x86/irq: Move irq stacks to percpu hot section

No functional change.

Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmai

x86/irq: Move irq stacks to percpu hot section

No functional change.

Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Uros Bizjak <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

show more ...

x86/percpu: Move irq_stack variables next to current_task

Further extend struct pcpu_hot with the hard and soft irq stack
pointers.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by

x86/percpu: Move irq_stack variables next to current_task

Further extend struct pcpu_hot with the hard and soft irq stack
pointers.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

show more ...

x86/32: Remove CONFIG_DOUBLEFAULT

Make the doublefault exception handler unconditional on 32-bit. Yes,
it is important to be able to catch #DF exceptions instead of silent
reboots. Yes, the code siz

x86/32: Remove CONFIG_DOUBLEFAULT

Make the doublefault exception handler unconditional on 32-bit. Yes,
it is important to be able to catch #DF exceptions instead of silent
reboots. Yes, the code size increase is worth every byte. And one less
CONFIG symbol is just the cherry on top.

No functional changes.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

show more ...

x86/doublefault/32: Move #DF stack and TSS to cpu_entry_area

There are three problems with the current layout of the doublefault
stack and TSS. First, the TSS is only cacheline-aligned, which is
no

x86/doublefault/32: Move #DF stack and TSS to cpu_entry_area

There are three problems with the current layout of the doublefault
stack and TSS. First, the TSS is only cacheline-aligned, which is
not enough -- if the hardware portion of the TSS (struct x86_hw_tss)
crosses a page boundary, horrible things happen [0]. Second, the
stack and TSS are global, so simultaneous double faults on different
CPUs will cause massive corruption. Third, the whole mechanism
won't work if user CR3 is loaded, resulting in a triple fault [1].

Let the doublefault stack and TSS share a page (which prevents the
TSS from spanning a page boundary), make it percpu, and move it into
cpu_entry_area. Teach the stack dump code about the doublefault
stack.

[0] Real hardware will read past the end of the page onto the next
*physical* page if a task switch happens. Virtual machines may
have any number of bugs, and I would consider it reasonable for
a VM to summarily kill the guest if it tries to task-switch to
a page-spanning TSS.

[1] Real hardware triple faults. At least some VMs seem to hang.
I'm not sure what's going on.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>

show more ...

x86/irq/32: Rename hard/softirq_stack to hard/softirq_stack_ptr

The percpu storage holds a pointer to the stack not the stack
itself. Rename it before sharing struct irq_stack with 64-bit.

No funct

x86/irq/32: Rename hard/softirq_stack to hard/softirq_stack_ptr

The percpu storage holds a pointer to the stack not the stack
itself. Rename it before sharing struct irq_stack with 64-bit.

No functional changes.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Cc: Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <[email protected]>
Cc: Nicolai Stange <[email protected]>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Cc: x86-ml <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

show more ...

x86/dumpstack: Fix off-by-one errors in stack identification

The get_stack_info() function is off-by-one when checking whether an
address is on a IRQ stack or a IST stack. This prevents an overflowe

x86/dumpstack: Fix off-by-one errors in stack identification

The get_stack_info() function is off-by-one when checking whether an
address is on a IRQ stack or a IST stack. This prevents an overflowed
IRQ or IST stack from being dumped properly.

[ tglx: Do the same for 32-bit ]

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Cc: x86-ml <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

show more ...

x86/dumpstack: Unify show_regs()

The 32-bit version uses KERN_EMERG and commit

b0f4c4b32c8e ("bugs, x86: Fix printk levels for panic, softlockups and stack dumps")

changed the 64-bit version to

x86/dumpstack: Unify show_regs()

The 32-bit version uses KERN_EMERG and commit

b0f4c4b32c8e ("bugs, x86: Fix printk levels for panic, softlockups and stack dumps")

changed the 64-bit version to KERN_DEFAULT. The same justification in
that commit that those messages do not belong in the terminal, holds
true for 32-bit also, so make it so.

Make code_bytes static, while at it.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

show more ...

x86/entry: Rename SYSENTER_stack to CPU_ENTRY_AREA_entry_stack

If the kernel oopses while on the trampoline stack, it will print
"<SYSENTER>" even if SYSENTER is not involved. That is rather confus

x86/entry: Rename SYSENTER_stack to CPU_ENTRY_AREA_entry_stack

If the kernel oopses while on the trampoline stack, it will print
"<SYSENTER>" even if SYSENTER is not involved. That is rather confusing.

The "SYSENTER" stack is used for a lot more than SYSENTER now. Give it a
better string to display in stack dumps, and rename the kernel code to
match.

Also move the 32-bit code over to the new naming even though it still uses
the entry stack only for SYSENTER.

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Brian Gerst <[email protected]>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <[email protected]>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Cc: Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>

show more ...

x86/dumpstack: Add get_stack_info() support for the SYSENTER stack

get_stack_info() doesn't currently know about the SYSENTER stack, so
unwinding will fail if we entered the kernel on the SYSENTER s

x86/dumpstack: Add get_stack_info() support for the SYSENTER stack

get_stack_info() doesn't currently know about the SYSENTER stack, so
unwinding will fail if we entered the kernel on the SYSENTER stack
and haven't fully switched off. Teach get_stack_info() about the
SYSENTER stack.

With future patches applied that run part of the entry code on the
SYSENTER stack and introduce an intentional BUG(), I would get:

PANIC: double fault, error_code: 0x0
...
RIP: 0010:do_error_trap+0x33/0x1c0
...
Call Trace:
Code: ...

With this patch, I get:

PANIC: double fault, error_code: 0x0
...
Call Trace:
<SYSENTER>
? async_page_fault+0x36/0x60
? invalid_op+0x22/0x40
? async_page_fault+0x36/0x60
? sync_regs+0x3c/0x40
? sync_regs+0x2e/0x40
? error_entry+0x6c/0xd0
? async_page_fault+0x36/0x60
</SYSENTER>
Code: ...

which is a lot more informative.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Brian Gerst <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc: David Laight <[email protected]>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <[email protected]>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <[email protected]>
Cc: Greg KH <[email protected]>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Cc: Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>

show more ...

License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license

Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine

License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license

Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.

By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.

Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.

This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.

How this work was done:

Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,

Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.

The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.

The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).

All documentation files were explicitly excluded.

The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.

- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.

For non */uapi/* files that summary was:

SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139

and resulted in the first patch in this series.

If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:

SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930

and resulted in the second patch in this series.

- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:

SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1

and that resulted in the third patch in this series.

- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).

- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.

- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).

- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.

In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.

Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.

In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.

Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct

This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.

These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.

Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

show more ...

x86/dumpstack: Fix interrupt and exception stack boundary checks

On x86_64, the double fault exception stack is located immediately after
the interrupt stack in memory. This causes confusion in the

x86/dumpstack: Fix interrupt and exception stack boundary checks

On x86_64, the double fault exception stack is located immediately after
the interrupt stack in memory. This causes confusion in the unwinder
when it tries to unwind through an empty interrupt stack, where the
stack pointer points to the address bordering the two stacks. The
unwinder incorrectly thinks it's running on the double fault stack.

Fix this kind of stack border confusion by never considering the
beginning address of an exception or interrupt stack to be part of the
stack.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Brian Gerst <[email protected]>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <[email protected]>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 5fe599e02e41 ("x86/dumpstack: Add support for unwinding empty IRQ stacks")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/bcc142160a5104de5c354c21c394c93a0173943f.1499786555.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>

show more ...

x86/debug: Implement __WARN() using UD0

By using "UD0" for WARN()s we remove the function call and its possible
__FILE__ and __LINE__ immediate arguments from the instruction stream.

Total image si

x86/debug: Implement __WARN() using UD0

By using "UD0" for WARN()s we remove the function call and its possible
__FILE__ and __LINE__ immediate arguments from the instruction stream.

Total image size will not change much, what we win in the instruction
stream we'll lose because of the __bug_table entries. Still, saves on
I$ footprint and the total image size does go down a bit.

text data filename
10702123 4530992 defconfig-build/vmlinux.orig
10682460 4530992 defconfig-build/vmlinux.patched

(UML didn't seem to use GENERIC_BUG at all, so remove it)

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>

show more ...

sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to <linux/sched/debug.h>

We are going to split <linux/sched/debug.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up fro

sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to <linux/sched/debug.h>

We are going to split <linux/sched/debug.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.

Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/debug.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.

Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>

show more ...

x86/dumpstack: Make stack name tags more comprehensible

NMI stack dumps are bracketed by the following tags:

<NMI>
...
<EOE>

The ending tag is kind of confusing if you don't already know wha

x86/dumpstack: Make stack name tags more comprehensible

NMI stack dumps are bracketed by the following tags:

<NMI>
...
<EOE>

The ending tag is kind of confusing if you don't already know what "EOE"
means (end of exception). The same ending tag is also used to mark the
end of all other exceptions' stacks. For example:

<#DF>
...
<EOE>

And similarly, "EOI" is used as the ending tag for interrupts:

<IRQ>
...
<EOI>

Change the tags to be more comprehensible by making them symmetrical and
more XML-esque:

<NMI>
...
</NMI>

<#DF>
...
</#DF>

<IRQ>
...
</IRQ>

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Brian Gerst <[email protected]>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <[email protected]>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/180196e3754572540b595bc56b947d43658979a7.1479491159.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>

show more ...

x86/dumpstack: Warn on stack recursion

Print a warning if stack recursion is detected.

Use printk_deferred_once() because the unwinder can be called with the
console lock by lockdep via save_stack_

x86/dumpstack: Warn on stack recursion

Print a warning if stack recursion is detected.

Use printk_deferred_once() because the unwinder can be called with the
console lock by lockdep via save_stack_trace().

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Brian Gerst <[email protected]>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <[email protected]>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/def18247aafaab480844484398e793f552b79bda.1477496147.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
[ Unbroke the lines. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>

show more ...

x86/dumpstack: Remove raw stack dump

For mostly historical reasons, the x86 oops dump shows the raw stack
values:

...
[registers]
Stack:
ffff880079af7350 ffff880079905400 0000000000000000

x86/dumpstack: Remove raw stack dump

For mostly historical reasons, the x86 oops dump shows the raw stack
values:

...
[registers]
Stack:
ffff880079af7350 ffff880079905400 0000000000000000 ffffc900008f3ae0
ffffffffa0196610 0000000000000001 00010000ffffffff 0000000087654321
0000000000000002 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
...

This seems to be an artifact from long ago, and probably isn't needed
anymore. It generally just adds noise to the dump, and it can be
actively harmful because it leaks kernel addresses.

Linus says:

"The stack dump actually goes back to forever, and it used to be
useful back in 1992 or so. But it used to be useful mainly because
stacks were simpler and we didn't have very good call traces anyway. I
definitely remember having used them - I just do not remember having
used them in the last ten+ years.

Of course, it's still true that if you can trigger an oops, you've
likely already lost the security game, but since the stack dump is so
useless, let's aim to just remove it and make games like the above
harder."

This also removes the related 'kstack=' cmdline option and the
'kstack_depth_to_print' sysctl.

Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Brian Gerst <[email protected]>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <[email protected]>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e83bd50df52d8fe88e94d2566426ae40d813bf8f.1477405374.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>

show more ...

x86/dumpstack: Remove dump_trace() and related callbacks

All previous users of dump_trace() have been converted to use the new
unwind interfaces, so we can remove it and the related
print_context_st

x86/dumpstack: Remove dump_trace() and related callbacks

All previous users of dump_trace() have been converted to use the new
unwind interfaces, so we can remove it and the related
print_context_stack() and print_context_stack_bp() callback functions.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Brian Gerst <[email protected]>
Cc: Byungchul Park <[email protected]>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Nilay Vaish <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5b97da3572b40b5a4d8e185cf2429308d0987a13.1474045023.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>

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x86/dumpstack: Convert show_trace_log_lvl() to use the new unwinder

Convert show_trace_log_lvl() to use the new unwinder. dump_trace() has
been deprecated.

show_trace_log_lvl() is special compared

x86/dumpstack: Convert show_trace_log_lvl() to use the new unwinder

Convert show_trace_log_lvl() to use the new unwinder. dump_trace() has
been deprecated.

show_trace_log_lvl() is special compared to other users of the unwinder.
It's the only place where both reliable *and* unreliable addresses are
needed. With frame pointers enabled, most callers of the unwinder don't
want to know about unreliable addresses. But in this case, when we're
dumping the stack to the console because something presumably went
wrong, the unreliable addresses are useful:

- They show stale data on the stack which can provide useful clues.

- If something goes wrong with the unwinder, or if frame pointers are
corrupt or missing, all the stack addresses still get shown.

So in order to show all addresses on the stack, and at the same time
figure out which addresses are reliable, we have to do the scanning and
the unwinding in parallel.

The scanning is done with the help of get_stack_info() to traverse the
stacks. The unwinding is done separately by the new unwinder.

In theory we could simplify show_trace_log_lvl() by instead pushing some
of this logic into the unwind code. But then we would need some kind of
"fake" frame logic in the unwinder which would add a lot of complexity
and wouldn't be worth it in order to support only one user.

Another benefit of this approach is that once we have a DWARF unwinder,
we should be able to just plug it in with minimal impact to this code.

Another change here is that callers of show_trace_log_lvl() don't need
to provide the 'bp' argument. The unwinder already finds the relevant
frame pointer by unwinding until it reaches the first frame after the
provided stack pointer.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Brian Gerst <[email protected]>
Cc: Byungchul Park <[email protected]>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Nilay Vaish <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/703b5998604c712a1f801874b43f35d6dac52ede.1474045023.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>

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x86/dumpstack: Remove NULL task pointer convention

show_stack_log_lvl() and friends allow a NULL pointer for the
task_struct to indicate the current task. This creates confusion and
can cause sneak

x86/dumpstack: Remove NULL task pointer convention

show_stack_log_lvl() and friends allow a NULL pointer for the
task_struct to indicate the current task. This creates confusion and
can cause sneaky bugs.

Instead require the caller to pass 'current' directly.

This only changes the internal workings of the dumpstack code. The
dump_trace() and show_stack() interfaces still allow a NULL task
pointer. Those interfaces should also probably be fixed as well.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>

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x86/dumpstack: Pin the target stack when dumping it

Specifically, pin the stack in save_stack_trace_tsk() and
show_trace_log_lvl().

This will prevent a crash if the target task dies before or while

x86/dumpstack: Pin the target stack when dumping it

Specifically, pin the stack in save_stack_trace_tsk() and
show_trace_log_lvl().

This will prevent a crash if the target task dies before or while
dumping its stack once we start freeing task stacks early.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Brian Gerst <[email protected]>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <[email protected]>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Cc: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/cf0082cde65d1941a996d026f2b2cdbfaca17bfa.1474003868.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>

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x86/dumpstack: Add recursion checking for all stacks

in_exception_stack() has some recursion checking which makes sure the
stack trace code never traverses a given exception stack more than once.
Th

x86/dumpstack: Add recursion checking for all stacks

in_exception_stack() has some recursion checking which makes sure the
stack trace code never traverses a given exception stack more than once.
This prevents an infinite loop if corruption somehow causes a stack's
"next stack" pointer to point to itself (directly or indirectly).

The recursion checking can be useful for other stacks in addition to the
exception stack, so extend it to work for all stacks.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Brian Gerst <[email protected]>
Cc: Byungchul Park <[email protected]>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Nilay Vaish <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/95de5db4cfe111754845a5cef04e20630d01423f.1473905218.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>

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x86/dumpstack: Add support for unwinding empty IRQ stacks

When an interrupt happens in entry code while running on a software IRQ
stack, and the IRQ stack was empty, regs->sp will contain the stack

x86/dumpstack: Add support for unwinding empty IRQ stacks

When an interrupt happens in entry code while running on a software IRQ
stack, and the IRQ stack was empty, regs->sp will contain the stack end
address (e.g., irq_stack_ptr). If the regs are passed to dump_trace(),
get_stack_info() will report STACK_TYPE_UNKNOWN, causing dump_trace() to
return prematurely without trying to go to the next stack.

Update the bounds checking for software interrupt stacks so that the
ending address is now considered part of the stack.

This means that it's now possible for the 'walk_stack' callbacks --
print_context_stack() and print_context_stack_bp() -- to be called with
an empty stack. But that's fine; they're already prepared to deal with
that due to their on_stack() checks.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Brian Gerst <[email protected]>
Cc: Byungchul Park <[email protected]>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Nilay Vaish <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5a5e5de92dcf11e8dc6b6e8e50ad7639d067830b.1473905218.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>

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x86/dumpstack: Add get_stack_info() interface

valid_stack_ptr() is buggy: it assumes that all stacks are of size
THREAD_SIZE, which is not true for exception stacks. So the
walk_stack() callbacks w

x86/dumpstack: Add get_stack_info() interface

valid_stack_ptr() is buggy: it assumes that all stacks are of size
THREAD_SIZE, which is not true for exception stacks. So the
walk_stack() callbacks will need to know the location of the beginning
of the stack as well as the end.

Another issue is that in general the various features of a stack (type,
size, next stack pointer, description string) are scattered around in
various places throughout the stack dump code.

Encapsulate all that information in a single place with a new stack_info
struct and a get_stack_info() interface.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Brian Gerst <[email protected]>
Cc: Byungchul Park <[email protected]>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Nilay Vaish <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/8164dd0db96b7e6a279fa17ae5e6dc375eecb4a9.1473905218.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>

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x86/dumpstack: Allow preemption in show_stack_log_lvl() and dump_trace()

show_stack_log_lvl() and dump_trace() are already preemption safe:

- If they're running in irq or exception context, preempt

x86/dumpstack: Allow preemption in show_stack_log_lvl() and dump_trace()

show_stack_log_lvl() and dump_trace() are already preemption safe:

- If they're running in irq or exception context, preemption is already
disabled and the percpu stack pointers can be trusted.

- If they're running with preemption enabled, they must be running on
the task stack anyway, so it doesn't matter if they're comparing the
stack pointer against a percpu stack pointer from this CPU or another
one: either way it won't match.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Brian Gerst <[email protected]>
Cc: Byungchul Park <[email protected]>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Nilay Vaish <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a0ca0b1044eca97d4f0ec7c1619cf80b3b65560d.1473371307.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>

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x86/dumpstack: Remove unnecessary stack pointer arguments

When calling show_stack_log_lvl() or dump_trace() with a regs argument,
providing a stack pointer or frame pointer is redundant.

Signed-off

x86/dumpstack: Remove unnecessary stack pointer arguments

When calling show_stack_log_lvl() or dump_trace() with a regs argument,
providing a stack pointer or frame pointer is redundant.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>d
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Brian Gerst <[email protected]>
Cc: Byungchul Park <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Nilay Vaish <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1694e2e955e3b9a73a3c3d5ba2634344014dd550.1472057064.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>

show more ...