x86/msr: Prepare for including <linux/percpu.h> into <asm/msr.h>

To clean up the per CPU insanity of UP which causes sparse to be rightfully
unhappy and prevents the usage of the generic per CPU acc

x86/msr: Prepare for including <linux/percpu.h> into <asm/msr.h>

To clean up the per CPU insanity of UP which causes sparse to be rightfully
unhappy and prevents the usage of the generic per CPU accessors on cpu_info
it is necessary to include <linux/percpu.h> into <asm/msr.h>.

Including <linux/percpu.h> into <asm/msr.h> is impossible because it ends
up in header dependency hell. The problem is that <asm/processor.h>
includes <asm/msr.h>. The inclusion of <linux/percpu.h> results in a
compile fail where the compiler cannot longer handle an include in
<asm/cpufeature.h> which references boot_cpu_data which is
defined in <asm/processor.h>.

The only reason why <asm/msr.h> is included in <asm/processor.h> are the
set/get_debugctlmsr() inlines. They are defined there because <asm/processor.h>
is such a nice dump ground for everything. In fact they belong obviously
into <asm/debugreg.h>.

Move them to <asm/debugreg.h> and fix up the resulting damage which is just
exposing the reliance on random include chains.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

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x86/rdrand: Remove "nordrand" flag in favor of "random.trust_cpu"

The decision of whether or not to trust RDRAND is controlled by the
"random.trust_cpu" boot time parameter or the CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUS

x86/rdrand: Remove "nordrand" flag in favor of "random.trust_cpu"

The decision of whether or not to trust RDRAND is controlled by the
"random.trust_cpu" boot time parameter or the CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU
compile time default. The "nordrand" flag was added during the early
days of RDRAND, when there were worries that merely using its values
could compromise the RNG. However, these days, RDRAND values are not
used directly but always go through the RNG's hash function, making
"nordrand" no longer useful.

Rather, the correct switch is "random.trust_cpu", which not only handles
the relevant trust issue directly, but also is general to multiple CPU
types, not just x86.

However, x86 RDRAND does have a history of being occasionally
problematic. Prior, when the kernel would notice something strange, it'd
warn in dmesg and suggest enabling "nordrand". We can improve on that by
making the test a little bit better and then taking the step of
automatically disabling RDRAND if we detect it's problematic.

Also disable RDSEED if the RDRAND test fails.

Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>

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random: remove CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM

When RDRAND was introduced, there was much discussion on whether it
should be trusted and how the kernel should handle that. Initially, two
mechanisms cropped up, C

random: remove CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM

When RDRAND was introduced, there was much discussion on whether it
should be trusted and how the kernel should handle that. Initially, two
mechanisms cropped up, CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM, a compile time switch, and
"nordrand", a boot-time switch.

Later the thinking evolved. With a properly designed RNG, using RDRAND
values alone won't harm anything, even if the outputs are malicious.
Rather, the issue is whether those values are being *trusted* to be good
or not. And so a new set of options were introduced as the real
ones that people use -- CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU and "random.trust_cpu".
With these options, RDRAND is used, but it's not always credited. So in
the worst case, it does nothing, and in the best case, maybe it helps.

Along the way, CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM's meaning got sort of pulled into the
center and became something certain platforms force-select.

The old options don't really help with much, and it's a bit odd to have
special handling for these instructions when the kernel can deal fine
with the existence or untrusted existence or broken existence or
non-existence of that CPU capability.

Simplify the situation by removing CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM and using the
ordinary asm-generic fallback pattern instead, keeping the two options
that are actually used. For now it leaves "nordrand" for now, as the
removal of that will take a different route.

Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>

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x86/rdrand: Sanity-check RDRAND output

It turned out recently that on certain AMD F15h and F16h machines, due
to the BIOS dropping the ball after resume, yet again, RDRAND would not
function anymore

x86/rdrand: Sanity-check RDRAND output

It turned out recently that on certain AMD F15h and F16h machines, due
to the BIOS dropping the ball after resume, yet again, RDRAND would not
function anymore:

c49a0a80137c ("x86/CPU/AMD: Clear RDRAND CPUID bit on AMD family 15h/16h")

Add a silly test to the CPU bringup path, to sanity-check the random
data RDRAND returns and scream as loudly as possible if that returned
random data doesn't change.

Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Pu Wen <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
Cc: x86-ml <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAHk-=wjWPDauemCmLTKbdMYFB0UveMszZpcrwoUkJRRWKrqaTw@mail.gmail.com

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treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 335

Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms and c

treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 335

Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms and conditions of the gnu general public license
version 2 as published by the free software foundation this program
is distributed in the hope it will be useful but without any
warranty without even the implied warranty of merchantability or
fitness for a particular purpose see the gnu general public license
for more details you should have received a copy of the gnu general
public license along with this program if not write to the free
software foundation inc 51 franklin st fifth floor boston ma 02110
1301 usa

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

GPL-2.0-only

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 111 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexios Zavras <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

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x86, asm: Use CC_SET()/CC_OUT() and static_cpu_has() in archrandom.h

Use CC_SET()/CC_OUT() and static_cpu_has(). This produces code good
enough to eliminate ad hoc use of alternatives in <asm/archr

x86, asm: Use CC_SET()/CC_OUT() and static_cpu_has() in archrandom.h

Use CC_SET()/CC_OUT() and static_cpu_has(). This produces code good
enough to eliminate ad hoc use of alternatives in <asm/archrandom.h>,
greatly simplifying the code.

While we are at it, make x86_init_rdrand() compile out completely if
we don't need it.

Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

v2: fix a conflict between <linux/random.h> and <asm/archrandom.h>
discovered by Ingo Molnar. There are a few places in x86-specific
code where we need all of <arch/archrandom.h> even when
CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM is disabled, so <linux/random.h> does not
suffice.

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x86/cpu: Convert printk(KERN_<LEVEL> ...) to pr_<level>(...)

- Use the more current logging style pr_<level>(...) instead of the old
printk(KERN_<LEVEL> ...).

- Convert pr_warning() to pr_warn

x86/cpu: Convert printk(KERN_<LEVEL> ...) to pr_<level>(...)

- Use the more current logging style pr_<level>(...) instead of the old
printk(KERN_<LEVEL> ...).

- Convert pr_warning() to pr_warn().

Signed-off-by: Chen Yucong <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>

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x86: Replace RDRAND forced-reseed with simple sanity check

x86_init_rdrand() was added with 2 goals:

1. Sanity check that the built-in-self-test circuit on the Digital
Random Number Generator (D

x86: Replace RDRAND forced-reseed with simple sanity check

x86_init_rdrand() was added with 2 goals:

1. Sanity check that the built-in-self-test circuit on the Digital
Random Number Generator (DRNG) is not complaining. As RDRAND
HW self-checks on every invocation, this goal is achieved
by simply invoking RDRAND and checking its return code.

2. Force a full re-seed of the random number generator.
This was done out of paranoia to benefit the most un-sophisticated
DRNG implementation conceivable in the architecture,
an implementation that does not exist, and unlikely ever will.
This worst-case full-re-seed is achieved by invoking
a 64-bit RDRAND 8192 times.

Unfortunately, this worst-case re-seed costs O(1,000us).
Magnifying this cost, it is done from identify_cpu(), which is the
synchronous critical path to bring a processor on-line -- repeated
for every logical processor in the system at boot and resume from S3.

As it is very expensive, and of highly dubious value, we delete the
worst-case re-seed from the kernel.

We keep the 1st goal -- sanity check the hardware, and mark it absent
if it complains.

This change reduces the cost of x86_init_rdrand() by a factor of 1,000x,
to O(1us) from O(1,000us).

Signed-off-by: Len Brown <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/058618cc56ec6611171427ad7205e37e377aa8d4.1439738240.git.len.brown@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>

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x86, rdrand: When nordrand is specified, disable RDSEED as well

One can logically expect that when the user has specified "nordrand",
the user doesn't want any use of the CPU random number generator

x86, rdrand: When nordrand is specified, disable RDSEED as well

One can logically expect that when the user has specified "nordrand",
the user doesn't want any use of the CPU random number generator,
neither RDRAND nor RDSEED, so disable both.

Reported-by: Stephan Mueller <[email protected]>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>

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x86, kaslr: Provide randomness functions

Adds potential sources of randomness: RDRAND, RDTSC, or the i8254.

This moves the pre-alternatives inline rdrand function into the header so
both pieces of

x86, kaslr: Provide randomness functions

Adds potential sources of randomness: RDRAND, RDTSC, or the i8254.

This moves the pre-alternatives inline rdrand function into the header so
both pieces of code can use it. Availability of RDRAND is then controlled
by CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM, if someone wants to disable it even for kASLR.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>

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x86: delete __cpuinit usage from all x86 files

The __cpuinit type of throwaway sections might have made sense
some time ago when RAM was more constrained, but now the savings
do not offset the cost

x86: delete __cpuinit usage from all x86 files

The __cpuinit type of throwaway sections might have made sense
some time ago when RAM was more constrained, but now the savings
do not offset the cost and complications. For example, the fix in
commit 5e427ec2d0 ("x86: Fix bit corruption at CPU resume time")
is a good example of the nasty type of bugs that can be created
with improper use of the various __init prefixes.

After a discussion on LKML[1] it was decided that cpuinit should go
the way of devinit and be phased out. Once all the users are gone,
we can then finally remove the macros themselves from linux/init.h.

Note that some harmless section mismatch warnings may result, since
notify_cpu_starting() and cpu_up() are arch independent (kernel/cpu.c)
are flagged as __cpuinit -- so if we remove the __cpuinit from
arch specific callers, we will also get section mismatch warnings.
As an intermediate step, we intend to turn the linux/init.h cpuinit
content into no-ops as early as possible, since that will get rid
of these warnings. In any case, they are temporary and harmless.

This removes all the arch/x86 uses of the __cpuinit macros from
all C files. x86 only had the one __CPUINIT used in assembly files,
and it wasn't paired off with a .previous or a __FINIT, so we can
delete it directly w/o any corresponding additional change there.

[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/5/20/589

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <[email protected]>

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x86, random: Verify RDRAND functionality and allow it to be disabled

If the CPU declares that RDRAND is available, go through a guranteed
reseed sequence, and make sure that it is actually working (

x86, random: Verify RDRAND functionality and allow it to be disabled

If the CPU declares that RDRAND is available, go through a guranteed
reseed sequence, and make sure that it is actually working (producing
data.) If it does not, disable the CPU feature flag.

Allow RDRAND to be disabled on the command line (as opposed to at
compile time) for a user who has special requirements with regards to
random numbers.

Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Cc: Matt Mackall <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>

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