is
in ptrace_stop.

The function ptrace_freeze_traced can succeed at any point after
ptrace_stop has set TASK_TRACED and dropped siglock. The read_lock on
tasklist_lock only excludes ptrace_attach.

This means that the !current->ptrace which executes under a read_lock
of tasklist_lock will never see a ptrace_freeze_trace as the tracer
must have gone away before the tasklist_lock was taken and
ptrace_attach can not occur until the read_lock is dropped. As
ptrace_freeze_traced depends upon ptrace_attach running before it can
run that excludes ptrace_freeze_traced until __state is set to
TASK_RUNNING. This means that task_is_traced will fail in
ptrace_freeze_attach and ptrace_freeze_attached will fail.

On the current->ptrace branch of ptrace_stop which will be reached any
time after ptrace_freeze_traced has succeed it is known that __state
is __TASK_TRACED and schedule() will be called with that state.

Use a WARN_ON_ONCE to document that wait_task_inactive(TASK_TRACED)
should never fail. Remove the stale comment about may_ptrace_stop.

Strictly speaking this is not true because if PREEMPT_RT is enabled
wait_task_inactive can fail because __state can be changed. I don't
see this as a problem as the ptrace code is currently broken on
PREMPT_RT, and this is one of the issues. Failing and warning when
the assumptions of the code are broken is good.

Tested-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>

show more ...

ptrace: Reimplement PTRACE_KILL by always sending SIGKILL

The current implementation of PTRACE_KILL is buggy and has been for
many years as it assumes it's target has stopped in ptrace_stop. At a
q

ptrace: Reimplement PTRACE_KILL by always sending SIGKILL

The current implementation of PTRACE_KILL is buggy and has been for
many years as it assumes it's target has stopped in ptrace_stop. At a
quick skim it looks like this assumption has existed since ptrace
support was added in linux v1.0.

While PTRACE_KILL has been deprecated we can not remove it as
a quick search with google code search reveals many existing
programs calling it.

When the ptracee is not stopped at ptrace_stop some fields would be
set that are ignored except in ptrace_stop. Making the userspace
visible behavior of PTRACE_KILL a noop in those case.

As the usual rules are not obeyed it is not clear what the
consequences are of calling PTRACE_KILL on a running process.
Presumably userspace does not do this as it achieves nothing.

Replace the implementation of PTRACE_KILL with a simple
send_sig_info(SIGKILL) followed by a return 0. This changes the
observable user space behavior only in that PTRACE_KILL on a process
not stopped in ptrace_stop will also kill it. As that has always
been the intent of the code this seems like a reasonable change.

Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>

show more ...

ptrace: Remove arch_ptrace_attach

The last remaining implementation of arch_ptrace_attach is ia64's
ptrace_attach_sync_user_rbs which was added at the end of 2007 in
commit aa91a2e90044 ("[IA64] Syn

ptrace: Remove arch_ptrace_attach

The last remaining implementation of arch_ptrace_attach is ia64's
ptrace_attach_sync_user_rbs which was added at the end of 2007 in
commit aa91a2e90044 ("[IA64] Synchronize RBS on PTRACE_ATTACH").

Reading the comments and examining the code ptrace_attach_sync_user_rbs
has the sole purpose of saving registers to the stack when ptrace_attach
changes TASK_STOPPED to TASK_TRACED. In all other cases arch_ptrace_stop
takes care of the register saving.

In commit d79fdd6d96f4 ("ptrace: Clean transitions between TASK_STOPPED and TRACED")
modified ptrace_attach to wake up the thread and enter ptrace_stop normally even
when the thread starts out stopped.

This makes ptrace_attach_sync_user_rbs completely unnecessary. So just
remove it.

I read through the code to verify that ptrace_attach_sync_user_rbs is
unnecessary. What I found is that the code is quite dead.

Reading ptrace_attach_sync_user_rbs it is easy to see that the it does
nothing unless __state == TASK_STOPPED.

Calling arch_ptrace_attach (aka ptrace_attach_sync_user_rbs) after
ptrace_traceme it is easy to see that because we are talking about the
current process the value of __state is TASK_RUNNING. Which means
ptrace_attach_sync_user_rbs does nothing.

The only other call of arch_ptrace_attach (aka
ptrace_attach_sync_user_rbs) is after ptrace_attach.

If the task is running (and PTRACE_SEIZE is not specified), a SIGSTOP
is sent which results in do_signal_stop setting JOBCTL_TRAP_STOP on
the target task (as it is ptraced) and the target task stopping
in ptrace_stop with __state == TASK_TRACED.

If the task was already stopped then ptrace_attach sets
JOBCTL_TRAPPING and JOBCTL_TRAP_STOP, wakes it out of __TASK_STOPPED,
and waits until the JOBCTL_TRAPPING_BIT is clear. At which point
the task stops in ptrace_stop.

In both cases there are a couple of funning excpetions such as if the
traced task receiveds a SIGCONT, or is set a fatal signal.

However in all of those cases the tracee never stops in __state
TASK_STOPPED. Which is a long way of saying that ptrace_attach_sync_user_rbs
is guaranteed never to do anything.

Cc: [email protected]
Tested-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>

show more ...

ptrace: remove redudant check of #ifdef PTRACE_SINGLESTEP

Patch series "ptrace: do some cleanup".


This patch (of 3):

PTRACE_SINGLESTEP is always defined as 9 in include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h,
remov

ptrace: remove redudant check of #ifdef PTRACE_SINGLESTEP

Patch series "ptrace: do some cleanup".


This patch (of 3):

PTRACE_SINGLESTEP is always defined as 9 in include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h,
remove redudant check of #ifdef PTRACE_SINGLESTEP.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Tiezhu Yang <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>

show more ...

ptrace: Check PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP permission on PTRACE_SEIZE

Setting PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP is supposed to be a highly privileged
operation because it allows the tracee to completely bypass a

ptrace: Check PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP permission on PTRACE_SEIZE

Setting PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP is supposed to be a highly privileged
operation because it allows the tracee to completely bypass all seccomp
filters on kernels with CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE=y. It is only supposed to
be settable by a process with global CAP_SYS_ADMIN, and only if that
process is not subject to any seccomp filters at all.

However, while these permission checks were done on the PTRACE_SETOPTIONS
path, they were missing on the PTRACE_SEIZE path, which also sets
user-specified ptrace flags.

Move the permissions checks out into a helper function and let both
ptrace_attach() and ptrace_setoptions() call it.

Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 13c4a90119d2 ("seccomp: add ptrace options for suspend/resume")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>

show more ...

ptrace: Remove second setting of PT_SEIZED in ptrace_attach

The code is totally redundant remove it.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: "Eric

ptrace: Remove second setting of PT_SEIZED in ptrace_attach

The code is totally redundant remove it.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>

show more ...

sched: Change task_struct::state

Change the type and name of task_struct::state. Drop the volatile and
shrink it to an 'unsigned int'. Rename it in order to find all uses
such that we can use READ_O

sched: Change task_struct::state

Change the type and name of task_struct::state. Drop the volatile and
shrink it to an 'unsigned int'. Rename it in order to find all uses
such that we can use READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE as appropriate.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Daniel Thompson <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

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ptrace: make ptrace() fail if the tracee changed its pid unexpectedly

Suppose we have 2 threads, the group-leader L and a sub-theread T,
both parked in ptrace_stop(). Debugger tries to resume both t

ptrace: make ptrace() fail if the tracee changed its pid unexpectedly

Suppose we have 2 threads, the group-leader L and a sub-theread T,
both parked in ptrace_stop(). Debugger tries to resume both threads
and does

ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, T);
ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, L);

If the sub-thread T execs in between, the 2nd PTRACE_CONT doesn not
resume the old leader L, it resumes the post-exec thread T which was
actually now stopped in PTHREAD_EVENT_EXEC. In this case the
PTHREAD_EVENT_EXEC event is lost, and the tracer can't know that the
tracee changed its pid.

This patch makes ptrace() fail in this case until debugger does wait()
and consumes PTHREAD_EVENT_EXEC which reports old_pid. This affects all
ptrace requests except the "asynchronous" PTRACE_INTERRUPT/KILL.

The patch doesn't add the new PTRACE_ option to not complicate the API,
and I _hope_ this won't cause any noticeable regression:

- If debugger uses PTRACE_O_TRACEEXEC and the thread did an exec
and the tracer does a ptrace request without having consumed
the exec event, it's 100% sure that the thread the ptracer
thinks it is targeting does not exist anymore, or isn't the
same as the one it thinks it is targeting.

- To some degree this patch adds nothing new. In the scenario
above ptrace(L) can fail with -ESRCH if it is called after the
execing sub-thread wakes the leader up and before it "steals"
the leader's pid.

Test-case:

#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <assert.h>

void *tf(void *arg)
{
execve("/usr/bin/true", NULL, NULL);
assert(0);

return NULL;
}

int main(void)
{
int leader = fork();
if (!leader) {
kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP);

pthread_t th;
pthread_create(&th, NULL, tf, NULL);
for (;;)
pause();

return 0;
}

waitpid(leader, NULL, WSTOPPED);

ptrace(PTRACE_SEIZE, leader, 0,
PTRACE_O_TRACECLONE | PTRACE_O_TRACEEXEC);
waitpid(leader, NULL, 0);

ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, leader, 0,0);
waitpid(leader, NULL, 0);

int status, thread = waitpid(-1, &status, 0);
assert(thread > 0 && thread != leader);
assert(status == 0x80137f);

ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, thread, 0,0);
/*
* waitid() because waitpid(leader, &status, WNOWAIT) does not
* report status. Why ????
*
* Why WEXITED? because we have another kernel problem connected
* to mt-exec.
*/
siginfo_t info;
assert(waitid(P_PID, leader, &info, WSTOPPED|WEXITED|WNOWAIT) == 0);
assert(info.si_pid == leader && info.si_status == 0x0405);

/* OK, it sleeps in ptrace(PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC == 0x04) */
assert(ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, leader, 0,0) == -1);
assert(errno == ESRCH);

assert(leader == waitpid(leader, &status, WNOHANG));
assert(status == 0x04057f);

assert(ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, leader, 0,0) == 0);

return 0;
}

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Simon Marchi <[email protected]>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Pedro Alves <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Simon Marchi <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jan Kratochvil <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

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Revert "kernel: treat PF_IO_WORKER like PF_KTHREAD for ptrace/signals"

This reverts commit 6fb8f43cede0e4bd3ead847de78d531424a96be9.

The IO threads do allow signals now, including SIGSTOP, and we c

Revert "kernel: treat PF_IO_WORKER like PF_KTHREAD for ptrace/signals"

This reverts commit 6fb8f43cede0e4bd3ead847de78d531424a96be9.

The IO threads do allow signals now, including SIGSTOP, and we can allow
ptrace attach. Attaching won't reveal anything interesting for the IO
threads, but it will allow eg gdb to attach to a task with io_urings
and IO threads without complaining. And once attached, it will allow
the usual introspection into regular threads.

Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>

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rseq, ptrace: Add PTRACE_GET_RSEQ_CONFIGURATION request

For userspace checkpoint and restore (C/R) a way of getting process state
containing RSEQ configuration is needed.

There are two ways this in

rseq, ptrace: Add PTRACE_GET_RSEQ_CONFIGURATION request

For userspace checkpoint and restore (C/R) a way of getting process state
containing RSEQ configuration is needed.

There are two ways this information is going to be used:
- to re-enable RSEQ for threads which had it enabled before C/R
- to detect if a thread was in a critical section during C/R

Since C/R preserves TLS memory and addresses RSEQ ABI will be restored
using the address registered before C/R.

Detection whether the thread is in a critical section during C/R is needed
to enforce behavior of RSEQ abort during C/R. Attaching with ptrace()
before registers are dumped itself doesn't cause RSEQ abort.
Restoring the instruction pointer within the critical section is
problematic because rseq_cs may get cleared before the control is passed
to the migrated application code leading to RSEQ invariants not being
preserved. C/R code will use RSEQ ABI address to find the abort handler
to which the instruction pointer needs to be set.

To achieve above goals expose the RSEQ ABI address and the signature value
with the new ptrace request PTRACE_GET_RSEQ_CONFIGURATION.

This new ptrace request can also be used by debuggers so they are aware
of stops within restartable sequences in progress.

Signed-off-by: Piotr Figiel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michal Miroslaw <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

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kernel: treat PF_IO_WORKER like PF_KTHREAD for ptrace/signals

Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>

mm: cleanup: remove unused tsk arg from __access_remote_vm

Despite a comment that said that page fault accounting would be charged to
whatever task_struct* was passed into __access_remote_vm(), the

mm: cleanup: remove unused tsk arg from __access_remote_vm

Despite a comment that said that page fault accounting would be charged to
whatever task_struct* was passed into __access_remote_vm(), the tsk
argument was actually unused.

Making page fault accounting actually use this task struct is quite a
project, so there is no point in keeping the tsk argument.

Delete both the comment, and the argument.

[[email protected]: changelog addition]

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: John Hubbard <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

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ptrace: Set PF_SUPERPRIV when checking capability

Commit 69f594a38967 ("ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing
/proc/pid/stat") replaced the use of ns_capable() with
has_ns_capability{

ptrace: Set PF_SUPERPRIV when checking capability

Commit 69f594a38967 ("ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing
/proc/pid/stat") replaced the use of ns_capable() with
has_ns_capability{,_noaudit}() which doesn't set PF_SUPERPRIV.

Commit 6b3ad6649a4c ("ptrace: reintroduce usage of subjective credentials in
ptrace_has_cap()") replaced has_ns_capability{,_noaudit}() with
security_capable(), which doesn't set PF_SUPERPRIV neither.

Since commit 98f368e9e263 ("kernel: Add noaudit variant of ns_capable()"), a
new ns_capable_noaudit() helper is available. Let's use it!

As a result, the signature of ptrace_has_cap() is restored to its original one.

Cc: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Paris <[email protected]>
Cc: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 6b3ad6649a4c ("ptrace: reintroduce usage of subjective credentials in ptrace_has_cap()")
Fixes: 69f594a38967 ("ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing /proc/pid/stat")
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

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