1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only 2 /* Copyright (c) 2011-2014 PLUMgrid, http://plumgrid.com 3 * Copyright (c) 2016 Facebook 4 * Copyright (c) 2018 Covalent IO, Inc. http://covalent.io 5 */ 6 #include <uapi/linux/btf.h> 7 #include <linux/bpf-cgroup.h> 8 #include <linux/kernel.h> 9 #include <linux/types.h> 10 #include <linux/slab.h> 11 #include <linux/bpf.h> 12 #include <linux/btf.h> 13 #include <linux/bpf_verifier.h> 14 #include <linux/filter.h> 15 #include <net/netlink.h> 16 #include <linux/file.h> 17 #include <linux/vmalloc.h> 18 #include <linux/stringify.h> 19 #include <linux/bsearch.h> 20 #include <linux/sort.h> 21 #include <linux/perf_event.h> 22 #include <linux/ctype.h> 23 #include <linux/error-injection.h> 24 #include <linux/bpf_lsm.h> 25 #include <linux/btf_ids.h> 26 #include <linux/poison.h> 27 28 #include "disasm.h" 29 30 static const struct bpf_verifier_ops * const bpf_verifier_ops[] = { 31 #define BPF_PROG_TYPE(_id, _name, prog_ctx_type, kern_ctx_type) \ 32 [_id] = & _name ## _verifier_ops, 33 #define BPF_MAP_TYPE(_id, _ops) 34 #define BPF_LINK_TYPE(_id, _name) 35 #include <linux/bpf_types.h> 36 #undef BPF_PROG_TYPE 37 #undef BPF_MAP_TYPE 38 #undef BPF_LINK_TYPE 39 }; 40 41 /* bpf_check() is a static code analyzer that walks eBPF program 42 * instruction by instruction and updates register/stack state. 43 * All paths of conditional branches are analyzed until 'bpf_exit' insn. 44 * 45 * The first pass is depth-first-search to check that the program is a DAG. 46 * It rejects the following programs: 47 * - larger than BPF_MAXINSNS insns 48 * - if loop is present (detected via back-edge) 49 * - unreachable insns exist (shouldn't be a forest. program = one function) 50 * - out of bounds or malformed jumps 51 * The second pass is all possible path descent from the 1st insn. 52 * Since it's analyzing all paths through the program, the length of the 53 * analysis is limited to 64k insn, which may be hit even if total number of 54 * insn is less then 4K, but there are too many branches that change stack/regs. 55 * Number of 'branches to be analyzed' is limited to 1k 56 * 57 * On entry to each instruction, each register has a type, and the instruction 58 * changes the types of the registers depending on instruction semantics. 59 * If instruction is BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_5), then type of R5 is 60 * copied to R1. 61 * 62 * All registers are 64-bit. 63 * R0 - return register 64 * R1-R5 argument passing registers 65 * R6-R9 callee saved registers 66 * R10 - frame pointer read-only 67 * 68 * At the start of BPF program the register R1 contains a pointer to bpf_context 69 * and has type PTR_TO_CTX. 70 * 71 * Verifier tracks arithmetic operations on pointers in case: 72 * BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10), 73 * BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -20), 74 * 1st insn copies R10 (which has FRAME_PTR) type into R1 75 * and 2nd arithmetic instruction is pattern matched to recognize 76 * that it wants to construct a pointer to some element within stack. 77 * So after 2nd insn, the register R1 has type PTR_TO_STACK 78 * (and -20 constant is saved for further stack bounds checking). 79 * Meaning that this reg is a pointer to stack plus known immediate constant. 80 * 81 * Most of the time the registers have SCALAR_VALUE type, which 82 * means the register has some value, but it's not a valid pointer. 83 * (like pointer plus pointer becomes SCALAR_VALUE type) 84 * 85 * When verifier sees load or store instructions the type of base register 86 * can be: PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_CTX, PTR_TO_STACK, PTR_TO_SOCKET. These are 87 * four pointer types recognized by check_mem_access() function. 88 * 89 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE means that this register is pointing to 'map element value' 90 * and the range of [ptr, ptr + map's value_size) is accessible. 91 * 92 * registers used to pass values to function calls are checked against 93 * function argument constraints. 94 * 95 * ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY is one of such argument constraints. 96 * It means that the register type passed to this function must be 97 * PTR_TO_STACK and it will be used inside the function as 98 * 'pointer to map element key' 99 * 100 * For example the argument constraints for bpf_map_lookup_elem(): 101 * .ret_type = RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, 102 * .arg1_type = ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR, 103 * .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, 104 * 105 * ret_type says that this function returns 'pointer to map elem value or null' 106 * function expects 1st argument to be a const pointer to 'struct bpf_map' and 107 * 2nd argument should be a pointer to stack, which will be used inside 108 * the helper function as a pointer to map element key. 109 * 110 * On the kernel side the helper function looks like: 111 * u64 bpf_map_lookup_elem(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5) 112 * { 113 * struct bpf_map *map = (struct bpf_map *) (unsigned long) r1; 114 * void *key = (void *) (unsigned long) r2; 115 * void *value; 116 * 117 * here kernel can access 'key' and 'map' pointers safely, knowing that 118 * [key, key + map->key_size) bytes are valid and were initialized on 119 * the stack of eBPF program. 120 * } 121 * 122 * Corresponding eBPF program may look like: 123 * BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), // after this insn R2 type is FRAME_PTR 124 * BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -4), // after this insn R2 type is PTR_TO_STACK 125 * BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, map_fd), // after this insn R1 type is CONST_PTR_TO_MAP 126 * BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), 127 * here verifier looks at prototype of map_lookup_elem() and sees: 128 * .arg1_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR and R1->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP, which is ok, 129 * Now verifier knows that this map has key of R1->map_ptr->key_size bytes 130 * 131 * Then .arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY and R2->type == PTR_TO_STACK, ok so far, 132 * Now verifier checks that [R2, R2 + map's key_size) are within stack limits 133 * and were initialized prior to this call. 134 * If it's ok, then verifier allows this BPF_CALL insn and looks at 135 * .ret_type which is RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, so it sets 136 * R0->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL which means bpf_map_lookup_elem() function 137 * returns either pointer to map value or NULL. 138 * 139 * When type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL passes through 'if (reg != 0) goto +off' 140 * insn, the register holding that pointer in the true branch changes state to 141 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE and the same register changes state to CONST_IMM in the false 142 * branch. See check_cond_jmp_op(). 143 * 144 * After the call R0 is set to return type of the function and registers R1-R5 145 * are set to NOT_INIT to indicate that they are no longer readable. 146 * 147 * The following reference types represent a potential reference to a kernel 148 * resource which, after first being allocated, must be checked and freed by 149 * the BPF program: 150 * - PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL, PTR_TO_SOCKET 151 * 152 * When the verifier sees a helper call return a reference type, it allocates a 153 * pointer id for the reference and stores it in the current function state. 154 * Similar to the way that PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL is converted into 155 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL becomes PTR_TO_SOCKET when the type 156 * passes through a NULL-check conditional. For the branch wherein the state is 157 * changed to CONST_IMM, the verifier releases the reference. 158 * 159 * For each helper function that allocates a reference, such as 160 * bpf_sk_lookup_tcp(), there is a corresponding release function, such as 161 * bpf_sk_release(). When a reference type passes into the release function, 162 * the verifier also releases the reference. If any unchecked or unreleased 163 * reference remains at the end of the program, the verifier rejects it. 164 */ 165 166 /* verifier_state + insn_idx are pushed to stack when branch is encountered */ 167 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem { 168 /* verifer state is 'st' 169 * before processing instruction 'insn_idx' 170 * and after processing instruction 'prev_insn_idx' 171 */ 172 struct bpf_verifier_state st; 173 int insn_idx; 174 int prev_insn_idx; 175 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *next; 176 /* length of verifier log at the time this state was pushed on stack */ 177 u32 log_pos; 178 }; 179 180 #define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ 8192 181 #define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES 64 182 183 #define BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON (1ULL << 63) 184 #define BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN (1ULL << 62) 185 186 #define BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV 1UL 187 #define BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON ((void *)((0xeB9FUL << 1) + \ 188 POISON_POINTER_DELTA)) 189 #define BPF_MAP_PTR(X) ((struct bpf_map *)((X) & ~BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV)) 190 191 static int acquire_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx); 192 static int release_reference(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int ref_obj_id); 193 194 static bool bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 195 { 196 return BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state) == BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON; 197 } 198 199 static bool bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 200 { 201 return aux->map_ptr_state & BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV; 202 } 203 204 static void bpf_map_ptr_store(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, 205 const struct bpf_map *map, bool unpriv) 206 { 207 BUILD_BUG_ON((unsigned long)BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON & BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV); 208 unpriv |= bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux); 209 aux->map_ptr_state = (unsigned long)map | 210 (unpriv ? BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV : 0UL); 211 } 212 213 static bool bpf_map_key_poisoned(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 214 { 215 return aux->map_key_state & BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON; 216 } 217 218 static bool bpf_map_key_unseen(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 219 { 220 return !(aux->map_key_state & BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN); 221 } 222 223 static u64 bpf_map_key_immediate(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 224 { 225 return aux->map_key_state & ~(BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN | BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON); 226 } 227 228 static void bpf_map_key_store(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, u64 state) 229 { 230 bool poisoned = bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux); 231 232 aux->map_key_state = state | BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN | 233 (poisoned ? BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON : 0ULL); 234 } 235 236 static bool bpf_pseudo_call(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 237 { 238 return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 239 insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL; 240 } 241 242 static bool bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 243 { 244 return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 245 insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL; 246 } 247 248 struct bpf_call_arg_meta { 249 struct bpf_map *map_ptr; 250 bool raw_mode; 251 bool pkt_access; 252 u8 release_regno; 253 int regno; 254 int access_size; 255 int mem_size; 256 u64 msize_max_value; 257 int ref_obj_id; 258 int map_uid; 259 int func_id; 260 struct btf *btf; 261 u32 btf_id; 262 struct btf *ret_btf; 263 u32 ret_btf_id; 264 u32 subprogno; 265 struct btf_field *kptr_field; 266 u8 uninit_dynptr_regno; 267 }; 268 269 struct btf *btf_vmlinux; 270 271 static DEFINE_MUTEX(bpf_verifier_lock); 272 273 static const struct bpf_line_info * 274 find_linfo(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 insn_off) 275 { 276 const struct bpf_line_info *linfo; 277 const struct bpf_prog *prog; 278 u32 i, nr_linfo; 279 280 prog = env->prog; 281 nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; 282 283 if (!nr_linfo || insn_off >= prog->len) 284 return NULL; 285 286 linfo = prog->aux->linfo; 287 for (i = 1; i < nr_linfo; i++) 288 if (insn_off < linfo[i].insn_off) 289 break; 290 291 return &linfo[i - 1]; 292 } 293 294 void bpf_verifier_vlog(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, const char *fmt, 295 va_list args) 296 { 297 unsigned int n; 298 299 n = vscnprintf(log->kbuf, BPF_VERIFIER_TMP_LOG_SIZE, fmt, args); 300 301 WARN_ONCE(n >= BPF_VERIFIER_TMP_LOG_SIZE - 1, 302 "verifier log line truncated - local buffer too short\n"); 303 304 if (log->level == BPF_LOG_KERNEL) { 305 bool newline = n > 0 && log->kbuf[n - 1] == '\n'; 306 307 pr_err("BPF: %s%s", log->kbuf, newline ? "" : "\n"); 308 return; 309 } 310 311 n = min(log->len_total - log->len_used - 1, n); 312 log->kbuf[n] = '\0'; 313 if (!copy_to_user(log->ubuf + log->len_used, log->kbuf, n + 1)) 314 log->len_used += n; 315 else 316 log->ubuf = NULL; 317 } 318 319 static void bpf_vlog_reset(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, u32 new_pos) 320 { 321 char zero = 0; 322 323 if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(log)) 324 return; 325 326 log->len_used = new_pos; 327 if (put_user(zero, log->ubuf + new_pos)) 328 log->ubuf = NULL; 329 } 330 331 /* log_level controls verbosity level of eBPF verifier. 332 * bpf_verifier_log_write() is used to dump the verification trace to the log, 333 * so the user can figure out what's wrong with the program 334 */ 335 __printf(2, 3) void bpf_verifier_log_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 336 const char *fmt, ...) 337 { 338 va_list args; 339 340 if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(&env->log)) 341 return; 342 343 va_start(args, fmt); 344 bpf_verifier_vlog(&env->log, fmt, args); 345 va_end(args); 346 } 347 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_verifier_log_write); 348 349 __printf(2, 3) static void verbose(void *private_data, const char *fmt, ...) 350 { 351 struct bpf_verifier_env *env = private_data; 352 va_list args; 353 354 if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(&env->log)) 355 return; 356 357 va_start(args, fmt); 358 bpf_verifier_vlog(&env->log, fmt, args); 359 va_end(args); 360 } 361 362 __printf(2, 3) void bpf_log(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, 363 const char *fmt, ...) 364 { 365 va_list args; 366 367 if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(log)) 368 return; 369 370 va_start(args, fmt); 371 bpf_verifier_vlog(log, fmt, args); 372 va_end(args); 373 } 374 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_log); 375 376 static const char *ltrim(const char *s) 377 { 378 while (isspace(*s)) 379 s++; 380 381 return s; 382 } 383 384 __printf(3, 4) static void verbose_linfo(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 385 u32 insn_off, 386 const char *prefix_fmt, ...) 387 { 388 const struct bpf_line_info *linfo; 389 390 if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(&env->log)) 391 return; 392 393 linfo = find_linfo(env, insn_off); 394 if (!linfo || linfo == env->prev_linfo) 395 return; 396 397 if (prefix_fmt) { 398 va_list args; 399 400 va_start(args, prefix_fmt); 401 bpf_verifier_vlog(&env->log, prefix_fmt, args); 402 va_end(args); 403 } 404 405 verbose(env, "%s\n", 406 ltrim(btf_name_by_offset(env->prog->aux->btf, 407 linfo->line_off))); 408 409 env->prev_linfo = linfo; 410 } 411 412 static void verbose_invalid_scalar(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 413 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 414 struct tnum *range, const char *ctx, 415 const char *reg_name) 416 { 417 char tn_buf[48]; 418 419 verbose(env, "At %s the register %s ", ctx, reg_name); 420 if (!tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off)) { 421 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 422 verbose(env, "has value %s", tn_buf); 423 } else { 424 verbose(env, "has unknown scalar value"); 425 } 426 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), *range); 427 verbose(env, " should have been in %s\n", tn_buf); 428 } 429 430 static bool type_is_pkt_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type) 431 { 432 type = base_type(type); 433 return type == PTR_TO_PACKET || 434 type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META; 435 } 436 437 static bool type_is_sk_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type) 438 { 439 return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET || 440 type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON || 441 type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK || 442 type == PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK; 443 } 444 445 static bool reg_type_not_null(enum bpf_reg_type type) 446 { 447 return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET || 448 type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK || 449 type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE || 450 type == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY || 451 type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON; 452 } 453 454 static struct btf_record *reg_btf_record(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 455 { 456 struct btf_record *rec = NULL; 457 struct btf_struct_meta *meta; 458 459 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 460 rec = reg->map_ptr->record; 461 } else if (reg->type == (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) { 462 meta = btf_find_struct_meta(reg->btf, reg->btf_id); 463 if (meta) 464 rec = meta->record; 465 } 466 return rec; 467 } 468 469 static bool reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 470 { 471 return btf_record_has_field(reg_btf_record(reg), BPF_SPIN_LOCK); 472 } 473 474 static bool type_is_rdonly_mem(u32 type) 475 { 476 return type & MEM_RDONLY; 477 } 478 479 static bool type_may_be_null(u32 type) 480 { 481 return type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 482 } 483 484 static bool is_acquire_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id, 485 const struct bpf_map *map) 486 { 487 enum bpf_map_type map_type = map ? map->map_type : BPF_MAP_TYPE_UNSPEC; 488 489 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_tcp || 490 func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_udp || 491 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_lookup_tcp || 492 func_id == BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve || 493 func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) 494 return true; 495 496 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 497 (map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP || 498 map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH)) 499 return true; 500 501 return false; 502 } 503 504 static bool is_ptr_cast_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 505 { 506 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_tcp_sock || 507 func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_fullsock || 508 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_sock || 509 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp6_sock || 510 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_udp6_sock || 511 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_mptcp_sock || 512 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_timewait_sock || 513 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_request_sock; 514 } 515 516 static bool is_dynptr_ref_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 517 { 518 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_dynptr_data; 519 } 520 521 static bool is_callback_calling_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 522 { 523 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem || 524 func_id == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback || 525 func_id == BPF_FUNC_find_vma || 526 func_id == BPF_FUNC_loop || 527 func_id == BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain; 528 } 529 530 static bool helper_multiple_ref_obj_use(enum bpf_func_id func_id, 531 const struct bpf_map *map) 532 { 533 int ref_obj_uses = 0; 534 535 if (is_ptr_cast_function(func_id)) 536 ref_obj_uses++; 537 if (is_acquire_function(func_id, map)) 538 ref_obj_uses++; 539 if (is_dynptr_ref_function(func_id)) 540 ref_obj_uses++; 541 542 return ref_obj_uses > 1; 543 } 544 545 static bool is_cmpxchg_insn(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 546 { 547 return BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX && 548 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC && 549 insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG; 550 } 551 552 /* string representation of 'enum bpf_reg_type' 553 * 554 * Note that reg_type_str() can not appear more than once in a single verbose() 555 * statement. 556 */ 557 static const char *reg_type_str(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 558 enum bpf_reg_type type) 559 { 560 char postfix[16] = {0}, prefix[64] = {0}; 561 static const char * const str[] = { 562 [NOT_INIT] = "?", 563 [SCALAR_VALUE] = "scalar", 564 [PTR_TO_CTX] = "ctx", 565 [CONST_PTR_TO_MAP] = "map_ptr", 566 [PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE] = "map_value", 567 [PTR_TO_STACK] = "fp", 568 [PTR_TO_PACKET] = "pkt", 569 [PTR_TO_PACKET_META] = "pkt_meta", 570 [PTR_TO_PACKET_END] = "pkt_end", 571 [PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS] = "flow_keys", 572 [PTR_TO_SOCKET] = "sock", 573 [PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON] = "sock_common", 574 [PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK] = "tcp_sock", 575 [PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER] = "tp_buffer", 576 [PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK] = "xdp_sock", 577 [PTR_TO_BTF_ID] = "ptr_", 578 [PTR_TO_MEM] = "mem", 579 [PTR_TO_BUF] = "buf", 580 [PTR_TO_FUNC] = "func", 581 [PTR_TO_MAP_KEY] = "map_key", 582 [PTR_TO_DYNPTR] = "dynptr_ptr", 583 }; 584 585 if (type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL) { 586 if (base_type(type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) 587 strncpy(postfix, "or_null_", 16); 588 else 589 strncpy(postfix, "_or_null", 16); 590 } 591 592 snprintf(prefix, sizeof(prefix), "%s%s%s%s%s%s", 593 type & MEM_RDONLY ? "rdonly_" : "", 594 type & MEM_RINGBUF ? "ringbuf_" : "", 595 type & MEM_USER ? "user_" : "", 596 type & MEM_PERCPU ? "percpu_" : "", 597 type & PTR_UNTRUSTED ? "untrusted_" : "", 598 type & PTR_TRUSTED ? "trusted_" : "" 599 ); 600 601 snprintf(env->type_str_buf, TYPE_STR_BUF_LEN, "%s%s%s", 602 prefix, str[base_type(type)], postfix); 603 return env->type_str_buf; 604 } 605 606 static char slot_type_char[] = { 607 [STACK_INVALID] = '?', 608 [STACK_SPILL] = 'r', 609 [STACK_MISC] = 'm', 610 [STACK_ZERO] = '0', 611 [STACK_DYNPTR] = 'd', 612 }; 613 614 static void print_liveness(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 615 enum bpf_reg_liveness live) 616 { 617 if (live & (REG_LIVE_READ | REG_LIVE_WRITTEN | REG_LIVE_DONE)) 618 verbose(env, "_"); 619 if (live & REG_LIVE_READ) 620 verbose(env, "r"); 621 if (live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN) 622 verbose(env, "w"); 623 if (live & REG_LIVE_DONE) 624 verbose(env, "D"); 625 } 626 627 static int get_spi(s32 off) 628 { 629 return (-off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE; 630 } 631 632 static bool is_spi_bounds_valid(struct bpf_func_state *state, int spi, int nr_slots) 633 { 634 int allocated_slots = state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; 635 636 /* We need to check that slots between [spi - nr_slots + 1, spi] are 637 * within [0, allocated_stack). 638 * 639 * Please note that the spi grows downwards. For example, a dynptr 640 * takes the size of two stack slots; the first slot will be at 641 * spi and the second slot will be at spi - 1. 642 */ 643 return spi - nr_slots + 1 >= 0 && spi < allocated_slots; 644 } 645 646 static struct bpf_func_state *func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 647 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 648 { 649 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 650 651 return cur->frame[reg->frameno]; 652 } 653 654 static const char *kernel_type_name(const struct btf* btf, u32 id) 655 { 656 return btf_name_by_offset(btf, btf_type_by_id(btf, id)->name_off); 657 } 658 659 static void mark_reg_scratched(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno) 660 { 661 env->scratched_regs |= 1U << regno; 662 } 663 664 static void mark_stack_slot_scratched(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 spi) 665 { 666 env->scratched_stack_slots |= 1ULL << spi; 667 } 668 669 static bool reg_scratched(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno) 670 { 671 return (env->scratched_regs >> regno) & 1; 672 } 673 674 static bool stack_slot_scratched(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u64 regno) 675 { 676 return (env->scratched_stack_slots >> regno) & 1; 677 } 678 679 static bool verifier_state_scratched(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 680 { 681 return env->scratched_regs || env->scratched_stack_slots; 682 } 683 684 static void mark_verifier_state_clean(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 685 { 686 env->scratched_regs = 0U; 687 env->scratched_stack_slots = 0ULL; 688 } 689 690 /* Used for printing the entire verifier state. */ 691 static void mark_verifier_state_scratched(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 692 { 693 env->scratched_regs = ~0U; 694 env->scratched_stack_slots = ~0ULL; 695 } 696 697 static enum bpf_dynptr_type arg_to_dynptr_type(enum bpf_arg_type arg_type) 698 { 699 switch (arg_type & DYNPTR_TYPE_FLAG_MASK) { 700 case DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL: 701 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL; 702 case DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF: 703 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF; 704 default: 705 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID; 706 } 707 } 708 709 static bool dynptr_type_refcounted(enum bpf_dynptr_type type) 710 { 711 return type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF; 712 } 713 714 static int mark_stack_slots_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 715 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type, int insn_idx) 716 { 717 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 718 enum bpf_dynptr_type type; 719 int spi, i, id; 720 721 spi = get_spi(reg->off); 722 723 if (!is_spi_bounds_valid(state, spi, BPF_DYNPTR_NR_SLOTS)) 724 return -EINVAL; 725 726 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 727 state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_DYNPTR; 728 state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] = STACK_DYNPTR; 729 } 730 731 type = arg_to_dynptr_type(arg_type); 732 if (type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID) 733 return -EINVAL; 734 735 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.first_slot = true; 736 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type = type; 737 state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type = type; 738 739 if (dynptr_type_refcounted(type)) { 740 /* The id is used to track proper releasing */ 741 id = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx); 742 if (id < 0) 743 return id; 744 745 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.id = id; 746 state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.id = id; 747 } 748 749 return 0; 750 } 751 752 static int unmark_stack_slots_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 753 { 754 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 755 int spi, i; 756 757 spi = get_spi(reg->off); 758 759 if (!is_spi_bounds_valid(state, spi, BPF_DYNPTR_NR_SLOTS)) 760 return -EINVAL; 761 762 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 763 state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID; 764 state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID; 765 } 766 767 /* Invalidate any slices associated with this dynptr */ 768 if (dynptr_type_refcounted(state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type)) { 769 release_reference(env, state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.id); 770 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.id = 0; 771 state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.id = 0; 772 } 773 774 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.first_slot = false; 775 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type = 0; 776 state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type = 0; 777 778 return 0; 779 } 780 781 static bool is_dynptr_reg_valid_uninit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 782 { 783 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 784 int spi = get_spi(reg->off); 785 int i; 786 787 if (!is_spi_bounds_valid(state, spi, BPF_DYNPTR_NR_SLOTS)) 788 return true; 789 790 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 791 if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] == STACK_DYNPTR || 792 state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] == STACK_DYNPTR) 793 return false; 794 } 795 796 return true; 797 } 798 799 bool is_dynptr_reg_valid_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 800 struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 801 { 802 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 803 int spi = get_spi(reg->off); 804 int i; 805 806 if (!is_spi_bounds_valid(state, spi, BPF_DYNPTR_NR_SLOTS) || 807 !state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.first_slot) 808 return false; 809 810 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 811 if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] != STACK_DYNPTR || 812 state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] != STACK_DYNPTR) 813 return false; 814 } 815 816 return true; 817 } 818 819 bool is_dynptr_type_expected(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 820 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 821 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type) 822 { 823 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 824 enum bpf_dynptr_type dynptr_type; 825 int spi = get_spi(reg->off); 826 827 /* ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR takes any type of dynptr */ 828 if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 829 return true; 830 831 dynptr_type = arg_to_dynptr_type(arg_type); 832 833 return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type == dynptr_type; 834 } 835 836 /* The reg state of a pointer or a bounded scalar was saved when 837 * it was spilled to the stack. 838 */ 839 static bool is_spilled_reg(const struct bpf_stack_state *stack) 840 { 841 return stack->slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE - 1] == STACK_SPILL; 842 } 843 844 static void scrub_spilled_slot(u8 *stype) 845 { 846 if (*stype != STACK_INVALID) 847 *stype = STACK_MISC; 848 } 849 850 static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 851 const struct bpf_func_state *state, 852 bool print_all) 853 { 854 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 855 enum bpf_reg_type t; 856 int i; 857 858 if (state->frameno) 859 verbose(env, " frame%d:", state->frameno); 860 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) { 861 reg = &state->regs[i]; 862 t = reg->type; 863 if (t == NOT_INIT) 864 continue; 865 if (!print_all && !reg_scratched(env, i)) 866 continue; 867 verbose(env, " R%d", i); 868 print_liveness(env, reg->live); 869 verbose(env, "="); 870 if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->precise) 871 verbose(env, "P"); 872 if ((t == SCALAR_VALUE || t == PTR_TO_STACK) && 873 tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 874 /* reg->off should be 0 for SCALAR_VALUE */ 875 verbose(env, "%s", t == SCALAR_VALUE ? "" : reg_type_str(env, t)); 876 verbose(env, "%lld", reg->var_off.value + reg->off); 877 } else { 878 const char *sep = ""; 879 880 verbose(env, "%s", reg_type_str(env, t)); 881 if (base_type(t) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) 882 verbose(env, "%s", kernel_type_name(reg->btf, reg->btf_id)); 883 verbose(env, "("); 884 /* 885 * _a stands for append, was shortened to avoid multiline statements below. 886 * This macro is used to output a comma separated list of attributes. 887 */ 888 #define verbose_a(fmt, ...) ({ verbose(env, "%s" fmt, sep, __VA_ARGS__); sep = ","; }) 889 890 if (reg->id) 891 verbose_a("id=%d", reg->id); 892 if (reg->ref_obj_id) 893 verbose_a("ref_obj_id=%d", reg->ref_obj_id); 894 if (t != SCALAR_VALUE) 895 verbose_a("off=%d", reg->off); 896 if (type_is_pkt_pointer(t)) 897 verbose_a("r=%d", reg->range); 898 else if (base_type(t) == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP || 899 base_type(t) == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY || 900 base_type(t) == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) 901 verbose_a("ks=%d,vs=%d", 902 reg->map_ptr->key_size, 903 reg->map_ptr->value_size); 904 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 905 /* Typically an immediate SCALAR_VALUE, but 906 * could be a pointer whose offset is too big 907 * for reg->off 908 */ 909 verbose_a("imm=%llx", reg->var_off.value); 910 } else { 911 if (reg->smin_value != reg->umin_value && 912 reg->smin_value != S64_MIN) 913 verbose_a("smin=%lld", (long long)reg->smin_value); 914 if (reg->smax_value != reg->umax_value && 915 reg->smax_value != S64_MAX) 916 verbose_a("smax=%lld", (long long)reg->smax_value); 917 if (reg->umin_value != 0) 918 verbose_a("umin=%llu", (unsigned long long)reg->umin_value); 919 if (reg->umax_value != U64_MAX) 920 verbose_a("umax=%llu", (unsigned long long)reg->umax_value); 921 if (!tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off)) { 922 char tn_buf[48]; 923 924 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 925 verbose_a("var_off=%s", tn_buf); 926 } 927 if (reg->s32_min_value != reg->smin_value && 928 reg->s32_min_value != S32_MIN) 929 verbose_a("s32_min=%d", (int)(reg->s32_min_value)); 930 if (reg->s32_max_value != reg->smax_value && 931 reg->s32_max_value != S32_MAX) 932 verbose_a("s32_max=%d", (int)(reg->s32_max_value)); 933 if (reg->u32_min_value != reg->umin_value && 934 reg->u32_min_value != U32_MIN) 935 verbose_a("u32_min=%d", (int)(reg->u32_min_value)); 936 if (reg->u32_max_value != reg->umax_value && 937 reg->u32_max_value != U32_MAX) 938 verbose_a("u32_max=%d", (int)(reg->u32_max_value)); 939 } 940 #undef verbose_a 941 942 verbose(env, ")"); 943 } 944 } 945 for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 946 char types_buf[BPF_REG_SIZE + 1]; 947 bool valid = false; 948 int j; 949 950 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) { 951 if (state->stack[i].slot_type[j] != STACK_INVALID) 952 valid = true; 953 types_buf[j] = slot_type_char[ 954 state->stack[i].slot_type[j]]; 955 } 956 types_buf[BPF_REG_SIZE] = 0; 957 if (!valid) 958 continue; 959 if (!print_all && !stack_slot_scratched(env, i)) 960 continue; 961 verbose(env, " fp%d", (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE); 962 print_liveness(env, state->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live); 963 if (is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[i])) { 964 reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 965 t = reg->type; 966 verbose(env, "=%s", t == SCALAR_VALUE ? "" : reg_type_str(env, t)); 967 if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->precise) 968 verbose(env, "P"); 969 if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 970 verbose(env, "%lld", reg->var_off.value + reg->off); 971 } else { 972 verbose(env, "=%s", types_buf); 973 } 974 } 975 if (state->acquired_refs && state->refs[0].id) { 976 verbose(env, " refs=%d", state->refs[0].id); 977 for (i = 1; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) 978 if (state->refs[i].id) 979 verbose(env, ",%d", state->refs[i].id); 980 } 981 if (state->in_callback_fn) 982 verbose(env, " cb"); 983 if (state->in_async_callback_fn) 984 verbose(env, " async_cb"); 985 verbose(env, "\n"); 986 mark_verifier_state_clean(env); 987 } 988 989 static inline u32 vlog_alignment(u32 pos) 990 { 991 return round_up(max(pos + BPF_LOG_MIN_ALIGNMENT / 2, BPF_LOG_ALIGNMENT), 992 BPF_LOG_MIN_ALIGNMENT) - pos - 1; 993 } 994 995 static void print_insn_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 996 const struct bpf_func_state *state) 997 { 998 if (env->prev_log_len && env->prev_log_len == env->log.len_used) { 999 /* remove new line character */ 1000 bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, env->prev_log_len - 1); 1001 verbose(env, "%*c;", vlog_alignment(env->prev_insn_print_len), ' '); 1002 } else { 1003 verbose(env, "%d:", env->insn_idx); 1004 } 1005 print_verifier_state(env, state, false); 1006 } 1007 1008 /* copy array src of length n * size bytes to dst. dst is reallocated if it's too 1009 * small to hold src. This is different from krealloc since we don't want to preserve 1010 * the contents of dst. 1011 * 1012 * Leaves dst untouched if src is NULL or length is zero. Returns NULL if memory could 1013 * not be allocated. 1014 */ 1015 static void *copy_array(void *dst, const void *src, size_t n, size_t size, gfp_t flags) 1016 { 1017 size_t bytes; 1018 1019 if (ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(src)) 1020 goto out; 1021 1022 if (unlikely(check_mul_overflow(n, size, &bytes))) 1023 return NULL; 1024 1025 if (ksize(dst) < bytes) { 1026 kfree(dst); 1027 dst = kmalloc_track_caller(bytes, flags); 1028 if (!dst) 1029 return NULL; 1030 } 1031 1032 memcpy(dst, src, bytes); 1033 out: 1034 return dst ? dst : ZERO_SIZE_PTR; 1035 } 1036 1037 /* resize an array from old_n items to new_n items. the array is reallocated if it's too 1038 * small to hold new_n items. new items are zeroed out if the array grows. 1039 * 1040 * Contrary to krealloc_array, does not free arr if new_n is zero. 1041 */ 1042 static void *realloc_array(void *arr, size_t old_n, size_t new_n, size_t size) 1043 { 1044 void *new_arr; 1045 1046 if (!new_n || old_n == new_n) 1047 goto out; 1048 1049 new_arr = krealloc_array(arr, new_n, size, GFP_KERNEL); 1050 if (!new_arr) { 1051 kfree(arr); 1052 return NULL; 1053 } 1054 arr = new_arr; 1055 1056 if (new_n > old_n) 1057 memset(arr + old_n * size, 0, (new_n - old_n) * size); 1058 1059 out: 1060 return arr ? arr : ZERO_SIZE_PTR; 1061 } 1062 1063 static int copy_reference_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, const struct bpf_func_state *src) 1064 { 1065 dst->refs = copy_array(dst->refs, src->refs, src->acquired_refs, 1066 sizeof(struct bpf_reference_state), GFP_KERNEL); 1067 if (!dst->refs) 1068 return -ENOMEM; 1069 1070 dst->acquired_refs = src->acquired_refs; 1071 return 0; 1072 } 1073 1074 static int copy_stack_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, const struct bpf_func_state *src) 1075 { 1076 size_t n = src->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; 1077 1078 dst->stack = copy_array(dst->stack, src->stack, n, sizeof(struct bpf_stack_state), 1079 GFP_KERNEL); 1080 if (!dst->stack) 1081 return -ENOMEM; 1082 1083 dst->allocated_stack = src->allocated_stack; 1084 return 0; 1085 } 1086 1087 static int resize_reference_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, size_t n) 1088 { 1089 state->refs = realloc_array(state->refs, state->acquired_refs, n, 1090 sizeof(struct bpf_reference_state)); 1091 if (!state->refs) 1092 return -ENOMEM; 1093 1094 state->acquired_refs = n; 1095 return 0; 1096 } 1097 1098 static int grow_stack_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, int size) 1099 { 1100 size_t old_n = state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE, n = size / BPF_REG_SIZE; 1101 1102 if (old_n >= n) 1103 return 0; 1104 1105 state->stack = realloc_array(state->stack, old_n, n, sizeof(struct bpf_stack_state)); 1106 if (!state->stack) 1107 return -ENOMEM; 1108 1109 state->allocated_stack = size; 1110 return 0; 1111 } 1112 1113 /* Acquire a pointer id from the env and update the state->refs to include 1114 * this new pointer reference. 1115 * On success, returns a valid pointer id to associate with the register 1116 * On failure, returns a negative errno. 1117 */ 1118 static int acquire_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 1119 { 1120 struct bpf_func_state *state = cur_func(env); 1121 int new_ofs = state->acquired_refs; 1122 int id, err; 1123 1124 err = resize_reference_state(state, state->acquired_refs + 1); 1125 if (err) 1126 return err; 1127 id = ++env->id_gen; 1128 state->refs[new_ofs].id = id; 1129 state->refs[new_ofs].insn_idx = insn_idx; 1130 state->refs[new_ofs].callback_ref = state->in_callback_fn ? state->frameno : 0; 1131 1132 return id; 1133 } 1134 1135 /* release function corresponding to acquire_reference_state(). Idempotent. */ 1136 static int release_reference_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, int ptr_id) 1137 { 1138 int i, last_idx; 1139 1140 last_idx = state->acquired_refs - 1; 1141 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) { 1142 if (state->refs[i].id == ptr_id) { 1143 /* Cannot release caller references in callbacks */ 1144 if (state->in_callback_fn && state->refs[i].callback_ref != state->frameno) 1145 return -EINVAL; 1146 if (last_idx && i != last_idx) 1147 memcpy(&state->refs[i], &state->refs[last_idx], 1148 sizeof(*state->refs)); 1149 memset(&state->refs[last_idx], 0, sizeof(*state->refs)); 1150 state->acquired_refs--; 1151 return 0; 1152 } 1153 } 1154 return -EINVAL; 1155 } 1156 1157 static void free_func_state(struct bpf_func_state *state) 1158 { 1159 if (!state) 1160 return; 1161 kfree(state->refs); 1162 kfree(state->stack); 1163 kfree(state); 1164 } 1165 1166 static void clear_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_state *state) 1167 { 1168 kfree(state->jmp_history); 1169 state->jmp_history = NULL; 1170 state->jmp_history_cnt = 0; 1171 } 1172 1173 static void free_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, 1174 bool free_self) 1175 { 1176 int i; 1177 1178 for (i = 0; i <= state->curframe; i++) { 1179 free_func_state(state->frame[i]); 1180 state->frame[i] = NULL; 1181 } 1182 clear_jmp_history(state); 1183 if (free_self) 1184 kfree(state); 1185 } 1186 1187 /* copy verifier state from src to dst growing dst stack space 1188 * when necessary to accommodate larger src stack 1189 */ 1190 static int copy_func_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, 1191 const struct bpf_func_state *src) 1192 { 1193 int err; 1194 1195 memcpy(dst, src, offsetof(struct bpf_func_state, acquired_refs)); 1196 err = copy_reference_state(dst, src); 1197 if (err) 1198 return err; 1199 return copy_stack_state(dst, src); 1200 } 1201 1202 static int copy_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *dst_state, 1203 const struct bpf_verifier_state *src) 1204 { 1205 struct bpf_func_state *dst; 1206 int i, err; 1207 1208 dst_state->jmp_history = copy_array(dst_state->jmp_history, src->jmp_history, 1209 src->jmp_history_cnt, sizeof(struct bpf_idx_pair), 1210 GFP_USER); 1211 if (!dst_state->jmp_history) 1212 return -ENOMEM; 1213 dst_state->jmp_history_cnt = src->jmp_history_cnt; 1214 1215 /* if dst has more stack frames then src frame, free them */ 1216 for (i = src->curframe + 1; i <= dst_state->curframe; i++) { 1217 free_func_state(dst_state->frame[i]); 1218 dst_state->frame[i] = NULL; 1219 } 1220 dst_state->speculative = src->speculative; 1221 dst_state->curframe = src->curframe; 1222 dst_state->active_lock.ptr = src->active_lock.ptr; 1223 dst_state->active_lock.id = src->active_lock.id; 1224 dst_state->branches = src->branches; 1225 dst_state->parent = src->parent; 1226 dst_state->first_insn_idx = src->first_insn_idx; 1227 dst_state->last_insn_idx = src->last_insn_idx; 1228 for (i = 0; i <= src->curframe; i++) { 1229 dst = dst_state->frame[i]; 1230 if (!dst) { 1231 dst = kzalloc(sizeof(*dst), GFP_KERNEL); 1232 if (!dst) 1233 return -ENOMEM; 1234 dst_state->frame[i] = dst; 1235 } 1236 err = copy_func_state(dst, src->frame[i]); 1237 if (err) 1238 return err; 1239 } 1240 return 0; 1241 } 1242 1243 static void update_branch_counts(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 1244 { 1245 while (st) { 1246 u32 br = --st->branches; 1247 1248 /* WARN_ON(br > 1) technically makes sense here, 1249 * but see comment in push_stack(), hence: 1250 */ 1251 WARN_ONCE((int)br < 0, 1252 "BUG update_branch_counts:branches_to_explore=%d\n", 1253 br); 1254 if (br) 1255 break; 1256 st = st->parent; 1257 } 1258 } 1259 1260 static int pop_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *prev_insn_idx, 1261 int *insn_idx, bool pop_log) 1262 { 1263 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 1264 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem, *head = env->head; 1265 int err; 1266 1267 if (env->head == NULL) 1268 return -ENOENT; 1269 1270 if (cur) { 1271 err = copy_verifier_state(cur, &head->st); 1272 if (err) 1273 return err; 1274 } 1275 if (pop_log) 1276 bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, head->log_pos); 1277 if (insn_idx) 1278 *insn_idx = head->insn_idx; 1279 if (prev_insn_idx) 1280 *prev_insn_idx = head->prev_insn_idx; 1281 elem = head->next; 1282 free_verifier_state(&head->st, false); 1283 kfree(head); 1284 env->head = elem; 1285 env->stack_size--; 1286 return 0; 1287 } 1288 1289 static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1290 int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx, 1291 bool speculative) 1292 { 1293 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 1294 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem; 1295 int err; 1296 1297 elem = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem), GFP_KERNEL); 1298 if (!elem) 1299 goto err; 1300 1301 elem->insn_idx = insn_idx; 1302 elem->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx; 1303 elem->next = env->head; 1304 elem->log_pos = env->log.len_used; 1305 env->head = elem; 1306 env->stack_size++; 1307 err = copy_verifier_state(&elem->st, cur); 1308 if (err) 1309 goto err; 1310 elem->st.speculative |= speculative; 1311 if (env->stack_size > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ) { 1312 verbose(env, "The sequence of %d jumps is too complex.\n", 1313 env->stack_size); 1314 goto err; 1315 } 1316 if (elem->st.parent) { 1317 ++elem->st.parent->branches; 1318 /* WARN_ON(branches > 2) technically makes sense here, 1319 * but 1320 * 1. speculative states will bump 'branches' for non-branch 1321 * instructions 1322 * 2. is_state_visited() heuristics may decide not to create 1323 * a new state for a sequence of branches and all such current 1324 * and cloned states will be pointing to a single parent state 1325 * which might have large 'branches' count. 1326 */ 1327 } 1328 return &elem->st; 1329 err: 1330 free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true); 1331 env->cur_state = NULL; 1332 /* pop all elements and return */ 1333 while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false)); 1334 return NULL; 1335 } 1336 1337 #define CALLER_SAVED_REGS 6 1338 static const int caller_saved[CALLER_SAVED_REGS] = { 1339 BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_5 1340 }; 1341 1342 static void __mark_reg_not_init(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1343 struct bpf_reg_state *reg); 1344 1345 /* This helper doesn't clear reg->id */ 1346 static void ___mark_reg_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm) 1347 { 1348 reg->var_off = tnum_const(imm); 1349 reg->smin_value = (s64)imm; 1350 reg->smax_value = (s64)imm; 1351 reg->umin_value = imm; 1352 reg->umax_value = imm; 1353 1354 reg->s32_min_value = (s32)imm; 1355 reg->s32_max_value = (s32)imm; 1356 reg->u32_min_value = (u32)imm; 1357 reg->u32_max_value = (u32)imm; 1358 } 1359 1360 /* Mark the unknown part of a register (variable offset or scalar value) as 1361 * known to have the value @imm. 1362 */ 1363 static void __mark_reg_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm) 1364 { 1365 /* Clear id, off, and union(map_ptr, range) */ 1366 memset(((u8 *)reg) + sizeof(reg->type), 0, 1367 offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off) - sizeof(reg->type)); 1368 ___mark_reg_known(reg, imm); 1369 } 1370 1371 static void __mark_reg32_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm) 1372 { 1373 reg->var_off = tnum_const_subreg(reg->var_off, imm); 1374 reg->s32_min_value = (s32)imm; 1375 reg->s32_max_value = (s32)imm; 1376 reg->u32_min_value = (u32)imm; 1377 reg->u32_max_value = (u32)imm; 1378 } 1379 1380 /* Mark the 'variable offset' part of a register as zero. This should be 1381 * used only on registers holding a pointer type. 1382 */ 1383 static void __mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1384 { 1385 __mark_reg_known(reg, 0); 1386 } 1387 1388 static void __mark_reg_const_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1389 { 1390 __mark_reg_known(reg, 0); 1391 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 1392 } 1393 1394 static void mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1395 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) 1396 { 1397 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { 1398 verbose(env, "mark_reg_known_zero(regs, %u)\n", regno); 1399 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs */ 1400 for (regno = 0; regno < MAX_BPF_REG; regno++) 1401 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); 1402 return; 1403 } 1404 __mark_reg_known_zero(regs + regno); 1405 } 1406 1407 static void mark_ptr_not_null_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1408 { 1409 if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 1410 const struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 1411 1412 if (map->inner_map_meta) { 1413 reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; 1414 reg->map_ptr = map->inner_map_meta; 1415 /* transfer reg's id which is unique for every map_lookup_elem 1416 * as UID of the inner map. 1417 */ 1418 if (btf_record_has_field(map->inner_map_meta->record, BPF_TIMER)) 1419 reg->map_uid = reg->id; 1420 } else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP) { 1421 reg->type = PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK; 1422 } else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP || 1423 map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH) { 1424 reg->type = PTR_TO_SOCKET; 1425 } else { 1426 reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 1427 } 1428 return; 1429 } 1430 1431 reg->type &= ~PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 1432 } 1433 1434 static bool reg_is_pkt_pointer(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1435 { 1436 return type_is_pkt_pointer(reg->type); 1437 } 1438 1439 static bool reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1440 { 1441 return reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg) || 1442 reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END; 1443 } 1444 1445 /* Unmodified PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END] register from ctx access. */ 1446 static bool reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 1447 enum bpf_reg_type which) 1448 { 1449 /* The register can already have a range from prior markings. 1450 * This is fine as long as it hasn't been advanced from its 1451 * origin. 1452 */ 1453 return reg->type == which && 1454 reg->id == 0 && 1455 reg->off == 0 && 1456 tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0); 1457 } 1458 1459 /* Reset the min/max bounds of a register */ 1460 static void __mark_reg_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1461 { 1462 reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 1463 reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 1464 reg->umin_value = 0; 1465 reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 1466 1467 reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 1468 reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 1469 reg->u32_min_value = 0; 1470 reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 1471 } 1472 1473 static void __mark_reg64_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1474 { 1475 reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 1476 reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 1477 reg->umin_value = 0; 1478 reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 1479 } 1480 1481 static void __mark_reg32_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1482 { 1483 reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 1484 reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 1485 reg->u32_min_value = 0; 1486 reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 1487 } 1488 1489 static void __update_reg32_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1490 { 1491 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off); 1492 1493 /* min signed is max(sign bit) | min(other bits) */ 1494 reg->s32_min_value = max_t(s32, reg->s32_min_value, 1495 var32_off.value | (var32_off.mask & S32_MIN)); 1496 /* max signed is min(sign bit) | max(other bits) */ 1497 reg->s32_max_value = min_t(s32, reg->s32_max_value, 1498 var32_off.value | (var32_off.mask & S32_MAX)); 1499 reg->u32_min_value = max_t(u32, reg->u32_min_value, (u32)var32_off.value); 1500 reg->u32_max_value = min(reg->u32_max_value, 1501 (u32)(var32_off.value | var32_off.mask)); 1502 } 1503 1504 static void __update_reg64_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1505 { 1506 /* min signed is max(sign bit) | min(other bits) */ 1507 reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, reg->smin_value, 1508 reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask & S64_MIN)); 1509 /* max signed is min(sign bit) | max(other bits) */ 1510 reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, reg->smax_value, 1511 reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask & S64_MAX)); 1512 reg->umin_value = max(reg->umin_value, reg->var_off.value); 1513 reg->umax_value = min(reg->umax_value, 1514 reg->var_off.value | reg->var_off.mask); 1515 } 1516 1517 static void __update_reg_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1518 { 1519 __update_reg32_bounds(reg); 1520 __update_reg64_bounds(reg); 1521 } 1522 1523 /* Uses signed min/max values to inform unsigned, and vice-versa */ 1524 static void __reg32_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1525 { 1526 /* Learn sign from signed bounds. 1527 * If we cannot cross the sign boundary, then signed and unsigned bounds 1528 * are the same, so combine. This works even in the negative case, e.g. 1529 * -3 s<= x s<= -1 implies 0xf...fd u<= x u<= 0xf...ff. 1530 */ 1531 if (reg->s32_min_value >= 0 || reg->s32_max_value < 0) { 1532 reg->s32_min_value = reg->u32_min_value = 1533 max_t(u32, reg->s32_min_value, reg->u32_min_value); 1534 reg->s32_max_value = reg->u32_max_value = 1535 min_t(u32, reg->s32_max_value, reg->u32_max_value); 1536 return; 1537 } 1538 /* Learn sign from unsigned bounds. Signed bounds cross the sign 1539 * boundary, so we must be careful. 1540 */ 1541 if ((s32)reg->u32_max_value >= 0) { 1542 /* Positive. We can't learn anything from the smin, but smax 1543 * is positive, hence safe. 1544 */ 1545 reg->s32_min_value = reg->u32_min_value; 1546 reg->s32_max_value = reg->u32_max_value = 1547 min_t(u32, reg->s32_max_value, reg->u32_max_value); 1548 } else if ((s32)reg->u32_min_value < 0) { 1549 /* Negative. We can't learn anything from the smax, but smin 1550 * is negative, hence safe. 1551 */ 1552 reg->s32_min_value = reg->u32_min_value = 1553 max_t(u32, reg->s32_min_value, reg->u32_min_value); 1554 reg->s32_max_value = reg->u32_max_value; 1555 } 1556 } 1557 1558 static void __reg64_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1559 { 1560 /* Learn sign from signed bounds. 1561 * If we cannot cross the sign boundary, then signed and unsigned bounds 1562 * are the same, so combine. This works even in the negative case, e.g. 1563 * -3 s<= x s<= -1 implies 0xf...fd u<= x u<= 0xf...ff. 1564 */ 1565 if (reg->smin_value >= 0 || reg->smax_value < 0) { 1566 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->smin_value, 1567 reg->umin_value); 1568 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->smax_value, 1569 reg->umax_value); 1570 return; 1571 } 1572 /* Learn sign from unsigned bounds. Signed bounds cross the sign 1573 * boundary, so we must be careful. 1574 */ 1575 if ((s64)reg->umax_value >= 0) { 1576 /* Positive. We can't learn anything from the smin, but smax 1577 * is positive, hence safe. 1578 */ 1579 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value; 1580 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->smax_value, 1581 reg->umax_value); 1582 } else if ((s64)reg->umin_value < 0) { 1583 /* Negative. We can't learn anything from the smax, but smin 1584 * is negative, hence safe. 1585 */ 1586 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->smin_value, 1587 reg->umin_value); 1588 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value; 1589 } 1590 } 1591 1592 static void __reg_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1593 { 1594 __reg32_deduce_bounds(reg); 1595 __reg64_deduce_bounds(reg); 1596 } 1597 1598 /* Attempts to improve var_off based on unsigned min/max information */ 1599 static void __reg_bound_offset(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1600 { 1601 struct tnum var64_off = tnum_intersect(reg->var_off, 1602 tnum_range(reg->umin_value, 1603 reg->umax_value)); 1604 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_intersect(tnum_subreg(reg->var_off), 1605 tnum_range(reg->u32_min_value, 1606 reg->u32_max_value)); 1607 1608 reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(var64_off), var32_off); 1609 } 1610 1611 static void reg_bounds_sync(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1612 { 1613 /* We might have learned new bounds from the var_off. */ 1614 __update_reg_bounds(reg); 1615 /* We might have learned something about the sign bit. */ 1616 __reg_deduce_bounds(reg); 1617 /* We might have learned some bits from the bounds. */ 1618 __reg_bound_offset(reg); 1619 /* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds 1620 * slightly, e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc), 1621 * then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax. 1622 */ 1623 __update_reg_bounds(reg); 1624 } 1625 1626 static bool __reg32_bound_s64(s32 a) 1627 { 1628 return a >= 0 && a <= S32_MAX; 1629 } 1630 1631 static void __reg_assign_32_into_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1632 { 1633 reg->umin_value = reg->u32_min_value; 1634 reg->umax_value = reg->u32_max_value; 1635 1636 /* Attempt to pull 32-bit signed bounds into 64-bit bounds but must 1637 * be positive otherwise set to worse case bounds and refine later 1638 * from tnum. 1639 */ 1640 if (__reg32_bound_s64(reg->s32_min_value) && 1641 __reg32_bound_s64(reg->s32_max_value)) { 1642 reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value; 1643 reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value; 1644 } else { 1645 reg->smin_value = 0; 1646 reg->smax_value = U32_MAX; 1647 } 1648 } 1649 1650 static void __reg_combine_32_into_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1651 { 1652 /* special case when 64-bit register has upper 32-bit register 1653 * zeroed. Typically happens after zext or <<32, >>32 sequence 1654 * allowing us to use 32-bit bounds directly, 1655 */ 1656 if (tnum_equals_const(tnum_clear_subreg(reg->var_off), 0)) { 1657 __reg_assign_32_into_64(reg); 1658 } else { 1659 /* Otherwise the best we can do is push lower 32bit known and 1660 * unknown bits into register (var_off set from jmp logic) 1661 * then learn as much as possible from the 64-bit tnum 1662 * known and unknown bits. The previous smin/smax bounds are 1663 * invalid here because of jmp32 compare so mark them unknown 1664 * so they do not impact tnum bounds calculation. 1665 */ 1666 __mark_reg64_unbounded(reg); 1667 } 1668 reg_bounds_sync(reg); 1669 } 1670 1671 static bool __reg64_bound_s32(s64 a) 1672 { 1673 return a >= S32_MIN && a <= S32_MAX; 1674 } 1675 1676 static bool __reg64_bound_u32(u64 a) 1677 { 1678 return a >= U32_MIN && a <= U32_MAX; 1679 } 1680 1681 static void __reg_combine_64_into_32(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1682 { 1683 __mark_reg32_unbounded(reg); 1684 if (__reg64_bound_s32(reg->smin_value) && __reg64_bound_s32(reg->smax_value)) { 1685 reg->s32_min_value = (s32)reg->smin_value; 1686 reg->s32_max_value = (s32)reg->smax_value; 1687 } 1688 if (__reg64_bound_u32(reg->umin_value) && __reg64_bound_u32(reg->umax_value)) { 1689 reg->u32_min_value = (u32)reg->umin_value; 1690 reg->u32_max_value = (u32)reg->umax_value; 1691 } 1692 reg_bounds_sync(reg); 1693 } 1694 1695 /* Mark a register as having a completely unknown (scalar) value. */ 1696 static void __mark_reg_unknown(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1697 struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1698 { 1699 /* 1700 * Clear type, id, off, and union(map_ptr, range) and 1701 * padding between 'type' and union 1702 */ 1703 memset(reg, 0, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off)); 1704 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 1705 reg->var_off = tnum_unknown; 1706 reg->frameno = 0; 1707 reg->precise = !env->bpf_capable; 1708 __mark_reg_unbounded(reg); 1709 } 1710 1711 static void mark_reg_unknown(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1712 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) 1713 { 1714 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { 1715 verbose(env, "mark_reg_unknown(regs, %u)\n", regno); 1716 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs except FP */ 1717 for (regno = 0; regno < BPF_REG_FP; regno++) 1718 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); 1719 return; 1720 } 1721 __mark_reg_unknown(env, regs + regno); 1722 } 1723 1724 static void __mark_reg_not_init(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1725 struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1726 { 1727 __mark_reg_unknown(env, reg); 1728 reg->type = NOT_INIT; 1729 } 1730 1731 static void mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1732 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) 1733 { 1734 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { 1735 verbose(env, "mark_reg_not_init(regs, %u)\n", regno); 1736 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs except FP */ 1737 for (regno = 0; regno < BPF_REG_FP; regno++) 1738 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); 1739 return; 1740 } 1741 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); 1742 } 1743 1744 static void mark_btf_ld_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1745 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno, 1746 enum bpf_reg_type reg_type, 1747 struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id, 1748 enum bpf_type_flag flag) 1749 { 1750 if (reg_type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 1751 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, regno); 1752 return; 1753 } 1754 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, regno); 1755 regs[regno].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | flag; 1756 regs[regno].btf = btf; 1757 regs[regno].btf_id = btf_id; 1758 } 1759 1760 #define DEF_NOT_SUBREG (0) 1761 static void init_reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1762 struct bpf_func_state *state) 1763 { 1764 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs; 1765 int i; 1766 1767 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) { 1768 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, i); 1769 regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE; 1770 regs[i].parent = NULL; 1771 regs[i].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 1772 } 1773 1774 /* frame pointer */ 1775 regs[BPF_REG_FP].type = PTR_TO_STACK; 1776 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_FP); 1777 regs[BPF_REG_FP].frameno = state->frameno; 1778 } 1779 1780 #define BPF_MAIN_FUNC (-1) 1781 static void init_func_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1782 struct bpf_func_state *state, 1783 int callsite, int frameno, int subprogno) 1784 { 1785 state->callsite = callsite; 1786 state->frameno = frameno; 1787 state->subprogno = subprogno; 1788 state->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 0); 1789 init_reg_state(env, state); 1790 mark_verifier_state_scratched(env); 1791 } 1792 1793 /* Similar to push_stack(), but for async callbacks */ 1794 static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_async_cb(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1795 int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx, 1796 int subprog) 1797 { 1798 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem; 1799 struct bpf_func_state *frame; 1800 1801 elem = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem), GFP_KERNEL); 1802 if (!elem) 1803 goto err; 1804 1805 elem->insn_idx = insn_idx; 1806 elem->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx; 1807 elem->next = env->head; 1808 elem->log_pos = env->log.len_used; 1809 env->head = elem; 1810 env->stack_size++; 1811 if (env->stack_size > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ) { 1812 verbose(env, 1813 "The sequence of %d jumps is too complex for async cb.\n", 1814 env->stack_size); 1815 goto err; 1816 } 1817 /* Unlike push_stack() do not copy_verifier_state(). 1818 * The caller state doesn't matter. 1819 * This is async callback. It starts in a fresh stack. 1820 * Initialize it similar to do_check_common(). 1821 */ 1822 elem->st.branches = 1; 1823 frame = kzalloc(sizeof(*frame), GFP_KERNEL); 1824 if (!frame) 1825 goto err; 1826 init_func_state(env, frame, 1827 BPF_MAIN_FUNC /* callsite */, 1828 0 /* frameno within this callchain */, 1829 subprog /* subprog number within this prog */); 1830 elem->st.frame[0] = frame; 1831 return &elem->st; 1832 err: 1833 free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true); 1834 env->cur_state = NULL; 1835 /* pop all elements and return */ 1836 while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false)); 1837 return NULL; 1838 } 1839 1840 1841 enum reg_arg_type { 1842 SRC_OP, /* register is used as source operand */ 1843 DST_OP, /* register is used as destination operand */ 1844 DST_OP_NO_MARK /* same as above, check only, don't mark */ 1845 }; 1846 1847 static int cmp_subprogs(const void *a, const void *b) 1848 { 1849 return ((struct bpf_subprog_info *)a)->start - 1850 ((struct bpf_subprog_info *)b)->start; 1851 } 1852 1853 static int find_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off) 1854 { 1855 struct bpf_subprog_info *p; 1856 1857 p = bsearch(&off, env->subprog_info, env->subprog_cnt, 1858 sizeof(env->subprog_info[0]), cmp_subprogs); 1859 if (!p) 1860 return -ENOENT; 1861 return p - env->subprog_info; 1862 1863 } 1864 1865 static int add_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off) 1866 { 1867 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 1868 int ret; 1869 1870 if (off >= insn_cnt || off < 0) { 1871 verbose(env, "call to invalid destination\n"); 1872 return -EINVAL; 1873 } 1874 ret = find_subprog(env, off); 1875 if (ret >= 0) 1876 return ret; 1877 if (env->subprog_cnt >= BPF_MAX_SUBPROGS) { 1878 verbose(env, "too many subprograms\n"); 1879 return -E2BIG; 1880 } 1881 /* determine subprog starts. The end is one before the next starts */ 1882 env->subprog_info[env->subprog_cnt++].start = off; 1883 sort(env->subprog_info, env->subprog_cnt, 1884 sizeof(env->subprog_info[0]), cmp_subprogs, NULL); 1885 return env->subprog_cnt - 1; 1886 } 1887 1888 #define MAX_KFUNC_DESCS 256 1889 #define MAX_KFUNC_BTFS 256 1890 1891 struct bpf_kfunc_desc { 1892 struct btf_func_model func_model; 1893 u32 func_id; 1894 s32 imm; 1895 u16 offset; 1896 }; 1897 1898 struct bpf_kfunc_btf { 1899 struct btf *btf; 1900 struct module *module; 1901 u16 offset; 1902 }; 1903 1904 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab { 1905 struct bpf_kfunc_desc descs[MAX_KFUNC_DESCS]; 1906 u32 nr_descs; 1907 }; 1908 1909 struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab { 1910 struct bpf_kfunc_btf descs[MAX_KFUNC_BTFS]; 1911 u32 nr_descs; 1912 }; 1913 1914 static int kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id_off(const void *a, const void *b) 1915 { 1916 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d0 = a; 1917 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d1 = b; 1918 1919 /* func_id is not greater than BTF_MAX_TYPE */ 1920 return d0->func_id - d1->func_id ?: d0->offset - d1->offset; 1921 } 1922 1923 static int kfunc_btf_cmp_by_off(const void *a, const void *b) 1924 { 1925 const struct bpf_kfunc_btf *d0 = a; 1926 const struct bpf_kfunc_btf *d1 = b; 1927 1928 return d0->offset - d1->offset; 1929 } 1930 1931 static const struct bpf_kfunc_desc * 1932 find_kfunc_desc(const struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 func_id, u16 offset) 1933 { 1934 struct bpf_kfunc_desc desc = { 1935 .func_id = func_id, 1936 .offset = offset, 1937 }; 1938 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab; 1939 1940 tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 1941 return bsearch(&desc, tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, 1942 sizeof(tab->descs[0]), kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id_off); 1943 } 1944 1945 static struct btf *__find_kfunc_desc_btf(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1946 s16 offset) 1947 { 1948 struct bpf_kfunc_btf kf_btf = { .offset = offset }; 1949 struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab *tab; 1950 struct bpf_kfunc_btf *b; 1951 struct module *mod; 1952 struct btf *btf; 1953 int btf_fd; 1954 1955 tab = env->prog->aux->kfunc_btf_tab; 1956 b = bsearch(&kf_btf, tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, 1957 sizeof(tab->descs[0]), kfunc_btf_cmp_by_off); 1958 if (!b) { 1959 if (tab->nr_descs == MAX_KFUNC_BTFS) { 1960 verbose(env, "too many different module BTFs\n"); 1961 return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG); 1962 } 1963 1964 if (bpfptr_is_null(env->fd_array)) { 1965 verbose(env, "kfunc offset > 0 without fd_array is invalid\n"); 1966 return ERR_PTR(-EPROTO); 1967 } 1968 1969 if (copy_from_bpfptr_offset(&btf_fd, env->fd_array, 1970 offset * sizeof(btf_fd), 1971 sizeof(btf_fd))) 1972 return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); 1973 1974 btf = btf_get_by_fd(btf_fd); 1975 if (IS_ERR(btf)) { 1976 verbose(env, "invalid module BTF fd specified\n"); 1977 return btf; 1978 } 1979 1980 if (!btf_is_module(btf)) { 1981 verbose(env, "BTF fd for kfunc is not a module BTF\n"); 1982 btf_put(btf); 1983 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); 1984 } 1985 1986 mod = btf_try_get_module(btf); 1987 if (!mod) { 1988 btf_put(btf); 1989 return ERR_PTR(-ENXIO); 1990 } 1991 1992 b = &tab->descs[tab->nr_descs++]; 1993 b->btf = btf; 1994 b->module = mod; 1995 b->offset = offset; 1996 1997 sort(tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, sizeof(tab->descs[0]), 1998 kfunc_btf_cmp_by_off, NULL); 1999 } 2000 return b->btf; 2001 } 2002 2003 void bpf_free_kfunc_btf_tab(struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab *tab) 2004 { 2005 if (!tab) 2006 return; 2007 2008 while (tab->nr_descs--) { 2009 module_put(tab->descs[tab->nr_descs].module); 2010 btf_put(tab->descs[tab->nr_descs].btf); 2011 } 2012 kfree(tab); 2013 } 2014 2015 static struct btf *find_kfunc_desc_btf(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, s16 offset) 2016 { 2017 if (offset) { 2018 if (offset < 0) { 2019 /* In the future, this can be allowed to increase limit 2020 * of fd index into fd_array, interpreted as u16. 2021 */ 2022 verbose(env, "negative offset disallowed for kernel module function call\n"); 2023 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); 2024 } 2025 2026 return __find_kfunc_desc_btf(env, offset); 2027 } 2028 return btf_vmlinux ?: ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); 2029 } 2030 2031 static int add_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 func_id, s16 offset) 2032 { 2033 const struct btf_type *func, *func_proto; 2034 struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab *btf_tab; 2035 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab; 2036 struct bpf_prog_aux *prog_aux; 2037 struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc; 2038 const char *func_name; 2039 struct btf *desc_btf; 2040 unsigned long call_imm; 2041 unsigned long addr; 2042 int err; 2043 2044 prog_aux = env->prog->aux; 2045 tab = prog_aux->kfunc_tab; 2046 btf_tab = prog_aux->kfunc_btf_tab; 2047 if (!tab) { 2048 if (!btf_vmlinux) { 2049 verbose(env, "calling kernel function is not supported without CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF\n"); 2050 return -ENOTSUPP; 2051 } 2052 2053 if (!env->prog->jit_requested) { 2054 verbose(env, "JIT is required for calling kernel function\n"); 2055 return -ENOTSUPP; 2056 } 2057 2058 if (!bpf_jit_supports_kfunc_call()) { 2059 verbose(env, "JIT does not support calling kernel function\n"); 2060 return -ENOTSUPP; 2061 } 2062 2063 if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible) { 2064 verbose(env, "cannot call kernel function from non-GPL compatible program\n"); 2065 return -EINVAL; 2066 } 2067 2068 tab = kzalloc(sizeof(*tab), GFP_KERNEL); 2069 if (!tab) 2070 return -ENOMEM; 2071 prog_aux->kfunc_tab = tab; 2072 } 2073 2074 /* func_id == 0 is always invalid, but instead of returning an error, be 2075 * conservative and wait until the code elimination pass before returning 2076 * error, so that invalid calls that get pruned out can be in BPF programs 2077 * loaded from userspace. It is also required that offset be untouched 2078 * for such calls. 2079 */ 2080 if (!func_id && !offset) 2081 return 0; 2082 2083 if (!btf_tab && offset) { 2084 btf_tab = kzalloc(sizeof(*btf_tab), GFP_KERNEL); 2085 if (!btf_tab) 2086 return -ENOMEM; 2087 prog_aux->kfunc_btf_tab = btf_tab; 2088 } 2089 2090 desc_btf = find_kfunc_desc_btf(env, offset); 2091 if (IS_ERR(desc_btf)) { 2092 verbose(env, "failed to find BTF for kernel function\n"); 2093 return PTR_ERR(desc_btf); 2094 } 2095 2096 if (find_kfunc_desc(env->prog, func_id, offset)) 2097 return 0; 2098 2099 if (tab->nr_descs == MAX_KFUNC_DESCS) { 2100 verbose(env, "too many different kernel function calls\n"); 2101 return -E2BIG; 2102 } 2103 2104 func = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, func_id); 2105 if (!func || !btf_type_is_func(func)) { 2106 verbose(env, "kernel btf_id %u is not a function\n", 2107 func_id); 2108 return -EINVAL; 2109 } 2110 func_proto = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, func->type); 2111 if (!func_proto || !btf_type_is_func_proto(func_proto)) { 2112 verbose(env, "kernel function btf_id %u does not have a valid func_proto\n", 2113 func_id); 2114 return -EINVAL; 2115 } 2116 2117 func_name = btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf, func->name_off); 2118 addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(func_name); 2119 if (!addr) { 2120 verbose(env, "cannot find address for kernel function %s\n", 2121 func_name); 2122 return -EINVAL; 2123 } 2124 2125 call_imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(addr); 2126 /* Check whether or not the relative offset overflows desc->imm */ 2127 if ((unsigned long)(s32)call_imm != call_imm) { 2128 verbose(env, "address of kernel function %s is out of range\n", 2129 func_name); 2130 return -EINVAL; 2131 } 2132 2133 desc = &tab->descs[tab->nr_descs++]; 2134 desc->func_id = func_id; 2135 desc->imm = call_imm; 2136 desc->offset = offset; 2137 err = btf_distill_func_proto(&env->log, desc_btf, 2138 func_proto, func_name, 2139 &desc->func_model); 2140 if (!err) 2141 sort(tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, sizeof(tab->descs[0]), 2142 kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id_off, NULL); 2143 return err; 2144 } 2145 2146 static int kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm(const void *a, const void *b) 2147 { 2148 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d0 = a; 2149 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d1 = b; 2150 2151 if (d0->imm > d1->imm) 2152 return 1; 2153 else if (d0->imm < d1->imm) 2154 return -1; 2155 return 0; 2156 } 2157 2158 static void sort_kfunc_descs_by_imm(struct bpf_prog *prog) 2159 { 2160 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab; 2161 2162 tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 2163 if (!tab) 2164 return; 2165 2166 sort(tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, sizeof(tab->descs[0]), 2167 kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm, NULL); 2168 } 2169 2170 bool bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call(const struct bpf_prog *prog) 2171 { 2172 return !!prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 2173 } 2174 2175 const struct btf_func_model * 2176 bpf_jit_find_kfunc_model(const struct bpf_prog *prog, 2177 const struct bpf_insn *insn) 2178 { 2179 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc desc = { 2180 .imm = insn->imm, 2181 }; 2182 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *res; 2183 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab; 2184 2185 tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 2186 res = bsearch(&desc, tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, 2187 sizeof(tab->descs[0]), kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm); 2188 2189 return res ? &res->func_model : NULL; 2190 } 2191 2192 static int add_subprog_and_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 2193 { 2194 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info; 2195 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 2196 int i, ret, insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 2197 2198 /* Add entry function. */ 2199 ret = add_subprog(env, 0); 2200 if (ret) 2201 return ret; 2202 2203 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 2204 if (!bpf_pseudo_func(insn) && !bpf_pseudo_call(insn) && 2205 !bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn)) 2206 continue; 2207 2208 if (!env->bpf_capable) { 2209 verbose(env, "loading/calling other bpf or kernel functions are allowed for CAP_BPF and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"); 2210 return -EPERM; 2211 } 2212 2213 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn) || bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 2214 ret = add_subprog(env, i + insn->imm + 1); 2215 else 2216 ret = add_kfunc_call(env, insn->imm, insn->off); 2217 2218 if (ret < 0) 2219 return ret; 2220 } 2221 2222 /* Add a fake 'exit' subprog which could simplify subprog iteration 2223 * logic. 'subprog_cnt' should not be increased. 2224 */ 2225 subprog[env->subprog_cnt].start = insn_cnt; 2226 2227 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) 2228 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) 2229 verbose(env, "func#%d @%d\n", i, subprog[i].start); 2230 2231 return 0; 2232 } 2233 2234 static int check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 2235 { 2236 int i, subprog_start, subprog_end, off, cur_subprog = 0; 2237 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info; 2238 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 2239 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 2240 2241 /* now check that all jumps are within the same subprog */ 2242 subprog_start = subprog[cur_subprog].start; 2243 subprog_end = subprog[cur_subprog + 1].start; 2244 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 2245 u8 code = insn[i].code; 2246 2247 if (code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 2248 insn[i].imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call && 2249 insn[i].src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 2250 subprog[cur_subprog].has_tail_call = true; 2251 if (BPF_CLASS(code) == BPF_LD && 2252 (BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_ABS || BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_IND)) 2253 subprog[cur_subprog].has_ld_abs = true; 2254 if (BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP && BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP32) 2255 goto next; 2256 if (BPF_OP(code) == BPF_EXIT || BPF_OP(code) == BPF_CALL) 2257 goto next; 2258 off = i + insn[i].off + 1; 2259 if (off < subprog_start || off >= subprog_end) { 2260 verbose(env, "jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", i, off); 2261 return -EINVAL; 2262 } 2263 next: 2264 if (i == subprog_end - 1) { 2265 /* to avoid fall-through from one subprog into another 2266 * the last insn of the subprog should be either exit 2267 * or unconditional jump back 2268 */ 2269 if (code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT) && 2270 code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_JA)) { 2271 verbose(env, "last insn is not an exit or jmp\n"); 2272 return -EINVAL; 2273 } 2274 subprog_start = subprog_end; 2275 cur_subprog++; 2276 if (cur_subprog < env->subprog_cnt) 2277 subprog_end = subprog[cur_subprog + 1].start; 2278 } 2279 } 2280 return 0; 2281 } 2282 2283 /* Parentage chain of this register (or stack slot) should take care of all 2284 * issues like callee-saved registers, stack slot allocation time, etc. 2285 */ 2286 static int mark_reg_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2287 const struct bpf_reg_state *state, 2288 struct bpf_reg_state *parent, u8 flag) 2289 { 2290 bool writes = parent == state->parent; /* Observe write marks */ 2291 int cnt = 0; 2292 2293 while (parent) { 2294 /* if read wasn't screened by an earlier write ... */ 2295 if (writes && state->live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN) 2296 break; 2297 if (parent->live & REG_LIVE_DONE) { 2298 verbose(env, "verifier BUG type %s var_off %lld off %d\n", 2299 reg_type_str(env, parent->type), 2300 parent->var_off.value, parent->off); 2301 return -EFAULT; 2302 } 2303 /* The first condition is more likely to be true than the 2304 * second, checked it first. 2305 */ 2306 if ((parent->live & REG_LIVE_READ) == flag || 2307 parent->live & REG_LIVE_READ64) 2308 /* The parentage chain never changes and 2309 * this parent was already marked as LIVE_READ. 2310 * There is no need to keep walking the chain again and 2311 * keep re-marking all parents as LIVE_READ. 2312 * This case happens when the same register is read 2313 * multiple times without writes into it in-between. 2314 * Also, if parent has the stronger REG_LIVE_READ64 set, 2315 * then no need to set the weak REG_LIVE_READ32. 2316 */ 2317 break; 2318 /* ... then we depend on parent's value */ 2319 parent->live |= flag; 2320 /* REG_LIVE_READ64 overrides REG_LIVE_READ32. */ 2321 if (flag == REG_LIVE_READ64) 2322 parent->live &= ~REG_LIVE_READ32; 2323 state = parent; 2324 parent = state->parent; 2325 writes = true; 2326 cnt++; 2327 } 2328 2329 if (env->longest_mark_read_walk < cnt) 2330 env->longest_mark_read_walk = cnt; 2331 return 0; 2332 } 2333 2334 /* This function is supposed to be used by the following 32-bit optimization 2335 * code only. It returns TRUE if the source or destination register operates 2336 * on 64-bit, otherwise return FALSE. 2337 */ 2338 static bool is_reg64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 2339 u32 regno, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, enum reg_arg_type t) 2340 { 2341 u8 code, class, op; 2342 2343 code = insn->code; 2344 class = BPF_CLASS(code); 2345 op = BPF_OP(code); 2346 if (class == BPF_JMP) { 2347 /* BPF_EXIT for "main" will reach here. Return TRUE 2348 * conservatively. 2349 */ 2350 if (op == BPF_EXIT) 2351 return true; 2352 if (op == BPF_CALL) { 2353 /* BPF to BPF call will reach here because of marking 2354 * caller saved clobber with DST_OP_NO_MARK for which we 2355 * don't care the register def because they are anyway 2356 * marked as NOT_INIT already. 2357 */ 2358 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 2359 return false; 2360 /* Helper call will reach here because of arg type 2361 * check, conservatively return TRUE. 2362 */ 2363 if (t == SRC_OP) 2364 return true; 2365 2366 return false; 2367 } 2368 } 2369 2370 if (class == BPF_ALU64 || class == BPF_JMP || 2371 /* BPF_END always use BPF_ALU class. */ 2372 (class == BPF_ALU && op == BPF_END && insn->imm == 64)) 2373 return true; 2374 2375 if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_JMP32) 2376 return false; 2377 2378 if (class == BPF_LDX) { 2379 if (t != SRC_OP) 2380 return BPF_SIZE(code) == BPF_DW; 2381 /* LDX source must be ptr. */ 2382 return true; 2383 } 2384 2385 if (class == BPF_STX) { 2386 /* BPF_STX (including atomic variants) has multiple source 2387 * operands, one of which is a ptr. Check whether the caller is 2388 * asking about it. 2389 */ 2390 if (t == SRC_OP && reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 2391 return true; 2392 return BPF_SIZE(code) == BPF_DW; 2393 } 2394 2395 if (class == BPF_LD) { 2396 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(code); 2397 2398 /* LD_IMM64 */ 2399 if (mode == BPF_IMM) 2400 return true; 2401 2402 /* Both LD_IND and LD_ABS return 32-bit data. */ 2403 if (t != SRC_OP) 2404 return false; 2405 2406 /* Implicit ctx ptr. */ 2407 if (regno == BPF_REG_6) 2408 return true; 2409 2410 /* Explicit source could be any width. */ 2411 return true; 2412 } 2413 2414 if (class == BPF_ST) 2415 /* The only source register for BPF_ST is a ptr. */ 2416 return true; 2417 2418 /* Conservatively return true at default. */ 2419 return true; 2420 } 2421 2422 /* Return the regno defined by the insn, or -1. */ 2423 static int insn_def_regno(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 2424 { 2425 switch (BPF_CLASS(insn->code)) { 2426 case BPF_JMP: 2427 case BPF_JMP32: 2428 case BPF_ST: 2429 return -1; 2430 case BPF_STX: 2431 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC && 2432 (insn->imm & BPF_FETCH)) { 2433 if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG) 2434 return BPF_REG_0; 2435 else 2436 return insn->src_reg; 2437 } else { 2438 return -1; 2439 } 2440 default: 2441 return insn->dst_reg; 2442 } 2443 } 2444 2445 /* Return TRUE if INSN has defined any 32-bit value explicitly. */ 2446 static bool insn_has_def32(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 2447 { 2448 int dst_reg = insn_def_regno(insn); 2449 2450 if (dst_reg == -1) 2451 return false; 2452 2453 return !is_reg64(env, insn, dst_reg, NULL, DST_OP); 2454 } 2455 2456 static void mark_insn_zext(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2457 struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2458 { 2459 s32 def_idx = reg->subreg_def; 2460 2461 if (def_idx == DEF_NOT_SUBREG) 2462 return; 2463 2464 env->insn_aux_data[def_idx - 1].zext_dst = true; 2465 /* The dst will be zero extended, so won't be sub-register anymore. */ 2466 reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 2467 } 2468 2469 static int check_reg_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 2470 enum reg_arg_type t) 2471 { 2472 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 2473 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 2474 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi + env->insn_idx; 2475 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, *regs = state->regs; 2476 bool rw64; 2477 2478 if (regno >= MAX_BPF_REG) { 2479 verbose(env, "R%d is invalid\n", regno); 2480 return -EINVAL; 2481 } 2482 2483 mark_reg_scratched(env, regno); 2484 2485 reg = ®s[regno]; 2486 rw64 = is_reg64(env, insn, regno, reg, t); 2487 if (t == SRC_OP) { 2488 /* check whether register used as source operand can be read */ 2489 if (reg->type == NOT_INIT) { 2490 verbose(env, "R%d !read_ok\n", regno); 2491 return -EACCES; 2492 } 2493 /* We don't need to worry about FP liveness because it's read-only */ 2494 if (regno == BPF_REG_FP) 2495 return 0; 2496 2497 if (rw64) 2498 mark_insn_zext(env, reg); 2499 2500 return mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, 2501 rw64 ? REG_LIVE_READ64 : REG_LIVE_READ32); 2502 } else { 2503 /* check whether register used as dest operand can be written to */ 2504 if (regno == BPF_REG_FP) { 2505 verbose(env, "frame pointer is read only\n"); 2506 return -EACCES; 2507 } 2508 reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 2509 reg->subreg_def = rw64 ? DEF_NOT_SUBREG : env->insn_idx + 1; 2510 if (t == DST_OP) 2511 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, regno); 2512 } 2513 return 0; 2514 } 2515 2516 /* for any branch, call, exit record the history of jmps in the given state */ 2517 static int push_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2518 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 2519 { 2520 u32 cnt = cur->jmp_history_cnt; 2521 struct bpf_idx_pair *p; 2522 2523 cnt++; 2524 p = krealloc(cur->jmp_history, cnt * sizeof(*p), GFP_USER); 2525 if (!p) 2526 return -ENOMEM; 2527 p[cnt - 1].idx = env->insn_idx; 2528 p[cnt - 1].prev_idx = env->prev_insn_idx; 2529 cur->jmp_history = p; 2530 cur->jmp_history_cnt = cnt; 2531 return 0; 2532 } 2533 2534 /* Backtrack one insn at a time. If idx is not at the top of recorded 2535 * history then previous instruction came from straight line execution. 2536 */ 2537 static int get_prev_insn_idx(struct bpf_verifier_state *st, int i, 2538 u32 *history) 2539 { 2540 u32 cnt = *history; 2541 2542 if (cnt && st->jmp_history[cnt - 1].idx == i) { 2543 i = st->jmp_history[cnt - 1].prev_idx; 2544 (*history)--; 2545 } else { 2546 i--; 2547 } 2548 return i; 2549 } 2550 2551 static const char *disasm_kfunc_name(void *data, const struct bpf_insn *insn) 2552 { 2553 const struct btf_type *func; 2554 struct btf *desc_btf; 2555 2556 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) 2557 return NULL; 2558 2559 desc_btf = find_kfunc_desc_btf(data, insn->off); 2560 if (IS_ERR(desc_btf)) 2561 return "<error>"; 2562 2563 func = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, insn->imm); 2564 return btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf, func->name_off); 2565 } 2566 2567 /* For given verifier state backtrack_insn() is called from the last insn to 2568 * the first insn. Its purpose is to compute a bitmask of registers and 2569 * stack slots that needs precision in the parent verifier state. 2570 */ 2571 static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx, 2572 u32 *reg_mask, u64 *stack_mask) 2573 { 2574 const struct bpf_insn_cbs cbs = { 2575 .cb_call = disasm_kfunc_name, 2576 .cb_print = verbose, 2577 .private_data = env, 2578 }; 2579 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi + idx; 2580 u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); 2581 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 2582 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); 2583 u32 dreg = 1u << insn->dst_reg; 2584 u32 sreg = 1u << insn->src_reg; 2585 u32 spi; 2586 2587 if (insn->code == 0) 2588 return 0; 2589 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 2590 verbose(env, "regs=%x stack=%llx before ", *reg_mask, *stack_mask); 2591 verbose(env, "%d: ", idx); 2592 print_bpf_insn(&cbs, insn, env->allow_ptr_leaks); 2593 } 2594 2595 if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) { 2596 if (!(*reg_mask & dreg)) 2597 return 0; 2598 if (opcode == BPF_MOV) { 2599 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 2600 /* dreg = sreg 2601 * dreg needs precision after this insn 2602 * sreg needs precision before this insn 2603 */ 2604 *reg_mask &= ~dreg; 2605 *reg_mask |= sreg; 2606 } else { 2607 /* dreg = K 2608 * dreg needs precision after this insn. 2609 * Corresponding register is already marked 2610 * as precise=true in this verifier state. 2611 * No further markings in parent are necessary 2612 */ 2613 *reg_mask &= ~dreg; 2614 } 2615 } else { 2616 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 2617 /* dreg += sreg 2618 * both dreg and sreg need precision 2619 * before this insn 2620 */ 2621 *reg_mask |= sreg; 2622 } /* else dreg += K 2623 * dreg still needs precision before this insn 2624 */ 2625 } 2626 } else if (class == BPF_LDX) { 2627 if (!(*reg_mask & dreg)) 2628 return 0; 2629 *reg_mask &= ~dreg; 2630 2631 /* scalars can only be spilled into stack w/o losing precision. 2632 * Load from any other memory can be zero extended. 2633 * The desire to keep that precision is already indicated 2634 * by 'precise' mark in corresponding register of this state. 2635 * No further tracking necessary. 2636 */ 2637 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_FP) 2638 return 0; 2639 2640 /* dreg = *(u64 *)[fp - off] was a fill from the stack. 2641 * that [fp - off] slot contains scalar that needs to be 2642 * tracked with precision 2643 */ 2644 spi = (-insn->off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE; 2645 if (spi >= 64) { 2646 verbose(env, "BUG spi %d\n", spi); 2647 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 2648 return -EFAULT; 2649 } 2650 *stack_mask |= 1ull << spi; 2651 } else if (class == BPF_STX || class == BPF_ST) { 2652 if (*reg_mask & dreg) 2653 /* stx & st shouldn't be using _scalar_ dst_reg 2654 * to access memory. It means backtracking 2655 * encountered a case of pointer subtraction. 2656 */ 2657 return -ENOTSUPP; 2658 /* scalars can only be spilled into stack */ 2659 if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_FP) 2660 return 0; 2661 spi = (-insn->off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE; 2662 if (spi >= 64) { 2663 verbose(env, "BUG spi %d\n", spi); 2664 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 2665 return -EFAULT; 2666 } 2667 if (!(*stack_mask & (1ull << spi))) 2668 return 0; 2669 *stack_mask &= ~(1ull << spi); 2670 if (class == BPF_STX) 2671 *reg_mask |= sreg; 2672 } else if (class == BPF_JMP || class == BPF_JMP32) { 2673 if (opcode == BPF_CALL) { 2674 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 2675 return -ENOTSUPP; 2676 /* BPF helpers that invoke callback subprogs are 2677 * equivalent to BPF_PSEUDO_CALL above 2678 */ 2679 if (insn->src_reg == 0 && is_callback_calling_function(insn->imm)) 2680 return -ENOTSUPP; 2681 /* regular helper call sets R0 */ 2682 *reg_mask &= ~1; 2683 if (*reg_mask & 0x3f) { 2684 /* if backtracing was looking for registers R1-R5 2685 * they should have been found already. 2686 */ 2687 verbose(env, "BUG regs %x\n", *reg_mask); 2688 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 2689 return -EFAULT; 2690 } 2691 } else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) { 2692 return -ENOTSUPP; 2693 } 2694 } else if (class == BPF_LD) { 2695 if (!(*reg_mask & dreg)) 2696 return 0; 2697 *reg_mask &= ~dreg; 2698 /* It's ld_imm64 or ld_abs or ld_ind. 2699 * For ld_imm64 no further tracking of precision 2700 * into parent is necessary 2701 */ 2702 if (mode == BPF_IND || mode == BPF_ABS) 2703 /* to be analyzed */ 2704 return -ENOTSUPP; 2705 } 2706 return 0; 2707 } 2708 2709 /* the scalar precision tracking algorithm: 2710 * . at the start all registers have precise=false. 2711 * . scalar ranges are tracked as normal through alu and jmp insns. 2712 * . once precise value of the scalar register is used in: 2713 * . ptr + scalar alu 2714 * . if (scalar cond K|scalar) 2715 * . helper_call(.., scalar, ...) where ARG_CONST is expected 2716 * backtrack through the verifier states and mark all registers and 2717 * stack slots with spilled constants that these scalar regisers 2718 * should be precise. 2719 * . during state pruning two registers (or spilled stack slots) 2720 * are equivalent if both are not precise. 2721 * 2722 * Note the verifier cannot simply walk register parentage chain, 2723 * since many different registers and stack slots could have been 2724 * used to compute single precise scalar. 2725 * 2726 * The approach of starting with precise=true for all registers and then 2727 * backtrack to mark a register as not precise when the verifier detects 2728 * that program doesn't care about specific value (e.g., when helper 2729 * takes register as ARG_ANYTHING parameter) is not safe. 2730 * 2731 * It's ok to walk single parentage chain of the verifier states. 2732 * It's possible that this backtracking will go all the way till 1st insn. 2733 * All other branches will be explored for needing precision later. 2734 * 2735 * The backtracking needs to deal with cases like: 2736 * R8=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=1952,imm=0) R9_w=map_value(id=0,off=40,ks=4,vs=1952,imm=0) 2737 * r9 -= r8 2738 * r5 = r9 2739 * if r5 > 0x79f goto pc+7 2740 * R5_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=1951,var_off=(0x0; 0x7ff)) 2741 * r5 += 1 2742 * ... 2743 * call bpf_perf_event_output#25 2744 * where .arg5_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO 2745 * 2746 * and this case: 2747 * r6 = 1 2748 * call foo // uses callee's r6 inside to compute r0 2749 * r0 += r6 2750 * if r0 == 0 goto 2751 * 2752 * to track above reg_mask/stack_mask needs to be independent for each frame. 2753 * 2754 * Also if parent's curframe > frame where backtracking started, 2755 * the verifier need to mark registers in both frames, otherwise callees 2756 * may incorrectly prune callers. This is similar to 2757 * commit 7640ead93924 ("bpf: verifier: make sure callees don't prune with caller differences") 2758 * 2759 * For now backtracking falls back into conservative marking. 2760 */ 2761 static void mark_all_scalars_precise(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2762 struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 2763 { 2764 struct bpf_func_state *func; 2765 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 2766 int i, j; 2767 2768 /* big hammer: mark all scalars precise in this path. 2769 * pop_stack may still get !precise scalars. 2770 * We also skip current state and go straight to first parent state, 2771 * because precision markings in current non-checkpointed state are 2772 * not needed. See why in the comment in __mark_chain_precision below. 2773 */ 2774 for (st = st->parent; st; st = st->parent) { 2775 for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) { 2776 func = st->frame[i]; 2777 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_FP; j++) { 2778 reg = &func->regs[j]; 2779 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 2780 continue; 2781 reg->precise = true; 2782 } 2783 for (j = 0; j < func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) { 2784 if (!is_spilled_reg(&func->stack[j])) 2785 continue; 2786 reg = &func->stack[j].spilled_ptr; 2787 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 2788 continue; 2789 reg->precise = true; 2790 } 2791 } 2792 } 2793 } 2794 2795 static void mark_all_scalars_imprecise(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 2796 { 2797 struct bpf_func_state *func; 2798 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 2799 int i, j; 2800 2801 for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) { 2802 func = st->frame[i]; 2803 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_FP; j++) { 2804 reg = &func->regs[j]; 2805 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 2806 continue; 2807 reg->precise = false; 2808 } 2809 for (j = 0; j < func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) { 2810 if (!is_spilled_reg(&func->stack[j])) 2811 continue; 2812 reg = &func->stack[j].spilled_ptr; 2813 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 2814 continue; 2815 reg->precise = false; 2816 } 2817 } 2818 } 2819 2820 /* 2821 * __mark_chain_precision() backtracks BPF program instruction sequence and 2822 * chain of verifier states making sure that register *regno* (if regno >= 0) 2823 * and/or stack slot *spi* (if spi >= 0) are marked as precisely tracked 2824 * SCALARS, as well as any other registers and slots that contribute to 2825 * a tracked state of given registers/stack slots, depending on specific BPF 2826 * assembly instructions (see backtrack_insns() for exact instruction handling 2827 * logic). This backtracking relies on recorded jmp_history and is able to 2828 * traverse entire chain of parent states. This process ends only when all the 2829 * necessary registers/slots and their transitive dependencies are marked as 2830 * precise. 2831 * 2832 * One important and subtle aspect is that precise marks *do not matter* in 2833 * the currently verified state (current state). It is important to understand 2834 * why this is the case. 2835 * 2836 * First, note that current state is the state that is not yet "checkpointed", 2837 * i.e., it is not yet put into env->explored_states, and it has no children 2838 * states as well. It's ephemeral, and can end up either a) being discarded if 2839 * compatible explored state is found at some point or BPF_EXIT instruction is 2840 * reached or b) checkpointed and put into env->explored_states, branching out 2841 * into one or more children states. 2842 * 2843 * In the former case, precise markings in current state are completely 2844 * ignored by state comparison code (see regsafe() for details). Only 2845 * checkpointed ("old") state precise markings are important, and if old 2846 * state's register/slot is precise, regsafe() assumes current state's 2847 * register/slot as precise and checks value ranges exactly and precisely. If 2848 * states turn out to be compatible, current state's necessary precise 2849 * markings and any required parent states' precise markings are enforced 2850 * after the fact with propagate_precision() logic, after the fact. But it's 2851 * important to realize that in this case, even after marking current state 2852 * registers/slots as precise, we immediately discard current state. So what 2853 * actually matters is any of the precise markings propagated into current 2854 * state's parent states, which are always checkpointed (due to b) case above). 2855 * As such, for scenario a) it doesn't matter if current state has precise 2856 * markings set or not. 2857 * 2858 * Now, for the scenario b), checkpointing and forking into child(ren) 2859 * state(s). Note that before current state gets to checkpointing step, any 2860 * processed instruction always assumes precise SCALAR register/slot 2861 * knowledge: if precise value or range is useful to prune jump branch, BPF 2862 * verifier takes this opportunity enthusiastically. Similarly, when 2863 * register's value is used to calculate offset or memory address, exact 2864 * knowledge of SCALAR range is assumed, checked, and enforced. So, similar to 2865 * what we mentioned above about state comparison ignoring precise markings 2866 * during state comparison, BPF verifier ignores and also assumes precise 2867 * markings *at will* during instruction verification process. But as verifier 2868 * assumes precision, it also propagates any precision dependencies across 2869 * parent states, which are not yet finalized, so can be further restricted 2870 * based on new knowledge gained from restrictions enforced by their children 2871 * states. This is so that once those parent states are finalized, i.e., when 2872 * they have no more active children state, state comparison logic in 2873 * is_state_visited() would enforce strict and precise SCALAR ranges, if 2874 * required for correctness. 2875 * 2876 * To build a bit more intuition, note also that once a state is checkpointed, 2877 * the path we took to get to that state is not important. This is crucial 2878 * property for state pruning. When state is checkpointed and finalized at 2879 * some instruction index, it can be correctly and safely used to "short 2880 * circuit" any *compatible* state that reaches exactly the same instruction 2881 * index. I.e., if we jumped to that instruction from a completely different 2882 * code path than original finalized state was derived from, it doesn't 2883 * matter, current state can be discarded because from that instruction 2884 * forward having a compatible state will ensure we will safely reach the 2885 * exit. States describe preconditions for further exploration, but completely 2886 * forget the history of how we got here. 2887 * 2888 * This also means that even if we needed precise SCALAR range to get to 2889 * finalized state, but from that point forward *that same* SCALAR register is 2890 * never used in a precise context (i.e., it's precise value is not needed for 2891 * correctness), it's correct and safe to mark such register as "imprecise" 2892 * (i.e., precise marking set to false). This is what we rely on when we do 2893 * not set precise marking in current state. If no child state requires 2894 * precision for any given SCALAR register, it's safe to dictate that it can 2895 * be imprecise. If any child state does require this register to be precise, 2896 * we'll mark it precise later retroactively during precise markings 2897 * propagation from child state to parent states. 2898 * 2899 * Skipping precise marking setting in current state is a mild version of 2900 * relying on the above observation. But we can utilize this property even 2901 * more aggressively by proactively forgetting any precise marking in the 2902 * current state (which we inherited from the parent state), right before we 2903 * checkpoint it and branch off into new child state. This is done by 2904 * mark_all_scalars_imprecise() to hopefully get more permissive and generic 2905 * finalized states which help in short circuiting more future states. 2906 */ 2907 static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int frame, int regno, 2908 int spi) 2909 { 2910 struct bpf_verifier_state *st = env->cur_state; 2911 int first_idx = st->first_insn_idx; 2912 int last_idx = env->insn_idx; 2913 struct bpf_func_state *func; 2914 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 2915 u32 reg_mask = regno >= 0 ? 1u << regno : 0; 2916 u64 stack_mask = spi >= 0 ? 1ull << spi : 0; 2917 bool skip_first = true; 2918 bool new_marks = false; 2919 int i, err; 2920 2921 if (!env->bpf_capable) 2922 return 0; 2923 2924 /* Do sanity checks against current state of register and/or stack 2925 * slot, but don't set precise flag in current state, as precision 2926 * tracking in the current state is unnecessary. 2927 */ 2928 func = st->frame[frame]; 2929 if (regno >= 0) { 2930 reg = &func->regs[regno]; 2931 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 2932 WARN_ONCE(1, "backtracing misuse"); 2933 return -EFAULT; 2934 } 2935 new_marks = true; 2936 } 2937 2938 while (spi >= 0) { 2939 if (!is_spilled_reg(&func->stack[spi])) { 2940 stack_mask = 0; 2941 break; 2942 } 2943 reg = &func->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 2944 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 2945 stack_mask = 0; 2946 break; 2947 } 2948 new_marks = true; 2949 break; 2950 } 2951 2952 if (!new_marks) 2953 return 0; 2954 if (!reg_mask && !stack_mask) 2955 return 0; 2956 2957 for (;;) { 2958 DECLARE_BITMAP(mask, 64); 2959 u32 history = st->jmp_history_cnt; 2960 2961 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) 2962 verbose(env, "last_idx %d first_idx %d\n", last_idx, first_idx); 2963 2964 if (last_idx < 0) { 2965 /* we are at the entry into subprog, which 2966 * is expected for global funcs, but only if 2967 * requested precise registers are R1-R5 2968 * (which are global func's input arguments) 2969 */ 2970 if (st->curframe == 0 && 2971 st->frame[0]->subprogno > 0 && 2972 st->frame[0]->callsite == BPF_MAIN_FUNC && 2973 stack_mask == 0 && (reg_mask & ~0x3e) == 0) { 2974 bitmap_from_u64(mask, reg_mask); 2975 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) { 2976 reg = &st->frame[0]->regs[i]; 2977 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 2978 reg_mask &= ~(1u << i); 2979 continue; 2980 } 2981 reg->precise = true; 2982 } 2983 return 0; 2984 } 2985 2986 verbose(env, "BUG backtracing func entry subprog %d reg_mask %x stack_mask %llx\n", 2987 st->frame[0]->subprogno, reg_mask, stack_mask); 2988 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 2989 return -EFAULT; 2990 } 2991 2992 for (i = last_idx;;) { 2993 if (skip_first) { 2994 err = 0; 2995 skip_first = false; 2996 } else { 2997 err = backtrack_insn(env, i, ®_mask, &stack_mask); 2998 } 2999 if (err == -ENOTSUPP) { 3000 mark_all_scalars_precise(env, st); 3001 return 0; 3002 } else if (err) { 3003 return err; 3004 } 3005 if (!reg_mask && !stack_mask) 3006 /* Found assignment(s) into tracked register in this state. 3007 * Since this state is already marked, just return. 3008 * Nothing to be tracked further in the parent state. 3009 */ 3010 return 0; 3011 if (i == first_idx) 3012 break; 3013 i = get_prev_insn_idx(st, i, &history); 3014 if (i >= env->prog->len) { 3015 /* This can happen if backtracking reached insn 0 3016 * and there are still reg_mask or stack_mask 3017 * to backtrack. 3018 * It means the backtracking missed the spot where 3019 * particular register was initialized with a constant. 3020 */ 3021 verbose(env, "BUG backtracking idx %d\n", i); 3022 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 3023 return -EFAULT; 3024 } 3025 } 3026 st = st->parent; 3027 if (!st) 3028 break; 3029 3030 new_marks = false; 3031 func = st->frame[frame]; 3032 bitmap_from_u64(mask, reg_mask); 3033 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) { 3034 reg = &func->regs[i]; 3035 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 3036 reg_mask &= ~(1u << i); 3037 continue; 3038 } 3039 if (!reg->precise) 3040 new_marks = true; 3041 reg->precise = true; 3042 } 3043 3044 bitmap_from_u64(mask, stack_mask); 3045 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 64) { 3046 if (i >= func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE) { 3047 /* the sequence of instructions: 3048 * 2: (bf) r3 = r10 3049 * 3: (7b) *(u64 *)(r3 -8) = r0 3050 * 4: (79) r4 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8) 3051 * doesn't contain jmps. It's backtracked 3052 * as a single block. 3053 * During backtracking insn 3 is not recognized as 3054 * stack access, so at the end of backtracking 3055 * stack slot fp-8 is still marked in stack_mask. 3056 * However the parent state may not have accessed 3057 * fp-8 and it's "unallocated" stack space. 3058 * In such case fallback to conservative. 3059 */ 3060 mark_all_scalars_precise(env, st); 3061 return 0; 3062 } 3063 3064 if (!is_spilled_reg(&func->stack[i])) { 3065 stack_mask &= ~(1ull << i); 3066 continue; 3067 } 3068 reg = &func->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 3069 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 3070 stack_mask &= ~(1ull << i); 3071 continue; 3072 } 3073 if (!reg->precise) 3074 new_marks = true; 3075 reg->precise = true; 3076 } 3077 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 3078 verbose(env, "parent %s regs=%x stack=%llx marks:", 3079 new_marks ? "didn't have" : "already had", 3080 reg_mask, stack_mask); 3081 print_verifier_state(env, func, true); 3082 } 3083 3084 if (!reg_mask && !stack_mask) 3085 break; 3086 if (!new_marks) 3087 break; 3088 3089 last_idx = st->last_insn_idx; 3090 first_idx = st->first_insn_idx; 3091 } 3092 return 0; 3093 } 3094 3095 int mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 3096 { 3097 return __mark_chain_precision(env, env->cur_state->curframe, regno, -1); 3098 } 3099 3100 static int mark_chain_precision_frame(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int frame, int regno) 3101 { 3102 return __mark_chain_precision(env, frame, regno, -1); 3103 } 3104 3105 static int mark_chain_precision_stack_frame(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int frame, int spi) 3106 { 3107 return __mark_chain_precision(env, frame, -1, spi); 3108 } 3109 3110 static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type) 3111 { 3112 switch (base_type(type)) { 3113 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 3114 case PTR_TO_STACK: 3115 case PTR_TO_CTX: 3116 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 3117 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 3118 case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: 3119 case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS: 3120 case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP: 3121 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 3122 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 3123 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 3124 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 3125 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 3126 case PTR_TO_BUF: 3127 case PTR_TO_MEM: 3128 case PTR_TO_FUNC: 3129 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 3130 return true; 3131 default: 3132 return false; 3133 } 3134 } 3135 3136 /* Does this register contain a constant zero? */ 3137 static bool register_is_null(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 3138 { 3139 return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0); 3140 } 3141 3142 static bool register_is_const(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 3143 { 3144 return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 3145 } 3146 3147 static bool __is_scalar_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 3148 { 3149 return tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off) && 3150 reg->smin_value == S64_MIN && reg->smax_value == S64_MAX && 3151 reg->umin_value == 0 && reg->umax_value == U64_MAX && 3152 reg->s32_min_value == S32_MIN && reg->s32_max_value == S32_MAX && 3153 reg->u32_min_value == 0 && reg->u32_max_value == U32_MAX; 3154 } 3155 3156 static bool register_is_bounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 3157 { 3158 return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && !__is_scalar_unbounded(reg); 3159 } 3160 3161 static bool __is_pointer_value(bool allow_ptr_leaks, 3162 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 3163 { 3164 if (allow_ptr_leaks) 3165 return false; 3166 3167 return reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE; 3168 } 3169 3170 static void save_register_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, 3171 int spi, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 3172 int size) 3173 { 3174 int i; 3175 3176 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr = *reg; 3177 if (size == BPF_REG_SIZE) 3178 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 3179 3180 for (i = BPF_REG_SIZE; i > BPF_REG_SIZE - size; i--) 3181 state->stack[spi].slot_type[i - 1] = STACK_SPILL; 3182 3183 /* size < 8 bytes spill */ 3184 for (; i; i--) 3185 scrub_spilled_slot(&state->stack[spi].slot_type[i - 1]); 3186 } 3187 3188 /* check_stack_{read,write}_fixed_off functions track spill/fill of registers, 3189 * stack boundary and alignment are checked in check_mem_access() 3190 */ 3191 static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3192 /* stack frame we're writing to */ 3193 struct bpf_func_state *state, 3194 int off, int size, int value_regno, 3195 int insn_idx) 3196 { 3197 struct bpf_func_state *cur; /* state of the current function */ 3198 int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE, err; 3199 u32 dst_reg = env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx].dst_reg; 3200 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = NULL; 3201 3202 err = grow_stack_state(state, round_up(slot + 1, BPF_REG_SIZE)); 3203 if (err) 3204 return err; 3205 /* caller checked that off % size == 0 and -MAX_BPF_STACK <= off < 0, 3206 * so it's aligned access and [off, off + size) are within stack limits 3207 */ 3208 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && 3209 state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL && 3210 size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { 3211 verbose(env, "attempt to corrupt spilled pointer on stack\n"); 3212 return -EACCES; 3213 } 3214 3215 cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe]; 3216 if (value_regno >= 0) 3217 reg = &cur->regs[value_regno]; 3218 if (!env->bypass_spec_v4) { 3219 bool sanitize = reg && is_spillable_regtype(reg->type); 3220 3221 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { 3222 if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] == STACK_INVALID) { 3223 sanitize = true; 3224 break; 3225 } 3226 } 3227 3228 if (sanitize) 3229 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].sanitize_stack_spill = true; 3230 } 3231 3232 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi); 3233 if (reg && !(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && register_is_bounded(reg) && 3234 !register_is_null(reg) && env->bpf_capable) { 3235 if (dst_reg != BPF_REG_FP) { 3236 /* The backtracking logic can only recognize explicit 3237 * stack slot address like [fp - 8]. Other spill of 3238 * scalar via different register has to be conservative. 3239 * Backtrack from here and mark all registers as precise 3240 * that contributed into 'reg' being a constant. 3241 */ 3242 err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno); 3243 if (err) 3244 return err; 3245 } 3246 save_register_state(state, spi, reg, size); 3247 } else if (reg && is_spillable_regtype(reg->type)) { 3248 /* register containing pointer is being spilled into stack */ 3249 if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { 3250 verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; "); 3251 verbose(env, "invalid size of register spill\n"); 3252 return -EACCES; 3253 } 3254 if (state != cur && reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 3255 verbose(env, "cannot spill pointers to stack into stack frame of the caller\n"); 3256 return -EINVAL; 3257 } 3258 save_register_state(state, spi, reg, size); 3259 } else { 3260 u8 type = STACK_MISC; 3261 3262 /* regular write of data into stack destroys any spilled ptr */ 3263 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type = NOT_INIT; 3264 /* Mark slots as STACK_MISC if they belonged to spilled ptr. */ 3265 if (is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[spi])) 3266 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) 3267 scrub_spilled_slot(&state->stack[spi].slot_type[i]); 3268 3269 /* only mark the slot as written if all 8 bytes were written 3270 * otherwise read propagation may incorrectly stop too soon 3271 * when stack slots are partially written. 3272 * This heuristic means that read propagation will be 3273 * conservative, since it will add reg_live_read marks 3274 * to stack slots all the way to first state when programs 3275 * writes+reads less than 8 bytes 3276 */ 3277 if (size == BPF_REG_SIZE) 3278 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 3279 3280 /* when we zero initialize stack slots mark them as such */ 3281 if (reg && register_is_null(reg)) { 3282 /* backtracking doesn't work for STACK_ZERO yet. */ 3283 err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno); 3284 if (err) 3285 return err; 3286 type = STACK_ZERO; 3287 } 3288 3289 /* Mark slots affected by this stack write. */ 3290 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) 3291 state->stack[spi].slot_type[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] = 3292 type; 3293 } 3294 return 0; 3295 } 3296 3297 /* Write the stack: 'stack[ptr_regno + off] = value_regno'. 'ptr_regno' is 3298 * known to contain a variable offset. 3299 * This function checks whether the write is permitted and conservatively 3300 * tracks the effects of the write, considering that each stack slot in the 3301 * dynamic range is potentially written to. 3302 * 3303 * 'off' includes 'regno->off'. 3304 * 'value_regno' can be -1, meaning that an unknown value is being written to 3305 * the stack. 3306 * 3307 * Spilled pointers in range are not marked as written because we don't know 3308 * what's going to be actually written. This means that read propagation for 3309 * future reads cannot be terminated by this write. 3310 * 3311 * For privileged programs, uninitialized stack slots are considered 3312 * initialized by this write (even though we don't know exactly what offsets 3313 * are going to be written to). The idea is that we don't want the verifier to 3314 * reject future reads that access slots written to through variable offsets. 3315 */ 3316 static int check_stack_write_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3317 /* func where register points to */ 3318 struct bpf_func_state *state, 3319 int ptr_regno, int off, int size, 3320 int value_regno, int insn_idx) 3321 { 3322 struct bpf_func_state *cur; /* state of the current function */ 3323 int min_off, max_off; 3324 int i, err; 3325 struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, *value_reg = NULL; 3326 bool writing_zero = false; 3327 /* set if the fact that we're writing a zero is used to let any 3328 * stack slots remain STACK_ZERO 3329 */ 3330 bool zero_used = false; 3331 3332 cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe]; 3333 ptr_reg = &cur->regs[ptr_regno]; 3334 min_off = ptr_reg->smin_value + off; 3335 max_off = ptr_reg->smax_value + off + size; 3336 if (value_regno >= 0) 3337 value_reg = &cur->regs[value_regno]; 3338 if (value_reg && register_is_null(value_reg)) 3339 writing_zero = true; 3340 3341 err = grow_stack_state(state, round_up(-min_off, BPF_REG_SIZE)); 3342 if (err) 3343 return err; 3344 3345 3346 /* Variable offset writes destroy any spilled pointers in range. */ 3347 for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) { 3348 u8 new_type, *stype; 3349 int slot, spi; 3350 3351 slot = -i - 1; 3352 spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; 3353 stype = &state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE]; 3354 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi); 3355 3356 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && *stype != STACK_MISC && *stype != STACK_ZERO) { 3357 /* Reject the write if range we may write to has not 3358 * been initialized beforehand. If we didn't reject 3359 * here, the ptr status would be erased below (even 3360 * though not all slots are actually overwritten), 3361 * possibly opening the door to leaks. 3362 * 3363 * We do however catch STACK_INVALID case below, and 3364 * only allow reading possibly uninitialized memory 3365 * later for CAP_PERFMON, as the write may not happen to 3366 * that slot. 3367 */ 3368 verbose(env, "spilled ptr in range of var-offset stack write; insn %d, ptr off: %d", 3369 insn_idx, i); 3370 return -EINVAL; 3371 } 3372 3373 /* Erase all spilled pointers. */ 3374 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type = NOT_INIT; 3375 3376 /* Update the slot type. */ 3377 new_type = STACK_MISC; 3378 if (writing_zero && *stype == STACK_ZERO) { 3379 new_type = STACK_ZERO; 3380 zero_used = true; 3381 } 3382 /* If the slot is STACK_INVALID, we check whether it's OK to 3383 * pretend that it will be initialized by this write. The slot 3384 * might not actually be written to, and so if we mark it as 3385 * initialized future reads might leak uninitialized memory. 3386 * For privileged programs, we will accept such reads to slots 3387 * that may or may not be written because, if we're reject 3388 * them, the error would be too confusing. 3389 */ 3390 if (*stype == STACK_INVALID && !env->allow_uninit_stack) { 3391 verbose(env, "uninit stack in range of var-offset write prohibited for !root; insn %d, off: %d", 3392 insn_idx, i); 3393 return -EINVAL; 3394 } 3395 *stype = new_type; 3396 } 3397 if (zero_used) { 3398 /* backtracking doesn't work for STACK_ZERO yet. */ 3399 err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno); 3400 if (err) 3401 return err; 3402 } 3403 return 0; 3404 } 3405 3406 /* When register 'dst_regno' is assigned some values from stack[min_off, 3407 * max_off), we set the register's type according to the types of the 3408 * respective stack slots. If all the stack values are known to be zeros, then 3409 * so is the destination reg. Otherwise, the register is considered to be 3410 * SCALAR. This function does not deal with register filling; the caller must 3411 * ensure that all spilled registers in the stack range have been marked as 3412 * read. 3413 */ 3414 static void mark_reg_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3415 /* func where src register points to */ 3416 struct bpf_func_state *ptr_state, 3417 int min_off, int max_off, int dst_regno) 3418 { 3419 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 3420 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 3421 int i, slot, spi; 3422 u8 *stype; 3423 int zeros = 0; 3424 3425 for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) { 3426 slot = -i - 1; 3427 spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; 3428 stype = ptr_state->stack[spi].slot_type; 3429 if (stype[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE] != STACK_ZERO) 3430 break; 3431 zeros++; 3432 } 3433 if (zeros == max_off - min_off) { 3434 /* any access_size read into register is zero extended, 3435 * so the whole register == const_zero 3436 */ 3437 __mark_reg_const_zero(&state->regs[dst_regno]); 3438 /* backtracking doesn't support STACK_ZERO yet, 3439 * so mark it precise here, so that later 3440 * backtracking can stop here. 3441 * Backtracking may not need this if this register 3442 * doesn't participate in pointer adjustment. 3443 * Forward propagation of precise flag is not 3444 * necessary either. This mark is only to stop 3445 * backtracking. Any register that contributed 3446 * to const 0 was marked precise before spill. 3447 */ 3448 state->regs[dst_regno].precise = true; 3449 } else { 3450 /* have read misc data from the stack */ 3451 mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, dst_regno); 3452 } 3453 state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 3454 } 3455 3456 /* Read the stack at 'off' and put the results into the register indicated by 3457 * 'dst_regno'. It handles reg filling if the addressed stack slot is a 3458 * spilled reg. 3459 * 3460 * 'dst_regno' can be -1, meaning that the read value is not going to a 3461 * register. 3462 * 3463 * The access is assumed to be within the current stack bounds. 3464 */ 3465 static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3466 /* func where src register points to */ 3467 struct bpf_func_state *reg_state, 3468 int off, int size, int dst_regno) 3469 { 3470 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 3471 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 3472 int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; 3473 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 3474 u8 *stype, type; 3475 3476 stype = reg_state->stack[spi].slot_type; 3477 reg = ®_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 3478 3479 if (is_spilled_reg(®_state->stack[spi])) { 3480 u8 spill_size = 1; 3481 3482 for (i = BPF_REG_SIZE - 1; i > 0 && stype[i - 1] == STACK_SPILL; i--) 3483 spill_size++; 3484 3485 if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE || spill_size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { 3486 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 3487 verbose_linfo(env, env->insn_idx, "; "); 3488 verbose(env, "invalid size of register fill\n"); 3489 return -EACCES; 3490 } 3491 3492 mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 3493 if (dst_regno < 0) 3494 return 0; 3495 3496 if (!(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && size == spill_size) { 3497 /* The earlier check_reg_arg() has decided the 3498 * subreg_def for this insn. Save it first. 3499 */ 3500 s32 subreg_def = state->regs[dst_regno].subreg_def; 3501 3502 state->regs[dst_regno] = *reg; 3503 state->regs[dst_regno].subreg_def = subreg_def; 3504 } else { 3505 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { 3506 type = stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE]; 3507 if (type == STACK_SPILL) 3508 continue; 3509 if (type == STACK_MISC) 3510 continue; 3511 verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n", 3512 off, i, size); 3513 return -EACCES; 3514 } 3515 mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, dst_regno); 3516 } 3517 state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 3518 return 0; 3519 } 3520 3521 if (dst_regno >= 0) { 3522 /* restore register state from stack */ 3523 state->regs[dst_regno] = *reg; 3524 /* mark reg as written since spilled pointer state likely 3525 * has its liveness marks cleared by is_state_visited() 3526 * which resets stack/reg liveness for state transitions 3527 */ 3528 state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 3529 } else if (__is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, reg)) { 3530 /* If dst_regno==-1, the caller is asking us whether 3531 * it is acceptable to use this value as a SCALAR_VALUE 3532 * (e.g. for XADD). 3533 * We must not allow unprivileged callers to do that 3534 * with spilled pointers. 3535 */ 3536 verbose(env, "leaking pointer from stack off %d\n", 3537 off); 3538 return -EACCES; 3539 } 3540 mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 3541 } else { 3542 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { 3543 type = stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE]; 3544 if (type == STACK_MISC) 3545 continue; 3546 if (type == STACK_ZERO) 3547 continue; 3548 verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n", 3549 off, i, size); 3550 return -EACCES; 3551 } 3552 mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 3553 if (dst_regno >= 0) 3554 mark_reg_stack_read(env, reg_state, off, off + size, dst_regno); 3555 } 3556 return 0; 3557 } 3558 3559 enum bpf_access_src { 3560 ACCESS_DIRECT = 1, /* the access is performed by an instruction */ 3561 ACCESS_HELPER = 2, /* the access is performed by a helper */ 3562 }; 3563 3564 static int check_stack_range_initialized(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3565 int regno, int off, int access_size, 3566 bool zero_size_allowed, 3567 enum bpf_access_src type, 3568 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta); 3569 3570 static struct bpf_reg_state *reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 3571 { 3572 return cur_regs(env) + regno; 3573 } 3574 3575 /* Read the stack at 'ptr_regno + off' and put the result into the register 3576 * 'dst_regno'. 3577 * 'off' includes the pointer register's fixed offset(i.e. 'ptr_regno.off'), 3578 * but not its variable offset. 3579 * 'size' is assumed to be <= reg size and the access is assumed to be aligned. 3580 * 3581 * As opposed to check_stack_read_fixed_off, this function doesn't deal with 3582 * filling registers (i.e. reads of spilled register cannot be detected when 3583 * the offset is not fixed). We conservatively mark 'dst_regno' as containing 3584 * SCALAR_VALUE. That's why we assert that the 'ptr_regno' has a variable 3585 * offset; for a fixed offset check_stack_read_fixed_off should be used 3586 * instead. 3587 */ 3588 static int check_stack_read_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3589 int ptr_regno, int off, int size, int dst_regno) 3590 { 3591 /* The state of the source register. */ 3592 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno); 3593 struct bpf_func_state *ptr_state = func(env, reg); 3594 int err; 3595 int min_off, max_off; 3596 3597 /* Note that we pass a NULL meta, so raw access will not be permitted. 3598 */ 3599 err = check_stack_range_initialized(env, ptr_regno, off, size, 3600 false, ACCESS_DIRECT, NULL); 3601 if (err) 3602 return err; 3603 3604 min_off = reg->smin_value + off; 3605 max_off = reg->smax_value + off; 3606 mark_reg_stack_read(env, ptr_state, min_off, max_off + size, dst_regno); 3607 return 0; 3608 } 3609 3610 /* check_stack_read dispatches to check_stack_read_fixed_off or 3611 * check_stack_read_var_off. 3612 * 3613 * The caller must ensure that the offset falls within the allocated stack 3614 * bounds. 3615 * 3616 * 'dst_regno' is a register which will receive the value from the stack. It 3617 * can be -1, meaning that the read value is not going to a register. 3618 */ 3619 static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3620 int ptr_regno, int off, int size, 3621 int dst_regno) 3622 { 3623 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno); 3624 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 3625 int err; 3626 /* Some accesses are only permitted with a static offset. */ 3627 bool var_off = !tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 3628 3629 /* The offset is required to be static when reads don't go to a 3630 * register, in order to not leak pointers (see 3631 * check_stack_read_fixed_off). 3632 */ 3633 if (dst_regno < 0 && var_off) { 3634 char tn_buf[48]; 3635 3636 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 3637 verbose(env, "variable offset stack pointer cannot be passed into helper function; var_off=%s off=%d size=%d\n", 3638 tn_buf, off, size); 3639 return -EACCES; 3640 } 3641 /* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for simplicity 3642 * since it requires corresponding support in Spectre masking for stack 3643 * ALU. See also retrieve_ptr_limit(). 3644 */ 3645 if (!env->bypass_spec_v1 && var_off) { 3646 char tn_buf[48]; 3647 3648 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 3649 verbose(env, "R%d variable offset stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n", 3650 ptr_regno, tn_buf); 3651 return -EACCES; 3652 } 3653 3654 if (!var_off) { 3655 off += reg->var_off.value; 3656 err = check_stack_read_fixed_off(env, state, off, size, 3657 dst_regno); 3658 } else { 3659 /* Variable offset stack reads need more conservative handling 3660 * than fixed offset ones. Note that dst_regno >= 0 on this 3661 * branch. 3662 */ 3663 err = check_stack_read_var_off(env, ptr_regno, off, size, 3664 dst_regno); 3665 } 3666 return err; 3667 } 3668 3669 3670 /* check_stack_write dispatches to check_stack_write_fixed_off or 3671 * check_stack_write_var_off. 3672 * 3673 * 'ptr_regno' is the register used as a pointer into the stack. 3674 * 'off' includes 'ptr_regno->off', but not its variable offset (if any). 3675 * 'value_regno' is the register whose value we're writing to the stack. It can 3676 * be -1, meaning that we're not writing from a register. 3677 * 3678 * The caller must ensure that the offset falls within the maximum stack size. 3679 */ 3680 static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3681 int ptr_regno, int off, int size, 3682 int value_regno, int insn_idx) 3683 { 3684 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno); 3685 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 3686 int err; 3687 3688 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 3689 off += reg->var_off.value; 3690 err = check_stack_write_fixed_off(env, state, off, size, 3691 value_regno, insn_idx); 3692 } else { 3693 /* Variable offset stack reads need more conservative handling 3694 * than fixed offset ones. 3695 */ 3696 err = check_stack_write_var_off(env, state, 3697 ptr_regno, off, size, 3698 value_regno, insn_idx); 3699 } 3700 return err; 3701 } 3702 3703 static int check_map_access_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 3704 int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type) 3705 { 3706 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 3707 struct bpf_map *map = regs[regno].map_ptr; 3708 u32 cap = bpf_map_flags_to_cap(map); 3709 3710 if (type == BPF_WRITE && !(cap & BPF_MAP_CAN_WRITE)) { 3711 verbose(env, "write into map forbidden, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", 3712 map->value_size, off, size); 3713 return -EACCES; 3714 } 3715 3716 if (type == BPF_READ && !(cap & BPF_MAP_CAN_READ)) { 3717 verbose(env, "read from map forbidden, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", 3718 map->value_size, off, size); 3719 return -EACCES; 3720 } 3721 3722 return 0; 3723 } 3724 3725 /* check read/write into memory region (e.g., map value, ringbuf sample, etc) */ 3726 static int __check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 3727 int off, int size, u32 mem_size, 3728 bool zero_size_allowed) 3729 { 3730 bool size_ok = size > 0 || (size == 0 && zero_size_allowed); 3731 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 3732 3733 if (off >= 0 && size_ok && (u64)off + size <= mem_size) 3734 return 0; 3735 3736 reg = &cur_regs(env)[regno]; 3737 switch (reg->type) { 3738 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 3739 verbose(env, "invalid access to map key, key_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", 3740 mem_size, off, size); 3741 break; 3742 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 3743 verbose(env, "invalid access to map value, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", 3744 mem_size, off, size); 3745 break; 3746 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 3747 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 3748 case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: 3749 verbose(env, "invalid access to packet, off=%d size=%d, R%d(id=%d,off=%d,r=%d)\n", 3750 off, size, regno, reg->id, off, mem_size); 3751 break; 3752 case PTR_TO_MEM: 3753 default: 3754 verbose(env, "invalid access to memory, mem_size=%u off=%d size=%d\n", 3755 mem_size, off, size); 3756 } 3757 3758 return -EACCES; 3759 } 3760 3761 /* check read/write into a memory region with possible variable offset */ 3762 static int check_mem_region_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 3763 int off, int size, u32 mem_size, 3764 bool zero_size_allowed) 3765 { 3766 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 3767 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 3768 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno]; 3769 int err; 3770 3771 /* We may have adjusted the register pointing to memory region, so we 3772 * need to try adding each of min_value and max_value to off 3773 * to make sure our theoretical access will be safe. 3774 * 3775 * The minimum value is only important with signed 3776 * comparisons where we can't assume the floor of a 3777 * value is 0. If we are using signed variables for our 3778 * index'es we need to make sure that whatever we use 3779 * will have a set floor within our range. 3780 */ 3781 if (reg->smin_value < 0 && 3782 (reg->smin_value == S64_MIN || 3783 (off + reg->smin_value != (s64)(s32)(off + reg->smin_value)) || 3784 reg->smin_value + off < 0)) { 3785 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", 3786 regno); 3787 return -EACCES; 3788 } 3789 err = __check_mem_access(env, regno, reg->smin_value + off, size, 3790 mem_size, zero_size_allowed); 3791 if (err) { 3792 verbose(env, "R%d min value is outside of the allowed memory range\n", 3793 regno); 3794 return err; 3795 } 3796 3797 /* If we haven't set a max value then we need to bail since we can't be 3798 * sure we won't do bad things. 3799 * If reg->umax_value + off could overflow, treat that as unbounded too. 3800 */ 3801 if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 3802 verbose(env, "R%d unbounded memory access, make sure to bounds check any such access\n", 3803 regno); 3804 return -EACCES; 3805 } 3806 err = __check_mem_access(env, regno, reg->umax_value + off, size, 3807 mem_size, zero_size_allowed); 3808 if (err) { 3809 verbose(env, "R%d max value is outside of the allowed memory range\n", 3810 regno); 3811 return err; 3812 } 3813 3814 return 0; 3815 } 3816 3817 static int __check_ptr_off_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3818 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno, 3819 bool fixed_off_ok) 3820 { 3821 /* Access to this pointer-typed register or passing it to a helper 3822 * is only allowed in its original, unmodified form. 3823 */ 3824 3825 if (reg->off < 0) { 3826 verbose(env, "negative offset %s ptr R%d off=%d disallowed\n", 3827 reg_type_str(env, reg->type), regno, reg->off); 3828 return -EACCES; 3829 } 3830 3831 if (!fixed_off_ok && reg->off) { 3832 verbose(env, "dereference of modified %s ptr R%d off=%d disallowed\n", 3833 reg_type_str(env, reg->type), regno, reg->off); 3834 return -EACCES; 3835 } 3836 3837 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) { 3838 char tn_buf[48]; 3839 3840 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 3841 verbose(env, "variable %s access var_off=%s disallowed\n", 3842 reg_type_str(env, reg->type), tn_buf); 3843 return -EACCES; 3844 } 3845 3846 return 0; 3847 } 3848 3849 int check_ptr_off_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3850 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno) 3851 { 3852 return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, false); 3853 } 3854 3855 static int map_kptr_match_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3856 struct btf_field *kptr_field, 3857 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno) 3858 { 3859 const char *targ_name = kernel_type_name(kptr_field->kptr.btf, kptr_field->kptr.btf_id); 3860 int perm_flags = PTR_MAYBE_NULL | PTR_TRUSTED; 3861 const char *reg_name = ""; 3862 3863 /* Only unreferenced case accepts untrusted pointers */ 3864 if (kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_UNREF) 3865 perm_flags |= PTR_UNTRUSTED; 3866 3867 if (base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID || (type_flag(reg->type) & ~perm_flags)) 3868 goto bad_type; 3869 3870 if (!btf_is_kernel(reg->btf)) { 3871 verbose(env, "R%d must point to kernel BTF\n", regno); 3872 return -EINVAL; 3873 } 3874 /* We need to verify reg->type and reg->btf, before accessing reg->btf */ 3875 reg_name = kernel_type_name(reg->btf, reg->btf_id); 3876 3877 /* For ref_ptr case, release function check should ensure we get one 3878 * referenced PTR_TO_BTF_ID, and that its fixed offset is 0. For the 3879 * normal store of unreferenced kptr, we must ensure var_off is zero. 3880 * Since ref_ptr cannot be accessed directly by BPF insns, checks for 3881 * reg->off and reg->ref_obj_id are not needed here. 3882 */ 3883 if (__check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, true)) 3884 return -EACCES; 3885 3886 /* A full type match is needed, as BTF can be vmlinux or module BTF, and 3887 * we also need to take into account the reg->off. 3888 * 3889 * We want to support cases like: 3890 * 3891 * struct foo { 3892 * struct bar br; 3893 * struct baz bz; 3894 * }; 3895 * 3896 * struct foo *v; 3897 * v = func(); // PTR_TO_BTF_ID 3898 * val->foo = v; // reg->off is zero, btf and btf_id match type 3899 * val->bar = &v->br; // reg->off is still zero, but we need to retry with 3900 * // first member type of struct after comparison fails 3901 * val->baz = &v->bz; // reg->off is non-zero, so struct needs to be walked 3902 * // to match type 3903 * 3904 * In the kptr_ref case, check_func_arg_reg_off already ensures reg->off 3905 * is zero. We must also ensure that btf_struct_ids_match does not walk 3906 * the struct to match type against first member of struct, i.e. reject 3907 * second case from above. Hence, when type is BPF_KPTR_REF, we set 3908 * strict mode to true for type match. 3909 */ 3910 if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg->btf, reg->btf_id, reg->off, 3911 kptr_field->kptr.btf, kptr_field->kptr.btf_id, 3912 kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_REF)) 3913 goto bad_type; 3914 return 0; 3915 bad_type: 3916 verbose(env, "invalid kptr access, R%d type=%s%s ", regno, 3917 reg_type_str(env, reg->type), reg_name); 3918 verbose(env, "expected=%s%s", reg_type_str(env, PTR_TO_BTF_ID), targ_name); 3919 if (kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_UNREF) 3920 verbose(env, " or %s%s\n", reg_type_str(env, PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED), 3921 targ_name); 3922 else 3923 verbose(env, "\n"); 3924 return -EINVAL; 3925 } 3926 3927 static int check_map_kptr_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 3928 int value_regno, int insn_idx, 3929 struct btf_field *kptr_field) 3930 { 3931 struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx]; 3932 int class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); 3933 struct bpf_reg_state *val_reg; 3934 3935 /* Things we already checked for in check_map_access and caller: 3936 * - Reject cases where variable offset may touch kptr 3937 * - size of access (must be BPF_DW) 3938 * - tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) 3939 * - kptr_field->offset == off + reg->var_off.value 3940 */ 3941 /* Only BPF_[LDX,STX,ST] | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW is supported */ 3942 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) { 3943 verbose(env, "kptr in map can only be accessed using BPF_MEM instruction mode\n"); 3944 return -EACCES; 3945 } 3946 3947 /* We only allow loading referenced kptr, since it will be marked as 3948 * untrusted, similar to unreferenced kptr. 3949 */ 3950 if (class != BPF_LDX && kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_REF) { 3951 verbose(env, "store to referenced kptr disallowed\n"); 3952 return -EACCES; 3953 } 3954 3955 if (class == BPF_LDX) { 3956 val_reg = reg_state(env, value_regno); 3957 /* We can simply mark the value_regno receiving the pointer 3958 * value from map as PTR_TO_BTF_ID, with the correct type. 3959 */ 3960 mark_btf_ld_reg(env, cur_regs(env), value_regno, PTR_TO_BTF_ID, kptr_field->kptr.btf, 3961 kptr_field->kptr.btf_id, PTR_MAYBE_NULL | PTR_UNTRUSTED); 3962 /* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg */ 3963 val_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 3964 } else if (class == BPF_STX) { 3965 val_reg = reg_state(env, value_regno); 3966 if (!register_is_null(val_reg) && 3967 map_kptr_match_type(env, kptr_field, val_reg, value_regno)) 3968 return -EACCES; 3969 } else if (class == BPF_ST) { 3970 if (insn->imm) { 3971 verbose(env, "BPF_ST imm must be 0 when storing to kptr at off=%u\n", 3972 kptr_field->offset); 3973 return -EACCES; 3974 } 3975 } else { 3976 verbose(env, "kptr in map can only be accessed using BPF_LDX/BPF_STX/BPF_ST\n"); 3977 return -EACCES; 3978 } 3979 return 0; 3980 } 3981 3982 /* check read/write into a map element with possible variable offset */ 3983 static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 3984 int off, int size, bool zero_size_allowed, 3985 enum bpf_access_src src) 3986 { 3987 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 3988 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 3989 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno]; 3990 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 3991 struct btf_record *rec; 3992 int err, i; 3993 3994 err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size, map->value_size, 3995 zero_size_allowed); 3996 if (err) 3997 return err; 3998 3999 if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(map->record)) 4000 return 0; 4001 rec = map->record; 4002 for (i = 0; i < rec->cnt; i++) { 4003 struct btf_field *field = &rec->fields[i]; 4004 u32 p = field->offset; 4005 4006 /* If any part of a field can be touched by load/store, reject 4007 * this program. To check that [x1, x2) overlaps with [y1, y2), 4008 * it is sufficient to check x1 < y2 && y1 < x2. 4009 */ 4010 if (reg->smin_value + off < p + btf_field_type_size(field->type) && 4011 p < reg->umax_value + off + size) { 4012 switch (field->type) { 4013 case BPF_KPTR_UNREF: 4014 case BPF_KPTR_REF: 4015 if (src != ACCESS_DIRECT) { 4016 verbose(env, "kptr cannot be accessed indirectly by helper\n"); 4017 return -EACCES; 4018 } 4019 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 4020 verbose(env, "kptr access cannot have variable offset\n"); 4021 return -EACCES; 4022 } 4023 if (p != off + reg->var_off.value) { 4024 verbose(env, "kptr access misaligned expected=%u off=%llu\n", 4025 p, off + reg->var_off.value); 4026 return -EACCES; 4027 } 4028 if (size != bpf_size_to_bytes(BPF_DW)) { 4029 verbose(env, "kptr access size must be BPF_DW\n"); 4030 return -EACCES; 4031 } 4032 break; 4033 default: 4034 verbose(env, "%s cannot be accessed directly by load/store\n", 4035 btf_field_type_name(field->type)); 4036 return -EACCES; 4037 } 4038 } 4039 } 4040 return 0; 4041 } 4042 4043 #define MAX_PACKET_OFF 0xffff 4044 4045 static bool may_access_direct_pkt_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4046 const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 4047 enum bpf_access_type t) 4048 { 4049 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 4050 4051 switch (prog_type) { 4052 /* Program types only with direct read access go here! */ 4053 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN: 4054 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_OUT: 4055 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_SEG6LOCAL: 4056 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT: 4057 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR: 4058 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB: 4059 if (t == BPF_WRITE) 4060 return false; 4061 fallthrough; 4062 4063 /* Program types with direct read + write access go here! */ 4064 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: 4065 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT: 4066 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP: 4067 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT: 4068 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_SKB: 4069 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_MSG: 4070 if (meta) 4071 return meta->pkt_access; 4072 4073 env->seen_direct_write = true; 4074 return true; 4075 4076 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT: 4077 if (t == BPF_WRITE) 4078 env->seen_direct_write = true; 4079 4080 return true; 4081 4082 default: 4083 return false; 4084 } 4085 } 4086 4087 static int check_packet_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off, 4088 int size, bool zero_size_allowed) 4089 { 4090 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 4091 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; 4092 int err; 4093 4094 /* We may have added a variable offset to the packet pointer; but any 4095 * reg->range we have comes after that. We are only checking the fixed 4096 * offset. 4097 */ 4098 4099 /* We don't allow negative numbers, because we aren't tracking enough 4100 * detail to prove they're safe. 4101 */ 4102 if (reg->smin_value < 0) { 4103 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", 4104 regno); 4105 return -EACCES; 4106 } 4107 4108 err = reg->range < 0 ? -EINVAL : 4109 __check_mem_access(env, regno, off, size, reg->range, 4110 zero_size_allowed); 4111 if (err) { 4112 verbose(env, "R%d offset is outside of the packet\n", regno); 4113 return err; 4114 } 4115 4116 /* __check_mem_access has made sure "off + size - 1" is within u16. 4117 * reg->umax_value can't be bigger than MAX_PACKET_OFF which is 0xffff, 4118 * otherwise find_good_pkt_pointers would have refused to set range info 4119 * that __check_mem_access would have rejected this pkt access. 4120 * Therefore, "off + reg->umax_value + size - 1" won't overflow u32. 4121 */ 4122 env->prog->aux->max_pkt_offset = 4123 max_t(u32, env->prog->aux->max_pkt_offset, 4124 off + reg->umax_value + size - 1); 4125 4126 return err; 4127 } 4128 4129 /* check access to 'struct bpf_context' fields. Supports fixed offsets only */ 4130 static int check_ctx_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, int off, int size, 4131 enum bpf_access_type t, enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type, 4132 struct btf **btf, u32 *btf_id) 4133 { 4134 struct bpf_insn_access_aux info = { 4135 .reg_type = *reg_type, 4136 .log = &env->log, 4137 }; 4138 4139 if (env->ops->is_valid_access && 4140 env->ops->is_valid_access(off, size, t, env->prog, &info)) { 4141 /* A non zero info.ctx_field_size indicates that this field is a 4142 * candidate for later verifier transformation to load the whole 4143 * field and then apply a mask when accessed with a narrower 4144 * access than actual ctx access size. A zero info.ctx_field_size 4145 * will only allow for whole field access and rejects any other 4146 * type of narrower access. 4147 */ 4148 *reg_type = info.reg_type; 4149 4150 if (base_type(*reg_type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 4151 *btf = info.btf; 4152 *btf_id = info.btf_id; 4153 } else { 4154 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ctx_field_size = info.ctx_field_size; 4155 } 4156 /* remember the offset of last byte accessed in ctx */ 4157 if (env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset < off + size) 4158 env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset = off + size; 4159 return 0; 4160 } 4161 4162 verbose(env, "invalid bpf_context access off=%d size=%d\n", off, size); 4163 return -EACCES; 4164 } 4165 4166 static int check_flow_keys_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off, 4167 int size) 4168 { 4169 if (size < 0 || off < 0 || 4170 (u64)off + size > sizeof(struct bpf_flow_keys)) { 4171 verbose(env, "invalid access to flow keys off=%d size=%d\n", 4172 off, size); 4173 return -EACCES; 4174 } 4175 return 0; 4176 } 4177 4178 static int check_sock_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, 4179 u32 regno, int off, int size, 4180 enum bpf_access_type t) 4181 { 4182 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 4183 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; 4184 struct bpf_insn_access_aux info = {}; 4185 bool valid; 4186 4187 if (reg->smin_value < 0) { 4188 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", 4189 regno); 4190 return -EACCES; 4191 } 4192 4193 switch (reg->type) { 4194 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 4195 valid = bpf_sock_common_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); 4196 break; 4197 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 4198 valid = bpf_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); 4199 break; 4200 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 4201 valid = bpf_tcp_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); 4202 break; 4203 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 4204 valid = bpf_xdp_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); 4205 break; 4206 default: 4207 valid = false; 4208 } 4209 4210 4211 if (valid) { 4212 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ctx_field_size = 4213 info.ctx_field_size; 4214 return 0; 4215 } 4216 4217 verbose(env, "R%d invalid %s access off=%d size=%d\n", 4218 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type), off, size); 4219 4220 return -EACCES; 4221 } 4222 4223 static bool is_pointer_value(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 4224 { 4225 return __is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, reg_state(env, regno)); 4226 } 4227 4228 static bool is_ctx_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 4229 { 4230 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 4231 4232 return reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX; 4233 } 4234 4235 static bool is_sk_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 4236 { 4237 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 4238 4239 return type_is_sk_pointer(reg->type); 4240 } 4241 4242 static bool is_pkt_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 4243 { 4244 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 4245 4246 return type_is_pkt_pointer(reg->type); 4247 } 4248 4249 static bool is_flow_key_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 4250 { 4251 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 4252 4253 /* Separate to is_ctx_reg() since we still want to allow BPF_ST here. */ 4254 return reg->type == PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS; 4255 } 4256 4257 static int check_pkt_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4258 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 4259 int off, int size, bool strict) 4260 { 4261 struct tnum reg_off; 4262 int ip_align; 4263 4264 /* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */ 4265 if (!strict || size == 1) 4266 return 0; 4267 4268 /* For platforms that do not have a Kconfig enabling 4269 * CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS the value of 4270 * NET_IP_ALIGN is universally set to '2'. And on platforms 4271 * that do set CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS, we get 4272 * to this code only in strict mode where we want to emulate 4273 * the NET_IP_ALIGN==2 checking. Therefore use an 4274 * unconditional IP align value of '2'. 4275 */ 4276 ip_align = 2; 4277 4278 reg_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, tnum_const(ip_align + reg->off + off)); 4279 if (!tnum_is_aligned(reg_off, size)) { 4280 char tn_buf[48]; 4281 4282 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 4283 verbose(env, 4284 "misaligned packet access off %d+%s+%d+%d size %d\n", 4285 ip_align, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size); 4286 return -EACCES; 4287 } 4288 4289 return 0; 4290 } 4291 4292 static int check_generic_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4293 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 4294 const char *pointer_desc, 4295 int off, int size, bool strict) 4296 { 4297 struct tnum reg_off; 4298 4299 /* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */ 4300 if (!strict || size == 1) 4301 return 0; 4302 4303 reg_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, tnum_const(reg->off + off)); 4304 if (!tnum_is_aligned(reg_off, size)) { 4305 char tn_buf[48]; 4306 4307 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 4308 verbose(env, "misaligned %saccess off %s+%d+%d size %d\n", 4309 pointer_desc, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size); 4310 return -EACCES; 4311 } 4312 4313 return 0; 4314 } 4315 4316 static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4317 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int off, 4318 int size, bool strict_alignment_once) 4319 { 4320 bool strict = env->strict_alignment || strict_alignment_once; 4321 const char *pointer_desc = ""; 4322 4323 switch (reg->type) { 4324 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 4325 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 4326 /* Special case, because of NET_IP_ALIGN. Given metadata sits 4327 * right in front, treat it the very same way. 4328 */ 4329 return check_pkt_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size, strict); 4330 case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS: 4331 pointer_desc = "flow keys "; 4332 break; 4333 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 4334 pointer_desc = "key "; 4335 break; 4336 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 4337 pointer_desc = "value "; 4338 break; 4339 case PTR_TO_CTX: 4340 pointer_desc = "context "; 4341 break; 4342 case PTR_TO_STACK: 4343 pointer_desc = "stack "; 4344 /* The stack spill tracking logic in check_stack_write_fixed_off() 4345 * and check_stack_read_fixed_off() relies on stack accesses being 4346 * aligned. 4347 */ 4348 strict = true; 4349 break; 4350 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 4351 pointer_desc = "sock "; 4352 break; 4353 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 4354 pointer_desc = "sock_common "; 4355 break; 4356 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 4357 pointer_desc = "tcp_sock "; 4358 break; 4359 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 4360 pointer_desc = "xdp_sock "; 4361 break; 4362 default: 4363 break; 4364 } 4365 return check_generic_ptr_alignment(env, reg, pointer_desc, off, size, 4366 strict); 4367 } 4368 4369 static int update_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4370 const struct bpf_func_state *func, 4371 int off) 4372 { 4373 u16 stack = env->subprog_info[func->subprogno].stack_depth; 4374 4375 if (stack >= -off) 4376 return 0; 4377 4378 /* update known max for given subprogram */ 4379 env->subprog_info[func->subprogno].stack_depth = -off; 4380 return 0; 4381 } 4382 4383 /* starting from main bpf function walk all instructions of the function 4384 * and recursively walk all callees that given function can call. 4385 * Ignore jump and exit insns. 4386 * Since recursion is prevented by check_cfg() this algorithm 4387 * only needs a local stack of MAX_CALL_FRAMES to remember callsites 4388 */ 4389 static int check_max_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 4390 { 4391 int depth = 0, frame = 0, idx = 0, i = 0, subprog_end; 4392 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info; 4393 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 4394 bool tail_call_reachable = false; 4395 int ret_insn[MAX_CALL_FRAMES]; 4396 int ret_prog[MAX_CALL_FRAMES]; 4397 int j; 4398 4399 process_func: 4400 /* protect against potential stack overflow that might happen when 4401 * bpf2bpf calls get combined with tailcalls. Limit the caller's stack 4402 * depth for such case down to 256 so that the worst case scenario 4403 * would result in 8k stack size (32 which is tailcall limit * 256 = 4404 * 8k). 4405 * 4406 * To get the idea what might happen, see an example: 4407 * func1 -> sub rsp, 128 4408 * subfunc1 -> sub rsp, 256 4409 * tailcall1 -> add rsp, 256 4410 * func2 -> sub rsp, 192 (total stack size = 128 + 192 = 320) 4411 * subfunc2 -> sub rsp, 64 4412 * subfunc22 -> sub rsp, 128 4413 * tailcall2 -> add rsp, 128 4414 * func3 -> sub rsp, 32 (total stack size 128 + 192 + 64 + 32 = 416) 4415 * 4416 * tailcall will unwind the current stack frame but it will not get rid 4417 * of caller's stack as shown on the example above. 4418 */ 4419 if (idx && subprog[idx].has_tail_call && depth >= 256) { 4420 verbose(env, 4421 "tail_calls are not allowed when call stack of previous frames is %d bytes. Too large\n", 4422 depth); 4423 return -EACCES; 4424 } 4425 /* round up to 32-bytes, since this is granularity 4426 * of interpreter stack size 4427 */ 4428 depth += round_up(max_t(u32, subprog[idx].stack_depth, 1), 32); 4429 if (depth > MAX_BPF_STACK) { 4430 verbose(env, "combined stack size of %d calls is %d. Too large\n", 4431 frame + 1, depth); 4432 return -EACCES; 4433 } 4434 continue_func: 4435 subprog_end = subprog[idx + 1].start; 4436 for (; i < subprog_end; i++) { 4437 int next_insn; 4438 4439 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn + i) && !bpf_pseudo_func(insn + i)) 4440 continue; 4441 /* remember insn and function to return to */ 4442 ret_insn[frame] = i + 1; 4443 ret_prog[frame] = idx; 4444 4445 /* find the callee */ 4446 next_insn = i + insn[i].imm + 1; 4447 idx = find_subprog(env, next_insn); 4448 if (idx < 0) { 4449 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", 4450 next_insn); 4451 return -EFAULT; 4452 } 4453 if (subprog[idx].is_async_cb) { 4454 if (subprog[idx].has_tail_call) { 4455 verbose(env, "verifier bug. subprog has tail_call and async cb\n"); 4456 return -EFAULT; 4457 } 4458 /* async callbacks don't increase bpf prog stack size */ 4459 continue; 4460 } 4461 i = next_insn; 4462 4463 if (subprog[idx].has_tail_call) 4464 tail_call_reachable = true; 4465 4466 frame++; 4467 if (frame >= MAX_CALL_FRAMES) { 4468 verbose(env, "the call stack of %d frames is too deep !\n", 4469 frame); 4470 return -E2BIG; 4471 } 4472 goto process_func; 4473 } 4474 /* if tail call got detected across bpf2bpf calls then mark each of the 4475 * currently present subprog frames as tail call reachable subprogs; 4476 * this info will be utilized by JIT so that we will be preserving the 4477 * tail call counter throughout bpf2bpf calls combined with tailcalls 4478 */ 4479 if (tail_call_reachable) 4480 for (j = 0; j < frame; j++) 4481 subprog[ret_prog[j]].tail_call_reachable = true; 4482 if (subprog[0].tail_call_reachable) 4483 env->prog->aux->tail_call_reachable = true; 4484 4485 /* end of for() loop means the last insn of the 'subprog' 4486 * was reached. Doesn't matter whether it was JA or EXIT 4487 */ 4488 if (frame == 0) 4489 return 0; 4490 depth -= round_up(max_t(u32, subprog[idx].stack_depth, 1), 32); 4491 frame--; 4492 i = ret_insn[frame]; 4493 idx = ret_prog[frame]; 4494 goto continue_func; 4495 } 4496 4497 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON 4498 static int get_callee_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4499 const struct bpf_insn *insn, int idx) 4500 { 4501 int start = idx + insn->imm + 1, subprog; 4502 4503 subprog = find_subprog(env, start); 4504 if (subprog < 0) { 4505 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", 4506 start); 4507 return -EFAULT; 4508 } 4509 return env->subprog_info[subprog].stack_depth; 4510 } 4511 #endif 4512 4513 static int __check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4514 const char *buf_info, 4515 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 4516 int regno, int off, int size) 4517 { 4518 if (off < 0) { 4519 verbose(env, 4520 "R%d invalid %s buffer access: off=%d, size=%d\n", 4521 regno, buf_info, off, size); 4522 return -EACCES; 4523 } 4524 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) { 4525 char tn_buf[48]; 4526 4527 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 4528 verbose(env, 4529 "R%d invalid variable buffer offset: off=%d, var_off=%s\n", 4530 regno, off, tn_buf); 4531 return -EACCES; 4532 } 4533 4534 return 0; 4535 } 4536 4537 static int check_tp_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4538 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 4539 int regno, int off, int size) 4540 { 4541 int err; 4542 4543 err = __check_buffer_access(env, "tracepoint", reg, regno, off, size); 4544 if (err) 4545 return err; 4546 4547 if (off + size > env->prog->aux->max_tp_access) 4548 env->prog->aux->max_tp_access = off + size; 4549 4550 return 0; 4551 } 4552 4553 static int check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4554 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 4555 int regno, int off, int size, 4556 bool zero_size_allowed, 4557 u32 *max_access) 4558 { 4559 const char *buf_info = type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type) ? "rdonly" : "rdwr"; 4560 int err; 4561 4562 err = __check_buffer_access(env, buf_info, reg, regno, off, size); 4563 if (err) 4564 return err; 4565 4566 if (off + size > *max_access) 4567 *max_access = off + size; 4568 4569 return 0; 4570 } 4571 4572 /* BPF architecture zero extends alu32 ops into 64-bit registesr */ 4573 static void zext_32_to_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 4574 { 4575 reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off); 4576 __reg_assign_32_into_64(reg); 4577 } 4578 4579 /* truncate register to smaller size (in bytes) 4580 * must be called with size < BPF_REG_SIZE 4581 */ 4582 static void coerce_reg_to_size(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size) 4583 { 4584 u64 mask; 4585 4586 /* clear high bits in bit representation */ 4587 reg->var_off = tnum_cast(reg->var_off, size); 4588 4589 /* fix arithmetic bounds */ 4590 mask = ((u64)1 << (size * 8)) - 1; 4591 if ((reg->umin_value & ~mask) == (reg->umax_value & ~mask)) { 4592 reg->umin_value &= mask; 4593 reg->umax_value &= mask; 4594 } else { 4595 reg->umin_value = 0; 4596 reg->umax_value = mask; 4597 } 4598 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value; 4599 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value; 4600 4601 /* If size is smaller than 32bit register the 32bit register 4602 * values are also truncated so we push 64-bit bounds into 4603 * 32-bit bounds. Above were truncated < 32-bits already. 4604 */ 4605 if (size >= 4) 4606 return; 4607 __reg_combine_64_into_32(reg); 4608 } 4609 4610 static bool bpf_map_is_rdonly(const struct bpf_map *map) 4611 { 4612 /* A map is considered read-only if the following condition are true: 4613 * 4614 * 1) BPF program side cannot change any of the map content. The 4615 * BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG flag is throughout the lifetime of a map 4616 * and was set at map creation time. 4617 * 2) The map value(s) have been initialized from user space by a 4618 * loader and then "frozen", such that no new map update/delete 4619 * operations from syscall side are possible for the rest of 4620 * the map's lifetime from that point onwards. 4621 * 3) Any parallel/pending map update/delete operations from syscall 4622 * side have been completed. Only after that point, it's safe to 4623 * assume that map value(s) are immutable. 4624 */ 4625 return (map->map_flags & BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG) && 4626 READ_ONCE(map->frozen) && 4627 !bpf_map_write_active(map); 4628 } 4629 4630 static int bpf_map_direct_read(struct bpf_map *map, int off, int size, u64 *val) 4631 { 4632 void *ptr; 4633 u64 addr; 4634 int err; 4635 4636 err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &addr, off); 4637 if (err) 4638 return err; 4639 ptr = (void *)(long)addr + off; 4640 4641 switch (size) { 4642 case sizeof(u8): 4643 *val = (u64)*(u8 *)ptr; 4644 break; 4645 case sizeof(u16): 4646 *val = (u64)*(u16 *)ptr; 4647 break; 4648 case sizeof(u32): 4649 *val = (u64)*(u32 *)ptr; 4650 break; 4651 case sizeof(u64): 4652 *val = *(u64 *)ptr; 4653 break; 4654 default: 4655 return -EINVAL; 4656 } 4657 return 0; 4658 } 4659 4660 static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4661 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, 4662 int regno, int off, int size, 4663 enum bpf_access_type atype, 4664 int value_regno) 4665 { 4666 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; 4667 const struct btf_type *t = btf_type_by_id(reg->btf, reg->btf_id); 4668 const char *tname = btf_name_by_offset(reg->btf, t->name_off); 4669 enum bpf_type_flag flag = 0; 4670 u32 btf_id; 4671 int ret; 4672 4673 if (off < 0) { 4674 verbose(env, 4675 "R%d is ptr_%s invalid negative access: off=%d\n", 4676 regno, tname, off); 4677 return -EACCES; 4678 } 4679 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) { 4680 char tn_buf[48]; 4681 4682 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 4683 verbose(env, 4684 "R%d is ptr_%s invalid variable offset: off=%d, var_off=%s\n", 4685 regno, tname, off, tn_buf); 4686 return -EACCES; 4687 } 4688 4689 if (reg->type & MEM_USER) { 4690 verbose(env, 4691 "R%d is ptr_%s access user memory: off=%d\n", 4692 regno, tname, off); 4693 return -EACCES; 4694 } 4695 4696 if (reg->type & MEM_PERCPU) { 4697 verbose(env, 4698 "R%d is ptr_%s access percpu memory: off=%d\n", 4699 regno, tname, off); 4700 return -EACCES; 4701 } 4702 4703 if (env->ops->btf_struct_access && !type_is_alloc(reg->type)) { 4704 if (!btf_is_kernel(reg->btf)) { 4705 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: reg->btf must be kernel btf\n"); 4706 return -EFAULT; 4707 } 4708 ret = env->ops->btf_struct_access(&env->log, reg, off, size, atype, &btf_id, &flag); 4709 } else { 4710 /* Writes are permitted with default btf_struct_access for 4711 * program allocated objects (which always have ref_obj_id > 0), 4712 * but not for untrusted PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC. 4713 */ 4714 if (atype != BPF_READ && reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) { 4715 verbose(env, "only read is supported\n"); 4716 return -EACCES; 4717 } 4718 4719 if (type_is_alloc(reg->type) && !reg->ref_obj_id) { 4720 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: ref_obj_id for allocated object must be non-zero\n"); 4721 return -EFAULT; 4722 } 4723 4724 ret = btf_struct_access(&env->log, reg, off, size, atype, &btf_id, &flag); 4725 } 4726 4727 if (ret < 0) 4728 return ret; 4729 4730 /* If this is an untrusted pointer, all pointers formed by walking it 4731 * also inherit the untrusted flag. 4732 */ 4733 if (type_flag(reg->type) & PTR_UNTRUSTED) 4734 flag |= PTR_UNTRUSTED; 4735 4736 /* Any pointer obtained from walking a trusted pointer is no longer trusted. */ 4737 flag &= ~PTR_TRUSTED; 4738 4739 if (atype == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 4740 mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, reg->btf, btf_id, flag); 4741 4742 return 0; 4743 } 4744 4745 static int check_ptr_to_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4746 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, 4747 int regno, int off, int size, 4748 enum bpf_access_type atype, 4749 int value_regno) 4750 { 4751 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; 4752 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 4753 struct bpf_reg_state map_reg; 4754 enum bpf_type_flag flag = 0; 4755 const struct btf_type *t; 4756 const char *tname; 4757 u32 btf_id; 4758 int ret; 4759 4760 if (!btf_vmlinux) { 4761 verbose(env, "map_ptr access not supported without CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF\n"); 4762 return -ENOTSUPP; 4763 } 4764 4765 if (!map->ops->map_btf_id || !*map->ops->map_btf_id) { 4766 verbose(env, "map_ptr access not supported for map type %d\n", 4767 map->map_type); 4768 return -ENOTSUPP; 4769 } 4770 4771 t = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, *map->ops->map_btf_id); 4772 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, t->name_off); 4773 4774 if (!env->allow_ptr_to_map_access) { 4775 verbose(env, 4776 "%s access is allowed only to CAP_PERFMON and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n", 4777 tname); 4778 return -EPERM; 4779 } 4780 4781 if (off < 0) { 4782 verbose(env, "R%d is %s invalid negative access: off=%d\n", 4783 regno, tname, off); 4784 return -EACCES; 4785 } 4786 4787 if (atype != BPF_READ) { 4788 verbose(env, "only read from %s is supported\n", tname); 4789 return -EACCES; 4790 } 4791 4792 /* Simulate access to a PTR_TO_BTF_ID */ 4793 memset(&map_reg, 0, sizeof(map_reg)); 4794 mark_btf_ld_reg(env, &map_reg, 0, PTR_TO_BTF_ID, btf_vmlinux, *map->ops->map_btf_id, 0); 4795 ret = btf_struct_access(&env->log, &map_reg, off, size, atype, &btf_id, &flag); 4796 if (ret < 0) 4797 return ret; 4798 4799 if (value_regno >= 0) 4800 mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, btf_vmlinux, btf_id, flag); 4801 4802 return 0; 4803 } 4804 4805 /* Check that the stack access at the given offset is within bounds. The 4806 * maximum valid offset is -1. 4807 * 4808 * The minimum valid offset is -MAX_BPF_STACK for writes, and 4809 * -state->allocated_stack for reads. 4810 */ 4811 static int check_stack_slot_within_bounds(int off, 4812 struct bpf_func_state *state, 4813 enum bpf_access_type t) 4814 { 4815 int min_valid_off; 4816 4817 if (t == BPF_WRITE) 4818 min_valid_off = -MAX_BPF_STACK; 4819 else 4820 min_valid_off = -state->allocated_stack; 4821 4822 if (off < min_valid_off || off > -1) 4823 return -EACCES; 4824 return 0; 4825 } 4826 4827 /* Check that the stack access at 'regno + off' falls within the maximum stack 4828 * bounds. 4829 * 4830 * 'off' includes `regno->offset`, but not its dynamic part (if any). 4831 */ 4832 static int check_stack_access_within_bounds( 4833 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4834 int regno, int off, int access_size, 4835 enum bpf_access_src src, enum bpf_access_type type) 4836 { 4837 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 4838 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; 4839 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 4840 int min_off, max_off; 4841 int err; 4842 char *err_extra; 4843 4844 if (src == ACCESS_HELPER) 4845 /* We don't know if helpers are reading or writing (or both). */ 4846 err_extra = " indirect access to"; 4847 else if (type == BPF_READ) 4848 err_extra = " read from"; 4849 else 4850 err_extra = " write to"; 4851 4852 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 4853 min_off = reg->var_off.value + off; 4854 if (access_size > 0) 4855 max_off = min_off + access_size - 1; 4856 else 4857 max_off = min_off; 4858 } else { 4859 if (reg->smax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || 4860 reg->smin_value <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 4861 verbose(env, "invalid unbounded variable-offset%s stack R%d\n", 4862 err_extra, regno); 4863 return -EACCES; 4864 } 4865 min_off = reg->smin_value + off; 4866 if (access_size > 0) 4867 max_off = reg->smax_value + off + access_size - 1; 4868 else 4869 max_off = min_off; 4870 } 4871 4872 err = check_stack_slot_within_bounds(min_off, state, type); 4873 if (!err) 4874 err = check_stack_slot_within_bounds(max_off, state, type); 4875 4876 if (err) { 4877 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 4878 verbose(env, "invalid%s stack R%d off=%d size=%d\n", 4879 err_extra, regno, off, access_size); 4880 } else { 4881 char tn_buf[48]; 4882 4883 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 4884 verbose(env, "invalid variable-offset%s stack R%d var_off=%s size=%d\n", 4885 err_extra, regno, tn_buf, access_size); 4886 } 4887 } 4888 return err; 4889 } 4890 4891 /* check whether memory at (regno + off) is accessible for t = (read | write) 4892 * if t==write, value_regno is a register which value is stored into memory 4893 * if t==read, value_regno is a register which will receive the value from memory 4894 * if t==write && value_regno==-1, some unknown value is stored into memory 4895 * if t==read && value_regno==-1, don't care what we read from memory 4896 */ 4897 static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regno, 4898 int off, int bpf_size, enum bpf_access_type t, 4899 int value_regno, bool strict_alignment_once) 4900 { 4901 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 4902 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; 4903 struct bpf_func_state *state; 4904 int size, err = 0; 4905 4906 size = bpf_size_to_bytes(bpf_size); 4907 if (size < 0) 4908 return size; 4909 4910 /* alignment checks will add in reg->off themselves */ 4911 err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size, strict_alignment_once); 4912 if (err) 4913 return err; 4914 4915 /* for access checks, reg->off is just part of off */ 4916 off += reg->off; 4917 4918 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY) { 4919 if (t == BPF_WRITE) { 4920 verbose(env, "write to change key R%d not allowed\n", regno); 4921 return -EACCES; 4922 } 4923 4924 err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size, 4925 reg->map_ptr->key_size, false); 4926 if (err) 4927 return err; 4928 if (value_regno >= 0) 4929 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 4930 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 4931 struct btf_field *kptr_field = NULL; 4932 4933 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 4934 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 4935 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into map\n", value_regno); 4936 return -EACCES; 4937 } 4938 err = check_map_access_type(env, regno, off, size, t); 4939 if (err) 4940 return err; 4941 err = check_map_access(env, regno, off, size, false, ACCESS_DIRECT); 4942 if (err) 4943 return err; 4944 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 4945 kptr_field = btf_record_find(reg->map_ptr->record, 4946 off + reg->var_off.value, BPF_KPTR); 4947 if (kptr_field) { 4948 err = check_map_kptr_access(env, regno, value_regno, insn_idx, kptr_field); 4949 } else if (t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) { 4950 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 4951 4952 /* if map is read-only, track its contents as scalars */ 4953 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) && 4954 bpf_map_is_rdonly(map) && 4955 map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) { 4956 int map_off = off + reg->var_off.value; 4957 u64 val = 0; 4958 4959 err = bpf_map_direct_read(map, map_off, size, 4960 &val); 4961 if (err) 4962 return err; 4963 4964 regs[value_regno].type = SCALAR_VALUE; 4965 __mark_reg_known(®s[value_regno], val); 4966 } else { 4967 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 4968 } 4969 } 4970 } else if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_MEM) { 4971 bool rdonly_mem = type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type); 4972 4973 if (type_may_be_null(reg->type)) { 4974 verbose(env, "R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n", regno, 4975 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 4976 return -EACCES; 4977 } 4978 4979 if (t == BPF_WRITE && rdonly_mem) { 4980 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", 4981 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 4982 return -EACCES; 4983 } 4984 4985 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 4986 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 4987 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", value_regno); 4988 return -EACCES; 4989 } 4990 4991 err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size, 4992 reg->mem_size, false); 4993 if (!err && value_regno >= 0 && (t == BPF_READ || rdonly_mem)) 4994 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 4995 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX) { 4996 enum bpf_reg_type reg_type = SCALAR_VALUE; 4997 struct btf *btf = NULL; 4998 u32 btf_id = 0; 4999 5000 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 5001 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 5002 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into ctx\n", value_regno); 5003 return -EACCES; 5004 } 5005 5006 err = check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno); 5007 if (err < 0) 5008 return err; 5009 5010 err = check_ctx_access(env, insn_idx, off, size, t, ®_type, &btf, 5011 &btf_id); 5012 if (err) 5013 verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; "); 5014 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) { 5015 /* ctx access returns either a scalar, or a 5016 * PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END]. In the latter 5017 * case, we know the offset is zero. 5018 */ 5019 if (reg_type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 5020 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 5021 } else { 5022 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, 5023 value_regno); 5024 if (type_may_be_null(reg_type)) 5025 regs[value_regno].id = ++env->id_gen; 5026 /* A load of ctx field could have different 5027 * actual load size with the one encoded in the 5028 * insn. When the dst is PTR, it is for sure not 5029 * a sub-register. 5030 */ 5031 regs[value_regno].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 5032 if (base_type(reg_type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 5033 regs[value_regno].btf = btf; 5034 regs[value_regno].btf_id = btf_id; 5035 } 5036 } 5037 regs[value_regno].type = reg_type; 5038 } 5039 5040 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 5041 /* Basic bounds checks. */ 5042 err = check_stack_access_within_bounds(env, regno, off, size, ACCESS_DIRECT, t); 5043 if (err) 5044 return err; 5045 5046 state = func(env, reg); 5047 err = update_stack_depth(env, state, off); 5048 if (err) 5049 return err; 5050 5051 if (t == BPF_READ) 5052 err = check_stack_read(env, regno, off, size, 5053 value_regno); 5054 else 5055 err = check_stack_write(env, regno, off, size, 5056 value_regno, insn_idx); 5057 } else if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg)) { 5058 if (t == BPF_WRITE && !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, t)) { 5059 verbose(env, "cannot write into packet\n"); 5060 return -EACCES; 5061 } 5062 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 5063 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 5064 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into packet\n", 5065 value_regno); 5066 return -EACCES; 5067 } 5068 err = check_packet_access(env, regno, off, size, false); 5069 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 5070 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 5071 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS) { 5072 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 5073 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 5074 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into flow keys\n", 5075 value_regno); 5076 return -EACCES; 5077 } 5078 5079 err = check_flow_keys_access(env, off, size); 5080 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 5081 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 5082 } else if (type_is_sk_pointer(reg->type)) { 5083 if (t == BPF_WRITE) { 5084 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", 5085 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 5086 return -EACCES; 5087 } 5088 err = check_sock_access(env, insn_idx, regno, off, size, t); 5089 if (!err && value_regno >= 0) 5090 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 5091 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER) { 5092 err = check_tp_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, off, size); 5093 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 5094 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 5095 } else if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID && 5096 !type_may_be_null(reg->type)) { 5097 err = check_ptr_to_btf_access(env, regs, regno, off, size, t, 5098 value_regno); 5099 } else if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP) { 5100 err = check_ptr_to_map_access(env, regs, regno, off, size, t, 5101 value_regno); 5102 } else if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BUF) { 5103 bool rdonly_mem = type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type); 5104 u32 *max_access; 5105 5106 if (rdonly_mem) { 5107 if (t == BPF_WRITE) { 5108 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", 5109 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 5110 return -EACCES; 5111 } 5112 max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdonly_access; 5113 } else { 5114 max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdwr_access; 5115 } 5116 5117 err = check_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, off, size, false, 5118 max_access); 5119 5120 if (!err && value_regno >= 0 && (rdonly_mem || t == BPF_READ)) 5121 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 5122 } else { 5123 verbose(env, "R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n", regno, 5124 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 5125 return -EACCES; 5126 } 5127 5128 if (!err && size < BPF_REG_SIZE && value_regno >= 0 && t == BPF_READ && 5129 regs[value_regno].type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 5130 /* b/h/w load zero-extends, mark upper bits as known 0 */ 5131 coerce_reg_to_size(®s[value_regno], size); 5132 } 5133 return err; 5134 } 5135 5136 static int check_atomic(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_insn *insn) 5137 { 5138 int load_reg; 5139 int err; 5140 5141 switch (insn->imm) { 5142 case BPF_ADD: 5143 case BPF_ADD | BPF_FETCH: 5144 case BPF_AND: 5145 case BPF_AND | BPF_FETCH: 5146 case BPF_OR: 5147 case BPF_OR | BPF_FETCH: 5148 case BPF_XOR: 5149 case BPF_XOR | BPF_FETCH: 5150 case BPF_XCHG: 5151 case BPF_CMPXCHG: 5152 break; 5153 default: 5154 verbose(env, "BPF_ATOMIC uses invalid atomic opcode %02x\n", insn->imm); 5155 return -EINVAL; 5156 } 5157 5158 if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_W && BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) { 5159 verbose(env, "invalid atomic operand size\n"); 5160 return -EINVAL; 5161 } 5162 5163 /* check src1 operand */ 5164 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 5165 if (err) 5166 return err; 5167 5168 /* check src2 operand */ 5169 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 5170 if (err) 5171 return err; 5172 5173 if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG) { 5174 /* Check comparison of R0 with memory location */ 5175 const u32 aux_reg = BPF_REG_0; 5176 5177 err = check_reg_arg(env, aux_reg, SRC_OP); 5178 if (err) 5179 return err; 5180 5181 if (is_pointer_value(env, aux_reg)) { 5182 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", aux_reg); 5183 return -EACCES; 5184 } 5185 } 5186 5187 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { 5188 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", insn->src_reg); 5189 return -EACCES; 5190 } 5191 5192 if (is_ctx_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) || 5193 is_pkt_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) || 5194 is_flow_key_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) || 5195 is_sk_reg(env, insn->dst_reg)) { 5196 verbose(env, "BPF_ATOMIC stores into R%d %s is not allowed\n", 5197 insn->dst_reg, 5198 reg_type_str(env, reg_state(env, insn->dst_reg)->type)); 5199 return -EACCES; 5200 } 5201 5202 if (insn->imm & BPF_FETCH) { 5203 if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG) 5204 load_reg = BPF_REG_0; 5205 else 5206 load_reg = insn->src_reg; 5207 5208 /* check and record load of old value */ 5209 err = check_reg_arg(env, load_reg, DST_OP); 5210 if (err) 5211 return err; 5212 } else { 5213 /* This instruction accesses a memory location but doesn't 5214 * actually load it into a register. 5215 */ 5216 load_reg = -1; 5217 } 5218 5219 /* Check whether we can read the memory, with second call for fetch 5220 * case to simulate the register fill. 5221 */ 5222 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, 5223 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, -1, true); 5224 if (!err && load_reg >= 0) 5225 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, 5226 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, load_reg, 5227 true); 5228 if (err) 5229 return err; 5230 5231 /* Check whether we can write into the same memory. */ 5232 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, 5233 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1, true); 5234 if (err) 5235 return err; 5236 5237 return 0; 5238 } 5239 5240 /* When register 'regno' is used to read the stack (either directly or through 5241 * a helper function) make sure that it's within stack boundary and, depending 5242 * on the access type, that all elements of the stack are initialized. 5243 * 5244 * 'off' includes 'regno->off', but not its dynamic part (if any). 5245 * 5246 * All registers that have been spilled on the stack in the slots within the 5247 * read offsets are marked as read. 5248 */ 5249 static int check_stack_range_initialized( 5250 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int off, 5251 int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed, 5252 enum bpf_access_src type, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 5253 { 5254 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 5255 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 5256 int err, min_off, max_off, i, j, slot, spi; 5257 char *err_extra = type == ACCESS_HELPER ? " indirect" : ""; 5258 enum bpf_access_type bounds_check_type; 5259 /* Some accesses can write anything into the stack, others are 5260 * read-only. 5261 */ 5262 bool clobber = false; 5263 5264 if (access_size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed) { 5265 verbose(env, "invalid zero-sized read\n"); 5266 return -EACCES; 5267 } 5268 5269 if (type == ACCESS_HELPER) { 5270 /* The bounds checks for writes are more permissive than for 5271 * reads. However, if raw_mode is not set, we'll do extra 5272 * checks below. 5273 */ 5274 bounds_check_type = BPF_WRITE; 5275 clobber = true; 5276 } else { 5277 bounds_check_type = BPF_READ; 5278 } 5279 err = check_stack_access_within_bounds(env, regno, off, access_size, 5280 type, bounds_check_type); 5281 if (err) 5282 return err; 5283 5284 5285 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 5286 min_off = max_off = reg->var_off.value + off; 5287 } else { 5288 /* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for 5289 * simplicity since it requires corresponding support in 5290 * Spectre masking for stack ALU. 5291 * See also retrieve_ptr_limit(). 5292 */ 5293 if (!env->bypass_spec_v1) { 5294 char tn_buf[48]; 5295 5296 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 5297 verbose(env, "R%d%s variable offset stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n", 5298 regno, err_extra, tn_buf); 5299 return -EACCES; 5300 } 5301 /* Only initialized buffer on stack is allowed to be accessed 5302 * with variable offset. With uninitialized buffer it's hard to 5303 * guarantee that whole memory is marked as initialized on 5304 * helper return since specific bounds are unknown what may 5305 * cause uninitialized stack leaking. 5306 */ 5307 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) 5308 meta = NULL; 5309 5310 min_off = reg->smin_value + off; 5311 max_off = reg->smax_value + off; 5312 } 5313 5314 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) { 5315 meta->access_size = access_size; 5316 meta->regno = regno; 5317 return 0; 5318 } 5319 5320 for (i = min_off; i < max_off + access_size; i++) { 5321 u8 *stype; 5322 5323 slot = -i - 1; 5324 spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; 5325 if (state->allocated_stack <= slot) 5326 goto err; 5327 stype = &state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE]; 5328 if (*stype == STACK_MISC) 5329 goto mark; 5330 if (*stype == STACK_ZERO) { 5331 if (clobber) { 5332 /* helper can write anything into the stack */ 5333 *stype = STACK_MISC; 5334 } 5335 goto mark; 5336 } 5337 5338 if (is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[spi]) && 5339 (state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type == SCALAR_VALUE || 5340 env->allow_ptr_leaks)) { 5341 if (clobber) { 5342 __mark_reg_unknown(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr); 5343 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 5344 scrub_spilled_slot(&state->stack[spi].slot_type[j]); 5345 } 5346 goto mark; 5347 } 5348 5349 err: 5350 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 5351 verbose(env, "invalid%s read from stack R%d off %d+%d size %d\n", 5352 err_extra, regno, min_off, i - min_off, access_size); 5353 } else { 5354 char tn_buf[48]; 5355 5356 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 5357 verbose(env, "invalid%s read from stack R%d var_off %s+%d size %d\n", 5358 err_extra, regno, tn_buf, i - min_off, access_size); 5359 } 5360 return -EACCES; 5361 mark: 5362 /* reading any byte out of 8-byte 'spill_slot' will cause 5363 * the whole slot to be marked as 'read' 5364 */ 5365 mark_reg_read(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, 5366 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.parent, 5367 REG_LIVE_READ64); 5368 /* We do not set REG_LIVE_WRITTEN for stack slot, as we can not 5369 * be sure that whether stack slot is written to or not. Hence, 5370 * we must still conservatively propagate reads upwards even if 5371 * helper may write to the entire memory range. 5372 */ 5373 } 5374 return update_stack_depth(env, state, min_off); 5375 } 5376 5377 static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 5378 int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed, 5379 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 5380 { 5381 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 5382 u32 *max_access; 5383 5384 switch (base_type(reg->type)) { 5385 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 5386 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 5387 return check_packet_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, 5388 zero_size_allowed); 5389 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 5390 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) { 5391 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", regno, 5392 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 5393 return -EACCES; 5394 } 5395 return check_mem_region_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, 5396 reg->map_ptr->key_size, false); 5397 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 5398 if (check_map_access_type(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, 5399 meta && meta->raw_mode ? BPF_WRITE : 5400 BPF_READ)) 5401 return -EACCES; 5402 return check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, 5403 zero_size_allowed, ACCESS_HELPER); 5404 case PTR_TO_MEM: 5405 if (type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type)) { 5406 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) { 5407 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", regno, 5408 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 5409 return -EACCES; 5410 } 5411 } 5412 return check_mem_region_access(env, regno, reg->off, 5413 access_size, reg->mem_size, 5414 zero_size_allowed); 5415 case PTR_TO_BUF: 5416 if (type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type)) { 5417 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) { 5418 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", regno, 5419 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 5420 return -EACCES; 5421 } 5422 5423 max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdonly_access; 5424 } else { 5425 max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdwr_access; 5426 } 5427 return check_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, reg->off, 5428 access_size, zero_size_allowed, 5429 max_access); 5430 case PTR_TO_STACK: 5431 return check_stack_range_initialized( 5432 env, 5433 regno, reg->off, access_size, 5434 zero_size_allowed, ACCESS_HELPER, meta); 5435 case PTR_TO_CTX: 5436 /* in case the function doesn't know how to access the context, 5437 * (because we are in a program of type SYSCALL for example), we 5438 * can not statically check its size. 5439 * Dynamically check it now. 5440 */ 5441 if (!env->ops->convert_ctx_access) { 5442 enum bpf_access_type atype = meta && meta->raw_mode ? BPF_WRITE : BPF_READ; 5443 int offset = access_size - 1; 5444 5445 /* Allow zero-byte read from PTR_TO_CTX */ 5446 if (access_size == 0) 5447 return zero_size_allowed ? 0 : -EACCES; 5448 5449 return check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, regno, offset, BPF_B, 5450 atype, -1, false); 5451 } 5452 5453 fallthrough; 5454 default: /* scalar_value or invalid ptr */ 5455 /* Allow zero-byte read from NULL, regardless of pointer type */ 5456 if (zero_size_allowed && access_size == 0 && 5457 register_is_null(reg)) 5458 return 0; 5459 5460 verbose(env, "R%d type=%s ", regno, 5461 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 5462 verbose(env, "expected=%s\n", reg_type_str(env, PTR_TO_STACK)); 5463 return -EACCES; 5464 } 5465 } 5466 5467 static int check_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5468 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 5469 bool zero_size_allowed, 5470 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 5471 { 5472 int err; 5473 5474 /* This is used to refine r0 return value bounds for helpers 5475 * that enforce this value as an upper bound on return values. 5476 * See do_refine_retval_range() for helpers that can refine 5477 * the return value. C type of helper is u32 so we pull register 5478 * bound from umax_value however, if negative verifier errors 5479 * out. Only upper bounds can be learned because retval is an 5480 * int type and negative retvals are allowed. 5481 */ 5482 meta->msize_max_value = reg->umax_value; 5483 5484 /* The register is SCALAR_VALUE; the access check 5485 * happens using its boundaries. 5486 */ 5487 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 5488 /* For unprivileged variable accesses, disable raw 5489 * mode so that the program is required to 5490 * initialize all the memory that the helper could 5491 * just partially fill up. 5492 */ 5493 meta = NULL; 5494 5495 if (reg->smin_value < 0) { 5496 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned or 'var &= const'\n", 5497 regno); 5498 return -EACCES; 5499 } 5500 5501 if (reg->umin_value == 0) { 5502 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1, 0, 5503 zero_size_allowed, 5504 meta); 5505 if (err) 5506 return err; 5507 } 5508 5509 if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ) { 5510 verbose(env, "R%d unbounded memory access, use 'var &= const' or 'if (var < const)'\n", 5511 regno); 5512 return -EACCES; 5513 } 5514 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1, 5515 reg->umax_value, 5516 zero_size_allowed, meta); 5517 if (!err) 5518 err = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); 5519 return err; 5520 } 5521 5522 int check_mem_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 5523 u32 regno, u32 mem_size) 5524 { 5525 bool may_be_null = type_may_be_null(reg->type); 5526 struct bpf_reg_state saved_reg; 5527 struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta; 5528 int err; 5529 5530 if (register_is_null(reg)) 5531 return 0; 5532 5533 memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta)); 5534 /* Assuming that the register contains a value check if the memory 5535 * access is safe. Temporarily save and restore the register's state as 5536 * the conversion shouldn't be visible to a caller. 5537 */ 5538 if (may_be_null) { 5539 saved_reg = *reg; 5540 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(reg); 5541 } 5542 5543 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, mem_size, true, &meta); 5544 /* Check access for BPF_WRITE */ 5545 meta.raw_mode = true; 5546 err = err ?: check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, mem_size, true, &meta); 5547 5548 if (may_be_null) 5549 *reg = saved_reg; 5550 5551 return err; 5552 } 5553 5554 static int check_kfunc_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 5555 u32 regno) 5556 { 5557 struct bpf_reg_state *mem_reg = &cur_regs(env)[regno - 1]; 5558 bool may_be_null = type_may_be_null(mem_reg->type); 5559 struct bpf_reg_state saved_reg; 5560 struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta; 5561 int err; 5562 5563 WARN_ON_ONCE(regno < BPF_REG_2 || regno > BPF_REG_5); 5564 5565 memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta)); 5566 5567 if (may_be_null) { 5568 saved_reg = *mem_reg; 5569 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(mem_reg); 5570 } 5571 5572 err = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, true, &meta); 5573 /* Check access for BPF_WRITE */ 5574 meta.raw_mode = true; 5575 err = err ?: check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, true, &meta); 5576 5577 if (may_be_null) 5578 *mem_reg = saved_reg; 5579 return err; 5580 } 5581 5582 /* Implementation details: 5583 * bpf_map_lookup returns PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL. 5584 * bpf_obj_new returns PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_MAYBE_NULL. 5585 * Two bpf_map_lookups (even with the same key) will have different reg->id. 5586 * Two separate bpf_obj_new will also have different reg->id. 5587 * For traditional PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE or PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC, the verifier 5588 * clears reg->id after value_or_null->value transition, since the verifier only 5589 * cares about the range of access to valid map value pointer and doesn't care 5590 * about actual address of the map element. 5591 * For maps with 'struct bpf_spin_lock' inside map value the verifier keeps 5592 * reg->id > 0 after value_or_null->value transition. By doing so 5593 * two bpf_map_lookups will be considered two different pointers that 5594 * point to different bpf_spin_locks. Likewise for pointers to allocated objects 5595 * returned from bpf_obj_new. 5596 * The verifier allows taking only one bpf_spin_lock at a time to avoid 5597 * dead-locks. 5598 * Since only one bpf_spin_lock is allowed the checks are simpler than 5599 * reg_is_refcounted() logic. The verifier needs to remember only 5600 * one spin_lock instead of array of acquired_refs. 5601 * cur_state->active_lock remembers which map value element or allocated 5602 * object got locked and clears it after bpf_spin_unlock. 5603 */ 5604 static int process_spin_lock(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 5605 bool is_lock) 5606 { 5607 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 5608 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 5609 bool is_const = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 5610 u64 val = reg->var_off.value; 5611 struct bpf_map *map = NULL; 5612 struct btf *btf = NULL; 5613 struct btf_record *rec; 5614 5615 if (!is_const) { 5616 verbose(env, 5617 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. bpf_spin_lock has to be at the constant offset\n", 5618 regno); 5619 return -EINVAL; 5620 } 5621 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 5622 map = reg->map_ptr; 5623 if (!map->btf) { 5624 verbose(env, 5625 "map '%s' has to have BTF in order to use bpf_spin_lock\n", 5626 map->name); 5627 return -EINVAL; 5628 } 5629 } else { 5630 btf = reg->btf; 5631 } 5632 5633 rec = reg_btf_record(reg); 5634 if (!btf_record_has_field(rec, BPF_SPIN_LOCK)) { 5635 verbose(env, "%s '%s' has no valid bpf_spin_lock\n", map ? "map" : "local", 5636 map ? map->name : "kptr"); 5637 return -EINVAL; 5638 } 5639 if (rec->spin_lock_off != val + reg->off) { 5640 verbose(env, "off %lld doesn't point to 'struct bpf_spin_lock' that is at %d\n", 5641 val + reg->off, rec->spin_lock_off); 5642 return -EINVAL; 5643 } 5644 if (is_lock) { 5645 if (cur->active_lock.ptr) { 5646 verbose(env, 5647 "Locking two bpf_spin_locks are not allowed\n"); 5648 return -EINVAL; 5649 } 5650 if (map) 5651 cur->active_lock.ptr = map; 5652 else 5653 cur->active_lock.ptr = btf; 5654 cur->active_lock.id = reg->id; 5655 } else { 5656 struct bpf_func_state *fstate = cur_func(env); 5657 void *ptr; 5658 int i; 5659 5660 if (map) 5661 ptr = map; 5662 else 5663 ptr = btf; 5664 5665 if (!cur->active_lock.ptr) { 5666 verbose(env, "bpf_spin_unlock without taking a lock\n"); 5667 return -EINVAL; 5668 } 5669 if (cur->active_lock.ptr != ptr || 5670 cur->active_lock.id != reg->id) { 5671 verbose(env, "bpf_spin_unlock of different lock\n"); 5672 return -EINVAL; 5673 } 5674 cur->active_lock.ptr = NULL; 5675 cur->active_lock.id = 0; 5676 5677 for (i = 0; i < fstate->acquired_refs; i++) { 5678 int err; 5679 5680 /* Complain on error because this reference state cannot 5681 * be freed before this point, as bpf_spin_lock critical 5682 * section does not allow functions that release the 5683 * allocated object immediately. 5684 */ 5685 if (!fstate->refs[i].release_on_unlock) 5686 continue; 5687 err = release_reference(env, fstate->refs[i].id); 5688 if (err) { 5689 verbose(env, "failed to release release_on_unlock reference"); 5690 return err; 5691 } 5692 } 5693 } 5694 return 0; 5695 } 5696 5697 static int process_timer_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 5698 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 5699 { 5700 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 5701 bool is_const = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 5702 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 5703 u64 val = reg->var_off.value; 5704 5705 if (!is_const) { 5706 verbose(env, 5707 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. bpf_timer has to be at the constant offset\n", 5708 regno); 5709 return -EINVAL; 5710 } 5711 if (!map->btf) { 5712 verbose(env, "map '%s' has to have BTF in order to use bpf_timer\n", 5713 map->name); 5714 return -EINVAL; 5715 } 5716 if (!btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_TIMER)) { 5717 verbose(env, "map '%s' has no valid bpf_timer\n", map->name); 5718 return -EINVAL; 5719 } 5720 if (map->record->timer_off != val + reg->off) { 5721 verbose(env, "off %lld doesn't point to 'struct bpf_timer' that is at %d\n", 5722 val + reg->off, map->record->timer_off); 5723 return -EINVAL; 5724 } 5725 if (meta->map_ptr) { 5726 verbose(env, "verifier bug. Two map pointers in a timer helper\n"); 5727 return -EFAULT; 5728 } 5729 meta->map_uid = reg->map_uid; 5730 meta->map_ptr = map; 5731 return 0; 5732 } 5733 5734 static int process_kptr_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 5735 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 5736 { 5737 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 5738 struct bpf_map *map_ptr = reg->map_ptr; 5739 struct btf_field *kptr_field; 5740 u32 kptr_off; 5741 5742 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 5743 verbose(env, 5744 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. kptr has to be at the constant offset\n", 5745 regno); 5746 return -EINVAL; 5747 } 5748 if (!map_ptr->btf) { 5749 verbose(env, "map '%s' has to have BTF in order to use bpf_kptr_xchg\n", 5750 map_ptr->name); 5751 return -EINVAL; 5752 } 5753 if (!btf_record_has_field(map_ptr->record, BPF_KPTR)) { 5754 verbose(env, "map '%s' has no valid kptr\n", map_ptr->name); 5755 return -EINVAL; 5756 } 5757 5758 meta->map_ptr = map_ptr; 5759 kptr_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; 5760 kptr_field = btf_record_find(map_ptr->record, kptr_off, BPF_KPTR); 5761 if (!kptr_field) { 5762 verbose(env, "off=%d doesn't point to kptr\n", kptr_off); 5763 return -EACCES; 5764 } 5765 if (kptr_field->type != BPF_KPTR_REF) { 5766 verbose(env, "off=%d kptr isn't referenced kptr\n", kptr_off); 5767 return -EACCES; 5768 } 5769 meta->kptr_field = kptr_field; 5770 return 0; 5771 } 5772 5773 static bool arg_type_is_mem_size(enum bpf_arg_type type) 5774 { 5775 return type == ARG_CONST_SIZE || 5776 type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO; 5777 } 5778 5779 static bool arg_type_is_release(enum bpf_arg_type type) 5780 { 5781 return type & OBJ_RELEASE; 5782 } 5783 5784 static bool arg_type_is_dynptr(enum bpf_arg_type type) 5785 { 5786 return base_type(type) == ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR; 5787 } 5788 5789 static int int_ptr_type_to_size(enum bpf_arg_type type) 5790 { 5791 if (type == ARG_PTR_TO_INT) 5792 return sizeof(u32); 5793 else if (type == ARG_PTR_TO_LONG) 5794 return sizeof(u64); 5795 5796 return -EINVAL; 5797 } 5798 5799 static int resolve_map_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5800 const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 5801 enum bpf_arg_type *arg_type) 5802 { 5803 if (!meta->map_ptr) { 5804 /* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */ 5805 verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->type\n"); 5806 return -EACCES; 5807 } 5808 5809 switch (meta->map_ptr->map_type) { 5810 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP: 5811 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH: 5812 if (*arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 5813 *arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_SOCK_COMMON; 5814 } else { 5815 verbose(env, "invalid arg_type for sockmap/sockhash\n"); 5816 return -EINVAL; 5817 } 5818 break; 5819 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER: 5820 if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem) 5821 *arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 5822 break; 5823 default: 5824 break; 5825 } 5826 return 0; 5827 } 5828 5829 struct bpf_reg_types { 5830 const enum bpf_reg_type types[10]; 5831 u32 *btf_id; 5832 }; 5833 5834 static const struct bpf_reg_types sock_types = { 5835 .types = { 5836 PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON, 5837 PTR_TO_SOCKET, 5838 PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK, 5839 PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK, 5840 }, 5841 }; 5842 5843 #ifdef CONFIG_NET 5844 static const struct bpf_reg_types btf_id_sock_common_types = { 5845 .types = { 5846 PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON, 5847 PTR_TO_SOCKET, 5848 PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK, 5849 PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK, 5850 PTR_TO_BTF_ID, 5851 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED, 5852 }, 5853 .btf_id = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_SOCK_COMMON], 5854 }; 5855 #endif 5856 5857 static const struct bpf_reg_types mem_types = { 5858 .types = { 5859 PTR_TO_STACK, 5860 PTR_TO_PACKET, 5861 PTR_TO_PACKET_META, 5862 PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, 5863 PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, 5864 PTR_TO_MEM, 5865 PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RINGBUF, 5866 PTR_TO_BUF, 5867 }, 5868 }; 5869 5870 static const struct bpf_reg_types int_ptr_types = { 5871 .types = { 5872 PTR_TO_STACK, 5873 PTR_TO_PACKET, 5874 PTR_TO_PACKET_META, 5875 PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, 5876 PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, 5877 }, 5878 }; 5879 5880 static const struct bpf_reg_types spin_lock_types = { 5881 .types = { 5882 PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, 5883 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC, 5884 } 5885 }; 5886 5887 static const struct bpf_reg_types fullsock_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_SOCKET } }; 5888 static const struct bpf_reg_types scalar_types = { .types = { SCALAR_VALUE } }; 5889 static const struct bpf_reg_types context_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_CTX } }; 5890 static const struct bpf_reg_types ringbuf_mem_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RINGBUF } }; 5891 static const struct bpf_reg_types const_map_ptr_types = { .types = { CONST_PTR_TO_MAP } }; 5892 static const struct bpf_reg_types btf_ptr_types = { 5893 .types = { 5894 PTR_TO_BTF_ID, 5895 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED, 5896 }, 5897 }; 5898 static const struct bpf_reg_types percpu_btf_ptr_types = { 5899 .types = { 5900 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU, 5901 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU | PTR_TRUSTED, 5902 } 5903 }; 5904 static const struct bpf_reg_types func_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_FUNC } }; 5905 static const struct bpf_reg_types stack_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_STACK } }; 5906 static const struct bpf_reg_types const_str_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE } }; 5907 static const struct bpf_reg_types timer_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE } }; 5908 static const struct bpf_reg_types kptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE } }; 5909 static const struct bpf_reg_types dynptr_types = { 5910 .types = { 5911 PTR_TO_STACK, 5912 PTR_TO_DYNPTR | DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL, 5913 } 5914 }; 5915 5916 static const struct bpf_reg_types *compatible_reg_types[__BPF_ARG_TYPE_MAX] = { 5917 [ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY] = &mem_types, 5918 [ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE] = &mem_types, 5919 [ARG_CONST_SIZE] = &scalar_types, 5920 [ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO] = &scalar_types, 5921 [ARG_CONST_ALLOC_SIZE_OR_ZERO] = &scalar_types, 5922 [ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR] = &const_map_ptr_types, 5923 [ARG_PTR_TO_CTX] = &context_types, 5924 [ARG_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON] = &sock_types, 5925 #ifdef CONFIG_NET 5926 [ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_SOCK_COMMON] = &btf_id_sock_common_types, 5927 #endif 5928 [ARG_PTR_TO_SOCKET] = &fullsock_types, 5929 [ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID] = &btf_ptr_types, 5930 [ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK] = &spin_lock_types, 5931 [ARG_PTR_TO_MEM] = &mem_types, 5932 [ARG_PTR_TO_RINGBUF_MEM] = &ringbuf_mem_types, 5933 [ARG_PTR_TO_INT] = &int_ptr_types, 5934 [ARG_PTR_TO_LONG] = &int_ptr_types, 5935 [ARG_PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID] = &percpu_btf_ptr_types, 5936 [ARG_PTR_TO_FUNC] = &func_ptr_types, 5937 [ARG_PTR_TO_STACK] = &stack_ptr_types, 5938 [ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR] = &const_str_ptr_types, 5939 [ARG_PTR_TO_TIMER] = &timer_types, 5940 [ARG_PTR_TO_KPTR] = &kptr_types, 5941 [ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR] = &dynptr_types, 5942 }; 5943 5944 static int check_reg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 5945 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type, 5946 const u32 *arg_btf_id, 5947 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 5948 { 5949 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 5950 enum bpf_reg_type expected, type = reg->type; 5951 const struct bpf_reg_types *compatible; 5952 int i, j; 5953 5954 compatible = compatible_reg_types[base_type(arg_type)]; 5955 if (!compatible) { 5956 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unsupported arg type %d\n", arg_type); 5957 return -EFAULT; 5958 } 5959 5960 /* ARG_PTR_TO_MEM + RDONLY is compatible with PTR_TO_MEM and PTR_TO_MEM + RDONLY, 5961 * but ARG_PTR_TO_MEM is compatible only with PTR_TO_MEM and NOT with PTR_TO_MEM + RDONLY 5962 * 5963 * Same for MAYBE_NULL: 5964 * 5965 * ARG_PTR_TO_MEM + MAYBE_NULL is compatible with PTR_TO_MEM and PTR_TO_MEM + MAYBE_NULL, 5966 * but ARG_PTR_TO_MEM is compatible only with PTR_TO_MEM but NOT with PTR_TO_MEM + MAYBE_NULL 5967 * 5968 * Therefore we fold these flags depending on the arg_type before comparison. 5969 */ 5970 if (arg_type & MEM_RDONLY) 5971 type &= ~MEM_RDONLY; 5972 if (arg_type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL) 5973 type &= ~PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 5974 5975 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(compatible->types); i++) { 5976 expected = compatible->types[i]; 5977 if (expected == NOT_INIT) 5978 break; 5979 5980 if (type == expected) 5981 goto found; 5982 } 5983 5984 verbose(env, "R%d type=%s expected=", regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 5985 for (j = 0; j + 1 < i; j++) 5986 verbose(env, "%s, ", reg_type_str(env, compatible->types[j])); 5987 verbose(env, "%s\n", reg_type_str(env, compatible->types[j])); 5988 return -EACCES; 5989 5990 found: 5991 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID || reg->type & PTR_TRUSTED) { 5992 /* For bpf_sk_release, it needs to match against first member 5993 * 'struct sock_common', hence make an exception for it. This 5994 * allows bpf_sk_release to work for multiple socket types. 5995 */ 5996 bool strict_type_match = arg_type_is_release(arg_type) && 5997 meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_release; 5998 5999 if (!arg_btf_id) { 6000 if (!compatible->btf_id) { 6001 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: missing arg compatible BTF ID\n"); 6002 return -EFAULT; 6003 } 6004 arg_btf_id = compatible->btf_id; 6005 } 6006 6007 if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) { 6008 if (map_kptr_match_type(env, meta->kptr_field, reg, regno)) 6009 return -EACCES; 6010 } else { 6011 if (arg_btf_id == BPF_PTR_POISON) { 6012 verbose(env, "verifier internal error:"); 6013 verbose(env, "R%d has non-overwritten BPF_PTR_POISON type\n", 6014 regno); 6015 return -EACCES; 6016 } 6017 6018 if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg->btf, reg->btf_id, reg->off, 6019 btf_vmlinux, *arg_btf_id, 6020 strict_type_match)) { 6021 verbose(env, "R%d is of type %s but %s is expected\n", 6022 regno, kernel_type_name(reg->btf, reg->btf_id), 6023 kernel_type_name(btf_vmlinux, *arg_btf_id)); 6024 return -EACCES; 6025 } 6026 } 6027 } else if (type_is_alloc(reg->type)) { 6028 if (meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_spin_lock && meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock) { 6029 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unimplemented handling of MEM_ALLOC\n"); 6030 return -EFAULT; 6031 } 6032 } 6033 6034 return 0; 6035 } 6036 6037 int check_func_arg_reg_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6038 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno, 6039 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type) 6040 { 6041 enum bpf_reg_type type = reg->type; 6042 bool fixed_off_ok = false; 6043 6044 switch ((u32)type) { 6045 /* Pointer types where reg offset is explicitly allowed: */ 6046 case PTR_TO_STACK: 6047 if (arg_type_is_dynptr(arg_type) && reg->off % BPF_REG_SIZE) { 6048 verbose(env, "cannot pass in dynptr at an offset\n"); 6049 return -EINVAL; 6050 } 6051 fallthrough; 6052 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 6053 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 6054 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 6055 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 6056 case PTR_TO_MEM: 6057 case PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY: 6058 case PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RINGBUF: 6059 case PTR_TO_BUF: 6060 case PTR_TO_BUF | MEM_RDONLY: 6061 case SCALAR_VALUE: 6062 /* Some of the argument types nevertheless require a 6063 * zero register offset. 6064 */ 6065 if (base_type(arg_type) != ARG_PTR_TO_RINGBUF_MEM) 6066 return 0; 6067 break; 6068 /* All the rest must be rejected, except PTR_TO_BTF_ID which allows 6069 * fixed offset. 6070 */ 6071 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 6072 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC: 6073 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED: 6074 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_TRUSTED: 6075 /* When referenced PTR_TO_BTF_ID is passed to release function, 6076 * it's fixed offset must be 0. In the other cases, fixed offset 6077 * can be non-zero. 6078 */ 6079 if (arg_type_is_release(arg_type) && reg->off) { 6080 verbose(env, "R%d must have zero offset when passed to release func\n", 6081 regno); 6082 return -EINVAL; 6083 } 6084 /* For arg is release pointer, fixed_off_ok must be false, but 6085 * we already checked and rejected reg->off != 0 above, so set 6086 * to true to allow fixed offset for all other cases. 6087 */ 6088 fixed_off_ok = true; 6089 break; 6090 default: 6091 break; 6092 } 6093 return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, fixed_off_ok); 6094 } 6095 6096 static u32 stack_slot_get_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 6097 { 6098 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 6099 int spi = get_spi(reg->off); 6100 6101 return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.id; 6102 } 6103 6104 static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg, 6105 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 6106 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) 6107 { 6108 u32 regno = BPF_REG_1 + arg; 6109 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 6110 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type = fn->arg_type[arg]; 6111 enum bpf_reg_type type = reg->type; 6112 u32 *arg_btf_id = NULL; 6113 int err = 0; 6114 6115 if (arg_type == ARG_DONTCARE) 6116 return 0; 6117 6118 err = check_reg_arg(env, regno, SRC_OP); 6119 if (err) 6120 return err; 6121 6122 if (arg_type == ARG_ANYTHING) { 6123 if (is_pointer_value(env, regno)) { 6124 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into helper function\n", 6125 regno); 6126 return -EACCES; 6127 } 6128 return 0; 6129 } 6130 6131 if (type_is_pkt_pointer(type) && 6132 !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, meta, BPF_READ)) { 6133 verbose(env, "helper access to the packet is not allowed\n"); 6134 return -EACCES; 6135 } 6136 6137 if (base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 6138 err = resolve_map_arg_type(env, meta, &arg_type); 6139 if (err) 6140 return err; 6141 } 6142 6143 if (register_is_null(reg) && type_may_be_null(arg_type)) 6144 /* A NULL register has a SCALAR_VALUE type, so skip 6145 * type checking. 6146 */ 6147 goto skip_type_check; 6148 6149 /* arg_btf_id and arg_size are in a union. */ 6150 if (base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID || 6151 base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK) 6152 arg_btf_id = fn->arg_btf_id[arg]; 6153 6154 err = check_reg_type(env, regno, arg_type, arg_btf_id, meta); 6155 if (err) 6156 return err; 6157 6158 err = check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, regno, arg_type); 6159 if (err) 6160 return err; 6161 6162 skip_type_check: 6163 if (arg_type_is_release(arg_type)) { 6164 if (arg_type_is_dynptr(arg_type)) { 6165 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 6166 int spi = get_spi(reg->off); 6167 6168 if (!is_spi_bounds_valid(state, spi, BPF_DYNPTR_NR_SLOTS) || 6169 !state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.id) { 6170 verbose(env, "arg %d is an unacquired reference\n", regno); 6171 return -EINVAL; 6172 } 6173 } else if (!reg->ref_obj_id && !register_is_null(reg)) { 6174 verbose(env, "R%d must be referenced when passed to release function\n", 6175 regno); 6176 return -EINVAL; 6177 } 6178 if (meta->release_regno) { 6179 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: more than one release argument\n"); 6180 return -EFAULT; 6181 } 6182 meta->release_regno = regno; 6183 } 6184 6185 if (reg->ref_obj_id) { 6186 if (meta->ref_obj_id) { 6187 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: more than one arg with ref_obj_id R%d %u %u\n", 6188 regno, reg->ref_obj_id, 6189 meta->ref_obj_id); 6190 return -EFAULT; 6191 } 6192 meta->ref_obj_id = reg->ref_obj_id; 6193 } 6194 6195 switch (base_type(arg_type)) { 6196 case ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR: 6197 /* bpf_map_xxx(map_ptr) call: remember that map_ptr */ 6198 if (meta->map_ptr) { 6199 /* Use map_uid (which is unique id of inner map) to reject: 6200 * inner_map1 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(outer_map, key1) 6201 * inner_map2 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(outer_map, key2) 6202 * if (inner_map1 && inner_map2) { 6203 * timer = bpf_map_lookup_elem(inner_map1); 6204 * if (timer) 6205 * // mismatch would have been allowed 6206 * bpf_timer_init(timer, inner_map2); 6207 * } 6208 * 6209 * Comparing map_ptr is enough to distinguish normal and outer maps. 6210 */ 6211 if (meta->map_ptr != reg->map_ptr || 6212 meta->map_uid != reg->map_uid) { 6213 verbose(env, 6214 "timer pointer in R1 map_uid=%d doesn't match map pointer in R2 map_uid=%d\n", 6215 meta->map_uid, reg->map_uid); 6216 return -EINVAL; 6217 } 6218 } 6219 meta->map_ptr = reg->map_ptr; 6220 meta->map_uid = reg->map_uid; 6221 break; 6222 case ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 6223 /* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., key) call: 6224 * check that [key, key + map->key_size) are within 6225 * stack limits and initialized 6226 */ 6227 if (!meta->map_ptr) { 6228 /* in function declaration map_ptr must come before 6229 * map_key, so that it's verified and known before 6230 * we have to check map_key here. Otherwise it means 6231 * that kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier 6232 */ 6233 verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->key\n"); 6234 return -EACCES; 6235 } 6236 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, 6237 meta->map_ptr->key_size, false, 6238 NULL); 6239 break; 6240 case ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 6241 if (type_may_be_null(arg_type) && register_is_null(reg)) 6242 return 0; 6243 6244 /* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., value) call: 6245 * check [value, value + map->value_size) validity 6246 */ 6247 if (!meta->map_ptr) { 6248 /* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */ 6249 verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->value\n"); 6250 return -EACCES; 6251 } 6252 meta->raw_mode = arg_type & MEM_UNINIT; 6253 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, 6254 meta->map_ptr->value_size, false, 6255 meta); 6256 break; 6257 case ARG_PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID: 6258 if (!reg->btf_id) { 6259 verbose(env, "Helper has invalid btf_id in R%d\n", regno); 6260 return -EACCES; 6261 } 6262 meta->ret_btf = reg->btf; 6263 meta->ret_btf_id = reg->btf_id; 6264 break; 6265 case ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK: 6266 if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_spin_lock) { 6267 if (process_spin_lock(env, regno, true)) 6268 return -EACCES; 6269 } else if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock) { 6270 if (process_spin_lock(env, regno, false)) 6271 return -EACCES; 6272 } else { 6273 verbose(env, "verifier internal error\n"); 6274 return -EFAULT; 6275 } 6276 break; 6277 case ARG_PTR_TO_TIMER: 6278 if (process_timer_func(env, regno, meta)) 6279 return -EACCES; 6280 break; 6281 case ARG_PTR_TO_FUNC: 6282 meta->subprogno = reg->subprogno; 6283 break; 6284 case ARG_PTR_TO_MEM: 6285 /* The access to this pointer is only checked when we hit the 6286 * next is_mem_size argument below. 6287 */ 6288 meta->raw_mode = arg_type & MEM_UNINIT; 6289 if (arg_type & MEM_FIXED_SIZE) { 6290 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, 6291 fn->arg_size[arg], false, 6292 meta); 6293 } 6294 break; 6295 case ARG_CONST_SIZE: 6296 err = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, false, meta); 6297 break; 6298 case ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO: 6299 err = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, true, meta); 6300 break; 6301 case ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR: 6302 /* We only need to check for initialized / uninitialized helper 6303 * dynptr args if the dynptr is not PTR_TO_DYNPTR, as the 6304 * assumption is that if it is, that a helper function 6305 * initialized the dynptr on behalf of the BPF program. 6306 */ 6307 if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 6308 break; 6309 if (arg_type & MEM_UNINIT) { 6310 if (!is_dynptr_reg_valid_uninit(env, reg)) { 6311 verbose(env, "Dynptr has to be an uninitialized dynptr\n"); 6312 return -EINVAL; 6313 } 6314 6315 /* We only support one dynptr being uninitialized at the moment, 6316 * which is sufficient for the helper functions we have right now. 6317 */ 6318 if (meta->uninit_dynptr_regno) { 6319 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: multiple uninitialized dynptr args\n"); 6320 return -EFAULT; 6321 } 6322 6323 meta->uninit_dynptr_regno = regno; 6324 } else if (!is_dynptr_reg_valid_init(env, reg)) { 6325 verbose(env, 6326 "Expected an initialized dynptr as arg #%d\n", 6327 arg + 1); 6328 return -EINVAL; 6329 } else if (!is_dynptr_type_expected(env, reg, arg_type)) { 6330 const char *err_extra = ""; 6331 6332 switch (arg_type & DYNPTR_TYPE_FLAG_MASK) { 6333 case DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL: 6334 err_extra = "local"; 6335 break; 6336 case DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF: 6337 err_extra = "ringbuf"; 6338 break; 6339 default: 6340 err_extra = "<unknown>"; 6341 break; 6342 } 6343 verbose(env, 6344 "Expected a dynptr of type %s as arg #%d\n", 6345 err_extra, arg + 1); 6346 return -EINVAL; 6347 } 6348 break; 6349 case ARG_CONST_ALLOC_SIZE_OR_ZERO: 6350 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 6351 verbose(env, "R%d is not a known constant'\n", 6352 regno); 6353 return -EACCES; 6354 } 6355 meta->mem_size = reg->var_off.value; 6356 err = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); 6357 if (err) 6358 return err; 6359 break; 6360 case ARG_PTR_TO_INT: 6361 case ARG_PTR_TO_LONG: 6362 { 6363 int size = int_ptr_type_to_size(arg_type); 6364 6365 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, size, false, meta); 6366 if (err) 6367 return err; 6368 err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, 0, size, true); 6369 break; 6370 } 6371 case ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR: 6372 { 6373 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 6374 int map_off; 6375 u64 map_addr; 6376 char *str_ptr; 6377 6378 if (!bpf_map_is_rdonly(map)) { 6379 verbose(env, "R%d does not point to a readonly map'\n", regno); 6380 return -EACCES; 6381 } 6382 6383 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 6384 verbose(env, "R%d is not a constant address'\n", regno); 6385 return -EACCES; 6386 } 6387 6388 if (!map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) { 6389 verbose(env, "no direct value access support for this map type\n"); 6390 return -EACCES; 6391 } 6392 6393 err = check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off, 6394 map->value_size - reg->off, false, 6395 ACCESS_HELPER); 6396 if (err) 6397 return err; 6398 6399 map_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; 6400 err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &map_addr, map_off); 6401 if (err) { 6402 verbose(env, "direct value access on string failed\n"); 6403 return err; 6404 } 6405 6406 str_ptr = (char *)(long)(map_addr); 6407 if (!strnchr(str_ptr + map_off, map->value_size - map_off, 0)) { 6408 verbose(env, "string is not zero-terminated\n"); 6409 return -EINVAL; 6410 } 6411 break; 6412 } 6413 case ARG_PTR_TO_KPTR: 6414 if (process_kptr_func(env, regno, meta)) 6415 return -EACCES; 6416 break; 6417 } 6418 6419 return err; 6420 } 6421 6422 static bool may_update_sockmap(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id) 6423 { 6424 enum bpf_attach_type eatype = env->prog->expected_attach_type; 6425 enum bpf_prog_type type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 6426 6427 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem) 6428 return false; 6429 6430 /* It's not possible to get access to a locked struct sock in these 6431 * contexts, so updating is safe. 6432 */ 6433 switch (type) { 6434 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: 6435 if (eatype == BPF_TRACE_ITER) 6436 return true; 6437 break; 6438 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER: 6439 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: 6440 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT: 6441 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP: 6442 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT: 6443 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR: 6444 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP: 6445 return true; 6446 default: 6447 break; 6448 } 6449 6450 verbose(env, "cannot update sockmap in this context\n"); 6451 return false; 6452 } 6453 6454 static bool allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 6455 { 6456 return env->prog->jit_requested && 6457 bpf_jit_supports_subprog_tailcalls(); 6458 } 6459 6460 static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6461 struct bpf_map *map, int func_id) 6462 { 6463 if (!map) 6464 return 0; 6465 6466 /* We need a two way check, first is from map perspective ... */ 6467 switch (map->map_type) { 6468 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY: 6469 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call) 6470 goto error; 6471 break; 6472 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY: 6473 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read && 6474 func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output && 6475 func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_output && 6476 func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read_value && 6477 func_id != BPF_FUNC_xdp_output) 6478 goto error; 6479 break; 6480 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF: 6481 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_output && 6482 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve && 6483 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_query && 6484 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve_dynptr && 6485 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_submit_dynptr && 6486 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_discard_dynptr) 6487 goto error; 6488 break; 6489 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF: 6490 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain) 6491 goto error; 6492 break; 6493 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE: 6494 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stackid) 6495 goto error; 6496 break; 6497 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY: 6498 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup && 6499 func_id != BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup) 6500 goto error; 6501 break; 6502 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE: 6503 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE: 6504 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage) 6505 goto error; 6506 break; 6507 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP: 6508 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP_HASH: 6509 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map && 6510 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) 6511 goto error; 6512 break; 6513 /* Restrict bpf side of cpumap and xskmap, open when use-cases 6514 * appear. 6515 */ 6516 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP: 6517 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map) 6518 goto error; 6519 break; 6520 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP: 6521 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map && 6522 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) 6523 goto error; 6524 break; 6525 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS: 6526 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS: 6527 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) 6528 goto error; 6529 break; 6530 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP: 6531 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map && 6532 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update && 6533 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem && 6534 func_id != BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_map && 6535 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport && 6536 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 6537 !may_update_sockmap(env, func_id)) 6538 goto error; 6539 break; 6540 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH: 6541 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_hash && 6542 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_hash_update && 6543 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem && 6544 func_id != BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_hash && 6545 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport && 6546 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 6547 !may_update_sockmap(env, func_id)) 6548 goto error; 6549 break; 6550 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY: 6551 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport) 6552 goto error; 6553 break; 6554 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE: 6555 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK: 6556 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem && 6557 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem && 6558 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem) 6559 goto error; 6560 break; 6561 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE: 6562 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get && 6563 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_delete) 6564 goto error; 6565 break; 6566 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE: 6567 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get && 6568 func_id != BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_delete) 6569 goto error; 6570 break; 6571 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE: 6572 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_task_storage_get && 6573 func_id != BPF_FUNC_task_storage_delete) 6574 goto error; 6575 break; 6576 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE: 6577 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_get && 6578 func_id != BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_delete) 6579 goto error; 6580 break; 6581 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER: 6582 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem && 6583 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem) 6584 goto error; 6585 break; 6586 default: 6587 break; 6588 } 6589 6590 /* ... and second from the function itself. */ 6591 switch (func_id) { 6592 case BPF_FUNC_tail_call: 6593 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY) 6594 goto error; 6595 if (env->subprog_cnt > 1 && !allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(env)) { 6596 verbose(env, "tail_calls are not allowed in non-JITed programs with bpf-to-bpf calls\n"); 6597 return -EINVAL; 6598 } 6599 break; 6600 case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read: 6601 case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output: 6602 case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read_value: 6603 case BPF_FUNC_skb_output: 6604 case BPF_FUNC_xdp_output: 6605 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY) 6606 goto error; 6607 break; 6608 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_output: 6609 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve: 6610 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_query: 6611 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve_dynptr: 6612 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_submit_dynptr: 6613 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_discard_dynptr: 6614 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF) 6615 goto error; 6616 break; 6617 case BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain: 6618 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF) 6619 goto error; 6620 break; 6621 case BPF_FUNC_get_stackid: 6622 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE) 6623 goto error; 6624 break; 6625 case BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup: 6626 case BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup: 6627 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY) 6628 goto error; 6629 break; 6630 case BPF_FUNC_redirect_map: 6631 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP && 6632 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP_HASH && 6633 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP && 6634 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP) 6635 goto error; 6636 break; 6637 case BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map: 6638 case BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_map: 6639 case BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update: 6640 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP) 6641 goto error; 6642 break; 6643 case BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_hash: 6644 case BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_hash: 6645 case BPF_FUNC_sock_hash_update: 6646 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH) 6647 goto error; 6648 break; 6649 case BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage: 6650 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE && 6651 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE) 6652 goto error; 6653 break; 6654 case BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport: 6655 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY && 6656 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP && 6657 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH) 6658 goto error; 6659 break; 6660 case BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem: 6661 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE && 6662 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK) 6663 goto error; 6664 break; 6665 case BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem: 6666 case BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem: 6667 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE && 6668 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK && 6669 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER) 6670 goto error; 6671 break; 6672 case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem: 6673 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY && 6674 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH && 6675 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_PERCPU_HASH) 6676 goto error; 6677 break; 6678 case BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get: 6679 case BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_delete: 6680 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE) 6681 goto error; 6682 break; 6683 case BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get: 6684 case BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_delete: 6685 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE) 6686 goto error; 6687 break; 6688 case BPF_FUNC_task_storage_get: 6689 case BPF_FUNC_task_storage_delete: 6690 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE) 6691 goto error; 6692 break; 6693 case BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_get: 6694 case BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_delete: 6695 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE) 6696 goto error; 6697 break; 6698 default: 6699 break; 6700 } 6701 6702 return 0; 6703 error: 6704 verbose(env, "cannot pass map_type %d into func %s#%d\n", 6705 map->map_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 6706 return -EINVAL; 6707 } 6708 6709 static bool check_raw_mode_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) 6710 { 6711 int count = 0; 6712 6713 if (fn->arg1_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) 6714 count++; 6715 if (fn->arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) 6716 count++; 6717 if (fn->arg3_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) 6718 count++; 6719 if (fn->arg4_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) 6720 count++; 6721 if (fn->arg5_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) 6722 count++; 6723 6724 /* We only support one arg being in raw mode at the moment, 6725 * which is sufficient for the helper functions we have 6726 * right now. 6727 */ 6728 return count <= 1; 6729 } 6730 6731 static bool check_args_pair_invalid(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, int arg) 6732 { 6733 bool is_fixed = fn->arg_type[arg] & MEM_FIXED_SIZE; 6734 bool has_size = fn->arg_size[arg] != 0; 6735 bool is_next_size = false; 6736 6737 if (arg + 1 < ARRAY_SIZE(fn->arg_type)) 6738 is_next_size = arg_type_is_mem_size(fn->arg_type[arg + 1]); 6739 6740 if (base_type(fn->arg_type[arg]) != ARG_PTR_TO_MEM) 6741 return is_next_size; 6742 6743 return has_size == is_next_size || is_next_size == is_fixed; 6744 } 6745 6746 static bool check_arg_pair_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) 6747 { 6748 /* bpf_xxx(..., buf, len) call will access 'len' 6749 * bytes from memory 'buf'. Both arg types need 6750 * to be paired, so make sure there's no buggy 6751 * helper function specification. 6752 */ 6753 if (arg_type_is_mem_size(fn->arg1_type) || 6754 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 0) || 6755 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 1) || 6756 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 2) || 6757 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 3) || 6758 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 4)) 6759 return false; 6760 6761 return true; 6762 } 6763 6764 static bool check_btf_id_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) 6765 { 6766 int i; 6767 6768 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(fn->arg_type); i++) { 6769 if (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) == ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID) 6770 return !!fn->arg_btf_id[i]; 6771 if (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) == ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK) 6772 return fn->arg_btf_id[i] == BPF_PTR_POISON; 6773 if (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) != ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID && fn->arg_btf_id[i] && 6774 /* arg_btf_id and arg_size are in a union. */ 6775 (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) != ARG_PTR_TO_MEM || 6776 !(fn->arg_type[i] & MEM_FIXED_SIZE))) 6777 return false; 6778 } 6779 6780 return true; 6781 } 6782 6783 static int check_func_proto(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, int func_id) 6784 { 6785 return check_raw_mode_ok(fn) && 6786 check_arg_pair_ok(fn) && 6787 check_btf_id_ok(fn) ? 0 : -EINVAL; 6788 } 6789 6790 /* Packet data might have moved, any old PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END] 6791 * are now invalid, so turn them into unknown SCALAR_VALUE. 6792 */ 6793 static void clear_all_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 6794 { 6795 struct bpf_func_state *state; 6796 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 6797 6798 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, state, reg, ({ 6799 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(reg)) 6800 __mark_reg_unknown(env, reg); 6801 })); 6802 } 6803 6804 enum { 6805 AT_PKT_END = -1, 6806 BEYOND_PKT_END = -2, 6807 }; 6808 6809 static void mark_pkt_end(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, int regn, bool range_open) 6810 { 6811 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 6812 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regn]; 6813 6814 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_PACKET) 6815 /* PTR_TO_PACKET_META is not supported yet */ 6816 return; 6817 6818 /* The 'reg' is pkt > pkt_end or pkt >= pkt_end. 6819 * How far beyond pkt_end it goes is unknown. 6820 * if (!range_open) it's the case of pkt >= pkt_end 6821 * if (range_open) it's the case of pkt > pkt_end 6822 * hence this pointer is at least 1 byte bigger than pkt_end 6823 */ 6824 if (range_open) 6825 reg->range = BEYOND_PKT_END; 6826 else 6827 reg->range = AT_PKT_END; 6828 } 6829 6830 /* The pointer with the specified id has released its reference to kernel 6831 * resources. Identify all copies of the same pointer and clear the reference. 6832 */ 6833 static int release_reference(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6834 int ref_obj_id) 6835 { 6836 struct bpf_func_state *state; 6837 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 6838 int err; 6839 6840 err = release_reference_state(cur_func(env), ref_obj_id); 6841 if (err) 6842 return err; 6843 6844 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, state, reg, ({ 6845 if (reg->ref_obj_id == ref_obj_id) { 6846 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) 6847 __mark_reg_not_init(env, reg); 6848 else 6849 __mark_reg_unknown(env, reg); 6850 } 6851 })); 6852 6853 return 0; 6854 } 6855 6856 static void clear_caller_saved_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6857 struct bpf_reg_state *regs) 6858 { 6859 int i; 6860 6861 /* after the call registers r0 - r5 were scratched */ 6862 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { 6863 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); 6864 check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); 6865 } 6866 } 6867 6868 typedef int (*set_callee_state_fn)(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6869 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 6870 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 6871 int insn_idx); 6872 6873 static int set_callee_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6874 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 6875 struct bpf_func_state *callee, int insn_idx); 6876 6877 static int __check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 6878 int *insn_idx, int subprog, 6879 set_callee_state_fn set_callee_state_cb) 6880 { 6881 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 6882 struct bpf_func_info_aux *func_info_aux; 6883 struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee; 6884 int err; 6885 bool is_global = false; 6886 6887 if (state->curframe + 1 >= MAX_CALL_FRAMES) { 6888 verbose(env, "the call stack of %d frames is too deep\n", 6889 state->curframe + 2); 6890 return -E2BIG; 6891 } 6892 6893 caller = state->frame[state->curframe]; 6894 if (state->frame[state->curframe + 1]) { 6895 verbose(env, "verifier bug. Frame %d already allocated\n", 6896 state->curframe + 1); 6897 return -EFAULT; 6898 } 6899 6900 func_info_aux = env->prog->aux->func_info_aux; 6901 if (func_info_aux) 6902 is_global = func_info_aux[subprog].linkage == BTF_FUNC_GLOBAL; 6903 err = btf_check_subprog_call(env, subprog, caller->regs); 6904 if (err == -EFAULT) 6905 return err; 6906 if (is_global) { 6907 if (err) { 6908 verbose(env, "Caller passes invalid args into func#%d\n", 6909 subprog); 6910 return err; 6911 } else { 6912 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) 6913 verbose(env, 6914 "Func#%d is global and valid. Skipping.\n", 6915 subprog); 6916 clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs); 6917 6918 /* All global functions return a 64-bit SCALAR_VALUE */ 6919 mark_reg_unknown(env, caller->regs, BPF_REG_0); 6920 caller->regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 6921 6922 /* continue with next insn after call */ 6923 return 0; 6924 } 6925 } 6926 6927 /* set_callee_state is used for direct subprog calls, but we are 6928 * interested in validating only BPF helpers that can call subprogs as 6929 * callbacks 6930 */ 6931 if (set_callee_state_cb != set_callee_state && !is_callback_calling_function(insn->imm)) { 6932 verbose(env, "verifier bug: helper %s#%d is not marked as callback-calling\n", 6933 func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm); 6934 return -EFAULT; 6935 } 6936 6937 if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 6938 insn->src_reg == 0 && 6939 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback) { 6940 struct bpf_verifier_state *async_cb; 6941 6942 /* there is no real recursion here. timer callbacks are async */ 6943 env->subprog_info[subprog].is_async_cb = true; 6944 async_cb = push_async_cb(env, env->subprog_info[subprog].start, 6945 *insn_idx, subprog); 6946 if (!async_cb) 6947 return -EFAULT; 6948 callee = async_cb->frame[0]; 6949 callee->async_entry_cnt = caller->async_entry_cnt + 1; 6950 6951 /* Convert bpf_timer_set_callback() args into timer callback args */ 6952 err = set_callee_state_cb(env, caller, callee, *insn_idx); 6953 if (err) 6954 return err; 6955 6956 clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs); 6957 mark_reg_unknown(env, caller->regs, BPF_REG_0); 6958 caller->regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 6959 /* continue with next insn after call */ 6960 return 0; 6961 } 6962 6963 callee = kzalloc(sizeof(*callee), GFP_KERNEL); 6964 if (!callee) 6965 return -ENOMEM; 6966 state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = callee; 6967 6968 /* callee cannot access r0, r6 - r9 for reading and has to write 6969 * into its own stack before reading from it. 6970 * callee can read/write into caller's stack 6971 */ 6972 init_func_state(env, callee, 6973 /* remember the callsite, it will be used by bpf_exit */ 6974 *insn_idx /* callsite */, 6975 state->curframe + 1 /* frameno within this callchain */, 6976 subprog /* subprog number within this prog */); 6977 6978 /* Transfer references to the callee */ 6979 err = copy_reference_state(callee, caller); 6980 if (err) 6981 return err; 6982 6983 err = set_callee_state_cb(env, caller, callee, *insn_idx); 6984 if (err) 6985 return err; 6986 6987 clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs); 6988 6989 /* only increment it after check_reg_arg() finished */ 6990 state->curframe++; 6991 6992 /* and go analyze first insn of the callee */ 6993 *insn_idx = env->subprog_info[subprog].start - 1; 6994 6995 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 6996 verbose(env, "caller:\n"); 6997 print_verifier_state(env, caller, true); 6998 verbose(env, "callee:\n"); 6999 print_verifier_state(env, callee, true); 7000 } 7001 return 0; 7002 } 7003 7004 int map_set_for_each_callback_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7005 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 7006 struct bpf_func_state *callee) 7007 { 7008 /* bpf_for_each_map_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *callback_fn, 7009 * void *callback_ctx, u64 flags); 7010 * callback_fn(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value, 7011 * void *callback_ctx); 7012 */ 7013 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1]; 7014 7015 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].type = PTR_TO_MAP_KEY; 7016 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]); 7017 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr; 7018 7019 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 7020 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); 7021 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr; 7022 7023 /* pointer to stack or null */ 7024 callee->regs[BPF_REG_4] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_3]; 7025 7026 /* unused */ 7027 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 7028 return 0; 7029 } 7030 7031 static int set_callee_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7032 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 7033 struct bpf_func_state *callee, int insn_idx) 7034 { 7035 int i; 7036 7037 /* copy r1 - r5 args that callee can access. The copy includes parent 7038 * pointers, which connects us up to the liveness chain 7039 */ 7040 for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) 7041 callee->regs[i] = caller->regs[i]; 7042 return 0; 7043 } 7044 7045 static int check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 7046 int *insn_idx) 7047 { 7048 int subprog, target_insn; 7049 7050 target_insn = *insn_idx + insn->imm + 1; 7051 subprog = find_subprog(env, target_insn); 7052 if (subprog < 0) { 7053 verbose(env, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", 7054 target_insn); 7055 return -EFAULT; 7056 } 7057 7058 return __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx, subprog, set_callee_state); 7059 } 7060 7061 static int set_map_elem_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7062 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 7063 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 7064 int insn_idx) 7065 { 7066 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; 7067 struct bpf_map *map; 7068 int err; 7069 7070 if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(insn_aux)) { 7071 verbose(env, "tail_call abusing map_ptr\n"); 7072 return -EINVAL; 7073 } 7074 7075 map = BPF_MAP_PTR(insn_aux->map_ptr_state); 7076 if (!map->ops->map_set_for_each_callback_args || 7077 !map->ops->map_for_each_callback) { 7078 verbose(env, "callback function not allowed for map\n"); 7079 return -ENOTSUPP; 7080 } 7081 7082 err = map->ops->map_set_for_each_callback_args(env, caller, callee); 7083 if (err) 7084 return err; 7085 7086 callee->in_callback_fn = true; 7087 callee->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 1); 7088 return 0; 7089 } 7090 7091 static int set_loop_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7092 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 7093 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 7094 int insn_idx) 7095 { 7096 /* bpf_loop(u32 nr_loops, void *callback_fn, void *callback_ctx, 7097 * u64 flags); 7098 * callback_fn(u32 index, void *callback_ctx); 7099 */ 7100 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1].type = SCALAR_VALUE; 7101 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_3]; 7102 7103 /* unused */ 7104 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); 7105 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]); 7106 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 7107 7108 callee->in_callback_fn = true; 7109 callee->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 1); 7110 return 0; 7111 } 7112 7113 static int set_timer_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7114 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 7115 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 7116 int insn_idx) 7117 { 7118 struct bpf_map *map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr; 7119 7120 /* bpf_timer_set_callback(struct bpf_timer *timer, void *callback_fn); 7121 * callback_fn(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value); 7122 */ 7123 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1].type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; 7124 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_1]); 7125 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr = map_ptr; 7126 7127 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].type = PTR_TO_MAP_KEY; 7128 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]); 7129 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].map_ptr = map_ptr; 7130 7131 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 7132 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); 7133 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].map_ptr = map_ptr; 7134 7135 /* unused */ 7136 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]); 7137 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 7138 callee->in_async_callback_fn = true; 7139 callee->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 1); 7140 return 0; 7141 } 7142 7143 static int set_find_vma_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7144 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 7145 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 7146 int insn_idx) 7147 { 7148 /* bpf_find_vma(struct task_struct *task, u64 addr, 7149 * void *callback_fn, void *callback_ctx, u64 flags) 7150 * (callback_fn)(struct task_struct *task, 7151 * struct vm_area_struct *vma, void *callback_ctx); 7152 */ 7153 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1]; 7154 7155 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 7156 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]); 7157 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].btf = btf_vmlinux; 7158 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].btf_id = btf_tracing_ids[BTF_TRACING_TYPE_VMA], 7159 7160 /* pointer to stack or null */ 7161 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_4]; 7162 7163 /* unused */ 7164 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]); 7165 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 7166 callee->in_callback_fn = true; 7167 callee->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 1); 7168 return 0; 7169 } 7170 7171 static int set_user_ringbuf_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7172 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 7173 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 7174 int insn_idx) 7175 { 7176 /* bpf_user_ringbuf_drain(struct bpf_map *map, void *callback_fn, void 7177 * callback_ctx, u64 flags); 7178 * callback_fn(struct bpf_dynptr_t* dynptr, void *callback_ctx); 7179 */ 7180 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_0]); 7181 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1].type = PTR_TO_DYNPTR | DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL; 7182 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_1]); 7183 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_3]; 7184 7185 /* unused */ 7186 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); 7187 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]); 7188 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 7189 7190 callee->in_callback_fn = true; 7191 callee->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 1); 7192 return 0; 7193 } 7194 7195 static int prepare_func_exit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *insn_idx) 7196 { 7197 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 7198 struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee; 7199 struct bpf_reg_state *r0; 7200 int err; 7201 7202 callee = state->frame[state->curframe]; 7203 r0 = &callee->regs[BPF_REG_0]; 7204 if (r0->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 7205 /* technically it's ok to return caller's stack pointer 7206 * (or caller's caller's pointer) back to the caller, 7207 * since these pointers are valid. Only current stack 7208 * pointer will be invalid as soon as function exits, 7209 * but let's be conservative 7210 */ 7211 verbose(env, "cannot return stack pointer to the caller\n"); 7212 return -EINVAL; 7213 } 7214 7215 state->curframe--; 7216 caller = state->frame[state->curframe]; 7217 if (callee->in_callback_fn) { 7218 /* enforce R0 return value range [0, 1]. */ 7219 struct tnum range = callee->callback_ret_range; 7220 7221 if (r0->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 7222 verbose(env, "R0 not a scalar value\n"); 7223 return -EACCES; 7224 } 7225 if (!tnum_in(range, r0->var_off)) { 7226 verbose_invalid_scalar(env, r0, &range, "callback return", "R0"); 7227 return -EINVAL; 7228 } 7229 } else { 7230 /* return to the caller whatever r0 had in the callee */ 7231 caller->regs[BPF_REG_0] = *r0; 7232 } 7233 7234 /* callback_fn frame should have released its own additions to parent's 7235 * reference state at this point, or check_reference_leak would 7236 * complain, hence it must be the same as the caller. There is no need 7237 * to copy it back. 7238 */ 7239 if (!callee->in_callback_fn) { 7240 /* Transfer references to the caller */ 7241 err = copy_reference_state(caller, callee); 7242 if (err) 7243 return err; 7244 } 7245 7246 *insn_idx = callee->callsite + 1; 7247 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 7248 verbose(env, "returning from callee:\n"); 7249 print_verifier_state(env, callee, true); 7250 verbose(env, "to caller at %d:\n", *insn_idx); 7251 print_verifier_state(env, caller, true); 7252 } 7253 /* clear everything in the callee */ 7254 free_func_state(callee); 7255 state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = NULL; 7256 return 0; 7257 } 7258 7259 static void do_refine_retval_range(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, int ret_type, 7260 int func_id, 7261 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 7262 { 7263 struct bpf_reg_state *ret_reg = ®s[BPF_REG_0]; 7264 7265 if (ret_type != RET_INTEGER || 7266 (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stack && 7267 func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_task_stack && 7268 func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_str && 7269 func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel_str && 7270 func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_user_str)) 7271 return; 7272 7273 ret_reg->smax_value = meta->msize_max_value; 7274 ret_reg->s32_max_value = meta->msize_max_value; 7275 ret_reg->smin_value = -MAX_ERRNO; 7276 ret_reg->s32_min_value = -MAX_ERRNO; 7277 reg_bounds_sync(ret_reg); 7278 } 7279 7280 static int 7281 record_func_map(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 7282 int func_id, int insn_idx) 7283 { 7284 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; 7285 struct bpf_map *map = meta->map_ptr; 7286 7287 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call && 7288 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 7289 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem && 7290 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem && 7291 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem && 7292 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem && 7293 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem && 7294 func_id != BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem && 7295 func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map && 7296 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem) 7297 return 0; 7298 7299 if (map == NULL) { 7300 verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n"); 7301 return -EINVAL; 7302 } 7303 7304 /* In case of read-only, some additional restrictions 7305 * need to be applied in order to prevent altering the 7306 * state of the map from program side. 7307 */ 7308 if ((map->map_flags & BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG) && 7309 (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem || 7310 func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem || 7311 func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem || 7312 func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem)) { 7313 verbose(env, "write into map forbidden\n"); 7314 return -EACCES; 7315 } 7316 7317 if (!BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state)) 7318 bpf_map_ptr_store(aux, meta->map_ptr, 7319 !meta->map_ptr->bypass_spec_v1); 7320 else if (BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state) != meta->map_ptr) 7321 bpf_map_ptr_store(aux, BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON, 7322 !meta->map_ptr->bypass_spec_v1); 7323 return 0; 7324 } 7325 7326 static int 7327 record_func_key(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 7328 int func_id, int insn_idx) 7329 { 7330 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; 7331 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg; 7332 struct bpf_map *map = meta->map_ptr; 7333 u64 val, max; 7334 int err; 7335 7336 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call) 7337 return 0; 7338 if (!map || map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY) { 7339 verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n"); 7340 return -EINVAL; 7341 } 7342 7343 reg = ®s[BPF_REG_3]; 7344 val = reg->var_off.value; 7345 max = map->max_entries; 7346 7347 if (!(register_is_const(reg) && val < max)) { 7348 bpf_map_key_store(aux, BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON); 7349 return 0; 7350 } 7351 7352 err = mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_3); 7353 if (err) 7354 return err; 7355 if (bpf_map_key_unseen(aux)) 7356 bpf_map_key_store(aux, val); 7357 else if (!bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux) && 7358 bpf_map_key_immediate(aux) != val) 7359 bpf_map_key_store(aux, BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON); 7360 return 0; 7361 } 7362 7363 static int check_reference_leak(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 7364 { 7365 struct bpf_func_state *state = cur_func(env); 7366 bool refs_lingering = false; 7367 int i; 7368 7369 if (state->frameno && !state->in_callback_fn) 7370 return 0; 7371 7372 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) { 7373 if (state->in_callback_fn && state->refs[i].callback_ref != state->frameno) 7374 continue; 7375 verbose(env, "Unreleased reference id=%d alloc_insn=%d\n", 7376 state->refs[i].id, state->refs[i].insn_idx); 7377 refs_lingering = true; 7378 } 7379 return refs_lingering ? -EINVAL : 0; 7380 } 7381 7382 static int check_bpf_snprintf_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7383 struct bpf_reg_state *regs) 7384 { 7385 struct bpf_reg_state *fmt_reg = ®s[BPF_REG_3]; 7386 struct bpf_reg_state *data_len_reg = ®s[BPF_REG_5]; 7387 struct bpf_map *fmt_map = fmt_reg->map_ptr; 7388 int err, fmt_map_off, num_args; 7389 u64 fmt_addr; 7390 char *fmt; 7391 7392 /* data must be an array of u64 */ 7393 if (data_len_reg->var_off.value % 8) 7394 return -EINVAL; 7395 num_args = data_len_reg->var_off.value / 8; 7396 7397 /* fmt being ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR guarantees that var_off is const 7398 * and map_direct_value_addr is set. 7399 */ 7400 fmt_map_off = fmt_reg->off + fmt_reg->var_off.value; 7401 err = fmt_map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(fmt_map, &fmt_addr, 7402 fmt_map_off); 7403 if (err) { 7404 verbose(env, "verifier bug\n"); 7405 return -EFAULT; 7406 } 7407 fmt = (char *)(long)fmt_addr + fmt_map_off; 7408 7409 /* We are also guaranteed that fmt+fmt_map_off is NULL terminated, we 7410 * can focus on validating the format specifiers. 7411 */ 7412 err = bpf_bprintf_prepare(fmt, UINT_MAX, NULL, NULL, num_args); 7413 if (err < 0) 7414 verbose(env, "Invalid format string\n"); 7415 7416 return err; 7417 } 7418 7419 static int check_get_func_ip(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 7420 { 7421 enum bpf_prog_type type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 7422 int func_id = BPF_FUNC_get_func_ip; 7423 7424 if (type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING) { 7425 if (!bpf_prog_has_trampoline(env->prog)) { 7426 verbose(env, "func %s#%d supported only for fentry/fexit/fmod_ret programs\n", 7427 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 7428 return -ENOTSUPP; 7429 } 7430 return 0; 7431 } else if (type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE) { 7432 return 0; 7433 } 7434 7435 verbose(env, "func %s#%d not supported for program type %d\n", 7436 func_id_name(func_id), func_id, type); 7437 return -ENOTSUPP; 7438 } 7439 7440 static struct bpf_insn_aux_data *cur_aux(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 7441 { 7442 return &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx]; 7443 } 7444 7445 static bool loop_flag_is_zero(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 7446 { 7447 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 7448 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[BPF_REG_4]; 7449 bool reg_is_null = register_is_null(reg); 7450 7451 if (reg_is_null) 7452 mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_4); 7453 7454 return reg_is_null; 7455 } 7456 7457 static void update_loop_inline_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 subprogno) 7458 { 7459 struct bpf_loop_inline_state *state = &cur_aux(env)->loop_inline_state; 7460 7461 if (!state->initialized) { 7462 state->initialized = 1; 7463 state->fit_for_inline = loop_flag_is_zero(env); 7464 state->callback_subprogno = subprogno; 7465 return; 7466 } 7467 7468 if (!state->fit_for_inline) 7469 return; 7470 7471 state->fit_for_inline = (loop_flag_is_zero(env) && 7472 state->callback_subprogno == subprogno); 7473 } 7474 7475 static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 7476 int *insn_idx_p) 7477 { 7478 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 7479 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn = NULL; 7480 enum bpf_return_type ret_type; 7481 enum bpf_type_flag ret_flag; 7482 struct bpf_reg_state *regs; 7483 struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta; 7484 int insn_idx = *insn_idx_p; 7485 bool changes_data; 7486 int i, err, func_id; 7487 7488 /* find function prototype */ 7489 func_id = insn->imm; 7490 if (func_id < 0 || func_id >= __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID) { 7491 verbose(env, "invalid func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), 7492 func_id); 7493 return -EINVAL; 7494 } 7495 7496 if (env->ops->get_func_proto) 7497 fn = env->ops->get_func_proto(func_id, env->prog); 7498 if (!fn) { 7499 verbose(env, "unknown func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), 7500 func_id); 7501 return -EINVAL; 7502 } 7503 7504 /* eBPF programs must be GPL compatible to use GPL-ed functions */ 7505 if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible && fn->gpl_only) { 7506 verbose(env, "cannot call GPL-restricted function from non-GPL compatible program\n"); 7507 return -EINVAL; 7508 } 7509 7510 if (fn->allowed && !fn->allowed(env->prog)) { 7511 verbose(env, "helper call is not allowed in probe\n"); 7512 return -EINVAL; 7513 } 7514 7515 /* With LD_ABS/IND some JITs save/restore skb from r1. */ 7516 changes_data = bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(fn->func); 7517 if (changes_data && fn->arg1_type != ARG_PTR_TO_CTX) { 7518 verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d: r1 != ctx\n", 7519 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 7520 return -EINVAL; 7521 } 7522 7523 memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta)); 7524 meta.pkt_access = fn->pkt_access; 7525 7526 err = check_func_proto(fn, func_id); 7527 if (err) { 7528 verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n", 7529 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 7530 return err; 7531 } 7532 7533 meta.func_id = func_id; 7534 /* check args */ 7535 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS; i++) { 7536 err = check_func_arg(env, i, &meta, fn); 7537 if (err) 7538 return err; 7539 } 7540 7541 err = record_func_map(env, &meta, func_id, insn_idx); 7542 if (err) 7543 return err; 7544 7545 err = record_func_key(env, &meta, func_id, insn_idx); 7546 if (err) 7547 return err; 7548 7549 /* Mark slots with STACK_MISC in case of raw mode, stack offset 7550 * is inferred from register state. 7551 */ 7552 for (i = 0; i < meta.access_size; i++) { 7553 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, meta.regno, i, BPF_B, 7554 BPF_WRITE, -1, false); 7555 if (err) 7556 return err; 7557 } 7558 7559 regs = cur_regs(env); 7560 7561 if (meta.uninit_dynptr_regno) { 7562 /* we write BPF_DW bits (8 bytes) at a time */ 7563 for (i = 0; i < BPF_DYNPTR_SIZE; i += 8) { 7564 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, meta.uninit_dynptr_regno, 7565 i, BPF_DW, BPF_WRITE, -1, false); 7566 if (err) 7567 return err; 7568 } 7569 7570 err = mark_stack_slots_dynptr(env, ®s[meta.uninit_dynptr_regno], 7571 fn->arg_type[meta.uninit_dynptr_regno - BPF_REG_1], 7572 insn_idx); 7573 if (err) 7574 return err; 7575 } 7576 7577 if (meta.release_regno) { 7578 err = -EINVAL; 7579 if (arg_type_is_dynptr(fn->arg_type[meta.release_regno - BPF_REG_1])) 7580 err = unmark_stack_slots_dynptr(env, ®s[meta.release_regno]); 7581 else if (meta.ref_obj_id) 7582 err = release_reference(env, meta.ref_obj_id); 7583 /* meta.ref_obj_id can only be 0 if register that is meant to be 7584 * released is NULL, which must be > R0. 7585 */ 7586 else if (register_is_null(®s[meta.release_regno])) 7587 err = 0; 7588 if (err) { 7589 verbose(env, "func %s#%d reference has not been acquired before\n", 7590 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 7591 return err; 7592 } 7593 } 7594 7595 switch (func_id) { 7596 case BPF_FUNC_tail_call: 7597 err = check_reference_leak(env); 7598 if (err) { 7599 verbose(env, "tail_call would lead to reference leak\n"); 7600 return err; 7601 } 7602 break; 7603 case BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage: 7604 /* check that flags argument in get_local_storage(map, flags) is 0, 7605 * this is required because get_local_storage() can't return an error. 7606 */ 7607 if (!register_is_null(®s[BPF_REG_2])) { 7608 verbose(env, "get_local_storage() doesn't support non-zero flags\n"); 7609 return -EINVAL; 7610 } 7611 break; 7612 case BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem: 7613 err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno, 7614 set_map_elem_callback_state); 7615 break; 7616 case BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback: 7617 err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno, 7618 set_timer_callback_state); 7619 break; 7620 case BPF_FUNC_find_vma: 7621 err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno, 7622 set_find_vma_callback_state); 7623 break; 7624 case BPF_FUNC_snprintf: 7625 err = check_bpf_snprintf_call(env, regs); 7626 break; 7627 case BPF_FUNC_loop: 7628 update_loop_inline_state(env, meta.subprogno); 7629 err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno, 7630 set_loop_callback_state); 7631 break; 7632 case BPF_FUNC_dynptr_from_mem: 7633 if (regs[BPF_REG_1].type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 7634 verbose(env, "Unsupported reg type %s for bpf_dynptr_from_mem data\n", 7635 reg_type_str(env, regs[BPF_REG_1].type)); 7636 return -EACCES; 7637 } 7638 break; 7639 case BPF_FUNC_set_retval: 7640 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM && 7641 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_LSM_CGROUP) { 7642 if (!env->prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) { 7643 /* Make sure programs that attach to void 7644 * hooks don't try to modify return value. 7645 */ 7646 verbose(env, "BPF_LSM_CGROUP that attach to void LSM hooks can't modify return value!\n"); 7647 return -EINVAL; 7648 } 7649 } 7650 break; 7651 case BPF_FUNC_dynptr_data: 7652 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS; i++) { 7653 if (arg_type_is_dynptr(fn->arg_type[i])) { 7654 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[BPF_REG_1 + i]; 7655 7656 if (meta.ref_obj_id) { 7657 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: meta.ref_obj_id already set\n"); 7658 return -EFAULT; 7659 } 7660 7661 if (base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 7662 /* Find the id of the dynptr we're 7663 * tracking the reference of 7664 */ 7665 meta.ref_obj_id = stack_slot_get_id(env, reg); 7666 break; 7667 } 7668 } 7669 if (i == MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS) { 7670 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no dynptr in bpf_dynptr_data()\n"); 7671 return -EFAULT; 7672 } 7673 break; 7674 case BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain: 7675 err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno, 7676 set_user_ringbuf_callback_state); 7677 break; 7678 } 7679 7680 if (err) 7681 return err; 7682 7683 /* reset caller saved regs */ 7684 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { 7685 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); 7686 check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); 7687 } 7688 7689 /* helper call returns 64-bit value. */ 7690 regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 7691 7692 /* update return register (already marked as written above) */ 7693 ret_type = fn->ret_type; 7694 ret_flag = type_flag(ret_type); 7695 7696 switch (base_type(ret_type)) { 7697 case RET_INTEGER: 7698 /* sets type to SCALAR_VALUE */ 7699 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 7700 break; 7701 case RET_VOID: 7702 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = NOT_INIT; 7703 break; 7704 case RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 7705 /* There is no offset yet applied, variable or fixed */ 7706 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 7707 /* remember map_ptr, so that check_map_access() 7708 * can check 'value_size' boundary of memory access 7709 * to map element returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem() 7710 */ 7711 if (meta.map_ptr == NULL) { 7712 verbose(env, 7713 "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n"); 7714 return -EINVAL; 7715 } 7716 regs[BPF_REG_0].map_ptr = meta.map_ptr; 7717 regs[BPF_REG_0].map_uid = meta.map_uid; 7718 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE | ret_flag; 7719 if (!type_may_be_null(ret_type) && 7720 btf_record_has_field(meta.map_ptr->record, BPF_SPIN_LOCK)) { 7721 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; 7722 } 7723 break; 7724 case RET_PTR_TO_SOCKET: 7725 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 7726 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_SOCKET | ret_flag; 7727 break; 7728 case RET_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 7729 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 7730 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON | ret_flag; 7731 break; 7732 case RET_PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 7733 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 7734 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK | ret_flag; 7735 break; 7736 case RET_PTR_TO_MEM: 7737 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 7738 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM | ret_flag; 7739 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = meta.mem_size; 7740 break; 7741 case RET_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_BTF_ID: 7742 { 7743 const struct btf_type *t; 7744 7745 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 7746 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(meta.ret_btf, meta.ret_btf_id, NULL); 7747 if (!btf_type_is_struct(t)) { 7748 u32 tsize; 7749 const struct btf_type *ret; 7750 const char *tname; 7751 7752 /* resolve the type size of ksym. */ 7753 ret = btf_resolve_size(meta.ret_btf, t, &tsize); 7754 if (IS_ERR(ret)) { 7755 tname = btf_name_by_offset(meta.ret_btf, t->name_off); 7756 verbose(env, "unable to resolve the size of type '%s': %ld\n", 7757 tname, PTR_ERR(ret)); 7758 return -EINVAL; 7759 } 7760 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM | ret_flag; 7761 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = tsize; 7762 } else { 7763 /* MEM_RDONLY may be carried from ret_flag, but it 7764 * doesn't apply on PTR_TO_BTF_ID. Fold it, otherwise 7765 * it will confuse the check of PTR_TO_BTF_ID in 7766 * check_mem_access(). 7767 */ 7768 ret_flag &= ~MEM_RDONLY; 7769 7770 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | ret_flag; 7771 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = meta.ret_btf; 7772 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta.ret_btf_id; 7773 } 7774 break; 7775 } 7776 case RET_PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 7777 { 7778 struct btf *ret_btf; 7779 int ret_btf_id; 7780 7781 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 7782 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | ret_flag; 7783 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) { 7784 ret_btf = meta.kptr_field->kptr.btf; 7785 ret_btf_id = meta.kptr_field->kptr.btf_id; 7786 } else { 7787 if (fn->ret_btf_id == BPF_PTR_POISON) { 7788 verbose(env, "verifier internal error:"); 7789 verbose(env, "func %s has non-overwritten BPF_PTR_POISON return type\n", 7790 func_id_name(func_id)); 7791 return -EINVAL; 7792 } 7793 ret_btf = btf_vmlinux; 7794 ret_btf_id = *fn->ret_btf_id; 7795 } 7796 if (ret_btf_id == 0) { 7797 verbose(env, "invalid return type %u of func %s#%d\n", 7798 base_type(ret_type), func_id_name(func_id), 7799 func_id); 7800 return -EINVAL; 7801 } 7802 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = ret_btf; 7803 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ret_btf_id; 7804 break; 7805 } 7806 default: 7807 verbose(env, "unknown return type %u of func %s#%d\n", 7808 base_type(ret_type), func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 7809 return -EINVAL; 7810 } 7811 7812 if (type_may_be_null(regs[BPF_REG_0].type)) 7813 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; 7814 7815 if (helper_multiple_ref_obj_use(func_id, meta.map_ptr)) { 7816 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: func %s#%d sets ref_obj_id more than once\n", 7817 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 7818 return -EFAULT; 7819 } 7820 7821 if (is_ptr_cast_function(func_id) || is_dynptr_ref_function(func_id)) { 7822 /* For release_reference() */ 7823 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = meta.ref_obj_id; 7824 } else if (is_acquire_function(func_id, meta.map_ptr)) { 7825 int id = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx); 7826 7827 if (id < 0) 7828 return id; 7829 /* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg() */ 7830 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = id; 7831 /* For release_reference() */ 7832 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = id; 7833 } 7834 7835 do_refine_retval_range(regs, fn->ret_type, func_id, &meta); 7836 7837 err = check_map_func_compatibility(env, meta.map_ptr, func_id); 7838 if (err) 7839 return err; 7840 7841 if ((func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stack || 7842 func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_task_stack) && 7843 !env->prog->has_callchain_buf) { 7844 const char *err_str; 7845 7846 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS 7847 err = get_callchain_buffers(sysctl_perf_event_max_stack); 7848 err_str = "cannot get callchain buffer for func %s#%d\n"; 7849 #else 7850 err = -ENOTSUPP; 7851 err_str = "func %s#%d not supported without CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS\n"; 7852 #endif 7853 if (err) { 7854 verbose(env, err_str, func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 7855 return err; 7856 } 7857 7858 env->prog->has_callchain_buf = true; 7859 } 7860 7861 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stackid || func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stack) 7862 env->prog->call_get_stack = true; 7863 7864 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_func_ip) { 7865 if (check_get_func_ip(env)) 7866 return -ENOTSUPP; 7867 env->prog->call_get_func_ip = true; 7868 } 7869 7870 if (changes_data) 7871 clear_all_pkt_pointers(env); 7872 return 0; 7873 } 7874 7875 /* mark_btf_func_reg_size() is used when the reg size is determined by 7876 * the BTF func_proto's return value size and argument. 7877 */ 7878 static void mark_btf_func_reg_size(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 7879 size_t reg_size) 7880 { 7881 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &cur_regs(env)[regno]; 7882 7883 if (regno == BPF_REG_0) { 7884 /* Function return value */ 7885 reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 7886 reg->subreg_def = reg_size == sizeof(u64) ? 7887 DEF_NOT_SUBREG : env->insn_idx + 1; 7888 } else { 7889 /* Function argument */ 7890 if (reg_size == sizeof(u64)) { 7891 mark_insn_zext(env, reg); 7892 mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 7893 } else { 7894 mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ32); 7895 } 7896 } 7897 } 7898 7899 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta { 7900 /* In parameters */ 7901 struct btf *btf; 7902 u32 func_id; 7903 u32 kfunc_flags; 7904 const struct btf_type *func_proto; 7905 const char *func_name; 7906 /* Out parameters */ 7907 u32 ref_obj_id; 7908 u8 release_regno; 7909 bool r0_rdonly; 7910 u32 ret_btf_id; 7911 u64 r0_size; 7912 struct { 7913 u64 value; 7914 bool found; 7915 } arg_constant; 7916 struct { 7917 struct btf *btf; 7918 u32 btf_id; 7919 } arg_obj_drop; 7920 struct { 7921 struct btf_field *field; 7922 } arg_list_head; 7923 }; 7924 7925 static bool is_kfunc_acquire(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 7926 { 7927 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_ACQUIRE; 7928 } 7929 7930 static bool is_kfunc_ret_null(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 7931 { 7932 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_RET_NULL; 7933 } 7934 7935 static bool is_kfunc_release(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 7936 { 7937 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_RELEASE; 7938 } 7939 7940 static bool is_kfunc_trusted_args(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 7941 { 7942 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_TRUSTED_ARGS; 7943 } 7944 7945 static bool is_kfunc_sleepable(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 7946 { 7947 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_SLEEPABLE; 7948 } 7949 7950 static bool is_kfunc_destructive(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 7951 { 7952 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_DESTRUCTIVE; 7953 } 7954 7955 static bool is_kfunc_arg_kptr_get(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, int arg) 7956 { 7957 return arg == 0 && (meta->kfunc_flags & KF_KPTR_GET); 7958 } 7959 7960 static bool is_trusted_reg(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 7961 { 7962 /* A referenced register is always trusted. */ 7963 if (reg->ref_obj_id) 7964 return true; 7965 7966 /* If a register is not referenced, it is trusted if it has either the 7967 * MEM_ALLOC or PTR_TRUSTED type modifiers, and no others. Some of the 7968 * other type modifiers may be safe, but we elect to take an opt-in 7969 * approach here as some (e.g. PTR_UNTRUSTED and PTR_MAYBE_NULL) are 7970 * not. 7971 * 7972 * Eventually, we should make PTR_TRUSTED the single source of truth 7973 * for whether a register is trusted. 7974 */ 7975 return type_flag(reg->type) & BPF_REG_TRUSTED_MODIFIERS && 7976 !bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg->type); 7977 } 7978 7979 static bool __kfunc_param_match_suffix(const struct btf *btf, 7980 const struct btf_param *arg, 7981 const char *suffix) 7982 { 7983 int suffix_len = strlen(suffix), len; 7984 const char *param_name; 7985 7986 /* In the future, this can be ported to use BTF tagging */ 7987 param_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf, arg->name_off); 7988 if (str_is_empty(param_name)) 7989 return false; 7990 len = strlen(param_name); 7991 if (len < suffix_len) 7992 return false; 7993 param_name += len - suffix_len; 7994 return !strncmp(param_name, suffix, suffix_len); 7995 } 7996 7997 static bool is_kfunc_arg_mem_size(const struct btf *btf, 7998 const struct btf_param *arg, 7999 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 8000 { 8001 const struct btf_type *t; 8002 8003 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, arg->type, NULL); 8004 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(t) || reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 8005 return false; 8006 8007 return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__sz"); 8008 } 8009 8010 static bool is_kfunc_arg_constant(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 8011 { 8012 return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__k"); 8013 } 8014 8015 static bool is_kfunc_arg_ignore(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 8016 { 8017 return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__ign"); 8018 } 8019 8020 static bool is_kfunc_arg_alloc_obj(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 8021 { 8022 return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__alloc"); 8023 } 8024 8025 static bool is_kfunc_arg_scalar_with_name(const struct btf *btf, 8026 const struct btf_param *arg, 8027 const char *name) 8028 { 8029 int len, target_len = strlen(name); 8030 const char *param_name; 8031 8032 param_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf, arg->name_off); 8033 if (str_is_empty(param_name)) 8034 return false; 8035 len = strlen(param_name); 8036 if (len != target_len) 8037 return false; 8038 if (strcmp(param_name, name)) 8039 return false; 8040 8041 return true; 8042 } 8043 8044 enum { 8045 KF_ARG_DYNPTR_ID, 8046 KF_ARG_LIST_HEAD_ID, 8047 KF_ARG_LIST_NODE_ID, 8048 }; 8049 8050 BTF_ID_LIST(kf_arg_btf_ids) 8051 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_dynptr_kern) 8052 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_list_head) 8053 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_list_node) 8054 8055 static bool __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(const struct btf *btf, 8056 const struct btf_param *arg, int type) 8057 { 8058 const struct btf_type *t; 8059 u32 res_id; 8060 8061 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, arg->type, NULL); 8062 if (!t) 8063 return false; 8064 if (!btf_type_is_ptr(t)) 8065 return false; 8066 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, t->type, &res_id); 8067 if (!t) 8068 return false; 8069 return btf_types_are_same(btf, res_id, btf_vmlinux, kf_arg_btf_ids[type]); 8070 } 8071 8072 static bool is_kfunc_arg_dynptr(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 8073 { 8074 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_DYNPTR_ID); 8075 } 8076 8077 static bool is_kfunc_arg_list_head(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 8078 { 8079 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_LIST_HEAD_ID); 8080 } 8081 8082 static bool is_kfunc_arg_list_node(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 8083 { 8084 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_LIST_NODE_ID); 8085 } 8086 8087 /* Returns true if struct is composed of scalars, 4 levels of nesting allowed */ 8088 static bool __btf_type_is_scalar_struct(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8089 const struct btf *btf, 8090 const struct btf_type *t, int rec) 8091 { 8092 const struct btf_type *member_type; 8093 const struct btf_member *member; 8094 u32 i; 8095 8096 if (!btf_type_is_struct(t)) 8097 return false; 8098 8099 for_each_member(i, t, member) { 8100 const struct btf_array *array; 8101 8102 member_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, member->type, NULL); 8103 if (btf_type_is_struct(member_type)) { 8104 if (rec >= 3) { 8105 verbose(env, "max struct nesting depth exceeded\n"); 8106 return false; 8107 } 8108 if (!__btf_type_is_scalar_struct(env, btf, member_type, rec + 1)) 8109 return false; 8110 continue; 8111 } 8112 if (btf_type_is_array(member_type)) { 8113 array = btf_array(member_type); 8114 if (!array->nelems) 8115 return false; 8116 member_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, array->type, NULL); 8117 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(member_type)) 8118 return false; 8119 continue; 8120 } 8121 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(member_type)) 8122 return false; 8123 } 8124 return true; 8125 } 8126 8127 8128 static u32 *reg2btf_ids[__BPF_REG_TYPE_MAX] = { 8129 #ifdef CONFIG_NET 8130 [PTR_TO_SOCKET] = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_SOCK], 8131 [PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON] = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_SOCK_COMMON], 8132 [PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK] = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_TCP], 8133 #endif 8134 }; 8135 8136 enum kfunc_ptr_arg_type { 8137 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX, 8138 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID, /* Allocated object */ 8139 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_KPTR, /* PTR_TO_KPTR but type specific */ 8140 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, 8141 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD, 8142 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_NODE, 8143 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID, /* Also covers reg2btf_ids conversions */ 8144 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM, 8145 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE, /* Size derived from next argument, skip it */ 8146 }; 8147 8148 enum special_kfunc_type { 8149 KF_bpf_obj_new_impl, 8150 KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl, 8151 KF_bpf_list_push_front, 8152 KF_bpf_list_push_back, 8153 KF_bpf_list_pop_front, 8154 KF_bpf_list_pop_back, 8155 KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx, 8156 KF_bpf_rdonly_cast, 8157 }; 8158 8159 BTF_SET_START(special_kfunc_set) 8160 BTF_ID(func, bpf_obj_new_impl) 8161 BTF_ID(func, bpf_obj_drop_impl) 8162 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_push_front) 8163 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_push_back) 8164 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_pop_front) 8165 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_pop_back) 8166 BTF_ID(func, bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx) 8167 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rdonly_cast) 8168 BTF_SET_END(special_kfunc_set) 8169 8170 BTF_ID_LIST(special_kfunc_list) 8171 BTF_ID(func, bpf_obj_new_impl) 8172 BTF_ID(func, bpf_obj_drop_impl) 8173 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_push_front) 8174 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_push_back) 8175 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_pop_front) 8176 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_pop_back) 8177 BTF_ID(func, bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx) 8178 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rdonly_cast) 8179 8180 static enum kfunc_ptr_arg_type 8181 get_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8182 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 8183 const struct btf_type *t, const struct btf_type *ref_t, 8184 const char *ref_tname, const struct btf_param *args, 8185 int argno, int nargs) 8186 { 8187 u32 regno = argno + 1; 8188 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 8189 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; 8190 bool arg_mem_size = false; 8191 8192 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx]) 8193 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX; 8194 8195 /* In this function, we verify the kfunc's BTF as per the argument type, 8196 * leaving the rest of the verification with respect to the register 8197 * type to our caller. When a set of conditions hold in the BTF type of 8198 * arguments, we resolve it to a known kfunc_ptr_arg_type. 8199 */ 8200 if (btf_get_prog_ctx_type(&env->log, meta->btf, t, resolve_prog_type(env->prog), argno)) 8201 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX; 8202 8203 if (is_kfunc_arg_alloc_obj(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 8204 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID; 8205 8206 if (is_kfunc_arg_kptr_get(meta, argno)) { 8207 if (!btf_type_is_ptr(ref_t)) { 8208 verbose(env, "arg#0 BTF type must be a double pointer for kptr_get kfunc\n"); 8209 return -EINVAL; 8210 } 8211 ref_t = btf_type_by_id(meta->btf, ref_t->type); 8212 ref_tname = btf_name_by_offset(meta->btf, ref_t->name_off); 8213 if (!btf_type_is_struct(ref_t)) { 8214 verbose(env, "kernel function %s args#0 pointer type %s %s is not supported\n", 8215 meta->func_name, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname); 8216 return -EINVAL; 8217 } 8218 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_KPTR; 8219 } 8220 8221 if (is_kfunc_arg_dynptr(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 8222 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR; 8223 8224 if (is_kfunc_arg_list_head(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 8225 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD; 8226 8227 if (is_kfunc_arg_list_node(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 8228 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_NODE; 8229 8230 if ((base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID || reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)])) { 8231 if (!btf_type_is_struct(ref_t)) { 8232 verbose(env, "kernel function %s args#%d pointer type %s %s is not supported\n", 8233 meta->func_name, argno, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname); 8234 return -EINVAL; 8235 } 8236 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 8237 } 8238 8239 if (argno + 1 < nargs && is_kfunc_arg_mem_size(meta->btf, &args[argno + 1], ®s[regno + 1])) 8240 arg_mem_size = true; 8241 8242 /* This is the catch all argument type of register types supported by 8243 * check_helper_mem_access. However, we only allow when argument type is 8244 * pointer to scalar, or struct composed (recursively) of scalars. When 8245 * arg_mem_size is true, the pointer can be void *. 8246 */ 8247 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(ref_t) && !__btf_type_is_scalar_struct(env, meta->btf, ref_t, 0) && 8248 (arg_mem_size ? !btf_type_is_void(ref_t) : 1)) { 8249 verbose(env, "arg#%d pointer type %s %s must point to %sscalar, or struct with scalar\n", 8250 argno, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname, arg_mem_size ? "void, " : ""); 8251 return -EINVAL; 8252 } 8253 return arg_mem_size ? KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE : KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM; 8254 } 8255 8256 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8257 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 8258 const struct btf_type *ref_t, 8259 const char *ref_tname, u32 ref_id, 8260 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 8261 int argno) 8262 { 8263 const struct btf_type *reg_ref_t; 8264 bool strict_type_match = false; 8265 const struct btf *reg_btf; 8266 const char *reg_ref_tname; 8267 u32 reg_ref_id; 8268 8269 if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 8270 reg_btf = reg->btf; 8271 reg_ref_id = reg->btf_id; 8272 } else { 8273 reg_btf = btf_vmlinux; 8274 reg_ref_id = *reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)]; 8275 } 8276 8277 if (is_kfunc_trusted_args(meta) || (is_kfunc_release(meta) && reg->ref_obj_id)) 8278 strict_type_match = true; 8279 8280 reg_ref_t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(reg_btf, reg_ref_id, ®_ref_id); 8281 reg_ref_tname = btf_name_by_offset(reg_btf, reg_ref_t->name_off); 8282 if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg_btf, reg_ref_id, reg->off, meta->btf, ref_id, strict_type_match)) { 8283 verbose(env, "kernel function %s args#%d expected pointer to %s %s but R%d has a pointer to %s %s\n", 8284 meta->func_name, argno, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname, argno + 1, 8285 btf_type_str(reg_ref_t), reg_ref_tname); 8286 return -EINVAL; 8287 } 8288 return 0; 8289 } 8290 8291 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_kptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8292 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 8293 const struct btf_type *ref_t, 8294 const char *ref_tname, 8295 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 8296 int argno) 8297 { 8298 struct btf_field *kptr_field; 8299 8300 /* check_func_arg_reg_off allows var_off for 8301 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, but we need fixed offset to find 8302 * off_desc. 8303 */ 8304 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 8305 verbose(env, "arg#0 must have constant offset\n"); 8306 return -EINVAL; 8307 } 8308 8309 kptr_field = btf_record_find(reg->map_ptr->record, reg->off + reg->var_off.value, BPF_KPTR); 8310 if (!kptr_field || kptr_field->type != BPF_KPTR_REF) { 8311 verbose(env, "arg#0 no referenced kptr at map value offset=%llu\n", 8312 reg->off + reg->var_off.value); 8313 return -EINVAL; 8314 } 8315 8316 if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, meta->btf, ref_t->type, 0, kptr_field->kptr.btf, 8317 kptr_field->kptr.btf_id, true)) { 8318 verbose(env, "kernel function %s args#%d expected pointer to %s %s\n", 8319 meta->func_name, argno, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname); 8320 return -EINVAL; 8321 } 8322 return 0; 8323 } 8324 8325 static int ref_set_release_on_unlock(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 ref_obj_id) 8326 { 8327 struct bpf_func_state *state = cur_func(env); 8328 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 8329 int i; 8330 8331 /* bpf_spin_lock only allows calling list_push and list_pop, no BPF 8332 * subprogs, no global functions. This means that the references would 8333 * not be released inside the critical section but they may be added to 8334 * the reference state, and the acquired_refs are never copied out for a 8335 * different frame as BPF to BPF calls don't work in bpf_spin_lock 8336 * critical sections. 8337 */ 8338 if (!ref_obj_id) { 8339 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: ref_obj_id is zero for release_on_unlock\n"); 8340 return -EFAULT; 8341 } 8342 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) { 8343 if (state->refs[i].id == ref_obj_id) { 8344 if (state->refs[i].release_on_unlock) { 8345 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: expected false release_on_unlock"); 8346 return -EFAULT; 8347 } 8348 state->refs[i].release_on_unlock = true; 8349 /* Now mark everyone sharing same ref_obj_id as untrusted */ 8350 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, state, reg, ({ 8351 if (reg->ref_obj_id == ref_obj_id) 8352 reg->type |= PTR_UNTRUSTED; 8353 })); 8354 return 0; 8355 } 8356 } 8357 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: ref state missing for ref_obj_id\n"); 8358 return -EFAULT; 8359 } 8360 8361 /* Implementation details: 8362 * 8363 * Each register points to some region of memory, which we define as an 8364 * allocation. Each allocation may embed a bpf_spin_lock which protects any 8365 * special BPF objects (bpf_list_head, bpf_rb_root, etc.) part of the same 8366 * allocation. The lock and the data it protects are colocated in the same 8367 * memory region. 8368 * 8369 * Hence, everytime a register holds a pointer value pointing to such 8370 * allocation, the verifier preserves a unique reg->id for it. 8371 * 8372 * The verifier remembers the lock 'ptr' and the lock 'id' whenever 8373 * bpf_spin_lock is called. 8374 * 8375 * To enable this, lock state in the verifier captures two values: 8376 * active_lock.ptr = Register's type specific pointer 8377 * active_lock.id = A unique ID for each register pointer value 8378 * 8379 * Currently, PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE and PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC are the two 8380 * supported register types. 8381 * 8382 * The active_lock.ptr in case of map values is the reg->map_ptr, and in case of 8383 * allocated objects is the reg->btf pointer. 8384 * 8385 * The active_lock.id is non-unique for maps supporting direct_value_addr, as we 8386 * can establish the provenance of the map value statically for each distinct 8387 * lookup into such maps. They always contain a single map value hence unique 8388 * IDs for each pseudo load pessimizes the algorithm and rejects valid programs. 8389 * 8390 * So, in case of global variables, they use array maps with max_entries = 1, 8391 * hence their active_lock.ptr becomes map_ptr and id = 0 (since they all point 8392 * into the same map value as max_entries is 1, as described above). 8393 * 8394 * In case of inner map lookups, the inner map pointer has same map_ptr as the 8395 * outer map pointer (in verifier context), but each lookup into an inner map 8396 * assigns a fresh reg->id to the lookup, so while lookups into distinct inner 8397 * maps from the same outer map share the same map_ptr as active_lock.ptr, they 8398 * will get different reg->id assigned to each lookup, hence different 8399 * active_lock.id. 8400 * 8401 * In case of allocated objects, active_lock.ptr is the reg->btf, and the 8402 * reg->id is a unique ID preserved after the NULL pointer check on the pointer 8403 * returned from bpf_obj_new. Each allocation receives a new reg->id. 8404 */ 8405 static int check_reg_allocation_locked(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 8406 { 8407 void *ptr; 8408 u32 id; 8409 8410 switch ((int)reg->type) { 8411 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 8412 ptr = reg->map_ptr; 8413 break; 8414 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC: 8415 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_TRUSTED: 8416 ptr = reg->btf; 8417 break; 8418 default: 8419 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unknown reg type for lock check\n"); 8420 return -EFAULT; 8421 } 8422 id = reg->id; 8423 8424 if (!env->cur_state->active_lock.ptr) 8425 return -EINVAL; 8426 if (env->cur_state->active_lock.ptr != ptr || 8427 env->cur_state->active_lock.id != id) { 8428 verbose(env, "held lock and object are not in the same allocation\n"); 8429 return -EINVAL; 8430 } 8431 return 0; 8432 } 8433 8434 static bool is_bpf_list_api_kfunc(u32 btf_id) 8435 { 8436 return btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_front] || 8437 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_back] || 8438 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_pop_front] || 8439 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_pop_back]; 8440 } 8441 8442 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_head(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8443 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 8444 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 8445 { 8446 struct btf_field *field; 8447 struct btf_record *rec; 8448 u32 list_head_off; 8449 8450 if (meta->btf != btf_vmlinux || !is_bpf_list_api_kfunc(meta->func_id)) { 8451 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: bpf_list_head argument for unknown kfunc\n"); 8452 return -EFAULT; 8453 } 8454 8455 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 8456 verbose(env, 8457 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. bpf_list_head has to be at the constant offset\n", 8458 regno); 8459 return -EINVAL; 8460 } 8461 8462 rec = reg_btf_record(reg); 8463 list_head_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; 8464 field = btf_record_find(rec, list_head_off, BPF_LIST_HEAD); 8465 if (!field) { 8466 verbose(env, "bpf_list_head not found at offset=%u\n", list_head_off); 8467 return -EINVAL; 8468 } 8469 8470 /* All functions require bpf_list_head to be protected using a bpf_spin_lock */ 8471 if (check_reg_allocation_locked(env, reg)) { 8472 verbose(env, "bpf_spin_lock at off=%d must be held for bpf_list_head\n", 8473 rec->spin_lock_off); 8474 return -EINVAL; 8475 } 8476 8477 if (meta->arg_list_head.field) { 8478 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: repeating bpf_list_head arg\n"); 8479 return -EFAULT; 8480 } 8481 meta->arg_list_head.field = field; 8482 return 0; 8483 } 8484 8485 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_node(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8486 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 8487 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 8488 { 8489 const struct btf_type *et, *t; 8490 struct btf_field *field; 8491 struct btf_record *rec; 8492 u32 list_node_off; 8493 8494 if (meta->btf != btf_vmlinux || 8495 (meta->func_id != special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_front] && 8496 meta->func_id != special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_back])) { 8497 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: bpf_list_node argument for unknown kfunc\n"); 8498 return -EFAULT; 8499 } 8500 8501 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 8502 verbose(env, 8503 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. bpf_list_node has to be at the constant offset\n", 8504 regno); 8505 return -EINVAL; 8506 } 8507 8508 rec = reg_btf_record(reg); 8509 list_node_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; 8510 field = btf_record_find(rec, list_node_off, BPF_LIST_NODE); 8511 if (!field || field->offset != list_node_off) { 8512 verbose(env, "bpf_list_node not found at offset=%u\n", list_node_off); 8513 return -EINVAL; 8514 } 8515 8516 field = meta->arg_list_head.field; 8517 8518 et = btf_type_by_id(field->list_head.btf, field->list_head.value_btf_id); 8519 t = btf_type_by_id(reg->btf, reg->btf_id); 8520 if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg->btf, reg->btf_id, 0, field->list_head.btf, 8521 field->list_head.value_btf_id, true)) { 8522 verbose(env, "operation on bpf_list_head expects arg#1 bpf_list_node at offset=%d " 8523 "in struct %s, but arg is at offset=%d in struct %s\n", 8524 field->list_head.node_offset, btf_name_by_offset(field->list_head.btf, et->name_off), 8525 list_node_off, btf_name_by_offset(reg->btf, t->name_off)); 8526 return -EINVAL; 8527 } 8528 8529 if (list_node_off != field->list_head.node_offset) { 8530 verbose(env, "arg#1 offset=%d, but expected bpf_list_node at offset=%d in struct %s\n", 8531 list_node_off, field->list_head.node_offset, 8532 btf_name_by_offset(field->list_head.btf, et->name_off)); 8533 return -EINVAL; 8534 } 8535 /* Set arg#1 for expiration after unlock */ 8536 return ref_set_release_on_unlock(env, reg->ref_obj_id); 8537 } 8538 8539 static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 8540 { 8541 const char *func_name = meta->func_name, *ref_tname; 8542 const struct btf *btf = meta->btf; 8543 const struct btf_param *args; 8544 u32 i, nargs; 8545 int ret; 8546 8547 args = (const struct btf_param *)(meta->func_proto + 1); 8548 nargs = btf_type_vlen(meta->func_proto); 8549 if (nargs > MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS) { 8550 verbose(env, "Function %s has %d > %d args\n", func_name, nargs, 8551 MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS); 8552 return -EINVAL; 8553 } 8554 8555 /* Check that BTF function arguments match actual types that the 8556 * verifier sees. 8557 */ 8558 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) { 8559 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[i + 1]; 8560 const struct btf_type *t, *ref_t, *resolve_ret; 8561 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type = ARG_DONTCARE; 8562 u32 regno = i + 1, ref_id, type_size; 8563 bool is_ret_buf_sz = false; 8564 int kf_arg_type; 8565 8566 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, args[i].type, NULL); 8567 8568 if (is_kfunc_arg_ignore(btf, &args[i])) 8569 continue; 8570 8571 if (btf_type_is_scalar(t)) { 8572 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 8573 verbose(env, "R%d is not a scalar\n", regno); 8574 return -EINVAL; 8575 } 8576 8577 if (is_kfunc_arg_constant(meta->btf, &args[i])) { 8578 if (meta->arg_constant.found) { 8579 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: only one constant argument permitted\n"); 8580 return -EFAULT; 8581 } 8582 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 8583 verbose(env, "R%d must be a known constant\n", regno); 8584 return -EINVAL; 8585 } 8586 ret = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); 8587 if (ret < 0) 8588 return ret; 8589 meta->arg_constant.found = true; 8590 meta->arg_constant.value = reg->var_off.value; 8591 } else if (is_kfunc_arg_scalar_with_name(btf, &args[i], "rdonly_buf_size")) { 8592 meta->r0_rdonly = true; 8593 is_ret_buf_sz = true; 8594 } else if (is_kfunc_arg_scalar_with_name(btf, &args[i], "rdwr_buf_size")) { 8595 is_ret_buf_sz = true; 8596 } 8597 8598 if (is_ret_buf_sz) { 8599 if (meta->r0_size) { 8600 verbose(env, "2 or more rdonly/rdwr_buf_size parameters for kfunc"); 8601 return -EINVAL; 8602 } 8603 8604 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 8605 verbose(env, "R%d is not a const\n", regno); 8606 return -EINVAL; 8607 } 8608 8609 meta->r0_size = reg->var_off.value; 8610 ret = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); 8611 if (ret) 8612 return ret; 8613 } 8614 continue; 8615 } 8616 8617 if (!btf_type_is_ptr(t)) { 8618 verbose(env, "Unrecognized arg#%d type %s\n", i, btf_type_str(t)); 8619 return -EINVAL; 8620 } 8621 8622 if (reg->ref_obj_id) { 8623 if (is_kfunc_release(meta) && meta->ref_obj_id) { 8624 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: more than one arg with ref_obj_id R%d %u %u\n", 8625 regno, reg->ref_obj_id, 8626 meta->ref_obj_id); 8627 return -EFAULT; 8628 } 8629 meta->ref_obj_id = reg->ref_obj_id; 8630 if (is_kfunc_release(meta)) 8631 meta->release_regno = regno; 8632 } 8633 8634 ref_t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, t->type, &ref_id); 8635 ref_tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, ref_t->name_off); 8636 8637 kf_arg_type = get_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(env, meta, t, ref_t, ref_tname, args, i, nargs); 8638 if (kf_arg_type < 0) 8639 return kf_arg_type; 8640 8641 switch (kf_arg_type) { 8642 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID: 8643 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 8644 if (!is_kfunc_trusted_args(meta)) 8645 break; 8646 8647 if (!is_trusted_reg(reg)) { 8648 verbose(env, "R%d must be referenced or trusted\n", regno); 8649 return -EINVAL; 8650 } 8651 fallthrough; 8652 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX: 8653 /* Trusted arguments have the same offset checks as release arguments */ 8654 arg_type |= OBJ_RELEASE; 8655 break; 8656 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_KPTR: 8657 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR: 8658 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD: 8659 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_NODE: 8660 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM: 8661 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE: 8662 /* Trusted by default */ 8663 break; 8664 default: 8665 WARN_ON_ONCE(1); 8666 return -EFAULT; 8667 } 8668 8669 if (is_kfunc_release(meta) && reg->ref_obj_id) 8670 arg_type |= OBJ_RELEASE; 8671 ret = check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, regno, arg_type); 8672 if (ret < 0) 8673 return ret; 8674 8675 switch (kf_arg_type) { 8676 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX: 8677 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_CTX) { 8678 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to ctx, but got %s\n", i, btf_type_str(t)); 8679 return -EINVAL; 8680 } 8681 8682 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx]) { 8683 ret = get_kern_ctx_btf_id(&env->log, resolve_prog_type(env->prog)); 8684 if (ret < 0) 8685 return -EINVAL; 8686 meta->ret_btf_id = ret; 8687 } 8688 break; 8689 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID: 8690 if (reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) { 8691 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to allocated object\n", i); 8692 return -EINVAL; 8693 } 8694 if (!reg->ref_obj_id) { 8695 verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n"); 8696 return -EINVAL; 8697 } 8698 if (meta->btf == btf_vmlinux && 8699 meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl]) { 8700 meta->arg_obj_drop.btf = reg->btf; 8701 meta->arg_obj_drop.btf_id = reg->btf_id; 8702 } 8703 break; 8704 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_KPTR: 8705 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 8706 verbose(env, "arg#0 expected pointer to map value\n"); 8707 return -EINVAL; 8708 } 8709 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_kptr(env, reg, ref_t, ref_tname, meta, i); 8710 if (ret < 0) 8711 return ret; 8712 break; 8713 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR: 8714 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_STACK) { 8715 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to stack\n", i); 8716 return -EINVAL; 8717 } 8718 8719 if (!is_dynptr_reg_valid_init(env, reg)) { 8720 verbose(env, "arg#%d pointer type %s %s must be valid and initialized\n", 8721 i, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname); 8722 return -EINVAL; 8723 } 8724 8725 if (!is_dynptr_type_expected(env, reg, ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR | DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL)) { 8726 verbose(env, "arg#%d pointer type %s %s points to unsupported dynamic pointer type\n", 8727 i, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname); 8728 return -EINVAL; 8729 } 8730 break; 8731 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD: 8732 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE && 8733 reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) { 8734 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to map value or allocated object\n", i); 8735 return -EINVAL; 8736 } 8737 if (reg->type == (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC) && !reg->ref_obj_id) { 8738 verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n"); 8739 return -EINVAL; 8740 } 8741 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_head(env, reg, regno, meta); 8742 if (ret < 0) 8743 return ret; 8744 break; 8745 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_NODE: 8746 if (reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) { 8747 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to allocated object\n", i); 8748 return -EINVAL; 8749 } 8750 if (!reg->ref_obj_id) { 8751 verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n"); 8752 return -EINVAL; 8753 } 8754 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_node(env, reg, regno, meta); 8755 if (ret < 0) 8756 return ret; 8757 break; 8758 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 8759 /* Only base_type is checked, further checks are done here */ 8760 if ((base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID || 8761 bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg->type)) && 8762 !reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)]) { 8763 verbose(env, "arg#%d is %s ", i, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 8764 verbose(env, "expected %s or socket\n", 8765 reg_type_str(env, base_type(reg->type) | 8766 (type_flag(reg->type) & BPF_REG_TRUSTED_MODIFIERS))); 8767 return -EINVAL; 8768 } 8769 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_btf_id(env, reg, ref_t, ref_tname, ref_id, meta, i); 8770 if (ret < 0) 8771 return ret; 8772 break; 8773 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM: 8774 resolve_ret = btf_resolve_size(btf, ref_t, &type_size); 8775 if (IS_ERR(resolve_ret)) { 8776 verbose(env, "arg#%d reference type('%s %s') size cannot be determined: %ld\n", 8777 i, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname, PTR_ERR(resolve_ret)); 8778 return -EINVAL; 8779 } 8780 ret = check_mem_reg(env, reg, regno, type_size); 8781 if (ret < 0) 8782 return ret; 8783 break; 8784 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE: 8785 ret = check_kfunc_mem_size_reg(env, ®s[regno + 1], regno + 1); 8786 if (ret < 0) { 8787 verbose(env, "arg#%d arg#%d memory, len pair leads to invalid memory access\n", i, i + 1); 8788 return ret; 8789 } 8790 /* Skip next '__sz' argument */ 8791 i++; 8792 break; 8793 } 8794 } 8795 8796 if (is_kfunc_release(meta) && !meta->release_regno) { 8797 verbose(env, "release kernel function %s expects refcounted PTR_TO_BTF_ID\n", 8798 func_name); 8799 return -EINVAL; 8800 } 8801 8802 return 0; 8803 } 8804 8805 static int check_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 8806 int *insn_idx_p) 8807 { 8808 const struct btf_type *t, *func, *func_proto, *ptr_type; 8809 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 8810 const char *func_name, *ptr_type_name; 8811 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta meta; 8812 u32 i, nargs, func_id, ptr_type_id; 8813 int err, insn_idx = *insn_idx_p; 8814 const struct btf_param *args; 8815 const struct btf_type *ret_t; 8816 struct btf *desc_btf; 8817 u32 *kfunc_flags; 8818 8819 /* skip for now, but return error when we find this in fixup_kfunc_call */ 8820 if (!insn->imm) 8821 return 0; 8822 8823 desc_btf = find_kfunc_desc_btf(env, insn->off); 8824 if (IS_ERR(desc_btf)) 8825 return PTR_ERR(desc_btf); 8826 8827 func_id = insn->imm; 8828 func = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, func_id); 8829 func_name = btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf, func->name_off); 8830 func_proto = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, func->type); 8831 8832 kfunc_flags = btf_kfunc_id_set_contains(desc_btf, resolve_prog_type(env->prog), func_id); 8833 if (!kfunc_flags) { 8834 verbose(env, "calling kernel function %s is not allowed\n", 8835 func_name); 8836 return -EACCES; 8837 } 8838 8839 /* Prepare kfunc call metadata */ 8840 memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta)); 8841 meta.btf = desc_btf; 8842 meta.func_id = func_id; 8843 meta.kfunc_flags = *kfunc_flags; 8844 meta.func_proto = func_proto; 8845 meta.func_name = func_name; 8846 8847 if (is_kfunc_destructive(&meta) && !capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT)) { 8848 verbose(env, "destructive kfunc calls require CAP_SYS_BOOT capability\n"); 8849 return -EACCES; 8850 } 8851 8852 if (is_kfunc_sleepable(&meta) && !env->prog->aux->sleepable) { 8853 verbose(env, "program must be sleepable to call sleepable kfunc %s\n", func_name); 8854 return -EACCES; 8855 } 8856 8857 /* Check the arguments */ 8858 err = check_kfunc_args(env, &meta); 8859 if (err < 0) 8860 return err; 8861 /* In case of release function, we get register number of refcounted 8862 * PTR_TO_BTF_ID in bpf_kfunc_arg_meta, do the release now. 8863 */ 8864 if (meta.release_regno) { 8865 err = release_reference(env, regs[meta.release_regno].ref_obj_id); 8866 if (err) { 8867 verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d reference has not been acquired before\n", 8868 func_name, func_id); 8869 return err; 8870 } 8871 } 8872 8873 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) 8874 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); 8875 8876 /* Check return type */ 8877 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(desc_btf, func_proto->type, NULL); 8878 8879 if (is_kfunc_acquire(&meta) && !btf_type_is_struct_ptr(meta.btf, t)) { 8880 /* Only exception is bpf_obj_new_impl */ 8881 if (meta.btf != btf_vmlinux || meta.func_id != special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_new_impl]) { 8882 verbose(env, "acquire kernel function does not return PTR_TO_BTF_ID\n"); 8883 return -EINVAL; 8884 } 8885 } 8886 8887 if (btf_type_is_scalar(t)) { 8888 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 8889 mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, BPF_REG_0, t->size); 8890 } else if (btf_type_is_ptr(t)) { 8891 ptr_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(desc_btf, t->type, &ptr_type_id); 8892 8893 if (meta.btf == btf_vmlinux && btf_id_set_contains(&special_kfunc_set, meta.func_id)) { 8894 if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_new_impl]) { 8895 struct btf *ret_btf; 8896 u32 ret_btf_id; 8897 8898 if (unlikely(!bpf_global_ma_set)) 8899 return -ENOMEM; 8900 8901 if (((u64)(u32)meta.arg_constant.value) != meta.arg_constant.value) { 8902 verbose(env, "local type ID argument must be in range [0, U32_MAX]\n"); 8903 return -EINVAL; 8904 } 8905 8906 ret_btf = env->prog->aux->btf; 8907 ret_btf_id = meta.arg_constant.value; 8908 8909 /* This may be NULL due to user not supplying a BTF */ 8910 if (!ret_btf) { 8911 verbose(env, "bpf_obj_new requires prog BTF\n"); 8912 return -EINVAL; 8913 } 8914 8915 ret_t = btf_type_by_id(ret_btf, ret_btf_id); 8916 if (!ret_t || !__btf_type_is_struct(ret_t)) { 8917 verbose(env, "bpf_obj_new type ID argument must be of a struct\n"); 8918 return -EINVAL; 8919 } 8920 8921 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 8922 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC; 8923 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = ret_btf; 8924 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ret_btf_id; 8925 8926 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].obj_new_size = ret_t->size; 8927 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].kptr_struct_meta = 8928 btf_find_struct_meta(ret_btf, ret_btf_id); 8929 } else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl]) { 8930 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].kptr_struct_meta = 8931 btf_find_struct_meta(meta.arg_obj_drop.btf, 8932 meta.arg_obj_drop.btf_id); 8933 } else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_pop_front] || 8934 meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_pop_back]) { 8935 struct btf_field *field = meta.arg_list_head.field; 8936 8937 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 8938 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC; 8939 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = field->list_head.btf; 8940 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = field->list_head.value_btf_id; 8941 regs[BPF_REG_0].off = field->list_head.node_offset; 8942 } else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx]) { 8943 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 8944 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED; 8945 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = desc_btf; 8946 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta.ret_btf_id; 8947 } else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rdonly_cast]) { 8948 ret_t = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, meta.arg_constant.value); 8949 if (!ret_t || !btf_type_is_struct(ret_t)) { 8950 verbose(env, 8951 "kfunc bpf_rdonly_cast type ID argument must be of a struct\n"); 8952 return -EINVAL; 8953 } 8954 8955 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 8956 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED; 8957 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = desc_btf; 8958 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta.arg_constant.value; 8959 } else { 8960 verbose(env, "kernel function %s unhandled dynamic return type\n", 8961 meta.func_name); 8962 return -EFAULT; 8963 } 8964 } else if (!__btf_type_is_struct(ptr_type)) { 8965 if (!meta.r0_size) { 8966 ptr_type_name = btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf, 8967 ptr_type->name_off); 8968 verbose(env, 8969 "kernel function %s returns pointer type %s %s is not supported\n", 8970 func_name, 8971 btf_type_str(ptr_type), 8972 ptr_type_name); 8973 return -EINVAL; 8974 } 8975 8976 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 8977 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM; 8978 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = meta.r0_size; 8979 8980 if (meta.r0_rdonly) 8981 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_RDONLY; 8982 8983 /* Ensures we don't access the memory after a release_reference() */ 8984 if (meta.ref_obj_id) 8985 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = meta.ref_obj_id; 8986 } else { 8987 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 8988 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = desc_btf; 8989 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 8990 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ptr_type_id; 8991 } 8992 8993 if (is_kfunc_ret_null(&meta)) { 8994 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 8995 /* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg, see 93c230e3f5bd6 */ 8996 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; 8997 } 8998 mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, BPF_REG_0, sizeof(void *)); 8999 if (is_kfunc_acquire(&meta)) { 9000 int id = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx); 9001 9002 if (id < 0) 9003 return id; 9004 if (is_kfunc_ret_null(&meta)) 9005 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = id; 9006 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = id; 9007 } 9008 if (reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(®s[BPF_REG_0]) && !regs[BPF_REG_0].id) 9009 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; 9010 } /* else { add_kfunc_call() ensures it is btf_type_is_void(t) } */ 9011 9012 nargs = btf_type_vlen(func_proto); 9013 args = (const struct btf_param *)(func_proto + 1); 9014 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) { 9015 u32 regno = i + 1; 9016 9017 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(desc_btf, args[i].type, NULL); 9018 if (btf_type_is_ptr(t)) 9019 mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, regno, sizeof(void *)); 9020 else 9021 /* scalar. ensured by btf_check_kfunc_arg_match() */ 9022 mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, regno, t->size); 9023 } 9024 9025 return 0; 9026 } 9027 9028 static bool signed_add_overflows(s64 a, s64 b) 9029 { 9030 /* Do the add in u64, where overflow is well-defined */ 9031 s64 res = (s64)((u64)a + (u64)b); 9032 9033 if (b < 0) 9034 return res > a; 9035 return res < a; 9036 } 9037 9038 static bool signed_add32_overflows(s32 a, s32 b) 9039 { 9040 /* Do the add in u32, where overflow is well-defined */ 9041 s32 res = (s32)((u32)a + (u32)b); 9042 9043 if (b < 0) 9044 return res > a; 9045 return res < a; 9046 } 9047 9048 static bool signed_sub_overflows(s64 a, s64 b) 9049 { 9050 /* Do the sub in u64, where overflow is well-defined */ 9051 s64 res = (s64)((u64)a - (u64)b); 9052 9053 if (b < 0) 9054 return res < a; 9055 return res > a; 9056 } 9057 9058 static bool signed_sub32_overflows(s32 a, s32 b) 9059 { 9060 /* Do the sub in u32, where overflow is well-defined */ 9061 s32 res = (s32)((u32)a - (u32)b); 9062 9063 if (b < 0) 9064 return res < a; 9065 return res > a; 9066 } 9067 9068 static bool check_reg_sane_offset(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9069 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 9070 enum bpf_reg_type type) 9071 { 9072 bool known = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 9073 s64 val = reg->var_off.value; 9074 s64 smin = reg->smin_value; 9075 9076 if (known && (val >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || val <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF)) { 9077 verbose(env, "math between %s pointer and %lld is not allowed\n", 9078 reg_type_str(env, type), val); 9079 return false; 9080 } 9081 9082 if (reg->off >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || reg->off <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 9083 verbose(env, "%s pointer offset %d is not allowed\n", 9084 reg_type_str(env, type), reg->off); 9085 return false; 9086 } 9087 9088 if (smin == S64_MIN) { 9089 verbose(env, "math between %s pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed\n", 9090 reg_type_str(env, type)); 9091 return false; 9092 } 9093 9094 if (smin >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || smin <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 9095 verbose(env, "value %lld makes %s pointer be out of bounds\n", 9096 smin, reg_type_str(env, type)); 9097 return false; 9098 } 9099 9100 return true; 9101 } 9102 9103 enum { 9104 REASON_BOUNDS = -1, 9105 REASON_TYPE = -2, 9106 REASON_PATHS = -3, 9107 REASON_LIMIT = -4, 9108 REASON_STACK = -5, 9109 }; 9110 9111 static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, 9112 u32 *alu_limit, bool mask_to_left) 9113 { 9114 u32 max = 0, ptr_limit = 0; 9115 9116 switch (ptr_reg->type) { 9117 case PTR_TO_STACK: 9118 /* Offset 0 is out-of-bounds, but acceptable start for the 9119 * left direction, see BPF_REG_FP. Also, unknown scalar 9120 * offset where we would need to deal with min/max bounds is 9121 * currently prohibited for unprivileged. 9122 */ 9123 max = MAX_BPF_STACK + mask_to_left; 9124 ptr_limit = -(ptr_reg->var_off.value + ptr_reg->off); 9125 break; 9126 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 9127 max = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size; 9128 ptr_limit = (mask_to_left ? 9129 ptr_reg->smin_value : 9130 ptr_reg->umax_value) + ptr_reg->off; 9131 break; 9132 default: 9133 return REASON_TYPE; 9134 } 9135 9136 if (ptr_limit >= max) 9137 return REASON_LIMIT; 9138 *alu_limit = ptr_limit; 9139 return 0; 9140 } 9141 9142 static bool can_skip_alu_sanitation(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9143 const struct bpf_insn *insn) 9144 { 9145 return env->bypass_spec_v1 || BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K; 9146 } 9147 9148 static int update_alu_sanitation_state(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, 9149 u32 alu_state, u32 alu_limit) 9150 { 9151 /* If we arrived here from different branches with different 9152 * state or limits to sanitize, then this won't work. 9153 */ 9154 if (aux->alu_state && 9155 (aux->alu_state != alu_state || 9156 aux->alu_limit != alu_limit)) 9157 return REASON_PATHS; 9158 9159 /* Corresponding fixup done in do_misc_fixups(). */ 9160 aux->alu_state = alu_state; 9161 aux->alu_limit = alu_limit; 9162 return 0; 9163 } 9164 9165 static int sanitize_val_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9166 struct bpf_insn *insn) 9167 { 9168 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env); 9169 9170 if (can_skip_alu_sanitation(env, insn)) 9171 return 0; 9172 9173 return update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER, 0); 9174 } 9175 9176 static bool sanitize_needed(u8 opcode) 9177 { 9178 return opcode == BPF_ADD || opcode == BPF_SUB; 9179 } 9180 9181 struct bpf_sanitize_info { 9182 struct bpf_insn_aux_data aux; 9183 bool mask_to_left; 9184 }; 9185 9186 static struct bpf_verifier_state * 9187 sanitize_speculative_path(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9188 const struct bpf_insn *insn, 9189 u32 next_idx, u32 curr_idx) 9190 { 9191 struct bpf_verifier_state *branch; 9192 struct bpf_reg_state *regs; 9193 9194 branch = push_stack(env, next_idx, curr_idx, true); 9195 if (branch && insn) { 9196 regs = branch->frame[branch->curframe]->regs; 9197 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) { 9198 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 9199 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 9200 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 9201 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->src_reg); 9202 } 9203 } 9204 return branch; 9205 } 9206 9207 static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9208 struct bpf_insn *insn, 9209 const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, 9210 const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg, 9211 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 9212 struct bpf_sanitize_info *info, 9213 const bool commit_window) 9214 { 9215 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = commit_window ? cur_aux(env) : &info->aux; 9216 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 9217 bool off_is_imm = tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off); 9218 bool off_is_neg = off_reg->smin_value < 0; 9219 bool ptr_is_dst_reg = ptr_reg == dst_reg; 9220 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 9221 u32 alu_state, alu_limit; 9222 struct bpf_reg_state tmp; 9223 bool ret; 9224 int err; 9225 9226 if (can_skip_alu_sanitation(env, insn)) 9227 return 0; 9228 9229 /* We already marked aux for masking from non-speculative 9230 * paths, thus we got here in the first place. We only care 9231 * to explore bad access from here. 9232 */ 9233 if (vstate->speculative) 9234 goto do_sim; 9235 9236 if (!commit_window) { 9237 if (!tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off) && 9238 (off_reg->smin_value < 0) != (off_reg->smax_value < 0)) 9239 return REASON_BOUNDS; 9240 9241 info->mask_to_left = (opcode == BPF_ADD && off_is_neg) || 9242 (opcode == BPF_SUB && !off_is_neg); 9243 } 9244 9245 err = retrieve_ptr_limit(ptr_reg, &alu_limit, info->mask_to_left); 9246 if (err < 0) 9247 return err; 9248 9249 if (commit_window) { 9250 /* In commit phase we narrow the masking window based on 9251 * the observed pointer move after the simulated operation. 9252 */ 9253 alu_state = info->aux.alu_state; 9254 alu_limit = abs(info->aux.alu_limit - alu_limit); 9255 } else { 9256 alu_state = off_is_neg ? BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE : 0; 9257 alu_state |= off_is_imm ? BPF_ALU_IMMEDIATE : 0; 9258 alu_state |= ptr_is_dst_reg ? 9259 BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC : BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST; 9260 9261 /* Limit pruning on unknown scalars to enable deep search for 9262 * potential masking differences from other program paths. 9263 */ 9264 if (!off_is_imm) 9265 env->explore_alu_limits = true; 9266 } 9267 9268 err = update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, alu_state, alu_limit); 9269 if (err < 0) 9270 return err; 9271 do_sim: 9272 /* If we're in commit phase, we're done here given we already 9273 * pushed the truncated dst_reg into the speculative verification 9274 * stack. 9275 * 9276 * Also, when register is a known constant, we rewrite register-based 9277 * operation to immediate-based, and thus do not need masking (and as 9278 * a consequence, do not need to simulate the zero-truncation either). 9279 */ 9280 if (commit_window || off_is_imm) 9281 return 0; 9282 9283 /* Simulate and find potential out-of-bounds access under 9284 * speculative execution from truncation as a result of 9285 * masking when off was not within expected range. If off 9286 * sits in dst, then we temporarily need to move ptr there 9287 * to simulate dst (== 0) +/-= ptr. Needed, for example, 9288 * for cases where we use K-based arithmetic in one direction 9289 * and truncated reg-based in the other in order to explore 9290 * bad access. 9291 */ 9292 if (!ptr_is_dst_reg) { 9293 tmp = *dst_reg; 9294 *dst_reg = *ptr_reg; 9295 } 9296 ret = sanitize_speculative_path(env, NULL, env->insn_idx + 1, 9297 env->insn_idx); 9298 if (!ptr_is_dst_reg && ret) 9299 *dst_reg = tmp; 9300 return !ret ? REASON_STACK : 0; 9301 } 9302 9303 static void sanitize_mark_insn_seen(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 9304 { 9305 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 9306 9307 /* If we simulate paths under speculation, we don't update the 9308 * insn as 'seen' such that when we verify unreachable paths in 9309 * the non-speculative domain, sanitize_dead_code() can still 9310 * rewrite/sanitize them. 9311 */ 9312 if (!vstate->speculative) 9313 env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = env->pass_cnt; 9314 } 9315 9316 static int sanitize_err(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9317 const struct bpf_insn *insn, int reason, 9318 const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg, 9319 const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg) 9320 { 9321 static const char *err = "pointer arithmetic with it prohibited for !root"; 9322 const char *op = BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_ADD ? "add" : "sub"; 9323 u32 dst = insn->dst_reg, src = insn->src_reg; 9324 9325 switch (reason) { 9326 case REASON_BOUNDS: 9327 verbose(env, "R%d has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds, %s\n", 9328 off_reg == dst_reg ? dst : src, err); 9329 break; 9330 case REASON_TYPE: 9331 verbose(env, "R%d has pointer with unsupported alu operation, %s\n", 9332 off_reg == dst_reg ? src : dst, err); 9333 break; 9334 case REASON_PATHS: 9335 verbose(env, "R%d tried to %s from different maps, paths or scalars, %s\n", 9336 dst, op, err); 9337 break; 9338 case REASON_LIMIT: 9339 verbose(env, "R%d tried to %s beyond pointer bounds, %s\n", 9340 dst, op, err); 9341 break; 9342 case REASON_STACK: 9343 verbose(env, "R%d could not be pushed for speculative verification, %s\n", 9344 dst, err); 9345 break; 9346 default: 9347 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unknown reason (%d)\n", 9348 reason); 9349 break; 9350 } 9351 9352 return -EACCES; 9353 } 9354 9355 /* check that stack access falls within stack limits and that 'reg' doesn't 9356 * have a variable offset. 9357 * 9358 * Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for simplicity since it 9359 * requires corresponding support in Spectre masking for stack ALU. See also 9360 * retrieve_ptr_limit(). 9361 * 9362 * 9363 * 'off' includes 'reg->off'. 9364 */ 9365 static int check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic( 9366 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9367 int regno, 9368 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 9369 int off) 9370 { 9371 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 9372 char tn_buf[48]; 9373 9374 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 9375 verbose(env, "R%d variable stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s off=%d\n", 9376 regno, tn_buf, off); 9377 return -EACCES; 9378 } 9379 9380 if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK) { 9381 verbose(env, "R%d stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, " 9382 "prohibited for !root; off=%d\n", regno, off); 9383 return -EACCES; 9384 } 9385 9386 return 0; 9387 } 9388 9389 static int sanitize_check_bounds(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9390 const struct bpf_insn *insn, 9391 const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg) 9392 { 9393 u32 dst = insn->dst_reg; 9394 9395 /* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds 9396 * in order to be able to sanitize access later on. 9397 */ 9398 if (env->bypass_spec_v1) 9399 return 0; 9400 9401 switch (dst_reg->type) { 9402 case PTR_TO_STACK: 9403 if (check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic(env, dst, dst_reg, 9404 dst_reg->off + dst_reg->var_off.value)) 9405 return -EACCES; 9406 break; 9407 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 9408 if (check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1, false, ACCESS_HELPER)) { 9409 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, " 9410 "prohibited for !root\n", dst); 9411 return -EACCES; 9412 } 9413 break; 9414 default: 9415 break; 9416 } 9417 9418 return 0; 9419 } 9420 9421 /* Handles arithmetic on a pointer and a scalar: computes new min/max and var_off. 9422 * Caller should also handle BPF_MOV case separately. 9423 * If we return -EACCES, caller may want to try again treating pointer as a 9424 * scalar. So we only emit a diagnostic if !env->allow_ptr_leaks. 9425 */ 9426 static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9427 struct bpf_insn *insn, 9428 const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, 9429 const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg) 9430 { 9431 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 9432 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 9433 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *dst_reg; 9434 bool known = tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off); 9435 s64 smin_val = off_reg->smin_value, smax_val = off_reg->smax_value, 9436 smin_ptr = ptr_reg->smin_value, smax_ptr = ptr_reg->smax_value; 9437 u64 umin_val = off_reg->umin_value, umax_val = off_reg->umax_value, 9438 umin_ptr = ptr_reg->umin_value, umax_ptr = ptr_reg->umax_value; 9439 struct bpf_sanitize_info info = {}; 9440 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 9441 u32 dst = insn->dst_reg; 9442 int ret; 9443 9444 dst_reg = ®s[dst]; 9445 9446 if ((known && (smin_val != smax_val || umin_val != umax_val)) || 9447 smin_val > smax_val || umin_val > umax_val) { 9448 /* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds derived from 9449 * e.g. dead branches. 9450 */ 9451 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 9452 return 0; 9453 } 9454 9455 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) { 9456 /* 32-bit ALU ops on pointers produce (meaningless) scalars */ 9457 if (opcode == BPF_SUB && env->allow_ptr_leaks) { 9458 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 9459 return 0; 9460 } 9461 9462 verbose(env, 9463 "R%d 32-bit pointer arithmetic prohibited\n", 9464 dst); 9465 return -EACCES; 9466 } 9467 9468 if (ptr_reg->type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL) { 9469 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited, null-check it first\n", 9470 dst, reg_type_str(env, ptr_reg->type)); 9471 return -EACCES; 9472 } 9473 9474 switch (base_type(ptr_reg->type)) { 9475 case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP: 9476 /* smin_val represents the known value */ 9477 if (known && smin_val == 0 && opcode == BPF_ADD) 9478 break; 9479 fallthrough; 9480 case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: 9481 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 9482 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 9483 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 9484 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 9485 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited\n", 9486 dst, reg_type_str(env, ptr_reg->type)); 9487 return -EACCES; 9488 default: 9489 break; 9490 } 9491 9492 /* In case of 'scalar += pointer', dst_reg inherits pointer type and id. 9493 * The id may be overwritten later if we create a new variable offset. 9494 */ 9495 dst_reg->type = ptr_reg->type; 9496 dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id; 9497 9498 if (!check_reg_sane_offset(env, off_reg, ptr_reg->type) || 9499 !check_reg_sane_offset(env, ptr_reg, ptr_reg->type)) 9500 return -EINVAL; 9501 9502 /* pointer types do not carry 32-bit bounds at the moment. */ 9503 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 9504 9505 if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) { 9506 ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg, 9507 &info, false); 9508 if (ret < 0) 9509 return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg); 9510 } 9511 9512 switch (opcode) { 9513 case BPF_ADD: 9514 /* We can take a fixed offset as long as it doesn't overflow 9515 * the s32 'off' field 9516 */ 9517 if (known && (ptr_reg->off + smin_val == 9518 (s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off + smin_val))) { 9519 /* pointer += K. Accumulate it into fixed offset */ 9520 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr; 9521 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr; 9522 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr; 9523 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr; 9524 dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off; 9525 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off + smin_val; 9526 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; 9527 break; 9528 } 9529 /* A new variable offset is created. Note that off_reg->off 9530 * == 0, since it's a scalar. 9531 * dst_reg gets the pointer type and since some positive 9532 * integer value was added to the pointer, give it a new 'id' 9533 * if it's a PTR_TO_PACKET. 9534 * this creates a new 'base' pointer, off_reg (variable) gets 9535 * added into the variable offset, and we copy the fixed offset 9536 * from ptr_reg. 9537 */ 9538 if (signed_add_overflows(smin_ptr, smin_val) || 9539 signed_add_overflows(smax_ptr, smax_val)) { 9540 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 9541 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 9542 } else { 9543 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr + smin_val; 9544 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr + smax_val; 9545 } 9546 if (umin_ptr + umin_val < umin_ptr || 9547 umax_ptr + umax_val < umax_ptr) { 9548 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 9549 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 9550 } else { 9551 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr + umin_val; 9552 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr + umax_val; 9553 } 9554 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off); 9555 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off; 9556 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; 9557 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) { 9558 dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 9559 /* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */ 9560 memset(&dst_reg->raw, 0, sizeof(dst_reg->raw)); 9561 } 9562 break; 9563 case BPF_SUB: 9564 if (dst_reg == off_reg) { 9565 /* scalar -= pointer. Creates an unknown scalar */ 9566 verbose(env, "R%d tried to subtract pointer from scalar\n", 9567 dst); 9568 return -EACCES; 9569 } 9570 /* We don't allow subtraction from FP, because (according to 9571 * test_verifier.c test "invalid fp arithmetic", JITs might not 9572 * be able to deal with it. 9573 */ 9574 if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 9575 verbose(env, "R%d subtraction from stack pointer prohibited\n", 9576 dst); 9577 return -EACCES; 9578 } 9579 if (known && (ptr_reg->off - smin_val == 9580 (s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off - smin_val))) { 9581 /* pointer -= K. Subtract it from fixed offset */ 9582 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr; 9583 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr; 9584 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr; 9585 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr; 9586 dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off; 9587 dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id; 9588 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off - smin_val; 9589 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; 9590 break; 9591 } 9592 /* A new variable offset is created. If the subtrahend is known 9593 * nonnegative, then any reg->range we had before is still good. 9594 */ 9595 if (signed_sub_overflows(smin_ptr, smax_val) || 9596 signed_sub_overflows(smax_ptr, smin_val)) { 9597 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 9598 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 9599 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 9600 } else { 9601 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr - smax_val; 9602 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr - smin_val; 9603 } 9604 if (umin_ptr < umax_val) { 9605 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 9606 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 9607 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 9608 } else { 9609 /* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */ 9610 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr - umax_val; 9611 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr - umin_val; 9612 } 9613 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off); 9614 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off; 9615 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; 9616 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) { 9617 dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 9618 /* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */ 9619 if (smin_val < 0) 9620 memset(&dst_reg->raw, 0, sizeof(dst_reg->raw)); 9621 } 9622 break; 9623 case BPF_AND: 9624 case BPF_OR: 9625 case BPF_XOR: 9626 /* bitwise ops on pointers are troublesome, prohibit. */ 9627 verbose(env, "R%d bitwise operator %s on pointer prohibited\n", 9628 dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); 9629 return -EACCES; 9630 default: 9631 /* other operators (e.g. MUL,LSH) produce non-pointer results */ 9632 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic with %s operator prohibited\n", 9633 dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); 9634 return -EACCES; 9635 } 9636 9637 if (!check_reg_sane_offset(env, dst_reg, ptr_reg->type)) 9638 return -EINVAL; 9639 reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg); 9640 if (sanitize_check_bounds(env, insn, dst_reg) < 0) 9641 return -EACCES; 9642 if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) { 9643 ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, dst_reg, off_reg, dst_reg, 9644 &info, true); 9645 if (ret < 0) 9646 return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg); 9647 } 9648 9649 return 0; 9650 } 9651 9652 static void scalar32_min_max_add(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 9653 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 9654 { 9655 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 9656 s32 smax_val = src_reg->s32_max_value; 9657 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 9658 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 9659 9660 if (signed_add32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_min_value, smin_val) || 9661 signed_add32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_max_value, smax_val)) { 9662 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 9663 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 9664 } else { 9665 dst_reg->s32_min_value += smin_val; 9666 dst_reg->s32_max_value += smax_val; 9667 } 9668 if (dst_reg->u32_min_value + umin_val < umin_val || 9669 dst_reg->u32_max_value + umax_val < umax_val) { 9670 dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0; 9671 dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 9672 } else { 9673 dst_reg->u32_min_value += umin_val; 9674 dst_reg->u32_max_value += umax_val; 9675 } 9676 } 9677 9678 static void scalar_min_max_add(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 9679 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 9680 { 9681 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 9682 s64 smax_val = src_reg->smax_value; 9683 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 9684 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 9685 9686 if (signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smin_val) || 9687 signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smax_val)) { 9688 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 9689 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 9690 } else { 9691 dst_reg->smin_value += smin_val; 9692 dst_reg->smax_value += smax_val; 9693 } 9694 if (dst_reg->umin_value + umin_val < umin_val || 9695 dst_reg->umax_value + umax_val < umax_val) { 9696 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 9697 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 9698 } else { 9699 dst_reg->umin_value += umin_val; 9700 dst_reg->umax_value += umax_val; 9701 } 9702 } 9703 9704 static void scalar32_min_max_sub(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 9705 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 9706 { 9707 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 9708 s32 smax_val = src_reg->s32_max_value; 9709 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 9710 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 9711 9712 if (signed_sub32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_min_value, smax_val) || 9713 signed_sub32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_max_value, smin_val)) { 9714 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 9715 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 9716 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 9717 } else { 9718 dst_reg->s32_min_value -= smax_val; 9719 dst_reg->s32_max_value -= smin_val; 9720 } 9721 if (dst_reg->u32_min_value < umax_val) { 9722 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 9723 dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0; 9724 dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 9725 } else { 9726 /* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */ 9727 dst_reg->u32_min_value -= umax_val; 9728 dst_reg->u32_max_value -= umin_val; 9729 } 9730 } 9731 9732 static void scalar_min_max_sub(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 9733 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 9734 { 9735 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 9736 s64 smax_val = src_reg->smax_value; 9737 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 9738 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 9739 9740 if (signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smax_val) || 9741 signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smin_val)) { 9742 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 9743 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 9744 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 9745 } else { 9746 dst_reg->smin_value -= smax_val; 9747 dst_reg->smax_value -= smin_val; 9748 } 9749 if (dst_reg->umin_value < umax_val) { 9750 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 9751 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 9752 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 9753 } else { 9754 /* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */ 9755 dst_reg->umin_value -= umax_val; 9756 dst_reg->umax_value -= umin_val; 9757 } 9758 } 9759 9760 static void scalar32_min_max_mul(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 9761 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 9762 { 9763 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 9764 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 9765 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 9766 9767 if (smin_val < 0 || dst_reg->s32_min_value < 0) { 9768 /* Ain't nobody got time to multiply that sign */ 9769 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 9770 return; 9771 } 9772 /* Both values are positive, so we can work with unsigned and 9773 * copy the result to signed (unless it exceeds S32_MAX). 9774 */ 9775 if (umax_val > U16_MAX || dst_reg->u32_max_value > U16_MAX) { 9776 /* Potential overflow, we know nothing */ 9777 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 9778 return; 9779 } 9780 dst_reg->u32_min_value *= umin_val; 9781 dst_reg->u32_max_value *= umax_val; 9782 if (dst_reg->u32_max_value > S32_MAX) { 9783 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 9784 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 9785 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 9786 } else { 9787 dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; 9788 dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; 9789 } 9790 } 9791 9792 static void scalar_min_max_mul(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 9793 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 9794 { 9795 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 9796 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 9797 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 9798 9799 if (smin_val < 0 || dst_reg->smin_value < 0) { 9800 /* Ain't nobody got time to multiply that sign */ 9801 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 9802 return; 9803 } 9804 /* Both values are positive, so we can work with unsigned and 9805 * copy the result to signed (unless it exceeds S64_MAX). 9806 */ 9807 if (umax_val > U32_MAX || dst_reg->umax_value > U32_MAX) { 9808 /* Potential overflow, we know nothing */ 9809 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 9810 return; 9811 } 9812 dst_reg->umin_value *= umin_val; 9813 dst_reg->umax_value *= umax_val; 9814 if (dst_reg->umax_value > S64_MAX) { 9815 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 9816 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 9817 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 9818 } else { 9819 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; 9820 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; 9821 } 9822 } 9823 9824 static void scalar32_min_max_and(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 9825 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 9826 { 9827 bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 9828 bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 9829 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 9830 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 9831 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 9832 9833 if (src_known && dst_known) { 9834 __mark_reg32_known(dst_reg, var32_off.value); 9835 return; 9836 } 9837 9838 /* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently 9839 * bitwise. Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima. 9840 */ 9841 dst_reg->u32_min_value = var32_off.value; 9842 dst_reg->u32_max_value = min(dst_reg->u32_max_value, umax_val); 9843 if (dst_reg->s32_min_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) { 9844 /* Lose signed bounds when ANDing negative numbers, 9845 * ain't nobody got time for that. 9846 */ 9847 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 9848 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 9849 } else { 9850 /* ANDing two positives gives a positive, so safe to 9851 * cast result into s64. 9852 */ 9853 dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; 9854 dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; 9855 } 9856 } 9857 9858 static void scalar_min_max_and(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 9859 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 9860 { 9861 bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 9862 bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 9863 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 9864 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 9865 9866 if (src_known && dst_known) { 9867 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value); 9868 return; 9869 } 9870 9871 /* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently 9872 * bitwise. Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima. 9873 */ 9874 dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value; 9875 dst_reg->umax_value = min(dst_reg->umax_value, umax_val); 9876 if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) { 9877 /* Lose signed bounds when ANDing negative numbers, 9878 * ain't nobody got time for that. 9879 */ 9880 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 9881 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 9882 } else { 9883 /* ANDing two positives gives a positive, so safe to 9884 * cast result into s64. 9885 */ 9886 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; 9887 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; 9888 } 9889 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */ 9890 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 9891 } 9892 9893 static void scalar32_min_max_or(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 9894 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 9895 { 9896 bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 9897 bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 9898 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 9899 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 9900 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 9901 9902 if (src_known && dst_known) { 9903 __mark_reg32_known(dst_reg, var32_off.value); 9904 return; 9905 } 9906 9907 /* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the 9908 * maximum of the operands' minima 9909 */ 9910 dst_reg->u32_min_value = max(dst_reg->u32_min_value, umin_val); 9911 dst_reg->u32_max_value = var32_off.value | var32_off.mask; 9912 if (dst_reg->s32_min_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) { 9913 /* Lose signed bounds when ORing negative numbers, 9914 * ain't nobody got time for that. 9915 */ 9916 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 9917 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 9918 } else { 9919 /* ORing two positives gives a positive, so safe to 9920 * cast result into s64. 9921 */ 9922 dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; 9923 dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; 9924 } 9925 } 9926 9927 static void scalar_min_max_or(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 9928 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 9929 { 9930 bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 9931 bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 9932 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 9933 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 9934 9935 if (src_known && dst_known) { 9936 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value); 9937 return; 9938 } 9939 9940 /* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the 9941 * maximum of the operands' minima 9942 */ 9943 dst_reg->umin_value = max(dst_reg->umin_value, umin_val); 9944 dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value | dst_reg->var_off.mask; 9945 if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) { 9946 /* Lose signed bounds when ORing negative numbers, 9947 * ain't nobody got time for that. 9948 */ 9949 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 9950 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 9951 } else { 9952 /* ORing two positives gives a positive, so safe to 9953 * cast result into s64. 9954 */ 9955 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; 9956 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; 9957 } 9958 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */ 9959 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 9960 } 9961 9962 static void scalar32_min_max_xor(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 9963 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 9964 { 9965 bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 9966 bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 9967 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 9968 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 9969 9970 if (src_known && dst_known) { 9971 __mark_reg32_known(dst_reg, var32_off.value); 9972 return; 9973 } 9974 9975 /* We get both minimum and maximum from the var32_off. */ 9976 dst_reg->u32_min_value = var32_off.value; 9977 dst_reg->u32_max_value = var32_off.value | var32_off.mask; 9978 9979 if (dst_reg->s32_min_value >= 0 && smin_val >= 0) { 9980 /* XORing two positive sign numbers gives a positive, 9981 * so safe to cast u32 result into s32. 9982 */ 9983 dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; 9984 dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; 9985 } else { 9986 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 9987 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 9988 } 9989 } 9990 9991 static void scalar_min_max_xor(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 9992 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 9993 { 9994 bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 9995 bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 9996 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 9997 9998 if (src_known && dst_known) { 9999 /* dst_reg->var_off.value has been updated earlier */ 10000 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value); 10001 return; 10002 } 10003 10004 /* We get both minimum and maximum from the var_off. */ 10005 dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value; 10006 dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value | dst_reg->var_off.mask; 10007 10008 if (dst_reg->smin_value >= 0 && smin_val >= 0) { 10009 /* XORing two positive sign numbers gives a positive, 10010 * so safe to cast u64 result into s64. 10011 */ 10012 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; 10013 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; 10014 } else { 10015 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 10016 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 10017 } 10018 10019 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 10020 } 10021 10022 static void __scalar32_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10023 u64 umin_val, u64 umax_val) 10024 { 10025 /* We lose all sign bit information (except what we can pick 10026 * up from var_off) 10027 */ 10028 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 10029 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 10030 /* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */ 10031 if (umax_val > 31 || dst_reg->u32_max_value > 1ULL << (31 - umax_val)) { 10032 dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0; 10033 dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 10034 } else { 10035 dst_reg->u32_min_value <<= umin_val; 10036 dst_reg->u32_max_value <<= umax_val; 10037 } 10038 } 10039 10040 static void scalar32_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10041 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 10042 { 10043 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 10044 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 10045 /* u32 alu operation will zext upper bits */ 10046 struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 10047 10048 __scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val); 10049 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(tnum_lshift(subreg, umin_val)); 10050 /* Not required but being careful mark reg64 bounds as unknown so 10051 * that we are forced to pick them up from tnum and zext later and 10052 * if some path skips this step we are still safe. 10053 */ 10054 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 10055 __update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg); 10056 } 10057 10058 static void __scalar64_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10059 u64 umin_val, u64 umax_val) 10060 { 10061 /* Special case <<32 because it is a common compiler pattern to sign 10062 * extend subreg by doing <<32 s>>32. In this case if 32bit bounds are 10063 * positive we know this shift will also be positive so we can track 10064 * bounds correctly. Otherwise we lose all sign bit information except 10065 * what we can pick up from var_off. Perhaps we can generalize this 10066 * later to shifts of any length. 10067 */ 10068 if (umin_val == 32 && umax_val == 32 && dst_reg->s32_max_value >= 0) 10069 dst_reg->smax_value = (s64)dst_reg->s32_max_value << 32; 10070 else 10071 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 10072 10073 if (umin_val == 32 && umax_val == 32 && dst_reg->s32_min_value >= 0) 10074 dst_reg->smin_value = (s64)dst_reg->s32_min_value << 32; 10075 else 10076 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 10077 10078 /* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */ 10079 if (dst_reg->umax_value > 1ULL << (63 - umax_val)) { 10080 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 10081 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 10082 } else { 10083 dst_reg->umin_value <<= umin_val; 10084 dst_reg->umax_value <<= umax_val; 10085 } 10086 } 10087 10088 static void scalar_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10089 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 10090 { 10091 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 10092 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 10093 10094 /* scalar64 calc uses 32bit unshifted bounds so must be called first */ 10095 __scalar64_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val); 10096 __scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val); 10097 10098 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_lshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val); 10099 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */ 10100 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 10101 } 10102 10103 static void scalar32_min_max_rsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10104 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 10105 { 10106 struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 10107 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 10108 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 10109 10110 /* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift. If the value in dst_reg might 10111 * be negative, then either: 10112 * 1) src_reg might be zero, so the sign bit of the result is 10113 * unknown, so we lose our signed bounds 10114 * 2) it's known negative, thus the unsigned bounds capture the 10115 * signed bounds 10116 * 3) the signed bounds cross zero, so they tell us nothing 10117 * about the result 10118 * If the value in dst_reg is known nonnegative, then again the 10119 * unsigned bounds capture the signed bounds. 10120 * Thus, in all cases it suffices to blow away our signed bounds 10121 * and rely on inferring new ones from the unsigned bounds and 10122 * var_off of the result. 10123 */ 10124 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 10125 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 10126 10127 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(subreg, umin_val); 10128 dst_reg->u32_min_value >>= umax_val; 10129 dst_reg->u32_max_value >>= umin_val; 10130 10131 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 10132 __update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg); 10133 } 10134 10135 static void scalar_min_max_rsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10136 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 10137 { 10138 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 10139 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 10140 10141 /* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift. If the value in dst_reg might 10142 * be negative, then either: 10143 * 1) src_reg might be zero, so the sign bit of the result is 10144 * unknown, so we lose our signed bounds 10145 * 2) it's known negative, thus the unsigned bounds capture the 10146 * signed bounds 10147 * 3) the signed bounds cross zero, so they tell us nothing 10148 * about the result 10149 * If the value in dst_reg is known nonnegative, then again the 10150 * unsigned bounds capture the signed bounds. 10151 * Thus, in all cases it suffices to blow away our signed bounds 10152 * and rely on inferring new ones from the unsigned bounds and 10153 * var_off of the result. 10154 */ 10155 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 10156 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 10157 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val); 10158 dst_reg->umin_value >>= umax_val; 10159 dst_reg->umax_value >>= umin_val; 10160 10161 /* Its not easy to operate on alu32 bounds here because it depends 10162 * on bits being shifted in. Take easy way out and mark unbounded 10163 * so we can recalculate later from tnum. 10164 */ 10165 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 10166 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 10167 } 10168 10169 static void scalar32_min_max_arsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10170 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 10171 { 10172 u64 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 10173 10174 /* Upon reaching here, src_known is true and 10175 * umax_val is equal to umin_val. 10176 */ 10177 dst_reg->s32_min_value = (u32)(((s32)dst_reg->s32_min_value) >> umin_val); 10178 dst_reg->s32_max_value = (u32)(((s32)dst_reg->s32_max_value) >> umin_val); 10179 10180 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_arshift(tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off), umin_val, 32); 10181 10182 /* blow away the dst_reg umin_value/umax_value and rely on 10183 * dst_reg var_off to refine the result. 10184 */ 10185 dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0; 10186 dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 10187 10188 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 10189 __update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg); 10190 } 10191 10192 static void scalar_min_max_arsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10193 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 10194 { 10195 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 10196 10197 /* Upon reaching here, src_known is true and umax_val is equal 10198 * to umin_val. 10199 */ 10200 dst_reg->smin_value >>= umin_val; 10201 dst_reg->smax_value >>= umin_val; 10202 10203 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_arshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val, 64); 10204 10205 /* blow away the dst_reg umin_value/umax_value and rely on 10206 * dst_reg var_off to refine the result. 10207 */ 10208 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 10209 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 10210 10211 /* Its not easy to operate on alu32 bounds here because it depends 10212 * on bits being shifted in from upper 32-bits. Take easy way out 10213 * and mark unbounded so we can recalculate later from tnum. 10214 */ 10215 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 10216 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 10217 } 10218 10219 /* WARNING: This function does calculations on 64-bit values, but the actual 10220 * execution may occur on 32-bit values. Therefore, things like bitshifts 10221 * need extra checks in the 32-bit case. 10222 */ 10223 static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10224 struct bpf_insn *insn, 10225 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10226 struct bpf_reg_state src_reg) 10227 { 10228 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 10229 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 10230 bool src_known; 10231 s64 smin_val, smax_val; 10232 u64 umin_val, umax_val; 10233 s32 s32_min_val, s32_max_val; 10234 u32 u32_min_val, u32_max_val; 10235 u64 insn_bitness = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) ? 64 : 32; 10236 bool alu32 = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64); 10237 int ret; 10238 10239 smin_val = src_reg.smin_value; 10240 smax_val = src_reg.smax_value; 10241 umin_val = src_reg.umin_value; 10242 umax_val = src_reg.umax_value; 10243 10244 s32_min_val = src_reg.s32_min_value; 10245 s32_max_val = src_reg.s32_max_value; 10246 u32_min_val = src_reg.u32_min_value; 10247 u32_max_val = src_reg.u32_max_value; 10248 10249 if (alu32) { 10250 src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg.var_off); 10251 if ((src_known && 10252 (s32_min_val != s32_max_val || u32_min_val != u32_max_val)) || 10253 s32_min_val > s32_max_val || u32_min_val > u32_max_val) { 10254 /* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds 10255 * derived from e.g. dead branches. 10256 */ 10257 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 10258 return 0; 10259 } 10260 } else { 10261 src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg.var_off); 10262 if ((src_known && 10263 (smin_val != smax_val || umin_val != umax_val)) || 10264 smin_val > smax_val || umin_val > umax_val) { 10265 /* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds 10266 * derived from e.g. dead branches. 10267 */ 10268 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 10269 return 0; 10270 } 10271 } 10272 10273 if (!src_known && 10274 opcode != BPF_ADD && opcode != BPF_SUB && opcode != BPF_AND) { 10275 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 10276 return 0; 10277 } 10278 10279 if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) { 10280 ret = sanitize_val_alu(env, insn); 10281 if (ret < 0) 10282 return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, NULL, NULL); 10283 } 10284 10285 /* Calculate sign/unsigned bounds and tnum for alu32 and alu64 bit ops. 10286 * There are two classes of instructions: The first class we track both 10287 * alu32 and alu64 sign/unsigned bounds independently this provides the 10288 * greatest amount of precision when alu operations are mixed with jmp32 10289 * operations. These operations are BPF_ADD, BPF_SUB, BPF_MUL, BPF_ADD, 10290 * and BPF_OR. This is possible because these ops have fairly easy to 10291 * understand and calculate behavior in both 32-bit and 64-bit alu ops. 10292 * See alu32 verifier tests for examples. The second class of 10293 * operations, BPF_LSH, BPF_RSH, and BPF_ARSH, however are not so easy 10294 * with regards to tracking sign/unsigned bounds because the bits may 10295 * cross subreg boundaries in the alu64 case. When this happens we mark 10296 * the reg unbounded in the subreg bound space and use the resulting 10297 * tnum to calculate an approximation of the sign/unsigned bounds. 10298 */ 10299 switch (opcode) { 10300 case BPF_ADD: 10301 scalar32_min_max_add(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10302 scalar_min_max_add(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10303 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 10304 break; 10305 case BPF_SUB: 10306 scalar32_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10307 scalar_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10308 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 10309 break; 10310 case BPF_MUL: 10311 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_mul(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 10312 scalar32_min_max_mul(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10313 scalar_min_max_mul(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10314 break; 10315 case BPF_AND: 10316 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_and(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 10317 scalar32_min_max_and(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10318 scalar_min_max_and(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10319 break; 10320 case BPF_OR: 10321 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_or(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 10322 scalar32_min_max_or(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10323 scalar_min_max_or(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10324 break; 10325 case BPF_XOR: 10326 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_xor(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 10327 scalar32_min_max_xor(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10328 scalar_min_max_xor(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10329 break; 10330 case BPF_LSH: 10331 if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) { 10332 /* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined. 10333 * This includes shifts by a negative number. 10334 */ 10335 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 10336 break; 10337 } 10338 if (alu32) 10339 scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10340 else 10341 scalar_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10342 break; 10343 case BPF_RSH: 10344 if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) { 10345 /* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined. 10346 * This includes shifts by a negative number. 10347 */ 10348 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 10349 break; 10350 } 10351 if (alu32) 10352 scalar32_min_max_rsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10353 else 10354 scalar_min_max_rsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10355 break; 10356 case BPF_ARSH: 10357 if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) { 10358 /* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined. 10359 * This includes shifts by a negative number. 10360 */ 10361 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 10362 break; 10363 } 10364 if (alu32) 10365 scalar32_min_max_arsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10366 else 10367 scalar_min_max_arsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10368 break; 10369 default: 10370 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 10371 break; 10372 } 10373 10374 /* ALU32 ops are zero extended into 64bit register */ 10375 if (alu32) 10376 zext_32_to_64(dst_reg); 10377 reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg); 10378 return 0; 10379 } 10380 10381 /* Handles ALU ops other than BPF_END, BPF_NEG and BPF_MOV: computes new min/max 10382 * and var_off. 10383 */ 10384 static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10385 struct bpf_insn *insn) 10386 { 10387 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 10388 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 10389 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *dst_reg, *src_reg; 10390 struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, off_reg = {0}; 10391 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 10392 int err; 10393 10394 dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg]; 10395 src_reg = NULL; 10396 if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 10397 ptr_reg = dst_reg; 10398 else 10399 /* Make sure ID is cleared otherwise dst_reg min/max could be 10400 * incorrectly propagated into other registers by find_equal_scalars() 10401 */ 10402 dst_reg->id = 0; 10403 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 10404 src_reg = ®s[insn->src_reg]; 10405 if (src_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 10406 if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 10407 /* Combining two pointers by any ALU op yields 10408 * an arbitrary scalar. Disallow all math except 10409 * pointer subtraction 10410 */ 10411 if (opcode == BPF_SUB && env->allow_ptr_leaks) { 10412 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 10413 return 0; 10414 } 10415 verbose(env, "R%d pointer %s pointer prohibited\n", 10416 insn->dst_reg, 10417 bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); 10418 return -EACCES; 10419 } else { 10420 /* scalar += pointer 10421 * This is legal, but we have to reverse our 10422 * src/dest handling in computing the range 10423 */ 10424 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->dst_reg); 10425 if (err) 10426 return err; 10427 return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, 10428 src_reg, dst_reg); 10429 } 10430 } else if (ptr_reg) { 10431 /* pointer += scalar */ 10432 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg); 10433 if (err) 10434 return err; 10435 return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, 10436 dst_reg, src_reg); 10437 } else if (dst_reg->precise) { 10438 /* if dst_reg is precise, src_reg should be precise as well */ 10439 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg); 10440 if (err) 10441 return err; 10442 } 10443 } else { 10444 /* Pretend the src is a reg with a known value, since we only 10445 * need to be able to read from this state. 10446 */ 10447 off_reg.type = SCALAR_VALUE; 10448 __mark_reg_known(&off_reg, insn->imm); 10449 src_reg = &off_reg; 10450 if (ptr_reg) /* pointer += K */ 10451 return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, 10452 ptr_reg, src_reg); 10453 } 10454 10455 /* Got here implies adding two SCALAR_VALUEs */ 10456 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ptr_reg)) { 10457 print_verifier_state(env, state, true); 10458 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected ptr_reg\n"); 10459 return -EINVAL; 10460 } 10461 if (WARN_ON(!src_reg)) { 10462 print_verifier_state(env, state, true); 10463 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no src_reg\n"); 10464 return -EINVAL; 10465 } 10466 return adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(env, insn, dst_reg, *src_reg); 10467 } 10468 10469 /* check validity of 32-bit and 64-bit arithmetic operations */ 10470 static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 10471 { 10472 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 10473 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 10474 int err; 10475 10476 if (opcode == BPF_END || opcode == BPF_NEG) { 10477 if (opcode == BPF_NEG) { 10478 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || 10479 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 10480 insn->off != 0 || insn->imm != 0) { 10481 verbose(env, "BPF_NEG uses reserved fields\n"); 10482 return -EINVAL; 10483 } 10484 } else { 10485 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 || 10486 (insn->imm != 16 && insn->imm != 32 && insn->imm != 64) || 10487 BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) { 10488 verbose(env, "BPF_END uses reserved fields\n"); 10489 return -EINVAL; 10490 } 10491 } 10492 10493 /* check src operand */ 10494 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 10495 if (err) 10496 return err; 10497 10498 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) { 10499 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n", 10500 insn->dst_reg); 10501 return -EACCES; 10502 } 10503 10504 /* check dest operand */ 10505 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP); 10506 if (err) 10507 return err; 10508 10509 } else if (opcode == BPF_MOV) { 10510 10511 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 10512 if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) { 10513 verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n"); 10514 return -EINVAL; 10515 } 10516 10517 /* check src operand */ 10518 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 10519 if (err) 10520 return err; 10521 } else { 10522 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) { 10523 verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n"); 10524 return -EINVAL; 10525 } 10526 } 10527 10528 /* check dest operand, mark as required later */ 10529 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK); 10530 if (err) 10531 return err; 10532 10533 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 10534 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg = regs + insn->src_reg; 10535 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg = regs + insn->dst_reg; 10536 10537 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) { 10538 /* case: R1 = R2 10539 * copy register state to dest reg 10540 */ 10541 if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && !src_reg->id) 10542 /* Assign src and dst registers the same ID 10543 * that will be used by find_equal_scalars() 10544 * to propagate min/max range. 10545 */ 10546 src_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 10547 *dst_reg = *src_reg; 10548 dst_reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 10549 dst_reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 10550 } else { 10551 /* R1 = (u32) R2 */ 10552 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { 10553 verbose(env, 10554 "R%d partial copy of pointer\n", 10555 insn->src_reg); 10556 return -EACCES; 10557 } else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 10558 *dst_reg = *src_reg; 10559 /* Make sure ID is cleared otherwise 10560 * dst_reg min/max could be incorrectly 10561 * propagated into src_reg by find_equal_scalars() 10562 */ 10563 dst_reg->id = 0; 10564 dst_reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 10565 dst_reg->subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1; 10566 } else { 10567 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, 10568 insn->dst_reg); 10569 } 10570 zext_32_to_64(dst_reg); 10571 reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg); 10572 } 10573 } else { 10574 /* case: R = imm 10575 * remember the value we stored into this reg 10576 */ 10577 /* clear any state __mark_reg_known doesn't set */ 10578 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 10579 regs[insn->dst_reg].type = SCALAR_VALUE; 10580 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) { 10581 __mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg, 10582 insn->imm); 10583 } else { 10584 __mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg, 10585 (u32)insn->imm); 10586 } 10587 } 10588 10589 } else if (opcode > BPF_END) { 10590 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_ALU opcode %x\n", opcode); 10591 return -EINVAL; 10592 10593 } else { /* all other ALU ops: and, sub, xor, add, ... */ 10594 10595 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 10596 if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) { 10597 verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n"); 10598 return -EINVAL; 10599 } 10600 /* check src1 operand */ 10601 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 10602 if (err) 10603 return err; 10604 } else { 10605 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) { 10606 verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n"); 10607 return -EINVAL; 10608 } 10609 } 10610 10611 /* check src2 operand */ 10612 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 10613 if (err) 10614 return err; 10615 10616 if ((opcode == BPF_MOD || opcode == BPF_DIV) && 10617 BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && insn->imm == 0) { 10618 verbose(env, "div by zero\n"); 10619 return -EINVAL; 10620 } 10621 10622 if ((opcode == BPF_LSH || opcode == BPF_RSH || 10623 opcode == BPF_ARSH) && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) { 10624 int size = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 ? 64 : 32; 10625 10626 if (insn->imm < 0 || insn->imm >= size) { 10627 verbose(env, "invalid shift %d\n", insn->imm); 10628 return -EINVAL; 10629 } 10630 } 10631 10632 /* check dest operand */ 10633 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK); 10634 if (err) 10635 return err; 10636 10637 return adjust_reg_min_max_vals(env, insn); 10638 } 10639 10640 return 0; 10641 } 10642 10643 static void find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, 10644 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10645 enum bpf_reg_type type, 10646 bool range_right_open) 10647 { 10648 struct bpf_func_state *state; 10649 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 10650 int new_range; 10651 10652 if (dst_reg->off < 0 || 10653 (dst_reg->off == 0 && range_right_open)) 10654 /* This doesn't give us any range */ 10655 return; 10656 10657 if (dst_reg->umax_value > MAX_PACKET_OFF || 10658 dst_reg->umax_value + dst_reg->off > MAX_PACKET_OFF) 10659 /* Risk of overflow. For instance, ptr + (1<<63) may be less 10660 * than pkt_end, but that's because it's also less than pkt. 10661 */ 10662 return; 10663 10664 new_range = dst_reg->off; 10665 if (range_right_open) 10666 new_range++; 10667 10668 /* Examples for register markings: 10669 * 10670 * pkt_data in dst register: 10671 * 10672 * r2 = r3; 10673 * r2 += 8; 10674 * if (r2 > pkt_end) goto <handle exception> 10675 * <access okay> 10676 * 10677 * r2 = r3; 10678 * r2 += 8; 10679 * if (r2 < pkt_end) goto <access okay> 10680 * <handle exception> 10681 * 10682 * Where: 10683 * r2 == dst_reg, pkt_end == src_reg 10684 * r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0) 10685 * r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0) 10686 * 10687 * pkt_data in src register: 10688 * 10689 * r2 = r3; 10690 * r2 += 8; 10691 * if (pkt_end >= r2) goto <access okay> 10692 * <handle exception> 10693 * 10694 * r2 = r3; 10695 * r2 += 8; 10696 * if (pkt_end <= r2) goto <handle exception> 10697 * <access okay> 10698 * 10699 * Where: 10700 * pkt_end == dst_reg, r2 == src_reg 10701 * r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0) 10702 * r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0) 10703 * 10704 * Find register r3 and mark its range as r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8) 10705 * or r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8-1), so that range of bytes [r3, r3 + 8) 10706 * and [r3, r3 + 8-1) respectively is safe to access depending on 10707 * the check. 10708 */ 10709 10710 /* If our ids match, then we must have the same max_value. And we 10711 * don't care about the other reg's fixed offset, since if it's too big 10712 * the range won't allow anything. 10713 * dst_reg->off is known < MAX_PACKET_OFF, therefore it fits in a u16. 10714 */ 10715 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(vstate, state, reg, ({ 10716 if (reg->type == type && reg->id == dst_reg->id) 10717 /* keep the maximum range already checked */ 10718 reg->range = max(reg->range, new_range); 10719 })); 10720 } 10721 10722 static int is_branch32_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 val, u8 opcode) 10723 { 10724 struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off); 10725 s32 sval = (s32)val; 10726 10727 switch (opcode) { 10728 case BPF_JEQ: 10729 if (tnum_is_const(subreg)) 10730 return !!tnum_equals_const(subreg, val); 10731 break; 10732 case BPF_JNE: 10733 if (tnum_is_const(subreg)) 10734 return !tnum_equals_const(subreg, val); 10735 break; 10736 case BPF_JSET: 10737 if ((~subreg.mask & subreg.value) & val) 10738 return 1; 10739 if (!((subreg.mask | subreg.value) & val)) 10740 return 0; 10741 break; 10742 case BPF_JGT: 10743 if (reg->u32_min_value > val) 10744 return 1; 10745 else if (reg->u32_max_value <= val) 10746 return 0; 10747 break; 10748 case BPF_JSGT: 10749 if (reg->s32_min_value > sval) 10750 return 1; 10751 else if (reg->s32_max_value <= sval) 10752 return 0; 10753 break; 10754 case BPF_JLT: 10755 if (reg->u32_max_value < val) 10756 return 1; 10757 else if (reg->u32_min_value >= val) 10758 return 0; 10759 break; 10760 case BPF_JSLT: 10761 if (reg->s32_max_value < sval) 10762 return 1; 10763 else if (reg->s32_min_value >= sval) 10764 return 0; 10765 break; 10766 case BPF_JGE: 10767 if (reg->u32_min_value >= val) 10768 return 1; 10769 else if (reg->u32_max_value < val) 10770 return 0; 10771 break; 10772 case BPF_JSGE: 10773 if (reg->s32_min_value >= sval) 10774 return 1; 10775 else if (reg->s32_max_value < sval) 10776 return 0; 10777 break; 10778 case BPF_JLE: 10779 if (reg->u32_max_value <= val) 10780 return 1; 10781 else if (reg->u32_min_value > val) 10782 return 0; 10783 break; 10784 case BPF_JSLE: 10785 if (reg->s32_max_value <= sval) 10786 return 1; 10787 else if (reg->s32_min_value > sval) 10788 return 0; 10789 break; 10790 } 10791 10792 return -1; 10793 } 10794 10795 10796 static int is_branch64_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 val, u8 opcode) 10797 { 10798 s64 sval = (s64)val; 10799 10800 switch (opcode) { 10801 case BPF_JEQ: 10802 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 10803 return !!tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, val); 10804 break; 10805 case BPF_JNE: 10806 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 10807 return !tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, val); 10808 break; 10809 case BPF_JSET: 10810 if ((~reg->var_off.mask & reg->var_off.value) & val) 10811 return 1; 10812 if (!((reg->var_off.mask | reg->var_off.value) & val)) 10813 return 0; 10814 break; 10815 case BPF_JGT: 10816 if (reg->umin_value > val) 10817 return 1; 10818 else if (reg->umax_value <= val) 10819 return 0; 10820 break; 10821 case BPF_JSGT: 10822 if (reg->smin_value > sval) 10823 return 1; 10824 else if (reg->smax_value <= sval) 10825 return 0; 10826 break; 10827 case BPF_JLT: 10828 if (reg->umax_value < val) 10829 return 1; 10830 else if (reg->umin_value >= val) 10831 return 0; 10832 break; 10833 case BPF_JSLT: 10834 if (reg->smax_value < sval) 10835 return 1; 10836 else if (reg->smin_value >= sval) 10837 return 0; 10838 break; 10839 case BPF_JGE: 10840 if (reg->umin_value >= val) 10841 return 1; 10842 else if (reg->umax_value < val) 10843 return 0; 10844 break; 10845 case BPF_JSGE: 10846 if (reg->smin_value >= sval) 10847 return 1; 10848 else if (reg->smax_value < sval) 10849 return 0; 10850 break; 10851 case BPF_JLE: 10852 if (reg->umax_value <= val) 10853 return 1; 10854 else if (reg->umin_value > val) 10855 return 0; 10856 break; 10857 case BPF_JSLE: 10858 if (reg->smax_value <= sval) 10859 return 1; 10860 else if (reg->smin_value > sval) 10861 return 0; 10862 break; 10863 } 10864 10865 return -1; 10866 } 10867 10868 /* compute branch direction of the expression "if (reg opcode val) goto target;" 10869 * and return: 10870 * 1 - branch will be taken and "goto target" will be executed 10871 * 0 - branch will not be taken and fall-through to next insn 10872 * -1 - unknown. Example: "if (reg < 5)" is unknown when register value 10873 * range [0,10] 10874 */ 10875 static int is_branch_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 val, u8 opcode, 10876 bool is_jmp32) 10877 { 10878 if (__is_pointer_value(false, reg)) { 10879 if (!reg_type_not_null(reg->type)) 10880 return -1; 10881 10882 /* If pointer is valid tests against zero will fail so we can 10883 * use this to direct branch taken. 10884 */ 10885 if (val != 0) 10886 return -1; 10887 10888 switch (opcode) { 10889 case BPF_JEQ: 10890 return 0; 10891 case BPF_JNE: 10892 return 1; 10893 default: 10894 return -1; 10895 } 10896 } 10897 10898 if (is_jmp32) 10899 return is_branch32_taken(reg, val, opcode); 10900 return is_branch64_taken(reg, val, opcode); 10901 } 10902 10903 static int flip_opcode(u32 opcode) 10904 { 10905 /* How can we transform "a <op> b" into "b <op> a"? */ 10906 static const u8 opcode_flip[16] = { 10907 /* these stay the same */ 10908 [BPF_JEQ >> 4] = BPF_JEQ, 10909 [BPF_JNE >> 4] = BPF_JNE, 10910 [BPF_JSET >> 4] = BPF_JSET, 10911 /* these swap "lesser" and "greater" (L and G in the opcodes) */ 10912 [BPF_JGE >> 4] = BPF_JLE, 10913 [BPF_JGT >> 4] = BPF_JLT, 10914 [BPF_JLE >> 4] = BPF_JGE, 10915 [BPF_JLT >> 4] = BPF_JGT, 10916 [BPF_JSGE >> 4] = BPF_JSLE, 10917 [BPF_JSGT >> 4] = BPF_JSLT, 10918 [BPF_JSLE >> 4] = BPF_JSGE, 10919 [BPF_JSLT >> 4] = BPF_JSGT 10920 }; 10921 return opcode_flip[opcode >> 4]; 10922 } 10923 10924 static int is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10925 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg, 10926 u8 opcode) 10927 { 10928 struct bpf_reg_state *pkt; 10929 10930 if (src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) { 10931 pkt = dst_reg; 10932 } else if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) { 10933 pkt = src_reg; 10934 opcode = flip_opcode(opcode); 10935 } else { 10936 return -1; 10937 } 10938 10939 if (pkt->range >= 0) 10940 return -1; 10941 10942 switch (opcode) { 10943 case BPF_JLE: 10944 /* pkt <= pkt_end */ 10945 fallthrough; 10946 case BPF_JGT: 10947 /* pkt > pkt_end */ 10948 if (pkt->range == BEYOND_PKT_END) 10949 /* pkt has at last one extra byte beyond pkt_end */ 10950 return opcode == BPF_JGT; 10951 break; 10952 case BPF_JLT: 10953 /* pkt < pkt_end */ 10954 fallthrough; 10955 case BPF_JGE: 10956 /* pkt >= pkt_end */ 10957 if (pkt->range == BEYOND_PKT_END || pkt->range == AT_PKT_END) 10958 return opcode == BPF_JGE; 10959 break; 10960 } 10961 return -1; 10962 } 10963 10964 /* Adjusts the register min/max values in the case that the dst_reg is the 10965 * variable register that we are working on, and src_reg is a constant or we're 10966 * simply doing a BPF_K check. 10967 * In JEQ/JNE cases we also adjust the var_off values. 10968 */ 10969 static void reg_set_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg, 10970 struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg, 10971 u64 val, u32 val32, 10972 u8 opcode, bool is_jmp32) 10973 { 10974 struct tnum false_32off = tnum_subreg(false_reg->var_off); 10975 struct tnum false_64off = false_reg->var_off; 10976 struct tnum true_32off = tnum_subreg(true_reg->var_off); 10977 struct tnum true_64off = true_reg->var_off; 10978 s64 sval = (s64)val; 10979 s32 sval32 = (s32)val32; 10980 10981 /* If the dst_reg is a pointer, we can't learn anything about its 10982 * variable offset from the compare (unless src_reg were a pointer into 10983 * the same object, but we don't bother with that. 10984 * Since false_reg and true_reg have the same type by construction, we 10985 * only need to check one of them for pointerness. 10986 */ 10987 if (__is_pointer_value(false, false_reg)) 10988 return; 10989 10990 switch (opcode) { 10991 /* JEQ/JNE comparison doesn't change the register equivalence. 10992 * 10993 * r1 = r2; 10994 * if (r1 == 42) goto label; 10995 * ... 10996 * label: // here both r1 and r2 are known to be 42. 10997 * 10998 * Hence when marking register as known preserve it's ID. 10999 */ 11000 case BPF_JEQ: 11001 if (is_jmp32) { 11002 __mark_reg32_known(true_reg, val32); 11003 true_32off = tnum_subreg(true_reg->var_off); 11004 } else { 11005 ___mark_reg_known(true_reg, val); 11006 true_64off = true_reg->var_off; 11007 } 11008 break; 11009 case BPF_JNE: 11010 if (is_jmp32) { 11011 __mark_reg32_known(false_reg, val32); 11012 false_32off = tnum_subreg(false_reg->var_off); 11013 } else { 11014 ___mark_reg_known(false_reg, val); 11015 false_64off = false_reg->var_off; 11016 } 11017 break; 11018 case BPF_JSET: 11019 if (is_jmp32) { 11020 false_32off = tnum_and(false_32off, tnum_const(~val32)); 11021 if (is_power_of_2(val32)) 11022 true_32off = tnum_or(true_32off, 11023 tnum_const(val32)); 11024 } else { 11025 false_64off = tnum_and(false_64off, tnum_const(~val)); 11026 if (is_power_of_2(val)) 11027 true_64off = tnum_or(true_64off, 11028 tnum_const(val)); 11029 } 11030 break; 11031 case BPF_JGE: 11032 case BPF_JGT: 11033 { 11034 if (is_jmp32) { 11035 u32 false_umax = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val32 : val32 - 1; 11036 u32 true_umin = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val32 + 1 : val32; 11037 11038 false_reg->u32_max_value = min(false_reg->u32_max_value, 11039 false_umax); 11040 true_reg->u32_min_value = max(true_reg->u32_min_value, 11041 true_umin); 11042 } else { 11043 u64 false_umax = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val : val - 1; 11044 u64 true_umin = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val + 1 : val; 11045 11046 false_reg->umax_value = min(false_reg->umax_value, false_umax); 11047 true_reg->umin_value = max(true_reg->umin_value, true_umin); 11048 } 11049 break; 11050 } 11051 case BPF_JSGE: 11052 case BPF_JSGT: 11053 { 11054 if (is_jmp32) { 11055 s32 false_smax = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval32 : sval32 - 1; 11056 s32 true_smin = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval32 + 1 : sval32; 11057 11058 false_reg->s32_max_value = min(false_reg->s32_max_value, false_smax); 11059 true_reg->s32_min_value = max(true_reg->s32_min_value, true_smin); 11060 } else { 11061 s64 false_smax = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval : sval - 1; 11062 s64 true_smin = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval + 1 : sval; 11063 11064 false_reg->smax_value = min(false_reg->smax_value, false_smax); 11065 true_reg->smin_value = max(true_reg->smin_value, true_smin); 11066 } 11067 break; 11068 } 11069 case BPF_JLE: 11070 case BPF_JLT: 11071 { 11072 if (is_jmp32) { 11073 u32 false_umin = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val32 : val32 + 1; 11074 u32 true_umax = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val32 - 1 : val32; 11075 11076 false_reg->u32_min_value = max(false_reg->u32_min_value, 11077 false_umin); 11078 true_reg->u32_max_value = min(true_reg->u32_max_value, 11079 true_umax); 11080 } else { 11081 u64 false_umin = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val : val + 1; 11082 u64 true_umax = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val - 1 : val; 11083 11084 false_reg->umin_value = max(false_reg->umin_value, false_umin); 11085 true_reg->umax_value = min(true_reg->umax_value, true_umax); 11086 } 11087 break; 11088 } 11089 case BPF_JSLE: 11090 case BPF_JSLT: 11091 { 11092 if (is_jmp32) { 11093 s32 false_smin = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval32 : sval32 + 1; 11094 s32 true_smax = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval32 - 1 : sval32; 11095 11096 false_reg->s32_min_value = max(false_reg->s32_min_value, false_smin); 11097 true_reg->s32_max_value = min(true_reg->s32_max_value, true_smax); 11098 } else { 11099 s64 false_smin = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval : sval + 1; 11100 s64 true_smax = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval - 1 : sval; 11101 11102 false_reg->smin_value = max(false_reg->smin_value, false_smin); 11103 true_reg->smax_value = min(true_reg->smax_value, true_smax); 11104 } 11105 break; 11106 } 11107 default: 11108 return; 11109 } 11110 11111 if (is_jmp32) { 11112 false_reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(false_64off), 11113 tnum_subreg(false_32off)); 11114 true_reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(true_64off), 11115 tnum_subreg(true_32off)); 11116 __reg_combine_32_into_64(false_reg); 11117 __reg_combine_32_into_64(true_reg); 11118 } else { 11119 false_reg->var_off = false_64off; 11120 true_reg->var_off = true_64off; 11121 __reg_combine_64_into_32(false_reg); 11122 __reg_combine_64_into_32(true_reg); 11123 } 11124 } 11125 11126 /* Same as above, but for the case that dst_reg holds a constant and src_reg is 11127 * the variable reg. 11128 */ 11129 static void reg_set_min_max_inv(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg, 11130 struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg, 11131 u64 val, u32 val32, 11132 u8 opcode, bool is_jmp32) 11133 { 11134 opcode = flip_opcode(opcode); 11135 /* This uses zero as "not present in table"; luckily the zero opcode, 11136 * BPF_JA, can't get here. 11137 */ 11138 if (opcode) 11139 reg_set_min_max(true_reg, false_reg, val, val32, opcode, is_jmp32); 11140 } 11141 11142 /* Regs are known to be equal, so intersect their min/max/var_off */ 11143 static void __reg_combine_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg, 11144 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg) 11145 { 11146 src_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->umin_value = max(src_reg->umin_value, 11147 dst_reg->umin_value); 11148 src_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->umax_value = min(src_reg->umax_value, 11149 dst_reg->umax_value); 11150 src_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->smin_value = max(src_reg->smin_value, 11151 dst_reg->smin_value); 11152 src_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->smax_value = min(src_reg->smax_value, 11153 dst_reg->smax_value); 11154 src_reg->var_off = dst_reg->var_off = tnum_intersect(src_reg->var_off, 11155 dst_reg->var_off); 11156 reg_bounds_sync(src_reg); 11157 reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg); 11158 } 11159 11160 static void reg_combine_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *true_src, 11161 struct bpf_reg_state *true_dst, 11162 struct bpf_reg_state *false_src, 11163 struct bpf_reg_state *false_dst, 11164 u8 opcode) 11165 { 11166 switch (opcode) { 11167 case BPF_JEQ: 11168 __reg_combine_min_max(true_src, true_dst); 11169 break; 11170 case BPF_JNE: 11171 __reg_combine_min_max(false_src, false_dst); 11172 break; 11173 } 11174 } 11175 11176 static void mark_ptr_or_null_reg(struct bpf_func_state *state, 11177 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 id, 11178 bool is_null) 11179 { 11180 if (type_may_be_null(reg->type) && reg->id == id && 11181 !WARN_ON_ONCE(!reg->id)) { 11182 /* Old offset (both fixed and variable parts) should have been 11183 * known-zero, because we don't allow pointer arithmetic on 11184 * pointers that might be NULL. If we see this happening, don't 11185 * convert the register. 11186 * 11187 * But in some cases, some helpers that return local kptrs 11188 * advance offset for the returned pointer. In those cases, it 11189 * is fine to expect to see reg->off. 11190 */ 11191 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(reg->smin_value || reg->smax_value || !tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0))) 11192 return; 11193 if (reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_MAYBE_NULL) && WARN_ON_ONCE(reg->off)) 11194 return; 11195 if (is_null) { 11196 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 11197 /* We don't need id and ref_obj_id from this point 11198 * onwards anymore, thus we should better reset it, 11199 * so that state pruning has chances to take effect. 11200 */ 11201 reg->id = 0; 11202 reg->ref_obj_id = 0; 11203 11204 return; 11205 } 11206 11207 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(reg); 11208 11209 if (!reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(reg)) { 11210 /* For not-NULL ptr, reg->ref_obj_id will be reset 11211 * in release_reference(). 11212 * 11213 * reg->id is still used by spin_lock ptr. Other 11214 * than spin_lock ptr type, reg->id can be reset. 11215 */ 11216 reg->id = 0; 11217 } 11218 } 11219 } 11220 11221 /* The logic is similar to find_good_pkt_pointers(), both could eventually 11222 * be folded together at some point. 11223 */ 11224 static void mark_ptr_or_null_regs(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, u32 regno, 11225 bool is_null) 11226 { 11227 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 11228 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg; 11229 u32 ref_obj_id = regs[regno].ref_obj_id; 11230 u32 id = regs[regno].id; 11231 11232 if (ref_obj_id && ref_obj_id == id && is_null) 11233 /* regs[regno] is in the " == NULL" branch. 11234 * No one could have freed the reference state before 11235 * doing the NULL check. 11236 */ 11237 WARN_ON_ONCE(release_reference_state(state, id)); 11238 11239 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(vstate, state, reg, ({ 11240 mark_ptr_or_null_reg(state, reg, id, is_null); 11241 })); 11242 } 11243 11244 static bool try_match_pkt_pointers(const struct bpf_insn *insn, 11245 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 11246 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg, 11247 struct bpf_verifier_state *this_branch, 11248 struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch) 11249 { 11250 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_X) 11251 return false; 11252 11253 /* Pointers are always 64-bit. */ 11254 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP32) 11255 return false; 11256 11257 switch (BPF_OP(insn->code)) { 11258 case BPF_JGT: 11259 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 11260 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || 11261 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 11262 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { 11263 /* pkt_data' > pkt_end, pkt_meta' > pkt_data */ 11264 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg, 11265 dst_reg->type, false); 11266 mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, true); 11267 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 11268 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || 11269 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 11270 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { 11271 /* pkt_end > pkt_data', pkt_data > pkt_meta' */ 11272 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, src_reg, 11273 src_reg->type, true); 11274 mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->src_reg, false); 11275 } else { 11276 return false; 11277 } 11278 break; 11279 case BPF_JLT: 11280 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 11281 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || 11282 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 11283 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { 11284 /* pkt_data' < pkt_end, pkt_meta' < pkt_data */ 11285 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg, 11286 dst_reg->type, true); 11287 mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, false); 11288 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 11289 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || 11290 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 11291 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { 11292 /* pkt_end < pkt_data', pkt_data > pkt_meta' */ 11293 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, src_reg, 11294 src_reg->type, false); 11295 mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->src_reg, true); 11296 } else { 11297 return false; 11298 } 11299 break; 11300 case BPF_JGE: 11301 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 11302 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || 11303 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 11304 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { 11305 /* pkt_data' >= pkt_end, pkt_meta' >= pkt_data */ 11306 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg, 11307 dst_reg->type, true); 11308 mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, false); 11309 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 11310 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || 11311 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 11312 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { 11313 /* pkt_end >= pkt_data', pkt_data >= pkt_meta' */ 11314 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, src_reg, 11315 src_reg->type, false); 11316 mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->src_reg, true); 11317 } else { 11318 return false; 11319 } 11320 break; 11321 case BPF_JLE: 11322 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 11323 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || 11324 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 11325 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { 11326 /* pkt_data' <= pkt_end, pkt_meta' <= pkt_data */ 11327 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg, 11328 dst_reg->type, false); 11329 mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, true); 11330 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 11331 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || 11332 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 11333 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { 11334 /* pkt_end <= pkt_data', pkt_data <= pkt_meta' */ 11335 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, src_reg, 11336 src_reg->type, true); 11337 mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->src_reg, false); 11338 } else { 11339 return false; 11340 } 11341 break; 11342 default: 11343 return false; 11344 } 11345 11346 return true; 11347 } 11348 11349 static void find_equal_scalars(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, 11350 struct bpf_reg_state *known_reg) 11351 { 11352 struct bpf_func_state *state; 11353 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 11354 11355 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(vstate, state, reg, ({ 11356 if (reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->id == known_reg->id) 11357 *reg = *known_reg; 11358 })); 11359 } 11360 11361 static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11362 struct bpf_insn *insn, int *insn_idx) 11363 { 11364 struct bpf_verifier_state *this_branch = env->cur_state; 11365 struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch; 11366 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]->regs; 11367 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, *other_branch_regs, *src_reg = NULL; 11368 struct bpf_reg_state *eq_branch_regs; 11369 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 11370 bool is_jmp32; 11371 int pred = -1; 11372 int err; 11373 11374 /* Only conditional jumps are expected to reach here. */ 11375 if (opcode == BPF_JA || opcode > BPF_JSLE) { 11376 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_JMP/JMP32 opcode %x\n", opcode); 11377 return -EINVAL; 11378 } 11379 11380 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 11381 if (insn->imm != 0) { 11382 verbose(env, "BPF_JMP/JMP32 uses reserved fields\n"); 11383 return -EINVAL; 11384 } 11385 11386 /* check src1 operand */ 11387 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 11388 if (err) 11389 return err; 11390 11391 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { 11392 verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n", 11393 insn->src_reg); 11394 return -EACCES; 11395 } 11396 src_reg = ®s[insn->src_reg]; 11397 } else { 11398 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) { 11399 verbose(env, "BPF_JMP/JMP32 uses reserved fields\n"); 11400 return -EINVAL; 11401 } 11402 } 11403 11404 /* check src2 operand */ 11405 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 11406 if (err) 11407 return err; 11408 11409 dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg]; 11410 is_jmp32 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP32; 11411 11412 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) { 11413 pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, insn->imm, opcode, is_jmp32); 11414 } else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && 11415 is_jmp32 && tnum_is_const(tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off))) { 11416 pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, 11417 tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off).value, 11418 opcode, 11419 is_jmp32); 11420 } else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && 11421 !is_jmp32 && tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off)) { 11422 pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, 11423 src_reg->var_off.value, 11424 opcode, 11425 is_jmp32); 11426 } else if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(dst_reg) && 11427 reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(src_reg) && 11428 !is_jmp32) { 11429 pred = is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken(dst_reg, src_reg, opcode); 11430 } 11431 11432 if (pred >= 0) { 11433 /* If we get here with a dst_reg pointer type it is because 11434 * above is_branch_taken() special cased the 0 comparison. 11435 */ 11436 if (!__is_pointer_value(false, dst_reg)) 11437 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->dst_reg); 11438 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && !err && 11439 !__is_pointer_value(false, src_reg)) 11440 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg); 11441 if (err) 11442 return err; 11443 } 11444 11445 if (pred == 1) { 11446 /* Only follow the goto, ignore fall-through. If needed, push 11447 * the fall-through branch for simulation under speculative 11448 * execution. 11449 */ 11450 if (!env->bypass_spec_v1 && 11451 !sanitize_speculative_path(env, insn, *insn_idx + 1, 11452 *insn_idx)) 11453 return -EFAULT; 11454 *insn_idx += insn->off; 11455 return 0; 11456 } else if (pred == 0) { 11457 /* Only follow the fall-through branch, since that's where the 11458 * program will go. If needed, push the goto branch for 11459 * simulation under speculative execution. 11460 */ 11461 if (!env->bypass_spec_v1 && 11462 !sanitize_speculative_path(env, insn, 11463 *insn_idx + insn->off + 1, 11464 *insn_idx)) 11465 return -EFAULT; 11466 return 0; 11467 } 11468 11469 other_branch = push_stack(env, *insn_idx + insn->off + 1, *insn_idx, 11470 false); 11471 if (!other_branch) 11472 return -EFAULT; 11473 other_branch_regs = other_branch->frame[other_branch->curframe]->regs; 11474 11475 /* detect if we are comparing against a constant value so we can adjust 11476 * our min/max values for our dst register. 11477 * this is only legit if both are scalars (or pointers to the same 11478 * object, I suppose, see the PTR_MAYBE_NULL related if block below), 11479 * because otherwise the different base pointers mean the offsets aren't 11480 * comparable. 11481 */ 11482 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 11483 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg = ®s[insn->src_reg]; 11484 11485 if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && 11486 src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 11487 if (tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off) || 11488 (is_jmp32 && 11489 tnum_is_const(tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off)))) 11490 reg_set_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg], 11491 dst_reg, 11492 src_reg->var_off.value, 11493 tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off).value, 11494 opcode, is_jmp32); 11495 else if (tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off) || 11496 (is_jmp32 && 11497 tnum_is_const(tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off)))) 11498 reg_set_min_max_inv(&other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg], 11499 src_reg, 11500 dst_reg->var_off.value, 11501 tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off).value, 11502 opcode, is_jmp32); 11503 else if (!is_jmp32 && 11504 (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE)) 11505 /* Comparing for equality, we can combine knowledge */ 11506 reg_combine_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg], 11507 &other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg], 11508 src_reg, dst_reg, opcode); 11509 if (src_reg->id && 11510 !WARN_ON_ONCE(src_reg->id != other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg].id)) { 11511 find_equal_scalars(this_branch, src_reg); 11512 find_equal_scalars(other_branch, &other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg]); 11513 } 11514 11515 } 11516 } else if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 11517 reg_set_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg], 11518 dst_reg, insn->imm, (u32)insn->imm, 11519 opcode, is_jmp32); 11520 } 11521 11522 if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && dst_reg->id && 11523 !WARN_ON_ONCE(dst_reg->id != other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg].id)) { 11524 find_equal_scalars(this_branch, dst_reg); 11525 find_equal_scalars(other_branch, &other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg]); 11526 } 11527 11528 /* if one pointer register is compared to another pointer 11529 * register check if PTR_MAYBE_NULL could be lifted. 11530 * E.g. register A - maybe null 11531 * register B - not null 11532 * for JNE A, B, ... - A is not null in the false branch; 11533 * for JEQ A, B, ... - A is not null in the true branch. 11534 */ 11535 if (!is_jmp32 && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && 11536 __is_pointer_value(false, src_reg) && __is_pointer_value(false, dst_reg) && 11537 type_may_be_null(src_reg->type) != type_may_be_null(dst_reg->type)) { 11538 eq_branch_regs = NULL; 11539 switch (opcode) { 11540 case BPF_JEQ: 11541 eq_branch_regs = other_branch_regs; 11542 break; 11543 case BPF_JNE: 11544 eq_branch_regs = regs; 11545 break; 11546 default: 11547 /* do nothing */ 11548 break; 11549 } 11550 if (eq_branch_regs) { 11551 if (type_may_be_null(src_reg->type)) 11552 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(&eq_branch_regs[insn->src_reg]); 11553 else 11554 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(&eq_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg]); 11555 } 11556 } 11557 11558 /* detect if R == 0 where R is returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem(). 11559 * NOTE: these optimizations below are related with pointer comparison 11560 * which will never be JMP32. 11561 */ 11562 if (!is_jmp32 && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && 11563 insn->imm == 0 && (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE) && 11564 type_may_be_null(dst_reg->type)) { 11565 /* Mark all identical registers in each branch as either 11566 * safe or unknown depending R == 0 or R != 0 conditional. 11567 */ 11568 mark_ptr_or_null_regs(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, 11569 opcode == BPF_JNE); 11570 mark_ptr_or_null_regs(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, 11571 opcode == BPF_JEQ); 11572 } else if (!try_match_pkt_pointers(insn, dst_reg, ®s[insn->src_reg], 11573 this_branch, other_branch) && 11574 is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) { 11575 verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n", 11576 insn->dst_reg); 11577 return -EACCES; 11578 } 11579 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) 11580 print_insn_state(env, this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]); 11581 return 0; 11582 } 11583 11584 /* verify BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */ 11585 static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 11586 { 11587 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env); 11588 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 11589 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg; 11590 struct bpf_map *map; 11591 int err; 11592 11593 if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) { 11594 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD_IMM insn\n"); 11595 return -EINVAL; 11596 } 11597 if (insn->off != 0) { 11598 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_IMM64 uses reserved fields\n"); 11599 return -EINVAL; 11600 } 11601 11602 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP); 11603 if (err) 11604 return err; 11605 11606 dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg]; 11607 if (insn->src_reg == 0) { 11608 u64 imm = ((u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32) | (u32)insn->imm; 11609 11610 dst_reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 11611 __mark_reg_known(®s[insn->dst_reg], imm); 11612 return 0; 11613 } 11614 11615 /* All special src_reg cases are listed below. From this point onwards 11616 * we either succeed and assign a corresponding dst_reg->type after 11617 * zeroing the offset, or fail and reject the program. 11618 */ 11619 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 11620 11621 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_BTF_ID) { 11622 dst_reg->type = aux->btf_var.reg_type; 11623 switch (base_type(dst_reg->type)) { 11624 case PTR_TO_MEM: 11625 dst_reg->mem_size = aux->btf_var.mem_size; 11626 break; 11627 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 11628 dst_reg->btf = aux->btf_var.btf; 11629 dst_reg->btf_id = aux->btf_var.btf_id; 11630 break; 11631 default: 11632 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 11633 return -EFAULT; 11634 } 11635 return 0; 11636 } 11637 11638 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) { 11639 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 11640 u32 subprogno = find_subprog(env, 11641 env->insn_idx + insn->imm + 1); 11642 11643 if (!aux->func_info) { 11644 verbose(env, "missing btf func_info\n"); 11645 return -EINVAL; 11646 } 11647 if (aux->func_info_aux[subprogno].linkage != BTF_FUNC_STATIC) { 11648 verbose(env, "callback function not static\n"); 11649 return -EINVAL; 11650 } 11651 11652 dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_FUNC; 11653 dst_reg->subprogno = subprogno; 11654 return 0; 11655 } 11656 11657 map = env->used_maps[aux->map_index]; 11658 dst_reg->map_ptr = map; 11659 11660 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE || 11661 insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE) { 11662 dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 11663 dst_reg->off = aux->map_off; 11664 WARN_ON_ONCE(map->max_entries != 1); 11665 /* We want reg->id to be same (0) as map_value is not distinct */ 11666 } else if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD || 11667 insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX) { 11668 dst_reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; 11669 } else { 11670 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 11671 return -EINVAL; 11672 } 11673 11674 return 0; 11675 } 11676 11677 static bool may_access_skb(enum bpf_prog_type type) 11678 { 11679 switch (type) { 11680 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER: 11681 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: 11682 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT: 11683 return true; 11684 default: 11685 return false; 11686 } 11687 } 11688 11689 /* verify safety of LD_ABS|LD_IND instructions: 11690 * - they can only appear in the programs where ctx == skb 11691 * - since they are wrappers of function calls, they scratch R1-R5 registers, 11692 * preserve R6-R9, and store return value into R0 11693 * 11694 * Implicit input: 11695 * ctx == skb == R6 == CTX 11696 * 11697 * Explicit input: 11698 * SRC == any register 11699 * IMM == 32-bit immediate 11700 * 11701 * Output: 11702 * R0 - 8/16/32-bit skb data converted to cpu endianness 11703 */ 11704 static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 11705 { 11706 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 11707 static const int ctx_reg = BPF_REG_6; 11708 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); 11709 int i, err; 11710 11711 if (!may_access_skb(resolve_prog_type(env->prog))) { 11712 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] instructions not allowed for this program type\n"); 11713 return -EINVAL; 11714 } 11715 11716 if (!env->ops->gen_ld_abs) { 11717 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 11718 return -EINVAL; 11719 } 11720 11721 if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 || 11722 BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW || 11723 (mode == BPF_ABS && insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0)) { 11724 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] uses reserved fields\n"); 11725 return -EINVAL; 11726 } 11727 11728 /* check whether implicit source operand (register R6) is readable */ 11729 err = check_reg_arg(env, ctx_reg, SRC_OP); 11730 if (err) 11731 return err; 11732 11733 /* Disallow usage of BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] with reference tracking, as 11734 * gen_ld_abs() may terminate the program at runtime, leading to 11735 * reference leak. 11736 */ 11737 err = check_reference_leak(env); 11738 if (err) { 11739 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] cannot be mixed with socket references\n"); 11740 return err; 11741 } 11742 11743 if (env->cur_state->active_lock.ptr) { 11744 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] cannot be used inside bpf_spin_lock-ed region\n"); 11745 return -EINVAL; 11746 } 11747 11748 if (regs[ctx_reg].type != PTR_TO_CTX) { 11749 verbose(env, 11750 "at the time of BPF_LD_ABS|IND R6 != pointer to skb\n"); 11751 return -EINVAL; 11752 } 11753 11754 if (mode == BPF_IND) { 11755 /* check explicit source operand */ 11756 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 11757 if (err) 11758 return err; 11759 } 11760 11761 err = check_ptr_off_reg(env, ®s[ctx_reg], ctx_reg); 11762 if (err < 0) 11763 return err; 11764 11765 /* reset caller saved regs to unreadable */ 11766 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { 11767 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); 11768 check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); 11769 } 11770 11771 /* mark destination R0 register as readable, since it contains 11772 * the value fetched from the packet. 11773 * Already marked as written above. 11774 */ 11775 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 11776 /* ld_abs load up to 32-bit skb data. */ 11777 regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1; 11778 return 0; 11779 } 11780 11781 static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 11782 { 11783 struct tnum enforce_attach_type_range = tnum_unknown; 11784 const struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 11785 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 11786 struct tnum range = tnum_range(0, 1); 11787 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 11788 int err; 11789 struct bpf_func_state *frame = env->cur_state->frame[0]; 11790 const bool is_subprog = frame->subprogno; 11791 11792 /* LSM and struct_ops func-ptr's return type could be "void" */ 11793 if (!is_subprog) { 11794 switch (prog_type) { 11795 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: 11796 if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_LSM_CGROUP) 11797 /* See below, can be 0 or 0-1 depending on hook. */ 11798 break; 11799 fallthrough; 11800 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS: 11801 if (!prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) 11802 return 0; 11803 break; 11804 default: 11805 break; 11806 } 11807 } 11808 11809 /* eBPF calling convention is such that R0 is used 11810 * to return the value from eBPF program. 11811 * Make sure that it's readable at this time 11812 * of bpf_exit, which means that program wrote 11813 * something into it earlier 11814 */ 11815 err = check_reg_arg(env, BPF_REG_0, SRC_OP); 11816 if (err) 11817 return err; 11818 11819 if (is_pointer_value(env, BPF_REG_0)) { 11820 verbose(env, "R0 leaks addr as return value\n"); 11821 return -EACCES; 11822 } 11823 11824 reg = cur_regs(env) + BPF_REG_0; 11825 11826 if (frame->in_async_callback_fn) { 11827 /* enforce return zero from async callbacks like timer */ 11828 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 11829 verbose(env, "In async callback the register R0 is not a known value (%s)\n", 11830 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 11831 return -EINVAL; 11832 } 11833 11834 if (!tnum_in(tnum_const(0), reg->var_off)) { 11835 verbose_invalid_scalar(env, reg, &range, "async callback", "R0"); 11836 return -EINVAL; 11837 } 11838 return 0; 11839 } 11840 11841 if (is_subprog) { 11842 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 11843 verbose(env, "At subprogram exit the register R0 is not a scalar value (%s)\n", 11844 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 11845 return -EINVAL; 11846 } 11847 return 0; 11848 } 11849 11850 switch (prog_type) { 11851 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR: 11852 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UDP4_RECVMSG || 11853 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UDP6_RECVMSG || 11854 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETPEERNAME || 11855 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETPEERNAME || 11856 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETSOCKNAME || 11857 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETSOCKNAME) 11858 range = tnum_range(1, 1); 11859 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_BIND || 11860 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_BIND) 11861 range = tnum_range(0, 3); 11862 break; 11863 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB: 11864 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET_EGRESS) { 11865 range = tnum_range(0, 3); 11866 enforce_attach_type_range = tnum_range(2, 3); 11867 } 11868 break; 11869 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK: 11870 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS: 11871 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_DEVICE: 11872 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SYSCTL: 11873 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT: 11874 break; 11875 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT: 11876 if (!env->prog->aux->attach_btf_id) 11877 return 0; 11878 range = tnum_const(0); 11879 break; 11880 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: 11881 switch (env->prog->expected_attach_type) { 11882 case BPF_TRACE_FENTRY: 11883 case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT: 11884 range = tnum_const(0); 11885 break; 11886 case BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP: 11887 case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN: 11888 return 0; 11889 case BPF_TRACE_ITER: 11890 break; 11891 default: 11892 return -ENOTSUPP; 11893 } 11894 break; 11895 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP: 11896 range = tnum_range(SK_DROP, SK_PASS); 11897 break; 11898 11899 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: 11900 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type != BPF_LSM_CGROUP) { 11901 /* Regular BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM programs can return 11902 * any value. 11903 */ 11904 return 0; 11905 } 11906 if (!env->prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) { 11907 /* Make sure programs that attach to void 11908 * hooks don't try to modify return value. 11909 */ 11910 range = tnum_range(1, 1); 11911 } 11912 break; 11913 11914 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT: 11915 /* freplace program can return anything as its return value 11916 * depends on the to-be-replaced kernel func or bpf program. 11917 */ 11918 default: 11919 return 0; 11920 } 11921 11922 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 11923 verbose(env, "At program exit the register R0 is not a known value (%s)\n", 11924 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 11925 return -EINVAL; 11926 } 11927 11928 if (!tnum_in(range, reg->var_off)) { 11929 verbose_invalid_scalar(env, reg, &range, "program exit", "R0"); 11930 if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_LSM_CGROUP && 11931 prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM && 11932 !prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) 11933 verbose(env, "Note, BPF_LSM_CGROUP that attach to void LSM hooks can't modify return value!\n"); 11934 return -EINVAL; 11935 } 11936 11937 if (!tnum_is_unknown(enforce_attach_type_range) && 11938 tnum_in(enforce_attach_type_range, reg->var_off)) 11939 env->prog->enforce_expected_attach_type = 1; 11940 return 0; 11941 } 11942 11943 /* non-recursive DFS pseudo code 11944 * 1 procedure DFS-iterative(G,v): 11945 * 2 label v as discovered 11946 * 3 let S be a stack 11947 * 4 S.push(v) 11948 * 5 while S is not empty 11949 * 6 t <- S.peek() 11950 * 7 if t is what we're looking for: 11951 * 8 return t 11952 * 9 for all edges e in G.adjacentEdges(t) do 11953 * 10 if edge e is already labelled 11954 * 11 continue with the next edge 11955 * 12 w <- G.adjacentVertex(t,e) 11956 * 13 if vertex w is not discovered and not explored 11957 * 14 label e as tree-edge 11958 * 15 label w as discovered 11959 * 16 S.push(w) 11960 * 17 continue at 5 11961 * 18 else if vertex w is discovered 11962 * 19 label e as back-edge 11963 * 20 else 11964 * 21 // vertex w is explored 11965 * 22 label e as forward- or cross-edge 11966 * 23 label t as explored 11967 * 24 S.pop() 11968 * 11969 * convention: 11970 * 0x10 - discovered 11971 * 0x11 - discovered and fall-through edge labelled 11972 * 0x12 - discovered and fall-through and branch edges labelled 11973 * 0x20 - explored 11974 */ 11975 11976 enum { 11977 DISCOVERED = 0x10, 11978 EXPLORED = 0x20, 11979 FALLTHROUGH = 1, 11980 BRANCH = 2, 11981 }; 11982 11983 static u32 state_htab_size(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 11984 { 11985 return env->prog->len; 11986 } 11987 11988 static struct bpf_verifier_state_list **explored_state( 11989 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11990 int idx) 11991 { 11992 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 11993 struct bpf_func_state *state = cur->frame[cur->curframe]; 11994 11995 return &env->explored_states[(idx ^ state->callsite) % state_htab_size(env)]; 11996 } 11997 11998 static void init_explored_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx) 11999 { 12000 env->insn_aux_data[idx].prune_point = true; 12001 } 12002 12003 enum { 12004 DONE_EXPLORING = 0, 12005 KEEP_EXPLORING = 1, 12006 }; 12007 12008 /* t, w, e - match pseudo-code above: 12009 * t - index of current instruction 12010 * w - next instruction 12011 * e - edge 12012 */ 12013 static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12014 bool loop_ok) 12015 { 12016 int *insn_stack = env->cfg.insn_stack; 12017 int *insn_state = env->cfg.insn_state; 12018 12019 if (e == FALLTHROUGH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | FALLTHROUGH)) 12020 return DONE_EXPLORING; 12021 12022 if (e == BRANCH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | BRANCH)) 12023 return DONE_EXPLORING; 12024 12025 if (w < 0 || w >= env->prog->len) { 12026 verbose_linfo(env, t, "%d: ", t); 12027 verbose(env, "jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", t, w); 12028 return -EINVAL; 12029 } 12030 12031 if (e == BRANCH) 12032 /* mark branch target for state pruning */ 12033 init_explored_state(env, w); 12034 12035 if (insn_state[w] == 0) { 12036 /* tree-edge */ 12037 insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e; 12038 insn_state[w] = DISCOVERED; 12039 if (env->cfg.cur_stack >= env->prog->len) 12040 return -E2BIG; 12041 insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack++] = w; 12042 return KEEP_EXPLORING; 12043 } else if ((insn_state[w] & 0xF0) == DISCOVERED) { 12044 if (loop_ok && env->bpf_capable) 12045 return DONE_EXPLORING; 12046 verbose_linfo(env, t, "%d: ", t); 12047 verbose_linfo(env, w, "%d: ", w); 12048 verbose(env, "back-edge from insn %d to %d\n", t, w); 12049 return -EINVAL; 12050 } else if (insn_state[w] == EXPLORED) { 12051 /* forward- or cross-edge */ 12052 insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e; 12053 } else { 12054 verbose(env, "insn state internal bug\n"); 12055 return -EFAULT; 12056 } 12057 return DONE_EXPLORING; 12058 } 12059 12060 static int visit_func_call_insn(int t, int insn_cnt, 12061 struct bpf_insn *insns, 12062 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12063 bool visit_callee) 12064 { 12065 int ret; 12066 12067 ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, false); 12068 if (ret) 12069 return ret; 12070 12071 if (t + 1 < insn_cnt) 12072 init_explored_state(env, t + 1); 12073 if (visit_callee) { 12074 init_explored_state(env, t); 12075 ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].imm + 1, BRANCH, env, 12076 /* It's ok to allow recursion from CFG point of 12077 * view. __check_func_call() will do the actual 12078 * check. 12079 */ 12080 bpf_pseudo_func(insns + t)); 12081 } 12082 return ret; 12083 } 12084 12085 /* Visits the instruction at index t and returns one of the following: 12086 * < 0 - an error occurred 12087 * DONE_EXPLORING - the instruction was fully explored 12088 * KEEP_EXPLORING - there is still work to be done before it is fully explored 12089 */ 12090 static int visit_insn(int t, int insn_cnt, struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 12091 { 12092 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; 12093 int ret; 12094 12095 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insns + t)) 12096 return visit_func_call_insn(t, insn_cnt, insns, env, true); 12097 12098 /* All non-branch instructions have a single fall-through edge. */ 12099 if (BPF_CLASS(insns[t].code) != BPF_JMP && 12100 BPF_CLASS(insns[t].code) != BPF_JMP32) 12101 return push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, false); 12102 12103 switch (BPF_OP(insns[t].code)) { 12104 case BPF_EXIT: 12105 return DONE_EXPLORING; 12106 12107 case BPF_CALL: 12108 if (insns[t].imm == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback) 12109 /* Mark this call insn to trigger is_state_visited() check 12110 * before call itself is processed by __check_func_call(). 12111 * Otherwise new async state will be pushed for further 12112 * exploration. 12113 */ 12114 init_explored_state(env, t); 12115 return visit_func_call_insn(t, insn_cnt, insns, env, 12116 insns[t].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL); 12117 12118 case BPF_JA: 12119 if (BPF_SRC(insns[t].code) != BPF_K) 12120 return -EINVAL; 12121 12122 /* unconditional jump with single edge */ 12123 ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, 12124 true); 12125 if (ret) 12126 return ret; 12127 12128 /* unconditional jmp is not a good pruning point, 12129 * but it's marked, since backtracking needs 12130 * to record jmp history in is_state_visited(). 12131 */ 12132 init_explored_state(env, t + insns[t].off + 1); 12133 /* tell verifier to check for equivalent states 12134 * after every call and jump 12135 */ 12136 if (t + 1 < insn_cnt) 12137 init_explored_state(env, t + 1); 12138 12139 return ret; 12140 12141 default: 12142 /* conditional jump with two edges */ 12143 init_explored_state(env, t); 12144 ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, true); 12145 if (ret) 12146 return ret; 12147 12148 return push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1, BRANCH, env, true); 12149 } 12150 } 12151 12152 /* non-recursive depth-first-search to detect loops in BPF program 12153 * loop == back-edge in directed graph 12154 */ 12155 static int check_cfg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 12156 { 12157 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 12158 int *insn_stack, *insn_state; 12159 int ret = 0; 12160 int i; 12161 12162 insn_state = env->cfg.insn_state = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL); 12163 if (!insn_state) 12164 return -ENOMEM; 12165 12166 insn_stack = env->cfg.insn_stack = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL); 12167 if (!insn_stack) { 12168 kvfree(insn_state); 12169 return -ENOMEM; 12170 } 12171 12172 insn_state[0] = DISCOVERED; /* mark 1st insn as discovered */ 12173 insn_stack[0] = 0; /* 0 is the first instruction */ 12174 env->cfg.cur_stack = 1; 12175 12176 while (env->cfg.cur_stack > 0) { 12177 int t = insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack - 1]; 12178 12179 ret = visit_insn(t, insn_cnt, env); 12180 switch (ret) { 12181 case DONE_EXPLORING: 12182 insn_state[t] = EXPLORED; 12183 env->cfg.cur_stack--; 12184 break; 12185 case KEEP_EXPLORING: 12186 break; 12187 default: 12188 if (ret > 0) { 12189 verbose(env, "visit_insn internal bug\n"); 12190 ret = -EFAULT; 12191 } 12192 goto err_free; 12193 } 12194 } 12195 12196 if (env->cfg.cur_stack < 0) { 12197 verbose(env, "pop stack internal bug\n"); 12198 ret = -EFAULT; 12199 goto err_free; 12200 } 12201 12202 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 12203 if (insn_state[i] != EXPLORED) { 12204 verbose(env, "unreachable insn %d\n", i); 12205 ret = -EINVAL; 12206 goto err_free; 12207 } 12208 } 12209 ret = 0; /* cfg looks good */ 12210 12211 err_free: 12212 kvfree(insn_state); 12213 kvfree(insn_stack); 12214 env->cfg.insn_state = env->cfg.insn_stack = NULL; 12215 return ret; 12216 } 12217 12218 static int check_abnormal_return(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 12219 { 12220 int i; 12221 12222 for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 12223 if (env->subprog_info[i].has_ld_abs) { 12224 verbose(env, "LD_ABS is not allowed in subprogs without BTF\n"); 12225 return -EINVAL; 12226 } 12227 if (env->subprog_info[i].has_tail_call) { 12228 verbose(env, "tail_call is not allowed in subprogs without BTF\n"); 12229 return -EINVAL; 12230 } 12231 } 12232 return 0; 12233 } 12234 12235 /* The minimum supported BTF func info size */ 12236 #define MIN_BPF_FUNCINFO_SIZE 8 12237 #define MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE 252 12238 12239 static int check_btf_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12240 const union bpf_attr *attr, 12241 bpfptr_t uattr) 12242 { 12243 const struct btf_type *type, *func_proto, *ret_type; 12244 u32 i, nfuncs, urec_size, min_size; 12245 u32 krec_size = sizeof(struct bpf_func_info); 12246 struct bpf_func_info *krecord; 12247 struct bpf_func_info_aux *info_aux = NULL; 12248 struct bpf_prog *prog; 12249 const struct btf *btf; 12250 bpfptr_t urecord; 12251 u32 prev_offset = 0; 12252 bool scalar_return; 12253 int ret = -ENOMEM; 12254 12255 nfuncs = attr->func_info_cnt; 12256 if (!nfuncs) { 12257 if (check_abnormal_return(env)) 12258 return -EINVAL; 12259 return 0; 12260 } 12261 12262 if (nfuncs != env->subprog_cnt) { 12263 verbose(env, "number of funcs in func_info doesn't match number of subprogs\n"); 12264 return -EINVAL; 12265 } 12266 12267 urec_size = attr->func_info_rec_size; 12268 if (urec_size < MIN_BPF_FUNCINFO_SIZE || 12269 urec_size > MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE || 12270 urec_size % sizeof(u32)) { 12271 verbose(env, "invalid func info rec size %u\n", urec_size); 12272 return -EINVAL; 12273 } 12274 12275 prog = env->prog; 12276 btf = prog->aux->btf; 12277 12278 urecord = make_bpfptr(attr->func_info, uattr.is_kernel); 12279 min_size = min_t(u32, krec_size, urec_size); 12280 12281 krecord = kvcalloc(nfuncs, krec_size, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); 12282 if (!krecord) 12283 return -ENOMEM; 12284 info_aux = kcalloc(nfuncs, sizeof(*info_aux), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); 12285 if (!info_aux) 12286 goto err_free; 12287 12288 for (i = 0; i < nfuncs; i++) { 12289 ret = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(urecord, krec_size, urec_size); 12290 if (ret) { 12291 if (ret == -E2BIG) { 12292 verbose(env, "nonzero tailing record in func info"); 12293 /* set the size kernel expects so loader can zero 12294 * out the rest of the record. 12295 */ 12296 if (copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr, 12297 offsetof(union bpf_attr, func_info_rec_size), 12298 &min_size, sizeof(min_size))) 12299 ret = -EFAULT; 12300 } 12301 goto err_free; 12302 } 12303 12304 if (copy_from_bpfptr(&krecord[i], urecord, min_size)) { 12305 ret = -EFAULT; 12306 goto err_free; 12307 } 12308 12309 /* check insn_off */ 12310 ret = -EINVAL; 12311 if (i == 0) { 12312 if (krecord[i].insn_off) { 12313 verbose(env, 12314 "nonzero insn_off %u for the first func info record", 12315 krecord[i].insn_off); 12316 goto err_free; 12317 } 12318 } else if (krecord[i].insn_off <= prev_offset) { 12319 verbose(env, 12320 "same or smaller insn offset (%u) than previous func info record (%u)", 12321 krecord[i].insn_off, prev_offset); 12322 goto err_free; 12323 } 12324 12325 if (env->subprog_info[i].start != krecord[i].insn_off) { 12326 verbose(env, "func_info BTF section doesn't match subprog layout in BPF program\n"); 12327 goto err_free; 12328 } 12329 12330 /* check type_id */ 12331 type = btf_type_by_id(btf, krecord[i].type_id); 12332 if (!type || !btf_type_is_func(type)) { 12333 verbose(env, "invalid type id %d in func info", 12334 krecord[i].type_id); 12335 goto err_free; 12336 } 12337 info_aux[i].linkage = BTF_INFO_VLEN(type->info); 12338 12339 func_proto = btf_type_by_id(btf, type->type); 12340 if (unlikely(!func_proto || !btf_type_is_func_proto(func_proto))) 12341 /* btf_func_check() already verified it during BTF load */ 12342 goto err_free; 12343 ret_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, func_proto->type, NULL); 12344 scalar_return = 12345 btf_type_is_small_int(ret_type) || btf_is_any_enum(ret_type); 12346 if (i && !scalar_return && env->subprog_info[i].has_ld_abs) { 12347 verbose(env, "LD_ABS is only allowed in functions that return 'int'.\n"); 12348 goto err_free; 12349 } 12350 if (i && !scalar_return && env->subprog_info[i].has_tail_call) { 12351 verbose(env, "tail_call is only allowed in functions that return 'int'.\n"); 12352 goto err_free; 12353 } 12354 12355 prev_offset = krecord[i].insn_off; 12356 bpfptr_add(&urecord, urec_size); 12357 } 12358 12359 prog->aux->func_info = krecord; 12360 prog->aux->func_info_cnt = nfuncs; 12361 prog->aux->func_info_aux = info_aux; 12362 return 0; 12363 12364 err_free: 12365 kvfree(krecord); 12366 kfree(info_aux); 12367 return ret; 12368 } 12369 12370 static void adjust_btf_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 12371 { 12372 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 12373 int i; 12374 12375 if (!aux->func_info) 12376 return; 12377 12378 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) 12379 aux->func_info[i].insn_off = env->subprog_info[i].start; 12380 } 12381 12382 #define MIN_BPF_LINEINFO_SIZE offsetofend(struct bpf_line_info, line_col) 12383 #define MAX_LINEINFO_REC_SIZE MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE 12384 12385 static int check_btf_line(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12386 const union bpf_attr *attr, 12387 bpfptr_t uattr) 12388 { 12389 u32 i, s, nr_linfo, ncopy, expected_size, rec_size, prev_offset = 0; 12390 struct bpf_subprog_info *sub; 12391 struct bpf_line_info *linfo; 12392 struct bpf_prog *prog; 12393 const struct btf *btf; 12394 bpfptr_t ulinfo; 12395 int err; 12396 12397 nr_linfo = attr->line_info_cnt; 12398 if (!nr_linfo) 12399 return 0; 12400 if (nr_linfo > INT_MAX / sizeof(struct bpf_line_info)) 12401 return -EINVAL; 12402 12403 rec_size = attr->line_info_rec_size; 12404 if (rec_size < MIN_BPF_LINEINFO_SIZE || 12405 rec_size > MAX_LINEINFO_REC_SIZE || 12406 rec_size & (sizeof(u32) - 1)) 12407 return -EINVAL; 12408 12409 /* Need to zero it in case the userspace may 12410 * pass in a smaller bpf_line_info object. 12411 */ 12412 linfo = kvcalloc(nr_linfo, sizeof(struct bpf_line_info), 12413 GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); 12414 if (!linfo) 12415 return -ENOMEM; 12416 12417 prog = env->prog; 12418 btf = prog->aux->btf; 12419 12420 s = 0; 12421 sub = env->subprog_info; 12422 ulinfo = make_bpfptr(attr->line_info, uattr.is_kernel); 12423 expected_size = sizeof(struct bpf_line_info); 12424 ncopy = min_t(u32, expected_size, rec_size); 12425 for (i = 0; i < nr_linfo; i++) { 12426 err = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(ulinfo, expected_size, rec_size); 12427 if (err) { 12428 if (err == -E2BIG) { 12429 verbose(env, "nonzero tailing record in line_info"); 12430 if (copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr, 12431 offsetof(union bpf_attr, line_info_rec_size), 12432 &expected_size, sizeof(expected_size))) 12433 err = -EFAULT; 12434 } 12435 goto err_free; 12436 } 12437 12438 if (copy_from_bpfptr(&linfo[i], ulinfo, ncopy)) { 12439 err = -EFAULT; 12440 goto err_free; 12441 } 12442 12443 /* 12444 * Check insn_off to ensure 12445 * 1) strictly increasing AND 12446 * 2) bounded by prog->len 12447 * 12448 * The linfo[0].insn_off == 0 check logically falls into 12449 * the later "missing bpf_line_info for func..." case 12450 * because the first linfo[0].insn_off must be the 12451 * first sub also and the first sub must have 12452 * subprog_info[0].start == 0. 12453 */ 12454 if ((i && linfo[i].insn_off <= prev_offset) || 12455 linfo[i].insn_off >= prog->len) { 12456 verbose(env, "Invalid line_info[%u].insn_off:%u (prev_offset:%u prog->len:%u)\n", 12457 i, linfo[i].insn_off, prev_offset, 12458 prog->len); 12459 err = -EINVAL; 12460 goto err_free; 12461 } 12462 12463 if (!prog->insnsi[linfo[i].insn_off].code) { 12464 verbose(env, 12465 "Invalid insn code at line_info[%u].insn_off\n", 12466 i); 12467 err = -EINVAL; 12468 goto err_free; 12469 } 12470 12471 if (!btf_name_by_offset(btf, linfo[i].line_off) || 12472 !btf_name_by_offset(btf, linfo[i].file_name_off)) { 12473 verbose(env, "Invalid line_info[%u].line_off or .file_name_off\n", i); 12474 err = -EINVAL; 12475 goto err_free; 12476 } 12477 12478 if (s != env->subprog_cnt) { 12479 if (linfo[i].insn_off == sub[s].start) { 12480 sub[s].linfo_idx = i; 12481 s++; 12482 } else if (sub[s].start < linfo[i].insn_off) { 12483 verbose(env, "missing bpf_line_info for func#%u\n", s); 12484 err = -EINVAL; 12485 goto err_free; 12486 } 12487 } 12488 12489 prev_offset = linfo[i].insn_off; 12490 bpfptr_add(&ulinfo, rec_size); 12491 } 12492 12493 if (s != env->subprog_cnt) { 12494 verbose(env, "missing bpf_line_info for %u funcs starting from func#%u\n", 12495 env->subprog_cnt - s, s); 12496 err = -EINVAL; 12497 goto err_free; 12498 } 12499 12500 prog->aux->linfo = linfo; 12501 prog->aux->nr_linfo = nr_linfo; 12502 12503 return 0; 12504 12505 err_free: 12506 kvfree(linfo); 12507 return err; 12508 } 12509 12510 #define MIN_CORE_RELO_SIZE sizeof(struct bpf_core_relo) 12511 #define MAX_CORE_RELO_SIZE MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE 12512 12513 static int check_core_relo(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12514 const union bpf_attr *attr, 12515 bpfptr_t uattr) 12516 { 12517 u32 i, nr_core_relo, ncopy, expected_size, rec_size; 12518 struct bpf_core_relo core_relo = {}; 12519 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 12520 const struct btf *btf = prog->aux->btf; 12521 struct bpf_core_ctx ctx = { 12522 .log = &env->log, 12523 .btf = btf, 12524 }; 12525 bpfptr_t u_core_relo; 12526 int err; 12527 12528 nr_core_relo = attr->core_relo_cnt; 12529 if (!nr_core_relo) 12530 return 0; 12531 if (nr_core_relo > INT_MAX / sizeof(struct bpf_core_relo)) 12532 return -EINVAL; 12533 12534 rec_size = attr->core_relo_rec_size; 12535 if (rec_size < MIN_CORE_RELO_SIZE || 12536 rec_size > MAX_CORE_RELO_SIZE || 12537 rec_size % sizeof(u32)) 12538 return -EINVAL; 12539 12540 u_core_relo = make_bpfptr(attr->core_relos, uattr.is_kernel); 12541 expected_size = sizeof(struct bpf_core_relo); 12542 ncopy = min_t(u32, expected_size, rec_size); 12543 12544 /* Unlike func_info and line_info, copy and apply each CO-RE 12545 * relocation record one at a time. 12546 */ 12547 for (i = 0; i < nr_core_relo; i++) { 12548 /* future proofing when sizeof(bpf_core_relo) changes */ 12549 err = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(u_core_relo, expected_size, rec_size); 12550 if (err) { 12551 if (err == -E2BIG) { 12552 verbose(env, "nonzero tailing record in core_relo"); 12553 if (copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr, 12554 offsetof(union bpf_attr, core_relo_rec_size), 12555 &expected_size, sizeof(expected_size))) 12556 err = -EFAULT; 12557 } 12558 break; 12559 } 12560 12561 if (copy_from_bpfptr(&core_relo, u_core_relo, ncopy)) { 12562 err = -EFAULT; 12563 break; 12564 } 12565 12566 if (core_relo.insn_off % 8 || core_relo.insn_off / 8 >= prog->len) { 12567 verbose(env, "Invalid core_relo[%u].insn_off:%u prog->len:%u\n", 12568 i, core_relo.insn_off, prog->len); 12569 err = -EINVAL; 12570 break; 12571 } 12572 12573 err = bpf_core_apply(&ctx, &core_relo, i, 12574 &prog->insnsi[core_relo.insn_off / 8]); 12575 if (err) 12576 break; 12577 bpfptr_add(&u_core_relo, rec_size); 12578 } 12579 return err; 12580 } 12581 12582 static int check_btf_info(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12583 const union bpf_attr *attr, 12584 bpfptr_t uattr) 12585 { 12586 struct btf *btf; 12587 int err; 12588 12589 if (!attr->func_info_cnt && !attr->line_info_cnt) { 12590 if (check_abnormal_return(env)) 12591 return -EINVAL; 12592 return 0; 12593 } 12594 12595 btf = btf_get_by_fd(attr->prog_btf_fd); 12596 if (IS_ERR(btf)) 12597 return PTR_ERR(btf); 12598 if (btf_is_kernel(btf)) { 12599 btf_put(btf); 12600 return -EACCES; 12601 } 12602 env->prog->aux->btf = btf; 12603 12604 err = check_btf_func(env, attr, uattr); 12605 if (err) 12606 return err; 12607 12608 err = check_btf_line(env, attr, uattr); 12609 if (err) 12610 return err; 12611 12612 err = check_core_relo(env, attr, uattr); 12613 if (err) 12614 return err; 12615 12616 return 0; 12617 } 12618 12619 /* check %cur's range satisfies %old's */ 12620 static bool range_within(struct bpf_reg_state *old, 12621 struct bpf_reg_state *cur) 12622 { 12623 return old->umin_value <= cur->umin_value && 12624 old->umax_value >= cur->umax_value && 12625 old->smin_value <= cur->smin_value && 12626 old->smax_value >= cur->smax_value && 12627 old->u32_min_value <= cur->u32_min_value && 12628 old->u32_max_value >= cur->u32_max_value && 12629 old->s32_min_value <= cur->s32_min_value && 12630 old->s32_max_value >= cur->s32_max_value; 12631 } 12632 12633 /* If in the old state two registers had the same id, then they need to have 12634 * the same id in the new state as well. But that id could be different from 12635 * the old state, so we need to track the mapping from old to new ids. 12636 * Once we have seen that, say, a reg with old id 5 had new id 9, any subsequent 12637 * regs with old id 5 must also have new id 9 for the new state to be safe. But 12638 * regs with a different old id could still have new id 9, we don't care about 12639 * that. 12640 * So we look through our idmap to see if this old id has been seen before. If 12641 * so, we require the new id to match; otherwise, we add the id pair to the map. 12642 */ 12643 static bool check_ids(u32 old_id, u32 cur_id, struct bpf_id_pair *idmap) 12644 { 12645 unsigned int i; 12646 12647 for (i = 0; i < BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE; i++) { 12648 if (!idmap[i].old) { 12649 /* Reached an empty slot; haven't seen this id before */ 12650 idmap[i].old = old_id; 12651 idmap[i].cur = cur_id; 12652 return true; 12653 } 12654 if (idmap[i].old == old_id) 12655 return idmap[i].cur == cur_id; 12656 } 12657 /* We ran out of idmap slots, which should be impossible */ 12658 WARN_ON_ONCE(1); 12659 return false; 12660 } 12661 12662 static void clean_func_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12663 struct bpf_func_state *st) 12664 { 12665 enum bpf_reg_liveness live; 12666 int i, j; 12667 12668 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) { 12669 live = st->regs[i].live; 12670 /* liveness must not touch this register anymore */ 12671 st->regs[i].live |= REG_LIVE_DONE; 12672 if (!(live & REG_LIVE_READ)) 12673 /* since the register is unused, clear its state 12674 * to make further comparison simpler 12675 */ 12676 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &st->regs[i]); 12677 } 12678 12679 for (i = 0; i < st->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 12680 live = st->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live; 12681 /* liveness must not touch this stack slot anymore */ 12682 st->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_DONE; 12683 if (!(live & REG_LIVE_READ)) { 12684 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &st->stack[i].spilled_ptr); 12685 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 12686 st->stack[i].slot_type[j] = STACK_INVALID; 12687 } 12688 } 12689 } 12690 12691 static void clean_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12692 struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 12693 { 12694 int i; 12695 12696 if (st->frame[0]->regs[0].live & REG_LIVE_DONE) 12697 /* all regs in this state in all frames were already marked */ 12698 return; 12699 12700 for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) 12701 clean_func_state(env, st->frame[i]); 12702 } 12703 12704 /* the parentage chains form a tree. 12705 * the verifier states are added to state lists at given insn and 12706 * pushed into state stack for future exploration. 12707 * when the verifier reaches bpf_exit insn some of the verifer states 12708 * stored in the state lists have their final liveness state already, 12709 * but a lot of states will get revised from liveness point of view when 12710 * the verifier explores other branches. 12711 * Example: 12712 * 1: r0 = 1 12713 * 2: if r1 == 100 goto pc+1 12714 * 3: r0 = 2 12715 * 4: exit 12716 * when the verifier reaches exit insn the register r0 in the state list of 12717 * insn 2 will be seen as !REG_LIVE_READ. Then the verifier pops the other_branch 12718 * of insn 2 and goes exploring further. At the insn 4 it will walk the 12719 * parentage chain from insn 4 into insn 2 and will mark r0 as REG_LIVE_READ. 12720 * 12721 * Since the verifier pushes the branch states as it sees them while exploring 12722 * the program the condition of walking the branch instruction for the second 12723 * time means that all states below this branch were already explored and 12724 * their final liveness marks are already propagated. 12725 * Hence when the verifier completes the search of state list in is_state_visited() 12726 * we can call this clean_live_states() function to mark all liveness states 12727 * as REG_LIVE_DONE to indicate that 'parent' pointers of 'struct bpf_reg_state' 12728 * will not be used. 12729 * This function also clears the registers and stack for states that !READ 12730 * to simplify state merging. 12731 * 12732 * Important note here that walking the same branch instruction in the callee 12733 * doesn't meant that the states are DONE. The verifier has to compare 12734 * the callsites 12735 */ 12736 static void clean_live_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn, 12737 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 12738 { 12739 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl; 12740 int i; 12741 12742 sl = *explored_state(env, insn); 12743 while (sl) { 12744 if (sl->state.branches) 12745 goto next; 12746 if (sl->state.insn_idx != insn || 12747 sl->state.curframe != cur->curframe) 12748 goto next; 12749 for (i = 0; i <= cur->curframe; i++) 12750 if (sl->state.frame[i]->callsite != cur->frame[i]->callsite) 12751 goto next; 12752 clean_verifier_state(env, &sl->state); 12753 next: 12754 sl = sl->next; 12755 } 12756 } 12757 12758 /* Returns true if (rold safe implies rcur safe) */ 12759 static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold, 12760 struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, struct bpf_id_pair *idmap) 12761 { 12762 bool equal; 12763 12764 if (!(rold->live & REG_LIVE_READ)) 12765 /* explored state didn't use this */ 12766 return true; 12767 12768 equal = memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, parent)) == 0; 12769 12770 if (rold->type == PTR_TO_STACK) 12771 /* two stack pointers are equal only if they're pointing to 12772 * the same stack frame, since fp-8 in foo != fp-8 in bar 12773 */ 12774 return equal && rold->frameno == rcur->frameno; 12775 12776 if (equal) 12777 return true; 12778 12779 if (rold->type == NOT_INIT) 12780 /* explored state can't have used this */ 12781 return true; 12782 if (rcur->type == NOT_INIT) 12783 return false; 12784 switch (base_type(rold->type)) { 12785 case SCALAR_VALUE: 12786 if (env->explore_alu_limits) 12787 return false; 12788 if (rcur->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 12789 if (!rold->precise) 12790 return true; 12791 /* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */ 12792 return range_within(rold, rcur) && 12793 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off); 12794 } else { 12795 /* We're trying to use a pointer in place of a scalar. 12796 * Even if the scalar was unbounded, this could lead to 12797 * pointer leaks because scalars are allowed to leak 12798 * while pointers are not. We could make this safe in 12799 * special cases if root is calling us, but it's 12800 * probably not worth the hassle. 12801 */ 12802 return false; 12803 } 12804 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 12805 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 12806 /* a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE could be safe to use as a 12807 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL into the same map. 12808 * However, if the old PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL then got NULL- 12809 * checked, doing so could have affected others with the same 12810 * id, and we can't check for that because we lost the id when 12811 * we converted to a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE. 12812 */ 12813 if (type_may_be_null(rold->type)) { 12814 if (!type_may_be_null(rcur->type)) 12815 return false; 12816 if (memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id))) 12817 return false; 12818 /* Check our ids match any regs they're supposed to */ 12819 return check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap); 12820 } 12821 12822 /* If the new min/max/var_off satisfy the old ones and 12823 * everything else matches, we are OK. 12824 * 'id' is not compared, since it's only used for maps with 12825 * bpf_spin_lock inside map element and in such cases if 12826 * the rest of the prog is valid for one map element then 12827 * it's valid for all map elements regardless of the key 12828 * used in bpf_map_lookup() 12829 */ 12830 return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0 && 12831 range_within(rold, rcur) && 12832 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off); 12833 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 12834 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 12835 if (rcur->type != rold->type) 12836 return false; 12837 /* We must have at least as much range as the old ptr 12838 * did, so that any accesses which were safe before are 12839 * still safe. This is true even if old range < old off, 12840 * since someone could have accessed through (ptr - k), or 12841 * even done ptr -= k in a register, to get a safe access. 12842 */ 12843 if (rold->range > rcur->range) 12844 return false; 12845 /* If the offsets don't match, we can't trust our alignment; 12846 * nor can we be sure that we won't fall out of range. 12847 */ 12848 if (rold->off != rcur->off) 12849 return false; 12850 /* id relations must be preserved */ 12851 if (rold->id && !check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap)) 12852 return false; 12853 /* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */ 12854 return range_within(rold, rcur) && 12855 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off); 12856 case PTR_TO_CTX: 12857 case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP: 12858 case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: 12859 case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS: 12860 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 12861 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 12862 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 12863 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 12864 /* Only valid matches are exact, which memcmp() above 12865 * would have accepted 12866 */ 12867 default: 12868 /* Don't know what's going on, just say it's not safe */ 12869 return false; 12870 } 12871 12872 /* Shouldn't get here; if we do, say it's not safe */ 12873 WARN_ON_ONCE(1); 12874 return false; 12875 } 12876 12877 static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old, 12878 struct bpf_func_state *cur, struct bpf_id_pair *idmap) 12879 { 12880 int i, spi; 12881 12882 /* walk slots of the explored stack and ignore any additional 12883 * slots in the current stack, since explored(safe) state 12884 * didn't use them 12885 */ 12886 for (i = 0; i < old->allocated_stack; i++) { 12887 spi = i / BPF_REG_SIZE; 12888 12889 if (!(old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live & REG_LIVE_READ)) { 12890 i += BPF_REG_SIZE - 1; 12891 /* explored state didn't use this */ 12892 continue; 12893 } 12894 12895 if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_INVALID) 12896 continue; 12897 12898 /* explored stack has more populated slots than current stack 12899 * and these slots were used 12900 */ 12901 if (i >= cur->allocated_stack) 12902 return false; 12903 12904 /* if old state was safe with misc data in the stack 12905 * it will be safe with zero-initialized stack. 12906 * The opposite is not true 12907 */ 12908 if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_MISC && 12909 cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_ZERO) 12910 continue; 12911 if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] != 12912 cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE]) 12913 /* Ex: old explored (safe) state has STACK_SPILL in 12914 * this stack slot, but current has STACK_MISC -> 12915 * this verifier states are not equivalent, 12916 * return false to continue verification of this path 12917 */ 12918 return false; 12919 if (i % BPF_REG_SIZE != BPF_REG_SIZE - 1) 12920 continue; 12921 if (!is_spilled_reg(&old->stack[spi])) 12922 continue; 12923 if (!regsafe(env, &old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, 12924 &cur->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, idmap)) 12925 /* when explored and current stack slot are both storing 12926 * spilled registers, check that stored pointers types 12927 * are the same as well. 12928 * Ex: explored safe path could have stored 12929 * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -8} 12930 * but current path has stored: 12931 * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -16} 12932 * such verifier states are not equivalent. 12933 * return false to continue verification of this path 12934 */ 12935 return false; 12936 } 12937 return true; 12938 } 12939 12940 static bool refsafe(struct bpf_func_state *old, struct bpf_func_state *cur) 12941 { 12942 if (old->acquired_refs != cur->acquired_refs) 12943 return false; 12944 return !memcmp(old->refs, cur->refs, 12945 sizeof(*old->refs) * old->acquired_refs); 12946 } 12947 12948 /* compare two verifier states 12949 * 12950 * all states stored in state_list are known to be valid, since 12951 * verifier reached 'bpf_exit' instruction through them 12952 * 12953 * this function is called when verifier exploring different branches of 12954 * execution popped from the state stack. If it sees an old state that has 12955 * more strict register state and more strict stack state then this execution 12956 * branch doesn't need to be explored further, since verifier already 12957 * concluded that more strict state leads to valid finish. 12958 * 12959 * Therefore two states are equivalent if register state is more conservative 12960 * and explored stack state is more conservative than the current one. 12961 * Example: 12962 * explored current 12963 * (slot1=INV slot2=MISC) == (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC) 12964 * (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC) != (slot1=INV slot2=MISC) 12965 * 12966 * In other words if current stack state (one being explored) has more 12967 * valid slots than old one that already passed validation, it means 12968 * the verifier can stop exploring and conclude that current state is valid too 12969 * 12970 * Similarly with registers. If explored state has register type as invalid 12971 * whereas register type in current state is meaningful, it means that 12972 * the current state will reach 'bpf_exit' instruction safely 12973 */ 12974 static bool func_states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old, 12975 struct bpf_func_state *cur) 12976 { 12977 int i; 12978 12979 memset(env->idmap_scratch, 0, sizeof(env->idmap_scratch)); 12980 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) 12981 if (!regsafe(env, &old->regs[i], &cur->regs[i], 12982 env->idmap_scratch)) 12983 return false; 12984 12985 if (!stacksafe(env, old, cur, env->idmap_scratch)) 12986 return false; 12987 12988 if (!refsafe(old, cur)) 12989 return false; 12990 12991 return true; 12992 } 12993 12994 static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12995 struct bpf_verifier_state *old, 12996 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 12997 { 12998 int i; 12999 13000 if (old->curframe != cur->curframe) 13001 return false; 13002 13003 /* Verification state from speculative execution simulation 13004 * must never prune a non-speculative execution one. 13005 */ 13006 if (old->speculative && !cur->speculative) 13007 return false; 13008 13009 if (old->active_lock.ptr != cur->active_lock.ptr || 13010 old->active_lock.id != cur->active_lock.id) 13011 return false; 13012 13013 /* for states to be equal callsites have to be the same 13014 * and all frame states need to be equivalent 13015 */ 13016 for (i = 0; i <= old->curframe; i++) { 13017 if (old->frame[i]->callsite != cur->frame[i]->callsite) 13018 return false; 13019 if (!func_states_equal(env, old->frame[i], cur->frame[i])) 13020 return false; 13021 } 13022 return true; 13023 } 13024 13025 /* Return 0 if no propagation happened. Return negative error code if error 13026 * happened. Otherwise, return the propagated bit. 13027 */ 13028 static int propagate_liveness_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 13029 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 13030 struct bpf_reg_state *parent_reg) 13031 { 13032 u8 parent_flag = parent_reg->live & REG_LIVE_READ; 13033 u8 flag = reg->live & REG_LIVE_READ; 13034 int err; 13035 13036 /* When comes here, read flags of PARENT_REG or REG could be any of 13037 * REG_LIVE_READ64, REG_LIVE_READ32, REG_LIVE_NONE. There is no need 13038 * of propagation if PARENT_REG has strongest REG_LIVE_READ64. 13039 */ 13040 if (parent_flag == REG_LIVE_READ64 || 13041 /* Or if there is no read flag from REG. */ 13042 !flag || 13043 /* Or if the read flag from REG is the same as PARENT_REG. */ 13044 parent_flag == flag) 13045 return 0; 13046 13047 err = mark_reg_read(env, reg, parent_reg, flag); 13048 if (err) 13049 return err; 13050 13051 return flag; 13052 } 13053 13054 /* A write screens off any subsequent reads; but write marks come from the 13055 * straight-line code between a state and its parent. When we arrive at an 13056 * equivalent state (jump target or such) we didn't arrive by the straight-line 13057 * code, so read marks in the state must propagate to the parent regardless 13058 * of the state's write marks. That's what 'parent == state->parent' comparison 13059 * in mark_reg_read() is for. 13060 */ 13061 static int propagate_liveness(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 13062 const struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, 13063 struct bpf_verifier_state *vparent) 13064 { 13065 struct bpf_reg_state *state_reg, *parent_reg; 13066 struct bpf_func_state *state, *parent; 13067 int i, frame, err = 0; 13068 13069 if (vparent->curframe != vstate->curframe) { 13070 WARN(1, "propagate_live: parent frame %d current frame %d\n", 13071 vparent->curframe, vstate->curframe); 13072 return -EFAULT; 13073 } 13074 /* Propagate read liveness of registers... */ 13075 BUILD_BUG_ON(BPF_REG_FP + 1 != MAX_BPF_REG); 13076 for (frame = 0; frame <= vstate->curframe; frame++) { 13077 parent = vparent->frame[frame]; 13078 state = vstate->frame[frame]; 13079 parent_reg = parent->regs; 13080 state_reg = state->regs; 13081 /* We don't need to worry about FP liveness, it's read-only */ 13082 for (i = frame < vstate->curframe ? BPF_REG_6 : 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) { 13083 err = propagate_liveness_reg(env, &state_reg[i], 13084 &parent_reg[i]); 13085 if (err < 0) 13086 return err; 13087 if (err == REG_LIVE_READ64) 13088 mark_insn_zext(env, &parent_reg[i]); 13089 } 13090 13091 /* Propagate stack slots. */ 13092 for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE && 13093 i < parent->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 13094 parent_reg = &parent->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 13095 state_reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 13096 err = propagate_liveness_reg(env, state_reg, 13097 parent_reg); 13098 if (err < 0) 13099 return err; 13100 } 13101 } 13102 return 0; 13103 } 13104 13105 /* find precise scalars in the previous equivalent state and 13106 * propagate them into the current state 13107 */ 13108 static int propagate_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 13109 const struct bpf_verifier_state *old) 13110 { 13111 struct bpf_reg_state *state_reg; 13112 struct bpf_func_state *state; 13113 int i, err = 0, fr; 13114 13115 for (fr = old->curframe; fr >= 0; fr--) { 13116 state = old->frame[fr]; 13117 state_reg = state->regs; 13118 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++, state_reg++) { 13119 if (state_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || 13120 !state_reg->precise) 13121 continue; 13122 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) 13123 verbose(env, "frame %d: propagating r%d\n", i, fr); 13124 err = mark_chain_precision_frame(env, fr, i); 13125 if (err < 0) 13126 return err; 13127 } 13128 13129 for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 13130 if (!is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[i])) 13131 continue; 13132 state_reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 13133 if (state_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || 13134 !state_reg->precise) 13135 continue; 13136 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) 13137 verbose(env, "frame %d: propagating fp%d\n", 13138 (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE, fr); 13139 err = mark_chain_precision_stack_frame(env, fr, i); 13140 if (err < 0) 13141 return err; 13142 } 13143 } 13144 return 0; 13145 } 13146 13147 static bool states_maybe_looping(struct bpf_verifier_state *old, 13148 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 13149 { 13150 struct bpf_func_state *fold, *fcur; 13151 int i, fr = cur->curframe; 13152 13153 if (old->curframe != fr) 13154 return false; 13155 13156 fold = old->frame[fr]; 13157 fcur = cur->frame[fr]; 13158 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) 13159 if (memcmp(&fold->regs[i], &fcur->regs[i], 13160 offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, parent))) 13161 return false; 13162 return true; 13163 } 13164 13165 13166 static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 13167 { 13168 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *new_sl; 13169 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl, **pprev; 13170 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state, *new; 13171 int i, j, err, states_cnt = 0; 13172 bool add_new_state = env->test_state_freq ? true : false; 13173 13174 cur->last_insn_idx = env->prev_insn_idx; 13175 if (!env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].prune_point) 13176 /* this 'insn_idx' instruction wasn't marked, so we will not 13177 * be doing state search here 13178 */ 13179 return 0; 13180 13181 /* bpf progs typically have pruning point every 4 instructions 13182 * http://vger.kernel.org/bpfconf2019.html#session-1 13183 * Do not add new state for future pruning if the verifier hasn't seen 13184 * at least 2 jumps and at least 8 instructions. 13185 * This heuristics helps decrease 'total_states' and 'peak_states' metric. 13186 * In tests that amounts to up to 50% reduction into total verifier 13187 * memory consumption and 20% verifier time speedup. 13188 */ 13189 if (env->jmps_processed - env->prev_jmps_processed >= 2 && 13190 env->insn_processed - env->prev_insn_processed >= 8) 13191 add_new_state = true; 13192 13193 pprev = explored_state(env, insn_idx); 13194 sl = *pprev; 13195 13196 clean_live_states(env, insn_idx, cur); 13197 13198 while (sl) { 13199 states_cnt++; 13200 if (sl->state.insn_idx != insn_idx) 13201 goto next; 13202 13203 if (sl->state.branches) { 13204 struct bpf_func_state *frame = sl->state.frame[sl->state.curframe]; 13205 13206 if (frame->in_async_callback_fn && 13207 frame->async_entry_cnt != cur->frame[cur->curframe]->async_entry_cnt) { 13208 /* Different async_entry_cnt means that the verifier is 13209 * processing another entry into async callback. 13210 * Seeing the same state is not an indication of infinite 13211 * loop or infinite recursion. 13212 * But finding the same state doesn't mean that it's safe 13213 * to stop processing the current state. The previous state 13214 * hasn't yet reached bpf_exit, since state.branches > 0. 13215 * Checking in_async_callback_fn alone is not enough either. 13216 * Since the verifier still needs to catch infinite loops 13217 * inside async callbacks. 13218 */ 13219 } else if (states_maybe_looping(&sl->state, cur) && 13220 states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur)) { 13221 verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; "); 13222 verbose(env, "infinite loop detected at insn %d\n", insn_idx); 13223 return -EINVAL; 13224 } 13225 /* if the verifier is processing a loop, avoid adding new state 13226 * too often, since different loop iterations have distinct 13227 * states and may not help future pruning. 13228 * This threshold shouldn't be too low to make sure that 13229 * a loop with large bound will be rejected quickly. 13230 * The most abusive loop will be: 13231 * r1 += 1 13232 * if r1 < 1000000 goto pc-2 13233 * 1M insn_procssed limit / 100 == 10k peak states. 13234 * This threshold shouldn't be too high either, since states 13235 * at the end of the loop are likely to be useful in pruning. 13236 */ 13237 if (env->jmps_processed - env->prev_jmps_processed < 20 && 13238 env->insn_processed - env->prev_insn_processed < 100) 13239 add_new_state = false; 13240 goto miss; 13241 } 13242 if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur)) { 13243 sl->hit_cnt++; 13244 /* reached equivalent register/stack state, 13245 * prune the search. 13246 * Registers read by the continuation are read by us. 13247 * If we have any write marks in env->cur_state, they 13248 * will prevent corresponding reads in the continuation 13249 * from reaching our parent (an explored_state). Our 13250 * own state will get the read marks recorded, but 13251 * they'll be immediately forgotten as we're pruning 13252 * this state and will pop a new one. 13253 */ 13254 err = propagate_liveness(env, &sl->state, cur); 13255 13256 /* if previous state reached the exit with precision and 13257 * current state is equivalent to it (except precsion marks) 13258 * the precision needs to be propagated back in 13259 * the current state. 13260 */ 13261 err = err ? : push_jmp_history(env, cur); 13262 err = err ? : propagate_precision(env, &sl->state); 13263 if (err) 13264 return err; 13265 return 1; 13266 } 13267 miss: 13268 /* when new state is not going to be added do not increase miss count. 13269 * Otherwise several loop iterations will remove the state 13270 * recorded earlier. The goal of these heuristics is to have 13271 * states from some iterations of the loop (some in the beginning 13272 * and some at the end) to help pruning. 13273 */ 13274 if (add_new_state) 13275 sl->miss_cnt++; 13276 /* heuristic to determine whether this state is beneficial 13277 * to keep checking from state equivalence point of view. 13278 * Higher numbers increase max_states_per_insn and verification time, 13279 * but do not meaningfully decrease insn_processed. 13280 */ 13281 if (sl->miss_cnt > sl->hit_cnt * 3 + 3) { 13282 /* the state is unlikely to be useful. Remove it to 13283 * speed up verification 13284 */ 13285 *pprev = sl->next; 13286 if (sl->state.frame[0]->regs[0].live & REG_LIVE_DONE) { 13287 u32 br = sl->state.branches; 13288 13289 WARN_ONCE(br, 13290 "BUG live_done but branches_to_explore %d\n", 13291 br); 13292 free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false); 13293 kfree(sl); 13294 env->peak_states--; 13295 } else { 13296 /* cannot free this state, since parentage chain may 13297 * walk it later. Add it for free_list instead to 13298 * be freed at the end of verification 13299 */ 13300 sl->next = env->free_list; 13301 env->free_list = sl; 13302 } 13303 sl = *pprev; 13304 continue; 13305 } 13306 next: 13307 pprev = &sl->next; 13308 sl = *pprev; 13309 } 13310 13311 if (env->max_states_per_insn < states_cnt) 13312 env->max_states_per_insn = states_cnt; 13313 13314 if (!env->bpf_capable && states_cnt > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES) 13315 return push_jmp_history(env, cur); 13316 13317 if (!add_new_state) 13318 return push_jmp_history(env, cur); 13319 13320 /* There were no equivalent states, remember the current one. 13321 * Technically the current state is not proven to be safe yet, 13322 * but it will either reach outer most bpf_exit (which means it's safe) 13323 * or it will be rejected. When there are no loops the verifier won't be 13324 * seeing this tuple (frame[0].callsite, frame[1].callsite, .. insn_idx) 13325 * again on the way to bpf_exit. 13326 * When looping the sl->state.branches will be > 0 and this state 13327 * will not be considered for equivalence until branches == 0. 13328 */ 13329 new_sl = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list), GFP_KERNEL); 13330 if (!new_sl) 13331 return -ENOMEM; 13332 env->total_states++; 13333 env->peak_states++; 13334 env->prev_jmps_processed = env->jmps_processed; 13335 env->prev_insn_processed = env->insn_processed; 13336 13337 /* forget precise markings we inherited, see __mark_chain_precision */ 13338 if (env->bpf_capable) 13339 mark_all_scalars_imprecise(env, cur); 13340 13341 /* add new state to the head of linked list */ 13342 new = &new_sl->state; 13343 err = copy_verifier_state(new, cur); 13344 if (err) { 13345 free_verifier_state(new, false); 13346 kfree(new_sl); 13347 return err; 13348 } 13349 new->insn_idx = insn_idx; 13350 WARN_ONCE(new->branches != 1, 13351 "BUG is_state_visited:branches_to_explore=%d insn %d\n", new->branches, insn_idx); 13352 13353 cur->parent = new; 13354 cur->first_insn_idx = insn_idx; 13355 clear_jmp_history(cur); 13356 new_sl->next = *explored_state(env, insn_idx); 13357 *explored_state(env, insn_idx) = new_sl; 13358 /* connect new state to parentage chain. Current frame needs all 13359 * registers connected. Only r6 - r9 of the callers are alive (pushed 13360 * to the stack implicitly by JITs) so in callers' frames connect just 13361 * r6 - r9 as an optimization. Callers will have r1 - r5 connected to 13362 * the state of the call instruction (with WRITTEN set), and r0 comes 13363 * from callee with its full parentage chain, anyway. 13364 */ 13365 /* clear write marks in current state: the writes we did are not writes 13366 * our child did, so they don't screen off its reads from us. 13367 * (There are no read marks in current state, because reads always mark 13368 * their parent and current state never has children yet. Only 13369 * explored_states can get read marks.) 13370 */ 13371 for (j = 0; j <= cur->curframe; j++) { 13372 for (i = j < cur->curframe ? BPF_REG_6 : 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) 13373 cur->frame[j]->regs[i].parent = &new->frame[j]->regs[i]; 13374 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) 13375 cur->frame[j]->regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE; 13376 } 13377 13378 /* all stack frames are accessible from callee, clear them all */ 13379 for (j = 0; j <= cur->curframe; j++) { 13380 struct bpf_func_state *frame = cur->frame[j]; 13381 struct bpf_func_state *newframe = new->frame[j]; 13382 13383 for (i = 0; i < frame->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 13384 frame->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live = REG_LIVE_NONE; 13385 frame->stack[i].spilled_ptr.parent = 13386 &newframe->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 13387 } 13388 } 13389 return 0; 13390 } 13391 13392 /* Return true if it's OK to have the same insn return a different type. */ 13393 static bool reg_type_mismatch_ok(enum bpf_reg_type type) 13394 { 13395 switch (base_type(type)) { 13396 case PTR_TO_CTX: 13397 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 13398 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 13399 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 13400 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 13401 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 13402 return false; 13403 default: 13404 return true; 13405 } 13406 } 13407 13408 /* If an instruction was previously used with particular pointer types, then we 13409 * need to be careful to avoid cases such as the below, where it may be ok 13410 * for one branch accessing the pointer, but not ok for the other branch: 13411 * 13412 * R1 = sock_ptr 13413 * goto X; 13414 * ... 13415 * R1 = some_other_valid_ptr; 13416 * goto X; 13417 * ... 13418 * R2 = *(u32 *)(R1 + 0); 13419 */ 13420 static bool reg_type_mismatch(enum bpf_reg_type src, enum bpf_reg_type prev) 13421 { 13422 return src != prev && (!reg_type_mismatch_ok(src) || 13423 !reg_type_mismatch_ok(prev)); 13424 } 13425 13426 static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 13427 { 13428 bool pop_log = !(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2); 13429 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 13430 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; 13431 struct bpf_reg_state *regs; 13432 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 13433 bool do_print_state = false; 13434 int prev_insn_idx = -1; 13435 13436 for (;;) { 13437 struct bpf_insn *insn; 13438 u8 class; 13439 int err; 13440 13441 env->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx; 13442 if (env->insn_idx >= insn_cnt) { 13443 verbose(env, "invalid insn idx %d insn_cnt %d\n", 13444 env->insn_idx, insn_cnt); 13445 return -EFAULT; 13446 } 13447 13448 insn = &insns[env->insn_idx]; 13449 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); 13450 13451 if (++env->insn_processed > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS) { 13452 verbose(env, 13453 "BPF program is too large. Processed %d insn\n", 13454 env->insn_processed); 13455 return -E2BIG; 13456 } 13457 13458 err = is_state_visited(env, env->insn_idx); 13459 if (err < 0) 13460 return err; 13461 if (err == 1) { 13462 /* found equivalent state, can prune the search */ 13463 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 13464 if (do_print_state) 13465 verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d%s: safe\n", 13466 env->prev_insn_idx, env->insn_idx, 13467 env->cur_state->speculative ? 13468 " (speculative execution)" : ""); 13469 else 13470 verbose(env, "%d: safe\n", env->insn_idx); 13471 } 13472 goto process_bpf_exit; 13473 } 13474 13475 if (signal_pending(current)) 13476 return -EAGAIN; 13477 13478 if (need_resched()) 13479 cond_resched(); 13480 13481 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2 && do_print_state) { 13482 verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d%s:", 13483 env->prev_insn_idx, env->insn_idx, 13484 env->cur_state->speculative ? 13485 " (speculative execution)" : ""); 13486 print_verifier_state(env, state->frame[state->curframe], true); 13487 do_print_state = false; 13488 } 13489 13490 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 13491 const struct bpf_insn_cbs cbs = { 13492 .cb_call = disasm_kfunc_name, 13493 .cb_print = verbose, 13494 .private_data = env, 13495 }; 13496 13497 if (verifier_state_scratched(env)) 13498 print_insn_state(env, state->frame[state->curframe]); 13499 13500 verbose_linfo(env, env->insn_idx, "; "); 13501 env->prev_log_len = env->log.len_used; 13502 verbose(env, "%d: ", env->insn_idx); 13503 print_bpf_insn(&cbs, insn, env->allow_ptr_leaks); 13504 env->prev_insn_print_len = env->log.len_used - env->prev_log_len; 13505 env->prev_log_len = env->log.len_used; 13506 } 13507 13508 if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) { 13509 err = bpf_prog_offload_verify_insn(env, env->insn_idx, 13510 env->prev_insn_idx); 13511 if (err) 13512 return err; 13513 } 13514 13515 regs = cur_regs(env); 13516 sanitize_mark_insn_seen(env); 13517 prev_insn_idx = env->insn_idx; 13518 13519 if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) { 13520 err = check_alu_op(env, insn); 13521 if (err) 13522 return err; 13523 13524 } else if (class == BPF_LDX) { 13525 enum bpf_reg_type *prev_src_type, src_reg_type; 13526 13527 /* check for reserved fields is already done */ 13528 13529 /* check src operand */ 13530 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 13531 if (err) 13532 return err; 13533 13534 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK); 13535 if (err) 13536 return err; 13537 13538 src_reg_type = regs[insn->src_reg].type; 13539 13540 /* check that memory (src_reg + off) is readable, 13541 * the state of dst_reg will be updated by this func 13542 */ 13543 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->src_reg, 13544 insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), 13545 BPF_READ, insn->dst_reg, false); 13546 if (err) 13547 return err; 13548 13549 prev_src_type = &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].ptr_type; 13550 13551 if (*prev_src_type == NOT_INIT) { 13552 /* saw a valid insn 13553 * dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + off) 13554 * save type to validate intersecting paths 13555 */ 13556 *prev_src_type = src_reg_type; 13557 13558 } else if (reg_type_mismatch(src_reg_type, *prev_src_type)) { 13559 /* ABuser program is trying to use the same insn 13560 * dst_reg = *(u32*) (src_reg + off) 13561 * with different pointer types: 13562 * src_reg == ctx in one branch and 13563 * src_reg == stack|map in some other branch. 13564 * Reject it. 13565 */ 13566 verbose(env, "same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n"); 13567 return -EINVAL; 13568 } 13569 13570 } else if (class == BPF_STX) { 13571 enum bpf_reg_type *prev_dst_type, dst_reg_type; 13572 13573 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC) { 13574 err = check_atomic(env, env->insn_idx, insn); 13575 if (err) 13576 return err; 13577 env->insn_idx++; 13578 continue; 13579 } 13580 13581 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0) { 13582 verbose(env, "BPF_STX uses reserved fields\n"); 13583 return -EINVAL; 13584 } 13585 13586 /* check src1 operand */ 13587 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 13588 if (err) 13589 return err; 13590 /* check src2 operand */ 13591 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 13592 if (err) 13593 return err; 13594 13595 dst_reg_type = regs[insn->dst_reg].type; 13596 13597 /* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */ 13598 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, 13599 insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), 13600 BPF_WRITE, insn->src_reg, false); 13601 if (err) 13602 return err; 13603 13604 prev_dst_type = &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].ptr_type; 13605 13606 if (*prev_dst_type == NOT_INIT) { 13607 *prev_dst_type = dst_reg_type; 13608 } else if (reg_type_mismatch(dst_reg_type, *prev_dst_type)) { 13609 verbose(env, "same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n"); 13610 return -EINVAL; 13611 } 13612 13613 } else if (class == BPF_ST) { 13614 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || 13615 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) { 13616 verbose(env, "BPF_ST uses reserved fields\n"); 13617 return -EINVAL; 13618 } 13619 /* check src operand */ 13620 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 13621 if (err) 13622 return err; 13623 13624 if (is_ctx_reg(env, insn->dst_reg)) { 13625 verbose(env, "BPF_ST stores into R%d %s is not allowed\n", 13626 insn->dst_reg, 13627 reg_type_str(env, reg_state(env, insn->dst_reg)->type)); 13628 return -EACCES; 13629 } 13630 13631 /* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */ 13632 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, 13633 insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), 13634 BPF_WRITE, -1, false); 13635 if (err) 13636 return err; 13637 13638 } else if (class == BPF_JMP || class == BPF_JMP32) { 13639 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 13640 13641 env->jmps_processed++; 13642 if (opcode == BPF_CALL) { 13643 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || 13644 (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL 13645 && insn->off != 0) || 13646 (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 && 13647 insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL && 13648 insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) || 13649 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 13650 class == BPF_JMP32) { 13651 verbose(env, "BPF_CALL uses reserved fields\n"); 13652 return -EINVAL; 13653 } 13654 13655 if (env->cur_state->active_lock.ptr) { 13656 if ((insn->src_reg == BPF_REG_0 && insn->imm != BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock) || 13657 (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) || 13658 (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL && 13659 (insn->off != 0 || !is_bpf_list_api_kfunc(insn->imm)))) { 13660 verbose(env, "function calls are not allowed while holding a lock\n"); 13661 return -EINVAL; 13662 } 13663 } 13664 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 13665 err = check_func_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); 13666 else if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) 13667 err = check_kfunc_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); 13668 else 13669 err = check_helper_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); 13670 if (err) 13671 return err; 13672 } else if (opcode == BPF_JA) { 13673 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || 13674 insn->imm != 0 || 13675 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 13676 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 13677 class == BPF_JMP32) { 13678 verbose(env, "BPF_JA uses reserved fields\n"); 13679 return -EINVAL; 13680 } 13681 13682 env->insn_idx += insn->off + 1; 13683 continue; 13684 13685 } else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) { 13686 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || 13687 insn->imm != 0 || 13688 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 13689 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 13690 class == BPF_JMP32) { 13691 verbose(env, "BPF_EXIT uses reserved fields\n"); 13692 return -EINVAL; 13693 } 13694 13695 if (env->cur_state->active_lock.ptr) { 13696 verbose(env, "bpf_spin_unlock is missing\n"); 13697 return -EINVAL; 13698 } 13699 13700 /* We must do check_reference_leak here before 13701 * prepare_func_exit to handle the case when 13702 * state->curframe > 0, it may be a callback 13703 * function, for which reference_state must 13704 * match caller reference state when it exits. 13705 */ 13706 err = check_reference_leak(env); 13707 if (err) 13708 return err; 13709 13710 if (state->curframe) { 13711 /* exit from nested function */ 13712 err = prepare_func_exit(env, &env->insn_idx); 13713 if (err) 13714 return err; 13715 do_print_state = true; 13716 continue; 13717 } 13718 13719 err = check_return_code(env); 13720 if (err) 13721 return err; 13722 process_bpf_exit: 13723 mark_verifier_state_scratched(env); 13724 update_branch_counts(env, env->cur_state); 13725 err = pop_stack(env, &prev_insn_idx, 13726 &env->insn_idx, pop_log); 13727 if (err < 0) { 13728 if (err != -ENOENT) 13729 return err; 13730 break; 13731 } else { 13732 do_print_state = true; 13733 continue; 13734 } 13735 } else { 13736 err = check_cond_jmp_op(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); 13737 if (err) 13738 return err; 13739 } 13740 } else if (class == BPF_LD) { 13741 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); 13742 13743 if (mode == BPF_ABS || mode == BPF_IND) { 13744 err = check_ld_abs(env, insn); 13745 if (err) 13746 return err; 13747 13748 } else if (mode == BPF_IMM) { 13749 err = check_ld_imm(env, insn); 13750 if (err) 13751 return err; 13752 13753 env->insn_idx++; 13754 sanitize_mark_insn_seen(env); 13755 } else { 13756 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD mode\n"); 13757 return -EINVAL; 13758 } 13759 } else { 13760 verbose(env, "unknown insn class %d\n", class); 13761 return -EINVAL; 13762 } 13763 13764 env->insn_idx++; 13765 } 13766 13767 return 0; 13768 } 13769 13770 static int find_btf_percpu_datasec(struct btf *btf) 13771 { 13772 const struct btf_type *t; 13773 const char *tname; 13774 int i, n; 13775 13776 /* 13777 * Both vmlinux and module each have their own ".data..percpu" 13778 * DATASECs in BTF. So for module's case, we need to skip vmlinux BTF 13779 * types to look at only module's own BTF types. 13780 */ 13781 n = btf_nr_types(btf); 13782 if (btf_is_module(btf)) 13783 i = btf_nr_types(btf_vmlinux); 13784 else 13785 i = 1; 13786 13787 for(; i < n; i++) { 13788 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, i); 13789 if (BTF_INFO_KIND(t->info) != BTF_KIND_DATASEC) 13790 continue; 13791 13792 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off); 13793 if (!strcmp(tname, ".data..percpu")) 13794 return i; 13795 } 13796 13797 return -ENOENT; 13798 } 13799 13800 /* replace pseudo btf_id with kernel symbol address */ 13801 static int check_pseudo_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 13802 struct bpf_insn *insn, 13803 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 13804 { 13805 const struct btf_var_secinfo *vsi; 13806 const struct btf_type *datasec; 13807 struct btf_mod_pair *btf_mod; 13808 const struct btf_type *t; 13809 const char *sym_name; 13810 bool percpu = false; 13811 u32 type, id = insn->imm; 13812 struct btf *btf; 13813 s32 datasec_id; 13814 u64 addr; 13815 int i, btf_fd, err; 13816 13817 btf_fd = insn[1].imm; 13818 if (btf_fd) { 13819 btf = btf_get_by_fd(btf_fd); 13820 if (IS_ERR(btf)) { 13821 verbose(env, "invalid module BTF object FD specified.\n"); 13822 return -EINVAL; 13823 } 13824 } else { 13825 if (!btf_vmlinux) { 13826 verbose(env, "kernel is missing BTF, make sure CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF=y is specified in Kconfig.\n"); 13827 return -EINVAL; 13828 } 13829 btf = btf_vmlinux; 13830 btf_get(btf); 13831 } 13832 13833 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, id); 13834 if (!t) { 13835 verbose(env, "ldimm64 insn specifies invalid btf_id %d.\n", id); 13836 err = -ENOENT; 13837 goto err_put; 13838 } 13839 13840 if (!btf_type_is_var(t)) { 13841 verbose(env, "pseudo btf_id %d in ldimm64 isn't KIND_VAR.\n", id); 13842 err = -EINVAL; 13843 goto err_put; 13844 } 13845 13846 sym_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off); 13847 addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(sym_name); 13848 if (!addr) { 13849 verbose(env, "ldimm64 failed to find the address for kernel symbol '%s'.\n", 13850 sym_name); 13851 err = -ENOENT; 13852 goto err_put; 13853 } 13854 13855 datasec_id = find_btf_percpu_datasec(btf); 13856 if (datasec_id > 0) { 13857 datasec = btf_type_by_id(btf, datasec_id); 13858 for_each_vsi(i, datasec, vsi) { 13859 if (vsi->type == id) { 13860 percpu = true; 13861 break; 13862 } 13863 } 13864 } 13865 13866 insn[0].imm = (u32)addr; 13867 insn[1].imm = addr >> 32; 13868 13869 type = t->type; 13870 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, type, NULL); 13871 if (percpu) { 13872 aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU; 13873 aux->btf_var.btf = btf; 13874 aux->btf_var.btf_id = type; 13875 } else if (!btf_type_is_struct(t)) { 13876 const struct btf_type *ret; 13877 const char *tname; 13878 u32 tsize; 13879 13880 /* resolve the type size of ksym. */ 13881 ret = btf_resolve_size(btf, t, &tsize); 13882 if (IS_ERR(ret)) { 13883 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off); 13884 verbose(env, "ldimm64 unable to resolve the size of type '%s': %ld\n", 13885 tname, PTR_ERR(ret)); 13886 err = -EINVAL; 13887 goto err_put; 13888 } 13889 aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY; 13890 aux->btf_var.mem_size = tsize; 13891 } else { 13892 aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 13893 aux->btf_var.btf = btf; 13894 aux->btf_var.btf_id = type; 13895 } 13896 13897 /* check whether we recorded this BTF (and maybe module) already */ 13898 for (i = 0; i < env->used_btf_cnt; i++) { 13899 if (env->used_btfs[i].btf == btf) { 13900 btf_put(btf); 13901 return 0; 13902 } 13903 } 13904 13905 if (env->used_btf_cnt >= MAX_USED_BTFS) { 13906 err = -E2BIG; 13907 goto err_put; 13908 } 13909 13910 btf_mod = &env->used_btfs[env->used_btf_cnt]; 13911 btf_mod->btf = btf; 13912 btf_mod->module = NULL; 13913 13914 /* if we reference variables from kernel module, bump its refcount */ 13915 if (btf_is_module(btf)) { 13916 btf_mod->module = btf_try_get_module(btf); 13917 if (!btf_mod->module) { 13918 err = -ENXIO; 13919 goto err_put; 13920 } 13921 } 13922 13923 env->used_btf_cnt++; 13924 13925 return 0; 13926 err_put: 13927 btf_put(btf); 13928 return err; 13929 } 13930 13931 static bool is_tracing_prog_type(enum bpf_prog_type type) 13932 { 13933 switch (type) { 13934 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE: 13935 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT: 13936 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT: 13937 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT: 13938 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT_WRITABLE: 13939 return true; 13940 default: 13941 return false; 13942 } 13943 } 13944 13945 static int check_map_prog_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 13946 struct bpf_map *map, 13947 struct bpf_prog *prog) 13948 13949 { 13950 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(prog); 13951 13952 if (btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_LIST_HEAD)) { 13953 if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type)) { 13954 verbose(env, "tracing progs cannot use bpf_list_head yet\n"); 13955 return -EINVAL; 13956 } 13957 } 13958 13959 if (btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_SPIN_LOCK)) { 13960 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) { 13961 verbose(env, "socket filter progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n"); 13962 return -EINVAL; 13963 } 13964 13965 if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type)) { 13966 verbose(env, "tracing progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n"); 13967 return -EINVAL; 13968 } 13969 13970 if (prog->aux->sleepable) { 13971 verbose(env, "sleepable progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n"); 13972 return -EINVAL; 13973 } 13974 } 13975 13976 if (btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_TIMER)) { 13977 if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type)) { 13978 verbose(env, "tracing progs cannot use bpf_timer yet\n"); 13979 return -EINVAL; 13980 } 13981 } 13982 13983 if ((bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(prog->aux) || bpf_map_is_dev_bound(map)) && 13984 !bpf_offload_prog_map_match(prog, map)) { 13985 verbose(env, "offload device mismatch between prog and map\n"); 13986 return -EINVAL; 13987 } 13988 13989 if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) { 13990 verbose(env, "bpf_struct_ops map cannot be used in prog\n"); 13991 return -EINVAL; 13992 } 13993 13994 if (prog->aux->sleepable) 13995 switch (map->map_type) { 13996 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH: 13997 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_HASH: 13998 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY: 13999 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH: 14000 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY: 14001 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_PERCPU_HASH: 14002 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS: 14003 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS: 14004 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF: 14005 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF: 14006 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE: 14007 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE: 14008 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE: 14009 break; 14010 default: 14011 verbose(env, 14012 "Sleepable programs can only use array, hash, and ringbuf maps\n"); 14013 return -EINVAL; 14014 } 14015 14016 return 0; 14017 } 14018 14019 static bool bpf_map_is_cgroup_storage(struct bpf_map *map) 14020 { 14021 return (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE || 14022 map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE); 14023 } 14024 14025 /* find and rewrite pseudo imm in ld_imm64 instructions: 14026 * 14027 * 1. if it accesses map FD, replace it with actual map pointer. 14028 * 2. if it accesses btf_id of a VAR, replace it with pointer to the var. 14029 * 14030 * NOTE: btf_vmlinux is required for converting pseudo btf_id. 14031 */ 14032 static int resolve_pseudo_ldimm64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 14033 { 14034 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 14035 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 14036 int i, j, err; 14037 14038 err = bpf_prog_calc_tag(env->prog); 14039 if (err) 14040 return err; 14041 14042 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 14043 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX && 14044 (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0)) { 14045 verbose(env, "BPF_LDX uses reserved fields\n"); 14046 return -EINVAL; 14047 } 14048 14049 if (insn[0].code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) { 14050 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux; 14051 struct bpf_map *map; 14052 struct fd f; 14053 u64 addr; 14054 u32 fd; 14055 14056 if (i == insn_cnt - 1 || insn[1].code != 0 || 14057 insn[1].dst_reg != 0 || insn[1].src_reg != 0 || 14058 insn[1].off != 0) { 14059 verbose(env, "invalid bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n"); 14060 return -EINVAL; 14061 } 14062 14063 if (insn[0].src_reg == 0) 14064 /* valid generic load 64-bit imm */ 14065 goto next_insn; 14066 14067 if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_BTF_ID) { 14068 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i]; 14069 err = check_pseudo_btf_id(env, insn, aux); 14070 if (err) 14071 return err; 14072 goto next_insn; 14073 } 14074 14075 if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) { 14076 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i]; 14077 aux->ptr_type = PTR_TO_FUNC; 14078 goto next_insn; 14079 } 14080 14081 /* In final convert_pseudo_ld_imm64() step, this is 14082 * converted into regular 64-bit imm load insn. 14083 */ 14084 switch (insn[0].src_reg) { 14085 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE: 14086 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE: 14087 break; 14088 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD: 14089 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX: 14090 if (insn[1].imm == 0) 14091 break; 14092 fallthrough; 14093 default: 14094 verbose(env, "unrecognized bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n"); 14095 return -EINVAL; 14096 } 14097 14098 switch (insn[0].src_reg) { 14099 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE: 14100 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX: 14101 if (bpfptr_is_null(env->fd_array)) { 14102 verbose(env, "fd_idx without fd_array is invalid\n"); 14103 return -EPROTO; 14104 } 14105 if (copy_from_bpfptr_offset(&fd, env->fd_array, 14106 insn[0].imm * sizeof(fd), 14107 sizeof(fd))) 14108 return -EFAULT; 14109 break; 14110 default: 14111 fd = insn[0].imm; 14112 break; 14113 } 14114 14115 f = fdget(fd); 14116 map = __bpf_map_get(f); 14117 if (IS_ERR(map)) { 14118 verbose(env, "fd %d is not pointing to valid bpf_map\n", 14119 insn[0].imm); 14120 return PTR_ERR(map); 14121 } 14122 14123 err = check_map_prog_compatibility(env, map, env->prog); 14124 if (err) { 14125 fdput(f); 14126 return err; 14127 } 14128 14129 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i]; 14130 if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD || 14131 insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX) { 14132 addr = (unsigned long)map; 14133 } else { 14134 u32 off = insn[1].imm; 14135 14136 if (off >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 14137 verbose(env, "direct value offset of %u is not allowed\n", off); 14138 fdput(f); 14139 return -EINVAL; 14140 } 14141 14142 if (!map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) { 14143 verbose(env, "no direct value access support for this map type\n"); 14144 fdput(f); 14145 return -EINVAL; 14146 } 14147 14148 err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &addr, off); 14149 if (err) { 14150 verbose(env, "invalid access to map value pointer, value_size=%u off=%u\n", 14151 map->value_size, off); 14152 fdput(f); 14153 return err; 14154 } 14155 14156 aux->map_off = off; 14157 addr += off; 14158 } 14159 14160 insn[0].imm = (u32)addr; 14161 insn[1].imm = addr >> 32; 14162 14163 /* check whether we recorded this map already */ 14164 for (j = 0; j < env->used_map_cnt; j++) { 14165 if (env->used_maps[j] == map) { 14166 aux->map_index = j; 14167 fdput(f); 14168 goto next_insn; 14169 } 14170 } 14171 14172 if (env->used_map_cnt >= MAX_USED_MAPS) { 14173 fdput(f); 14174 return -E2BIG; 14175 } 14176 14177 /* hold the map. If the program is rejected by verifier, 14178 * the map will be released by release_maps() or it 14179 * will be used by the valid program until it's unloaded 14180 * and all maps are released in free_used_maps() 14181 */ 14182 bpf_map_inc(map); 14183 14184 aux->map_index = env->used_map_cnt; 14185 env->used_maps[env->used_map_cnt++] = map; 14186 14187 if (bpf_map_is_cgroup_storage(map) && 14188 bpf_cgroup_storage_assign(env->prog->aux, map)) { 14189 verbose(env, "only one cgroup storage of each type is allowed\n"); 14190 fdput(f); 14191 return -EBUSY; 14192 } 14193 14194 fdput(f); 14195 next_insn: 14196 insn++; 14197 i++; 14198 continue; 14199 } 14200 14201 /* Basic sanity check before we invest more work here. */ 14202 if (!bpf_opcode_in_insntable(insn->code)) { 14203 verbose(env, "unknown opcode %02x\n", insn->code); 14204 return -EINVAL; 14205 } 14206 } 14207 14208 /* now all pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions load valid 14209 * 'struct bpf_map *' into a register instead of user map_fd. 14210 * These pointers will be used later by verifier to validate map access. 14211 */ 14212 return 0; 14213 } 14214 14215 /* drop refcnt of maps used by the rejected program */ 14216 static void release_maps(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 14217 { 14218 __bpf_free_used_maps(env->prog->aux, env->used_maps, 14219 env->used_map_cnt); 14220 } 14221 14222 /* drop refcnt of maps used by the rejected program */ 14223 static void release_btfs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 14224 { 14225 __bpf_free_used_btfs(env->prog->aux, env->used_btfs, 14226 env->used_btf_cnt); 14227 } 14228 14229 /* convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic BPF_LD_IMM64 */ 14230 static void convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 14231 { 14232 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 14233 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 14234 int i; 14235 14236 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 14237 if (insn->code != (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) 14238 continue; 14239 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) 14240 continue; 14241 insn->src_reg = 0; 14242 } 14243 } 14244 14245 /* single env->prog->insni[off] instruction was replaced with the range 14246 * insni[off, off + cnt). Adjust corresponding insn_aux_data by copying 14247 * [0, off) and [off, end) to new locations, so the patched range stays zero 14248 */ 14249 static void adjust_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 14250 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *new_data, 14251 struct bpf_prog *new_prog, u32 off, u32 cnt) 14252 { 14253 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *old_data = env->insn_aux_data; 14254 struct bpf_insn *insn = new_prog->insnsi; 14255 u32 old_seen = old_data[off].seen; 14256 u32 prog_len; 14257 int i; 14258 14259 /* aux info at OFF always needs adjustment, no matter fast path 14260 * (cnt == 1) is taken or not. There is no guarantee INSN at OFF is the 14261 * original insn at old prog. 14262 */ 14263 old_data[off].zext_dst = insn_has_def32(env, insn + off + cnt - 1); 14264 14265 if (cnt == 1) 14266 return; 14267 prog_len = new_prog->len; 14268 14269 memcpy(new_data, old_data, sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * off); 14270 memcpy(new_data + off + cnt - 1, old_data + off, 14271 sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * (prog_len - off - cnt + 1)); 14272 for (i = off; i < off + cnt - 1; i++) { 14273 /* Expand insni[off]'s seen count to the patched range. */ 14274 new_data[i].seen = old_seen; 14275 new_data[i].zext_dst = insn_has_def32(env, insn + i); 14276 } 14277 env->insn_aux_data = new_data; 14278 vfree(old_data); 14279 } 14280 14281 static void adjust_subprog_starts(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 len) 14282 { 14283 int i; 14284 14285 if (len == 1) 14286 return; 14287 /* NOTE: fake 'exit' subprog should be updated as well. */ 14288 for (i = 0; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 14289 if (env->subprog_info[i].start <= off) 14290 continue; 14291 env->subprog_info[i].start += len - 1; 14292 } 14293 } 14294 14295 static void adjust_poke_descs(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 off, u32 len) 14296 { 14297 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *tab = prog->aux->poke_tab; 14298 int i, sz = prog->aux->size_poke_tab; 14299 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *desc; 14300 14301 for (i = 0; i < sz; i++) { 14302 desc = &tab[i]; 14303 if (desc->insn_idx <= off) 14304 continue; 14305 desc->insn_idx += len - 1; 14306 } 14307 } 14308 14309 static struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, 14310 const struct bpf_insn *patch, u32 len) 14311 { 14312 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 14313 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *new_data = NULL; 14314 14315 if (len > 1) { 14316 new_data = vzalloc(array_size(env->prog->len + len - 1, 14317 sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data))); 14318 if (!new_data) 14319 return NULL; 14320 } 14321 14322 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_single(env->prog, off, patch, len); 14323 if (IS_ERR(new_prog)) { 14324 if (PTR_ERR(new_prog) == -ERANGE) 14325 verbose(env, 14326 "insn %d cannot be patched due to 16-bit range\n", 14327 env->insn_aux_data[off].orig_idx); 14328 vfree(new_data); 14329 return NULL; 14330 } 14331 adjust_insn_aux_data(env, new_data, new_prog, off, len); 14332 adjust_subprog_starts(env, off, len); 14333 adjust_poke_descs(new_prog, off, len); 14334 return new_prog; 14335 } 14336 14337 static int adjust_subprog_starts_after_remove(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 14338 u32 off, u32 cnt) 14339 { 14340 int i, j; 14341 14342 /* find first prog starting at or after off (first to remove) */ 14343 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) 14344 if (env->subprog_info[i].start >= off) 14345 break; 14346 /* find first prog starting at or after off + cnt (first to stay) */ 14347 for (j = i; j < env->subprog_cnt; j++) 14348 if (env->subprog_info[j].start >= off + cnt) 14349 break; 14350 /* if j doesn't start exactly at off + cnt, we are just removing 14351 * the front of previous prog 14352 */ 14353 if (env->subprog_info[j].start != off + cnt) 14354 j--; 14355 14356 if (j > i) { 14357 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 14358 int move; 14359 14360 /* move fake 'exit' subprog as well */ 14361 move = env->subprog_cnt + 1 - j; 14362 14363 memmove(env->subprog_info + i, 14364 env->subprog_info + j, 14365 sizeof(*env->subprog_info) * move); 14366 env->subprog_cnt -= j - i; 14367 14368 /* remove func_info */ 14369 if (aux->func_info) { 14370 move = aux->func_info_cnt - j; 14371 14372 memmove(aux->func_info + i, 14373 aux->func_info + j, 14374 sizeof(*aux->func_info) * move); 14375 aux->func_info_cnt -= j - i; 14376 /* func_info->insn_off is set after all code rewrites, 14377 * in adjust_btf_func() - no need to adjust 14378 */ 14379 } 14380 } else { 14381 /* convert i from "first prog to remove" to "first to adjust" */ 14382 if (env->subprog_info[i].start == off) 14383 i++; 14384 } 14385 14386 /* update fake 'exit' subprog as well */ 14387 for (; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++) 14388 env->subprog_info[i].start -= cnt; 14389 14390 return 0; 14391 } 14392 14393 static int bpf_adj_linfo_after_remove(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, 14394 u32 cnt) 14395 { 14396 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 14397 u32 i, l_off, l_cnt, nr_linfo; 14398 struct bpf_line_info *linfo; 14399 14400 nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; 14401 if (!nr_linfo) 14402 return 0; 14403 14404 linfo = prog->aux->linfo; 14405 14406 /* find first line info to remove, count lines to be removed */ 14407 for (i = 0; i < nr_linfo; i++) 14408 if (linfo[i].insn_off >= off) 14409 break; 14410 14411 l_off = i; 14412 l_cnt = 0; 14413 for (; i < nr_linfo; i++) 14414 if (linfo[i].insn_off < off + cnt) 14415 l_cnt++; 14416 else 14417 break; 14418 14419 /* First live insn doesn't match first live linfo, it needs to "inherit" 14420 * last removed linfo. prog is already modified, so prog->len == off 14421 * means no live instructions after (tail of the program was removed). 14422 */ 14423 if (prog->len != off && l_cnt && 14424 (i == nr_linfo || linfo[i].insn_off != off + cnt)) { 14425 l_cnt--; 14426 linfo[--i].insn_off = off + cnt; 14427 } 14428 14429 /* remove the line info which refer to the removed instructions */ 14430 if (l_cnt) { 14431 memmove(linfo + l_off, linfo + i, 14432 sizeof(*linfo) * (nr_linfo - i)); 14433 14434 prog->aux->nr_linfo -= l_cnt; 14435 nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; 14436 } 14437 14438 /* pull all linfo[i].insn_off >= off + cnt in by cnt */ 14439 for (i = l_off; i < nr_linfo; i++) 14440 linfo[i].insn_off -= cnt; 14441 14442 /* fix up all subprogs (incl. 'exit') which start >= off */ 14443 for (i = 0; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++) 14444 if (env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx > l_off) { 14445 /* program may have started in the removed region but 14446 * may not be fully removed 14447 */ 14448 if (env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx >= l_off + l_cnt) 14449 env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx -= l_cnt; 14450 else 14451 env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx = l_off; 14452 } 14453 14454 return 0; 14455 } 14456 14457 static int verifier_remove_insns(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 cnt) 14458 { 14459 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 14460 unsigned int orig_prog_len = env->prog->len; 14461 int err; 14462 14463 if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) 14464 bpf_prog_offload_remove_insns(env, off, cnt); 14465 14466 err = bpf_remove_insns(env->prog, off, cnt); 14467 if (err) 14468 return err; 14469 14470 err = adjust_subprog_starts_after_remove(env, off, cnt); 14471 if (err) 14472 return err; 14473 14474 err = bpf_adj_linfo_after_remove(env, off, cnt); 14475 if (err) 14476 return err; 14477 14478 memmove(aux_data + off, aux_data + off + cnt, 14479 sizeof(*aux_data) * (orig_prog_len - off - cnt)); 14480 14481 return 0; 14482 } 14483 14484 /* The verifier does more data flow analysis than llvm and will not 14485 * explore branches that are dead at run time. Malicious programs can 14486 * have dead code too. Therefore replace all dead at-run-time code 14487 * with 'ja -1'. 14488 * 14489 * Just nops are not optimal, e.g. if they would sit at the end of the 14490 * program and through another bug we would manage to jump there, then 14491 * we'd execute beyond program memory otherwise. Returning exception 14492 * code also wouldn't work since we can have subprogs where the dead 14493 * code could be located. 14494 */ 14495 static void sanitize_dead_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 14496 { 14497 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 14498 struct bpf_insn trap = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, -1); 14499 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 14500 const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 14501 int i; 14502 14503 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 14504 if (aux_data[i].seen) 14505 continue; 14506 memcpy(insn + i, &trap, sizeof(trap)); 14507 aux_data[i].zext_dst = false; 14508 } 14509 } 14510 14511 static bool insn_is_cond_jump(u8 code) 14512 { 14513 u8 op; 14514 14515 if (BPF_CLASS(code) == BPF_JMP32) 14516 return true; 14517 14518 if (BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP) 14519 return false; 14520 14521 op = BPF_OP(code); 14522 return op != BPF_JA && op != BPF_EXIT && op != BPF_CALL; 14523 } 14524 14525 static void opt_hard_wire_dead_code_branches(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 14526 { 14527 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 14528 struct bpf_insn ja = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0); 14529 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 14530 const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 14531 int i; 14532 14533 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 14534 if (!insn_is_cond_jump(insn->code)) 14535 continue; 14536 14537 if (!aux_data[i + 1].seen) 14538 ja.off = insn->off; 14539 else if (!aux_data[i + 1 + insn->off].seen) 14540 ja.off = 0; 14541 else 14542 continue; 14543 14544 if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) 14545 bpf_prog_offload_replace_insn(env, i, &ja); 14546 14547 memcpy(insn, &ja, sizeof(ja)); 14548 } 14549 } 14550 14551 static int opt_remove_dead_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 14552 { 14553 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 14554 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 14555 int i, err; 14556 14557 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 14558 int j; 14559 14560 j = 0; 14561 while (i + j < insn_cnt && !aux_data[i + j].seen) 14562 j++; 14563 if (!j) 14564 continue; 14565 14566 err = verifier_remove_insns(env, i, j); 14567 if (err) 14568 return err; 14569 insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 14570 } 14571 14572 return 0; 14573 } 14574 14575 static int opt_remove_nops(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 14576 { 14577 const struct bpf_insn ja = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0); 14578 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 14579 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 14580 int i, err; 14581 14582 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 14583 if (memcmp(&insn[i], &ja, sizeof(ja))) 14584 continue; 14585 14586 err = verifier_remove_insns(env, i, 1); 14587 if (err) 14588 return err; 14589 insn_cnt--; 14590 i--; 14591 } 14592 14593 return 0; 14594 } 14595 14596 static int opt_subreg_zext_lo32_rnd_hi32(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 14597 const union bpf_attr *attr) 14598 { 14599 struct bpf_insn *patch, zext_patch[2], rnd_hi32_patch[4]; 14600 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = env->insn_aux_data; 14601 int i, patch_len, delta = 0, len = env->prog->len; 14602 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; 14603 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 14604 bool rnd_hi32; 14605 14606 rnd_hi32 = attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_TEST_RND_HI32; 14607 zext_patch[1] = BPF_ZEXT_REG(0); 14608 rnd_hi32_patch[1] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_AX, 0); 14609 rnd_hi32_patch[2] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_AX, 32); 14610 rnd_hi32_patch[3] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, 0, BPF_REG_AX); 14611 for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { 14612 int adj_idx = i + delta; 14613 struct bpf_insn insn; 14614 int load_reg; 14615 14616 insn = insns[adj_idx]; 14617 load_reg = insn_def_regno(&insn); 14618 if (!aux[adj_idx].zext_dst) { 14619 u8 code, class; 14620 u32 imm_rnd; 14621 14622 if (!rnd_hi32) 14623 continue; 14624 14625 code = insn.code; 14626 class = BPF_CLASS(code); 14627 if (load_reg == -1) 14628 continue; 14629 14630 /* NOTE: arg "reg" (the fourth one) is only used for 14631 * BPF_STX + SRC_OP, so it is safe to pass NULL 14632 * here. 14633 */ 14634 if (is_reg64(env, &insn, load_reg, NULL, DST_OP)) { 14635 if (class == BPF_LD && 14636 BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_IMM) 14637 i++; 14638 continue; 14639 } 14640 14641 /* ctx load could be transformed into wider load. */ 14642 if (class == BPF_LDX && 14643 aux[adj_idx].ptr_type == PTR_TO_CTX) 14644 continue; 14645 14646 imm_rnd = get_random_u32(); 14647 rnd_hi32_patch[0] = insn; 14648 rnd_hi32_patch[1].imm = imm_rnd; 14649 rnd_hi32_patch[3].dst_reg = load_reg; 14650 patch = rnd_hi32_patch; 14651 patch_len = 4; 14652 goto apply_patch_buffer; 14653 } 14654 14655 /* Add in an zero-extend instruction if a) the JIT has requested 14656 * it or b) it's a CMPXCHG. 14657 * 14658 * The latter is because: BPF_CMPXCHG always loads a value into 14659 * R0, therefore always zero-extends. However some archs' 14660 * equivalent instruction only does this load when the 14661 * comparison is successful. This detail of CMPXCHG is 14662 * orthogonal to the general zero-extension behaviour of the 14663 * CPU, so it's treated independently of bpf_jit_needs_zext. 14664 */ 14665 if (!bpf_jit_needs_zext() && !is_cmpxchg_insn(&insn)) 14666 continue; 14667 14668 if (WARN_ON(load_reg == -1)) { 14669 verbose(env, "verifier bug. zext_dst is set, but no reg is defined\n"); 14670 return -EFAULT; 14671 } 14672 14673 zext_patch[0] = insn; 14674 zext_patch[1].dst_reg = load_reg; 14675 zext_patch[1].src_reg = load_reg; 14676 patch = zext_patch; 14677 patch_len = 2; 14678 apply_patch_buffer: 14679 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, adj_idx, patch, patch_len); 14680 if (!new_prog) 14681 return -ENOMEM; 14682 env->prog = new_prog; 14683 insns = new_prog->insnsi; 14684 aux = env->insn_aux_data; 14685 delta += patch_len - 1; 14686 } 14687 14688 return 0; 14689 } 14690 14691 /* convert load instructions that access fields of a context type into a 14692 * sequence of instructions that access fields of the underlying structure: 14693 * struct __sk_buff -> struct sk_buff 14694 * struct bpf_sock_ops -> struct sock 14695 */ 14696 static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 14697 { 14698 const struct bpf_verifier_ops *ops = env->ops; 14699 int i, cnt, size, ctx_field_size, delta = 0; 14700 const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 14701 struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16], *insn; 14702 u32 target_size, size_default, off; 14703 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 14704 enum bpf_access_type type; 14705 bool is_narrower_load; 14706 14707 if (ops->gen_prologue || env->seen_direct_write) { 14708 if (!ops->gen_prologue) { 14709 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 14710 return -EINVAL; 14711 } 14712 cnt = ops->gen_prologue(insn_buf, env->seen_direct_write, 14713 env->prog); 14714 if (cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) { 14715 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 14716 return -EINVAL; 14717 } else if (cnt) { 14718 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, 0, insn_buf, cnt); 14719 if (!new_prog) 14720 return -ENOMEM; 14721 14722 env->prog = new_prog; 14723 delta += cnt - 1; 14724 } 14725 } 14726 14727 if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) 14728 return 0; 14729 14730 insn = env->prog->insnsi + delta; 14731 14732 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 14733 bpf_convert_ctx_access_t convert_ctx_access; 14734 bool ctx_access; 14735 14736 if (insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || 14737 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || 14738 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || 14739 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW)) { 14740 type = BPF_READ; 14741 ctx_access = true; 14742 } else if (insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || 14743 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || 14744 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || 14745 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW) || 14746 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || 14747 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || 14748 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || 14749 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW)) { 14750 type = BPF_WRITE; 14751 ctx_access = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX; 14752 } else { 14753 continue; 14754 } 14755 14756 if (type == BPF_WRITE && 14757 env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].sanitize_stack_spill) { 14758 struct bpf_insn patch[] = { 14759 *insn, 14760 BPF_ST_NOSPEC(), 14761 }; 14762 14763 cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(patch); 14764 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, patch, cnt); 14765 if (!new_prog) 14766 return -ENOMEM; 14767 14768 delta += cnt - 1; 14769 env->prog = new_prog; 14770 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 14771 continue; 14772 } 14773 14774 if (!ctx_access) 14775 continue; 14776 14777 switch ((int)env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ptr_type) { 14778 case PTR_TO_CTX: 14779 if (!ops->convert_ctx_access) 14780 continue; 14781 convert_ctx_access = ops->convert_ctx_access; 14782 break; 14783 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 14784 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 14785 convert_ctx_access = bpf_sock_convert_ctx_access; 14786 break; 14787 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 14788 convert_ctx_access = bpf_tcp_sock_convert_ctx_access; 14789 break; 14790 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 14791 convert_ctx_access = bpf_xdp_sock_convert_ctx_access; 14792 break; 14793 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 14794 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED: 14795 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED: 14796 /* PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC always has a valid lifetime, unlike 14797 * PTR_TO_BTF_ID, and an active ref_obj_id, but the same cannot 14798 * be said once it is marked PTR_UNTRUSTED, hence we must handle 14799 * any faults for loads into such types. BPF_WRITE is disallowed 14800 * for this case. 14801 */ 14802 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_UNTRUSTED: 14803 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED | PTR_TRUSTED: 14804 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_TRUSTED: 14805 if (type == BPF_READ) { 14806 insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEM | 14807 BPF_SIZE((insn)->code); 14808 env->prog->aux->num_exentries++; 14809 } 14810 continue; 14811 default: 14812 continue; 14813 } 14814 14815 ctx_field_size = env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ctx_field_size; 14816 size = BPF_LDST_BYTES(insn); 14817 14818 /* If the read access is a narrower load of the field, 14819 * convert to a 4/8-byte load, to minimum program type specific 14820 * convert_ctx_access changes. If conversion is successful, 14821 * we will apply proper mask to the result. 14822 */ 14823 is_narrower_load = size < ctx_field_size; 14824 size_default = bpf_ctx_off_adjust_machine(ctx_field_size); 14825 off = insn->off; 14826 if (is_narrower_load) { 14827 u8 size_code; 14828 14829 if (type == BPF_WRITE) { 14830 verbose(env, "bpf verifier narrow ctx access misconfigured\n"); 14831 return -EINVAL; 14832 } 14833 14834 size_code = BPF_H; 14835 if (ctx_field_size == 4) 14836 size_code = BPF_W; 14837 else if (ctx_field_size == 8) 14838 size_code = BPF_DW; 14839 14840 insn->off = off & ~(size_default - 1); 14841 insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | size_code; 14842 } 14843 14844 target_size = 0; 14845 cnt = convert_ctx_access(type, insn, insn_buf, env->prog, 14846 &target_size); 14847 if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf) || 14848 (ctx_field_size && !target_size)) { 14849 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 14850 return -EINVAL; 14851 } 14852 14853 if (is_narrower_load && size < target_size) { 14854 u8 shift = bpf_ctx_narrow_access_offset( 14855 off, size, size_default) * 8; 14856 if (shift && cnt + 1 >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) { 14857 verbose(env, "bpf verifier narrow ctx load misconfigured\n"); 14858 return -EINVAL; 14859 } 14860 if (ctx_field_size <= 4) { 14861 if (shift) 14862 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_RSH, 14863 insn->dst_reg, 14864 shift); 14865 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg, 14866 (1 << size * 8) - 1); 14867 } else { 14868 if (shift) 14869 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH, 14870 insn->dst_reg, 14871 shift); 14872 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg, 14873 (1ULL << size * 8) - 1); 14874 } 14875 } 14876 14877 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 14878 if (!new_prog) 14879 return -ENOMEM; 14880 14881 delta += cnt - 1; 14882 14883 /* keep walking new program and skip insns we just inserted */ 14884 env->prog = new_prog; 14885 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 14886 } 14887 14888 return 0; 14889 } 14890 14891 static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 14892 { 14893 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog, **func, *tmp; 14894 int i, j, subprog_start, subprog_end = 0, len, subprog; 14895 struct bpf_map *map_ptr; 14896 struct bpf_insn *insn; 14897 void *old_bpf_func; 14898 int err, num_exentries; 14899 14900 if (env->subprog_cnt <= 1) 14901 return 0; 14902 14903 for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { 14904 if (!bpf_pseudo_func(insn) && !bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 14905 continue; 14906 14907 /* Upon error here we cannot fall back to interpreter but 14908 * need a hard reject of the program. Thus -EFAULT is 14909 * propagated in any case. 14910 */ 14911 subprog = find_subprog(env, i + insn->imm + 1); 14912 if (subprog < 0) { 14913 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", 14914 i + insn->imm + 1); 14915 return -EFAULT; 14916 } 14917 /* temporarily remember subprog id inside insn instead of 14918 * aux_data, since next loop will split up all insns into funcs 14919 */ 14920 insn->off = subprog; 14921 /* remember original imm in case JIT fails and fallback 14922 * to interpreter will be needed 14923 */ 14924 env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm = insn->imm; 14925 /* point imm to __bpf_call_base+1 from JITs point of view */ 14926 insn->imm = 1; 14927 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) 14928 /* jit (e.g. x86_64) may emit fewer instructions 14929 * if it learns a u32 imm is the same as a u64 imm. 14930 * Force a non zero here. 14931 */ 14932 insn[1].imm = 1; 14933 } 14934 14935 err = bpf_prog_alloc_jited_linfo(prog); 14936 if (err) 14937 goto out_undo_insn; 14938 14939 err = -ENOMEM; 14940 func = kcalloc(env->subprog_cnt, sizeof(prog), GFP_KERNEL); 14941 if (!func) 14942 goto out_undo_insn; 14943 14944 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 14945 subprog_start = subprog_end; 14946 subprog_end = env->subprog_info[i + 1].start; 14947 14948 len = subprog_end - subprog_start; 14949 /* bpf_prog_run() doesn't call subprogs directly, 14950 * hence main prog stats include the runtime of subprogs. 14951 * subprogs don't have IDs and not reachable via prog_get_next_id 14952 * func[i]->stats will never be accessed and stays NULL 14953 */ 14954 func[i] = bpf_prog_alloc_no_stats(bpf_prog_size(len), GFP_USER); 14955 if (!func[i]) 14956 goto out_free; 14957 memcpy(func[i]->insnsi, &prog->insnsi[subprog_start], 14958 len * sizeof(struct bpf_insn)); 14959 func[i]->type = prog->type; 14960 func[i]->len = len; 14961 if (bpf_prog_calc_tag(func[i])) 14962 goto out_free; 14963 func[i]->is_func = 1; 14964 func[i]->aux->func_idx = i; 14965 /* Below members will be freed only at prog->aux */ 14966 func[i]->aux->btf = prog->aux->btf; 14967 func[i]->aux->func_info = prog->aux->func_info; 14968 func[i]->aux->func_info_cnt = prog->aux->func_info_cnt; 14969 func[i]->aux->poke_tab = prog->aux->poke_tab; 14970 func[i]->aux->size_poke_tab = prog->aux->size_poke_tab; 14971 14972 for (j = 0; j < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; j++) { 14973 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *poke; 14974 14975 poke = &prog->aux->poke_tab[j]; 14976 if (poke->insn_idx < subprog_end && 14977 poke->insn_idx >= subprog_start) 14978 poke->aux = func[i]->aux; 14979 } 14980 14981 func[i]->aux->name[0] = 'F'; 14982 func[i]->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth; 14983 func[i]->jit_requested = 1; 14984 func[i]->blinding_requested = prog->blinding_requested; 14985 func[i]->aux->kfunc_tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 14986 func[i]->aux->kfunc_btf_tab = prog->aux->kfunc_btf_tab; 14987 func[i]->aux->linfo = prog->aux->linfo; 14988 func[i]->aux->nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; 14989 func[i]->aux->jited_linfo = prog->aux->jited_linfo; 14990 func[i]->aux->linfo_idx = env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx; 14991 num_exentries = 0; 14992 insn = func[i]->insnsi; 14993 for (j = 0; j < func[i]->len; j++, insn++) { 14994 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX && 14995 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEM) 14996 num_exentries++; 14997 } 14998 func[i]->aux->num_exentries = num_exentries; 14999 func[i]->aux->tail_call_reachable = env->subprog_info[i].tail_call_reachable; 15000 func[i] = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]); 15001 if (!func[i]->jited) { 15002 err = -ENOTSUPP; 15003 goto out_free; 15004 } 15005 cond_resched(); 15006 } 15007 15008 /* at this point all bpf functions were successfully JITed 15009 * now populate all bpf_calls with correct addresses and 15010 * run last pass of JIT 15011 */ 15012 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 15013 insn = func[i]->insnsi; 15014 for (j = 0; j < func[i]->len; j++, insn++) { 15015 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { 15016 subprog = insn->off; 15017 insn[0].imm = (u32)(long)func[subprog]->bpf_func; 15018 insn[1].imm = ((u64)(long)func[subprog]->bpf_func) >> 32; 15019 continue; 15020 } 15021 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 15022 continue; 15023 subprog = insn->off; 15024 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(func[subprog]->bpf_func); 15025 } 15026 15027 /* we use the aux data to keep a list of the start addresses 15028 * of the JITed images for each function in the program 15029 * 15030 * for some architectures, such as powerpc64, the imm field 15031 * might not be large enough to hold the offset of the start 15032 * address of the callee's JITed image from __bpf_call_base 15033 * 15034 * in such cases, we can lookup the start address of a callee 15035 * by using its subprog id, available from the off field of 15036 * the call instruction, as an index for this list 15037 */ 15038 func[i]->aux->func = func; 15039 func[i]->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt; 15040 } 15041 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 15042 old_bpf_func = func[i]->bpf_func; 15043 tmp = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]); 15044 if (tmp != func[i] || func[i]->bpf_func != old_bpf_func) { 15045 verbose(env, "JIT doesn't support bpf-to-bpf calls\n"); 15046 err = -ENOTSUPP; 15047 goto out_free; 15048 } 15049 cond_resched(); 15050 } 15051 15052 /* finally lock prog and jit images for all functions and 15053 * populate kallsysm 15054 */ 15055 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 15056 bpf_prog_lock_ro(func[i]); 15057 bpf_prog_kallsyms_add(func[i]); 15058 } 15059 15060 /* Last step: make now unused interpreter insns from main 15061 * prog consistent for later dump requests, so they can 15062 * later look the same as if they were interpreted only. 15063 */ 15064 for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { 15065 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { 15066 insn[0].imm = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm; 15067 insn[1].imm = insn->off; 15068 insn->off = 0; 15069 continue; 15070 } 15071 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 15072 continue; 15073 insn->off = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm; 15074 subprog = find_subprog(env, i + insn->off + 1); 15075 insn->imm = subprog; 15076 } 15077 15078 prog->jited = 1; 15079 prog->bpf_func = func[0]->bpf_func; 15080 prog->jited_len = func[0]->jited_len; 15081 prog->aux->func = func; 15082 prog->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt; 15083 bpf_prog_jit_attempt_done(prog); 15084 return 0; 15085 out_free: 15086 /* We failed JIT'ing, so at this point we need to unregister poke 15087 * descriptors from subprogs, so that kernel is not attempting to 15088 * patch it anymore as we're freeing the subprog JIT memory. 15089 */ 15090 for (i = 0; i < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; i++) { 15091 map_ptr = prog->aux->poke_tab[i].tail_call.map; 15092 map_ptr->ops->map_poke_untrack(map_ptr, prog->aux); 15093 } 15094 /* At this point we're guaranteed that poke descriptors are not 15095 * live anymore. We can just unlink its descriptor table as it's 15096 * released with the main prog. 15097 */ 15098 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 15099 if (!func[i]) 15100 continue; 15101 func[i]->aux->poke_tab = NULL; 15102 bpf_jit_free(func[i]); 15103 } 15104 kfree(func); 15105 out_undo_insn: 15106 /* cleanup main prog to be interpreted */ 15107 prog->jit_requested = 0; 15108 prog->blinding_requested = 0; 15109 for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { 15110 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 15111 continue; 15112 insn->off = 0; 15113 insn->imm = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm; 15114 } 15115 bpf_prog_jit_attempt_done(prog); 15116 return err; 15117 } 15118 15119 static int fixup_call_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 15120 { 15121 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON 15122 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 15123 struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi; 15124 bool has_kfunc_call = bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call(prog); 15125 int i, depth; 15126 #endif 15127 int err = 0; 15128 15129 if (env->prog->jit_requested && 15130 !bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) { 15131 err = jit_subprogs(env); 15132 if (err == 0) 15133 return 0; 15134 if (err == -EFAULT) 15135 return err; 15136 } 15137 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON 15138 if (has_kfunc_call) { 15139 verbose(env, "calling kernel functions are not allowed in non-JITed programs\n"); 15140 return -EINVAL; 15141 } 15142 if (env->subprog_cnt > 1 && env->prog->aux->tail_call_reachable) { 15143 /* When JIT fails the progs with bpf2bpf calls and tail_calls 15144 * have to be rejected, since interpreter doesn't support them yet. 15145 */ 15146 verbose(env, "tail_calls are not allowed in non-JITed programs with bpf-to-bpf calls\n"); 15147 return -EINVAL; 15148 } 15149 for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { 15150 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { 15151 /* When JIT fails the progs with callback calls 15152 * have to be rejected, since interpreter doesn't support them yet. 15153 */ 15154 verbose(env, "callbacks are not allowed in non-JITed programs\n"); 15155 return -EINVAL; 15156 } 15157 15158 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 15159 continue; 15160 depth = get_callee_stack_depth(env, insn, i); 15161 if (depth < 0) 15162 return depth; 15163 bpf_patch_call_args(insn, depth); 15164 } 15165 err = 0; 15166 #endif 15167 return err; 15168 } 15169 15170 static int fixup_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 15171 struct bpf_insn *insn_buf, int insn_idx, int *cnt) 15172 { 15173 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc; 15174 15175 if (!insn->imm) { 15176 verbose(env, "invalid kernel function call not eliminated in verifier pass\n"); 15177 return -EINVAL; 15178 } 15179 15180 /* insn->imm has the btf func_id. Replace it with 15181 * an address (relative to __bpf_base_call). 15182 */ 15183 desc = find_kfunc_desc(env->prog, insn->imm, insn->off); 15184 if (!desc) { 15185 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: kernel function descriptor not found for func_id %u\n", 15186 insn->imm); 15187 return -EFAULT; 15188 } 15189 15190 *cnt = 0; 15191 insn->imm = desc->imm; 15192 if (insn->off) 15193 return 0; 15194 if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_new_impl]) { 15195 struct btf_struct_meta *kptr_struct_meta = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].kptr_struct_meta; 15196 struct bpf_insn addr[2] = { BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_2, (long)kptr_struct_meta) }; 15197 u64 obj_new_size = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].obj_new_size; 15198 15199 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_1, obj_new_size); 15200 insn_buf[1] = addr[0]; 15201 insn_buf[2] = addr[1]; 15202 insn_buf[3] = *insn; 15203 *cnt = 4; 15204 } else if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl]) { 15205 struct btf_struct_meta *kptr_struct_meta = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].kptr_struct_meta; 15206 struct bpf_insn addr[2] = { BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_2, (long)kptr_struct_meta) }; 15207 15208 insn_buf[0] = addr[0]; 15209 insn_buf[1] = addr[1]; 15210 insn_buf[2] = *insn; 15211 *cnt = 3; 15212 } else if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx] || 15213 desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rdonly_cast]) { 15214 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1); 15215 *cnt = 1; 15216 } 15217 return 0; 15218 } 15219 15220 /* Do various post-verification rewrites in a single program pass. 15221 * These rewrites simplify JIT and interpreter implementations. 15222 */ 15223 static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 15224 { 15225 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 15226 enum bpf_attach_type eatype = prog->expected_attach_type; 15227 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(prog); 15228 struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi; 15229 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn; 15230 const int insn_cnt = prog->len; 15231 const struct bpf_map_ops *ops; 15232 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux; 15233 struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16]; 15234 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 15235 struct bpf_map *map_ptr; 15236 int i, ret, cnt, delta = 0; 15237 15238 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 15239 /* Make divide-by-zero exceptions impossible. */ 15240 if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOD | BPF_X) || 15241 insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_DIV | BPF_X) || 15242 insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_MOD | BPF_X) || 15243 insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_DIV | BPF_X)) { 15244 bool is64 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64; 15245 bool isdiv = BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_DIV; 15246 struct bpf_insn *patchlet; 15247 struct bpf_insn chk_and_div[] = { 15248 /* [R,W]x div 0 -> 0 */ 15249 BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) | 15250 BPF_JNE | BPF_K, insn->src_reg, 15251 0, 2, 0), 15252 BPF_ALU32_REG(BPF_XOR, insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg), 15253 BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1), 15254 *insn, 15255 }; 15256 struct bpf_insn chk_and_mod[] = { 15257 /* [R,W]x mod 0 -> [R,W]x */ 15258 BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) | 15259 BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, insn->src_reg, 15260 0, 1 + (is64 ? 0 : 1), 0), 15261 *insn, 15262 BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1), 15263 BPF_MOV32_REG(insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg), 15264 }; 15265 15266 patchlet = isdiv ? chk_and_div : chk_and_mod; 15267 cnt = isdiv ? ARRAY_SIZE(chk_and_div) : 15268 ARRAY_SIZE(chk_and_mod) - (is64 ? 2 : 0); 15269 15270 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, patchlet, cnt); 15271 if (!new_prog) 15272 return -ENOMEM; 15273 15274 delta += cnt - 1; 15275 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 15276 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 15277 continue; 15278 } 15279 15280 /* Implement LD_ABS and LD_IND with a rewrite, if supported by the program type. */ 15281 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LD && 15282 (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS || 15283 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND)) { 15284 cnt = env->ops->gen_ld_abs(insn, insn_buf); 15285 if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) { 15286 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 15287 return -EINVAL; 15288 } 15289 15290 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 15291 if (!new_prog) 15292 return -ENOMEM; 15293 15294 delta += cnt - 1; 15295 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 15296 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 15297 continue; 15298 } 15299 15300 /* Rewrite pointer arithmetic to mitigate speculation attacks. */ 15301 if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ADD | BPF_X) || 15302 insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_SUB | BPF_X)) { 15303 const u8 code_add = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ADD | BPF_X; 15304 const u8 code_sub = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_SUB | BPF_X; 15305 struct bpf_insn *patch = &insn_buf[0]; 15306 bool issrc, isneg, isimm; 15307 u32 off_reg; 15308 15309 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta]; 15310 if (!aux->alu_state || 15311 aux->alu_state == BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER) 15312 continue; 15313 15314 isneg = aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE; 15315 issrc = (aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_SANITIZE) == 15316 BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC; 15317 isimm = aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_IMMEDIATE; 15318 15319 off_reg = issrc ? insn->src_reg : insn->dst_reg; 15320 if (isimm) { 15321 *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, aux->alu_limit); 15322 } else { 15323 if (isneg) 15324 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1); 15325 *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, aux->alu_limit); 15326 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg); 15327 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg); 15328 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_NEG, BPF_REG_AX, 0); 15329 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ARSH, BPF_REG_AX, 63); 15330 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg); 15331 } 15332 if (!issrc) 15333 *patch++ = BPF_MOV64_REG(insn->dst_reg, insn->src_reg); 15334 insn->src_reg = BPF_REG_AX; 15335 if (isneg) 15336 insn->code = insn->code == code_add ? 15337 code_sub : code_add; 15338 *patch++ = *insn; 15339 if (issrc && isneg && !isimm) 15340 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1); 15341 cnt = patch - insn_buf; 15342 15343 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 15344 if (!new_prog) 15345 return -ENOMEM; 15346 15347 delta += cnt - 1; 15348 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 15349 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 15350 continue; 15351 } 15352 15353 if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL)) 15354 continue; 15355 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 15356 continue; 15357 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) { 15358 ret = fixup_kfunc_call(env, insn, insn_buf, i + delta, &cnt); 15359 if (ret) 15360 return ret; 15361 if (cnt == 0) 15362 continue; 15363 15364 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 15365 if (!new_prog) 15366 return -ENOMEM; 15367 15368 delta += cnt - 1; 15369 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 15370 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 15371 continue; 15372 } 15373 15374 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm) 15375 prog->dst_needed = 1; 15376 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32) 15377 bpf_user_rnd_init_once(); 15378 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_override_return) 15379 prog->kprobe_override = 1; 15380 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) { 15381 /* If we tail call into other programs, we 15382 * cannot make any assumptions since they can 15383 * be replaced dynamically during runtime in 15384 * the program array. 15385 */ 15386 prog->cb_access = 1; 15387 if (!allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(env)) 15388 prog->aux->stack_depth = MAX_BPF_STACK; 15389 prog->aux->max_pkt_offset = MAX_PACKET_OFF; 15390 15391 /* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode to avoid 15392 * conditional branch in the interpreter for every normal 15393 * call and to prevent accidental JITing by JIT compiler 15394 * that doesn't support bpf_tail_call yet 15395 */ 15396 insn->imm = 0; 15397 insn->code = BPF_JMP | BPF_TAIL_CALL; 15398 15399 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta]; 15400 if (env->bpf_capable && !prog->blinding_requested && 15401 prog->jit_requested && 15402 !bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux) && 15403 !bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux) && 15404 !bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux)) { 15405 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor desc = { 15406 .reason = BPF_POKE_REASON_TAIL_CALL, 15407 .tail_call.map = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state), 15408 .tail_call.key = bpf_map_key_immediate(aux), 15409 .insn_idx = i + delta, 15410 }; 15411 15412 ret = bpf_jit_add_poke_descriptor(prog, &desc); 15413 if (ret < 0) { 15414 verbose(env, "adding tail call poke descriptor failed\n"); 15415 return ret; 15416 } 15417 15418 insn->imm = ret + 1; 15419 continue; 15420 } 15421 15422 if (!bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux)) 15423 continue; 15424 15425 /* instead of changing every JIT dealing with tail_call 15426 * emit two extra insns: 15427 * if (index >= max_entries) goto out; 15428 * index &= array->index_mask; 15429 * to avoid out-of-bounds cpu speculation 15430 */ 15431 if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux)) { 15432 verbose(env, "tail_call abusing map_ptr\n"); 15433 return -EINVAL; 15434 } 15435 15436 map_ptr = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state); 15437 insn_buf[0] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_3, 15438 map_ptr->max_entries, 2); 15439 insn_buf[1] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_3, 15440 container_of(map_ptr, 15441 struct bpf_array, 15442 map)->index_mask); 15443 insn_buf[2] = *insn; 15444 cnt = 3; 15445 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 15446 if (!new_prog) 15447 return -ENOMEM; 15448 15449 delta += cnt - 1; 15450 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 15451 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 15452 continue; 15453 } 15454 15455 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback) { 15456 /* The verifier will process callback_fn as many times as necessary 15457 * with different maps and the register states prepared by 15458 * set_timer_callback_state will be accurate. 15459 * 15460 * The following use case is valid: 15461 * map1 is shared by prog1, prog2, prog3. 15462 * prog1 calls bpf_timer_init for some map1 elements 15463 * prog2 calls bpf_timer_set_callback for some map1 elements. 15464 * Those that were not bpf_timer_init-ed will return -EINVAL. 15465 * prog3 calls bpf_timer_start for some map1 elements. 15466 * Those that were not both bpf_timer_init-ed and 15467 * bpf_timer_set_callback-ed will return -EINVAL. 15468 */ 15469 struct bpf_insn ld_addrs[2] = { 15470 BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_3, (long)prog->aux), 15471 }; 15472 15473 insn_buf[0] = ld_addrs[0]; 15474 insn_buf[1] = ld_addrs[1]; 15475 insn_buf[2] = *insn; 15476 cnt = 3; 15477 15478 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 15479 if (!new_prog) 15480 return -ENOMEM; 15481 15482 delta += cnt - 1; 15483 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 15484 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 15485 goto patch_call_imm; 15486 } 15487 15488 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_task_storage_get || 15489 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get || 15490 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get || 15491 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_get) { 15492 if (env->prog->aux->sleepable) 15493 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_5, (__force __s32)GFP_KERNEL); 15494 else 15495 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_5, (__force __s32)GFP_ATOMIC); 15496 insn_buf[1] = *insn; 15497 cnt = 2; 15498 15499 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 15500 if (!new_prog) 15501 return -ENOMEM; 15502 15503 delta += cnt - 1; 15504 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 15505 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 15506 goto patch_call_imm; 15507 } 15508 15509 /* BPF_EMIT_CALL() assumptions in some of the map_gen_lookup 15510 * and other inlining handlers are currently limited to 64 bit 15511 * only. 15512 */ 15513 if (prog->jit_requested && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 && 15514 (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem || 15515 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem || 15516 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem || 15517 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem || 15518 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem || 15519 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem || 15520 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_redirect_map || 15521 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem || 15522 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem)) { 15523 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta]; 15524 if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux)) 15525 goto patch_call_imm; 15526 15527 map_ptr = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state); 15528 ops = map_ptr->ops; 15529 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 15530 ops->map_gen_lookup) { 15531 cnt = ops->map_gen_lookup(map_ptr, insn_buf); 15532 if (cnt == -EOPNOTSUPP) 15533 goto patch_map_ops_generic; 15534 if (cnt <= 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) { 15535 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 15536 return -EINVAL; 15537 } 15538 15539 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, 15540 insn_buf, cnt); 15541 if (!new_prog) 15542 return -ENOMEM; 15543 15544 delta += cnt - 1; 15545 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 15546 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 15547 continue; 15548 } 15549 15550 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_lookup_elem, 15551 (void *(*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key))NULL)); 15552 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_delete_elem, 15553 (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key))NULL)); 15554 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_update_elem, 15555 (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value, 15556 u64 flags))NULL)); 15557 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_push_elem, 15558 (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value, 15559 u64 flags))NULL)); 15560 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_pop_elem, 15561 (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value))NULL)); 15562 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_peek_elem, 15563 (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value))NULL)); 15564 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_redirect, 15565 (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, u64 index, u64 flags))NULL)); 15566 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_for_each_callback, 15567 (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, 15568 bpf_callback_t callback_fn, 15569 void *callback_ctx, 15570 u64 flags))NULL)); 15571 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_lookup_percpu_elem, 15572 (void *(*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, u32 cpu))NULL)); 15573 15574 patch_map_ops_generic: 15575 switch (insn->imm) { 15576 case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem: 15577 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_lookup_elem); 15578 continue; 15579 case BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem: 15580 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_update_elem); 15581 continue; 15582 case BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem: 15583 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_delete_elem); 15584 continue; 15585 case BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem: 15586 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_push_elem); 15587 continue; 15588 case BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem: 15589 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_pop_elem); 15590 continue; 15591 case BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem: 15592 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_peek_elem); 15593 continue; 15594 case BPF_FUNC_redirect_map: 15595 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_redirect); 15596 continue; 15597 case BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem: 15598 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_for_each_callback); 15599 continue; 15600 case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem: 15601 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_lookup_percpu_elem); 15602 continue; 15603 } 15604 15605 goto patch_call_imm; 15606 } 15607 15608 /* Implement bpf_jiffies64 inline. */ 15609 if (prog->jit_requested && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 && 15610 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_jiffies64) { 15611 struct bpf_insn ld_jiffies_addr[2] = { 15612 BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_0, 15613 (unsigned long)&jiffies), 15614 }; 15615 15616 insn_buf[0] = ld_jiffies_addr[0]; 15617 insn_buf[1] = ld_jiffies_addr[1]; 15618 insn_buf[2] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 15619 BPF_REG_0, 0); 15620 cnt = 3; 15621 15622 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, 15623 cnt); 15624 if (!new_prog) 15625 return -ENOMEM; 15626 15627 delta += cnt - 1; 15628 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 15629 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 15630 continue; 15631 } 15632 15633 /* Implement bpf_get_func_arg inline. */ 15634 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 15635 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_arg) { 15636 /* Load nr_args from ctx - 8 */ 15637 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -8); 15638 insn_buf[1] = BPF_JMP32_REG(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_0, 6); 15639 insn_buf[2] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_2, 3); 15640 insn_buf[3] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1); 15641 insn_buf[4] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2, 0); 15642 insn_buf[5] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, 0); 15643 insn_buf[6] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0); 15644 insn_buf[7] = BPF_JMP_A(1); 15645 insn_buf[8] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, -EINVAL); 15646 cnt = 9; 15647 15648 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 15649 if (!new_prog) 15650 return -ENOMEM; 15651 15652 delta += cnt - 1; 15653 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 15654 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 15655 continue; 15656 } 15657 15658 /* Implement bpf_get_func_ret inline. */ 15659 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 15660 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_ret) { 15661 if (eatype == BPF_TRACE_FEXIT || 15662 eatype == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) { 15663 /* Load nr_args from ctx - 8 */ 15664 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -8); 15665 insn_buf[1] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_0, 3); 15666 insn_buf[2] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1); 15667 insn_buf[3] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, 0); 15668 insn_buf[4] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, 0); 15669 insn_buf[5] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0); 15670 cnt = 6; 15671 } else { 15672 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, -EOPNOTSUPP); 15673 cnt = 1; 15674 } 15675 15676 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 15677 if (!new_prog) 15678 return -ENOMEM; 15679 15680 delta += cnt - 1; 15681 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 15682 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 15683 continue; 15684 } 15685 15686 /* Implement get_func_arg_cnt inline. */ 15687 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 15688 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_arg_cnt) { 15689 /* Load nr_args from ctx - 8 */ 15690 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -8); 15691 15692 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, 1); 15693 if (!new_prog) 15694 return -ENOMEM; 15695 15696 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 15697 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 15698 continue; 15699 } 15700 15701 /* Implement bpf_get_func_ip inline. */ 15702 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 15703 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_ip) { 15704 /* Load IP address from ctx - 16 */ 15705 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -16); 15706 15707 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, 1); 15708 if (!new_prog) 15709 return -ENOMEM; 15710 15711 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 15712 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 15713 continue; 15714 } 15715 15716 patch_call_imm: 15717 fn = env->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm, env->prog); 15718 /* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed 15719 * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions 15720 */ 15721 if (!fn->func) { 15722 verbose(env, 15723 "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n", 15724 func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm); 15725 return -EFAULT; 15726 } 15727 insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base; 15728 } 15729 15730 /* Since poke tab is now finalized, publish aux to tracker. */ 15731 for (i = 0; i < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; i++) { 15732 map_ptr = prog->aux->poke_tab[i].tail_call.map; 15733 if (!map_ptr->ops->map_poke_track || 15734 !map_ptr->ops->map_poke_untrack || 15735 !map_ptr->ops->map_poke_run) { 15736 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 15737 return -EINVAL; 15738 } 15739 15740 ret = map_ptr->ops->map_poke_track(map_ptr, prog->aux); 15741 if (ret < 0) { 15742 verbose(env, "tracking tail call prog failed\n"); 15743 return ret; 15744 } 15745 } 15746 15747 sort_kfunc_descs_by_imm(env->prog); 15748 15749 return 0; 15750 } 15751 15752 static struct bpf_prog *inline_bpf_loop(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 15753 int position, 15754 s32 stack_base, 15755 u32 callback_subprogno, 15756 u32 *cnt) 15757 { 15758 s32 r6_offset = stack_base + 0 * BPF_REG_SIZE; 15759 s32 r7_offset = stack_base + 1 * BPF_REG_SIZE; 15760 s32 r8_offset = stack_base + 2 * BPF_REG_SIZE; 15761 int reg_loop_max = BPF_REG_6; 15762 int reg_loop_cnt = BPF_REG_7; 15763 int reg_loop_ctx = BPF_REG_8; 15764 15765 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 15766 u32 callback_start; 15767 u32 call_insn_offset; 15768 s32 callback_offset; 15769 15770 /* This represents an inlined version of bpf_iter.c:bpf_loop, 15771 * be careful to modify this code in sync. 15772 */ 15773 struct bpf_insn insn_buf[] = { 15774 /* Return error and jump to the end of the patch if 15775 * expected number of iterations is too big. 15776 */ 15777 BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JLE, BPF_REG_1, BPF_MAX_LOOPS, 2), 15778 BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_0, -E2BIG), 15779 BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 16), 15780 /* spill R6, R7, R8 to use these as loop vars */ 15781 BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_6, r6_offset), 15782 BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_7, r7_offset), 15783 BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_8, r8_offset), 15784 /* initialize loop vars */ 15785 BPF_MOV64_REG(reg_loop_max, BPF_REG_1), 15786 BPF_MOV32_IMM(reg_loop_cnt, 0), 15787 BPF_MOV64_REG(reg_loop_ctx, BPF_REG_3), 15788 /* loop header, 15789 * if reg_loop_cnt >= reg_loop_max skip the loop body 15790 */ 15791 BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGE, reg_loop_cnt, reg_loop_max, 5), 15792 /* callback call, 15793 * correct callback offset would be set after patching 15794 */ 15795 BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, reg_loop_cnt), 15796 BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, reg_loop_ctx), 15797 BPF_CALL_REL(0), 15798 /* increment loop counter */ 15799 BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, reg_loop_cnt, 1), 15800 /* jump to loop header if callback returned 0 */ 15801 BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, -6), 15802 /* return value of bpf_loop, 15803 * set R0 to the number of iterations 15804 */ 15805 BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, reg_loop_cnt), 15806 /* restore original values of R6, R7, R8 */ 15807 BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_10, r6_offset), 15808 BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_10, r7_offset), 15809 BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_10, r8_offset), 15810 }; 15811 15812 *cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf); 15813 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, position, insn_buf, *cnt); 15814 if (!new_prog) 15815 return new_prog; 15816 15817 /* callback start is known only after patching */ 15818 callback_start = env->subprog_info[callback_subprogno].start; 15819 /* Note: insn_buf[12] is an offset of BPF_CALL_REL instruction */ 15820 call_insn_offset = position + 12; 15821 callback_offset = callback_start - call_insn_offset - 1; 15822 new_prog->insnsi[call_insn_offset].imm = callback_offset; 15823 15824 return new_prog; 15825 } 15826 15827 static bool is_bpf_loop_call(struct bpf_insn *insn) 15828 { 15829 return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 15830 insn->src_reg == 0 && 15831 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_loop; 15832 } 15833 15834 /* For all sub-programs in the program (including main) check 15835 * insn_aux_data to see if there are bpf_loop calls that require 15836 * inlining. If such calls are found the calls are replaced with a 15837 * sequence of instructions produced by `inline_bpf_loop` function and 15838 * subprog stack_depth is increased by the size of 3 registers. 15839 * This stack space is used to spill values of the R6, R7, R8. These 15840 * registers are used to store the loop bound, counter and context 15841 * variables. 15842 */ 15843 static int optimize_bpf_loop(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 15844 { 15845 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprogs = env->subprog_info; 15846 int i, cur_subprog = 0, cnt, delta = 0; 15847 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 15848 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 15849 u16 stack_depth = subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth; 15850 u16 stack_depth_roundup = round_up(stack_depth, 8) - stack_depth; 15851 u16 stack_depth_extra = 0; 15852 15853 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 15854 struct bpf_loop_inline_state *inline_state = 15855 &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].loop_inline_state; 15856 15857 if (is_bpf_loop_call(insn) && inline_state->fit_for_inline) { 15858 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 15859 15860 stack_depth_extra = BPF_REG_SIZE * 3 + stack_depth_roundup; 15861 new_prog = inline_bpf_loop(env, 15862 i + delta, 15863 -(stack_depth + stack_depth_extra), 15864 inline_state->callback_subprogno, 15865 &cnt); 15866 if (!new_prog) 15867 return -ENOMEM; 15868 15869 delta += cnt - 1; 15870 env->prog = new_prog; 15871 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 15872 } 15873 15874 if (subprogs[cur_subprog + 1].start == i + delta + 1) { 15875 subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth += stack_depth_extra; 15876 cur_subprog++; 15877 stack_depth = subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth; 15878 stack_depth_roundup = round_up(stack_depth, 8) - stack_depth; 15879 stack_depth_extra = 0; 15880 } 15881 } 15882 15883 env->prog->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[0].stack_depth; 15884 15885 return 0; 15886 } 15887 15888 static void free_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 15889 { 15890 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl, *sln; 15891 int i; 15892 15893 sl = env->free_list; 15894 while (sl) { 15895 sln = sl->next; 15896 free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false); 15897 kfree(sl); 15898 sl = sln; 15899 } 15900 env->free_list = NULL; 15901 15902 if (!env->explored_states) 15903 return; 15904 15905 for (i = 0; i < state_htab_size(env); i++) { 15906 sl = env->explored_states[i]; 15907 15908 while (sl) { 15909 sln = sl->next; 15910 free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false); 15911 kfree(sl); 15912 sl = sln; 15913 } 15914 env->explored_states[i] = NULL; 15915 } 15916 } 15917 15918 static int do_check_common(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog) 15919 { 15920 bool pop_log = !(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2); 15921 struct bpf_verifier_state *state; 15922 struct bpf_reg_state *regs; 15923 int ret, i; 15924 15925 env->prev_linfo = NULL; 15926 env->pass_cnt++; 15927 15928 state = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state), GFP_KERNEL); 15929 if (!state) 15930 return -ENOMEM; 15931 state->curframe = 0; 15932 state->speculative = false; 15933 state->branches = 1; 15934 state->frame[0] = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_func_state), GFP_KERNEL); 15935 if (!state->frame[0]) { 15936 kfree(state); 15937 return -ENOMEM; 15938 } 15939 env->cur_state = state; 15940 init_func_state(env, state->frame[0], 15941 BPF_MAIN_FUNC /* callsite */, 15942 0 /* frameno */, 15943 subprog); 15944 state->first_insn_idx = env->subprog_info[subprog].start; 15945 state->last_insn_idx = -1; 15946 15947 regs = state->frame[state->curframe]->regs; 15948 if (subprog || env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) { 15949 ret = btf_prepare_func_args(env, subprog, regs); 15950 if (ret) 15951 goto out; 15952 for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) { 15953 if (regs[i].type == PTR_TO_CTX) 15954 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, i); 15955 else if (regs[i].type == SCALAR_VALUE) 15956 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, i); 15957 else if (base_type(regs[i].type) == PTR_TO_MEM) { 15958 const u32 mem_size = regs[i].mem_size; 15959 15960 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, i); 15961 regs[i].mem_size = mem_size; 15962 regs[i].id = ++env->id_gen; 15963 } 15964 } 15965 } else { 15966 /* 1st arg to a function */ 15967 regs[BPF_REG_1].type = PTR_TO_CTX; 15968 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_1); 15969 ret = btf_check_subprog_arg_match(env, subprog, regs); 15970 if (ret == -EFAULT) 15971 /* unlikely verifier bug. abort. 15972 * ret == 0 and ret < 0 are sadly acceptable for 15973 * main() function due to backward compatibility. 15974 * Like socket filter program may be written as: 15975 * int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) 15976 * and never dereference that ctx in the program. 15977 * 'struct pt_regs' is a type mismatch for socket 15978 * filter that should be using 'struct __sk_buff'. 15979 */ 15980 goto out; 15981 } 15982 15983 ret = do_check(env); 15984 out: 15985 /* check for NULL is necessary, since cur_state can be freed inside 15986 * do_check() under memory pressure. 15987 */ 15988 if (env->cur_state) { 15989 free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true); 15990 env->cur_state = NULL; 15991 } 15992 while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false)); 15993 if (!ret && pop_log) 15994 bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, 0); 15995 free_states(env); 15996 return ret; 15997 } 15998 15999 /* Verify all global functions in a BPF program one by one based on their BTF. 16000 * All global functions must pass verification. Otherwise the whole program is rejected. 16001 * Consider: 16002 * int bar(int); 16003 * int foo(int f) 16004 * { 16005 * return bar(f); 16006 * } 16007 * int bar(int b) 16008 * { 16009 * ... 16010 * } 16011 * foo() will be verified first for R1=any_scalar_value. During verification it 16012 * will be assumed that bar() already verified successfully and call to bar() 16013 * from foo() will be checked for type match only. Later bar() will be verified 16014 * independently to check that it's safe for R1=any_scalar_value. 16015 */ 16016 static int do_check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 16017 { 16018 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 16019 int i, ret; 16020 16021 if (!aux->func_info) 16022 return 0; 16023 16024 for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 16025 if (aux->func_info_aux[i].linkage != BTF_FUNC_GLOBAL) 16026 continue; 16027 env->insn_idx = env->subprog_info[i].start; 16028 WARN_ON_ONCE(env->insn_idx == 0); 16029 ret = do_check_common(env, i); 16030 if (ret) { 16031 return ret; 16032 } else if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 16033 verbose(env, 16034 "Func#%d is safe for any args that match its prototype\n", 16035 i); 16036 } 16037 } 16038 return 0; 16039 } 16040 16041 static int do_check_main(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 16042 { 16043 int ret; 16044 16045 env->insn_idx = 0; 16046 ret = do_check_common(env, 0); 16047 if (!ret) 16048 env->prog->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[0].stack_depth; 16049 return ret; 16050 } 16051 16052 16053 static void print_verification_stats(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 16054 { 16055 int i; 16056 16057 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_STATS) { 16058 verbose(env, "verification time %lld usec\n", 16059 div_u64(env->verification_time, 1000)); 16060 verbose(env, "stack depth "); 16061 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 16062 u32 depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth; 16063 16064 verbose(env, "%d", depth); 16065 if (i + 1 < env->subprog_cnt) 16066 verbose(env, "+"); 16067 } 16068 verbose(env, "\n"); 16069 } 16070 verbose(env, "processed %d insns (limit %d) max_states_per_insn %d " 16071 "total_states %d peak_states %d mark_read %d\n", 16072 env->insn_processed, BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS, 16073 env->max_states_per_insn, env->total_states, 16074 env->peak_states, env->longest_mark_read_walk); 16075 } 16076 16077 static int check_struct_ops_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 16078 { 16079 const struct btf_type *t, *func_proto; 16080 const struct bpf_struct_ops *st_ops; 16081 const struct btf_member *member; 16082 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 16083 u32 btf_id, member_idx; 16084 const char *mname; 16085 16086 if (!prog->gpl_compatible) { 16087 verbose(env, "struct ops programs must have a GPL compatible license\n"); 16088 return -EINVAL; 16089 } 16090 16091 btf_id = prog->aux->attach_btf_id; 16092 st_ops = bpf_struct_ops_find(btf_id); 16093 if (!st_ops) { 16094 verbose(env, "attach_btf_id %u is not a supported struct\n", 16095 btf_id); 16096 return -ENOTSUPP; 16097 } 16098 16099 t = st_ops->type; 16100 member_idx = prog->expected_attach_type; 16101 if (member_idx >= btf_type_vlen(t)) { 16102 verbose(env, "attach to invalid member idx %u of struct %s\n", 16103 member_idx, st_ops->name); 16104 return -EINVAL; 16105 } 16106 16107 member = &btf_type_member(t)[member_idx]; 16108 mname = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, member->name_off); 16109 func_proto = btf_type_resolve_func_ptr(btf_vmlinux, member->type, 16110 NULL); 16111 if (!func_proto) { 16112 verbose(env, "attach to invalid member %s(@idx %u) of struct %s\n", 16113 mname, member_idx, st_ops->name); 16114 return -EINVAL; 16115 } 16116 16117 if (st_ops->check_member) { 16118 int err = st_ops->check_member(t, member); 16119 16120 if (err) { 16121 verbose(env, "attach to unsupported member %s of struct %s\n", 16122 mname, st_ops->name); 16123 return err; 16124 } 16125 } 16126 16127 prog->aux->attach_func_proto = func_proto; 16128 prog->aux->attach_func_name = mname; 16129 env->ops = st_ops->verifier_ops; 16130 16131 return 0; 16132 } 16133 #define SECURITY_PREFIX "security_" 16134 16135 static int check_attach_modify_return(unsigned long addr, const char *func_name) 16136 { 16137 if (within_error_injection_list(addr) || 16138 !strncmp(SECURITY_PREFIX, func_name, sizeof(SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1)) 16139 return 0; 16140 16141 return -EINVAL; 16142 } 16143 16144 /* list of non-sleepable functions that are otherwise on 16145 * ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION list 16146 */ 16147 BTF_SET_START(btf_non_sleepable_error_inject) 16148 /* Three functions below can be called from sleepable and non-sleepable context. 16149 * Assume non-sleepable from bpf safety point of view. 16150 */ 16151 BTF_ID(func, __filemap_add_folio) 16152 BTF_ID(func, should_fail_alloc_page) 16153 BTF_ID(func, should_failslab) 16154 BTF_SET_END(btf_non_sleepable_error_inject) 16155 16156 static int check_non_sleepable_error_inject(u32 btf_id) 16157 { 16158 return btf_id_set_contains(&btf_non_sleepable_error_inject, btf_id); 16159 } 16160 16161 int bpf_check_attach_target(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, 16162 const struct bpf_prog *prog, 16163 const struct bpf_prog *tgt_prog, 16164 u32 btf_id, 16165 struct bpf_attach_target_info *tgt_info) 16166 { 16167 bool prog_extension = prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT; 16168 const char prefix[] = "btf_trace_"; 16169 int ret = 0, subprog = -1, i; 16170 const struct btf_type *t; 16171 bool conservative = true; 16172 const char *tname; 16173 struct btf *btf; 16174 long addr = 0; 16175 16176 if (!btf_id) { 16177 bpf_log(log, "Tracing programs must provide btf_id\n"); 16178 return -EINVAL; 16179 } 16180 btf = tgt_prog ? tgt_prog->aux->btf : prog->aux->attach_btf; 16181 if (!btf) { 16182 bpf_log(log, 16183 "FENTRY/FEXIT program can only be attached to another program annotated with BTF\n"); 16184 return -EINVAL; 16185 } 16186 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, btf_id); 16187 if (!t) { 16188 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is invalid\n", btf_id); 16189 return -EINVAL; 16190 } 16191 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off); 16192 if (!tname) { 16193 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u doesn't have a name\n", btf_id); 16194 return -EINVAL; 16195 } 16196 if (tgt_prog) { 16197 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = tgt_prog->aux; 16198 16199 for (i = 0; i < aux->func_info_cnt; i++) 16200 if (aux->func_info[i].type_id == btf_id) { 16201 subprog = i; 16202 break; 16203 } 16204 if (subprog == -1) { 16205 bpf_log(log, "Subprog %s doesn't exist\n", tname); 16206 return -EINVAL; 16207 } 16208 conservative = aux->func_info_aux[subprog].unreliable; 16209 if (prog_extension) { 16210 if (conservative) { 16211 bpf_log(log, 16212 "Cannot replace static functions\n"); 16213 return -EINVAL; 16214 } 16215 if (!prog->jit_requested) { 16216 bpf_log(log, 16217 "Extension programs should be JITed\n"); 16218 return -EINVAL; 16219 } 16220 } 16221 if (!tgt_prog->jited) { 16222 bpf_log(log, "Can attach to only JITed progs\n"); 16223 return -EINVAL; 16224 } 16225 if (tgt_prog->type == prog->type) { 16226 /* Cannot fentry/fexit another fentry/fexit program. 16227 * Cannot attach program extension to another extension. 16228 * It's ok to attach fentry/fexit to extension program. 16229 */ 16230 bpf_log(log, "Cannot recursively attach\n"); 16231 return -EINVAL; 16232 } 16233 if (tgt_prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 16234 prog_extension && 16235 (tgt_prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FENTRY || 16236 tgt_prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FEXIT)) { 16237 /* Program extensions can extend all program types 16238 * except fentry/fexit. The reason is the following. 16239 * The fentry/fexit programs are used for performance 16240 * analysis, stats and can be attached to any program 16241 * type except themselves. When extension program is 16242 * replacing XDP function it is necessary to allow 16243 * performance analysis of all functions. Both original 16244 * XDP program and its program extension. Hence 16245 * attaching fentry/fexit to BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT is 16246 * allowed. If extending of fentry/fexit was allowed it 16247 * would be possible to create long call chain 16248 * fentry->extension->fentry->extension beyond 16249 * reasonable stack size. Hence extending fentry is not 16250 * allowed. 16251 */ 16252 bpf_log(log, "Cannot extend fentry/fexit\n"); 16253 return -EINVAL; 16254 } 16255 } else { 16256 if (prog_extension) { 16257 bpf_log(log, "Cannot replace kernel functions\n"); 16258 return -EINVAL; 16259 } 16260 } 16261 16262 switch (prog->expected_attach_type) { 16263 case BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP: 16264 if (tgt_prog) { 16265 bpf_log(log, 16266 "Only FENTRY/FEXIT progs are attachable to another BPF prog\n"); 16267 return -EINVAL; 16268 } 16269 if (!btf_type_is_typedef(t)) { 16270 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a typedef\n", 16271 btf_id); 16272 return -EINVAL; 16273 } 16274 if (strncmp(prefix, tname, sizeof(prefix) - 1)) { 16275 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u points to wrong type name %s\n", 16276 btf_id, tname); 16277 return -EINVAL; 16278 } 16279 tname += sizeof(prefix) - 1; 16280 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); 16281 if (!btf_type_is_ptr(t)) 16282 /* should never happen in valid vmlinux build */ 16283 return -EINVAL; 16284 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); 16285 if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t)) 16286 /* should never happen in valid vmlinux build */ 16287 return -EINVAL; 16288 16289 break; 16290 case BPF_TRACE_ITER: 16291 if (!btf_type_is_func(t)) { 16292 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a function\n", 16293 btf_id); 16294 return -EINVAL; 16295 } 16296 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); 16297 if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t)) 16298 return -EINVAL; 16299 ret = btf_distill_func_proto(log, btf, t, tname, &tgt_info->fmodel); 16300 if (ret) 16301 return ret; 16302 break; 16303 default: 16304 if (!prog_extension) 16305 return -EINVAL; 16306 fallthrough; 16307 case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN: 16308 case BPF_LSM_MAC: 16309 case BPF_LSM_CGROUP: 16310 case BPF_TRACE_FENTRY: 16311 case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT: 16312 if (!btf_type_is_func(t)) { 16313 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a function\n", 16314 btf_id); 16315 return -EINVAL; 16316 } 16317 if (prog_extension && 16318 btf_check_type_match(log, prog, btf, t)) 16319 return -EINVAL; 16320 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); 16321 if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t)) 16322 return -EINVAL; 16323 16324 if ((prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type || prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type) && 16325 (!tgt_prog || prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type != tgt_prog->type || 16326 prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type != tgt_prog->expected_attach_type)) 16327 return -EINVAL; 16328 16329 if (tgt_prog && conservative) 16330 t = NULL; 16331 16332 ret = btf_distill_func_proto(log, btf, t, tname, &tgt_info->fmodel); 16333 if (ret < 0) 16334 return ret; 16335 16336 if (tgt_prog) { 16337 if (subprog == 0) 16338 addr = (long) tgt_prog->bpf_func; 16339 else 16340 addr = (long) tgt_prog->aux->func[subprog]->bpf_func; 16341 } else { 16342 addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(tname); 16343 if (!addr) { 16344 bpf_log(log, 16345 "The address of function %s cannot be found\n", 16346 tname); 16347 return -ENOENT; 16348 } 16349 } 16350 16351 if (prog->aux->sleepable) { 16352 ret = -EINVAL; 16353 switch (prog->type) { 16354 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: 16355 /* fentry/fexit/fmod_ret progs can be sleepable only if they are 16356 * attached to ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION and are not in denylist. 16357 */ 16358 if (!check_non_sleepable_error_inject(btf_id) && 16359 within_error_injection_list(addr)) 16360 ret = 0; 16361 break; 16362 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: 16363 /* LSM progs check that they are attached to bpf_lsm_*() funcs. 16364 * Only some of them are sleepable. 16365 */ 16366 if (bpf_lsm_is_sleepable_hook(btf_id)) 16367 ret = 0; 16368 break; 16369 default: 16370 break; 16371 } 16372 if (ret) { 16373 bpf_log(log, "%s is not sleepable\n", tname); 16374 return ret; 16375 } 16376 } else if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) { 16377 if (tgt_prog) { 16378 bpf_log(log, "can't modify return codes of BPF programs\n"); 16379 return -EINVAL; 16380 } 16381 ret = check_attach_modify_return(addr, tname); 16382 if (ret) { 16383 bpf_log(log, "%s() is not modifiable\n", tname); 16384 return ret; 16385 } 16386 } 16387 16388 break; 16389 } 16390 tgt_info->tgt_addr = addr; 16391 tgt_info->tgt_name = tname; 16392 tgt_info->tgt_type = t; 16393 return 0; 16394 } 16395 16396 BTF_SET_START(btf_id_deny) 16397 BTF_ID_UNUSED 16398 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP 16399 BTF_ID(func, migrate_disable) 16400 BTF_ID(func, migrate_enable) 16401 #endif 16402 #if !defined CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU && !defined CONFIG_TINY_RCU 16403 BTF_ID(func, rcu_read_unlock_strict) 16404 #endif 16405 BTF_SET_END(btf_id_deny) 16406 16407 static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 16408 { 16409 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 16410 struct bpf_prog *tgt_prog = prog->aux->dst_prog; 16411 struct bpf_attach_target_info tgt_info = {}; 16412 u32 btf_id = prog->aux->attach_btf_id; 16413 struct bpf_trampoline *tr; 16414 int ret; 16415 u64 key; 16416 16417 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_SYSCALL) { 16418 if (prog->aux->sleepable) 16419 /* attach_btf_id checked to be zero already */ 16420 return 0; 16421 verbose(env, "Syscall programs can only be sleepable\n"); 16422 return -EINVAL; 16423 } 16424 16425 if (prog->aux->sleepable && prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 16426 prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM && prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE) { 16427 verbose(env, "Only fentry/fexit/fmod_ret, lsm, and kprobe/uprobe programs can be sleepable\n"); 16428 return -EINVAL; 16429 } 16430 16431 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) 16432 return check_struct_ops_btf_id(env); 16433 16434 if (prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 16435 prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM && 16436 prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) 16437 return 0; 16438 16439 ret = bpf_check_attach_target(&env->log, prog, tgt_prog, btf_id, &tgt_info); 16440 if (ret) 16441 return ret; 16442 16443 if (tgt_prog && prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) { 16444 /* to make freplace equivalent to their targets, they need to 16445 * inherit env->ops and expected_attach_type for the rest of the 16446 * verification 16447 */ 16448 env->ops = bpf_verifier_ops[tgt_prog->type]; 16449 prog->expected_attach_type = tgt_prog->expected_attach_type; 16450 } 16451 16452 /* store info about the attachment target that will be used later */ 16453 prog->aux->attach_func_proto = tgt_info.tgt_type; 16454 prog->aux->attach_func_name = tgt_info.tgt_name; 16455 16456 if (tgt_prog) { 16457 prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type = tgt_prog->type; 16458 prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type = tgt_prog->expected_attach_type; 16459 } 16460 16461 if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP) { 16462 prog->aux->attach_btf_trace = true; 16463 return 0; 16464 } else if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_ITER) { 16465 if (!bpf_iter_prog_supported(prog)) 16466 return -EINVAL; 16467 return 0; 16468 } 16469 16470 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) { 16471 ret = bpf_lsm_verify_prog(&env->log, prog); 16472 if (ret < 0) 16473 return ret; 16474 } else if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 16475 btf_id_set_contains(&btf_id_deny, btf_id)) { 16476 return -EINVAL; 16477 } 16478 16479 key = bpf_trampoline_compute_key(tgt_prog, prog->aux->attach_btf, btf_id); 16480 tr = bpf_trampoline_get(key, &tgt_info); 16481 if (!tr) 16482 return -ENOMEM; 16483 16484 prog->aux->dst_trampoline = tr; 16485 return 0; 16486 } 16487 16488 struct btf *bpf_get_btf_vmlinux(void) 16489 { 16490 if (!btf_vmlinux && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF)) { 16491 mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 16492 if (!btf_vmlinux) 16493 btf_vmlinux = btf_parse_vmlinux(); 16494 mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 16495 } 16496 return btf_vmlinux; 16497 } 16498 16499 int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr) 16500 { 16501 u64 start_time = ktime_get_ns(); 16502 struct bpf_verifier_env *env; 16503 struct bpf_verifier_log *log; 16504 int i, len, ret = -EINVAL; 16505 bool is_priv; 16506 16507 /* no program is valid */ 16508 if (ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_verifier_ops) == 0) 16509 return -EINVAL; 16510 16511 /* 'struct bpf_verifier_env' can be global, but since it's not small, 16512 * allocate/free it every time bpf_check() is called 16513 */ 16514 env = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_env), GFP_KERNEL); 16515 if (!env) 16516 return -ENOMEM; 16517 log = &env->log; 16518 16519 len = (*prog)->len; 16520 env->insn_aux_data = 16521 vzalloc(array_size(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data), len)); 16522 ret = -ENOMEM; 16523 if (!env->insn_aux_data) 16524 goto err_free_env; 16525 for (i = 0; i < len; i++) 16526 env->insn_aux_data[i].orig_idx = i; 16527 env->prog = *prog; 16528 env->ops = bpf_verifier_ops[env->prog->type]; 16529 env->fd_array = make_bpfptr(attr->fd_array, uattr.is_kernel); 16530 is_priv = bpf_capable(); 16531 16532 bpf_get_btf_vmlinux(); 16533 16534 /* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */ 16535 if (!is_priv) 16536 mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 16537 16538 if (attr->log_level || attr->log_buf || attr->log_size) { 16539 /* user requested verbose verifier output 16540 * and supplied buffer to store the verification trace 16541 */ 16542 log->level = attr->log_level; 16543 log->ubuf = (char __user *) (unsigned long) attr->log_buf; 16544 log->len_total = attr->log_size; 16545 16546 /* log attributes have to be sane */ 16547 if (!bpf_verifier_log_attr_valid(log)) { 16548 ret = -EINVAL; 16549 goto err_unlock; 16550 } 16551 } 16552 16553 mark_verifier_state_clean(env); 16554 16555 if (IS_ERR(btf_vmlinux)) { 16556 /* Either gcc or pahole or kernel are broken. */ 16557 verbose(env, "in-kernel BTF is malformed\n"); 16558 ret = PTR_ERR(btf_vmlinux); 16559 goto skip_full_check; 16560 } 16561 16562 env->strict_alignment = !!(attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT); 16563 if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS)) 16564 env->strict_alignment = true; 16565 if (attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_ANY_ALIGNMENT) 16566 env->strict_alignment = false; 16567 16568 env->allow_ptr_leaks = bpf_allow_ptr_leaks(); 16569 env->allow_uninit_stack = bpf_allow_uninit_stack(); 16570 env->allow_ptr_to_map_access = bpf_allow_ptr_to_map_access(); 16571 env->bypass_spec_v1 = bpf_bypass_spec_v1(); 16572 env->bypass_spec_v4 = bpf_bypass_spec_v4(); 16573 env->bpf_capable = bpf_capable(); 16574 16575 if (is_priv) 16576 env->test_state_freq = attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ; 16577 16578 env->explored_states = kvcalloc(state_htab_size(env), 16579 sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list *), 16580 GFP_USER); 16581 ret = -ENOMEM; 16582 if (!env->explored_states) 16583 goto skip_full_check; 16584 16585 ret = add_subprog_and_kfunc(env); 16586 if (ret < 0) 16587 goto skip_full_check; 16588 16589 ret = check_subprogs(env); 16590 if (ret < 0) 16591 goto skip_full_check; 16592 16593 ret = check_btf_info(env, attr, uattr); 16594 if (ret < 0) 16595 goto skip_full_check; 16596 16597 ret = check_attach_btf_id(env); 16598 if (ret) 16599 goto skip_full_check; 16600 16601 ret = resolve_pseudo_ldimm64(env); 16602 if (ret < 0) 16603 goto skip_full_check; 16604 16605 if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) { 16606 ret = bpf_prog_offload_verifier_prep(env->prog); 16607 if (ret) 16608 goto skip_full_check; 16609 } 16610 16611 ret = check_cfg(env); 16612 if (ret < 0) 16613 goto skip_full_check; 16614 16615 ret = do_check_subprogs(env); 16616 ret = ret ?: do_check_main(env); 16617 16618 if (ret == 0 && bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) 16619 ret = bpf_prog_offload_finalize(env); 16620 16621 skip_full_check: 16622 kvfree(env->explored_states); 16623 16624 if (ret == 0) 16625 ret = check_max_stack_depth(env); 16626 16627 /* instruction rewrites happen after this point */ 16628 if (ret == 0) 16629 ret = optimize_bpf_loop(env); 16630 16631 if (is_priv) { 16632 if (ret == 0) 16633 opt_hard_wire_dead_code_branches(env); 16634 if (ret == 0) 16635 ret = opt_remove_dead_code(env); 16636 if (ret == 0) 16637 ret = opt_remove_nops(env); 16638 } else { 16639 if (ret == 0) 16640 sanitize_dead_code(env); 16641 } 16642 16643 if (ret == 0) 16644 /* program is valid, convert *(u32*)(ctx + off) accesses */ 16645 ret = convert_ctx_accesses(env); 16646 16647 if (ret == 0) 16648 ret = do_misc_fixups(env); 16649 16650 /* do 32-bit optimization after insn patching has done so those patched 16651 * insns could be handled correctly. 16652 */ 16653 if (ret == 0 && !bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) { 16654 ret = opt_subreg_zext_lo32_rnd_hi32(env, attr); 16655 env->prog->aux->verifier_zext = bpf_jit_needs_zext() ? !ret 16656 : false; 16657 } 16658 16659 if (ret == 0) 16660 ret = fixup_call_args(env); 16661 16662 env->verification_time = ktime_get_ns() - start_time; 16663 print_verification_stats(env); 16664 env->prog->aux->verified_insns = env->insn_processed; 16665 16666 if (log->level && bpf_verifier_log_full(log)) 16667 ret = -ENOSPC; 16668 if (log->level && !log->ubuf) { 16669 ret = -EFAULT; 16670 goto err_release_maps; 16671 } 16672 16673 if (ret) 16674 goto err_release_maps; 16675 16676 if (env->used_map_cnt) { 16677 /* if program passed verifier, update used_maps in bpf_prog_info */ 16678 env->prog->aux->used_maps = kmalloc_array(env->used_map_cnt, 16679 sizeof(env->used_maps[0]), 16680 GFP_KERNEL); 16681 16682 if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps) { 16683 ret = -ENOMEM; 16684 goto err_release_maps; 16685 } 16686 16687 memcpy(env->prog->aux->used_maps, env->used_maps, 16688 sizeof(env->used_maps[0]) * env->used_map_cnt); 16689 env->prog->aux->used_map_cnt = env->used_map_cnt; 16690 } 16691 if (env->used_btf_cnt) { 16692 /* if program passed verifier, update used_btfs in bpf_prog_aux */ 16693 env->prog->aux->used_btfs = kmalloc_array(env->used_btf_cnt, 16694 sizeof(env->used_btfs[0]), 16695 GFP_KERNEL); 16696 if (!env->prog->aux->used_btfs) { 16697 ret = -ENOMEM; 16698 goto err_release_maps; 16699 } 16700 16701 memcpy(env->prog->aux->used_btfs, env->used_btfs, 16702 sizeof(env->used_btfs[0]) * env->used_btf_cnt); 16703 env->prog->aux->used_btf_cnt = env->used_btf_cnt; 16704 } 16705 if (env->used_map_cnt || env->used_btf_cnt) { 16706 /* program is valid. Convert pseudo bpf_ld_imm64 into generic 16707 * bpf_ld_imm64 instructions 16708 */ 16709 convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(env); 16710 } 16711 16712 adjust_btf_func(env); 16713 16714 err_release_maps: 16715 if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps) 16716 /* if we didn't copy map pointers into bpf_prog_info, release 16717 * them now. Otherwise free_used_maps() will release them. 16718 */ 16719 release_maps(env); 16720 if (!env->prog->aux->used_btfs) 16721 release_btfs(env); 16722 16723 /* extension progs temporarily inherit the attach_type of their targets 16724 for verification purposes, so set it back to zero before returning 16725 */ 16726 if (env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) 16727 env->prog->expected_attach_type = 0; 16728 16729 *prog = env->prog; 16730 err_unlock: 16731 if (!is_priv) 16732 mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 16733 vfree(env->insn_aux_data); 16734 err_free_env: 16735 kfree(env); 16736 return ret; 16737 } 16738