dma: Introduce generic dma_addr_*crypted helpers

AMD SME added __sme_set/__sme_clr primitives to modify the DMA address for
encrypted/decrypted traffic. However this doesn't fit in with other models

dma: Introduce generic dma_addr_*crypted helpers

AMD SME added __sme_set/__sme_clr primitives to modify the DMA address for
encrypted/decrypted traffic. However this doesn't fit in with other models,
e.g., Arm CCA where the meanings are the opposite. i.e., "decrypted" traffic
has a bit set and "encrypted" traffic has the top bit cleared.

In preparation for adding the support for Arm CCA DMA conversions, convert the
existing primitives to more generic ones that can be provided by the backends.
i.e., add helpers to
1. dma_addr_encrypted - Convert a DMA address to "encrypted" [ == __sme_set() ]
2. dma_addr_unencrypted - Convert a DMA address to "decrypted" [ None exists today ]
3. dma_addr_canonical - Clear any "encryption"/"decryption" bits from DMA
address [ SME uses __sme_clr() ] and convert to a canonical DMA address.

Since the original __sme_xxx helpers come from linux/mem_encrypt.h, use that
as the home for the new definitions and provide dummy ones when none is provided
by the architectures.

With the above, phys_to_dma_unencrypted() uses the newly added dma_addr_unencrypted()
helper and to make it a bit more easier to read and avoid double conversion,
provide __phys_to_dma().

Suggested-by: Robin Murphy <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
Cc: Robin Murphy <[email protected]>
Cc: Steven Price <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Cc: Marek Szyprowski <[email protected]>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robin Murphy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Marek Szyprowski <[email protected]>
Fixes: 42be24a4178f ("arm64: Enable memory encrypt for Realms")
Acked-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>

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treewide: Replace the use of mem_encrypt_active() with cc_platform_has()

Replace uses of mem_encrypt_active() with calls to cc_platform_has() with
the CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT attribute.

Remove the impl

treewide: Replace the use of mem_encrypt_active() with cc_platform_has()

Replace uses of mem_encrypt_active() with calls to cc_platform_has() with
the CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT attribute.

Remove the implementation of mem_encrypt_active() across all arches.

For s390, since the default implementation of the cc_platform_has()
matches the s390 implementation of mem_encrypt_active(), cc_platform_has()
does not need to be implemented in s390 (the config option
ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM is not set).

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

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fs/core/vmcore: Move sev_active() reference to x86 arch code

Secure Encrypted Virtualization is an x86-specific feature, so it shouldn't
appear in generic kernel code because it forces non-x86 archi

fs/core/vmcore: Move sev_active() reference to x86 arch code

Secure Encrypted Virtualization is an x86-specific feature, so it shouldn't
appear in generic kernel code because it forces non-x86 architectures to
define the sev_active() function, which doesn't make a lot of sense.

To solve this problem, add an x86 elfcorehdr_read() function to override
the generic weak implementation. To do that, it's necessary to make
read_from_oldmem() public so that it can be used outside of vmcore.c.

Also, remove the export for sev_active() since it's only used in files that
won't be built as modules.

Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lianbo Jiang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

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x86, s390/mm: Move sme_active() and sme_me_mask to x86-specific header

Now that generic code doesn't reference them, move sme_active() and
sme_me_mask to x86's <asm/mem_encrypt.h>.

Also remove the

x86, s390/mm: Move sme_active() and sme_me_mask to x86-specific header

Now that generic code doesn't reference them, move sme_active() and
sme_me_mask to x86's <asm/mem_encrypt.h>.

Also remove the export for sme_active() since it's only used in files that
won't be built as modules. sme_me_mask on the other hand is used in
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c (via __sme_set() and __psp_pa()) which can be built as a
module so its export needs to stay.

Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

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treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 500

Based on 2 normalized pattern(s):

this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of th

treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 500

Based on 2 normalized pattern(s):

this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
published by the free software foundation

this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
published by the free software foundation #

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

GPL-2.0-only

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 4122 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Enrico Weigelt <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

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x86/mm: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support

Provide support for Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV). This initial
support defines a flag that is used by the kernel to determine if it

x86/mm: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support

Provide support for Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV). This initial
support defines a flag that is used by the kernel to determine if it is
running with SEV active.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

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x86/mm: Make the SME mask a u64

The SME encryption mask is for masking 64-bit pagetable entries. It
being an unsigned long works fine on X86_64 but on 32-bit builds in
truncates bits leading to Xen

x86/mm: Make the SME mask a u64

The SME encryption mask is for masking 64-bit pagetable entries. It
being an unsigned long works fine on X86_64 but on 32-bit builds in
truncates bits leading to Xen guests crashing very early.

And regardless, the whole SME mask handling shouldnt've leaked into
32-bit because SME is X86_64-only feature. So, first make the mask u64.
And then, add trivial 32-bit versions of the __sme_* macros so that
nothing happens there.

Reported-and-tested-by: Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas <[email protected]>
Fixes: 21729f81ce8a ("x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>

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x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption

Changes to the existing page table macros will allow the SME support to
be enabled in a simple fashion with minimal changes to files that

x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption

Changes to the existing page table macros will allow the SME support to
be enabled in a simple fashion with minimal changes to files that use these
macros. Since the memory encryption mask will now be part of the regular
pagetable macros, we introduce two new macros (_PAGE_TABLE_NOENC and
_KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC) to allow for early pagetable creation/initialization
without the encryption mask before SME becomes active. Two new pgprot()
macros are defined to allow setting or clearing the page encryption mask.

The FIXMAP_PAGE_NOCACHE define is introduced for use with MMIO. SME does
not support encryption for MMIO areas so this define removes the encryption
mask from the page attribute.

Two new macros are introduced (__sme_pa() / __sme_pa_nodebug()) to allow
creating a physical address with the encryption mask. These are used when
working with the cr3 register so that the PGD can be encrypted. The current
__va() macro is updated so that the virtual address is generated based off
of the physical address without the encryption mask thus allowing the same
virtual address to be generated regardless of whether encryption is enabled
for that physical location or not.

Also, an early initialization function is added for SME. If SME is active,
this function:

- Updates the early_pmd_flags so that early page faults create mappings
with the encryption mask.

- Updates the __supported_pte_mask to include the encryption mask.

- Updates the protection_map entries to include the encryption mask so
that user-space allocations will automatically have the encryption mask
applied.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Young <[email protected]>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
Cc: Larry Woodman <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Matt Fleming <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]>
Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b36e952c4c39767ae7f0a41cf5345adf27438480.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>

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x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing

Add support to the early boot code to use Secure Memory Encryption (SME).
Since the kernel has been loaded into memory in a decrypted state

x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing

Add support to the early boot code to use Secure Memory Encryption (SME).
Since the kernel has been loaded into memory in a decrypted state, encrypt
the kernel in place and update the early pagetables with the memory
encryption mask so that new pagetable entries will use memory encryption.

The routines to set the encryption mask and perform the encryption are
stub routines for now with functionality to be added in a later patch.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Young <[email protected]>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
Cc: Larry Woodman <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Matt Fleming <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]>
Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e52ad781f085224bf835b3caff9aa3aee6febccb.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>

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x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support

Add support for Secure Memory Encryption (SME). This initial support
provides a Kconfig entry to build the SME support into the kernel and
defines

x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support

Add support for Secure Memory Encryption (SME). This initial support
provides a Kconfig entry to build the SME support into the kernel and
defines the memory encryption mask that will be used in subsequent
patches to mark pages as encrypted.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Young <[email protected]>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
Cc: Larry Woodman <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Matt Fleming <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]>
Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a6c34d16caaed3bc3e2d6f0987554275bd291554.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>

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