lsm: Add audit_log_lsm_data() helper

Extract code from dump_common_audit_data() into the audit_log_lsm_data()
helper. This helps reuse common LSM audit data while not abusing
AUDIT_AVC records becau

lsm: Add audit_log_lsm_data() helper

Extract code from dump_common_audit_data() into the audit_log_lsm_data()
helper. This helps reuse common LSM audit data while not abusing
AUDIT_AVC records because of the common_lsm_audit() helper.

Depends-on: 7ccbe076d987 ("lsm: Only build lsm_audit.c if CONFIG_SECURITY and CONFIG_AUDIT are set")
Cc: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Cc: James Morris <[email protected]>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>

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lsm: remove old email address for Stephen Smalley

Remove my old, no longer functioning, email address from comments.
Could alternatively replace with my current email but seems
redundant with MAINTA

lsm: remove old email address for Stephen Smalley

Remove my old, no longer functioning, email address from comments.
Could alternatively replace with my current email but seems
redundant with MAINTAINERS and prone to being out of date.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>

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lsm: Only build lsm_audit.c if CONFIG_SECURITY and CONFIG_AUDIT are set

When CONFIG_AUDIT is set, its CONFIG_NET dependency is also set, and the
dev_get_by_index and init_net symbols (used by dump_c

lsm: Only build lsm_audit.c if CONFIG_SECURITY and CONFIG_AUDIT are set

When CONFIG_AUDIT is set, its CONFIG_NET dependency is also set, and the
dev_get_by_index and init_net symbols (used by dump_common_audit_data)
are found by the linker. dump_common_audit_data() should then failed to
build when CONFIG_NET is not set. However, because the compiler is
smart, it knows that audit_log_start() always return NULL when
!CONFIG_AUDIT, and it doesn't build the body of common_lsm_audit(). As
a side effect, dump_common_audit_data() is not built and the linker
doesn't error out because of missing symbols.

Let's only build lsm_audit.o when CONFIG_SECURITY and CONFIG_AUDIT are
both set, which is checked with the new CONFIG_HAS_SECURITY_AUDIT.

ipv4_skb_to_auditdata() and ipv6_skb_to_auditdata() are only used by
Smack if CONFIG_AUDIT is set, so they don't need fake implementations.

Because common_lsm_audit() is used in multiple places without
CONFIG_AUDIT checks, add a fake implementation.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Cc: James Morris <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>

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selinux: add netlink nlmsg_type audit message

Add a new audit message type to capture nlmsg-related information. This
is similar to LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP which was added for the other
SELinux exte

selinux: add netlink nlmsg_type audit message

Add a new audit message type to capture nlmsg-related information. This
is similar to LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP which was added for the other
SELinux extended permission (ioctl).

Adding a new type is preferred to adding to the existing
lsm_network_audit structure which contains irrelevant information for
the netlink sockets (i.e., dport, sport).

Signed-off-by: Thiébaud Weksteen <[email protected]>
[PM: change "nlnk-msgtype" to "nl-msgtype" as discussed]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>

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selinux: log anon inode class name

Log the anonymous inode class name in the security hook
inode_init_security_anon. This name is the key for name based type
transitions on the anon_inode security

selinux: log anon inode class name

Log the anonymous inode class name in the security hook
inode_init_security_anon. This name is the key for name based type
transitions on the anon_inode security class on creation. Example:

type=AVC msg=audit(02/16/22 22:02:50.585:216) : avc: granted \
{ create } for pid=2136 comm=mariadbd anonclass=[io_uring] \
scontext=system_u:system_r:mysqld_t:s0 \
tcontext=system_u:system_r:mysqld_iouring_t:s0 tclass=anon_inode

Add a new LSM audit data type holding the inode and the class name.

Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <[email protected]>
[PM: adjusted 'anonclass' to be a trusted string, cgzones approved]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>

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lsm_audit,selinux: pass IB device name by reference

While trying to address a Coverity warning that the dev_name string
might end up unterminated when strcpy'ing it in
selinux_ib_endport_manage_subn

lsm_audit,selinux: pass IB device name by reference

While trying to address a Coverity warning that the dev_name string
might end up unterminated when strcpy'ing it in
selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(), I realized that it is possible (and
simpler) to just pass the dev_name pointer directly, rather than copying
the string to a buffer.

The ibendport variable goes out of scope at the end of the function
anyway, so the lifetime of the dev_name pointer will never be shorter
than that of ibendport, thus we can safely just pass the dev_name
pointer and be done with it.

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>

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security: add const qualifier to struct sock in various places

A followup change to tcp_request_sock_op would have to drop the 'const'
qualifier from the 'route_req' function as the
'security_inet_c

security: add const qualifier to struct sock in various places

A followup change to tcp_request_sock_op would have to drop the 'const'
qualifier from the 'route_req' function as the
'security_inet_conn_request' call is moved there - and that function
expects a 'struct sock *'.

However, it turns out its also possible to add a const qualifier to
security_inet_conn_request instead.

Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Acked-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

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smack: Implement the watch_key and post_notification hooks

Implement the watch_key security hook in Smack to make sure that a key
grants the caller Read permission in order to set a watch on a key.

smack: Implement the watch_key and post_notification hooks

Implement the watch_key security hook in Smack to make sure that a key
grants the caller Read permission in order to set a watch on a key.

Also implement the post_notification security hook to make sure that the
notification source is granted Write permission by the watch queue.

For the moment, the watch_devices security hook is left unimplemented as
it's not obvious what the object should be since the queue is global and
didn't previously exist.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>

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security,lockdown,selinux: implement SELinux lockdown

Implement a SELinux hook for lockdown. If the lockdown module is also
enabled, then a denial by the lockdown module will take precedence over
S

security,lockdown,selinux: implement SELinux lockdown

Implement a SELinux hook for lockdown. If the lockdown module is also
enabled, then a denial by the lockdown module will take precedence over
SELinux, so SELinux can only further restrict lockdown decisions.
The SELinux hook only distinguishes at the granularity of integrity
versus confidentiality similar to the lockdown module, but includes the
full lockdown reason as part of the audit record as a hint in diagnosing
what triggered the denial. To support this auditing, move the
lockdown_reasons[] string array from being private to the lockdown
module to the security framework so that it can be used by the lsm audit
code and so that it is always available even when the lockdown module
is disabled.

Note that the SELinux implementation allows the integrity and
confidentiality reasons to be controlled independently from one another.
Thus, in an SELinux policy, one could allow operations that specify
an integrity reason while blocking operations that specify a
confidentiality reason. The SELinux hook implementation is
stricter than the lockdown module in validating the provided reason value.

Sample AVC audit output from denials:
avc: denied { integrity } for pid=3402 comm="fwupd"
lockdown_reason="/dev/mem,kmem,port" scontext=system_u:system_r:fwupd_t:s0
tcontext=system_u:system_r:fwupd_t:s0 tclass=lockdown permissive=0

avc: denied { confidentiality } for pid=4628 comm="cp"
lockdown_reason="/proc/kcore access"
scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:test_lockdown_integrity_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:test_lockdown_integrity_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
tclass=lockdown permissive=0

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
[PM: some merge fuzz do the the perf hooks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license

Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine

License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license

Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.

By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.

Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.

This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.

How this work was done:

Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,

Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.

The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.

The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).

All documentation files were explicitly excluded.

The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.

- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.

For non */uapi/* files that summary was:

SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139

and resulted in the first patch in this series.

If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:

SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930

and resulted in the second patch in this series.

- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:

SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1

and that resulted in the third patch in this series.

- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).

- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.

- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).

- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.

In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.

Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.

In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.

Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct

This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.

These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.

Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

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lsm_audit: update my email address

Update my email address since epoch.ncsc.mil no longer exists.
MAINTAINERS and CREDITS are already correct.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
Sig

lsm_audit: update my email address

Update my email address since epoch.ncsc.mil no longer exists.
MAINTAINERS and CREDITS are already correct.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>

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selinux: Add IB Port SMP access vector

Add a type for Infiniband ports and an access vector for subnet
management packets. Implement the ib_port_smp hook to check that the
caller has permission to s

selinux: Add IB Port SMP access vector

Add a type for Infiniband ports and an access vector for subnet
management packets. Implement the ib_port_smp hook to check that the
caller has permission to send and receive SMPs on the end port specified
by the device name and port. Add interface to query the SID for a IB
port, which walks the IB_PORT ocontexts to find an entry for the
given name and port.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>

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selinux: Implement Infiniband PKey "Access" access vector

Add a type and access vector for PKeys. Implement the ib_pkey_access
hook to check that the caller has permission to access the PKey on the

selinux: Implement Infiniband PKey "Access" access vector

Add a type and access vector for PKeys. Implement the ib_pkey_access
hook to check that the caller has permission to access the PKey on the
given subnet prefix. Add an interface to get the PKey SID. Walk the PKey
ocontexts to find an entry for the given subnet prefix and pkey.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>

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lsm,audit,selinux: Introduce a new audit data type LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE

Right now LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH type contains "struct path" in union "u"
of common_audit_data. This information is used to print

lsm,audit,selinux: Introduce a new audit data type LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE

Right now LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH type contains "struct path" in union "u"
of common_audit_data. This information is used to print path of file
at the same time it is also used to get to dentry and inode. And this
inode information is used to get to superblock and device and print
device information.

This does not work well for layered filesystems like overlay where dentry
contained in path is overlay dentry and not the real dentry of underlying
file system. That means inode retrieved from dentry is also overlay
inode and not the real inode.

SELinux helpers like file_path_has_perm() are doing checks on inode
retrieved from file_inode(). This returns the real inode and not the
overlay inode. That means we are doing check on real inode but for audit
purposes we are printing details of overlay inode and that can be
confusing while debugging.

Hence, introduce a new type LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE which carries file
information and inode retrieved is real inode using file_inode(). That
way right avc denied information is given to user.

For example, following is one example avc before the patch.

type=AVC msg=audit(1473360868.399:214): avc: denied { read open } for
pid=1765 comm="cat"
path="/root/.../overlay/container1/merged/readfile"
dev="overlay" ino=21443
scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:test_overlay_client_t:s0:c10,c20
tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:test_overlay_files_ro_t:s0
tclass=file permissive=0

It looks as follows after the patch.

type=AVC msg=audit(1473360017.388:282): avc: denied { read open } for
pid=2530 comm="cat"
path="/root/.../overlay/container1/merged/readfile"
dev="dm-0" ino=2377915
scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:test_overlay_client_t:s0:c10,c20
tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:test_overlay_files_ro_t:s0
tclass=file permissive=0

Notice that now dev information points to "dm-0" device instead of
"overlay" device. This makes it clear that check failed on underlying
inode and not on the overlay inode.

Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <[email protected]>
[PM: slight tweaks to the description to make checkpatch.pl happy]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>

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security: add ioctl specific auditing to lsm_audit

Add information about ioctl calls to the LSM audit data. Log the
file path and command number.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <[email protected]>

security: add ioctl specific auditing to lsm_audit

Add information about ioctl calls to the LSM audit data. Log the
file path and command number.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <[email protected]>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>

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LSM: do not initialize common_audit_data to 0

It isn't needed. If you don't set the type of the data associated with
that type it is a pretty obvious programming bug. So why waste the cycles?

Sig

LSM: do not initialize common_audit_data to 0

It isn't needed. If you don't set the type of the data associated with
that type it is a pretty obvious programming bug. So why waste the cycles?

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <[email protected]>

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LSM: remove the task field from common_audit_data

There are no legitimate users. Always use current and get back some stack
space for the common_audit_data.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redha

LSM: remove the task field from common_audit_data

There are no legitimate users. Always use current and get back some stack
space for the common_audit_data.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <[email protected]>

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LSM: remove the COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT type expansion

Just open code it so grep on the source code works better.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <[email protected]>

lsm_audit: don't specify the audit pre/post callbacks in 'struct common_audit_data'

It just bloats the audit data structure for no good reason, since the
only time those fields are filled are just b

lsm_audit: don't specify the audit pre/post callbacks in 'struct common_audit_data'

It just bloats the audit data structure for no good reason, since the
only time those fields are filled are just before calling the
common_lsm_audit() function, which is also the only user of those
fields.

So just make them be the arguments to common_lsm_audit(), rather than
bloating that structure that is passed around everywhere, and is
initialized in hot paths.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

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LSM: shrink the common_audit_data data union

After shrinking the common_audit_data stack usage for private LSM data I'm
not going to shrink the data union. To do this I'm going to move anything
lar

LSM: shrink the common_audit_data data union

After shrinking the common_audit_data stack usage for private LSM data I'm
not going to shrink the data union. To do this I'm going to move anything
larger than 2 void * ptrs to it's own structure and require it to be declared
separately on the calling stack. Thus hot paths which don't need more than
a couple pointer don't have to declare space to hold large unneeded
structures. I could get this down to one void * by dealing with the key
struct and the struct path. We'll see if that is helpful after taking care of
networking.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

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LSM: shrink sizeof LSM specific portion of common_audit_data

Linus found that the gigantic size of the common audit data caused a big
perf hit on something as simple as running stat() in a loop. Th

LSM: shrink sizeof LSM specific portion of common_audit_data

Linus found that the gigantic size of the common audit data caused a big
perf hit on something as simple as running stat() in a loop. This patch
requires LSMs to declare the LSM specific portion separately rather than
doing it in a union. Thus each LSM can be responsible for shrinking their
portion and don't have to pay a penalty just because other LSMs have a
bigger space requirement.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

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Remove all #inclusions of asm/system.h

Remove all #inclusions of asm/system.h preparatory to splitting and killing
it. Performed with the following command:

perl -p -i -e 's!^#\s*include\s*<asm/sy

Remove all #inclusions of asm/system.h

Remove all #inclusions of asm/system.h preparatory to splitting and killing
it. Performed with the following command:

perl -p -i -e 's!^#\s*include\s*<asm/system[.]h>.*\n!!' `grep -Irl '^#\s*include\s*<asm/system[.]h>' *`

Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>

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LSM: separate LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY from LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH

This patch separates and audit message that only contains a dentry from
one that contains a full path. This allows us to make it harder

LSM: separate LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY from LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH

This patch separates and audit message that only contains a dentry from
one that contains a full path. This allows us to make it harder to
misuse the interfaces or for the interfaces to be implemented wrong.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>

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LSM: split LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS into _PATH and _INODE

The lsm common audit code has wacky contortions making sure which pieces
of information are set based on if it was given a path, dentry, or
inode.

LSM: split LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS into _PATH and _INODE

The lsm common audit code has wacky contortions making sure which pieces
of information are set based on if it was given a path, dentry, or
inode. Split this into path and inode to get rid of some of the code
complexity.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>

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AppArmor: basic auditing infrastructure.

Update lsm_audit for AppArmor specific data, and add the core routines for
AppArmor uses for auditing.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical

AppArmor: basic auditing infrastructure.

Update lsm_audit for AppArmor specific data, and add the core routines for
AppArmor uses for auditing.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>

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