1 //== GenericTaintChecker.cpp ----------------------------------- -*- C++ -*--=//
2 //
3 // Part of the LLVM Project, under the Apache License v2.0 with LLVM Exceptions.
4 // See https://llvm.org/LICENSE.txt for license information.
5 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 WITH LLVM-exception
6 //
7 //===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
8 //
9 // This checker defines the attack surface for generic taint propagation.
10 //
11 // The taint information produced by it might be useful to other checkers. For
12 // example, checkers should report errors which involve tainted data more
13 // aggressively, even if the involved symbols are under constrained.
14 //
15 //===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
16 
17 #include "Yaml.h"
18 #include "clang/AST/Attr.h"
19 #include "clang/Basic/Builtins.h"
20 #include "clang/StaticAnalyzer/Checkers/BuiltinCheckerRegistration.h"
21 #include "clang/StaticAnalyzer/Checkers/Taint.h"
22 #include "clang/StaticAnalyzer/Core/BugReporter/BugType.h"
23 #include "clang/StaticAnalyzer/Core/Checker.h"
24 #include "clang/StaticAnalyzer/Core/CheckerManager.h"
25 #include "clang/StaticAnalyzer/Core/PathSensitive/CallDescription.h"
26 #include "clang/StaticAnalyzer/Core/PathSensitive/CallEvent.h"
27 #include "clang/StaticAnalyzer/Core/PathSensitive/CheckerContext.h"
28 #include "clang/StaticAnalyzer/Core/PathSensitive/ProgramStateTrait.h"
29 #include "llvm/Support/YAMLTraits.h"
30 
31 #include <limits>
32 #include <memory>
33 #include <utility>
34 
35 #define DEBUG_TYPE "taint-checker"
36 
37 using namespace clang;
38 using namespace ento;
39 using namespace taint;
40 
41 using llvm::ImmutableSet;
42 
43 namespace {
44 
45 class GenericTaintChecker;
46 
47 /// Check for CWE-134: Uncontrolled Format String.
48 constexpr llvm::StringLiteral MsgUncontrolledFormatString =
49     "Untrusted data is used as a format string "
50     "(CWE-134: Uncontrolled Format String)";
51 
52 /// Check for:
53 /// CERT/STR02-C. "Sanitize data passed to complex subsystems"
54 /// CWE-78, "Failure to Sanitize Data into an OS Command"
55 constexpr llvm::StringLiteral MsgSanitizeSystemArgs =
56     "Untrusted data is passed to a system call "
57     "(CERT/STR02-C. Sanitize data passed to complex subsystems)";
58 
59 /// Check if tainted data is used as a buffer size in strn.. functions,
60 /// and allocators.
61 constexpr llvm::StringLiteral MsgTaintedBufferSize =
62     "Untrusted data is used to specify the buffer size "
63     "(CERT/STR31-C. Guarantee that storage for strings has sufficient space "
64     "for character data and the null terminator)";
65 
66 /// Check if tainted data is used as a custom sink's parameter.
67 constexpr llvm::StringLiteral MsgCustomSink =
68     "Untrusted data is passed to a user-defined sink";
69 
70 using ArgIdxTy = int;
71 using ArgVecTy = llvm::SmallVector<ArgIdxTy, 2>;
72 
73 /// Denotes the return value.
74 constexpr ArgIdxTy ReturnValueIndex{-1};
75 
76 static ArgIdxTy fromArgumentCount(unsigned Count) {
77   assert(Count <=
78              static_cast<std::size_t>(std::numeric_limits<ArgIdxTy>::max()) &&
79          "ArgIdxTy is not large enough to represent the number of arguments.");
80   return Count;
81 }
82 
83 /// Check if the region the expression evaluates to is the standard input,
84 /// and thus, is tainted.
85 /// FIXME: Move this to Taint.cpp.
86 bool isStdin(SVal Val, const ASTContext &ACtx) {
87   // FIXME: What if Val is NonParamVarRegion?
88 
89   // The region should be symbolic, we do not know it's value.
90   const auto *SymReg = dyn_cast_or_null<SymbolicRegion>(Val.getAsRegion());
91   if (!SymReg)
92     return false;
93 
94   // Get it's symbol and find the declaration region it's pointing to.
95   const auto *Sm = dyn_cast<SymbolRegionValue>(SymReg->getSymbol());
96   if (!Sm)
97     return false;
98   const auto *DeclReg = dyn_cast<DeclRegion>(Sm->getRegion());
99   if (!DeclReg)
100     return false;
101 
102   // This region corresponds to a declaration, find out if it's a global/extern
103   // variable named stdin with the proper type.
104   if (const auto *D = dyn_cast_or_null<VarDecl>(DeclReg->getDecl())) {
105     D = D->getCanonicalDecl();
106     // FIXME: This should look for an exact match.
107     if (D->getName().contains("stdin") && D->isExternC()) {
108       const QualType FILETy = ACtx.getFILEType().getCanonicalType();
109       const QualType Ty = D->getType().getCanonicalType();
110 
111       if (Ty->isPointerType())
112         return Ty->getPointeeType() == FILETy;
113     }
114   }
115   return false;
116 }
117 
118 SVal getPointeeOf(const CheckerContext &C, Loc LValue) {
119   const QualType ArgTy = LValue.getType(C.getASTContext());
120   if (!ArgTy->isPointerType() || !ArgTy->getPointeeType()->isVoidType())
121     return C.getState()->getSVal(LValue);
122 
123   // Do not dereference void pointers. Treat them as byte pointers instead.
124   // FIXME: we might want to consider more than just the first byte.
125   return C.getState()->getSVal(LValue, C.getASTContext().CharTy);
126 }
127 
128 /// Given a pointer/reference argument, return the value it refers to.
129 Optional<SVal> getPointeeOf(const CheckerContext &C, SVal Arg) {
130   if (auto LValue = Arg.getAs<Loc>())
131     return getPointeeOf(C, *LValue);
132   return None;
133 }
134 
135 /// Given a pointer, return the SVal of its pointee or if it is tainted,
136 /// otherwise return the pointer's SVal if tainted.
137 /// Also considers stdin as a taint source.
138 Optional<SVal> getTaintedPointeeOrPointer(const CheckerContext &C, SVal Arg) {
139   const ProgramStateRef State = C.getState();
140 
141   if (auto Pointee = getPointeeOf(C, Arg))
142     if (isTainted(State, *Pointee)) // FIXME: isTainted(...) ? Pointee : None;
143       return Pointee;
144 
145   if (isTainted(State, Arg))
146     return Arg;
147 
148   // FIXME: This should be done by the isTainted() API.
149   if (isStdin(Arg, C.getASTContext()))
150     return Arg;
151 
152   return None;
153 }
154 
155 bool isTaintedOrPointsToTainted(const Expr *E, const ProgramStateRef &State,
156                                 CheckerContext &C) {
157   return getTaintedPointeeOrPointer(C, C.getSVal(E)).hasValue();
158 }
159 
160 /// ArgSet is used to describe arguments relevant for taint detection or
161 /// taint application. A discrete set of argument indexes and a variadic
162 /// argument list signified by a starting index are supported.
163 class ArgSet {
164 public:
165   ArgSet() = default;
166   ArgSet(ArgVecTy &&DiscreteArgs, Optional<ArgIdxTy> VariadicIndex = None)
167       : DiscreteArgs(std::move(DiscreteArgs)),
168         VariadicIndex(std::move(VariadicIndex)) {}
169 
170   bool contains(ArgIdxTy ArgIdx) const {
171     if (llvm::is_contained(DiscreteArgs, ArgIdx))
172       return true;
173 
174     return VariadicIndex && ArgIdx >= *VariadicIndex;
175   }
176 
177   bool isEmpty() const { return DiscreteArgs.empty() && !VariadicIndex; }
178 
179   ArgVecTy ArgsUpTo(ArgIdxTy LastArgIdx) const {
180     ArgVecTy Args;
181     for (ArgIdxTy I = ReturnValueIndex; I <= LastArgIdx; ++I) {
182       if (contains(I))
183         Args.push_back(I);
184     }
185     return Args;
186   }
187 
188 private:
189   ArgVecTy DiscreteArgs;
190   Optional<ArgIdxTy> VariadicIndex;
191 };
192 
193 /// A struct used to specify taint propagation rules for a function.
194 ///
195 /// If any of the possible taint source arguments is tainted, all of the
196 /// destination arguments should also be tainted. If ReturnValueIndex is added
197 /// to the dst list, the return value will be tainted.
198 class GenericTaintRule {
199   /// Arguments which are taints sinks and should be checked, and a report
200   /// should be emitted if taint reaches these.
201   ArgSet SinkArgs;
202   /// Arguments which should be sanitized on function return.
203   ArgSet FilterArgs;
204   /// Arguments which can participate in taint propagationa. If any of the
205   /// arguments in PropSrcArgs is tainted, all arguments in  PropDstArgs should
206   /// be tainted.
207   ArgSet PropSrcArgs;
208   ArgSet PropDstArgs;
209 
210   /// A message that explains why the call is sensitive to taint.
211   Optional<StringRef> SinkMsg;
212 
213   GenericTaintRule() = default;
214 
215   GenericTaintRule(ArgSet &&Sink, ArgSet &&Filter, ArgSet &&Src, ArgSet &&Dst,
216                    Optional<StringRef> SinkMsg = None)
217       : SinkArgs(std::move(Sink)), FilterArgs(std::move(Filter)),
218         PropSrcArgs(std::move(Src)), PropDstArgs(std::move(Dst)),
219         SinkMsg(SinkMsg) {}
220 
221 public:
222   /// Make a rule that reports a warning if taint reaches any of \p FilterArgs
223   /// arguments.
224   static GenericTaintRule Sink(ArgSet &&SinkArgs,
225                                Optional<StringRef> Msg = None) {
226     return {std::move(SinkArgs), {}, {}, {}, Msg};
227   }
228 
229   /// Make a rule that sanitizes all FilterArgs arguments.
230   static GenericTaintRule Filter(ArgSet &&FilterArgs) {
231     return {{}, std::move(FilterArgs), {}, {}};
232   }
233 
234   /// Make a rule that unconditionally taints all Args.
235   /// If Func is provided, it must also return true for taint to propagate.
236   static GenericTaintRule Source(ArgSet &&SourceArgs) {
237     return {{}, {}, {}, std::move(SourceArgs)};
238   }
239 
240   /// Make a rule that taints all PropDstArgs if any of PropSrcArgs is tainted.
241   static GenericTaintRule Prop(ArgSet &&SrcArgs, ArgSet &&DstArgs) {
242     return {{}, {}, std::move(SrcArgs), std::move(DstArgs)};
243   }
244 
245   /// Make a rule that taints all PropDstArgs if any of PropSrcArgs is tainted.
246   static GenericTaintRule SinkProp(ArgSet &&SinkArgs, ArgSet &&SrcArgs,
247                                    ArgSet &&DstArgs,
248                                    Optional<StringRef> Msg = None) {
249     return {
250         std::move(SinkArgs), {}, std::move(SrcArgs), std::move(DstArgs), Msg};
251   }
252 
253   /// Process a function which could either be a taint source, a taint sink, a
254   /// taint filter or a taint propagator.
255   void process(const GenericTaintChecker &Checker, const CallEvent &Call,
256                CheckerContext &C) const;
257 
258   /// Handles the resolution of indexes of type ArgIdxTy to Expr*-s.
259   static const Expr *GetArgExpr(ArgIdxTy ArgIdx, const CallEvent &Call) {
260     return ArgIdx == ReturnValueIndex ? Call.getOriginExpr()
261                                       : Call.getArgExpr(ArgIdx);
262   };
263 
264   /// Functions for custom taintedness propagation.
265   static bool UntrustedEnv(CheckerContext &C);
266 };
267 
268 using RuleLookupTy = CallDescriptionMap<GenericTaintRule>;
269 
270 /// Used to parse the configuration file.
271 struct TaintConfiguration {
272   using NameScopeArgs = std::tuple<std::string, std::string, ArgVecTy>;
273   enum class VariadicType { None, Src, Dst };
274 
275   struct Common {
276     std::string Name;
277     std::string Scope;
278   };
279 
280   struct Sink : Common {
281     ArgVecTy SinkArgs;
282   };
283 
284   struct Filter : Common {
285     ArgVecTy FilterArgs;
286   };
287 
288   struct Propagation : Common {
289     ArgVecTy SrcArgs;
290     ArgVecTy DstArgs;
291     VariadicType VarType;
292     ArgIdxTy VarIndex;
293   };
294 
295   std::vector<Propagation> Propagations;
296   std::vector<Filter> Filters;
297   std::vector<Sink> Sinks;
298 
299   TaintConfiguration() = default;
300   TaintConfiguration(const TaintConfiguration &) = default;
301   TaintConfiguration(TaintConfiguration &&) = default;
302   TaintConfiguration &operator=(const TaintConfiguration &) = default;
303   TaintConfiguration &operator=(TaintConfiguration &&) = default;
304 };
305 
306 struct GenericTaintRuleParser {
307   GenericTaintRuleParser(CheckerManager &Mgr) : Mgr(Mgr) {}
308   /// Container type used to gather call identification objects grouped into
309   /// pairs with their corresponding taint rules. It is temporary as it is used
310   /// to finally initialize RuleLookupTy, which is considered to be immutable.
311   using RulesContTy = std::vector<std::pair<CallDescription, GenericTaintRule>>;
312   RulesContTy parseConfiguration(const std::string &Option,
313                                  TaintConfiguration &&Config) const;
314 
315 private:
316   using NamePartsTy = llvm::SmallVector<SmallString<32>, 2>;
317 
318   /// Validate part of the configuration, which contains a list of argument
319   /// indexes.
320   void validateArgVector(const std::string &Option, const ArgVecTy &Args) const;
321 
322   template <typename Config> static NamePartsTy parseNameParts(const Config &C);
323 
324   // Takes the config and creates a CallDescription for it and associates a Rule
325   // with that.
326   template <typename Config>
327   static void consumeRulesFromConfig(const Config &C, GenericTaintRule &&Rule,
328                                      RulesContTy &Rules);
329 
330   void parseConfig(const std::string &Option, TaintConfiguration::Sink &&P,
331                    RulesContTy &Rules) const;
332   void parseConfig(const std::string &Option, TaintConfiguration::Filter &&P,
333                    RulesContTy &Rules) const;
334   void parseConfig(const std::string &Option,
335                    TaintConfiguration::Propagation &&P,
336                    RulesContTy &Rules) const;
337 
338   CheckerManager &Mgr;
339 };
340 
341 class GenericTaintChecker : public Checker<check::PreCall, check::PostCall> {
342 public:
343   static void *getTag() {
344     static int Tag;
345     return &Tag;
346   }
347 
348   void checkPreCall(const CallEvent &Call, CheckerContext &C) const;
349   void checkPostCall(const CallEvent &Call, CheckerContext &C) const;
350 
351   void printState(raw_ostream &Out, ProgramStateRef State, const char *NL,
352                   const char *Sep) const override;
353 
354   /// Generate a report if the expression is tainted or points to tainted data.
355   bool generateReportIfTainted(const Expr *E, StringRef Msg,
356                                CheckerContext &C) const;
357 
358 private:
359   const BugType BT{this, "Use of Untrusted Data", "Untrusted Data"};
360 
361   bool checkUncontrolledFormatString(const CallEvent &Call,
362                                      CheckerContext &C) const;
363 
364   void taintUnsafeSocketProtocol(const CallEvent &Call,
365                                  CheckerContext &C) const;
366 
367   /// Default taint rules are initilized with the help of a CheckerContext to
368   /// access the names of built-in functions like memcpy.
369   void initTaintRules(CheckerContext &C) const;
370 
371   /// CallDescription currently cannot restrict matches to the global namespace
372   /// only, which is why multiple CallDescriptionMaps are used, as we want to
373   /// disambiguate global C functions from functions inside user-defined
374   /// namespaces.
375   // TODO: Remove separation to simplify matching logic once CallDescriptions
376   // are more expressive.
377 
378   mutable Optional<RuleLookupTy> StaticTaintRules;
379   mutable Optional<RuleLookupTy> DynamicTaintRules;
380 };
381 } // end of anonymous namespace
382 
383 /// YAML serialization mapping.
384 LLVM_YAML_IS_SEQUENCE_VECTOR(TaintConfiguration::Sink)
385 LLVM_YAML_IS_SEQUENCE_VECTOR(TaintConfiguration::Filter)
386 LLVM_YAML_IS_SEQUENCE_VECTOR(TaintConfiguration::Propagation)
387 
388 namespace llvm {
389 namespace yaml {
390 template <> struct MappingTraits<TaintConfiguration> {
391   static void mapping(IO &IO, TaintConfiguration &Config) {
392     IO.mapOptional("Propagations", Config.Propagations);
393     IO.mapOptional("Filters", Config.Filters);
394     IO.mapOptional("Sinks", Config.Sinks);
395   }
396 };
397 
398 template <> struct MappingTraits<TaintConfiguration::Sink> {
399   static void mapping(IO &IO, TaintConfiguration::Sink &Sink) {
400     IO.mapRequired("Name", Sink.Name);
401     IO.mapOptional("Scope", Sink.Scope);
402     IO.mapRequired("Args", Sink.SinkArgs);
403   }
404 };
405 
406 template <> struct MappingTraits<TaintConfiguration::Filter> {
407   static void mapping(IO &IO, TaintConfiguration::Filter &Filter) {
408     IO.mapRequired("Name", Filter.Name);
409     IO.mapOptional("Scope", Filter.Scope);
410     IO.mapRequired("Args", Filter.FilterArgs);
411   }
412 };
413 
414 template <> struct MappingTraits<TaintConfiguration::Propagation> {
415   static void mapping(IO &IO, TaintConfiguration::Propagation &Propagation) {
416     IO.mapRequired("Name", Propagation.Name);
417     IO.mapOptional("Scope", Propagation.Scope);
418     IO.mapOptional("SrcArgs", Propagation.SrcArgs);
419     IO.mapOptional("DstArgs", Propagation.DstArgs);
420     IO.mapOptional("VariadicType", Propagation.VarType);
421     IO.mapOptional("VariadicIndex", Propagation.VarIndex);
422   }
423 };
424 
425 template <> struct ScalarEnumerationTraits<TaintConfiguration::VariadicType> {
426   static void enumeration(IO &IO, TaintConfiguration::VariadicType &Value) {
427     IO.enumCase(Value, "None", TaintConfiguration::VariadicType::None);
428     IO.enumCase(Value, "Src", TaintConfiguration::VariadicType::Src);
429     IO.enumCase(Value, "Dst", TaintConfiguration::VariadicType::Dst);
430   }
431 };
432 } // namespace yaml
433 } // namespace llvm
434 
435 /// A set which is used to pass information from call pre-visit instruction
436 /// to the call post-visit. The values are signed integers, which are either
437 /// ReturnValueIndex, or indexes of the pointer/reference argument, which
438 /// points to data, which should be tainted on return.
439 REGISTER_MAP_WITH_PROGRAMSTATE(TaintArgsOnPostVisit, const LocationContext *,
440                                ImmutableSet<ArgIdxTy>)
441 REGISTER_SET_FACTORY_WITH_PROGRAMSTATE(ArgIdxFactory, ArgIdxTy)
442 
443 void GenericTaintRuleParser::validateArgVector(const std::string &Option,
444                                                const ArgVecTy &Args) const {
445   for (ArgIdxTy Arg : Args) {
446     if (Arg < ReturnValueIndex) {
447       Mgr.reportInvalidCheckerOptionValue(
448           Mgr.getChecker<GenericTaintChecker>(), Option,
449           "an argument number for propagation rules greater or equal to -1");
450     }
451   }
452 }
453 
454 template <typename Config>
455 GenericTaintRuleParser::NamePartsTy
456 GenericTaintRuleParser::parseNameParts(const Config &C) {
457   NamePartsTy NameParts;
458   if (!C.Scope.empty()) {
459     // If the Scope argument contains multiple "::" parts, those are considered
460     // namespace identifiers.
461     llvm::SmallVector<StringRef, 2> NSParts;
462     StringRef{C.Scope}.split(NSParts, "::", /*MaxSplit*/ -1,
463                              /*KeepEmpty*/ false);
464     NameParts.append(NSParts.begin(), NSParts.end());
465   }
466   NameParts.emplace_back(C.Name);
467   return NameParts;
468 }
469 
470 template <typename Config>
471 void GenericTaintRuleParser::consumeRulesFromConfig(const Config &C,
472                                                     GenericTaintRule &&Rule,
473                                                     RulesContTy &Rules) {
474   NamePartsTy NameParts = parseNameParts(C);
475   llvm::SmallVector<const char *, 2> CallDescParts{NameParts.size()};
476   llvm::transform(NameParts, CallDescParts.begin(),
477                   [](SmallString<32> &S) { return S.c_str(); });
478   Rules.emplace_back(CallDescription(CallDescParts), std::move(Rule));
479 }
480 
481 void GenericTaintRuleParser::parseConfig(const std::string &Option,
482                                          TaintConfiguration::Sink &&S,
483                                          RulesContTy &Rules) const {
484   validateArgVector(Option, S.SinkArgs);
485   consumeRulesFromConfig(S, GenericTaintRule::Sink(std::move(S.SinkArgs)),
486                          Rules);
487 }
488 
489 void GenericTaintRuleParser::parseConfig(const std::string &Option,
490                                          TaintConfiguration::Filter &&S,
491                                          RulesContTy &Rules) const {
492   validateArgVector(Option, S.FilterArgs);
493   consumeRulesFromConfig(S, GenericTaintRule::Filter(std::move(S.FilterArgs)),
494                          Rules);
495 }
496 
497 void GenericTaintRuleParser::parseConfig(const std::string &Option,
498                                          TaintConfiguration::Propagation &&P,
499                                          RulesContTy &Rules) const {
500   validateArgVector(Option, P.SrcArgs);
501   validateArgVector(Option, P.DstArgs);
502   bool IsSrcVariadic = P.VarType == TaintConfiguration::VariadicType::Src;
503   bool IsDstVariadic = P.VarType == TaintConfiguration::VariadicType::Dst;
504   Optional<ArgIdxTy> JustVarIndex = P.VarIndex;
505 
506   ArgSet SrcDesc(std::move(P.SrcArgs), IsSrcVariadic ? JustVarIndex : None);
507   ArgSet DstDesc(std::move(P.DstArgs), IsDstVariadic ? JustVarIndex : None);
508 
509   consumeRulesFromConfig(
510       P, GenericTaintRule::Prop(std::move(SrcDesc), std::move(DstDesc)), Rules);
511 }
512 
513 GenericTaintRuleParser::RulesContTy
514 GenericTaintRuleParser::parseConfiguration(const std::string &Option,
515                                            TaintConfiguration &&Config) const {
516 
517   RulesContTy Rules;
518 
519   for (auto &F : Config.Filters)
520     parseConfig(Option, std::move(F), Rules);
521 
522   for (auto &S : Config.Sinks)
523     parseConfig(Option, std::move(S), Rules);
524 
525   for (auto &P : Config.Propagations)
526     parseConfig(Option, std::move(P), Rules);
527 
528   return Rules;
529 }
530 
531 void GenericTaintChecker::initTaintRules(CheckerContext &C) const {
532   // Check for exact name match for functions without builtin substitutes.
533   // Use qualified name, because these are C functions without namespace.
534 
535   if (StaticTaintRules || DynamicTaintRules)
536     return;
537 
538   using RulesConstructionTy =
539       std::vector<std::pair<CallDescription, GenericTaintRule>>;
540   using TR = GenericTaintRule;
541 
542   const Builtin::Context &BI = C.getASTContext().BuiltinInfo;
543 
544   RulesConstructionTy GlobalCRules{
545       // Sources
546       {{"fdopen"}, TR::Source({{ReturnValueIndex}})},
547       {{"fopen"}, TR::Source({{ReturnValueIndex}})},
548       {{"freopen"}, TR::Source({{ReturnValueIndex}})},
549       {{"getch"}, TR::Source({{ReturnValueIndex}})},
550       {{"getchar"}, TR::Source({{ReturnValueIndex}})},
551       {{"getchar_unlocked"}, TR::Source({{ReturnValueIndex}})},
552       {{"gets"}, TR::Source({{0}, ReturnValueIndex})},
553       {{"gets_s"}, TR::Source({{0}, ReturnValueIndex})},
554       {{"scanf"}, TR::Source({{}, 1})},
555       {{"scanf_s"}, TR::Source({{}, {1}})},
556       {{"wgetch"}, TR::Source({{}, ReturnValueIndex})},
557       // Sometimes the line between taint sources and propagators is blurry.
558       // _IO_getc is choosen to be a source, but could also be a propagator.
559       // This way it is simpler, as modeling it as a propagator would require
560       // to model the possible sources of _IO_FILE * values, which the _IO_getc
561       // function takes as parameters.
562       {{"_IO_getc"}, TR::Source({{ReturnValueIndex}})},
563       {{"getcwd"}, TR::Source({{0, ReturnValueIndex}})},
564       {{"getwd"}, TR::Source({{0, ReturnValueIndex}})},
565       {{"readlink"}, TR::Source({{1, ReturnValueIndex}})},
566       {{"readlinkat"}, TR::Source({{2, ReturnValueIndex}})},
567       {{"get_current_dir_name"}, TR::Source({{ReturnValueIndex}})},
568       {{"gethostname"}, TR::Source({{0}})},
569       {{"getnameinfo"}, TR::Source({{2, 4}})},
570       {{"getseuserbyname"}, TR::Source({{1, 2}})},
571       {{"getgroups"}, TR::Source({{1, ReturnValueIndex}})},
572       {{"getlogin"}, TR::Source({{ReturnValueIndex}})},
573       {{"getlogin_r"}, TR::Source({{0}})},
574 
575       // Props
576       {{"atoi"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
577       {{"atol"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
578       {{"atoll"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
579       {{"fgetc"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
580       {{"fgetln"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
581       {{"fgets"}, TR::Prop({{2}}, {{0, ReturnValueIndex}})},
582       {{"fscanf"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{}, 2})},
583       {{"fscanf_s"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{}, {2}})},
584       {{"sscanf"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{}, 2})},
585 
586       {{"getc"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
587       {{"getc_unlocked"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
588       {{"getdelim"}, TR::Prop({{3}}, {{0}})},
589       {{"getline"}, TR::Prop({{2}}, {{0}})},
590       {{"getw"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
591       {{"pread"}, TR::Prop({{0, 1, 2, 3}}, {{1, ReturnValueIndex}})},
592       {{"read"}, TR::Prop({{0, 2}}, {{1, ReturnValueIndex}})},
593       {{"strchr"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
594       {{"strrchr"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
595       {{"tolower"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
596       {{"toupper"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
597       {{"fread"}, TR::Prop({{3}}, {{0, ReturnValueIndex}})},
598       {{"recv"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{1, ReturnValueIndex}})},
599       {{"recvfrom"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{1, ReturnValueIndex}})},
600 
601       {{"ttyname"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
602       {{"ttyname_r"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{1, ReturnValueIndex}})},
603 
604       {{"basename"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
605       {{"dirname"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
606       {{"fnmatch"}, TR::Prop({{1}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
607       {{"memchr"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
608       {{"memrchr"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
609       {{"rawmemchr"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
610 
611       {{"mbtowc"}, TR::Prop({{1}}, {{0, ReturnValueIndex}})},
612       {{"wctomb"}, TR::Prop({{1}}, {{0, ReturnValueIndex}})},
613       {{"wcwidth"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
614 
615       {{"memcmp"}, TR::Prop({{0, 1}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
616       {{"memcpy"}, TR::Prop({{1}}, {{0, ReturnValueIndex}})},
617       {{"memmove"}, TR::Prop({{1}}, {{0, ReturnValueIndex}})},
618       // If memmem was called with a tainted needle and the search was
619       // successful, that would mean that the value pointed by the return value
620       // has the same content as the needle. If we choose to go by the policy of
621       // content equivalence implies taintedness equivalence, that would mean
622       // haystack should be considered a propagation source argument.
623       {{"memmem"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
624 
625       // The comment for memmem above also applies to strstr.
626       {{"strstr"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
627       {{"strcasestr"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
628 
629       {{"strchrnul"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
630 
631       {{"index"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
632       {{"rindex"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
633 
634       // FIXME: In case of arrays, only the first element of the array gets
635       // tainted.
636       {{"qsort"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{0}})},
637       {{"qsort_r"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{0}})},
638 
639       {{"strcmp"}, TR::Prop({{0, 1}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
640       {{"strcasecmp"}, TR::Prop({{0, 1}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
641       {{"strncmp"}, TR::Prop({{0, 1, 2}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
642       {{"strncasecmp"}, TR::Prop({{0, 1, 2}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
643       {{"strspn"}, TR::Prop({{0, 1}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
644       {{"strcspn"}, TR::Prop({{0, 1}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
645       {{"strpbrk"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
646       {{"strndup"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
647       {{"strndupa"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
648       {{"strlen"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
649       {{"strnlen"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
650       {{"strtol"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{1, ReturnValueIndex}})},
651       {{"strtoll"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{1, ReturnValueIndex}})},
652       {{"strtoul"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{1, ReturnValueIndex}})},
653       {{"strtoull"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{1, ReturnValueIndex}})},
654 
655       {{"isalnum"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
656       {{"isalpha"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
657       {{"isascii"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
658       {{"isblank"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
659       {{"iscntrl"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
660       {{"isdigit"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
661       {{"isgraph"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
662       {{"islower"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
663       {{"isprint"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
664       {{"ispunct"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
665       {{"isspace"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
666       {{"isupper"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
667       {{"isxdigit"}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
668 
669       {{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {BI.getName(Builtin::BIstrncat)}},
670        TR::Prop({{1, 2}}, {{0, ReturnValueIndex}})},
671       {{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {BI.getName(Builtin::BIstrlcpy)}},
672        TR::Prop({{1, 2}}, {{0}})},
673       {{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {BI.getName(Builtin::BIstrlcat)}},
674        TR::Prop({{1, 2}}, {{0}})},
675       {{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {"snprintf"}},
676        TR::Prop({{1}, 3}, {{0, ReturnValueIndex}})},
677       {{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {"sprintf"}},
678        TR::Prop({{1}, 2}, {{0, ReturnValueIndex}})},
679       {{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {"strcpy"}},
680        TR::Prop({{1}}, {{0, ReturnValueIndex}})},
681       {{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {"stpcpy"}},
682        TR::Prop({{1}}, {{0, ReturnValueIndex}})},
683       {{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {"strcat"}},
684        TR::Prop({{1}}, {{0, ReturnValueIndex}})},
685       {{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {"strdup"}}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
686       {{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {"strdupa"}}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
687       {{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {"wcsdup"}}, TR::Prop({{0}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}})},
688 
689       // Sinks
690       {{"system"}, TR::Sink({{0}}, MsgSanitizeSystemArgs)},
691       {{"popen"}, TR::Sink({{0}}, MsgSanitizeSystemArgs)},
692       {{"execl"}, TR::Sink({{0}}, MsgSanitizeSystemArgs)},
693       {{"execle"}, TR::Sink({{0}}, MsgSanitizeSystemArgs)},
694       {{"execlp"}, TR::Sink({{0}}, MsgSanitizeSystemArgs)},
695       {{"execvp"}, TR::Sink({{0}}, MsgSanitizeSystemArgs)},
696       {{"execvP"}, TR::Sink({{0}}, MsgSanitizeSystemArgs)},
697       {{"execve"}, TR::Sink({{0}}, MsgSanitizeSystemArgs)},
698       {{"dlopen"}, TR::Sink({{0}}, MsgSanitizeSystemArgs)},
699       {{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {"malloc"}}, TR::Sink({{0}}, MsgTaintedBufferSize)},
700       {{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {"calloc"}}, TR::Sink({{0}}, MsgTaintedBufferSize)},
701       {{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {"alloca"}}, TR::Sink({{0}}, MsgTaintedBufferSize)},
702       {{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {"memccpy"}}, TR::Sink({{3}}, MsgTaintedBufferSize)},
703       {{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {"realloc"}}, TR::Sink({{1}}, MsgTaintedBufferSize)},
704       {{{"setproctitle"}}, TR::Sink({{0}, 1}, MsgUncontrolledFormatString)},
705       {{{"setproctitle_fast"}},
706        TR::Sink({{0}, 1}, MsgUncontrolledFormatString)},
707 
708       // SinkProps
709       {{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, BI.getName(Builtin::BImemcpy)},
710        TR::SinkProp({{2}}, {{1, 2}}, {{0, ReturnValueIndex}},
711                     MsgTaintedBufferSize)},
712       {{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {BI.getName(Builtin::BImemmove)}},
713        TR::SinkProp({{2}}, {{1, 2}}, {{0, ReturnValueIndex}},
714                     MsgTaintedBufferSize)},
715       {{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {BI.getName(Builtin::BIstrncpy)}},
716        TR::SinkProp({{2}}, {{1, 2}}, {{0, ReturnValueIndex}},
717                     MsgTaintedBufferSize)},
718       {{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {BI.getName(Builtin::BIstrndup)}},
719        TR::SinkProp({{1}}, {{0, 1}}, {{ReturnValueIndex}},
720                     MsgTaintedBufferSize)},
721       {{CDF_MaybeBuiltin, {"bcopy"}},
722        TR::SinkProp({{2}}, {{0, 2}}, {{1}}, MsgTaintedBufferSize)}};
723 
724   // `getenv` returns taint only in untrusted environments.
725   if (TR::UntrustedEnv(C)) {
726     // void setproctitle_init(int argc, char *argv[], char *envp[])
727     GlobalCRules.push_back(
728         {{{"setproctitle_init"}}, TR::Sink({{1, 2}}, MsgCustomSink)});
729     GlobalCRules.push_back({{"getenv"}, TR::Source({{ReturnValueIndex}})});
730   }
731 
732   StaticTaintRules.emplace(std::make_move_iterator(GlobalCRules.begin()),
733                            std::make_move_iterator(GlobalCRules.end()));
734 
735   // User-provided taint configuration.
736   CheckerManager *Mgr = C.getAnalysisManager().getCheckerManager();
737   assert(Mgr);
738   GenericTaintRuleParser ConfigParser{*Mgr};
739   std::string Option{"Config"};
740   StringRef ConfigFile =
741       Mgr->getAnalyzerOptions().getCheckerStringOption(this, Option);
742   llvm::Optional<TaintConfiguration> Config =
743       getConfiguration<TaintConfiguration>(*Mgr, this, Option, ConfigFile);
744   if (!Config) {
745     // We don't have external taint config, no parsing required.
746     DynamicTaintRules = RuleLookupTy{};
747     return;
748   }
749 
750   GenericTaintRuleParser::RulesContTy Rules{
751       ConfigParser.parseConfiguration(Option, std::move(Config.getValue()))};
752 
753   DynamicTaintRules.emplace(std::make_move_iterator(Rules.begin()),
754                             std::make_move_iterator(Rules.end()));
755 }
756 
757 void GenericTaintChecker::checkPreCall(const CallEvent &Call,
758                                        CheckerContext &C) const {
759   initTaintRules(C);
760 
761   // FIXME: this should be much simpler.
762   if (const auto *Rule =
763           Call.isGlobalCFunction() ? StaticTaintRules->lookup(Call) : nullptr)
764     Rule->process(*this, Call, C);
765   else if (const auto *Rule = DynamicTaintRules->lookup(Call))
766     Rule->process(*this, Call, C);
767 
768   // FIXME: These edge cases are to be eliminated from here eventually.
769   //
770   // Additional check that is not supported by CallDescription.
771   // TODO: Make CallDescription be able to match attributes such as printf-like
772   // arguments.
773   checkUncontrolledFormatString(Call, C);
774 
775   // TODO: Modeling sockets should be done in a specific checker.
776   // Socket is a source, which taints the return value.
777   taintUnsafeSocketProtocol(Call, C);
778 }
779 
780 void GenericTaintChecker::checkPostCall(const CallEvent &Call,
781                                         CheckerContext &C) const {
782   // Set the marked values as tainted. The return value only accessible from
783   // checkPostStmt.
784   ProgramStateRef State = C.getState();
785   const StackFrameContext *CurrentFrame = C.getStackFrame();
786 
787   // Depending on what was tainted at pre-visit, we determined a set of
788   // arguments which should be tainted after the function returns. These are
789   // stored in the state as TaintArgsOnPostVisit set.
790   TaintArgsOnPostVisitTy TaintArgsMap = State->get<TaintArgsOnPostVisit>();
791 
792   const ImmutableSet<ArgIdxTy> *TaintArgs = TaintArgsMap.lookup(CurrentFrame);
793   if (!TaintArgs)
794     return;
795   assert(!TaintArgs->isEmpty());
796 
797   LLVM_DEBUG(for (ArgIdxTy I
798                   : *TaintArgs) {
799     llvm::dbgs() << "PostCall<";
800     Call.dump(llvm::dbgs());
801     llvm::dbgs() << "> actually wants to taint arg index: " << I << '\n';
802   });
803 
804   for (ArgIdxTy ArgNum : *TaintArgs) {
805     // Special handling for the tainted return value.
806     if (ArgNum == ReturnValueIndex) {
807       State = addTaint(State, Call.getReturnValue());
808       continue;
809     }
810 
811     // The arguments are pointer arguments. The data they are pointing at is
812     // tainted after the call.
813     if (auto V = getPointeeOf(C, Call.getArgSVal(ArgNum)))
814       State = addTaint(State, *V);
815   }
816 
817   // Clear up the taint info from the state.
818   State = State->remove<TaintArgsOnPostVisit>(CurrentFrame);
819   C.addTransition(State);
820 }
821 
822 void GenericTaintChecker::printState(raw_ostream &Out, ProgramStateRef State,
823                                      const char *NL, const char *Sep) const {
824   printTaint(State, Out, NL, Sep);
825 }
826 
827 void GenericTaintRule::process(const GenericTaintChecker &Checker,
828                                const CallEvent &Call, CheckerContext &C) const {
829   ProgramStateRef State = C.getState();
830   const ArgIdxTy CallNumArgs = fromArgumentCount(Call.getNumArgs());
831 
832   /// Iterate every call argument, and get their corresponding Expr and SVal.
833   const auto ForEachCallArg = [&C, &Call, CallNumArgs](auto &&Fun) {
834     for (ArgIdxTy I = ReturnValueIndex; I < CallNumArgs; ++I) {
835       const Expr *E = GetArgExpr(I, Call);
836       Fun(I, E, C.getSVal(E));
837     }
838   };
839 
840   /// Check for taint sinks.
841   ForEachCallArg([this, &Checker, &C, &State](ArgIdxTy I, const Expr *E, SVal) {
842     if (SinkArgs.contains(I) && isTaintedOrPointsToTainted(E, State, C))
843       Checker.generateReportIfTainted(E, SinkMsg.getValueOr(MsgCustomSink), C);
844   });
845 
846   /// Check for taint filters.
847   ForEachCallArg([this, &C, &State](ArgIdxTy I, const Expr *E, SVal S) {
848     if (FilterArgs.contains(I)) {
849       State = removeTaint(State, S);
850       if (auto P = getPointeeOf(C, S))
851         State = removeTaint(State, *P);
852     }
853   });
854 
855   /// Check for taint propagation sources.
856   /// A rule is relevant if PropSrcArgs is empty, or if any of its signified
857   /// args are tainted in context of the current CallEvent.
858   bool IsMatching = PropSrcArgs.isEmpty();
859   ForEachCallArg(
860       [this, &C, &IsMatching, &State](ArgIdxTy I, const Expr *E, SVal) {
861         IsMatching = IsMatching || (PropSrcArgs.contains(I) &&
862                                     isTaintedOrPointsToTainted(E, State, C));
863       });
864 
865   if (!IsMatching)
866     return;
867 
868   const auto WouldEscape = [](SVal V, QualType Ty) -> bool {
869     if (!V.getAs<Loc>())
870       return false;
871 
872     const bool IsNonConstRef = Ty->isReferenceType() && !Ty.isConstQualified();
873     const bool IsNonConstPtr =
874         Ty->isPointerType() && !Ty->getPointeeType().isConstQualified();
875 
876     return IsNonConstRef || IsNonConstPtr;
877   };
878 
879   /// Propagate taint where it is necessary.
880   auto &F = State->getStateManager().get_context<ArgIdxFactory>();
881   ImmutableSet<ArgIdxTy> Result = F.getEmptySet();
882   ForEachCallArg(
883       [&](ArgIdxTy I, const Expr *E, SVal V) {
884         if (PropDstArgs.contains(I)) {
885           LLVM_DEBUG(llvm::dbgs() << "PreCall<"; Call.dump(llvm::dbgs());
886                      llvm::dbgs()
887                      << "> prepares tainting arg index: " << I << '\n';);
888           Result = F.add(Result, I);
889         }
890 
891         // TODO: We should traverse all reachable memory regions via the
892         // escaping parameter. Instead of doing that we simply mark only the
893         // referred memory region as tainted.
894         if (WouldEscape(V, E->getType())) {
895           LLVM_DEBUG(if (!Result.contains(I)) {
896             llvm::dbgs() << "PreCall<";
897             Call.dump(llvm::dbgs());
898             llvm::dbgs() << "> prepares tainting arg index: " << I << '\n';
899           });
900           Result = F.add(Result, I);
901         }
902       });
903 
904   if (!Result.isEmpty())
905     State = State->set<TaintArgsOnPostVisit>(C.getStackFrame(), Result);
906   C.addTransition(State);
907 }
908 
909 bool GenericTaintRule::UntrustedEnv(CheckerContext &C) {
910   return !C.getAnalysisManager()
911               .getAnalyzerOptions()
912               .ShouldAssumeControlledEnvironment;
913 }
914 
915 bool GenericTaintChecker::generateReportIfTainted(const Expr *E, StringRef Msg,
916                                                   CheckerContext &C) const {
917   assert(E);
918   Optional<SVal> TaintedSVal{getTaintedPointeeOrPointer(C, C.getSVal(E))};
919 
920   if (!TaintedSVal)
921     return false;
922 
923   // Generate diagnostic.
924   if (ExplodedNode *N = C.generateNonFatalErrorNode()) {
925     auto report = std::make_unique<PathSensitiveBugReport>(BT, Msg, N);
926     report->addRange(E->getSourceRange());
927     report->addVisitor(std::make_unique<TaintBugVisitor>(*TaintedSVal));
928     C.emitReport(std::move(report));
929     return true;
930   }
931   return false;
932 }
933 
934 /// TODO: remove checking for printf format attributes and socket whitelisting
935 /// from GenericTaintChecker, and that means the following functions:
936 /// getPrintfFormatArgumentNum,
937 /// GenericTaintChecker::checkUncontrolledFormatString,
938 /// GenericTaintChecker::taintUnsafeSocketProtocol
939 
940 static bool getPrintfFormatArgumentNum(const CallEvent &Call,
941                                        const CheckerContext &C,
942                                        ArgIdxTy &ArgNum) {
943   // Find if the function contains a format string argument.
944   // Handles: fprintf, printf, sprintf, snprintf, vfprintf, vprintf, vsprintf,
945   // vsnprintf, syslog, custom annotated functions.
946   const Decl *CallDecl = Call.getDecl();
947   if (!CallDecl)
948     return false;
949   const FunctionDecl *FDecl = CallDecl->getAsFunction();
950   if (!FDecl)
951     return false;
952 
953   const ArgIdxTy CallNumArgs = fromArgumentCount(Call.getNumArgs());
954 
955   for (const auto *Format : FDecl->specific_attrs<FormatAttr>()) {
956     ArgNum = Format->getFormatIdx() - 1;
957     if ((Format->getType()->getName() == "printf") && CallNumArgs > ArgNum)
958       return true;
959   }
960 
961   return false;
962 }
963 
964 bool GenericTaintChecker::checkUncontrolledFormatString(
965     const CallEvent &Call, CheckerContext &C) const {
966   // Check if the function contains a format string argument.
967   ArgIdxTy ArgNum = 0;
968   if (!getPrintfFormatArgumentNum(Call, C, ArgNum))
969     return false;
970 
971   // If either the format string content or the pointer itself are tainted,
972   // warn.
973   return generateReportIfTainted(Call.getArgExpr(ArgNum),
974                                  MsgUncontrolledFormatString, C);
975 }
976 
977 void GenericTaintChecker::taintUnsafeSocketProtocol(const CallEvent &Call,
978                                                     CheckerContext &C) const {
979   if (Call.getNumArgs() < 1)
980     return;
981   const IdentifierInfo *ID = Call.getCalleeIdentifier();
982   if (!ID)
983     return;
984   if (!ID->getName().equals("socket"))
985     return;
986 
987   SourceLocation DomLoc = Call.getArgExpr(0)->getExprLoc();
988   StringRef DomName = C.getMacroNameOrSpelling(DomLoc);
989   // Allow internal communication protocols.
990   bool SafeProtocol = DomName.equals("AF_SYSTEM") ||
991                       DomName.equals("AF_LOCAL") || DomName.equals("AF_UNIX") ||
992                       DomName.equals("AF_RESERVED_36");
993   if (SafeProtocol)
994     return;
995 
996   ProgramStateRef State = C.getState();
997   auto &F = State->getStateManager().get_context<ArgIdxFactory>();
998   ImmutableSet<ArgIdxTy> Result = F.add(F.getEmptySet(), ReturnValueIndex);
999   State = State->set<TaintArgsOnPostVisit>(C.getStackFrame(), Result);
1000   C.addTransition(State);
1001 }
1002 
1003 /// Checker registration
1004 void ento::registerGenericTaintChecker(CheckerManager &Mgr) {
1005   Mgr.registerChecker<GenericTaintChecker>();
1006 }
1007 
1008 bool ento::shouldRegisterGenericTaintChecker(const CheckerManager &mgr) {
1009   return true;
1010 }
1011