Change inode_operations.mkdir to return struct dentry *

Some filesystems, such as NFS, cifs, ceph, and fuse, do not have
complete control of sequencing on the actual filesystem (e.g. on a
different

Change inode_operations.mkdir to return struct dentry *

Some filesystems, such as NFS, cifs, ceph, and fuse, do not have
complete control of sequencing on the actual filesystem (e.g. on a
different server) and may find that the inode created for a mkdir
request already exists in the icache and dcache by the time the mkdir
request returns. For example, if the filesystem is mounted twice the
directory could be visible on the other mount before it is on the
original mount, and a pair of name_to_handle_at(), open_by_handle_at()
calls could instantiate the directory inode with an IS_ROOT() dentry
before the first mkdir returns.

This means that the dentry passed to ->mkdir() may not be the one that
is associated with the inode after the ->mkdir() completes. Some
callers need to interact with the inode after the ->mkdir completes and
they currently need to perform a lookup in the (rare) case that the
dentry is no longer hashed.

This lookup-after-mkdir requires that the directory remains locked to
avoid races. Planned future patches to lock the dentry rather than the
directory will mean that this lookup cannot be performed atomically with
the mkdir.

To remove this barrier, this patch changes ->mkdir to return the
resulting dentry if it is different from the one passed in.
Possible returns are:
NULL - the directory was created and no other dentry was used
ERR_PTR() - an error occurred
non-NULL - this other dentry was spliced in

This patch only changes file-systems to return "ERR_PTR(err)" instead of
"err" or equivalent transformations. Subsequent patches will make
further changes to some file-systems to return a correct dentry.

Not all filesystems reliably result in a positive hashed dentry:

- NFS, cifs, hostfs will sometimes need to perform a lookup of
the name to get inode information. Races could result in this
returning something different. Note that this lookup is
non-atomic which is what we are trying to avoid. Placing the
lookup in filesystem code means it only happens when the filesystem
has no other option.
- kernfs and tracefs leave the dentry negative and the ->revalidate
operation ensures that lookup will be called to correctly populate
the dentry. This could be fixed but I don't think it is important
to any of the users of vfs_mkdir() which look at the dentry.

The recommendation to use
d_drop();d_splice_alias()
is ugly but fits with current practice. A planned future patch will
change this.

Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>

show more ...

bpf: Preserve param->string when parsing mount options

In bpf_parse_param(), keep the value of param->string intact so it can
be freed later. Otherwise, the kmalloc area pointed to by param->string

bpf: Preserve param->string when parsing mount options

In bpf_parse_param(), keep the value of param->string intact so it can
be freed later. Otherwise, the kmalloc area pointed to by param->string
will be leaked as shown below:

unreferenced object 0xffff888118c46d20 (size 8):
comm "new_name", pid 12109, jiffies 4295580214
hex dump (first 8 bytes):
61 6e 79 00 38 c9 5c 7e any.8.\~
backtrace (crc e1b7f876):
[<00000000c6848ac7>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4b/0x80
[<00000000de9f7d00>] __kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x36e/0x4a0
[<000000003e29b886>] memdup_user+0x32/0xa0
[<0000000007248326>] strndup_user+0x46/0x60
[<0000000035b3dd29>] __x64_sys_fsconfig+0x368/0x3d0
[<0000000018657927>] x64_sys_call+0xff/0x9f0
[<00000000c0cabc95>] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0
[<000000002f331597>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

Fixes: 6c1752e0b6ca ("bpf: Support symbolic BPF FS delegation mount options")
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]

show more ...

bpf: Simplify character output in seq_print_delegate_opts()

Single characters should be put into a sequence.
Thus use the corresponding function “seq_putc” for two selected calls.

This issue was tr

bpf: Simplify character output in seq_print_delegate_opts()

Single characters should be put into a sequence.
Thus use the corresponding function “seq_putc” for two selected calls.

This issue was transformed by using the Coccinelle software.

Suggested-by: Christophe Jaillet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]

show more ...

bpf: Support symbolic BPF FS delegation mount options

Besides already supported special "any" value and hex bit mask, support
string-based parsing of delegation masks based on exact enumerator
names

bpf: Support symbolic BPF FS delegation mount options

Besides already supported special "any" value and hex bit mask, support
string-based parsing of delegation masks based on exact enumerator
names. Utilize BTF information of `enum bpf_cmd`, `enum bpf_map_type`,
`enum bpf_prog_type`, and `enum bpf_attach_type` types to find supported
symbolic names (ignoring __MAX_xxx guard values and stripping repetitive
prefixes like BPF_ for cmd and attach types, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ for maps, and
BPF_PROG_TYPE_ for prog types). The case doesn't matter, but it is
normalized to lower case in mount option output. So "PROG_LOAD",
"prog_load", and "MAP_create" are all valid values to specify for
delegate_cmds options, "array" is among supported for map types, etc.

Besides supporting string values, we also support multiple values
specified at the same time, using colon (':') separator.

There are corresponding changes on bpf_show_options side to use known
values to print them in human-readable format, falling back to hex mask
printing, if there are any unrecognized bits. This shouldn't be
necessary when enum BTF information is present, but in general we should
always be able to fall back to this even if kernel was built without BTF.
As mentioned, emitted symbolic names are normalized to be all lower case.

Example below shows various ways to specify delegate_cmds options
through mount command and how mount options are printed back:

12/14 14:39:07.604
vmuser@archvm:~/local/linux/tools/testing/selftests/bpf
$ mount | rg token

$ sudo mkdir -p /sys/fs/bpf/token
$ sudo mount -t bpf bpffs /sys/fs/bpf/token \
-o delegate_cmds=prog_load:MAP_CREATE \
-o delegate_progs=kprobe \
-o delegate_attachs=xdp
$ mount | grep token
bpffs on /sys/fs/bpf/token type bpf (rw,relatime,delegate_cmds=map_create:prog_load,delegate_progs=kprobe,delegate_attachs=xdp)

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]

show more ...

bpf: Add BPF token support to BPF_PROG_LOAD command

Add basic support of BPF token to BPF_PROG_LOAD. BPF_F_TOKEN_FD flag
should be set in prog_flags field when providing prog_token_fd.

Wire through

bpf: Add BPF token support to BPF_PROG_LOAD command

Add basic support of BPF token to BPF_PROG_LOAD. BPF_F_TOKEN_FD flag
should be set in prog_flags field when providing prog_token_fd.

Wire through a set of allowed BPF program types and attach types,
derived from BPF FS at BPF token creation time. Then make sure we
perform bpf_token_capable() checks everywhere where it's relevant.

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]

show more ...

bpf: Add BPF token support to BPF_MAP_CREATE command

Allow providing token_fd for BPF_MAP_CREATE command to allow controlled
BPF map creation from unprivileged process through delegated BPF token.
N

bpf: Add BPF token support to BPF_MAP_CREATE command

Allow providing token_fd for BPF_MAP_CREATE command to allow controlled
BPF map creation from unprivileged process through delegated BPF token.
New BPF_F_TOKEN_FD flag is added to specify together with BPF token FD
for BPF_MAP_CREATE command.

Wire through a set of allowed BPF map types to BPF token, derived from
BPF FS at BPF token creation time. This, in combination with allowed_cmds
allows to create a narrowly-focused BPF token (controlled by privileged
agent) with a restrictive set of BPF maps that application can attempt
to create.

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]

show more ...

bpf: Introduce BPF token object

Add new kind of BPF kernel object, BPF token. BPF token is meant to
allow delegating privileged BPF functionality, like loading a BPF
program or creating a BPF map, f

bpf: Introduce BPF token object

Add new kind of BPF kernel object, BPF token. BPF token is meant to
allow delegating privileged BPF functionality, like loading a BPF
program or creating a BPF map, from privileged process to a *trusted*
unprivileged process, all while having a good amount of control over which
privileged operations could be performed using provided BPF token.

This is achieved through mounting BPF FS instance with extra delegation
mount options, which determine what operations are delegatable, and also
constraining it to the owning user namespace (as mentioned in the
previous patch).

BPF token itself is just a derivative from BPF FS and can be created
through a new bpf() syscall command, BPF_TOKEN_CREATE, which accepts BPF
FS FD, which can be attained through open() API by opening BPF FS mount
point. Currently, BPF token "inherits" delegated command, map types,
prog type, and attach type bit sets from BPF FS as is. In the future,
having an BPF token as a separate object with its own FD, we can allow
to further restrict BPF token's allowable set of things either at the
creation time or after the fact, allowing the process to guard itself
further from unintentionally trying to load undesired kind of BPF
programs. But for now we keep things simple and just copy bit sets as is.

When BPF token is created from BPF FS mount, we take reference to the
BPF super block's owning user namespace, and then use that namespace for
checking all the {CAP_BPF, CAP_PERFMON, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_ADMIN}
capabilities that are normally only checked against init userns (using
capable()), but now we check them using ns_capable() instead (if BPF
token is provided). See bpf_token_capable() for details.

Such setup means that BPF token in itself is not sufficient to grant BPF
functionality. User namespaced process has to *also* have necessary
combination of capabilities inside that user namespace. So while
previously CAP_BPF was useless when granted within user namespace, now
it gains a meaning and allows container managers and sys admins to have
a flexible control over which processes can and need to use BPF
functionality within the user namespace (i.e., container in practice).
And BPF FS delegation mount options and derived BPF tokens serve as
a per-container "flag" to grant overall ability to use bpf() (plus further
restrict on which parts of bpf() syscalls are treated as namespaced).

Note also, BPF_TOKEN_CREATE command itself requires ns_capable(CAP_BPF)
within the BPF FS owning user namespace, rounding up the ns_capable()
story of BPF token. Also creating BPF token in init user namespace is
currently not supported, given BPF token doesn't have any effect in init
user namespace anyways.

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]

show more ...

bpf: Add BPF token delegation mount options to BPF FS

Add few new mount options to BPF FS that allow to specify that a given
BPF FS instance allows creation of BPF token (added in the next patch),
a

bpf: Add BPF token delegation mount options to BPF FS

Add few new mount options to BPF FS that allow to specify that a given
BPF FS instance allows creation of BPF token (added in the next patch),
and what sort of operations are allowed under BPF token. As such, we get
4 new mount options, each is a bit mask
- `delegate_cmds` allow to specify which bpf() syscall commands are
allowed with BPF token derived from this BPF FS instance;
- if BPF_MAP_CREATE command is allowed, `delegate_maps` specifies
a set of allowable BPF map types that could be created with BPF token;
- if BPF_PROG_LOAD command is allowed, `delegate_progs` specifies
a set of allowable BPF program types that could be loaded with BPF token;
- if BPF_PROG_LOAD command is allowed, `delegate_attachs` specifies
a set of allowable BPF program attach types that could be loaded with
BPF token; delegate_progs and delegate_attachs are meant to be used
together, as full BPF program type is, in general, determined
through both program type and program attach type.

Currently, these mount options accept the following forms of values:
- a special value "any", that enables all possible values of a given
bit set;
- numeric value (decimal or hexadecimal, determined by kernel
automatically) that specifies a bit mask value directly;
- all the values for a given mount option are combined, if specified
multiple times. E.g., `mount -t bpf nodev /path/to/mount -o
delegate_maps=0x1 -o delegate_maps=0x2` will result in a combined 0x3
mask.

Ideally, more convenient (for humans) symbolic form derived from
corresponding UAPI enums would be accepted (e.g., `-o
delegate_progs=kprobe|tracepoint`) and I intend to implement this, but
it requires a bunch of UAPI header churn, so I postponed it until this
feature lands upstream or at least there is a definite consensus that
this feature is acceptable and is going to make it, just to minimize
amount of wasted effort and not increase amount of non-essential code to
be reviewed.

Attentive reader will notice that BPF FS is now marked as
FS_USERNS_MOUNT, which theoretically makes it mountable inside non-init
user namespace as long as the process has sufficient *namespaced*
capabilities within that user namespace. But in reality we still
restrict BPF FS to be mountable only by processes with CAP_SYS_ADMIN *in
init userns* (extra check in bpf_fill_super()). FS_USERNS_MOUNT is added
to allow creating BPF FS context object (i.e., fsopen("bpf")) from
inside unprivileged process inside non-init userns, to capture that
userns as the owning userns. It will still be required to pass this
context object back to privileged process to instantiate and mount it.

This manipulation is important, because capturing non-init userns as the
owning userns of BPF FS instance (super block) allows to use that userns
to constraint BPF token to that userns later on (see next patch). So
creating BPF FS with delegation inside unprivileged userns will restrict
derived BPF token objects to only "work" inside that intended userns,
making it scoped to a intended "container". Also, setting these
delegation options requires capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN), so unprivileged
process cannot set this up without involvement of a privileged process.

There is a set of selftests at the end of the patch set that simulates
this sequence of steps and validates that everything works as intended.
But careful review is requested to make sure there are no missed gaps in
the implementation and testing.

This somewhat subtle set of aspects is the result of previous
discussions ([0]) about various user namespace implications and
interactions with BPF token functionality and is necessary to contain
BPF token inside intended user namespace.

[0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230704-hochverdient-lehne-eeb9eeef785e@brauner/

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]

show more ...

bpf: Re-support uid and gid when mounting bpffs

For a clean, conflict-free revert of the token-related patches in commit
d17aff807f84 ("Revert BPF token-related functionality"), the bpf fs commit
75

bpf: Re-support uid and gid when mounting bpffs

For a clean, conflict-free revert of the token-related patches in commit
d17aff807f84 ("Revert BPF token-related functionality"), the bpf fs commit
750e785796bb ("bpf: Support uid and gid when mounting bpffs") was undone
temporarily as well.

This patch manually re-adds the functionality from the original one back
in 750e785796bb, no other functional changes intended.

Testing:

# mount -t bpf -o uid=65534,gid=65534 bpffs ./foo
# ls -la . | grep foo
drwxrwxrwt 2 nobody nogroup 0 Dec 20 13:16 foo
# mount -t bpf
bpffs on /root/foo type bpf (rw,relatime,uid=65534,gid=65534)

Also, passing invalid arguments for uid/gid are properly rejected as expected.

Fixes: d17aff807f84 ("Revert BPF token-related functionality")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
Cc: Jie Jiang <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]

show more ...

Revert BPF token-related functionality

This patch includes the following revert (one conflicting BPF FS
patch and three token patch sets, represented by merge commits):
- revert 0f5d5454c723 "Mer

Revert BPF token-related functionality

This patch includes the following revert (one conflicting BPF FS
patch and three token patch sets, represented by merge commits):
- revert 0f5d5454c723 "Merge branch 'bpf-fs-mount-options-parsing-follow-ups'";
- revert 750e785796bb "bpf: Support uid and gid when mounting bpffs";
- revert 733763285acf "Merge branch 'bpf-token-support-in-libbpf-s-bpf-object'";
- revert c35919dcce28 "Merge branch 'bpf-token-and-bpf-fs-based-delegation'".

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAHk-=wg7JuFYwGy=GOMbRCtOL+jwSQsdUaBsRWkDVYbxipbM5A@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>

show more ...

bpf: support symbolic BPF FS delegation mount options

Besides already supported special "any" value and hex bit mask, support
string-based parsing of delegation masks based on exact enumerator
names

bpf: support symbolic BPF FS delegation mount options

Besides already supported special "any" value and hex bit mask, support
string-based parsing of delegation masks based on exact enumerator
names. Utilize BTF information of `enum bpf_cmd`, `enum bpf_map_type`,
`enum bpf_prog_type`, and `enum bpf_attach_type` types to find supported
symbolic names (ignoring __MAX_xxx guard values and stripping repetitive
prefixes like BPF_ for cmd and attach types, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ for maps, and
BPF_PROG_TYPE_ for prog types). The case doesn't matter, but it is
normalized to lower case in mount option output. So "PROG_LOAD",
"prog_load", and "MAP_create" are all valid values to specify for
delegate_cmds options, "array" is among supported for map types, etc.

Besides supporting string values, we also support multiple values
specified at the same time, using colon (':') separator.

There are corresponding changes on bpf_show_options side to use known
values to print them in human-readable format, falling back to hex mask
printing, if there are any unrecognized bits. This shouldn't be
necessary when enum BTF information is present, but in general we should
always be able to fall back to this even if kernel was built without BTF.
As mentioned, emitted symbolic names are normalized to be all lower case.

Example below shows various ways to specify delegate_cmds options
through mount command and how mount options are printed back:

12/14 14:39:07.604
vmuser@archvm:~/local/linux/tools/testing/selftests/bpf
$ mount | rg token

$ sudo mkdir -p /sys/fs/bpf/token
$ sudo mount -t bpf bpffs /sys/fs/bpf/token \
-o delegate_cmds=prog_load:MAP_CREATE \
-o delegate_progs=kprobe \
-o delegate_attachs=xdp
$ mount | grep token
bpffs on /sys/fs/bpf/token type bpf (rw,relatime,delegate_cmds=map_create:prog_load,delegate_progs=kprobe,delegate_attachs=xdp)

Acked-by: John Fastabend <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>

show more ...

bpf: Support uid and gid when mounting bpffs

Parse uid and gid in bpf_parse_param() so that they can be passed in as
the `data` parameter when mount() bpffs. This will be useful when we
want to cont

bpf: Support uid and gid when mounting bpffs

Parse uid and gid in bpf_parse_param() so that they can be passed in as
the `data` parameter when mount() bpffs. This will be useful when we
want to control which user/group has the control to the mounted bpffs,
otherwise a separate chown() call will be needed.

Signed-off-by: Jie Jiang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mike Frysinger <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]

show more ...

bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_PROG_LOAD command

Add basic support of BPF token to BPF_PROG_LOAD. Wire through a set of
allowed BPF program types and attach types, derived from BPF FS at BPF
toke

bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_PROG_LOAD command

Add basic support of BPF token to BPF_PROG_LOAD. Wire through a set of
allowed BPF program types and attach types, derived from BPF FS at BPF
token creation time. Then make sure we perform bpf_token_capable()
checks everywhere where it's relevant.

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>

show more ...

bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_MAP_CREATE command

Allow providing token_fd for BPF_MAP_CREATE command to allow controlled
BPF map creation from unprivileged process through delegated BPF token.

bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_MAP_CREATE command

Allow providing token_fd for BPF_MAP_CREATE command to allow controlled
BPF map creation from unprivileged process through delegated BPF token.

Wire through a set of allowed BPF map types to BPF token, derived from
BPF FS at BPF token creation time. This, in combination with allowed_cmds
allows to create a narrowly-focused BPF token (controlled by privileged
agent) with a restrictive set of BPF maps that application can attempt
to create.

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>

show more ...

bpf: introduce BPF token object

Add new kind of BPF kernel object, BPF token. BPF token is meant to
allow delegating privileged BPF functionality, like loading a BPF
program or creating a BPF map, f

bpf: introduce BPF token object

Add new kind of BPF kernel object, BPF token. BPF token is meant to
allow delegating privileged BPF functionality, like loading a BPF
program or creating a BPF map, from privileged process to a *trusted*
unprivileged process, all while having a good amount of control over which
privileged operations could be performed using provided BPF token.

This is achieved through mounting BPF FS instance with extra delegation
mount options, which determine what operations are delegatable, and also
constraining it to the owning user namespace (as mentioned in the
previous patch).

BPF token itself is just a derivative from BPF FS and can be created
through a new bpf() syscall command, BPF_TOKEN_CREATE, which accepts BPF
FS FD, which can be attained through open() API by opening BPF FS mount
point. Currently, BPF token "inherits" delegated command, map types,
prog type, and attach type bit sets from BPF FS as is. In the future,
having an BPF token as a separate object with its own FD, we can allow
to further restrict BPF token's allowable set of things either at the
creation time or after the fact, allowing the process to guard itself
further from unintentionally trying to load undesired kind of BPF
programs. But for now we keep things simple and just copy bit sets as is.

When BPF token is created from BPF FS mount, we take reference to the
BPF super block's owning user namespace, and then use that namespace for
checking all the {CAP_BPF, CAP_PERFMON, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_ADMIN}
capabilities that are normally only checked against init userns (using
capable()), but now we check them using ns_capable() instead (if BPF
token is provided). See bpf_token_capable() for details.

Such setup means that BPF token in itself is not sufficient to grant BPF
functionality. User namespaced process has to *also* have necessary
combination of capabilities inside that user namespace. So while
previously CAP_BPF was useless when granted within user namespace, now
it gains a meaning and allows container managers and sys admins to have
a flexible control over which processes can and need to use BPF
functionality within the user namespace (i.e., container in practice).
And BPF FS delegation mount options and derived BPF tokens serve as
a per-container "flag" to grant overall ability to use bpf() (plus further
restrict on which parts of bpf() syscalls are treated as namespaced).

Note also, BPF_TOKEN_CREATE command itself requires ns_capable(CAP_BPF)
within the BPF FS owning user namespace, rounding up the ns_capable()
story of BPF token.

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>

show more ...

bpf: add BPF token delegation mount options to BPF FS

Add few new mount options to BPF FS that allow to specify that a given
BPF FS instance allows creation of BPF token (added in the next patch),
a

bpf: add BPF token delegation mount options to BPF FS

Add few new mount options to BPF FS that allow to specify that a given
BPF FS instance allows creation of BPF token (added in the next patch),
and what sort of operations are allowed under BPF token. As such, we get
4 new mount options, each is a bit mask
- `delegate_cmds` allow to specify which bpf() syscall commands are
allowed with BPF token derived from this BPF FS instance;
- if BPF_MAP_CREATE command is allowed, `delegate_maps` specifies
a set of allowable BPF map types that could be created with BPF token;
- if BPF_PROG_LOAD command is allowed, `delegate_progs` specifies
a set of allowable BPF program types that could be loaded with BPF token;
- if BPF_PROG_LOAD command is allowed, `delegate_attachs` specifies
a set of allowable BPF program attach types that could be loaded with
BPF token; delegate_progs and delegate_attachs are meant to be used
together, as full BPF program type is, in general, determined
through both program type and program attach type.

Currently, these mount options accept the following forms of values:
- a special value "any", that enables all possible values of a given
bit set;
- numeric value (decimal or hexadecimal, determined by kernel
automatically) that specifies a bit mask value directly;
- all the values for a given mount option are combined, if specified
multiple times. E.g., `mount -t bpf nodev /path/to/mount -o
delegate_maps=0x1 -o delegate_maps=0x2` will result in a combined 0x3
mask.

Ideally, more convenient (for humans) symbolic form derived from
corresponding UAPI enums would be accepted (e.g., `-o
delegate_progs=kprobe|tracepoint`) and I intend to implement this, but
it requires a bunch of UAPI header churn, so I postponed it until this
feature lands upstream or at least there is a definite consensus that
this feature is acceptable and is going to make it, just to minimize
amount of wasted effort and not increase amount of non-essential code to
be reviewed.

Attentive reader will notice that BPF FS is now marked as
FS_USERNS_MOUNT, which theoretically makes it mountable inside non-init
user namespace as long as the process has sufficient *namespaced*
capabilities within that user namespace. But in reality we still
restrict BPF FS to be mountable only by processes with CAP_SYS_ADMIN *in
init userns* (extra check in bpf_fill_super()). FS_USERNS_MOUNT is added
to allow creating BPF FS context object (i.e., fsopen("bpf")) from
inside unprivileged process inside non-init userns, to capture that
userns as the owning userns. It will still be required to pass this
context object back to privileged process to instantiate and mount it.

This manipulation is important, because capturing non-init userns as the
owning userns of BPF FS instance (super block) allows to use that userns
to constraint BPF token to that userns later on (see next patch). So
creating BPF FS with delegation inside unprivileged userns will restrict
derived BPF token objects to only "work" inside that intended userns,
making it scoped to a intended "container". Also, setting these
delegation options requires capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN), so unprivileged
process cannot set this up without involvement of a privileged process.

There is a set of selftests at the end of the patch set that simulates
this sequence of steps and validates that everything works as intended.
But careful review is requested to make sure there are no missed gaps in
the implementation and testing.

This somewhat subtle set of aspects is the result of previous
discussions ([0]) about various user namespace implications and
interactions with BPF token functionality and is necessary to contain
BPF token inside intended user namespace.

[0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230704-hochverdient-lehne-eeb9eeef785e@brauner/

Acked-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>

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bpf: convert to new timestamp accessors

Convert to using the new inode timestamp accessor functions.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231004185347.8

bpf: convert to new timestamp accessors

Convert to using the new inode timestamp accessor functions.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>

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bpf: convert to ctime accessor functions

In later patches, we're going to change how the inode's ctime field is
used. Switch to using accessor functions instead of raw accesses of
inode->i_ctime.

S

bpf: convert to ctime accessor functions

In later patches, we're going to change how the inode's ctime field is
used. Switch to using accessor functions instead of raw accesses of
inode->i_ctime.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>

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bpf: Support O_PATH FDs in BPF_OBJ_PIN and BPF_OBJ_GET commands

Current UAPI of BPF_OBJ_PIN and BPF_OBJ_GET commands of bpf() syscall
forces users to specify pinning location as a string-based absol

bpf: Support O_PATH FDs in BPF_OBJ_PIN and BPF_OBJ_GET commands

Current UAPI of BPF_OBJ_PIN and BPF_OBJ_GET commands of bpf() syscall
forces users to specify pinning location as a string-based absolute or
relative (to current working directory) path. This has various
implications related to security (e.g., symlink-based attacks), forces
BPF FS to be exposed in the file system, which can cause races with
other applications.

One of the feedbacks we got from folks working with containers heavily
was that inability to use purely FD-based location specification was an
unfortunate limitation and hindrance for BPF_OBJ_PIN and BPF_OBJ_GET
commands. This patch closes this oversight, adding path_fd field to
BPF_OBJ_PIN and BPF_OBJ_GET UAPI, following conventions established by
*at() syscalls for dirfd + pathname combinations.

This now allows interesting possibilities like working with detached BPF
FS mount (e.g., to perform multiple pinnings without running a risk of
someone interfering with them), and generally making pinning/getting
more secure and not prone to any races and/or security attacks.

This is demonstrated by a selftest added in subsequent patch that takes
advantage of new mount APIs (fsopen, fsconfig, fsmount) to demonstrate
creating detached BPF FS mount, pinning, and then getting BPF map out of
it, all while never exposing this private instance of BPF FS to outside
worlds.

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]

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bpf: Validate BPF object in BPF_OBJ_PIN before calling LSM

Do a sanity check whether provided file-to-be-pinned is actually a BPF
object (prog, map, btf) before calling security_path_mknod LSM hook.

bpf: Validate BPF object in BPF_OBJ_PIN before calling LSM

Do a sanity check whether provided file-to-be-pinned is actually a BPF
object (prog, map, btf) before calling security_path_mknod LSM hook. If
it's not, LSM hook doesn't have to be triggered, as the operation has no
chance of succeeding anyways.

Suggested-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]

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fs: port inode_init_owner() to mnt_idmap

Convert to struct mnt_idmap.

Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in
256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts").
This is ju

fs: port inode_init_owner() to mnt_idmap

Convert to struct mnt_idmap.

Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in
256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts").
This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap.

Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a
mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to
conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces
that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers
without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for
bugs.

Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the
really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of
two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two
eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems
only operate on struct mnt_idmap.

Acked-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <[email protected]>

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fs: port ->permission() to pass mnt_idmap

Convert to struct mnt_idmap.

Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in
256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts").
This is j

fs: port ->permission() to pass mnt_idmap

Convert to struct mnt_idmap.

Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in
256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts").
This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap.

Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a
mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to
conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces
that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers
without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for
bugs.

Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the
really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of
two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two
eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems
only operate on struct mnt_idmap.

Acked-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <[email protected]>

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fs: port ->mkdir() to pass mnt_idmap

Convert to struct mnt_idmap.

Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in
256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts").
This is just t

fs: port ->mkdir() to pass mnt_idmap

Convert to struct mnt_idmap.

Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in
256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts").
This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap.

Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a
mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to
conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces
that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers
without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for
bugs.

Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the
really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of
two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two
eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems
only operate on struct mnt_idmap.

Acked-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <[email protected]>

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fs: port ->symlink() to pass mnt_idmap

Convert to struct mnt_idmap.

Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in
256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts").
This is just

fs: port ->symlink() to pass mnt_idmap

Convert to struct mnt_idmap.

Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in
256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts").
This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap.

Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a
mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to
conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces
that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers
without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for
bugs.

Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the
really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of
two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two
eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems
only operate on struct mnt_idmap.

Acked-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <[email protected]>

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bpf: Convert bpf_preload.ko to use light skeleton.

The main change is a move of the single line
#include "iterators.lskel.h"
from iterators/iterators.c to bpf_preload_kern.c.
Which means that gene

bpf: Convert bpf_preload.ko to use light skeleton.

The main change is a move of the single line
#include "iterators.lskel.h"
from iterators/iterators.c to bpf_preload_kern.c.
Which means that generated light skeleton can be used from user space or
user mode driver like iterators.c or from the kernel module or the kernel itself.
The direct use of light skeleton from the kernel module simplifies the code,
since UMD is no longer necessary. The libbpf.a required user space and UMD. The
CO-RE in the kernel and generated "loader bpf program" used by the light
skeleton are capable to perform complex loading operations traditionally
provided by libbpf. In addition UMD approach was launching UMD process
every time bpffs has to be mounted. With light skeleton in the kernel
the bpf_preload kernel module loads bpf iterators once and pins them
multiple times into different bpffs mounts.

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]

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