fs: add open_tree_attr()

Add open_tree_attr() which allow to atomically create a detached mount
tree and set mount options on it. If OPEN_TREE_CLONE is used this will
allow the creation of a detache

fs: add open_tree_attr()

Add open_tree_attr() which allow to atomically create a detached mount
tree and set mount options on it. If OPEN_TREE_CLONE is used this will
allow the creation of a detached mount with a new set of mount options
without it ever being exposed to userspace without that set of mount
options applied.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Reviewed-by: "Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean)" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>

show more ...

fs/xattr: add *at family syscalls

Add the four syscalls setxattrat(), getxattrat(), listxattrat() and
removexattrat(). Those can be used to operate on extended attributes,
especially security relat

fs/xattr: add *at family syscalls

Add the four syscalls setxattrat(), getxattrat(), listxattrat() and
removexattrat(). Those can be used to operate on extended attributes,
especially security related ones, either relative to a pinned directory
or on a file descriptor without read access, avoiding a
/proc/<pid>/fd/<fd> detour, requiring a mounted procfs.

One use case will be setfiles(8) setting SELinux file contexts
("security.selinux") without race conditions and without a file
descriptor opened with read access requiring SELinux read permission.

Use the do_{name}at() pattern from fs/open.c.

Pass the value of the extended attribute, its length, and for
setxattrat(2) the command (XATTR_CREATE or XATTR_REPLACE) via an added
struct xattr_args to not exceed six syscall arguments and not
merging the AT_* and XATTR_* flags.

[AV: fixes by Christian Brauner folded in, the entire thing rebased on
top of {filename,file}_...xattr() primitives, treatment of empty
pathnames regularized. As the result, AT_EMPTY_PATH+NULL handling
is cheap, so f...(2) can use it]

Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
CC: [email protected]
CC: [email protected]
CC: [email protected]
CC: [email protected]
CC: [email protected]
CC: [email protected]
CC: [email protected]
CC: [email protected]
CC: [email protected]
CC: [email protected]
CC: [email protected]
CC: [email protected]
CC: [email protected]
CC: [email protected]
CC: [email protected]
CC: [email protected]
CC: [email protected]
CC: [email protected]
[brauner: slight tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>

show more ...

mseal: wire up mseal syscall

Patch series "Introduce mseal", v10.

This patchset proposes a new mseal() syscall for the Linux kernel.

In a nutshell, mseal() protects the VMAs of a given virtual mem

mseal: wire up mseal syscall

Patch series "Introduce mseal", v10.

This patchset proposes a new mseal() syscall for the Linux kernel.

In a nutshell, mseal() protects the VMAs of a given virtual memory range
against modifications, such as changes to their permission bits.

Modern CPUs support memory permissions, such as the read/write (RW) and
no-execute (NX) bits. Linux has supported NX since the release of kernel
version 2.6.8 in August 2004 [1]. The memory permission feature improves
the security stance on memory corruption bugs, as an attacker cannot
simply write to arbitrary memory and point the code to it. The memory
must be marked with the X bit, or else an exception will occur.
Internally, the kernel maintains the memory permissions in a data
structure called VMA (vm_area_struct). mseal() additionally protects the
VMA itself against modifications of the selected seal type.

Memory sealing is useful to mitigate memory corruption issues where a
corrupted pointer is passed to a memory management system. For example,
such an attacker primitive can break control-flow integrity guarantees
since read-only memory that is supposed to be trusted can become writable
or .text pages can get remapped. Memory sealing can automatically be
applied by the runtime loader to seal .text and .rodata pages and
applications can additionally seal security critical data at runtime. A
similar feature already exists in the XNU kernel with the
VM_FLAGS_PERMANENT [3] flag and on OpenBSD with the mimmutable syscall
[4]. Also, Chrome wants to adopt this feature for their CFI work [2] and
this patchset has been designed to be compatible with the Chrome use case.

Two system calls are involved in sealing the map: mmap() and mseal().

The new mseal() is an syscall on 64 bit CPU, and with following signature:

int mseal(void addr, size_t len, unsigned long flags)
addr/len: memory range.
flags: reserved.

mseal() blocks following operations for the given memory range.

1> Unmapping, moving to another location, and shrinking the size,
via munmap() and mremap(), can leave an empty space, therefore can
be replaced with a VMA with a new set of attributes.

2> Moving or expanding a different VMA into the current location,
via mremap().

3> Modifying a VMA via mmap(MAP_FIXED).

4> Size expansion, via mremap(), does not appear to pose any specific
risks to sealed VMAs. It is included anyway because the use case is
unclear. In any case, users can rely on merging to expand a sealed VMA.

5> mprotect() and pkey_mprotect().

6> Some destructive madvice() behaviors (e.g. MADV_DONTNEED) for anonymous
memory, when users don't have write permission to the memory. Those
behaviors can alter region contents by discarding pages, effectively a
memset(0) for anonymous memory.

The idea that inspired this patch comes from Stephen Röttger’s work in
V8 CFI [5]. Chrome browser in ChromeOS will be the first user of this
API.

Indeed, the Chrome browser has very specific requirements for sealing,
which are distinct from those of most applications. For example, in the
case of libc, sealing is only applied to read-only (RO) or read-execute
(RX) memory segments (such as .text and .RELRO) to prevent them from
becoming writable, the lifetime of those mappings are tied to the lifetime
of the process.

Chrome wants to seal two large address space reservations that are managed
by different allocators. The memory is mapped RW- and RWX respectively
but write access to it is restricted using pkeys (or in the future ARM
permission overlay extensions). The lifetime of those mappings are not
tied to the lifetime of the process, therefore, while the memory is
sealed, the allocators still need to free or discard the unused memory.
For example, with madvise(DONTNEED).

However, always allowing madvise(DONTNEED) on this range poses a security
risk. For example if a jump instruction crosses a page boundary and the
second page gets discarded, it will overwrite the target bytes with zeros
and change the control flow. Checking write-permission before the discard
operation allows us to control when the operation is valid. In this case,
the madvise will only succeed if the executing thread has PKEY write
permissions and PKRU changes are protected in software by control-flow
integrity.

Although the initial version of this patch series is targeting the Chrome
browser as its first user, it became evident during upstream discussions
that we would also want to ensure that the patch set eventually is a
complete solution for memory sealing and compatible with other use cases.
The specific scenario currently in mind is glibc's use case of loading and
sealing ELF executables. To this end, Stephen is working on a change to
glibc to add sealing support to the dynamic linker, which will seal all
non-writable segments at startup. Once this work is completed, all
applications will be able to automatically benefit from these new
protections.

In closing, I would like to formally acknowledge the valuable
contributions received during the RFC process, which were instrumental in
shaping this patch:

Jann Horn: raising awareness and providing valuable insights on the
destructive madvise operations.
Liam R. Howlett: perf optimization.
Linus Torvalds: assisting in defining system call signature and scope.
Theo de Raadt: sharing the experiences and insight gained from
implementing mimmutable() in OpenBSD.

MM perf benchmarks
==================
This patch adds a loop in the mprotect/munmap/madvise(DONTNEED) to
check the VMAs’ sealing flag, so that no partial update can be made,
when any segment within the given memory range is sealed.

To measure the performance impact of this loop, two tests are developed.
[8]

The first is measuring the time taken for a particular system call,
by using clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC). The second is using
PERF_COUNT_HW_REF_CPU_CYCLES (exclude user space). Both tests have
similar results.

The tests have roughly below sequence:
for (i = 0; i < 1000, i++)
create 1000 mappings (1 page per VMA)
start the sampling
for (j = 0; j < 1000, j++)
mprotect one mapping
stop and save the sample
delete 1000 mappings
calculates all samples.

Below tests are performed on Intel(R) Pentium(R) Gold 7505 @ 2.00GHz,
4G memory, Chromebook.

Based on the latest upstream code:
The first test (measuring time)
syscall__ vmas t t_mseal delta_ns per_vma %
munmap__ 1 909 944 35 35 104%
munmap__ 2 1398 1502 104 52 107%
munmap__ 4 2444 2594 149 37 106%
munmap__ 8 4029 4323 293 37 107%
munmap__ 16 6647 6935 288 18 104%
munmap__ 32 11811 12398 587 18 105%
mprotect 1 439 465 26 26 106%
mprotect 2 1659 1745 86 43 105%
mprotect 4 3747 3889 142 36 104%
mprotect 8 6755 6969 215 27 103%
mprotect 16 13748 14144 396 25 103%
mprotect 32 27827 28969 1142 36 104%
madvise_ 1 240 262 22 22 109%
madvise_ 2 366 442 76 38 121%
madvise_ 4 623 751 128 32 121%
madvise_ 8 1110 1324 215 27 119%
madvise_ 16 2127 2451 324 20 115%
madvise_ 32 4109 4642 534 17 113%

The second test (measuring cpu cycle)
syscall__ vmas cpu cmseal delta_cpu per_vma %
munmap__ 1 1790 1890 100 100 106%
munmap__ 2 2819 3033 214 107 108%
munmap__ 4 4959 5271 312 78 106%
munmap__ 8 8262 8745 483 60 106%
munmap__ 16 13099 14116 1017 64 108%
munmap__ 32 23221 24785 1565 49 107%
mprotect 1 906 967 62 62 107%
mprotect 2 3019 3203 184 92 106%
mprotect 4 6149 6569 420 105 107%
mprotect 8 9978 10524 545 68 105%
mprotect 16 20448 21427 979 61 105%
mprotect 32 40972 42935 1963 61 105%
madvise_ 1 434 497 63 63 115%
madvise_ 2 752 899 147 74 120%
madvise_ 4 1313 1513 200 50 115%
madvise_ 8 2271 2627 356 44 116%
madvise_ 16 4312 4883 571 36 113%
madvise_ 32 8376 9319 943 29 111%

Based on the result, for 6.8 kernel, sealing check adds
20-40 nano seconds, or around 50-100 CPU cycles, per VMA.

In addition, I applied the sealing to 5.10 kernel:
The first test (measuring time)
syscall__ vmas t tmseal delta_ns per_vma %
munmap__ 1 357 390 33 33 109%
munmap__ 2 442 463 21 11 105%
munmap__ 4 614 634 20 5 103%
munmap__ 8 1017 1137 120 15 112%
munmap__ 16 1889 2153 263 16 114%
munmap__ 32 4109 4088 -21 -1 99%
mprotect 1 235 227 -7 -7 97%
mprotect 2 495 464 -30 -15 94%
mprotect 4 741 764 24 6 103%
mprotect 8 1434 1437 2 0 100%
mprotect 16 2958 2991 33 2 101%
mprotect 32 6431 6608 177 6 103%
madvise_ 1 191 208 16 16 109%
madvise_ 2 300 324 24 12 108%
madvise_ 4 450 473 23 6 105%
madvise_ 8 753 806 53 7 107%
madvise_ 16 1467 1592 125 8 108%
madvise_ 32 2795 3405 610 19 122%

The second test (measuring cpu cycle)
syscall__ nbr_vma cpu cmseal delta_cpu per_vma %
munmap__ 1 684 715 31 31 105%
munmap__ 2 861 898 38 19 104%
munmap__ 4 1183 1235 51 13 104%
munmap__ 8 1999 2045 46 6 102%
munmap__ 16 3839 3816 -23 -1 99%
munmap__ 32 7672 7887 216 7 103%
mprotect 1 397 443 46 46 112%
mprotect 2 738 788 50 25 107%
mprotect 4 1221 1256 35 9 103%
mprotect 8 2356 2429 72 9 103%
mprotect 16 4961 4935 -26 -2 99%
mprotect 32 9882 10172 291 9 103%
madvise_ 1 351 380 29 29 108%
madvise_ 2 565 615 49 25 109%
madvise_ 4 872 933 61 15 107%
madvise_ 8 1508 1640 132 16 109%
madvise_ 16 3078 3323 245 15 108%
madvise_ 32 5893 6704 811 25 114%

For 5.10 kernel, sealing check adds 0-15 ns in time, or 10-30
CPU cycles, there is even decrease in some cases.

It might be interesting to compare 5.10 and 6.8 kernel
The first test (measuring time)
syscall__ vmas t_5_10 t_6_8 delta_ns per_vma %
munmap__ 1 357 909 552 552 254%
munmap__ 2 442 1398 956 478 316%
munmap__ 4 614 2444 1830 458 398%
munmap__ 8 1017 4029 3012 377 396%
munmap__ 16 1889 6647 4758 297 352%
munmap__ 32 4109 11811 7702 241 287%
mprotect 1 235 439 204 204 187%
mprotect 2 495 1659 1164 582 335%
mprotect 4 741 3747 3006 752 506%
mprotect 8 1434 6755 5320 665 471%
mprotect 16 2958 13748 10790 674 465%
mprotect 32 6431 27827 21397 669 433%
madvise_ 1 191 240 49 49 125%
madvise_ 2 300 366 67 33 122%
madvise_ 4 450 623 173 43 138%
madvise_ 8 753 1110 357 45 147%
madvise_ 16 1467 2127 660 41 145%
madvise_ 32 2795 4109 1314 41 147%

The second test (measuring cpu cycle)
syscall__ vmas cpu_5_10 c_6_8 delta_cpu per_vma %
munmap__ 1 684 1790 1106 1106 262%
munmap__ 2 861 2819 1958 979 327%
munmap__ 4 1183 4959 3776 944 419%
munmap__ 8 1999 8262 6263 783 413%
munmap__ 16 3839 13099 9260 579 341%
munmap__ 32 7672 23221 15549 486 303%
mprotect 1 397 906 509 509 228%
mprotect 2 738 3019 2281 1140 409%
mprotect 4 1221 6149 4929 1232 504%
mprotect 8 2356 9978 7622 953 423%
mprotect 16 4961 20448 15487 968 412%
mprotect 32 9882 40972 31091 972 415%
madvise_ 1 351 434 82 82 123%
madvise_ 2 565 752 186 93 133%
madvise_ 4 872 1313 442 110 151%
madvise_ 8 1508 2271 763 95 151%
madvise_ 16 3078 4312 1234 77 140%
madvise_ 32 5893 8376 2483 78 142%

From 5.10 to 6.8
munmap: added 250-550 ns in time, or 500-1100 in cpu cycle, per vma.
mprotect: added 200-750 ns in time, or 500-1200 in cpu cycle, per vma.
madvise: added 33-50 ns in time, or 70-110 in cpu cycle, per vma.

In comparison to mseal, which adds 20-40 ns or 50-100 CPU cycles, the
increase from 5.10 to 6.8 is significantly larger, approximately ten times
greater for munmap and mprotect.

When I discuss the mm performance with Brian Makin, an engineer who worked
on performance, it was brought to my attention that such performance
benchmarks, which measuring millions of mm syscall in a tight loop, may
not accurately reflect real-world scenarios, such as that of a database
service. Also this is tested using a single HW and ChromeOS, the data
from another HW or distribution might be different. It might be best to
take this data with a grain of salt.


This patch (of 5):

Wire up mseal syscall for all architectures.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
Cc: Jann Horn <[email protected]> [Bug #2]
Cc: Jeff Xu <[email protected]>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]>
Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <[email protected]>
Cc: Muhammad Usama Anjum <[email protected]>
Cc: Pedro Falcato <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephen Röttger <[email protected]>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <[email protected]>
Cc: Amer Al Shanawany <[email protected]>
Cc: Javier Carrasco <[email protected]>
Cc: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>

show more ...

wire up syscalls for statmount/listmount

Wire up all archs.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Reviewed

wire up syscalls for statmount/listmount

Wire up all archs.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Reviewed-by: Ian Kent <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>

show more ...

LSM: wireup Linux Security Module syscalls

Wireup lsm_get_self_attr, lsm_set_self_attr and lsm_list_modules
system calls.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees C

LSM: wireup Linux Security Module syscalls

Wireup lsm_get_self_attr, lsm_set_self_attr and lsm_list_modules
system calls.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
[PM: forward ported beyond v6.6 due merge window changes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>

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arch: Reserve map_shadow_stack() syscall number for all architectures

commit c35559f94ebc ("x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall")
recently added support for map_shadow_stack() but it is li

arch: Reserve map_shadow_stack() syscall number for all architectures

commit c35559f94ebc ("x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall")
recently added support for map_shadow_stack() but it is limited to x86
only for now. There is a possibility that other architectures (namely,
arm64 and RISC-V), that are implementing equivalent support for shadow
stacks, might need to add support for it.

Independent of that, reserving arch-specific syscall numbers in the
syscall tables of all architectures is good practice and would help
avoid future conflicts. map_shadow_stack() is marked as a conditional
syscall in sys_ni.c. Adding it to the syscall tables of other
architectures is harmless and would return ENOSYS when exercised.

Note, map_shadow_stack() was assigned #453 during the merge process
since #452 was taken by fchmodat2().

For Powerpc, map it to sys_ni_syscall() as is the norm for Powerpc
syscall tables.

For Alpha, map_shadow_stack() takes up #563 as Alpha still diverges from
the common syscall numbering system in the other architectures.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

Signed-off-by: Sohil Mehta <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> (powerpc)
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>

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syscalls: Cleanup references to sys_lookup_dcookie()

commit 'be65de6b03aa ("fs: Remove dcookies support")' removed the
syscall definition for lookup_dcookie. However, syscall tables still
point to

syscalls: Cleanup references to sys_lookup_dcookie()

commit 'be65de6b03aa ("fs: Remove dcookies support")' removed the
syscall definition for lookup_dcookie. However, syscall tables still
point to the old sys_lookup_dcookie() definition. Update syscall tables
of all architectures to directly point to sys_ni_syscall() instead.

Signed-off-by: Sohil Mehta <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> # for perf
Acked-by: Russell King (Oracle) <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>

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futex: Add sys_futex_requeue()

Finish off the 'simple' futex2 syscall group by adding
sys_futex_requeue(). Unlike sys_futex_{wait,wake}() its arguments are
too numerous to fit into a regular syscall

futex: Add sys_futex_requeue()

Finish off the 'simple' futex2 syscall group by adding
sys_futex_requeue(). Unlike sys_futex_{wait,wake}() its arguments are
too numerous to fit into a regular syscall. As such, use struct
futex_waitv to pass the 'source' and 'destination' futexes to the
syscall.

This syscall implements what was previously known as FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE
and uses {val, uaddr, flags} for source and {uaddr, flags} for
destination.

This design explicitly allows requeueing between different types of
futex by having a different flags word per uaddr.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

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futex: Add sys_futex_wait()

To complement sys_futex_waitv()/wake(), add sys_futex_wait(). This
syscall implements what was previously known as FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET
except it uses 'unsigned long' for th

futex: Add sys_futex_wait()

To complement sys_futex_waitv()/wake(), add sys_futex_wait(). This
syscall implements what was previously known as FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET
except it uses 'unsigned long' for the value and bitmask arguments,
takes timespec and clockid_t arguments for the absolute timeout and
uses FUTEX2 flags.

The 'unsigned long' allows FUTEX2_SIZE_U64 on 64bit platforms.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

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futex: Add sys_futex_wake()

To complement sys_futex_waitv() add sys_futex_wake(). This syscall
implements what was previously known as FUTEX_WAKE_BITSET except it
uses 'unsigned long' for the bitmas

futex: Add sys_futex_wake()

To complement sys_futex_waitv() add sys_futex_wake(). This syscall
implements what was previously known as FUTEX_WAKE_BITSET except it
uses 'unsigned long' for the bitmask and takes FUTEX2 flags.

The 'unsigned long' allows FUTEX2_SIZE_U64 on 64bit platforms.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

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arch: Register fchmodat2, usually as syscall 452

This registers the new fchmodat2 syscall in most places as nuber 452,
with alpha being the exception where it's 562. I found all these sites
by grep

arch: Register fchmodat2, usually as syscall 452

This registers the new fchmodat2 syscall in most places as nuber 452,
with alpha being the exception where it's 562. I found all these sites
by grepping for fspick, which I assume has found me everything.

Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <a677d521f048e4ca439e7080a5328f21eb8e960e.1689092120.git.legion@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>

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cachestat: wire up cachestat for other architectures

cachestat is previously only wired in for x86 (and architectures using
the generic unistd.h table):

https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230503013608.

cachestat: wire up cachestat for other architectures

cachestat is previously only wired in for x86 (and architectures using
the generic unistd.h table):

https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

This patch wires cachestat in for all the other architectures.

[[email protected]: wire up cachestat for arm64]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Nhat Pham <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> [powerpc]
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]> [m68k]
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> [s390]
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
Cc: Chris Zankel <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Helge Deller <[email protected]>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <[email protected]>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <[email protected]>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <[email protected]>
Cc: Matt Turner <[email protected]>
Cc: Max Filippov <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Simek <[email protected]>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>
Cc: Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
Cc: Rich Felker <[email protected]>
Cc: Russell King <[email protected]>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <[email protected]>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>

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mm/mempolicy: wire up syscall set_mempolicy_home_node

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <[email protected]>

mm/mempolicy: wire up syscall set_mempolicy_home_node

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <[email protected]>
Cc: Ben Widawsky <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc: Feng Tang <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <[email protected]>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Cc: Huang Ying <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

show more ...

futex: Wireup futex_waitv syscall

Wireup futex_waitv syscall for all remaining archs.

Signed-off-by: André Almeida <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Max Filippov <[email protected]>
Acked-by:

futex: Wireup futex_waitv syscall

Wireup futex_waitv syscall for all remaining archs.

Signed-off-by: André Almeida <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Max Filippov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> (powerpc)
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>

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mm: wire up syscall process_mrelease

Split off from prev patch in the series that implements the syscall.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Su

mm: wire up syscall process_mrelease

Split off from prev patch in the series that implements the syscall.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc: Florian Weimer <[email protected]>
Cc: Jan Engelhardt <[email protected]>
Cc: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Minchan Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <[email protected]>
Cc: Tim Murray <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

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exit/bdflush: Remove the deprecated bdflush system call

The bdflush system call has been deprecated for a very long time.
Recently Michael Schmitz tested[1] and found that the last known
caller of o

exit/bdflush: Remove the deprecated bdflush system call

The bdflush system call has been deprecated for a very long time.
Recently Michael Schmitz tested[1] and found that the last known
caller of of the bdflush system call is unaffected by it's removal.

Since the code is not needed delete it.

[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87sg10quue.fsf_-_@disp2133
Tested-by: Michael Schmitz <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Cyril Hrubis <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>

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quota: Wire up quotactl_fd syscall

Wire up the quotactl_fd syscall.

Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>

quota: Disable quotactl_path syscall

In commit fa8b90070a80 ("quota: wire up quotactl_path") we have wired up
new quotactl_path syscall. However some people in LWN discussion have
objected that the

quota: Disable quotactl_path syscall

In commit fa8b90070a80 ("quota: wire up quotactl_path") we have wired up
new quotactl_path syscall. However some people in LWN discussion have
objected that the path based syscall is missing dirfd and flags argument
which is mostly standard for contemporary path based syscalls. Indeed
they have a point and after a discussion with Christian Brauner and
Sascha Hauer I've decided to disable the syscall for now and update its
API. Since there is no userspace currently using that syscall and it
hasn't been released in any major release, we should be fine.

CC: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
CC: Sascha Hauer <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210512153621.n5u43jsytbik4yze@wittgenstein
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>

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arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls

Wire up the following system calls for all architectures:
* landlock_create_ruleset(2)
* landlock_add_rule(2)
* landlock_restrict_self(2)

Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arn

arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls

Wire up the following system calls for all architectures:
* landlock_create_ruleset(2)
* landlock_add_rule(2)
* landlock_restrict_self(2)

Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc: James Morris <[email protected]>
Cc: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>

show more ...

quota: wire up quotactl_path

Wire up the quotactl_path syscall added in the previous patch.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer

quota: wire up quotactl_path

Wire up the quotactl_path syscall added in the previous patch.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>

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fs: add mount_setattr()

This implements the missing mount_setattr() syscall. While the new mount
api allows to change the properties of a superblock there is currently
no way to change the propertie

fs: add mount_setattr()

This implements the missing mount_setattr() syscall. While the new mount
api allows to change the properties of a superblock there is currently
no way to change the properties of a mount or a mount tree using file
descriptors which the new mount api is based on. In addition the old
mount api has the restriction that mount options cannot be applied
recursively. This hasn't changed since changing mount options on a
per-mount basis was implemented in [1] and has been a frequent request
not just for convenience but also for security reasons. The legacy
mount syscall is unable to accommodate this behavior without introducing
a whole new set of flags because MS_REC | MS_REMOUNT | MS_BIND |
MS_RDONLY | MS_NOEXEC | [...] only apply the mount option to the topmost
mount. Changing MS_REC to apply to the whole mount tree would mean
introducing a significant uapi change and would likely cause significant
regressions.

The new mount_setattr() syscall allows to recursively clear and set
mount options in one shot. Multiple calls to change mount options
requesting the same changes are idempotent:

int mount_setattr(int dfd, const char *path, unsigned flags,
struct mount_attr *uattr, size_t usize);

Flags to modify path resolution behavior are specified in the @flags
argument. Currently, AT_EMPTY_PATH, AT_RECURSIVE, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW,
and AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT are supported. If useful, additional lookup flags to
restrict path resolution as introduced with openat2() might be supported
in the future.

The mount_setattr() syscall can be expected to grow over time and is
designed with extensibility in mind. It follows the extensible syscall
pattern we have used with other syscalls such as openat2(), clone3(),
sched_{set,get}attr(), and others.
The set of mount options is passed in the uapi struct mount_attr which
currently has the following layout:

struct mount_attr {
__u64 attr_set;
__u64 attr_clr;
__u64 propagation;
__u64 userns_fd;
};

The @attr_set and @attr_clr members are used to clear and set mount
options. This way a user can e.g. request that a set of flags is to be
raised such as turning mounts readonly by raising MOUNT_ATTR_RDONLY in
@attr_set while at the same time requesting that another set of flags is
to be lowered such as removing noexec from a mount tree by specifying
MOUNT_ATTR_NOEXEC in @attr_clr.

Note, since the MOUNT_ATTR_<atime> values are an enum starting from 0,
not a bitmap, users wanting to transition to a different atime setting
cannot simply specify the atime setting in @attr_set, but must also
specify MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME in the @attr_clr field. So we ensure that
MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME can't be partially set in @attr_clr and that @attr_set
can't have any atime bits set if MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME isn't set in
@attr_clr.

The @propagation field lets callers specify the propagation type of a
mount tree. Propagation is a single property that has four different
settings and as such is not really a flag argument but an enum.
Specifically, it would be unclear what setting and clearing propagation
settings in combination would amount to. The legacy mount() syscall thus
forbids the combination of multiple propagation settings too. The goal
is to keep the semantics of mount propagation somewhat simple as they
are overly complex as it is.

The @userns_fd field lets user specify a user namespace whose idmapping
becomes the idmapping of the mount. This is implemented and explained in
detail in the next patch.

[1]: commit 2e4b7fcd9260 ("[PATCH] r/o bind mounts: honor mount writer counts at remount")

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: David Howells <[email protected]>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>

show more ...

epoll: wire up syscall epoll_pwait2

Split off from prev patch in the series that implements the syscall.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Sig

epoll: wire up syscall epoll_pwait2

Split off from prev patch in the series that implements the syscall.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

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mm/madvise: introduce process_madvise() syscall: an external memory hinting API

There is usecase that System Management Software(SMS) want to give a
memory hint like MADV_[COLD|PAGEEOUT] to other pr

mm/madvise: introduce process_madvise() syscall: an external memory hinting API

There is usecase that System Management Software(SMS) want to give a
memory hint like MADV_[COLD|PAGEEOUT] to other processes and in the
case of Android, it is the ActivityManagerService.

The information required to make the reclaim decision is not known to the
app. Instead, it is known to the centralized userspace
daemon(ActivityManagerService), and that daemon must be able to initiate
reclaim on its own without any app involvement.

To solve the issue, this patch introduces a new syscall
process_madvise(2). It uses pidfd of an external process to give the
hint. It also supports vector address range because Android app has
thousands of vmas due to zygote so it's totally waste of CPU and power if
we should call the syscall one by one for each vma.(With testing 2000-vma
syscall vs 1-vector syscall, it showed 15% performance improvement. I
think it would be bigger in real practice because the testing ran very
cache friendly environment).

Another potential use case for the vector range is to amortize the cost
ofTLB shootdowns for multiple ranges when using MADV_DONTNEED; this could
benefit users like TCP receive zerocopy and malloc implementations. In
future, we could find more usecases for other advises so let's make it
happens as API since we introduce a new syscall at this moment. With
that, existing madvise(2) user could replace it with process_madvise(2)
with their own pid if they want to have batch address ranges support
feature.

ince it could affect other process's address range, only privileged
process(PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS) or something else(e.g., being the same
UID) gives it the right to ptrace the process could use it successfully.
The flag argument is reserved for future use if we need to extend the API.

I think supporting all hints madvise has/will supported/support to
process_madvise is rather risky. Because we are not sure all hints make
sense from external process and implementation for the hint may rely on
the caller being in the current context so it could be error-prone. Thus,
I just limited hints as MADV_[COLD|PAGEOUT] in this patch.

If someone want to add other hints, we could hear the usecase and review
it for each hint. It's safer for maintenance rather than introducing a
buggy syscall but hard to fix it later.

So finally, the API is as follows,

ssize_t process_madvise(int pidfd, const struct iovec *iovec,
unsigned long vlen, int advice, unsigned int flags);

DESCRIPTION
The process_madvise() system call is used to give advice or directions
to the kernel about the address ranges from external process as well as
local process. It provides the advice to address ranges of process
described by iovec and vlen. The goal of such advice is to improve
system or application performance.

The pidfd selects the process referred to by the PID file descriptor
specified in pidfd. (See pidofd_open(2) for further information)

The pointer iovec points to an array of iovec structures, defined in
<sys/uio.h> as:

struct iovec {
void *iov_base; /* starting address */
size_t iov_len; /* number of bytes to be advised */
};

The iovec describes address ranges beginning at address(iov_base)
and with size length of bytes(iov_len).

The vlen represents the number of elements in iovec.

The advice is indicated in the advice argument, which is one of the
following at this moment if the target process specified by pidfd is
external.

MADV_COLD
MADV_PAGEOUT

Permission to provide a hint to external process is governed by a
ptrace access mode PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS check; see ptrace(2).

The process_madvise supports every advice madvise(2) has if target
process is in same thread group with calling process so user could
use process_madvise(2) to extend existing madvise(2) to support
vector address ranges.

RETURN VALUE
On success, process_madvise() returns the number of bytes advised.
This return value may be less than the total number of requested
bytes, if an error occurred. The caller should check return value
to determine whether a partial advice occurred.

FAQ:

Q.1 - Why does any external entity have better knowledge?

Quote from Sandeep

"For Android, every application (including the special SystemServer)
are forked from Zygote. The reason of course is to share as many
libraries and classes between the two as possible to benefit from the
preloading during boot.

After applications start, (almost) all of the APIs end up calling into
this SystemServer process over IPC (binder) and back to the
application.

In a fully running system, the SystemServer monitors every single
process periodically to calculate their PSS / RSS and also decides
which process is "important" to the user for interactivity.

So, because of how these processes start _and_ the fact that the
SystemServer is looping to monitor each process, it does tend to *know*
which address range of the application is not used / useful.

Besides, we can never rely on applications to clean things up
themselves. We've had the "hey app1, the system is low on memory,
please trim your memory usage down" notifications for a long time[1].
They rely on applications honoring the broadcasts and very few do.

So, if we want to avoid the inevitable killing of the application and
restarting it, some way to be able to tell the OS about unimportant
memory in these applications will be useful.

- ssp

Q.2 - How to guarantee the race(i.e., object validation) between when
giving a hint from an external process and get the hint from the target
process?

process_madvise operates on the target process's address space as it
exists at the instant that process_madvise is called. If the space
target process can run between the time the process_madvise process
inspects the target process address space and the time that
process_madvise is actually called, process_madvise may operate on
memory regions that the calling process does not expect. It's the
responsibility of the process calling process_madvise to close this
race condition. For example, the calling process can suspend the
target process with ptrace, SIGSTOP, or the freezer cgroup so that it
doesn't have an opportunity to change its own address space before
process_madvise is called. Another option is to operate on memory
regions that the caller knows a priori will be unchanged in the target
process. Yet another option is to accept the race for certain
process_madvise calls after reasoning that mistargeting will do no
harm. The suggested API itself does not provide synchronization. It
also apply other APIs like move_pages, process_vm_write.

The race isn't really a problem though. Why is it so wrong to require
that callers do their own synchronization in some manner? Nobody
objects to write(2) merely because it's possible for two processes to
open the same file and clobber each other's writes --- instead, we tell
people to use flock or something. Think about mmap. It never
guarantees newly allocated address space is still valid when the user
tries to access it because other threads could unmap the memory right
before. That's where we need synchronization by using other API or
design from userside. It shouldn't be part of API itself. If someone
needs more fine-grained synchronization rather than process level,
there were two ideas suggested - cookie[2] and anon-fd[3]. Both are
applicable via using last reserved argument of the API but I don't
think it's necessary right now since we have already ways to prevent
the race so don't want to add additional complexity with more
fine-grained optimization model.

To make the API extend, it reserved an unsigned long as last argument
so we could support it in future if someone really needs it.

Q.3 - Why doesn't ptrace work?

Injecting an madvise in the target process using ptrace would not work
for us because such injected madvise would have to be executed by the
target process, which means that process would have to be runnable and
that creates the risk of the abovementioned race and hinting a wrong
VMA. Furthermore, we want to act the hint in caller's context, not the
callee's, because the callee is usually limited in cpuset/cgroups or
even freezed state so they can't act by themselves quick enough, which
causes more thrashing/kill. It doesn't work if the target process are
ptraced(e.g., strace, debugger, minidump) because a process can have at
most one ptracer.

[1] https://developer.android.com/topic/performance/memory"

[2] process_getinfo for getting the cookie which is updated whenever
vma of process address layout are changed - Daniel Colascione -
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/T/#m7694416fd179b2066a2c62b5b139b14e3894e224

[3] anonymous fd which is used for the object(i.e., address range)
validation - Michal Hocko -
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

[[email protected]: fix process_madvise build break for arm64]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
[[email protected]: fix build error for mips of process_madvise]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
[[email protected]: fix patch ordering issue]
[[email protected]: fix arm64 whoops]
[[email protected]: make process_madvise() vlen arg have type size_t, per Florian]
[[email protected]: fix i386 build]
[[email protected]: fix syscall numbering]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
[[email protected]: madvise.c needs compat.h]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
[[email protected]: fix mips build]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
[[email protected]: remove duplicate header which is included twice]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
[[email protected]: do not use helper functions for process_madvise]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
[[email protected]: pidfd_get_pid() gained an argument]
[[email protected]: fix up for "iov_iter: transparently handle compat iovecs in import_iovec"]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Duyck <[email protected]>
Cc: Brian Geffon <[email protected]>
Cc: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
Cc: Daniel Colascione <[email protected]>
Cc: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Cc: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Cc: Joel Fernandes <[email protected]>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: John Dias <[email protected]>
Cc: Kirill Tkhai <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleksandr Natalenko <[email protected]>
Cc: Sandeep Patil <[email protected]>
Cc: SeongJae Park <[email protected]>
Cc: SeongJae Park <[email protected]>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <[email protected]>
Cc: Sonny Rao <[email protected]>
Cc: Tim Murray <[email protected]>
Cc: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
Cc: Florian Weimer <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

show more ...

all arch: remove system call sys_sysctl

Since commit 61a47c1ad3a4dc ("sysctl: Remove the sysctl system call"),
sys_sysctl is actually unavailable: any input can only return an error.

We have been w

all arch: remove system call sys_sysctl

Since commit 61a47c1ad3a4dc ("sysctl: Remove the sysctl system call"),
sys_sysctl is actually unavailable: any input can only return an error.

We have been warning about people using the sysctl system call for years
and believe there are no more users. Even if there are users of this
interface if they have not complained or fixed their code by now they
probably are not going to, so there is no point in warning them any
longer.

So completely remove sys_sysctl on all architectures.

[[email protected]: s390: fix build error for sys_call_table_emu]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

Signed-off-by: Xiaoming Ni <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]> [arm/arm64]
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <[email protected]>
Cc: Bin Meng <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Brian Gerst <[email protected]>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc: chenzefeng <[email protected]>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]>
Cc: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
Cc: Chris Zankel <[email protected]>
Cc: David Howells <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Diego Elio Pettenò <[email protected]>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <[email protected]>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <[email protected]>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Helge Deller <[email protected]>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Iurii Zaikin <[email protected]>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <[email protected]>
Cc: James Bottomley <[email protected]>
Cc: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Kars de Jong <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]>
Cc: Luis Chamberlain <[email protected]>
Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <[email protected]>
Cc: Matt Turner <[email protected]>
Cc: Max Filippov <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Simek <[email protected]>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
Cc: Minchan Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Naveen N. Rao <[email protected]>
Cc: Nick Piggin <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: Olof Johansson <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Burton <[email protected]>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <[email protected]>
Cc: Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
Cc: Rich Felker <[email protected]>
Cc: Russell King <[email protected]>
Cc: Sami Tolvanen <[email protected]>
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <[email protected]>
Cc: Sudeep Holla <[email protected]>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Tony Luck <[email protected]>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <[email protected]>
Cc: Zhou Yanjie <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

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arch: wire-up close_range()

This wires up the close_range() syscall into all arches at once.

Suggested-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]

arch: wire-up close_range()

This wires up the close_range() syscall into all arches at once.

Suggested-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> (powerpc)
Cc: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Cc: David Howells <[email protected]>
Cc: Dmitry V. Levin <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Florian Weimer <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]

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