x86/cpu: Remove unused TLB strings

Commit:

e0ba94f14f74 ("x86/tlb_info: get last level TLB entry number of CPU")

added the TLB table for parsing CPUID(0x4), including strings
describing them. Th

x86/cpu: Remove unused TLB strings

Commit:

e0ba94f14f74 ("x86/tlb_info: get last level TLB entry number of CPU")

added the TLB table for parsing CPUID(0x4), including strings
describing them. The string entry in the table was never used.

Convert them to comments.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

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x86/topology/intel: Unlock CPUID before evaluating anything

Intel CPUs have a MSR bit to limit CPUID enumeration to leaf two. If
this bit is set by the BIOS then CPUID evaluation including topology

x86/topology/intel: Unlock CPUID before evaluating anything

Intel CPUs have a MSR bit to limit CPUID enumeration to leaf two. If
this bit is set by the BIOS then CPUID evaluation including topology
enumeration does not work correctly as the evaluation code does not try
to analyze any leaf greater than two.

This went unnoticed before because the original topology code just
repeated evaluation several times and managed to overwrite the initial
limited information with the correct one later. The new evaluation code
does it once and therefore ends up with the limited and wrong
information.

Cure this by unlocking CPUID right before evaluating anything which
depends on the maximum CPUID leaf being greater than two instead of
rereading stuff after unlock.

Fixes: 22d63660c35e ("x86/cpu: Use common topology code for Intel")
Reported-by: Peter Schneider <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Peter Schneider <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

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x86/cpu: Use common topology code for HYGON

Switch it over to use the consolidated topology evaluation and remove the
temporary safe guards which are not longer needed.

No functional change intende

x86/cpu: Use common topology code for HYGON

Switch it over to use the consolidated topology evaluation and remove the
temporary safe guards which are not longer needed.

No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sohil Mehta <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Michael Kelley <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Zhang Rui <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Wang Wendy <[email protected]>
Tested-by: K Prateek Nayak <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

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x86/cpu: Provide an AMD/HYGON specific topology parser

AMD/HYGON uses various methods for topology evaluation:

- Leaf 0x80000008 and 0x8000001e based with an optional leaf 0xb,
which is the p

x86/cpu: Provide an AMD/HYGON specific topology parser

AMD/HYGON uses various methods for topology evaluation:

- Leaf 0x80000008 and 0x8000001e based with an optional leaf 0xb,
which is the preferred variant for modern CPUs.

Leaf 0xb will be superseded by leaf 0x80000026 soon, which is just
another variant of the Intel 0x1f leaf for whatever reasons.

- Subleaf 0x80000008 and NODEID_MSR base

- Legacy fallback

That code is following the principle of random bits and pieces all over the
place which results in multiple evaluations and impenetrable code flows in
the same way as the Intel parsing did.

Provide a sane implementation by clearly separating the three variants and
bringing them in the proper preference order in one place.

This provides the parsing for both AMD and HYGON because there is no point
in having a separate HYGON parser which only differs by 3 lines of
code. Any further divergence between AMD and HYGON can be handled in
different functions, while still sharing the existing parsers.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sohil Mehta <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Michael Kelley <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Zhang Rui <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Wang Wendy <[email protected]>
Tested-by: K Prateek Nayak <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

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x86/cpu: Use common topology code for Intel

Intel CPUs use either topology leaf 0xb/0x1f evaluation or the legacy
SMP/HT evaluation based on CPUID leaf 0x1/0x4.

Move it over to the consolidated top

x86/cpu: Use common topology code for Intel

Intel CPUs use either topology leaf 0xb/0x1f evaluation or the legacy
SMP/HT evaluation based on CPUID leaf 0x1/0x4.

Move it over to the consolidated topology code and remove the random
topology hacks which are sprinkled into the Intel and the common code.

No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sohil Mehta <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Michael Kelley <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Zhang Rui <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Wang Wendy <[email protected]>
Tested-by: K Prateek Nayak <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

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x86/cpu: Provide cpu_init/parse_topology()

Topology evaluation is a complete disaster and impenetrable mess. It's
scattered all over the place with some vendor implementations doing early
evaluation

x86/cpu: Provide cpu_init/parse_topology()

Topology evaluation is a complete disaster and impenetrable mess. It's
scattered all over the place with some vendor implementations doing early
evaluation and some not. The most horrific part is the permanent
overwriting of smt_max_siblings and __max_die_per_package, instead of
establishing them once on the boot CPU and validating the result on the
APs.

The goals are:

- One topology evaluation entry point

- Proper sharing of pointlessly duplicated code

- Proper structuring of the evaluation logic and preferences.

- Evaluating important system wide information only once on the boot CPU

- Making the 0xb/0x1f leaf parsing less convoluted and actually fixing
the short comings of leaf 0x1f evaluation.

Start to consolidate the topology evaluation code by providing the entry
points for the early boot CPU evaluation and for the final parsing on the
boot CPU and the APs.

Move the trivial pieces into that new code:

- The initialization of cpuinfo_x86::topo

- The evaluation of CPUID leaf 1, which presets topo::initial_apicid

- topo_apicid is set to topo::initial_apicid when invoked from early
boot. When invoked for the final evaluation on the boot CPU it reads
the actual APIC ID, which makes apic_get_initial_apicid() obsolete
once everything is converted over.

Provide a temporary helper function topo_converted() which shields off the
not yet converted CPU vendors from invoking code which would break them.
This shielding covers all vendor CPUs which support SMP, but not the
historical pure UP ones as they only need the topology info init and
eventually the initial APIC initialization.

Provide two new members in cpuinfo_x86::topo to store the maximum number of
SMT siblings and the number of dies per package and add them to the debugfs
readout. These two members will be used to populate this information on the
boot CPU and to validate the APs against it.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sohil Mehta <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Michael Kelley <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Zhang Rui <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Wang Wendy <[email protected]>
Tested-by: K Prateek Nayak <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

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x86/cpu: Move cpu_l[l2]c_id into topology info

The topology IDs which identify the LLC and L2 domains clearly belong to
the per CPU topology information.

Move them into cpuinfo_x86::cpuinfo_topo an

x86/cpu: Move cpu_l[l2]c_id into topology info

The topology IDs which identify the LLC and L2 domains clearly belong to
the per CPU topology information.

Move them into cpuinfo_x86::cpuinfo_topo and get rid of the extra per CPU
data and the related exports.

This also paves the way to do proper topology evaluation during early boot
because it removes the only per CPU dependency for that.

No functional change.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sohil Mehta <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Michael Kelley <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Zhang Rui <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Arjan van de Ven <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

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x86/speculation: Add Gather Data Sampling mitigation

Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is a hardware vulnerability which allows
unprivileged speculative access to data which was previously stored in
vector

x86/speculation: Add Gather Data Sampling mitigation

Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is a hardware vulnerability which allows
unprivileged speculative access to data which was previously stored in
vector registers.

Intel processors that support AVX2 and AVX512 have gather instructions
that fetch non-contiguous data elements from memory. On vulnerable
hardware, when a gather instruction is transiently executed and
encounters a fault, stale data from architectural or internal vector
registers may get transiently stored to the destination vector
register allowing an attacker to infer the stale data using typical
side channel techniques like cache timing attacks.

This mitigation is different from many earlier ones for two reasons.
First, it is enabled by default and a bit must be set to *DISABLE* it.
This is the opposite of normal mitigation polarity. This means GDS can
be mitigated simply by updating microcode and leaving the new control
bit alone.

Second, GDS has a "lock" bit. This lock bit is there because the
mitigation affects the hardware security features KeyLocker and SGX.
It needs to be enabled and *STAY* enabled for these features to be
mitigated against GDS.

The mitigation is enabled in the microcode by default. Disable it by
setting gather_data_sampling=off or by disabling all mitigations with
mitigations=off. The mitigation status can be checked by reading:

/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling

Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>

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x86/cpu: Switch to arch_cpu_finalize_init()

check_bugs() is a dumping ground for finalizing the CPU bringup. Only parts of
it has to do with actual CPU bugs.

Split it apart into arch_cpu_finalize_i

x86/cpu: Switch to arch_cpu_finalize_init()

check_bugs() is a dumping ground for finalizing the CPU bringup. Only parts of
it has to do with actual CPU bugs.

Split it apart into arch_cpu_finalize_init() and cpu_select_mitigations().

Fixup the bogus 32bit comments while at it.

No functional change.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

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x86/CPU/AMD: Make sure EFER[AIBRSE] is set

The AutoIBRS bit gets set only on the BSP as part of determining which
mitigation to enable on AMD. Setting on the APs relies on the
circumstance that the

x86/CPU/AMD: Make sure EFER[AIBRSE] is set

The AutoIBRS bit gets set only on the BSP as part of determining which
mitigation to enable on AMD. Setting on the APs relies on the
circumstance that the APs get booted through the trampoline and EFER
- the MSR which contains that bit - gets replicated on every AP from the
BSP.

However, this can change in the future and considering the security
implications of this bit not being set on every CPU, make sure it is set
by verifying EFER later in the boot process and on every AP.

Reported-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230224185257.o3mcmloei5zqu7wa@treble

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x86/cpu: Remove redundant extern x86_read_arch_cap_msr()

The prototype for the x86_read_arch_cap_msr() function has moved to
arch/x86/include/asm/cpu.h - kill the redundant definition in arch/x86/ke

x86/cpu: Remove redundant extern x86_read_arch_cap_msr()

The prototype for the x86_read_arch_cap_msr() function has moved to
arch/x86/include/asm/cpu.h - kill the redundant definition in arch/x86/kernel/cpu.h
and include the header.

Signed-off-by: Ashok Raj <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Sneddon <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

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x86/cpu/amd: Add Spectral Chicken

Zen2 uarchs have an undocumented, unnamed, MSR that contains a chicken
bit for some speculation behaviour. It needs setting.

Note: very belatedly AMD released nami

x86/cpu/amd: Add Spectral Chicken

Zen2 uarchs have an undocumented, unnamed, MSR that contains a chicken
bit for some speculation behaviour. It needs setting.

Note: very belatedly AMD released naming; it's now officially called
MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG2 and MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG2_SUPPRESS_NOBR_PRED_BIT
but shall remain the SPECTRAL CHICKEN.

Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>

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x86/tsx: Disable TSX development mode at boot

A microcode update on some Intel processors causes all TSX transactions
to always abort by default[*]. Microcode also added functionality to
re-enable T

x86/tsx: Disable TSX development mode at boot

A microcode update on some Intel processors causes all TSX transactions
to always abort by default[*]. Microcode also added functionality to
re-enable TSX for development purposes. With this microcode loaded, if
tsx=on was passed on the cmdline, and TSX development mode was already
enabled before the kernel boot, it may make the system vulnerable to TSX
Asynchronous Abort (TAA).

To be on safer side, unconditionally disable TSX development mode during
boot. If a viable use case appears, this can be revisited later.

[*]: Intel TSX Disable Update for Selected Processors, doc ID: 643557

[ bp: Drop unstable web link, massage heavily. ]

Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/347bd844da3a333a9793c6687d4e4eb3b2419a3e.1646943780.git.pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com

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x86/cpu: Fix migration safety with X86_BUG_NULL_SEL

Currently, Linux probes for X86_BUG_NULL_SEL unconditionally which
makes it unsafe to migrate in a virtualised environment as the
properties acros

x86/cpu: Fix migration safety with X86_BUG_NULL_SEL

Currently, Linux probes for X86_BUG_NULL_SEL unconditionally which
makes it unsafe to migrate in a virtualised environment as the
properties across the migration pool might differ.

To be specific, the case which goes wrong is:

1. Zen1 (or earlier) and Zen2 (or later) in a migration pool
2. Linux boots on Zen2, probes and finds the absence of X86_BUG_NULL_SEL
3. Linux is then migrated to Zen1

Linux is now running on a X86_BUG_NULL_SEL-impacted CPU while believing
that the bug is fixed.

The only way to address the problem is to fully trust the "no longer
affected" CPUID bit when virtualised, because in the above case it would
be clear deliberately to indicate the fact "you might migrate to
somewhere which has this behaviour".

Zen3 adds the NullSelectorClearsBase CPUID bit to indicate that loading
a NULL segment selector zeroes the base and limit fields, as well as
just attributes. Zen2 also has this behaviour but doesn't have the NSCB
bit.

[ bp: Minor touchups. ]

Signed-off-by: Jane Malalane <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
CC: <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

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x86/tsx: Clear CPUID bits when TSX always force aborts

As a result of TSX deprecation, some processors always abort TSX
transactions by default after a microcode update.

When TSX feature cannot be

x86/tsx: Clear CPUID bits when TSX always force aborts

As a result of TSX deprecation, some processors always abort TSX
transactions by default after a microcode update.

When TSX feature cannot be used it is better to hide it. Clear CPUID.RTM
and CPUID.HLE bits when TSX transactions always abort.

[ bp: Massage commit message and comments. ]

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/5209b3d72ffe5bd3cafdcc803f5b883f785329c3.1623704845.git-series.pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com

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treewide: Convert macro and uses of __section(foo) to __section("foo")

Use a more generic form for __section that requires quotes to avoid
complications with clang and gcc differences.

Remove the q

treewide: Convert macro and uses of __section(foo) to __section("foo")

Use a more generic form for __section that requires quotes to avoid
complications with clang and gcc differences.

Remove the quote operator # from compiler_attributes.h __section macro.

Convert all unquoted __section(foo) uses to quoted __section("foo").
Also convert __attribute__((section("foo"))) uses to __section("foo")
even if the __attribute__ has multiple list entry forms.

Conversion done using the script at:

https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/2-convert_section.pl

Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Miguel Ojeda <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

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x86/cpu: Reinitialize IA32_FEAT_CTL MSR on BSP during wakeup

Reinitialize IA32_FEAT_CTL on the BSP during wakeup to handle the case
where firmware doesn't initialize or save/restore across S3. This

x86/cpu: Reinitialize IA32_FEAT_CTL MSR on BSP during wakeup

Reinitialize IA32_FEAT_CTL on the BSP during wakeup to handle the case
where firmware doesn't initialize or save/restore across S3. This fixes
a bug where IA32_FEAT_CTL is left uninitialized and results in VMXON
taking a #GP due to VMX not being fully enabled, i.e. breaks KVM.

Use init_ia32_feat_ctl() to "restore" IA32_FEAT_CTL as it already deals
with the case where the MSR is locked, and because APs already redo
init_ia32_feat_ctl() during suspend by virtue of the SMP boot flow being
used to reinitialize APs upon wakeup. Do the call in the early wakeup
flow to avoid dependencies in the syscore_ops chain, e.g. simply adding
a resume hook is not guaranteed to work, as KVM does VMXON in its own
resume hook, kvm_resume(), when KVM has active guests.

Fixes: 21bd3467a58e ("KVM: VMX: Drop initialization of IA32_FEAT_CTL MSR")
Reported-by: Brad Campbell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Liam Merwick <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Brad Campbell <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] # v5.6
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

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x86/speculation: Add Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS) mitigation

SRBDS is an MDS-like speculative side channel that can leak bits from the
random number generator (RNG) across cores and

x86/speculation: Add Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS) mitigation

SRBDS is an MDS-like speculative side channel that can leak bits from the
random number generator (RNG) across cores and threads. New microcode
serializes the processor access during the execution of RDRAND and
RDSEED. This ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is
released for reuse.

While it is present on all affected CPU models, the microcode mitigation
is not needed on models that enumerate ARCH_CAPABILITIES[MDS_NO] in the
cases where TSX is not supported or has been disabled with TSX_CTRL.

The mitigation is activated by default on affected processors and it
increases latency for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions. Among other
effects this will reduce throughput from /dev/urandom.

* Enable administrator to configure the mitigation off when desired using
either mitigations=off or srbds=off.

* Export vulnerability status via sysfs

* Rename file-scoped macros to apply for non-whitelist table initializations.

[ bp: Massage,
- s/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS/g,
- do not read arch cap MSR a second time in tsx_fused_off() - just pass it in,
- flip check in cpu_set_bug_bits() to save an indentation level,
- reflow comments.
jpoimboe: s/Mitigated/Mitigation/ in user-visible strings
tglx: Dropped the fused off magic for now
]

Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <[email protected]>

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x86/intel: Initialize IA32_FEAT_CTL MSR at boot

Opportunistically initialize IA32_FEAT_CTL to enable VMX when the MSR is
left unlocked by BIOS. Configuring feature control at boot time paves
the wa

x86/intel: Initialize IA32_FEAT_CTL MSR at boot

Opportunistically initialize IA32_FEAT_CTL to enable VMX when the MSR is
left unlocked by BIOS. Configuring feature control at boot time paves
the way for similar enabling of other features, e.g. Software Guard
Extensions (SGX).

Temporarily leave equivalent KVM code in place in order to avoid
introducing a regression on Centaur and Zhaoxin CPUs, e.g. removing
KVM's code would leave the MSR unlocked on those CPUs and would break
existing functionality if people are loading kvm_intel on Centaur and/or
Zhaoxin. Defer enablement of the boot-time configuration on Centaur and
Zhaoxin to future patches to aid bisection.

Note, Local Machine Check Exceptions (LMCE) are also supported by the
kernel and enabled via feature control, but the kernel currently uses
LMCE if and only if the feature is explicitly enabled by BIOS. Keep
the current behavior to avoid introducing bugs, future patches can opt
in to opportunistic enabling if it's deemed desirable to do so.

Always lock IA32_FEAT_CTL if it exists, even if the CPU doesn't support
VMX, so that other existing and future kernel code that queries the MSR
can assume it's locked.

Start from a clean slate when constructing the value to write to
IA32_FEAT_CTL, i.e. ignore whatever value BIOS left in the MSR so as not
to enable random features or fault on the WRMSR.

Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

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x86/cpu: Add a "tsx=" cmdline option with TSX disabled by default

Add a kernel cmdline parameter "tsx" to control the Transactional
Synchronization Extensions (TSX) feature. On CPUs that support TSX

x86/cpu: Add a "tsx=" cmdline option with TSX disabled by default

Add a kernel cmdline parameter "tsx" to control the Transactional
Synchronization Extensions (TSX) feature. On CPUs that support TSX
control, use "tsx=on|off" to enable or disable TSX. Not specifying this
option is equivalent to "tsx=off". This is because on certain processors
TSX may be used as a part of a speculative side channel attack.

Carve out the TSX controlling functionality into a separate compilation
unit because TSX is a CPU feature while the TSX async abort control
machinery will go to cpu/bugs.c.

[ bp: - Massage, shorten and clear the arg buffer.
- Clarifications of the tsx= possible options - Josh.
- Expand on TSX_CTRL availability - Pawan. ]

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>

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x86/cpu: Add a helper function x86_read_arch_cap_msr()

Add a helper function to read the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Bo

x86/cpu: Add a helper function x86_read_arch_cap_msr()

Add a helper function to read the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mark Gross <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>

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PM / arch: x86: Rework the MSR_IA32_ENERGY_PERF_BIAS handling

The current handling of MSR_IA32_ENERGY_PERF_BIAS in the kernel is
problematic, because it may cause changes made by user space to that

PM / arch: x86: Rework the MSR_IA32_ENERGY_PERF_BIAS handling

The current handling of MSR_IA32_ENERGY_PERF_BIAS in the kernel is
problematic, because it may cause changes made by user space to that
MSR (with the help of the x86_energy_perf_policy tool, for example)
to be lost every time a CPU goes offline and then back online as well
as during system-wide power management transitions into sleep states
and back into the working state.

The first problem is that if the current EPB value for a CPU going
online is 0 ('performance'), the kernel will change it to 6 ('normal')
regardless of whether or not this is the first bring-up of that CPU.
That also happens during system-wide resume from sleep states
(including, but not limited to, hibernation). However, the EPB may
have been adjusted by user space this way and the kernel should not
blindly override that setting.

The second problem is that if the platform firmware resets the EPB
values for any CPUs during system-wide resume from a sleep state,
the kernel will not restore their previous EPB values that may
have been set by user space before the preceding system-wide
suspend transition. Again, that behavior may at least be confusing
from the user space perspective.

In order to address these issues, rework the handling of
MSR_IA32_ENERGY_PERF_BIAS so that the EPB value is saved on CPU
offline and restored on CPU online as well as (for the boot CPU)
during the syscore stages of system-wide suspend and resume
transitions, respectively.

However, retain the policy by which the EPB is set to 6 ('normal')
on the first bring-up of each CPU if its initial value is 0, based
on the observation that 0 may mean 'not initialized' just as well as
'performance' in that case.

While at it, move the MSR_IA32_ENERGY_PERF_BIAS handling code into
a separate file and document it in Documentation/admin-guide.

Fixes: abe48b108247 (x86, intel, power: Initialize MSR_IA32_ENERGY_PERF_BIAS)
Fixes: b51ef52df71c (x86/cpu: Restore MSR_IA32_ENERGY_PERF_BIAS after resume)
Reported-by: Thomas Renninger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>

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x86/cpufeatures: Remove get_scattered_cpuid_leaf()

get_scattered_cpuid_leaf() was added[1] to help KVM rebuild hardware-
defined leafs that are rearranged by Linux to avoid bloating the
x86_capabili

x86/cpufeatures: Remove get_scattered_cpuid_leaf()

get_scattered_cpuid_leaf() was added[1] to help KVM rebuild hardware-
defined leafs that are rearranged by Linux to avoid bloating the
x86_capability array. Eventually, the last consumer of the function was
removed[2], but the function itself was kept, perhaps even intentionally
as a form of documentation.

Remove get_scattered_cpuid_leaf() as it is currently not used by KVM.
Furthermore, simply rebuilding the "real" leaf does not resolve all of
KVM's woes when it comes to exposing a scattered CPUID feature, i.e.
keeping the function as documentation may be counter-productive in some
scenarios, e.g. when KVM needs to do more than simply expose the leaf.

[1] 47bdf3378d62 ("x86/cpuid: Provide get_scattered_cpuid_leaf()")
[2] b7b27aa011a1 ("KVM/x86: Update the reverse_cpuid list to include CPUID_7_EDX")

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
CC: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
CC: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]>
CC: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
CC: x86-ml <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

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x86/cpu: Get cache info and setup cache cpumap for Hygon Dhyana

The Hygon Dhyana CPU has a topology extensions bit in CPUID. With
this bit, the kernel can get the cache information. So add support i

x86/cpu: Get cache info and setup cache cpumap for Hygon Dhyana

The Hygon Dhyana CPU has a topology extensions bit in CPUID. With
this bit, the kernel can get the cache information. So add support in
cpuid4_cache_lookup_regs() to get the correct cache size.

The Hygon Dhyana CPU also discovers num_cache_leaves via CPUID leaf
0x8000001d, so add support to it in find_num_cache_leaves().

Also add cacheinfo_hygon_init_llc_id() and init_hygon_cacheinfo()
functions to initialize Dhyana cache info. Setup cache cpumap in the
same way as AMD does.

Signed-off-by: Pu Wen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/2a686b2ac0e2f5a1f2f5f101124d9dd44f949731.1537533369.git.puwen@hygon.cn

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xen/pv: Call get_cpu_address_sizes to set x86_virt/phys_bits

Commit d94a155c59c9 ("x86/cpu: Prevent cpuinfo_x86::x86_phys_bits
adjustment corruption") has moved the query and calculation of the
x86_

xen/pv: Call get_cpu_address_sizes to set x86_virt/phys_bits

Commit d94a155c59c9 ("x86/cpu: Prevent cpuinfo_x86::x86_phys_bits
adjustment corruption") has moved the query and calculation of the
x86_virt_bits and x86_phys_bits fields of the cpuinfo_x86 struct
from the get_cpu_cap function to a new function named
get_cpu_address_sizes.

One of the call sites related to Xen PV VMs was unfortunately missed
in the aforementioned commit. This prevents successful boot-up of
kernel versions 4.17 and up in Xen PV VMs if CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL
is enabled, due to the following code path:

enlighten_pv.c::xen_start_kernel
mmu_pv.c::xen_reserve_special_pages
page.h::__pa
physaddr.c::__phys_addr
physaddr.h::phys_addr_valid

phys_addr_valid uses boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits to validate physical
addresses. boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits is no longer populated before
the call to xen_reserve_special_pages due to the aforementioned commit
though, so the validation performed by phys_addr_valid fails, which
causes __phys_addr to trigger a BUG, preventing boot-up.

Signed-off-by: M. Vefa Bicakci <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]>
Cc: Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected] # for v4.17 and up
Fixes: d94a155c59c9 ("x86/cpu: Prevent cpuinfo_x86::x86_phys_bits adjustment corruption")
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]>

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