1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only 2 /* Copyright (c) 2011-2014 PLUMgrid, http://plumgrid.com 3 * Copyright (c) 2016 Facebook 4 * Copyright (c) 2018 Covalent IO, Inc. http://covalent.io 5 */ 6 #include <uapi/linux/btf.h> 7 #include <linux/bpf-cgroup.h> 8 #include <linux/kernel.h> 9 #include <linux/types.h> 10 #include <linux/slab.h> 11 #include <linux/bpf.h> 12 #include <linux/btf.h> 13 #include <linux/bpf_verifier.h> 14 #include <linux/filter.h> 15 #include <net/netlink.h> 16 #include <linux/file.h> 17 #include <linux/vmalloc.h> 18 #include <linux/stringify.h> 19 #include <linux/bsearch.h> 20 #include <linux/sort.h> 21 #include <linux/perf_event.h> 22 #include <linux/ctype.h> 23 #include <linux/error-injection.h> 24 #include <linux/bpf_lsm.h> 25 #include <linux/btf_ids.h> 26 #include <linux/poison.h> 27 #include <linux/module.h> 28 29 #include "disasm.h" 30 31 static const struct bpf_verifier_ops * const bpf_verifier_ops[] = { 32 #define BPF_PROG_TYPE(_id, _name, prog_ctx_type, kern_ctx_type) \ 33 [_id] = & _name ## _verifier_ops, 34 #define BPF_MAP_TYPE(_id, _ops) 35 #define BPF_LINK_TYPE(_id, _name) 36 #include <linux/bpf_types.h> 37 #undef BPF_PROG_TYPE 38 #undef BPF_MAP_TYPE 39 #undef BPF_LINK_TYPE 40 }; 41 42 /* bpf_check() is a static code analyzer that walks eBPF program 43 * instruction by instruction and updates register/stack state. 44 * All paths of conditional branches are analyzed until 'bpf_exit' insn. 45 * 46 * The first pass is depth-first-search to check that the program is a DAG. 47 * It rejects the following programs: 48 * - larger than BPF_MAXINSNS insns 49 * - if loop is present (detected via back-edge) 50 * - unreachable insns exist (shouldn't be a forest. program = one function) 51 * - out of bounds or malformed jumps 52 * The second pass is all possible path descent from the 1st insn. 53 * Since it's analyzing all paths through the program, the length of the 54 * analysis is limited to 64k insn, which may be hit even if total number of 55 * insn is less then 4K, but there are too many branches that change stack/regs. 56 * Number of 'branches to be analyzed' is limited to 1k 57 * 58 * On entry to each instruction, each register has a type, and the instruction 59 * changes the types of the registers depending on instruction semantics. 60 * If instruction is BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_5), then type of R5 is 61 * copied to R1. 62 * 63 * All registers are 64-bit. 64 * R0 - return register 65 * R1-R5 argument passing registers 66 * R6-R9 callee saved registers 67 * R10 - frame pointer read-only 68 * 69 * At the start of BPF program the register R1 contains a pointer to bpf_context 70 * and has type PTR_TO_CTX. 71 * 72 * Verifier tracks arithmetic operations on pointers in case: 73 * BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10), 74 * BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -20), 75 * 1st insn copies R10 (which has FRAME_PTR) type into R1 76 * and 2nd arithmetic instruction is pattern matched to recognize 77 * that it wants to construct a pointer to some element within stack. 78 * So after 2nd insn, the register R1 has type PTR_TO_STACK 79 * (and -20 constant is saved for further stack bounds checking). 80 * Meaning that this reg is a pointer to stack plus known immediate constant. 81 * 82 * Most of the time the registers have SCALAR_VALUE type, which 83 * means the register has some value, but it's not a valid pointer. 84 * (like pointer plus pointer becomes SCALAR_VALUE type) 85 * 86 * When verifier sees load or store instructions the type of base register 87 * can be: PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_CTX, PTR_TO_STACK, PTR_TO_SOCKET. These are 88 * four pointer types recognized by check_mem_access() function. 89 * 90 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE means that this register is pointing to 'map element value' 91 * and the range of [ptr, ptr + map's value_size) is accessible. 92 * 93 * registers used to pass values to function calls are checked against 94 * function argument constraints. 95 * 96 * ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY is one of such argument constraints. 97 * It means that the register type passed to this function must be 98 * PTR_TO_STACK and it will be used inside the function as 99 * 'pointer to map element key' 100 * 101 * For example the argument constraints for bpf_map_lookup_elem(): 102 * .ret_type = RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, 103 * .arg1_type = ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR, 104 * .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, 105 * 106 * ret_type says that this function returns 'pointer to map elem value or null' 107 * function expects 1st argument to be a const pointer to 'struct bpf_map' and 108 * 2nd argument should be a pointer to stack, which will be used inside 109 * the helper function as a pointer to map element key. 110 * 111 * On the kernel side the helper function looks like: 112 * u64 bpf_map_lookup_elem(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5) 113 * { 114 * struct bpf_map *map = (struct bpf_map *) (unsigned long) r1; 115 * void *key = (void *) (unsigned long) r2; 116 * void *value; 117 * 118 * here kernel can access 'key' and 'map' pointers safely, knowing that 119 * [key, key + map->key_size) bytes are valid and were initialized on 120 * the stack of eBPF program. 121 * } 122 * 123 * Corresponding eBPF program may look like: 124 * BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), // after this insn R2 type is FRAME_PTR 125 * BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -4), // after this insn R2 type is PTR_TO_STACK 126 * BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, map_fd), // after this insn R1 type is CONST_PTR_TO_MAP 127 * BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), 128 * here verifier looks at prototype of map_lookup_elem() and sees: 129 * .arg1_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR and R1->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP, which is ok, 130 * Now verifier knows that this map has key of R1->map_ptr->key_size bytes 131 * 132 * Then .arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY and R2->type == PTR_TO_STACK, ok so far, 133 * Now verifier checks that [R2, R2 + map's key_size) are within stack limits 134 * and were initialized prior to this call. 135 * If it's ok, then verifier allows this BPF_CALL insn and looks at 136 * .ret_type which is RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, so it sets 137 * R0->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL which means bpf_map_lookup_elem() function 138 * returns either pointer to map value or NULL. 139 * 140 * When type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL passes through 'if (reg != 0) goto +off' 141 * insn, the register holding that pointer in the true branch changes state to 142 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE and the same register changes state to CONST_IMM in the false 143 * branch. See check_cond_jmp_op(). 144 * 145 * After the call R0 is set to return type of the function and registers R1-R5 146 * are set to NOT_INIT to indicate that they are no longer readable. 147 * 148 * The following reference types represent a potential reference to a kernel 149 * resource which, after first being allocated, must be checked and freed by 150 * the BPF program: 151 * - PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL, PTR_TO_SOCKET 152 * 153 * When the verifier sees a helper call return a reference type, it allocates a 154 * pointer id for the reference and stores it in the current function state. 155 * Similar to the way that PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL is converted into 156 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL becomes PTR_TO_SOCKET when the type 157 * passes through a NULL-check conditional. For the branch wherein the state is 158 * changed to CONST_IMM, the verifier releases the reference. 159 * 160 * For each helper function that allocates a reference, such as 161 * bpf_sk_lookup_tcp(), there is a corresponding release function, such as 162 * bpf_sk_release(). When a reference type passes into the release function, 163 * the verifier also releases the reference. If any unchecked or unreleased 164 * reference remains at the end of the program, the verifier rejects it. 165 */ 166 167 /* verifier_state + insn_idx are pushed to stack when branch is encountered */ 168 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem { 169 /* verifer state is 'st' 170 * before processing instruction 'insn_idx' 171 * and after processing instruction 'prev_insn_idx' 172 */ 173 struct bpf_verifier_state st; 174 int insn_idx; 175 int prev_insn_idx; 176 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *next; 177 /* length of verifier log at the time this state was pushed on stack */ 178 u32 log_pos; 179 }; 180 181 #define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ 8192 182 #define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES 64 183 184 #define BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON (1ULL << 63) 185 #define BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN (1ULL << 62) 186 187 #define BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV 1UL 188 #define BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON ((void *)((0xeB9FUL << 1) + \ 189 POISON_POINTER_DELTA)) 190 #define BPF_MAP_PTR(X) ((struct bpf_map *)((X) & ~BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV)) 191 192 static int acquire_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx); 193 static int release_reference(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int ref_obj_id); 194 static void invalidate_non_owning_refs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env); 195 static bool in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(struct bpf_verifier_env *env); 196 static int ref_set_non_owning(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 197 struct bpf_reg_state *reg); 198 static void specialize_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 199 u32 func_id, u16 offset, unsigned long *addr); 200 static bool is_trusted_reg(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg); 201 202 static bool bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 203 { 204 return BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state) == BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON; 205 } 206 207 static bool bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 208 { 209 return aux->map_ptr_state & BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV; 210 } 211 212 static void bpf_map_ptr_store(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, 213 const struct bpf_map *map, bool unpriv) 214 { 215 BUILD_BUG_ON((unsigned long)BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON & BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV); 216 unpriv |= bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux); 217 aux->map_ptr_state = (unsigned long)map | 218 (unpriv ? BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV : 0UL); 219 } 220 221 static bool bpf_map_key_poisoned(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 222 { 223 return aux->map_key_state & BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON; 224 } 225 226 static bool bpf_map_key_unseen(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 227 { 228 return !(aux->map_key_state & BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN); 229 } 230 231 static u64 bpf_map_key_immediate(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 232 { 233 return aux->map_key_state & ~(BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN | BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON); 234 } 235 236 static void bpf_map_key_store(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, u64 state) 237 { 238 bool poisoned = bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux); 239 240 aux->map_key_state = state | BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN | 241 (poisoned ? BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON : 0ULL); 242 } 243 244 static bool bpf_helper_call(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 245 { 246 return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 247 insn->src_reg == 0; 248 } 249 250 static bool bpf_pseudo_call(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 251 { 252 return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 253 insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL; 254 } 255 256 static bool bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 257 { 258 return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 259 insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL; 260 } 261 262 struct bpf_call_arg_meta { 263 struct bpf_map *map_ptr; 264 bool raw_mode; 265 bool pkt_access; 266 u8 release_regno; 267 int regno; 268 int access_size; 269 int mem_size; 270 u64 msize_max_value; 271 int ref_obj_id; 272 int dynptr_id; 273 int map_uid; 274 int func_id; 275 struct btf *btf; 276 u32 btf_id; 277 struct btf *ret_btf; 278 u32 ret_btf_id; 279 u32 subprogno; 280 struct btf_field *kptr_field; 281 }; 282 283 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta { 284 /* In parameters */ 285 struct btf *btf; 286 u32 func_id; 287 u32 kfunc_flags; 288 const struct btf_type *func_proto; 289 const char *func_name; 290 /* Out parameters */ 291 u32 ref_obj_id; 292 u8 release_regno; 293 bool r0_rdonly; 294 u32 ret_btf_id; 295 u64 r0_size; 296 u32 subprogno; 297 struct { 298 u64 value; 299 bool found; 300 } arg_constant; 301 302 /* arg_{btf,btf_id,owning_ref} are used by kfunc-specific handling, 303 * generally to pass info about user-defined local kptr types to later 304 * verification logic 305 * bpf_obj_drop 306 * Record the local kptr type to be drop'd 307 * bpf_refcount_acquire (via KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR arg type) 308 * Record the local kptr type to be refcount_incr'd and use 309 * arg_owning_ref to determine whether refcount_acquire should be 310 * fallible 311 */ 312 struct btf *arg_btf; 313 u32 arg_btf_id; 314 bool arg_owning_ref; 315 316 struct { 317 struct btf_field *field; 318 } arg_list_head; 319 struct { 320 struct btf_field *field; 321 } arg_rbtree_root; 322 struct { 323 enum bpf_dynptr_type type; 324 u32 id; 325 u32 ref_obj_id; 326 } initialized_dynptr; 327 struct { 328 u8 spi; 329 u8 frameno; 330 } iter; 331 u64 mem_size; 332 }; 333 334 struct btf *btf_vmlinux; 335 336 static DEFINE_MUTEX(bpf_verifier_lock); 337 338 static const struct bpf_line_info * 339 find_linfo(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 insn_off) 340 { 341 const struct bpf_line_info *linfo; 342 const struct bpf_prog *prog; 343 u32 i, nr_linfo; 344 345 prog = env->prog; 346 nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; 347 348 if (!nr_linfo || insn_off >= prog->len) 349 return NULL; 350 351 linfo = prog->aux->linfo; 352 for (i = 1; i < nr_linfo; i++) 353 if (insn_off < linfo[i].insn_off) 354 break; 355 356 return &linfo[i - 1]; 357 } 358 359 __printf(2, 3) static void verbose(void *private_data, const char *fmt, ...) 360 { 361 struct bpf_verifier_env *env = private_data; 362 va_list args; 363 364 if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(&env->log)) 365 return; 366 367 va_start(args, fmt); 368 bpf_verifier_vlog(&env->log, fmt, args); 369 va_end(args); 370 } 371 372 static const char *ltrim(const char *s) 373 { 374 while (isspace(*s)) 375 s++; 376 377 return s; 378 } 379 380 __printf(3, 4) static void verbose_linfo(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 381 u32 insn_off, 382 const char *prefix_fmt, ...) 383 { 384 const struct bpf_line_info *linfo; 385 386 if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(&env->log)) 387 return; 388 389 linfo = find_linfo(env, insn_off); 390 if (!linfo || linfo == env->prev_linfo) 391 return; 392 393 if (prefix_fmt) { 394 va_list args; 395 396 va_start(args, prefix_fmt); 397 bpf_verifier_vlog(&env->log, prefix_fmt, args); 398 va_end(args); 399 } 400 401 verbose(env, "%s\n", 402 ltrim(btf_name_by_offset(env->prog->aux->btf, 403 linfo->line_off))); 404 405 env->prev_linfo = linfo; 406 } 407 408 static void verbose_invalid_scalar(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 409 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 410 struct tnum *range, const char *ctx, 411 const char *reg_name) 412 { 413 char tn_buf[48]; 414 415 verbose(env, "At %s the register %s ", ctx, reg_name); 416 if (!tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off)) { 417 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 418 verbose(env, "has value %s", tn_buf); 419 } else { 420 verbose(env, "has unknown scalar value"); 421 } 422 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), *range); 423 verbose(env, " should have been in %s\n", tn_buf); 424 } 425 426 static bool type_is_pkt_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type) 427 { 428 type = base_type(type); 429 return type == PTR_TO_PACKET || 430 type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META; 431 } 432 433 static bool type_is_sk_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type) 434 { 435 return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET || 436 type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON || 437 type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK || 438 type == PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK; 439 } 440 441 static bool type_may_be_null(u32 type) 442 { 443 return type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 444 } 445 446 static bool reg_not_null(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 447 { 448 enum bpf_reg_type type; 449 450 type = reg->type; 451 if (type_may_be_null(type)) 452 return false; 453 454 type = base_type(type); 455 return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET || 456 type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK || 457 type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE || 458 type == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY || 459 type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON || 460 (type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID && is_trusted_reg(reg)) || 461 type == PTR_TO_MEM; 462 } 463 464 static bool type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(u32 type) 465 { 466 return base_type(type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID && type_flag(type) & MEM_ALLOC; 467 } 468 469 static bool type_is_non_owning_ref(u32 type) 470 { 471 return type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(type) && type_flag(type) & NON_OWN_REF; 472 } 473 474 static struct btf_record *reg_btf_record(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 475 { 476 struct btf_record *rec = NULL; 477 struct btf_struct_meta *meta; 478 479 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 480 rec = reg->map_ptr->record; 481 } else if (type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(reg->type)) { 482 meta = btf_find_struct_meta(reg->btf, reg->btf_id); 483 if (meta) 484 rec = meta->record; 485 } 486 return rec; 487 } 488 489 static bool subprog_is_global(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog) 490 { 491 struct bpf_func_info_aux *aux = env->prog->aux->func_info_aux; 492 493 return aux && aux[subprog].linkage == BTF_FUNC_GLOBAL; 494 } 495 496 static bool reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 497 { 498 return btf_record_has_field(reg_btf_record(reg), BPF_SPIN_LOCK); 499 } 500 501 static bool type_is_rdonly_mem(u32 type) 502 { 503 return type & MEM_RDONLY; 504 } 505 506 static bool is_acquire_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id, 507 const struct bpf_map *map) 508 { 509 enum bpf_map_type map_type = map ? map->map_type : BPF_MAP_TYPE_UNSPEC; 510 511 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_tcp || 512 func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_udp || 513 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_lookup_tcp || 514 func_id == BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve || 515 func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) 516 return true; 517 518 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 519 (map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP || 520 map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH)) 521 return true; 522 523 return false; 524 } 525 526 static bool is_ptr_cast_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 527 { 528 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_tcp_sock || 529 func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_fullsock || 530 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_sock || 531 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp6_sock || 532 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_udp6_sock || 533 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_mptcp_sock || 534 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_timewait_sock || 535 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_request_sock; 536 } 537 538 static bool is_dynptr_ref_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 539 { 540 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_dynptr_data; 541 } 542 543 static bool is_callback_calling_kfunc(u32 btf_id); 544 545 static bool is_callback_calling_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 546 { 547 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem || 548 func_id == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback || 549 func_id == BPF_FUNC_find_vma || 550 func_id == BPF_FUNC_loop || 551 func_id == BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain; 552 } 553 554 static bool is_async_callback_calling_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 555 { 556 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback; 557 } 558 559 static bool is_storage_get_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 560 { 561 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get || 562 func_id == BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get || 563 func_id == BPF_FUNC_task_storage_get || 564 func_id == BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_get; 565 } 566 567 static bool helper_multiple_ref_obj_use(enum bpf_func_id func_id, 568 const struct bpf_map *map) 569 { 570 int ref_obj_uses = 0; 571 572 if (is_ptr_cast_function(func_id)) 573 ref_obj_uses++; 574 if (is_acquire_function(func_id, map)) 575 ref_obj_uses++; 576 if (is_dynptr_ref_function(func_id)) 577 ref_obj_uses++; 578 579 return ref_obj_uses > 1; 580 } 581 582 static bool is_cmpxchg_insn(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 583 { 584 return BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX && 585 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC && 586 insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG; 587 } 588 589 /* string representation of 'enum bpf_reg_type' 590 * 591 * Note that reg_type_str() can not appear more than once in a single verbose() 592 * statement. 593 */ 594 static const char *reg_type_str(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 595 enum bpf_reg_type type) 596 { 597 char postfix[16] = {0}, prefix[64] = {0}; 598 static const char * const str[] = { 599 [NOT_INIT] = "?", 600 [SCALAR_VALUE] = "scalar", 601 [PTR_TO_CTX] = "ctx", 602 [CONST_PTR_TO_MAP] = "map_ptr", 603 [PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE] = "map_value", 604 [PTR_TO_STACK] = "fp", 605 [PTR_TO_PACKET] = "pkt", 606 [PTR_TO_PACKET_META] = "pkt_meta", 607 [PTR_TO_PACKET_END] = "pkt_end", 608 [PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS] = "flow_keys", 609 [PTR_TO_SOCKET] = "sock", 610 [PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON] = "sock_common", 611 [PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK] = "tcp_sock", 612 [PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER] = "tp_buffer", 613 [PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK] = "xdp_sock", 614 [PTR_TO_BTF_ID] = "ptr_", 615 [PTR_TO_MEM] = "mem", 616 [PTR_TO_BUF] = "buf", 617 [PTR_TO_FUNC] = "func", 618 [PTR_TO_MAP_KEY] = "map_key", 619 [CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR] = "dynptr_ptr", 620 }; 621 622 if (type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL) { 623 if (base_type(type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) 624 strncpy(postfix, "or_null_", 16); 625 else 626 strncpy(postfix, "_or_null", 16); 627 } 628 629 snprintf(prefix, sizeof(prefix), "%s%s%s%s%s%s%s", 630 type & MEM_RDONLY ? "rdonly_" : "", 631 type & MEM_RINGBUF ? "ringbuf_" : "", 632 type & MEM_USER ? "user_" : "", 633 type & MEM_PERCPU ? "percpu_" : "", 634 type & MEM_RCU ? "rcu_" : "", 635 type & PTR_UNTRUSTED ? "untrusted_" : "", 636 type & PTR_TRUSTED ? "trusted_" : "" 637 ); 638 639 snprintf(env->tmp_str_buf, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN, "%s%s%s", 640 prefix, str[base_type(type)], postfix); 641 return env->tmp_str_buf; 642 } 643 644 static char slot_type_char[] = { 645 [STACK_INVALID] = '?', 646 [STACK_SPILL] = 'r', 647 [STACK_MISC] = 'm', 648 [STACK_ZERO] = '0', 649 [STACK_DYNPTR] = 'd', 650 [STACK_ITER] = 'i', 651 }; 652 653 static void print_liveness(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 654 enum bpf_reg_liveness live) 655 { 656 if (live & (REG_LIVE_READ | REG_LIVE_WRITTEN | REG_LIVE_DONE)) 657 verbose(env, "_"); 658 if (live & REG_LIVE_READ) 659 verbose(env, "r"); 660 if (live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN) 661 verbose(env, "w"); 662 if (live & REG_LIVE_DONE) 663 verbose(env, "D"); 664 } 665 666 static int __get_spi(s32 off) 667 { 668 return (-off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE; 669 } 670 671 static struct bpf_func_state *func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 672 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 673 { 674 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 675 676 return cur->frame[reg->frameno]; 677 } 678 679 static bool is_spi_bounds_valid(struct bpf_func_state *state, int spi, int nr_slots) 680 { 681 int allocated_slots = state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; 682 683 /* We need to check that slots between [spi - nr_slots + 1, spi] are 684 * within [0, allocated_stack). 685 * 686 * Please note that the spi grows downwards. For example, a dynptr 687 * takes the size of two stack slots; the first slot will be at 688 * spi and the second slot will be at spi - 1. 689 */ 690 return spi - nr_slots + 1 >= 0 && spi < allocated_slots; 691 } 692 693 static int stack_slot_obj_get_spi(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 694 const char *obj_kind, int nr_slots) 695 { 696 int off, spi; 697 698 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 699 verbose(env, "%s has to be at a constant offset\n", obj_kind); 700 return -EINVAL; 701 } 702 703 off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; 704 if (off % BPF_REG_SIZE) { 705 verbose(env, "cannot pass in %s at an offset=%d\n", obj_kind, off); 706 return -EINVAL; 707 } 708 709 spi = __get_spi(off); 710 if (spi + 1 < nr_slots) { 711 verbose(env, "cannot pass in %s at an offset=%d\n", obj_kind, off); 712 return -EINVAL; 713 } 714 715 if (!is_spi_bounds_valid(func(env, reg), spi, nr_slots)) 716 return -ERANGE; 717 return spi; 718 } 719 720 static int dynptr_get_spi(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 721 { 722 return stack_slot_obj_get_spi(env, reg, "dynptr", BPF_DYNPTR_NR_SLOTS); 723 } 724 725 static int iter_get_spi(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int nr_slots) 726 { 727 return stack_slot_obj_get_spi(env, reg, "iter", nr_slots); 728 } 729 730 static const char *btf_type_name(const struct btf *btf, u32 id) 731 { 732 return btf_name_by_offset(btf, btf_type_by_id(btf, id)->name_off); 733 } 734 735 static const char *dynptr_type_str(enum bpf_dynptr_type type) 736 { 737 switch (type) { 738 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL: 739 return "local"; 740 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF: 741 return "ringbuf"; 742 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB: 743 return "skb"; 744 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP: 745 return "xdp"; 746 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID: 747 return "<invalid>"; 748 default: 749 WARN_ONCE(1, "unknown dynptr type %d\n", type); 750 return "<unknown>"; 751 } 752 } 753 754 static const char *iter_type_str(const struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id) 755 { 756 if (!btf || btf_id == 0) 757 return "<invalid>"; 758 759 /* we already validated that type is valid and has conforming name */ 760 return btf_type_name(btf, btf_id) + sizeof(ITER_PREFIX) - 1; 761 } 762 763 static const char *iter_state_str(enum bpf_iter_state state) 764 { 765 switch (state) { 766 case BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE: 767 return "active"; 768 case BPF_ITER_STATE_DRAINED: 769 return "drained"; 770 case BPF_ITER_STATE_INVALID: 771 return "<invalid>"; 772 default: 773 WARN_ONCE(1, "unknown iter state %d\n", state); 774 return "<unknown>"; 775 } 776 } 777 778 static void mark_reg_scratched(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno) 779 { 780 env->scratched_regs |= 1U << regno; 781 } 782 783 static void mark_stack_slot_scratched(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 spi) 784 { 785 env->scratched_stack_slots |= 1ULL << spi; 786 } 787 788 static bool reg_scratched(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno) 789 { 790 return (env->scratched_regs >> regno) & 1; 791 } 792 793 static bool stack_slot_scratched(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u64 regno) 794 { 795 return (env->scratched_stack_slots >> regno) & 1; 796 } 797 798 static bool verifier_state_scratched(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 799 { 800 return env->scratched_regs || env->scratched_stack_slots; 801 } 802 803 static void mark_verifier_state_clean(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 804 { 805 env->scratched_regs = 0U; 806 env->scratched_stack_slots = 0ULL; 807 } 808 809 /* Used for printing the entire verifier state. */ 810 static void mark_verifier_state_scratched(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 811 { 812 env->scratched_regs = ~0U; 813 env->scratched_stack_slots = ~0ULL; 814 } 815 816 static enum bpf_dynptr_type arg_to_dynptr_type(enum bpf_arg_type arg_type) 817 { 818 switch (arg_type & DYNPTR_TYPE_FLAG_MASK) { 819 case DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL: 820 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL; 821 case DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF: 822 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF; 823 case DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB: 824 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB; 825 case DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP: 826 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP; 827 default: 828 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID; 829 } 830 } 831 832 static enum bpf_type_flag get_dynptr_type_flag(enum bpf_dynptr_type type) 833 { 834 switch (type) { 835 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL: 836 return DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL; 837 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF: 838 return DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF; 839 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB: 840 return DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB; 841 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP: 842 return DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP; 843 default: 844 return 0; 845 } 846 } 847 848 static bool dynptr_type_refcounted(enum bpf_dynptr_type type) 849 { 850 return type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF; 851 } 852 853 static void __mark_dynptr_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 854 enum bpf_dynptr_type type, 855 bool first_slot, int dynptr_id); 856 857 static void __mark_reg_not_init(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 858 struct bpf_reg_state *reg); 859 860 static void mark_dynptr_stack_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 861 struct bpf_reg_state *sreg1, 862 struct bpf_reg_state *sreg2, 863 enum bpf_dynptr_type type) 864 { 865 int id = ++env->id_gen; 866 867 __mark_dynptr_reg(sreg1, type, true, id); 868 __mark_dynptr_reg(sreg2, type, false, id); 869 } 870 871 static void mark_dynptr_cb_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 872 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 873 enum bpf_dynptr_type type) 874 { 875 __mark_dynptr_reg(reg, type, true, ++env->id_gen); 876 } 877 878 static int destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 879 struct bpf_func_state *state, int spi); 880 881 static int mark_stack_slots_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 882 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type, int insn_idx, int clone_ref_obj_id) 883 { 884 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 885 enum bpf_dynptr_type type; 886 int spi, i, err; 887 888 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 889 if (spi < 0) 890 return spi; 891 892 /* We cannot assume both spi and spi - 1 belong to the same dynptr, 893 * hence we need to call destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot twice for both, 894 * to ensure that for the following example: 895 * [d1][d1][d2][d2] 896 * spi 3 2 1 0 897 * So marking spi = 2 should lead to destruction of both d1 and d2. In 898 * case they do belong to same dynptr, second call won't see slot_type 899 * as STACK_DYNPTR and will simply skip destruction. 900 */ 901 err = destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(env, state, spi); 902 if (err) 903 return err; 904 err = destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(env, state, spi - 1); 905 if (err) 906 return err; 907 908 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 909 state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_DYNPTR; 910 state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] = STACK_DYNPTR; 911 } 912 913 type = arg_to_dynptr_type(arg_type); 914 if (type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID) 915 return -EINVAL; 916 917 mark_dynptr_stack_regs(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, 918 &state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr, type); 919 920 if (dynptr_type_refcounted(type)) { 921 /* The id is used to track proper releasing */ 922 int id; 923 924 if (clone_ref_obj_id) 925 id = clone_ref_obj_id; 926 else 927 id = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx); 928 929 if (id < 0) 930 return id; 931 932 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id = id; 933 state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id = id; 934 } 935 936 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 937 state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 938 939 return 0; 940 } 941 942 static void invalidate_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *state, int spi) 943 { 944 int i; 945 946 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 947 state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID; 948 state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID; 949 } 950 951 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr); 952 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr); 953 954 /* Why do we need to set REG_LIVE_WRITTEN for STACK_INVALID slot? 955 * 956 * While we don't allow reading STACK_INVALID, it is still possible to 957 * do <8 byte writes marking some but not all slots as STACK_MISC. Then, 958 * helpers or insns can do partial read of that part without failing, 959 * but check_stack_range_initialized, check_stack_read_var_off, and 960 * check_stack_read_fixed_off will do mark_reg_read for all 8-bytes of 961 * the slot conservatively. Hence we need to prevent those liveness 962 * marking walks. 963 * 964 * This was not a problem before because STACK_INVALID is only set by 965 * default (where the default reg state has its reg->parent as NULL), or 966 * in clean_live_states after REG_LIVE_DONE (at which point 967 * mark_reg_read won't walk reg->parent chain), but not randomly during 968 * verifier state exploration (like we did above). Hence, for our case 969 * parentage chain will still be live (i.e. reg->parent may be 970 * non-NULL), while earlier reg->parent was NULL, so we need 971 * REG_LIVE_WRITTEN to screen off read marker propagation when it is 972 * done later on reads or by mark_dynptr_read as well to unnecessary 973 * mark registers in verifier state. 974 */ 975 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 976 state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 977 } 978 979 static int unmark_stack_slots_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 980 { 981 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 982 int spi, ref_obj_id, i; 983 984 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 985 if (spi < 0) 986 return spi; 987 988 if (!dynptr_type_refcounted(state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type)) { 989 invalidate_dynptr(env, state, spi); 990 return 0; 991 } 992 993 ref_obj_id = state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id; 994 995 /* If the dynptr has a ref_obj_id, then we need to invalidate 996 * two things: 997 * 998 * 1) Any dynptrs with a matching ref_obj_id (clones) 999 * 2) Any slices derived from this dynptr. 1000 */ 1001 1002 /* Invalidate any slices associated with this dynptr */ 1003 WARN_ON_ONCE(release_reference(env, ref_obj_id)); 1004 1005 /* Invalidate any dynptr clones */ 1006 for (i = 1; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 1007 if (state->stack[i].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id != ref_obj_id) 1008 continue; 1009 1010 /* it should always be the case that if the ref obj id 1011 * matches then the stack slot also belongs to a 1012 * dynptr 1013 */ 1014 if (state->stack[i].slot_type[0] != STACK_DYNPTR) { 1015 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: misconfigured ref_obj_id\n"); 1016 return -EFAULT; 1017 } 1018 if (state->stack[i].spilled_ptr.dynptr.first_slot) 1019 invalidate_dynptr(env, state, i); 1020 } 1021 1022 return 0; 1023 } 1024 1025 static void __mark_reg_unknown(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1026 struct bpf_reg_state *reg); 1027 1028 static void mark_reg_invalid(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1029 { 1030 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) 1031 __mark_reg_not_init(env, reg); 1032 else 1033 __mark_reg_unknown(env, reg); 1034 } 1035 1036 static int destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1037 struct bpf_func_state *state, int spi) 1038 { 1039 struct bpf_func_state *fstate; 1040 struct bpf_reg_state *dreg; 1041 int i, dynptr_id; 1042 1043 /* We always ensure that STACK_DYNPTR is never set partially, 1044 * hence just checking for slot_type[0] is enough. This is 1045 * different for STACK_SPILL, where it may be only set for 1046 * 1 byte, so code has to use is_spilled_reg. 1047 */ 1048 if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] != STACK_DYNPTR) 1049 return 0; 1050 1051 /* Reposition spi to first slot */ 1052 if (!state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.first_slot) 1053 spi = spi + 1; 1054 1055 if (dynptr_type_refcounted(state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type)) { 1056 verbose(env, "cannot overwrite referenced dynptr\n"); 1057 return -EINVAL; 1058 } 1059 1060 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi); 1061 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi - 1); 1062 1063 /* Writing partially to one dynptr stack slot destroys both. */ 1064 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 1065 state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID; 1066 state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID; 1067 } 1068 1069 dynptr_id = state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.id; 1070 /* Invalidate any slices associated with this dynptr */ 1071 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, fstate, dreg, ({ 1072 /* Dynptr slices are only PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL and PTR_TO_MEM */ 1073 if (dreg->type != (PTR_TO_MEM | PTR_MAYBE_NULL) && dreg->type != PTR_TO_MEM) 1074 continue; 1075 if (dreg->dynptr_id == dynptr_id) 1076 mark_reg_invalid(env, dreg); 1077 })); 1078 1079 /* Do not release reference state, we are destroying dynptr on stack, 1080 * not using some helper to release it. Just reset register. 1081 */ 1082 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr); 1083 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr); 1084 1085 /* Same reason as unmark_stack_slots_dynptr above */ 1086 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 1087 state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 1088 1089 return 0; 1090 } 1091 1092 static bool is_dynptr_reg_valid_uninit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1093 { 1094 int spi; 1095 1096 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 1097 return false; 1098 1099 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 1100 1101 /* -ERANGE (i.e. spi not falling into allocated stack slots) isn't an 1102 * error because this just means the stack state hasn't been updated yet. 1103 * We will do check_mem_access to check and update stack bounds later. 1104 */ 1105 if (spi < 0 && spi != -ERANGE) 1106 return false; 1107 1108 /* We don't need to check if the stack slots are marked by previous 1109 * dynptr initializations because we allow overwriting existing unreferenced 1110 * STACK_DYNPTR slots, see mark_stack_slots_dynptr which calls 1111 * destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot to ensure dynptr objects at the slots we are 1112 * touching are completely destructed before we reinitialize them for a new 1113 * one. For referenced ones, destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot returns an error early 1114 * instead of delaying it until the end where the user will get "Unreleased 1115 * reference" error. 1116 */ 1117 return true; 1118 } 1119 1120 static bool is_dynptr_reg_valid_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1121 { 1122 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 1123 int i, spi; 1124 1125 /* This already represents first slot of initialized bpf_dynptr. 1126 * 1127 * CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR already has fixed and var_off as 0 due to 1128 * check_func_arg_reg_off's logic, so we don't need to check its 1129 * offset and alignment. 1130 */ 1131 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 1132 return true; 1133 1134 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 1135 if (spi < 0) 1136 return false; 1137 if (!state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.first_slot) 1138 return false; 1139 1140 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 1141 if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] != STACK_DYNPTR || 1142 state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] != STACK_DYNPTR) 1143 return false; 1144 } 1145 1146 return true; 1147 } 1148 1149 static bool is_dynptr_type_expected(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 1150 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type) 1151 { 1152 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 1153 enum bpf_dynptr_type dynptr_type; 1154 int spi; 1155 1156 /* ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR takes any type of dynptr */ 1157 if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 1158 return true; 1159 1160 dynptr_type = arg_to_dynptr_type(arg_type); 1161 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) { 1162 return reg->dynptr.type == dynptr_type; 1163 } else { 1164 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 1165 if (spi < 0) 1166 return false; 1167 return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type == dynptr_type; 1168 } 1169 } 1170 1171 static void __mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg); 1172 1173 static int mark_stack_slots_iter(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1174 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int insn_idx, 1175 struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id, int nr_slots) 1176 { 1177 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 1178 int spi, i, j, id; 1179 1180 spi = iter_get_spi(env, reg, nr_slots); 1181 if (spi < 0) 1182 return spi; 1183 1184 id = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx); 1185 if (id < 0) 1186 return id; 1187 1188 for (i = 0; i < nr_slots; i++) { 1189 struct bpf_stack_state *slot = &state->stack[spi - i]; 1190 struct bpf_reg_state *st = &slot->spilled_ptr; 1191 1192 __mark_reg_known_zero(st); 1193 st->type = PTR_TO_STACK; /* we don't have dedicated reg type */ 1194 st->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 1195 st->ref_obj_id = i == 0 ? id : 0; 1196 st->iter.btf = btf; 1197 st->iter.btf_id = btf_id; 1198 st->iter.state = BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE; 1199 st->iter.depth = 0; 1200 1201 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 1202 slot->slot_type[j] = STACK_ITER; 1203 1204 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi - i); 1205 } 1206 1207 return 0; 1208 } 1209 1210 static int unmark_stack_slots_iter(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1211 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int nr_slots) 1212 { 1213 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 1214 int spi, i, j; 1215 1216 spi = iter_get_spi(env, reg, nr_slots); 1217 if (spi < 0) 1218 return spi; 1219 1220 for (i = 0; i < nr_slots; i++) { 1221 struct bpf_stack_state *slot = &state->stack[spi - i]; 1222 struct bpf_reg_state *st = &slot->spilled_ptr; 1223 1224 if (i == 0) 1225 WARN_ON_ONCE(release_reference(env, st->ref_obj_id)); 1226 1227 __mark_reg_not_init(env, st); 1228 1229 /* see unmark_stack_slots_dynptr() for why we need to set REG_LIVE_WRITTEN */ 1230 st->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 1231 1232 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 1233 slot->slot_type[j] = STACK_INVALID; 1234 1235 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi - i); 1236 } 1237 1238 return 0; 1239 } 1240 1241 static bool is_iter_reg_valid_uninit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1242 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int nr_slots) 1243 { 1244 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 1245 int spi, i, j; 1246 1247 /* For -ERANGE (i.e. spi not falling into allocated stack slots), we 1248 * will do check_mem_access to check and update stack bounds later, so 1249 * return true for that case. 1250 */ 1251 spi = iter_get_spi(env, reg, nr_slots); 1252 if (spi == -ERANGE) 1253 return true; 1254 if (spi < 0) 1255 return false; 1256 1257 for (i = 0; i < nr_slots; i++) { 1258 struct bpf_stack_state *slot = &state->stack[spi - i]; 1259 1260 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 1261 if (slot->slot_type[j] == STACK_ITER) 1262 return false; 1263 } 1264 1265 return true; 1266 } 1267 1268 static bool is_iter_reg_valid_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 1269 struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id, int nr_slots) 1270 { 1271 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 1272 int spi, i, j; 1273 1274 spi = iter_get_spi(env, reg, nr_slots); 1275 if (spi < 0) 1276 return false; 1277 1278 for (i = 0; i < nr_slots; i++) { 1279 struct bpf_stack_state *slot = &state->stack[spi - i]; 1280 struct bpf_reg_state *st = &slot->spilled_ptr; 1281 1282 /* only main (first) slot has ref_obj_id set */ 1283 if (i == 0 && !st->ref_obj_id) 1284 return false; 1285 if (i != 0 && st->ref_obj_id) 1286 return false; 1287 if (st->iter.btf != btf || st->iter.btf_id != btf_id) 1288 return false; 1289 1290 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 1291 if (slot->slot_type[j] != STACK_ITER) 1292 return false; 1293 } 1294 1295 return true; 1296 } 1297 1298 /* Check if given stack slot is "special": 1299 * - spilled register state (STACK_SPILL); 1300 * - dynptr state (STACK_DYNPTR); 1301 * - iter state (STACK_ITER). 1302 */ 1303 static bool is_stack_slot_special(const struct bpf_stack_state *stack) 1304 { 1305 enum bpf_stack_slot_type type = stack->slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE - 1]; 1306 1307 switch (type) { 1308 case STACK_SPILL: 1309 case STACK_DYNPTR: 1310 case STACK_ITER: 1311 return true; 1312 case STACK_INVALID: 1313 case STACK_MISC: 1314 case STACK_ZERO: 1315 return false; 1316 default: 1317 WARN_ONCE(1, "unknown stack slot type %d\n", type); 1318 return true; 1319 } 1320 } 1321 1322 /* The reg state of a pointer or a bounded scalar was saved when 1323 * it was spilled to the stack. 1324 */ 1325 static bool is_spilled_reg(const struct bpf_stack_state *stack) 1326 { 1327 return stack->slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE - 1] == STACK_SPILL; 1328 } 1329 1330 static bool is_spilled_scalar_reg(const struct bpf_stack_state *stack) 1331 { 1332 return stack->slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE - 1] == STACK_SPILL && 1333 stack->spilled_ptr.type == SCALAR_VALUE; 1334 } 1335 1336 static void scrub_spilled_slot(u8 *stype) 1337 { 1338 if (*stype != STACK_INVALID) 1339 *stype = STACK_MISC; 1340 } 1341 1342 static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1343 const struct bpf_func_state *state, 1344 bool print_all) 1345 { 1346 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 1347 enum bpf_reg_type t; 1348 int i; 1349 1350 if (state->frameno) 1351 verbose(env, " frame%d:", state->frameno); 1352 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) { 1353 reg = &state->regs[i]; 1354 t = reg->type; 1355 if (t == NOT_INIT) 1356 continue; 1357 if (!print_all && !reg_scratched(env, i)) 1358 continue; 1359 verbose(env, " R%d", i); 1360 print_liveness(env, reg->live); 1361 verbose(env, "="); 1362 if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->precise) 1363 verbose(env, "P"); 1364 if ((t == SCALAR_VALUE || t == PTR_TO_STACK) && 1365 tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 1366 /* reg->off should be 0 for SCALAR_VALUE */ 1367 verbose(env, "%s", t == SCALAR_VALUE ? "" : reg_type_str(env, t)); 1368 verbose(env, "%lld", reg->var_off.value + reg->off); 1369 } else { 1370 const char *sep = ""; 1371 1372 verbose(env, "%s", reg_type_str(env, t)); 1373 if (base_type(t) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) 1374 verbose(env, "%s", btf_type_name(reg->btf, reg->btf_id)); 1375 verbose(env, "("); 1376 /* 1377 * _a stands for append, was shortened to avoid multiline statements below. 1378 * This macro is used to output a comma separated list of attributes. 1379 */ 1380 #define verbose_a(fmt, ...) ({ verbose(env, "%s" fmt, sep, __VA_ARGS__); sep = ","; }) 1381 1382 if (reg->id) 1383 verbose_a("id=%d", reg->id); 1384 if (reg->ref_obj_id) 1385 verbose_a("ref_obj_id=%d", reg->ref_obj_id); 1386 if (type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type)) 1387 verbose_a("%s", "non_own_ref"); 1388 if (t != SCALAR_VALUE) 1389 verbose_a("off=%d", reg->off); 1390 if (type_is_pkt_pointer(t)) 1391 verbose_a("r=%d", reg->range); 1392 else if (base_type(t) == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP || 1393 base_type(t) == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY || 1394 base_type(t) == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) 1395 verbose_a("ks=%d,vs=%d", 1396 reg->map_ptr->key_size, 1397 reg->map_ptr->value_size); 1398 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 1399 /* Typically an immediate SCALAR_VALUE, but 1400 * could be a pointer whose offset is too big 1401 * for reg->off 1402 */ 1403 verbose_a("imm=%llx", reg->var_off.value); 1404 } else { 1405 if (reg->smin_value != reg->umin_value && 1406 reg->smin_value != S64_MIN) 1407 verbose_a("smin=%lld", (long long)reg->smin_value); 1408 if (reg->smax_value != reg->umax_value && 1409 reg->smax_value != S64_MAX) 1410 verbose_a("smax=%lld", (long long)reg->smax_value); 1411 if (reg->umin_value != 0) 1412 verbose_a("umin=%llu", (unsigned long long)reg->umin_value); 1413 if (reg->umax_value != U64_MAX) 1414 verbose_a("umax=%llu", (unsigned long long)reg->umax_value); 1415 if (!tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off)) { 1416 char tn_buf[48]; 1417 1418 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 1419 verbose_a("var_off=%s", tn_buf); 1420 } 1421 if (reg->s32_min_value != reg->smin_value && 1422 reg->s32_min_value != S32_MIN) 1423 verbose_a("s32_min=%d", (int)(reg->s32_min_value)); 1424 if (reg->s32_max_value != reg->smax_value && 1425 reg->s32_max_value != S32_MAX) 1426 verbose_a("s32_max=%d", (int)(reg->s32_max_value)); 1427 if (reg->u32_min_value != reg->umin_value && 1428 reg->u32_min_value != U32_MIN) 1429 verbose_a("u32_min=%d", (int)(reg->u32_min_value)); 1430 if (reg->u32_max_value != reg->umax_value && 1431 reg->u32_max_value != U32_MAX) 1432 verbose_a("u32_max=%d", (int)(reg->u32_max_value)); 1433 } 1434 #undef verbose_a 1435 1436 verbose(env, ")"); 1437 } 1438 } 1439 for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 1440 char types_buf[BPF_REG_SIZE + 1]; 1441 bool valid = false; 1442 int j; 1443 1444 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) { 1445 if (state->stack[i].slot_type[j] != STACK_INVALID) 1446 valid = true; 1447 types_buf[j] = slot_type_char[state->stack[i].slot_type[j]]; 1448 } 1449 types_buf[BPF_REG_SIZE] = 0; 1450 if (!valid) 1451 continue; 1452 if (!print_all && !stack_slot_scratched(env, i)) 1453 continue; 1454 switch (state->stack[i].slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE - 1]) { 1455 case STACK_SPILL: 1456 reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 1457 t = reg->type; 1458 1459 verbose(env, " fp%d", (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE); 1460 print_liveness(env, reg->live); 1461 verbose(env, "=%s", t == SCALAR_VALUE ? "" : reg_type_str(env, t)); 1462 if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->precise) 1463 verbose(env, "P"); 1464 if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 1465 verbose(env, "%lld", reg->var_off.value + reg->off); 1466 break; 1467 case STACK_DYNPTR: 1468 i += BPF_DYNPTR_NR_SLOTS - 1; 1469 reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 1470 1471 verbose(env, " fp%d", (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE); 1472 print_liveness(env, reg->live); 1473 verbose(env, "=dynptr_%s", dynptr_type_str(reg->dynptr.type)); 1474 if (reg->ref_obj_id) 1475 verbose(env, "(ref_id=%d)", reg->ref_obj_id); 1476 break; 1477 case STACK_ITER: 1478 /* only main slot has ref_obj_id set; skip others */ 1479 reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 1480 if (!reg->ref_obj_id) 1481 continue; 1482 1483 verbose(env, " fp%d", (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE); 1484 print_liveness(env, reg->live); 1485 verbose(env, "=iter_%s(ref_id=%d,state=%s,depth=%u)", 1486 iter_type_str(reg->iter.btf, reg->iter.btf_id), 1487 reg->ref_obj_id, iter_state_str(reg->iter.state), 1488 reg->iter.depth); 1489 break; 1490 case STACK_MISC: 1491 case STACK_ZERO: 1492 default: 1493 reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 1494 1495 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 1496 types_buf[j] = slot_type_char[state->stack[i].slot_type[j]]; 1497 types_buf[BPF_REG_SIZE] = 0; 1498 1499 verbose(env, " fp%d", (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE); 1500 print_liveness(env, reg->live); 1501 verbose(env, "=%s", types_buf); 1502 break; 1503 } 1504 } 1505 if (state->acquired_refs && state->refs[0].id) { 1506 verbose(env, " refs=%d", state->refs[0].id); 1507 for (i = 1; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) 1508 if (state->refs[i].id) 1509 verbose(env, ",%d", state->refs[i].id); 1510 } 1511 if (state->in_callback_fn) 1512 verbose(env, " cb"); 1513 if (state->in_async_callback_fn) 1514 verbose(env, " async_cb"); 1515 verbose(env, "\n"); 1516 mark_verifier_state_clean(env); 1517 } 1518 1519 static inline u32 vlog_alignment(u32 pos) 1520 { 1521 return round_up(max(pos + BPF_LOG_MIN_ALIGNMENT / 2, BPF_LOG_ALIGNMENT), 1522 BPF_LOG_MIN_ALIGNMENT) - pos - 1; 1523 } 1524 1525 static void print_insn_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1526 const struct bpf_func_state *state) 1527 { 1528 if (env->prev_log_pos && env->prev_log_pos == env->log.end_pos) { 1529 /* remove new line character */ 1530 bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, env->prev_log_pos - 1); 1531 verbose(env, "%*c;", vlog_alignment(env->prev_insn_print_pos), ' '); 1532 } else { 1533 verbose(env, "%d:", env->insn_idx); 1534 } 1535 print_verifier_state(env, state, false); 1536 } 1537 1538 /* copy array src of length n * size bytes to dst. dst is reallocated if it's too 1539 * small to hold src. This is different from krealloc since we don't want to preserve 1540 * the contents of dst. 1541 * 1542 * Leaves dst untouched if src is NULL or length is zero. Returns NULL if memory could 1543 * not be allocated. 1544 */ 1545 static void *copy_array(void *dst, const void *src, size_t n, size_t size, gfp_t flags) 1546 { 1547 size_t alloc_bytes; 1548 void *orig = dst; 1549 size_t bytes; 1550 1551 if (ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(src)) 1552 goto out; 1553 1554 if (unlikely(check_mul_overflow(n, size, &bytes))) 1555 return NULL; 1556 1557 alloc_bytes = max(ksize(orig), kmalloc_size_roundup(bytes)); 1558 dst = krealloc(orig, alloc_bytes, flags); 1559 if (!dst) { 1560 kfree(orig); 1561 return NULL; 1562 } 1563 1564 memcpy(dst, src, bytes); 1565 out: 1566 return dst ? dst : ZERO_SIZE_PTR; 1567 } 1568 1569 /* resize an array from old_n items to new_n items. the array is reallocated if it's too 1570 * small to hold new_n items. new items are zeroed out if the array grows. 1571 * 1572 * Contrary to krealloc_array, does not free arr if new_n is zero. 1573 */ 1574 static void *realloc_array(void *arr, size_t old_n, size_t new_n, size_t size) 1575 { 1576 size_t alloc_size; 1577 void *new_arr; 1578 1579 if (!new_n || old_n == new_n) 1580 goto out; 1581 1582 alloc_size = kmalloc_size_roundup(size_mul(new_n, size)); 1583 new_arr = krealloc(arr, alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL); 1584 if (!new_arr) { 1585 kfree(arr); 1586 return NULL; 1587 } 1588 arr = new_arr; 1589 1590 if (new_n > old_n) 1591 memset(arr + old_n * size, 0, (new_n - old_n) * size); 1592 1593 out: 1594 return arr ? arr : ZERO_SIZE_PTR; 1595 } 1596 1597 static int copy_reference_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, const struct bpf_func_state *src) 1598 { 1599 dst->refs = copy_array(dst->refs, src->refs, src->acquired_refs, 1600 sizeof(struct bpf_reference_state), GFP_KERNEL); 1601 if (!dst->refs) 1602 return -ENOMEM; 1603 1604 dst->acquired_refs = src->acquired_refs; 1605 return 0; 1606 } 1607 1608 static int copy_stack_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, const struct bpf_func_state *src) 1609 { 1610 size_t n = src->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; 1611 1612 dst->stack = copy_array(dst->stack, src->stack, n, sizeof(struct bpf_stack_state), 1613 GFP_KERNEL); 1614 if (!dst->stack) 1615 return -ENOMEM; 1616 1617 dst->allocated_stack = src->allocated_stack; 1618 return 0; 1619 } 1620 1621 static int resize_reference_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, size_t n) 1622 { 1623 state->refs = realloc_array(state->refs, state->acquired_refs, n, 1624 sizeof(struct bpf_reference_state)); 1625 if (!state->refs) 1626 return -ENOMEM; 1627 1628 state->acquired_refs = n; 1629 return 0; 1630 } 1631 1632 static int grow_stack_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, int size) 1633 { 1634 size_t old_n = state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE, n = size / BPF_REG_SIZE; 1635 1636 if (old_n >= n) 1637 return 0; 1638 1639 state->stack = realloc_array(state->stack, old_n, n, sizeof(struct bpf_stack_state)); 1640 if (!state->stack) 1641 return -ENOMEM; 1642 1643 state->allocated_stack = size; 1644 return 0; 1645 } 1646 1647 /* Acquire a pointer id from the env and update the state->refs to include 1648 * this new pointer reference. 1649 * On success, returns a valid pointer id to associate with the register 1650 * On failure, returns a negative errno. 1651 */ 1652 static int acquire_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 1653 { 1654 struct bpf_func_state *state = cur_func(env); 1655 int new_ofs = state->acquired_refs; 1656 int id, err; 1657 1658 err = resize_reference_state(state, state->acquired_refs + 1); 1659 if (err) 1660 return err; 1661 id = ++env->id_gen; 1662 state->refs[new_ofs].id = id; 1663 state->refs[new_ofs].insn_idx = insn_idx; 1664 state->refs[new_ofs].callback_ref = state->in_callback_fn ? state->frameno : 0; 1665 1666 return id; 1667 } 1668 1669 /* release function corresponding to acquire_reference_state(). Idempotent. */ 1670 static int release_reference_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, int ptr_id) 1671 { 1672 int i, last_idx; 1673 1674 last_idx = state->acquired_refs - 1; 1675 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) { 1676 if (state->refs[i].id == ptr_id) { 1677 /* Cannot release caller references in callbacks */ 1678 if (state->in_callback_fn && state->refs[i].callback_ref != state->frameno) 1679 return -EINVAL; 1680 if (last_idx && i != last_idx) 1681 memcpy(&state->refs[i], &state->refs[last_idx], 1682 sizeof(*state->refs)); 1683 memset(&state->refs[last_idx], 0, sizeof(*state->refs)); 1684 state->acquired_refs--; 1685 return 0; 1686 } 1687 } 1688 return -EINVAL; 1689 } 1690 1691 static void free_func_state(struct bpf_func_state *state) 1692 { 1693 if (!state) 1694 return; 1695 kfree(state->refs); 1696 kfree(state->stack); 1697 kfree(state); 1698 } 1699 1700 static void clear_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_state *state) 1701 { 1702 kfree(state->jmp_history); 1703 state->jmp_history = NULL; 1704 state->jmp_history_cnt = 0; 1705 } 1706 1707 static void free_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, 1708 bool free_self) 1709 { 1710 int i; 1711 1712 for (i = 0; i <= state->curframe; i++) { 1713 free_func_state(state->frame[i]); 1714 state->frame[i] = NULL; 1715 } 1716 clear_jmp_history(state); 1717 if (free_self) 1718 kfree(state); 1719 } 1720 1721 /* copy verifier state from src to dst growing dst stack space 1722 * when necessary to accommodate larger src stack 1723 */ 1724 static int copy_func_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, 1725 const struct bpf_func_state *src) 1726 { 1727 int err; 1728 1729 memcpy(dst, src, offsetof(struct bpf_func_state, acquired_refs)); 1730 err = copy_reference_state(dst, src); 1731 if (err) 1732 return err; 1733 return copy_stack_state(dst, src); 1734 } 1735 1736 static int copy_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *dst_state, 1737 const struct bpf_verifier_state *src) 1738 { 1739 struct bpf_func_state *dst; 1740 int i, err; 1741 1742 dst_state->jmp_history = copy_array(dst_state->jmp_history, src->jmp_history, 1743 src->jmp_history_cnt, sizeof(struct bpf_idx_pair), 1744 GFP_USER); 1745 if (!dst_state->jmp_history) 1746 return -ENOMEM; 1747 dst_state->jmp_history_cnt = src->jmp_history_cnt; 1748 1749 /* if dst has more stack frames then src frame, free them */ 1750 for (i = src->curframe + 1; i <= dst_state->curframe; i++) { 1751 free_func_state(dst_state->frame[i]); 1752 dst_state->frame[i] = NULL; 1753 } 1754 dst_state->speculative = src->speculative; 1755 dst_state->active_rcu_lock = src->active_rcu_lock; 1756 dst_state->curframe = src->curframe; 1757 dst_state->active_lock.ptr = src->active_lock.ptr; 1758 dst_state->active_lock.id = src->active_lock.id; 1759 dst_state->branches = src->branches; 1760 dst_state->parent = src->parent; 1761 dst_state->first_insn_idx = src->first_insn_idx; 1762 dst_state->last_insn_idx = src->last_insn_idx; 1763 for (i = 0; i <= src->curframe; i++) { 1764 dst = dst_state->frame[i]; 1765 if (!dst) { 1766 dst = kzalloc(sizeof(*dst), GFP_KERNEL); 1767 if (!dst) 1768 return -ENOMEM; 1769 dst_state->frame[i] = dst; 1770 } 1771 err = copy_func_state(dst, src->frame[i]); 1772 if (err) 1773 return err; 1774 } 1775 return 0; 1776 } 1777 1778 static void update_branch_counts(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 1779 { 1780 while (st) { 1781 u32 br = --st->branches; 1782 1783 /* WARN_ON(br > 1) technically makes sense here, 1784 * but see comment in push_stack(), hence: 1785 */ 1786 WARN_ONCE((int)br < 0, 1787 "BUG update_branch_counts:branches_to_explore=%d\n", 1788 br); 1789 if (br) 1790 break; 1791 st = st->parent; 1792 } 1793 } 1794 1795 static int pop_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *prev_insn_idx, 1796 int *insn_idx, bool pop_log) 1797 { 1798 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 1799 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem, *head = env->head; 1800 int err; 1801 1802 if (env->head == NULL) 1803 return -ENOENT; 1804 1805 if (cur) { 1806 err = copy_verifier_state(cur, &head->st); 1807 if (err) 1808 return err; 1809 } 1810 if (pop_log) 1811 bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, head->log_pos); 1812 if (insn_idx) 1813 *insn_idx = head->insn_idx; 1814 if (prev_insn_idx) 1815 *prev_insn_idx = head->prev_insn_idx; 1816 elem = head->next; 1817 free_verifier_state(&head->st, false); 1818 kfree(head); 1819 env->head = elem; 1820 env->stack_size--; 1821 return 0; 1822 } 1823 1824 static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1825 int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx, 1826 bool speculative) 1827 { 1828 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 1829 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem; 1830 int err; 1831 1832 elem = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem), GFP_KERNEL); 1833 if (!elem) 1834 goto err; 1835 1836 elem->insn_idx = insn_idx; 1837 elem->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx; 1838 elem->next = env->head; 1839 elem->log_pos = env->log.end_pos; 1840 env->head = elem; 1841 env->stack_size++; 1842 err = copy_verifier_state(&elem->st, cur); 1843 if (err) 1844 goto err; 1845 elem->st.speculative |= speculative; 1846 if (env->stack_size > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ) { 1847 verbose(env, "The sequence of %d jumps is too complex.\n", 1848 env->stack_size); 1849 goto err; 1850 } 1851 if (elem->st.parent) { 1852 ++elem->st.parent->branches; 1853 /* WARN_ON(branches > 2) technically makes sense here, 1854 * but 1855 * 1. speculative states will bump 'branches' for non-branch 1856 * instructions 1857 * 2. is_state_visited() heuristics may decide not to create 1858 * a new state for a sequence of branches and all such current 1859 * and cloned states will be pointing to a single parent state 1860 * which might have large 'branches' count. 1861 */ 1862 } 1863 return &elem->st; 1864 err: 1865 free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true); 1866 env->cur_state = NULL; 1867 /* pop all elements and return */ 1868 while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false)); 1869 return NULL; 1870 } 1871 1872 #define CALLER_SAVED_REGS 6 1873 static const int caller_saved[CALLER_SAVED_REGS] = { 1874 BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_5 1875 }; 1876 1877 /* This helper doesn't clear reg->id */ 1878 static void ___mark_reg_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm) 1879 { 1880 reg->var_off = tnum_const(imm); 1881 reg->smin_value = (s64)imm; 1882 reg->smax_value = (s64)imm; 1883 reg->umin_value = imm; 1884 reg->umax_value = imm; 1885 1886 reg->s32_min_value = (s32)imm; 1887 reg->s32_max_value = (s32)imm; 1888 reg->u32_min_value = (u32)imm; 1889 reg->u32_max_value = (u32)imm; 1890 } 1891 1892 /* Mark the unknown part of a register (variable offset or scalar value) as 1893 * known to have the value @imm. 1894 */ 1895 static void __mark_reg_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm) 1896 { 1897 /* Clear off and union(map_ptr, range) */ 1898 memset(((u8 *)reg) + sizeof(reg->type), 0, 1899 offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off) - sizeof(reg->type)); 1900 reg->id = 0; 1901 reg->ref_obj_id = 0; 1902 ___mark_reg_known(reg, imm); 1903 } 1904 1905 static void __mark_reg32_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm) 1906 { 1907 reg->var_off = tnum_const_subreg(reg->var_off, imm); 1908 reg->s32_min_value = (s32)imm; 1909 reg->s32_max_value = (s32)imm; 1910 reg->u32_min_value = (u32)imm; 1911 reg->u32_max_value = (u32)imm; 1912 } 1913 1914 /* Mark the 'variable offset' part of a register as zero. This should be 1915 * used only on registers holding a pointer type. 1916 */ 1917 static void __mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1918 { 1919 __mark_reg_known(reg, 0); 1920 } 1921 1922 static void __mark_reg_const_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1923 { 1924 __mark_reg_known(reg, 0); 1925 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 1926 } 1927 1928 static void mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1929 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) 1930 { 1931 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { 1932 verbose(env, "mark_reg_known_zero(regs, %u)\n", regno); 1933 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs */ 1934 for (regno = 0; regno < MAX_BPF_REG; regno++) 1935 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); 1936 return; 1937 } 1938 __mark_reg_known_zero(regs + regno); 1939 } 1940 1941 static void __mark_dynptr_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, enum bpf_dynptr_type type, 1942 bool first_slot, int dynptr_id) 1943 { 1944 /* reg->type has no meaning for STACK_DYNPTR, but when we set reg for 1945 * callback arguments, it does need to be CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, so simply 1946 * set it unconditionally as it is ignored for STACK_DYNPTR anyway. 1947 */ 1948 __mark_reg_known_zero(reg); 1949 reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR; 1950 /* Give each dynptr a unique id to uniquely associate slices to it. */ 1951 reg->id = dynptr_id; 1952 reg->dynptr.type = type; 1953 reg->dynptr.first_slot = first_slot; 1954 } 1955 1956 static void mark_ptr_not_null_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1957 { 1958 if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 1959 const struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 1960 1961 if (map->inner_map_meta) { 1962 reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; 1963 reg->map_ptr = map->inner_map_meta; 1964 /* transfer reg's id which is unique for every map_lookup_elem 1965 * as UID of the inner map. 1966 */ 1967 if (btf_record_has_field(map->inner_map_meta->record, BPF_TIMER)) 1968 reg->map_uid = reg->id; 1969 } else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP) { 1970 reg->type = PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK; 1971 } else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP || 1972 map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH) { 1973 reg->type = PTR_TO_SOCKET; 1974 } else { 1975 reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 1976 } 1977 return; 1978 } 1979 1980 reg->type &= ~PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 1981 } 1982 1983 static void mark_reg_graph_node(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno, 1984 struct btf_field_graph_root *ds_head) 1985 { 1986 __mark_reg_known_zero(®s[regno]); 1987 regs[regno].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC; 1988 regs[regno].btf = ds_head->btf; 1989 regs[regno].btf_id = ds_head->value_btf_id; 1990 regs[regno].off = ds_head->node_offset; 1991 } 1992 1993 static bool reg_is_pkt_pointer(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1994 { 1995 return type_is_pkt_pointer(reg->type); 1996 } 1997 1998 static bool reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1999 { 2000 return reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg) || 2001 reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END; 2002 } 2003 2004 static bool reg_is_dynptr_slice_pkt(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2005 { 2006 return base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_MEM && 2007 (reg->type & DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB || reg->type & DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP); 2008 } 2009 2010 /* Unmodified PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END] register from ctx access. */ 2011 static bool reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 2012 enum bpf_reg_type which) 2013 { 2014 /* The register can already have a range from prior markings. 2015 * This is fine as long as it hasn't been advanced from its 2016 * origin. 2017 */ 2018 return reg->type == which && 2019 reg->id == 0 && 2020 reg->off == 0 && 2021 tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0); 2022 } 2023 2024 /* Reset the min/max bounds of a register */ 2025 static void __mark_reg_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2026 { 2027 reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 2028 reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 2029 reg->umin_value = 0; 2030 reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 2031 2032 reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 2033 reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 2034 reg->u32_min_value = 0; 2035 reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 2036 } 2037 2038 static void __mark_reg64_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2039 { 2040 reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 2041 reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 2042 reg->umin_value = 0; 2043 reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 2044 } 2045 2046 static void __mark_reg32_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2047 { 2048 reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 2049 reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 2050 reg->u32_min_value = 0; 2051 reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 2052 } 2053 2054 static void __update_reg32_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2055 { 2056 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off); 2057 2058 /* min signed is max(sign bit) | min(other bits) */ 2059 reg->s32_min_value = max_t(s32, reg->s32_min_value, 2060 var32_off.value | (var32_off.mask & S32_MIN)); 2061 /* max signed is min(sign bit) | max(other bits) */ 2062 reg->s32_max_value = min_t(s32, reg->s32_max_value, 2063 var32_off.value | (var32_off.mask & S32_MAX)); 2064 reg->u32_min_value = max_t(u32, reg->u32_min_value, (u32)var32_off.value); 2065 reg->u32_max_value = min(reg->u32_max_value, 2066 (u32)(var32_off.value | var32_off.mask)); 2067 } 2068 2069 static void __update_reg64_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2070 { 2071 /* min signed is max(sign bit) | min(other bits) */ 2072 reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, reg->smin_value, 2073 reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask & S64_MIN)); 2074 /* max signed is min(sign bit) | max(other bits) */ 2075 reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, reg->smax_value, 2076 reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask & S64_MAX)); 2077 reg->umin_value = max(reg->umin_value, reg->var_off.value); 2078 reg->umax_value = min(reg->umax_value, 2079 reg->var_off.value | reg->var_off.mask); 2080 } 2081 2082 static void __update_reg_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2083 { 2084 __update_reg32_bounds(reg); 2085 __update_reg64_bounds(reg); 2086 } 2087 2088 /* Uses signed min/max values to inform unsigned, and vice-versa */ 2089 static void __reg32_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2090 { 2091 /* Learn sign from signed bounds. 2092 * If we cannot cross the sign boundary, then signed and unsigned bounds 2093 * are the same, so combine. This works even in the negative case, e.g. 2094 * -3 s<= x s<= -1 implies 0xf...fd u<= x u<= 0xf...ff. 2095 */ 2096 if (reg->s32_min_value >= 0 || reg->s32_max_value < 0) { 2097 reg->s32_min_value = reg->u32_min_value = 2098 max_t(u32, reg->s32_min_value, reg->u32_min_value); 2099 reg->s32_max_value = reg->u32_max_value = 2100 min_t(u32, reg->s32_max_value, reg->u32_max_value); 2101 return; 2102 } 2103 /* Learn sign from unsigned bounds. Signed bounds cross the sign 2104 * boundary, so we must be careful. 2105 */ 2106 if ((s32)reg->u32_max_value >= 0) { 2107 /* Positive. We can't learn anything from the smin, but smax 2108 * is positive, hence safe. 2109 */ 2110 reg->s32_min_value = reg->u32_min_value; 2111 reg->s32_max_value = reg->u32_max_value = 2112 min_t(u32, reg->s32_max_value, reg->u32_max_value); 2113 } else if ((s32)reg->u32_min_value < 0) { 2114 /* Negative. We can't learn anything from the smax, but smin 2115 * is negative, hence safe. 2116 */ 2117 reg->s32_min_value = reg->u32_min_value = 2118 max_t(u32, reg->s32_min_value, reg->u32_min_value); 2119 reg->s32_max_value = reg->u32_max_value; 2120 } 2121 } 2122 2123 static void __reg64_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2124 { 2125 /* Learn sign from signed bounds. 2126 * If we cannot cross the sign boundary, then signed and unsigned bounds 2127 * are the same, so combine. This works even in the negative case, e.g. 2128 * -3 s<= x s<= -1 implies 0xf...fd u<= x u<= 0xf...ff. 2129 */ 2130 if (reg->smin_value >= 0 || reg->smax_value < 0) { 2131 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->smin_value, 2132 reg->umin_value); 2133 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->smax_value, 2134 reg->umax_value); 2135 return; 2136 } 2137 /* Learn sign from unsigned bounds. Signed bounds cross the sign 2138 * boundary, so we must be careful. 2139 */ 2140 if ((s64)reg->umax_value >= 0) { 2141 /* Positive. We can't learn anything from the smin, but smax 2142 * is positive, hence safe. 2143 */ 2144 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value; 2145 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->smax_value, 2146 reg->umax_value); 2147 } else if ((s64)reg->umin_value < 0) { 2148 /* Negative. We can't learn anything from the smax, but smin 2149 * is negative, hence safe. 2150 */ 2151 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->smin_value, 2152 reg->umin_value); 2153 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value; 2154 } 2155 } 2156 2157 static void __reg_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2158 { 2159 __reg32_deduce_bounds(reg); 2160 __reg64_deduce_bounds(reg); 2161 } 2162 2163 /* Attempts to improve var_off based on unsigned min/max information */ 2164 static void __reg_bound_offset(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2165 { 2166 struct tnum var64_off = tnum_intersect(reg->var_off, 2167 tnum_range(reg->umin_value, 2168 reg->umax_value)); 2169 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_intersect(tnum_subreg(var64_off), 2170 tnum_range(reg->u32_min_value, 2171 reg->u32_max_value)); 2172 2173 reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(var64_off), var32_off); 2174 } 2175 2176 static void reg_bounds_sync(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2177 { 2178 /* We might have learned new bounds from the var_off. */ 2179 __update_reg_bounds(reg); 2180 /* We might have learned something about the sign bit. */ 2181 __reg_deduce_bounds(reg); 2182 /* We might have learned some bits from the bounds. */ 2183 __reg_bound_offset(reg); 2184 /* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds 2185 * slightly, e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc), 2186 * then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax. 2187 */ 2188 __update_reg_bounds(reg); 2189 } 2190 2191 static bool __reg32_bound_s64(s32 a) 2192 { 2193 return a >= 0 && a <= S32_MAX; 2194 } 2195 2196 static void __reg_assign_32_into_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2197 { 2198 reg->umin_value = reg->u32_min_value; 2199 reg->umax_value = reg->u32_max_value; 2200 2201 /* Attempt to pull 32-bit signed bounds into 64-bit bounds but must 2202 * be positive otherwise set to worse case bounds and refine later 2203 * from tnum. 2204 */ 2205 if (__reg32_bound_s64(reg->s32_min_value) && 2206 __reg32_bound_s64(reg->s32_max_value)) { 2207 reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value; 2208 reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value; 2209 } else { 2210 reg->smin_value = 0; 2211 reg->smax_value = U32_MAX; 2212 } 2213 } 2214 2215 static void __reg_combine_32_into_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2216 { 2217 /* special case when 64-bit register has upper 32-bit register 2218 * zeroed. Typically happens after zext or <<32, >>32 sequence 2219 * allowing us to use 32-bit bounds directly, 2220 */ 2221 if (tnum_equals_const(tnum_clear_subreg(reg->var_off), 0)) { 2222 __reg_assign_32_into_64(reg); 2223 } else { 2224 /* Otherwise the best we can do is push lower 32bit known and 2225 * unknown bits into register (var_off set from jmp logic) 2226 * then learn as much as possible from the 64-bit tnum 2227 * known and unknown bits. The previous smin/smax bounds are 2228 * invalid here because of jmp32 compare so mark them unknown 2229 * so they do not impact tnum bounds calculation. 2230 */ 2231 __mark_reg64_unbounded(reg); 2232 } 2233 reg_bounds_sync(reg); 2234 } 2235 2236 static bool __reg64_bound_s32(s64 a) 2237 { 2238 return a >= S32_MIN && a <= S32_MAX; 2239 } 2240 2241 static bool __reg64_bound_u32(u64 a) 2242 { 2243 return a >= U32_MIN && a <= U32_MAX; 2244 } 2245 2246 static void __reg_combine_64_into_32(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2247 { 2248 __mark_reg32_unbounded(reg); 2249 if (__reg64_bound_s32(reg->smin_value) && __reg64_bound_s32(reg->smax_value)) { 2250 reg->s32_min_value = (s32)reg->smin_value; 2251 reg->s32_max_value = (s32)reg->smax_value; 2252 } 2253 if (__reg64_bound_u32(reg->umin_value) && __reg64_bound_u32(reg->umax_value)) { 2254 reg->u32_min_value = (u32)reg->umin_value; 2255 reg->u32_max_value = (u32)reg->umax_value; 2256 } 2257 reg_bounds_sync(reg); 2258 } 2259 2260 /* Mark a register as having a completely unknown (scalar) value. */ 2261 static void __mark_reg_unknown(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2262 struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2263 { 2264 /* 2265 * Clear type, off, and union(map_ptr, range) and 2266 * padding between 'type' and union 2267 */ 2268 memset(reg, 0, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off)); 2269 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 2270 reg->id = 0; 2271 reg->ref_obj_id = 0; 2272 reg->var_off = tnum_unknown; 2273 reg->frameno = 0; 2274 reg->precise = !env->bpf_capable; 2275 __mark_reg_unbounded(reg); 2276 } 2277 2278 static void mark_reg_unknown(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2279 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) 2280 { 2281 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { 2282 verbose(env, "mark_reg_unknown(regs, %u)\n", regno); 2283 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs except FP */ 2284 for (regno = 0; regno < BPF_REG_FP; regno++) 2285 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); 2286 return; 2287 } 2288 __mark_reg_unknown(env, regs + regno); 2289 } 2290 2291 static void __mark_reg_not_init(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2292 struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2293 { 2294 __mark_reg_unknown(env, reg); 2295 reg->type = NOT_INIT; 2296 } 2297 2298 static void mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2299 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) 2300 { 2301 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { 2302 verbose(env, "mark_reg_not_init(regs, %u)\n", regno); 2303 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs except FP */ 2304 for (regno = 0; regno < BPF_REG_FP; regno++) 2305 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); 2306 return; 2307 } 2308 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); 2309 } 2310 2311 static void mark_btf_ld_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2312 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno, 2313 enum bpf_reg_type reg_type, 2314 struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id, 2315 enum bpf_type_flag flag) 2316 { 2317 if (reg_type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 2318 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, regno); 2319 return; 2320 } 2321 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, regno); 2322 regs[regno].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | flag; 2323 regs[regno].btf = btf; 2324 regs[regno].btf_id = btf_id; 2325 } 2326 2327 #define DEF_NOT_SUBREG (0) 2328 static void init_reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2329 struct bpf_func_state *state) 2330 { 2331 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs; 2332 int i; 2333 2334 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) { 2335 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, i); 2336 regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE; 2337 regs[i].parent = NULL; 2338 regs[i].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 2339 } 2340 2341 /* frame pointer */ 2342 regs[BPF_REG_FP].type = PTR_TO_STACK; 2343 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_FP); 2344 regs[BPF_REG_FP].frameno = state->frameno; 2345 } 2346 2347 #define BPF_MAIN_FUNC (-1) 2348 static void init_func_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2349 struct bpf_func_state *state, 2350 int callsite, int frameno, int subprogno) 2351 { 2352 state->callsite = callsite; 2353 state->frameno = frameno; 2354 state->subprogno = subprogno; 2355 state->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 0); 2356 init_reg_state(env, state); 2357 mark_verifier_state_scratched(env); 2358 } 2359 2360 /* Similar to push_stack(), but for async callbacks */ 2361 static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_async_cb(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2362 int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx, 2363 int subprog) 2364 { 2365 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem; 2366 struct bpf_func_state *frame; 2367 2368 elem = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem), GFP_KERNEL); 2369 if (!elem) 2370 goto err; 2371 2372 elem->insn_idx = insn_idx; 2373 elem->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx; 2374 elem->next = env->head; 2375 elem->log_pos = env->log.end_pos; 2376 env->head = elem; 2377 env->stack_size++; 2378 if (env->stack_size > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ) { 2379 verbose(env, 2380 "The sequence of %d jumps is too complex for async cb.\n", 2381 env->stack_size); 2382 goto err; 2383 } 2384 /* Unlike push_stack() do not copy_verifier_state(). 2385 * The caller state doesn't matter. 2386 * This is async callback. It starts in a fresh stack. 2387 * Initialize it similar to do_check_common(). 2388 */ 2389 elem->st.branches = 1; 2390 frame = kzalloc(sizeof(*frame), GFP_KERNEL); 2391 if (!frame) 2392 goto err; 2393 init_func_state(env, frame, 2394 BPF_MAIN_FUNC /* callsite */, 2395 0 /* frameno within this callchain */, 2396 subprog /* subprog number within this prog */); 2397 elem->st.frame[0] = frame; 2398 return &elem->st; 2399 err: 2400 free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true); 2401 env->cur_state = NULL; 2402 /* pop all elements and return */ 2403 while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false)); 2404 return NULL; 2405 } 2406 2407 2408 enum reg_arg_type { 2409 SRC_OP, /* register is used as source operand */ 2410 DST_OP, /* register is used as destination operand */ 2411 DST_OP_NO_MARK /* same as above, check only, don't mark */ 2412 }; 2413 2414 static int cmp_subprogs(const void *a, const void *b) 2415 { 2416 return ((struct bpf_subprog_info *)a)->start - 2417 ((struct bpf_subprog_info *)b)->start; 2418 } 2419 2420 static int find_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off) 2421 { 2422 struct bpf_subprog_info *p; 2423 2424 p = bsearch(&off, env->subprog_info, env->subprog_cnt, 2425 sizeof(env->subprog_info[0]), cmp_subprogs); 2426 if (!p) 2427 return -ENOENT; 2428 return p - env->subprog_info; 2429 2430 } 2431 2432 static int add_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off) 2433 { 2434 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 2435 int ret; 2436 2437 if (off >= insn_cnt || off < 0) { 2438 verbose(env, "call to invalid destination\n"); 2439 return -EINVAL; 2440 } 2441 ret = find_subprog(env, off); 2442 if (ret >= 0) 2443 return ret; 2444 if (env->subprog_cnt >= BPF_MAX_SUBPROGS) { 2445 verbose(env, "too many subprograms\n"); 2446 return -E2BIG; 2447 } 2448 /* determine subprog starts. The end is one before the next starts */ 2449 env->subprog_info[env->subprog_cnt++].start = off; 2450 sort(env->subprog_info, env->subprog_cnt, 2451 sizeof(env->subprog_info[0]), cmp_subprogs, NULL); 2452 return env->subprog_cnt - 1; 2453 } 2454 2455 #define MAX_KFUNC_DESCS 256 2456 #define MAX_KFUNC_BTFS 256 2457 2458 struct bpf_kfunc_desc { 2459 struct btf_func_model func_model; 2460 u32 func_id; 2461 s32 imm; 2462 u16 offset; 2463 unsigned long addr; 2464 }; 2465 2466 struct bpf_kfunc_btf { 2467 struct btf *btf; 2468 struct module *module; 2469 u16 offset; 2470 }; 2471 2472 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab { 2473 /* Sorted by func_id (BTF ID) and offset (fd_array offset) during 2474 * verification. JITs do lookups by bpf_insn, where func_id may not be 2475 * available, therefore at the end of verification do_misc_fixups() 2476 * sorts this by imm and offset. 2477 */ 2478 struct bpf_kfunc_desc descs[MAX_KFUNC_DESCS]; 2479 u32 nr_descs; 2480 }; 2481 2482 struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab { 2483 struct bpf_kfunc_btf descs[MAX_KFUNC_BTFS]; 2484 u32 nr_descs; 2485 }; 2486 2487 static int kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id_off(const void *a, const void *b) 2488 { 2489 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d0 = a; 2490 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d1 = b; 2491 2492 /* func_id is not greater than BTF_MAX_TYPE */ 2493 return d0->func_id - d1->func_id ?: d0->offset - d1->offset; 2494 } 2495 2496 static int kfunc_btf_cmp_by_off(const void *a, const void *b) 2497 { 2498 const struct bpf_kfunc_btf *d0 = a; 2499 const struct bpf_kfunc_btf *d1 = b; 2500 2501 return d0->offset - d1->offset; 2502 } 2503 2504 static const struct bpf_kfunc_desc * 2505 find_kfunc_desc(const struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 func_id, u16 offset) 2506 { 2507 struct bpf_kfunc_desc desc = { 2508 .func_id = func_id, 2509 .offset = offset, 2510 }; 2511 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab; 2512 2513 tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 2514 return bsearch(&desc, tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, 2515 sizeof(tab->descs[0]), kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id_off); 2516 } 2517 2518 int bpf_get_kfunc_addr(const struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 func_id, 2519 u16 btf_fd_idx, u8 **func_addr) 2520 { 2521 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc; 2522 2523 desc = find_kfunc_desc(prog, func_id, btf_fd_idx); 2524 if (!desc) 2525 return -EFAULT; 2526 2527 *func_addr = (u8 *)desc->addr; 2528 return 0; 2529 } 2530 2531 static struct btf *__find_kfunc_desc_btf(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2532 s16 offset) 2533 { 2534 struct bpf_kfunc_btf kf_btf = { .offset = offset }; 2535 struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab *tab; 2536 struct bpf_kfunc_btf *b; 2537 struct module *mod; 2538 struct btf *btf; 2539 int btf_fd; 2540 2541 tab = env->prog->aux->kfunc_btf_tab; 2542 b = bsearch(&kf_btf, tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, 2543 sizeof(tab->descs[0]), kfunc_btf_cmp_by_off); 2544 if (!b) { 2545 if (tab->nr_descs == MAX_KFUNC_BTFS) { 2546 verbose(env, "too many different module BTFs\n"); 2547 return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG); 2548 } 2549 2550 if (bpfptr_is_null(env->fd_array)) { 2551 verbose(env, "kfunc offset > 0 without fd_array is invalid\n"); 2552 return ERR_PTR(-EPROTO); 2553 } 2554 2555 if (copy_from_bpfptr_offset(&btf_fd, env->fd_array, 2556 offset * sizeof(btf_fd), 2557 sizeof(btf_fd))) 2558 return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); 2559 2560 btf = btf_get_by_fd(btf_fd); 2561 if (IS_ERR(btf)) { 2562 verbose(env, "invalid module BTF fd specified\n"); 2563 return btf; 2564 } 2565 2566 if (!btf_is_module(btf)) { 2567 verbose(env, "BTF fd for kfunc is not a module BTF\n"); 2568 btf_put(btf); 2569 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); 2570 } 2571 2572 mod = btf_try_get_module(btf); 2573 if (!mod) { 2574 btf_put(btf); 2575 return ERR_PTR(-ENXIO); 2576 } 2577 2578 b = &tab->descs[tab->nr_descs++]; 2579 b->btf = btf; 2580 b->module = mod; 2581 b->offset = offset; 2582 2583 sort(tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, sizeof(tab->descs[0]), 2584 kfunc_btf_cmp_by_off, NULL); 2585 } 2586 return b->btf; 2587 } 2588 2589 void bpf_free_kfunc_btf_tab(struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab *tab) 2590 { 2591 if (!tab) 2592 return; 2593 2594 while (tab->nr_descs--) { 2595 module_put(tab->descs[tab->nr_descs].module); 2596 btf_put(tab->descs[tab->nr_descs].btf); 2597 } 2598 kfree(tab); 2599 } 2600 2601 static struct btf *find_kfunc_desc_btf(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, s16 offset) 2602 { 2603 if (offset) { 2604 if (offset < 0) { 2605 /* In the future, this can be allowed to increase limit 2606 * of fd index into fd_array, interpreted as u16. 2607 */ 2608 verbose(env, "negative offset disallowed for kernel module function call\n"); 2609 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); 2610 } 2611 2612 return __find_kfunc_desc_btf(env, offset); 2613 } 2614 return btf_vmlinux ?: ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); 2615 } 2616 2617 static int add_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 func_id, s16 offset) 2618 { 2619 const struct btf_type *func, *func_proto; 2620 struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab *btf_tab; 2621 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab; 2622 struct bpf_prog_aux *prog_aux; 2623 struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc; 2624 const char *func_name; 2625 struct btf *desc_btf; 2626 unsigned long call_imm; 2627 unsigned long addr; 2628 int err; 2629 2630 prog_aux = env->prog->aux; 2631 tab = prog_aux->kfunc_tab; 2632 btf_tab = prog_aux->kfunc_btf_tab; 2633 if (!tab) { 2634 if (!btf_vmlinux) { 2635 verbose(env, "calling kernel function is not supported without CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF\n"); 2636 return -ENOTSUPP; 2637 } 2638 2639 if (!env->prog->jit_requested) { 2640 verbose(env, "JIT is required for calling kernel function\n"); 2641 return -ENOTSUPP; 2642 } 2643 2644 if (!bpf_jit_supports_kfunc_call()) { 2645 verbose(env, "JIT does not support calling kernel function\n"); 2646 return -ENOTSUPP; 2647 } 2648 2649 if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible) { 2650 verbose(env, "cannot call kernel function from non-GPL compatible program\n"); 2651 return -EINVAL; 2652 } 2653 2654 tab = kzalloc(sizeof(*tab), GFP_KERNEL); 2655 if (!tab) 2656 return -ENOMEM; 2657 prog_aux->kfunc_tab = tab; 2658 } 2659 2660 /* func_id == 0 is always invalid, but instead of returning an error, be 2661 * conservative and wait until the code elimination pass before returning 2662 * error, so that invalid calls that get pruned out can be in BPF programs 2663 * loaded from userspace. It is also required that offset be untouched 2664 * for such calls. 2665 */ 2666 if (!func_id && !offset) 2667 return 0; 2668 2669 if (!btf_tab && offset) { 2670 btf_tab = kzalloc(sizeof(*btf_tab), GFP_KERNEL); 2671 if (!btf_tab) 2672 return -ENOMEM; 2673 prog_aux->kfunc_btf_tab = btf_tab; 2674 } 2675 2676 desc_btf = find_kfunc_desc_btf(env, offset); 2677 if (IS_ERR(desc_btf)) { 2678 verbose(env, "failed to find BTF for kernel function\n"); 2679 return PTR_ERR(desc_btf); 2680 } 2681 2682 if (find_kfunc_desc(env->prog, func_id, offset)) 2683 return 0; 2684 2685 if (tab->nr_descs == MAX_KFUNC_DESCS) { 2686 verbose(env, "too many different kernel function calls\n"); 2687 return -E2BIG; 2688 } 2689 2690 func = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, func_id); 2691 if (!func || !btf_type_is_func(func)) { 2692 verbose(env, "kernel btf_id %u is not a function\n", 2693 func_id); 2694 return -EINVAL; 2695 } 2696 func_proto = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, func->type); 2697 if (!func_proto || !btf_type_is_func_proto(func_proto)) { 2698 verbose(env, "kernel function btf_id %u does not have a valid func_proto\n", 2699 func_id); 2700 return -EINVAL; 2701 } 2702 2703 func_name = btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf, func->name_off); 2704 addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(func_name); 2705 if (!addr) { 2706 verbose(env, "cannot find address for kernel function %s\n", 2707 func_name); 2708 return -EINVAL; 2709 } 2710 specialize_kfunc(env, func_id, offset, &addr); 2711 2712 if (bpf_jit_supports_far_kfunc_call()) { 2713 call_imm = func_id; 2714 } else { 2715 call_imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(addr); 2716 /* Check whether the relative offset overflows desc->imm */ 2717 if ((unsigned long)(s32)call_imm != call_imm) { 2718 verbose(env, "address of kernel function %s is out of range\n", 2719 func_name); 2720 return -EINVAL; 2721 } 2722 } 2723 2724 if (bpf_dev_bound_kfunc_id(func_id)) { 2725 err = bpf_dev_bound_kfunc_check(&env->log, prog_aux); 2726 if (err) 2727 return err; 2728 } 2729 2730 desc = &tab->descs[tab->nr_descs++]; 2731 desc->func_id = func_id; 2732 desc->imm = call_imm; 2733 desc->offset = offset; 2734 desc->addr = addr; 2735 err = btf_distill_func_proto(&env->log, desc_btf, 2736 func_proto, func_name, 2737 &desc->func_model); 2738 if (!err) 2739 sort(tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, sizeof(tab->descs[0]), 2740 kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id_off, NULL); 2741 return err; 2742 } 2743 2744 static int kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm_off(const void *a, const void *b) 2745 { 2746 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d0 = a; 2747 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d1 = b; 2748 2749 if (d0->imm != d1->imm) 2750 return d0->imm < d1->imm ? -1 : 1; 2751 if (d0->offset != d1->offset) 2752 return d0->offset < d1->offset ? -1 : 1; 2753 return 0; 2754 } 2755 2756 static void sort_kfunc_descs_by_imm_off(struct bpf_prog *prog) 2757 { 2758 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab; 2759 2760 tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 2761 if (!tab) 2762 return; 2763 2764 sort(tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, sizeof(tab->descs[0]), 2765 kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm_off, NULL); 2766 } 2767 2768 bool bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call(const struct bpf_prog *prog) 2769 { 2770 return !!prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 2771 } 2772 2773 const struct btf_func_model * 2774 bpf_jit_find_kfunc_model(const struct bpf_prog *prog, 2775 const struct bpf_insn *insn) 2776 { 2777 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc desc = { 2778 .imm = insn->imm, 2779 .offset = insn->off, 2780 }; 2781 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *res; 2782 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab; 2783 2784 tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 2785 res = bsearch(&desc, tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, 2786 sizeof(tab->descs[0]), kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm_off); 2787 2788 return res ? &res->func_model : NULL; 2789 } 2790 2791 static int add_subprog_and_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 2792 { 2793 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info; 2794 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 2795 int i, ret, insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 2796 2797 /* Add entry function. */ 2798 ret = add_subprog(env, 0); 2799 if (ret) 2800 return ret; 2801 2802 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 2803 if (!bpf_pseudo_func(insn) && !bpf_pseudo_call(insn) && 2804 !bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn)) 2805 continue; 2806 2807 if (!env->bpf_capable) { 2808 verbose(env, "loading/calling other bpf or kernel functions are allowed for CAP_BPF and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"); 2809 return -EPERM; 2810 } 2811 2812 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn) || bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 2813 ret = add_subprog(env, i + insn->imm + 1); 2814 else 2815 ret = add_kfunc_call(env, insn->imm, insn->off); 2816 2817 if (ret < 0) 2818 return ret; 2819 } 2820 2821 /* Add a fake 'exit' subprog which could simplify subprog iteration 2822 * logic. 'subprog_cnt' should not be increased. 2823 */ 2824 subprog[env->subprog_cnt].start = insn_cnt; 2825 2826 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) 2827 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) 2828 verbose(env, "func#%d @%d\n", i, subprog[i].start); 2829 2830 return 0; 2831 } 2832 2833 static int check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 2834 { 2835 int i, subprog_start, subprog_end, off, cur_subprog = 0; 2836 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info; 2837 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 2838 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 2839 2840 /* now check that all jumps are within the same subprog */ 2841 subprog_start = subprog[cur_subprog].start; 2842 subprog_end = subprog[cur_subprog + 1].start; 2843 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 2844 u8 code = insn[i].code; 2845 2846 if (code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 2847 insn[i].src_reg == 0 && 2848 insn[i].imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) 2849 subprog[cur_subprog].has_tail_call = true; 2850 if (BPF_CLASS(code) == BPF_LD && 2851 (BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_ABS || BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_IND)) 2852 subprog[cur_subprog].has_ld_abs = true; 2853 if (BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP && BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP32) 2854 goto next; 2855 if (BPF_OP(code) == BPF_EXIT || BPF_OP(code) == BPF_CALL) 2856 goto next; 2857 off = i + insn[i].off + 1; 2858 if (off < subprog_start || off >= subprog_end) { 2859 verbose(env, "jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", i, off); 2860 return -EINVAL; 2861 } 2862 next: 2863 if (i == subprog_end - 1) { 2864 /* to avoid fall-through from one subprog into another 2865 * the last insn of the subprog should be either exit 2866 * or unconditional jump back 2867 */ 2868 if (code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT) && 2869 code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_JA)) { 2870 verbose(env, "last insn is not an exit or jmp\n"); 2871 return -EINVAL; 2872 } 2873 subprog_start = subprog_end; 2874 cur_subprog++; 2875 if (cur_subprog < env->subprog_cnt) 2876 subprog_end = subprog[cur_subprog + 1].start; 2877 } 2878 } 2879 return 0; 2880 } 2881 2882 /* Parentage chain of this register (or stack slot) should take care of all 2883 * issues like callee-saved registers, stack slot allocation time, etc. 2884 */ 2885 static int mark_reg_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2886 const struct bpf_reg_state *state, 2887 struct bpf_reg_state *parent, u8 flag) 2888 { 2889 bool writes = parent == state->parent; /* Observe write marks */ 2890 int cnt = 0; 2891 2892 while (parent) { 2893 /* if read wasn't screened by an earlier write ... */ 2894 if (writes && state->live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN) 2895 break; 2896 if (parent->live & REG_LIVE_DONE) { 2897 verbose(env, "verifier BUG type %s var_off %lld off %d\n", 2898 reg_type_str(env, parent->type), 2899 parent->var_off.value, parent->off); 2900 return -EFAULT; 2901 } 2902 /* The first condition is more likely to be true than the 2903 * second, checked it first. 2904 */ 2905 if ((parent->live & REG_LIVE_READ) == flag || 2906 parent->live & REG_LIVE_READ64) 2907 /* The parentage chain never changes and 2908 * this parent was already marked as LIVE_READ. 2909 * There is no need to keep walking the chain again and 2910 * keep re-marking all parents as LIVE_READ. 2911 * This case happens when the same register is read 2912 * multiple times without writes into it in-between. 2913 * Also, if parent has the stronger REG_LIVE_READ64 set, 2914 * then no need to set the weak REG_LIVE_READ32. 2915 */ 2916 break; 2917 /* ... then we depend on parent's value */ 2918 parent->live |= flag; 2919 /* REG_LIVE_READ64 overrides REG_LIVE_READ32. */ 2920 if (flag == REG_LIVE_READ64) 2921 parent->live &= ~REG_LIVE_READ32; 2922 state = parent; 2923 parent = state->parent; 2924 writes = true; 2925 cnt++; 2926 } 2927 2928 if (env->longest_mark_read_walk < cnt) 2929 env->longest_mark_read_walk = cnt; 2930 return 0; 2931 } 2932 2933 static int mark_dynptr_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2934 { 2935 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 2936 int spi, ret; 2937 2938 /* For CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, it must have already been done by 2939 * check_reg_arg in check_helper_call and mark_btf_func_reg_size in 2940 * check_kfunc_call. 2941 */ 2942 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 2943 return 0; 2944 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 2945 if (spi < 0) 2946 return spi; 2947 /* Caller ensures dynptr is valid and initialized, which means spi is in 2948 * bounds and spi is the first dynptr slot. Simply mark stack slot as 2949 * read. 2950 */ 2951 ret = mark_reg_read(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, 2952 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 2953 if (ret) 2954 return ret; 2955 return mark_reg_read(env, &state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr, 2956 state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 2957 } 2958 2959 static int mark_iter_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 2960 int spi, int nr_slots) 2961 { 2962 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 2963 int err, i; 2964 2965 for (i = 0; i < nr_slots; i++) { 2966 struct bpf_reg_state *st = &state->stack[spi - i].spilled_ptr; 2967 2968 err = mark_reg_read(env, st, st->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 2969 if (err) 2970 return err; 2971 2972 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi - i); 2973 } 2974 2975 return 0; 2976 } 2977 2978 /* This function is supposed to be used by the following 32-bit optimization 2979 * code only. It returns TRUE if the source or destination register operates 2980 * on 64-bit, otherwise return FALSE. 2981 */ 2982 static bool is_reg64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 2983 u32 regno, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, enum reg_arg_type t) 2984 { 2985 u8 code, class, op; 2986 2987 code = insn->code; 2988 class = BPF_CLASS(code); 2989 op = BPF_OP(code); 2990 if (class == BPF_JMP) { 2991 /* BPF_EXIT for "main" will reach here. Return TRUE 2992 * conservatively. 2993 */ 2994 if (op == BPF_EXIT) 2995 return true; 2996 if (op == BPF_CALL) { 2997 /* BPF to BPF call will reach here because of marking 2998 * caller saved clobber with DST_OP_NO_MARK for which we 2999 * don't care the register def because they are anyway 3000 * marked as NOT_INIT already. 3001 */ 3002 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 3003 return false; 3004 /* Helper call will reach here because of arg type 3005 * check, conservatively return TRUE. 3006 */ 3007 if (t == SRC_OP) 3008 return true; 3009 3010 return false; 3011 } 3012 } 3013 3014 if (class == BPF_ALU64 || class == BPF_JMP || 3015 /* BPF_END always use BPF_ALU class. */ 3016 (class == BPF_ALU && op == BPF_END && insn->imm == 64)) 3017 return true; 3018 3019 if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_JMP32) 3020 return false; 3021 3022 if (class == BPF_LDX) { 3023 if (t != SRC_OP) 3024 return BPF_SIZE(code) == BPF_DW; 3025 /* LDX source must be ptr. */ 3026 return true; 3027 } 3028 3029 if (class == BPF_STX) { 3030 /* BPF_STX (including atomic variants) has multiple source 3031 * operands, one of which is a ptr. Check whether the caller is 3032 * asking about it. 3033 */ 3034 if (t == SRC_OP && reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 3035 return true; 3036 return BPF_SIZE(code) == BPF_DW; 3037 } 3038 3039 if (class == BPF_LD) { 3040 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(code); 3041 3042 /* LD_IMM64 */ 3043 if (mode == BPF_IMM) 3044 return true; 3045 3046 /* Both LD_IND and LD_ABS return 32-bit data. */ 3047 if (t != SRC_OP) 3048 return false; 3049 3050 /* Implicit ctx ptr. */ 3051 if (regno == BPF_REG_6) 3052 return true; 3053 3054 /* Explicit source could be any width. */ 3055 return true; 3056 } 3057 3058 if (class == BPF_ST) 3059 /* The only source register for BPF_ST is a ptr. */ 3060 return true; 3061 3062 /* Conservatively return true at default. */ 3063 return true; 3064 } 3065 3066 /* Return the regno defined by the insn, or -1. */ 3067 static int insn_def_regno(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 3068 { 3069 switch (BPF_CLASS(insn->code)) { 3070 case BPF_JMP: 3071 case BPF_JMP32: 3072 case BPF_ST: 3073 return -1; 3074 case BPF_STX: 3075 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC && 3076 (insn->imm & BPF_FETCH)) { 3077 if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG) 3078 return BPF_REG_0; 3079 else 3080 return insn->src_reg; 3081 } else { 3082 return -1; 3083 } 3084 default: 3085 return insn->dst_reg; 3086 } 3087 } 3088 3089 /* Return TRUE if INSN has defined any 32-bit value explicitly. */ 3090 static bool insn_has_def32(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 3091 { 3092 int dst_reg = insn_def_regno(insn); 3093 3094 if (dst_reg == -1) 3095 return false; 3096 3097 return !is_reg64(env, insn, dst_reg, NULL, DST_OP); 3098 } 3099 3100 static void mark_insn_zext(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3101 struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 3102 { 3103 s32 def_idx = reg->subreg_def; 3104 3105 if (def_idx == DEF_NOT_SUBREG) 3106 return; 3107 3108 env->insn_aux_data[def_idx - 1].zext_dst = true; 3109 /* The dst will be zero extended, so won't be sub-register anymore. */ 3110 reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 3111 } 3112 3113 static int check_reg_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 3114 enum reg_arg_type t) 3115 { 3116 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 3117 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 3118 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi + env->insn_idx; 3119 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, *regs = state->regs; 3120 bool rw64; 3121 3122 if (regno >= MAX_BPF_REG) { 3123 verbose(env, "R%d is invalid\n", regno); 3124 return -EINVAL; 3125 } 3126 3127 mark_reg_scratched(env, regno); 3128 3129 reg = ®s[regno]; 3130 rw64 = is_reg64(env, insn, regno, reg, t); 3131 if (t == SRC_OP) { 3132 /* check whether register used as source operand can be read */ 3133 if (reg->type == NOT_INIT) { 3134 verbose(env, "R%d !read_ok\n", regno); 3135 return -EACCES; 3136 } 3137 /* We don't need to worry about FP liveness because it's read-only */ 3138 if (regno == BPF_REG_FP) 3139 return 0; 3140 3141 if (rw64) 3142 mark_insn_zext(env, reg); 3143 3144 return mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, 3145 rw64 ? REG_LIVE_READ64 : REG_LIVE_READ32); 3146 } else { 3147 /* check whether register used as dest operand can be written to */ 3148 if (regno == BPF_REG_FP) { 3149 verbose(env, "frame pointer is read only\n"); 3150 return -EACCES; 3151 } 3152 reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 3153 reg->subreg_def = rw64 ? DEF_NOT_SUBREG : env->insn_idx + 1; 3154 if (t == DST_OP) 3155 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, regno); 3156 } 3157 return 0; 3158 } 3159 3160 static void mark_jmp_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx) 3161 { 3162 env->insn_aux_data[idx].jmp_point = true; 3163 } 3164 3165 static bool is_jmp_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 3166 { 3167 return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].jmp_point; 3168 } 3169 3170 /* for any branch, call, exit record the history of jmps in the given state */ 3171 static int push_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3172 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 3173 { 3174 u32 cnt = cur->jmp_history_cnt; 3175 struct bpf_idx_pair *p; 3176 size_t alloc_size; 3177 3178 if (!is_jmp_point(env, env->insn_idx)) 3179 return 0; 3180 3181 cnt++; 3182 alloc_size = kmalloc_size_roundup(size_mul(cnt, sizeof(*p))); 3183 p = krealloc(cur->jmp_history, alloc_size, GFP_USER); 3184 if (!p) 3185 return -ENOMEM; 3186 p[cnt - 1].idx = env->insn_idx; 3187 p[cnt - 1].prev_idx = env->prev_insn_idx; 3188 cur->jmp_history = p; 3189 cur->jmp_history_cnt = cnt; 3190 return 0; 3191 } 3192 3193 /* Backtrack one insn at a time. If idx is not at the top of recorded 3194 * history then previous instruction came from straight line execution. 3195 */ 3196 static int get_prev_insn_idx(struct bpf_verifier_state *st, int i, 3197 u32 *history) 3198 { 3199 u32 cnt = *history; 3200 3201 if (cnt && st->jmp_history[cnt - 1].idx == i) { 3202 i = st->jmp_history[cnt - 1].prev_idx; 3203 (*history)--; 3204 } else { 3205 i--; 3206 } 3207 return i; 3208 } 3209 3210 static const char *disasm_kfunc_name(void *data, const struct bpf_insn *insn) 3211 { 3212 const struct btf_type *func; 3213 struct btf *desc_btf; 3214 3215 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) 3216 return NULL; 3217 3218 desc_btf = find_kfunc_desc_btf(data, insn->off); 3219 if (IS_ERR(desc_btf)) 3220 return "<error>"; 3221 3222 func = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, insn->imm); 3223 return btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf, func->name_off); 3224 } 3225 3226 static inline void bt_init(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame) 3227 { 3228 bt->frame = frame; 3229 } 3230 3231 static inline void bt_reset(struct backtrack_state *bt) 3232 { 3233 struct bpf_verifier_env *env = bt->env; 3234 3235 memset(bt, 0, sizeof(*bt)); 3236 bt->env = env; 3237 } 3238 3239 static inline u32 bt_empty(struct backtrack_state *bt) 3240 { 3241 u64 mask = 0; 3242 int i; 3243 3244 for (i = 0; i <= bt->frame; i++) 3245 mask |= bt->reg_masks[i] | bt->stack_masks[i]; 3246 3247 return mask == 0; 3248 } 3249 3250 static inline int bt_subprog_enter(struct backtrack_state *bt) 3251 { 3252 if (bt->frame == MAX_CALL_FRAMES - 1) { 3253 verbose(bt->env, "BUG subprog enter from frame %d\n", bt->frame); 3254 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 3255 return -EFAULT; 3256 } 3257 bt->frame++; 3258 return 0; 3259 } 3260 3261 static inline int bt_subprog_exit(struct backtrack_state *bt) 3262 { 3263 if (bt->frame == 0) { 3264 verbose(bt->env, "BUG subprog exit from frame 0\n"); 3265 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 3266 return -EFAULT; 3267 } 3268 bt->frame--; 3269 return 0; 3270 } 3271 3272 static inline void bt_set_frame_reg(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame, u32 reg) 3273 { 3274 bt->reg_masks[frame] |= 1 << reg; 3275 } 3276 3277 static inline void bt_clear_frame_reg(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame, u32 reg) 3278 { 3279 bt->reg_masks[frame] &= ~(1 << reg); 3280 } 3281 3282 static inline void bt_set_reg(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 reg) 3283 { 3284 bt_set_frame_reg(bt, bt->frame, reg); 3285 } 3286 3287 static inline void bt_clear_reg(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 reg) 3288 { 3289 bt_clear_frame_reg(bt, bt->frame, reg); 3290 } 3291 3292 static inline void bt_set_frame_slot(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame, u32 slot) 3293 { 3294 bt->stack_masks[frame] |= 1ull << slot; 3295 } 3296 3297 static inline void bt_clear_frame_slot(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame, u32 slot) 3298 { 3299 bt->stack_masks[frame] &= ~(1ull << slot); 3300 } 3301 3302 static inline void bt_set_slot(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 slot) 3303 { 3304 bt_set_frame_slot(bt, bt->frame, slot); 3305 } 3306 3307 static inline void bt_clear_slot(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 slot) 3308 { 3309 bt_clear_frame_slot(bt, bt->frame, slot); 3310 } 3311 3312 static inline u32 bt_frame_reg_mask(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame) 3313 { 3314 return bt->reg_masks[frame]; 3315 } 3316 3317 static inline u32 bt_reg_mask(struct backtrack_state *bt) 3318 { 3319 return bt->reg_masks[bt->frame]; 3320 } 3321 3322 static inline u64 bt_frame_stack_mask(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame) 3323 { 3324 return bt->stack_masks[frame]; 3325 } 3326 3327 static inline u64 bt_stack_mask(struct backtrack_state *bt) 3328 { 3329 return bt->stack_masks[bt->frame]; 3330 } 3331 3332 static inline bool bt_is_reg_set(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 reg) 3333 { 3334 return bt->reg_masks[bt->frame] & (1 << reg); 3335 } 3336 3337 static inline bool bt_is_slot_set(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 slot) 3338 { 3339 return bt->stack_masks[bt->frame] & (1ull << slot); 3340 } 3341 3342 /* format registers bitmask, e.g., "r0,r2,r4" for 0x15 mask */ 3343 static void fmt_reg_mask(char *buf, ssize_t buf_sz, u32 reg_mask) 3344 { 3345 DECLARE_BITMAP(mask, 64); 3346 bool first = true; 3347 int i, n; 3348 3349 buf[0] = '\0'; 3350 3351 bitmap_from_u64(mask, reg_mask); 3352 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) { 3353 n = snprintf(buf, buf_sz, "%sr%d", first ? "" : ",", i); 3354 first = false; 3355 buf += n; 3356 buf_sz -= n; 3357 if (buf_sz < 0) 3358 break; 3359 } 3360 } 3361 /* format stack slots bitmask, e.g., "-8,-24,-40" for 0x15 mask */ 3362 static void fmt_stack_mask(char *buf, ssize_t buf_sz, u64 stack_mask) 3363 { 3364 DECLARE_BITMAP(mask, 64); 3365 bool first = true; 3366 int i, n; 3367 3368 buf[0] = '\0'; 3369 3370 bitmap_from_u64(mask, stack_mask); 3371 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 64) { 3372 n = snprintf(buf, buf_sz, "%s%d", first ? "" : ",", -(i + 1) * 8); 3373 first = false; 3374 buf += n; 3375 buf_sz -= n; 3376 if (buf_sz < 0) 3377 break; 3378 } 3379 } 3380 3381 /* For given verifier state backtrack_insn() is called from the last insn to 3382 * the first insn. Its purpose is to compute a bitmask of registers and 3383 * stack slots that needs precision in the parent verifier state. 3384 * 3385 * @idx is an index of the instruction we are currently processing; 3386 * @subseq_idx is an index of the subsequent instruction that: 3387 * - *would be* executed next, if jump history is viewed in forward order; 3388 * - *was* processed previously during backtracking. 3389 */ 3390 static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx, int subseq_idx, 3391 struct backtrack_state *bt) 3392 { 3393 const struct bpf_insn_cbs cbs = { 3394 .cb_call = disasm_kfunc_name, 3395 .cb_print = verbose, 3396 .private_data = env, 3397 }; 3398 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi + idx; 3399 u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); 3400 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 3401 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); 3402 u32 dreg = insn->dst_reg; 3403 u32 sreg = insn->src_reg; 3404 u32 spi, i; 3405 3406 if (insn->code == 0) 3407 return 0; 3408 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 3409 fmt_reg_mask(env->tmp_str_buf, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN, bt_reg_mask(bt)); 3410 verbose(env, "mark_precise: frame%d: regs=%s ", 3411 bt->frame, env->tmp_str_buf); 3412 fmt_stack_mask(env->tmp_str_buf, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN, bt_stack_mask(bt)); 3413 verbose(env, "stack=%s before ", env->tmp_str_buf); 3414 verbose(env, "%d: ", idx); 3415 print_bpf_insn(&cbs, insn, env->allow_ptr_leaks); 3416 } 3417 3418 if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) { 3419 if (!bt_is_reg_set(bt, dreg)) 3420 return 0; 3421 if (opcode == BPF_MOV) { 3422 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 3423 /* dreg = sreg 3424 * dreg needs precision after this insn 3425 * sreg needs precision before this insn 3426 */ 3427 bt_clear_reg(bt, dreg); 3428 bt_set_reg(bt, sreg); 3429 } else { 3430 /* dreg = K 3431 * dreg needs precision after this insn. 3432 * Corresponding register is already marked 3433 * as precise=true in this verifier state. 3434 * No further markings in parent are necessary 3435 */ 3436 bt_clear_reg(bt, dreg); 3437 } 3438 } else { 3439 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 3440 /* dreg += sreg 3441 * both dreg and sreg need precision 3442 * before this insn 3443 */ 3444 bt_set_reg(bt, sreg); 3445 } /* else dreg += K 3446 * dreg still needs precision before this insn 3447 */ 3448 } 3449 } else if (class == BPF_LDX) { 3450 if (!bt_is_reg_set(bt, dreg)) 3451 return 0; 3452 bt_clear_reg(bt, dreg); 3453 3454 /* scalars can only be spilled into stack w/o losing precision. 3455 * Load from any other memory can be zero extended. 3456 * The desire to keep that precision is already indicated 3457 * by 'precise' mark in corresponding register of this state. 3458 * No further tracking necessary. 3459 */ 3460 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_FP) 3461 return 0; 3462 3463 /* dreg = *(u64 *)[fp - off] was a fill from the stack. 3464 * that [fp - off] slot contains scalar that needs to be 3465 * tracked with precision 3466 */ 3467 spi = (-insn->off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE; 3468 if (spi >= 64) { 3469 verbose(env, "BUG spi %d\n", spi); 3470 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 3471 return -EFAULT; 3472 } 3473 bt_set_slot(bt, spi); 3474 } else if (class == BPF_STX || class == BPF_ST) { 3475 if (bt_is_reg_set(bt, dreg)) 3476 /* stx & st shouldn't be using _scalar_ dst_reg 3477 * to access memory. It means backtracking 3478 * encountered a case of pointer subtraction. 3479 */ 3480 return -ENOTSUPP; 3481 /* scalars can only be spilled into stack */ 3482 if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_FP) 3483 return 0; 3484 spi = (-insn->off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE; 3485 if (spi >= 64) { 3486 verbose(env, "BUG spi %d\n", spi); 3487 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 3488 return -EFAULT; 3489 } 3490 if (!bt_is_slot_set(bt, spi)) 3491 return 0; 3492 bt_clear_slot(bt, spi); 3493 if (class == BPF_STX) 3494 bt_set_reg(bt, sreg); 3495 } else if (class == BPF_JMP || class == BPF_JMP32) { 3496 if (bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) { 3497 int subprog_insn_idx, subprog; 3498 3499 subprog_insn_idx = idx + insn->imm + 1; 3500 subprog = find_subprog(env, subprog_insn_idx); 3501 if (subprog < 0) 3502 return -EFAULT; 3503 3504 if (subprog_is_global(env, subprog)) { 3505 /* check that jump history doesn't have any 3506 * extra instructions from subprog; the next 3507 * instruction after call to global subprog 3508 * should be literally next instruction in 3509 * caller program 3510 */ 3511 WARN_ONCE(idx + 1 != subseq_idx, "verifier backtracking bug"); 3512 /* r1-r5 are invalidated after subprog call, 3513 * so for global func call it shouldn't be set 3514 * anymore 3515 */ 3516 if (bt_reg_mask(bt) & BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) { 3517 verbose(env, "BUG regs %x\n", bt_reg_mask(bt)); 3518 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 3519 return -EFAULT; 3520 } 3521 /* global subprog always sets R0 */ 3522 bt_clear_reg(bt, BPF_REG_0); 3523 return 0; 3524 } else { 3525 /* static subprog call instruction, which 3526 * means that we are exiting current subprog, 3527 * so only r1-r5 could be still requested as 3528 * precise, r0 and r6-r10 or any stack slot in 3529 * the current frame should be zero by now 3530 */ 3531 if (bt_reg_mask(bt) & ~BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) { 3532 verbose(env, "BUG regs %x\n", bt_reg_mask(bt)); 3533 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 3534 return -EFAULT; 3535 } 3536 /* we don't track register spills perfectly, 3537 * so fallback to force-precise instead of failing */ 3538 if (bt_stack_mask(bt) != 0) 3539 return -ENOTSUPP; 3540 /* propagate r1-r5 to the caller */ 3541 for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) { 3542 if (bt_is_reg_set(bt, i)) { 3543 bt_clear_reg(bt, i); 3544 bt_set_frame_reg(bt, bt->frame - 1, i); 3545 } 3546 } 3547 if (bt_subprog_exit(bt)) 3548 return -EFAULT; 3549 return 0; 3550 } 3551 } else if ((bpf_helper_call(insn) && 3552 is_callback_calling_function(insn->imm) && 3553 !is_async_callback_calling_function(insn->imm)) || 3554 (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) && is_callback_calling_kfunc(insn->imm))) { 3555 /* callback-calling helper or kfunc call, which means 3556 * we are exiting from subprog, but unlike the subprog 3557 * call handling above, we shouldn't propagate 3558 * precision of r1-r5 (if any requested), as they are 3559 * not actually arguments passed directly to callback 3560 * subprogs 3561 */ 3562 if (bt_reg_mask(bt) & ~BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) { 3563 verbose(env, "BUG regs %x\n", bt_reg_mask(bt)); 3564 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 3565 return -EFAULT; 3566 } 3567 if (bt_stack_mask(bt) != 0) 3568 return -ENOTSUPP; 3569 /* clear r1-r5 in callback subprog's mask */ 3570 for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) 3571 bt_clear_reg(bt, i); 3572 if (bt_subprog_exit(bt)) 3573 return -EFAULT; 3574 return 0; 3575 } else if (opcode == BPF_CALL) { 3576 /* kfunc with imm==0 is invalid and fixup_kfunc_call will 3577 * catch this error later. Make backtracking conservative 3578 * with ENOTSUPP. 3579 */ 3580 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL && insn->imm == 0) 3581 return -ENOTSUPP; 3582 /* regular helper call sets R0 */ 3583 bt_clear_reg(bt, BPF_REG_0); 3584 if (bt_reg_mask(bt) & BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) { 3585 /* if backtracing was looking for registers R1-R5 3586 * they should have been found already. 3587 */ 3588 verbose(env, "BUG regs %x\n", bt_reg_mask(bt)); 3589 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 3590 return -EFAULT; 3591 } 3592 } else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) { 3593 bool r0_precise; 3594 3595 if (bt_reg_mask(bt) & BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) { 3596 /* if backtracing was looking for registers R1-R5 3597 * they should have been found already. 3598 */ 3599 verbose(env, "BUG regs %x\n", bt_reg_mask(bt)); 3600 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 3601 return -EFAULT; 3602 } 3603 3604 /* BPF_EXIT in subprog or callback always returns 3605 * right after the call instruction, so by checking 3606 * whether the instruction at subseq_idx-1 is subprog 3607 * call or not we can distinguish actual exit from 3608 * *subprog* from exit from *callback*. In the former 3609 * case, we need to propagate r0 precision, if 3610 * necessary. In the former we never do that. 3611 */ 3612 r0_precise = subseq_idx - 1 >= 0 && 3613 bpf_pseudo_call(&env->prog->insnsi[subseq_idx - 1]) && 3614 bt_is_reg_set(bt, BPF_REG_0); 3615 3616 bt_clear_reg(bt, BPF_REG_0); 3617 if (bt_subprog_enter(bt)) 3618 return -EFAULT; 3619 3620 if (r0_precise) 3621 bt_set_reg(bt, BPF_REG_0); 3622 /* r6-r9 and stack slots will stay set in caller frame 3623 * bitmasks until we return back from callee(s) 3624 */ 3625 return 0; 3626 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 3627 if (!bt_is_reg_set(bt, dreg) && !bt_is_reg_set(bt, sreg)) 3628 return 0; 3629 /* dreg <cond> sreg 3630 * Both dreg and sreg need precision before 3631 * this insn. If only sreg was marked precise 3632 * before it would be equally necessary to 3633 * propagate it to dreg. 3634 */ 3635 bt_set_reg(bt, dreg); 3636 bt_set_reg(bt, sreg); 3637 /* else dreg <cond> K 3638 * Only dreg still needs precision before 3639 * this insn, so for the K-based conditional 3640 * there is nothing new to be marked. 3641 */ 3642 } 3643 } else if (class == BPF_LD) { 3644 if (!bt_is_reg_set(bt, dreg)) 3645 return 0; 3646 bt_clear_reg(bt, dreg); 3647 /* It's ld_imm64 or ld_abs or ld_ind. 3648 * For ld_imm64 no further tracking of precision 3649 * into parent is necessary 3650 */ 3651 if (mode == BPF_IND || mode == BPF_ABS) 3652 /* to be analyzed */ 3653 return -ENOTSUPP; 3654 } 3655 return 0; 3656 } 3657 3658 /* the scalar precision tracking algorithm: 3659 * . at the start all registers have precise=false. 3660 * . scalar ranges are tracked as normal through alu and jmp insns. 3661 * . once precise value of the scalar register is used in: 3662 * . ptr + scalar alu 3663 * . if (scalar cond K|scalar) 3664 * . helper_call(.., scalar, ...) where ARG_CONST is expected 3665 * backtrack through the verifier states and mark all registers and 3666 * stack slots with spilled constants that these scalar regisers 3667 * should be precise. 3668 * . during state pruning two registers (or spilled stack slots) 3669 * are equivalent if both are not precise. 3670 * 3671 * Note the verifier cannot simply walk register parentage chain, 3672 * since many different registers and stack slots could have been 3673 * used to compute single precise scalar. 3674 * 3675 * The approach of starting with precise=true for all registers and then 3676 * backtrack to mark a register as not precise when the verifier detects 3677 * that program doesn't care about specific value (e.g., when helper 3678 * takes register as ARG_ANYTHING parameter) is not safe. 3679 * 3680 * It's ok to walk single parentage chain of the verifier states. 3681 * It's possible that this backtracking will go all the way till 1st insn. 3682 * All other branches will be explored for needing precision later. 3683 * 3684 * The backtracking needs to deal with cases like: 3685 * R8=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=1952,imm=0) R9_w=map_value(id=0,off=40,ks=4,vs=1952,imm=0) 3686 * r9 -= r8 3687 * r5 = r9 3688 * if r5 > 0x79f goto pc+7 3689 * R5_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=1951,var_off=(0x0; 0x7ff)) 3690 * r5 += 1 3691 * ... 3692 * call bpf_perf_event_output#25 3693 * where .arg5_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO 3694 * 3695 * and this case: 3696 * r6 = 1 3697 * call foo // uses callee's r6 inside to compute r0 3698 * r0 += r6 3699 * if r0 == 0 goto 3700 * 3701 * to track above reg_mask/stack_mask needs to be independent for each frame. 3702 * 3703 * Also if parent's curframe > frame where backtracking started, 3704 * the verifier need to mark registers in both frames, otherwise callees 3705 * may incorrectly prune callers. This is similar to 3706 * commit 7640ead93924 ("bpf: verifier: make sure callees don't prune with caller differences") 3707 * 3708 * For now backtracking falls back into conservative marking. 3709 */ 3710 static void mark_all_scalars_precise(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3711 struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 3712 { 3713 struct bpf_func_state *func; 3714 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 3715 int i, j; 3716 3717 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 3718 verbose(env, "mark_precise: frame%d: falling back to forcing all scalars precise\n", 3719 st->curframe); 3720 } 3721 3722 /* big hammer: mark all scalars precise in this path. 3723 * pop_stack may still get !precise scalars. 3724 * We also skip current state and go straight to first parent state, 3725 * because precision markings in current non-checkpointed state are 3726 * not needed. See why in the comment in __mark_chain_precision below. 3727 */ 3728 for (st = st->parent; st; st = st->parent) { 3729 for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) { 3730 func = st->frame[i]; 3731 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_FP; j++) { 3732 reg = &func->regs[j]; 3733 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || reg->precise) 3734 continue; 3735 reg->precise = true; 3736 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 3737 verbose(env, "force_precise: frame%d: forcing r%d to be precise\n", 3738 i, j); 3739 } 3740 } 3741 for (j = 0; j < func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) { 3742 if (!is_spilled_reg(&func->stack[j])) 3743 continue; 3744 reg = &func->stack[j].spilled_ptr; 3745 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || reg->precise) 3746 continue; 3747 reg->precise = true; 3748 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 3749 verbose(env, "force_precise: frame%d: forcing fp%d to be precise\n", 3750 i, -(j + 1) * 8); 3751 } 3752 } 3753 } 3754 } 3755 } 3756 3757 static void mark_all_scalars_imprecise(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 3758 { 3759 struct bpf_func_state *func; 3760 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 3761 int i, j; 3762 3763 for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) { 3764 func = st->frame[i]; 3765 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_FP; j++) { 3766 reg = &func->regs[j]; 3767 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 3768 continue; 3769 reg->precise = false; 3770 } 3771 for (j = 0; j < func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) { 3772 if (!is_spilled_reg(&func->stack[j])) 3773 continue; 3774 reg = &func->stack[j].spilled_ptr; 3775 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 3776 continue; 3777 reg->precise = false; 3778 } 3779 } 3780 } 3781 3782 static bool idset_contains(struct bpf_idset *s, u32 id) 3783 { 3784 u32 i; 3785 3786 for (i = 0; i < s->count; ++i) 3787 if (s->ids[i] == id) 3788 return true; 3789 3790 return false; 3791 } 3792 3793 static int idset_push(struct bpf_idset *s, u32 id) 3794 { 3795 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(s->count >= ARRAY_SIZE(s->ids))) 3796 return -EFAULT; 3797 s->ids[s->count++] = id; 3798 return 0; 3799 } 3800 3801 static void idset_reset(struct bpf_idset *s) 3802 { 3803 s->count = 0; 3804 } 3805 3806 /* Collect a set of IDs for all registers currently marked as precise in env->bt. 3807 * Mark all registers with these IDs as precise. 3808 */ 3809 static int mark_precise_scalar_ids(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 3810 { 3811 struct bpf_idset *precise_ids = &env->idset_scratch; 3812 struct backtrack_state *bt = &env->bt; 3813 struct bpf_func_state *func; 3814 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 3815 DECLARE_BITMAP(mask, 64); 3816 int i, fr; 3817 3818 idset_reset(precise_ids); 3819 3820 for (fr = bt->frame; fr >= 0; fr--) { 3821 func = st->frame[fr]; 3822 3823 bitmap_from_u64(mask, bt_frame_reg_mask(bt, fr)); 3824 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) { 3825 reg = &func->regs[i]; 3826 if (!reg->id || reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 3827 continue; 3828 if (idset_push(precise_ids, reg->id)) 3829 return -EFAULT; 3830 } 3831 3832 bitmap_from_u64(mask, bt_frame_stack_mask(bt, fr)); 3833 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 64) { 3834 if (i >= func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE) 3835 break; 3836 if (!is_spilled_scalar_reg(&func->stack[i])) 3837 continue; 3838 reg = &func->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 3839 if (!reg->id) 3840 continue; 3841 if (idset_push(precise_ids, reg->id)) 3842 return -EFAULT; 3843 } 3844 } 3845 3846 for (fr = 0; fr <= st->curframe; ++fr) { 3847 func = st->frame[fr]; 3848 3849 for (i = BPF_REG_0; i < BPF_REG_10; ++i) { 3850 reg = &func->regs[i]; 3851 if (!reg->id) 3852 continue; 3853 if (!idset_contains(precise_ids, reg->id)) 3854 continue; 3855 bt_set_frame_reg(bt, fr, i); 3856 } 3857 for (i = 0; i < func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; ++i) { 3858 if (!is_spilled_scalar_reg(&func->stack[i])) 3859 continue; 3860 reg = &func->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 3861 if (!reg->id) 3862 continue; 3863 if (!idset_contains(precise_ids, reg->id)) 3864 continue; 3865 bt_set_frame_slot(bt, fr, i); 3866 } 3867 } 3868 3869 return 0; 3870 } 3871 3872 /* 3873 * __mark_chain_precision() backtracks BPF program instruction sequence and 3874 * chain of verifier states making sure that register *regno* (if regno >= 0) 3875 * and/or stack slot *spi* (if spi >= 0) are marked as precisely tracked 3876 * SCALARS, as well as any other registers and slots that contribute to 3877 * a tracked state of given registers/stack slots, depending on specific BPF 3878 * assembly instructions (see backtrack_insns() for exact instruction handling 3879 * logic). This backtracking relies on recorded jmp_history and is able to 3880 * traverse entire chain of parent states. This process ends only when all the 3881 * necessary registers/slots and their transitive dependencies are marked as 3882 * precise. 3883 * 3884 * One important and subtle aspect is that precise marks *do not matter* in 3885 * the currently verified state (current state). It is important to understand 3886 * why this is the case. 3887 * 3888 * First, note that current state is the state that is not yet "checkpointed", 3889 * i.e., it is not yet put into env->explored_states, and it has no children 3890 * states as well. It's ephemeral, and can end up either a) being discarded if 3891 * compatible explored state is found at some point or BPF_EXIT instruction is 3892 * reached or b) checkpointed and put into env->explored_states, branching out 3893 * into one or more children states. 3894 * 3895 * In the former case, precise markings in current state are completely 3896 * ignored by state comparison code (see regsafe() for details). Only 3897 * checkpointed ("old") state precise markings are important, and if old 3898 * state's register/slot is precise, regsafe() assumes current state's 3899 * register/slot as precise and checks value ranges exactly and precisely. If 3900 * states turn out to be compatible, current state's necessary precise 3901 * markings and any required parent states' precise markings are enforced 3902 * after the fact with propagate_precision() logic, after the fact. But it's 3903 * important to realize that in this case, even after marking current state 3904 * registers/slots as precise, we immediately discard current state. So what 3905 * actually matters is any of the precise markings propagated into current 3906 * state's parent states, which are always checkpointed (due to b) case above). 3907 * As such, for scenario a) it doesn't matter if current state has precise 3908 * markings set or not. 3909 * 3910 * Now, for the scenario b), checkpointing and forking into child(ren) 3911 * state(s). Note that before current state gets to checkpointing step, any 3912 * processed instruction always assumes precise SCALAR register/slot 3913 * knowledge: if precise value or range is useful to prune jump branch, BPF 3914 * verifier takes this opportunity enthusiastically. Similarly, when 3915 * register's value is used to calculate offset or memory address, exact 3916 * knowledge of SCALAR range is assumed, checked, and enforced. So, similar to 3917 * what we mentioned above about state comparison ignoring precise markings 3918 * during state comparison, BPF verifier ignores and also assumes precise 3919 * markings *at will* during instruction verification process. But as verifier 3920 * assumes precision, it also propagates any precision dependencies across 3921 * parent states, which are not yet finalized, so can be further restricted 3922 * based on new knowledge gained from restrictions enforced by their children 3923 * states. This is so that once those parent states are finalized, i.e., when 3924 * they have no more active children state, state comparison logic in 3925 * is_state_visited() would enforce strict and precise SCALAR ranges, if 3926 * required for correctness. 3927 * 3928 * To build a bit more intuition, note also that once a state is checkpointed, 3929 * the path we took to get to that state is not important. This is crucial 3930 * property for state pruning. When state is checkpointed and finalized at 3931 * some instruction index, it can be correctly and safely used to "short 3932 * circuit" any *compatible* state that reaches exactly the same instruction 3933 * index. I.e., if we jumped to that instruction from a completely different 3934 * code path than original finalized state was derived from, it doesn't 3935 * matter, current state can be discarded because from that instruction 3936 * forward having a compatible state will ensure we will safely reach the 3937 * exit. States describe preconditions for further exploration, but completely 3938 * forget the history of how we got here. 3939 * 3940 * This also means that even if we needed precise SCALAR range to get to 3941 * finalized state, but from that point forward *that same* SCALAR register is 3942 * never used in a precise context (i.e., it's precise value is not needed for 3943 * correctness), it's correct and safe to mark such register as "imprecise" 3944 * (i.e., precise marking set to false). This is what we rely on when we do 3945 * not set precise marking in current state. If no child state requires 3946 * precision for any given SCALAR register, it's safe to dictate that it can 3947 * be imprecise. If any child state does require this register to be precise, 3948 * we'll mark it precise later retroactively during precise markings 3949 * propagation from child state to parent states. 3950 * 3951 * Skipping precise marking setting in current state is a mild version of 3952 * relying on the above observation. But we can utilize this property even 3953 * more aggressively by proactively forgetting any precise marking in the 3954 * current state (which we inherited from the parent state), right before we 3955 * checkpoint it and branch off into new child state. This is done by 3956 * mark_all_scalars_imprecise() to hopefully get more permissive and generic 3957 * finalized states which help in short circuiting more future states. 3958 */ 3959 static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 3960 { 3961 struct backtrack_state *bt = &env->bt; 3962 struct bpf_verifier_state *st = env->cur_state; 3963 int first_idx = st->first_insn_idx; 3964 int last_idx = env->insn_idx; 3965 int subseq_idx = -1; 3966 struct bpf_func_state *func; 3967 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 3968 bool skip_first = true; 3969 int i, fr, err; 3970 3971 if (!env->bpf_capable) 3972 return 0; 3973 3974 /* set frame number from which we are starting to backtrack */ 3975 bt_init(bt, env->cur_state->curframe); 3976 3977 /* Do sanity checks against current state of register and/or stack 3978 * slot, but don't set precise flag in current state, as precision 3979 * tracking in the current state is unnecessary. 3980 */ 3981 func = st->frame[bt->frame]; 3982 if (regno >= 0) { 3983 reg = &func->regs[regno]; 3984 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 3985 WARN_ONCE(1, "backtracing misuse"); 3986 return -EFAULT; 3987 } 3988 bt_set_reg(bt, regno); 3989 } 3990 3991 if (bt_empty(bt)) 3992 return 0; 3993 3994 for (;;) { 3995 DECLARE_BITMAP(mask, 64); 3996 u32 history = st->jmp_history_cnt; 3997 3998 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 3999 verbose(env, "mark_precise: frame%d: last_idx %d first_idx %d subseq_idx %d \n", 4000 bt->frame, last_idx, first_idx, subseq_idx); 4001 } 4002 4003 /* If some register with scalar ID is marked as precise, 4004 * make sure that all registers sharing this ID are also precise. 4005 * This is needed to estimate effect of find_equal_scalars(). 4006 * Do this at the last instruction of each state, 4007 * bpf_reg_state::id fields are valid for these instructions. 4008 * 4009 * Allows to track precision in situation like below: 4010 * 4011 * r2 = unknown value 4012 * ... 4013 * --- state #0 --- 4014 * ... 4015 * r1 = r2 // r1 and r2 now share the same ID 4016 * ... 4017 * --- state #1 {r1.id = A, r2.id = A} --- 4018 * ... 4019 * if (r2 > 10) goto exit; // find_equal_scalars() assigns range to r1 4020 * ... 4021 * --- state #2 {r1.id = A, r2.id = A} --- 4022 * r3 = r10 4023 * r3 += r1 // need to mark both r1 and r2 4024 */ 4025 if (mark_precise_scalar_ids(env, st)) 4026 return -EFAULT; 4027 4028 if (last_idx < 0) { 4029 /* we are at the entry into subprog, which 4030 * is expected for global funcs, but only if 4031 * requested precise registers are R1-R5 4032 * (which are global func's input arguments) 4033 */ 4034 if (st->curframe == 0 && 4035 st->frame[0]->subprogno > 0 && 4036 st->frame[0]->callsite == BPF_MAIN_FUNC && 4037 bt_stack_mask(bt) == 0 && 4038 (bt_reg_mask(bt) & ~BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) == 0) { 4039 bitmap_from_u64(mask, bt_reg_mask(bt)); 4040 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) { 4041 reg = &st->frame[0]->regs[i]; 4042 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 4043 bt_clear_reg(bt, i); 4044 continue; 4045 } 4046 reg->precise = true; 4047 } 4048 return 0; 4049 } 4050 4051 verbose(env, "BUG backtracking func entry subprog %d reg_mask %x stack_mask %llx\n", 4052 st->frame[0]->subprogno, bt_reg_mask(bt), bt_stack_mask(bt)); 4053 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 4054 return -EFAULT; 4055 } 4056 4057 for (i = last_idx;;) { 4058 if (skip_first) { 4059 err = 0; 4060 skip_first = false; 4061 } else { 4062 err = backtrack_insn(env, i, subseq_idx, bt); 4063 } 4064 if (err == -ENOTSUPP) { 4065 mark_all_scalars_precise(env, env->cur_state); 4066 bt_reset(bt); 4067 return 0; 4068 } else if (err) { 4069 return err; 4070 } 4071 if (bt_empty(bt)) 4072 /* Found assignment(s) into tracked register in this state. 4073 * Since this state is already marked, just return. 4074 * Nothing to be tracked further in the parent state. 4075 */ 4076 return 0; 4077 if (i == first_idx) 4078 break; 4079 subseq_idx = i; 4080 i = get_prev_insn_idx(st, i, &history); 4081 if (i >= env->prog->len) { 4082 /* This can happen if backtracking reached insn 0 4083 * and there are still reg_mask or stack_mask 4084 * to backtrack. 4085 * It means the backtracking missed the spot where 4086 * particular register was initialized with a constant. 4087 */ 4088 verbose(env, "BUG backtracking idx %d\n", i); 4089 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 4090 return -EFAULT; 4091 } 4092 } 4093 st = st->parent; 4094 if (!st) 4095 break; 4096 4097 for (fr = bt->frame; fr >= 0; fr--) { 4098 func = st->frame[fr]; 4099 bitmap_from_u64(mask, bt_frame_reg_mask(bt, fr)); 4100 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) { 4101 reg = &func->regs[i]; 4102 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 4103 bt_clear_frame_reg(bt, fr, i); 4104 continue; 4105 } 4106 if (reg->precise) 4107 bt_clear_frame_reg(bt, fr, i); 4108 else 4109 reg->precise = true; 4110 } 4111 4112 bitmap_from_u64(mask, bt_frame_stack_mask(bt, fr)); 4113 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 64) { 4114 if (i >= func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE) { 4115 /* the sequence of instructions: 4116 * 2: (bf) r3 = r10 4117 * 3: (7b) *(u64 *)(r3 -8) = r0 4118 * 4: (79) r4 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8) 4119 * doesn't contain jmps. It's backtracked 4120 * as a single block. 4121 * During backtracking insn 3 is not recognized as 4122 * stack access, so at the end of backtracking 4123 * stack slot fp-8 is still marked in stack_mask. 4124 * However the parent state may not have accessed 4125 * fp-8 and it's "unallocated" stack space. 4126 * In such case fallback to conservative. 4127 */ 4128 mark_all_scalars_precise(env, env->cur_state); 4129 bt_reset(bt); 4130 return 0; 4131 } 4132 4133 if (!is_spilled_scalar_reg(&func->stack[i])) { 4134 bt_clear_frame_slot(bt, fr, i); 4135 continue; 4136 } 4137 reg = &func->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 4138 if (reg->precise) 4139 bt_clear_frame_slot(bt, fr, i); 4140 else 4141 reg->precise = true; 4142 } 4143 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 4144 fmt_reg_mask(env->tmp_str_buf, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN, 4145 bt_frame_reg_mask(bt, fr)); 4146 verbose(env, "mark_precise: frame%d: parent state regs=%s ", 4147 fr, env->tmp_str_buf); 4148 fmt_stack_mask(env->tmp_str_buf, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN, 4149 bt_frame_stack_mask(bt, fr)); 4150 verbose(env, "stack=%s: ", env->tmp_str_buf); 4151 print_verifier_state(env, func, true); 4152 } 4153 } 4154 4155 if (bt_empty(bt)) 4156 return 0; 4157 4158 subseq_idx = first_idx; 4159 last_idx = st->last_insn_idx; 4160 first_idx = st->first_insn_idx; 4161 } 4162 4163 /* if we still have requested precise regs or slots, we missed 4164 * something (e.g., stack access through non-r10 register), so 4165 * fallback to marking all precise 4166 */ 4167 if (!bt_empty(bt)) { 4168 mark_all_scalars_precise(env, env->cur_state); 4169 bt_reset(bt); 4170 } 4171 4172 return 0; 4173 } 4174 4175 int mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 4176 { 4177 return __mark_chain_precision(env, regno); 4178 } 4179 4180 /* mark_chain_precision_batch() assumes that env->bt is set in the caller to 4181 * desired reg and stack masks across all relevant frames 4182 */ 4183 static int mark_chain_precision_batch(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 4184 { 4185 return __mark_chain_precision(env, -1); 4186 } 4187 4188 static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type) 4189 { 4190 switch (base_type(type)) { 4191 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 4192 case PTR_TO_STACK: 4193 case PTR_TO_CTX: 4194 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 4195 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 4196 case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: 4197 case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS: 4198 case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP: 4199 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 4200 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 4201 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 4202 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 4203 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 4204 case PTR_TO_BUF: 4205 case PTR_TO_MEM: 4206 case PTR_TO_FUNC: 4207 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 4208 return true; 4209 default: 4210 return false; 4211 } 4212 } 4213 4214 /* Does this register contain a constant zero? */ 4215 static bool register_is_null(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 4216 { 4217 return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0); 4218 } 4219 4220 static bool register_is_const(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 4221 { 4222 return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 4223 } 4224 4225 static bool __is_scalar_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 4226 { 4227 return tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off) && 4228 reg->smin_value == S64_MIN && reg->smax_value == S64_MAX && 4229 reg->umin_value == 0 && reg->umax_value == U64_MAX && 4230 reg->s32_min_value == S32_MIN && reg->s32_max_value == S32_MAX && 4231 reg->u32_min_value == 0 && reg->u32_max_value == U32_MAX; 4232 } 4233 4234 static bool register_is_bounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 4235 { 4236 return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && !__is_scalar_unbounded(reg); 4237 } 4238 4239 static bool __is_pointer_value(bool allow_ptr_leaks, 4240 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 4241 { 4242 if (allow_ptr_leaks) 4243 return false; 4244 4245 return reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE; 4246 } 4247 4248 /* Copy src state preserving dst->parent and dst->live fields */ 4249 static void copy_register_state(struct bpf_reg_state *dst, const struct bpf_reg_state *src) 4250 { 4251 struct bpf_reg_state *parent = dst->parent; 4252 enum bpf_reg_liveness live = dst->live; 4253 4254 *dst = *src; 4255 dst->parent = parent; 4256 dst->live = live; 4257 } 4258 4259 static void save_register_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, 4260 int spi, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 4261 int size) 4262 { 4263 int i; 4264 4265 copy_register_state(&state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, reg); 4266 if (size == BPF_REG_SIZE) 4267 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 4268 4269 for (i = BPF_REG_SIZE; i > BPF_REG_SIZE - size; i--) 4270 state->stack[spi].slot_type[i - 1] = STACK_SPILL; 4271 4272 /* size < 8 bytes spill */ 4273 for (; i; i--) 4274 scrub_spilled_slot(&state->stack[spi].slot_type[i - 1]); 4275 } 4276 4277 static bool is_bpf_st_mem(struct bpf_insn *insn) 4278 { 4279 return BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ST && BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM; 4280 } 4281 4282 /* check_stack_{read,write}_fixed_off functions track spill/fill of registers, 4283 * stack boundary and alignment are checked in check_mem_access() 4284 */ 4285 static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4286 /* stack frame we're writing to */ 4287 struct bpf_func_state *state, 4288 int off, int size, int value_regno, 4289 int insn_idx) 4290 { 4291 struct bpf_func_state *cur; /* state of the current function */ 4292 int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE, err; 4293 struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx]; 4294 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = NULL; 4295 u32 dst_reg = insn->dst_reg; 4296 4297 err = grow_stack_state(state, round_up(slot + 1, BPF_REG_SIZE)); 4298 if (err) 4299 return err; 4300 /* caller checked that off % size == 0 and -MAX_BPF_STACK <= off < 0, 4301 * so it's aligned access and [off, off + size) are within stack limits 4302 */ 4303 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && 4304 state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL && 4305 size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { 4306 verbose(env, "attempt to corrupt spilled pointer on stack\n"); 4307 return -EACCES; 4308 } 4309 4310 cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe]; 4311 if (value_regno >= 0) 4312 reg = &cur->regs[value_regno]; 4313 if (!env->bypass_spec_v4) { 4314 bool sanitize = reg && is_spillable_regtype(reg->type); 4315 4316 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { 4317 u8 type = state->stack[spi].slot_type[i]; 4318 4319 if (type != STACK_MISC && type != STACK_ZERO) { 4320 sanitize = true; 4321 break; 4322 } 4323 } 4324 4325 if (sanitize) 4326 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].sanitize_stack_spill = true; 4327 } 4328 4329 err = destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(env, state, spi); 4330 if (err) 4331 return err; 4332 4333 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi); 4334 if (reg && !(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && register_is_bounded(reg) && 4335 !register_is_null(reg) && env->bpf_capable) { 4336 if (dst_reg != BPF_REG_FP) { 4337 /* The backtracking logic can only recognize explicit 4338 * stack slot address like [fp - 8]. Other spill of 4339 * scalar via different register has to be conservative. 4340 * Backtrack from here and mark all registers as precise 4341 * that contributed into 'reg' being a constant. 4342 */ 4343 err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno); 4344 if (err) 4345 return err; 4346 } 4347 save_register_state(state, spi, reg, size); 4348 } else if (!reg && !(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && is_bpf_st_mem(insn) && 4349 insn->imm != 0 && env->bpf_capable) { 4350 struct bpf_reg_state fake_reg = {}; 4351 4352 __mark_reg_known(&fake_reg, (u32)insn->imm); 4353 fake_reg.type = SCALAR_VALUE; 4354 save_register_state(state, spi, &fake_reg, size); 4355 } else if (reg && is_spillable_regtype(reg->type)) { 4356 /* register containing pointer is being spilled into stack */ 4357 if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { 4358 verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; "); 4359 verbose(env, "invalid size of register spill\n"); 4360 return -EACCES; 4361 } 4362 if (state != cur && reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 4363 verbose(env, "cannot spill pointers to stack into stack frame of the caller\n"); 4364 return -EINVAL; 4365 } 4366 save_register_state(state, spi, reg, size); 4367 } else { 4368 u8 type = STACK_MISC; 4369 4370 /* regular write of data into stack destroys any spilled ptr */ 4371 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type = NOT_INIT; 4372 /* Mark slots as STACK_MISC if they belonged to spilled ptr/dynptr/iter. */ 4373 if (is_stack_slot_special(&state->stack[spi])) 4374 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) 4375 scrub_spilled_slot(&state->stack[spi].slot_type[i]); 4376 4377 /* only mark the slot as written if all 8 bytes were written 4378 * otherwise read propagation may incorrectly stop too soon 4379 * when stack slots are partially written. 4380 * This heuristic means that read propagation will be 4381 * conservative, since it will add reg_live_read marks 4382 * to stack slots all the way to first state when programs 4383 * writes+reads less than 8 bytes 4384 */ 4385 if (size == BPF_REG_SIZE) 4386 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 4387 4388 /* when we zero initialize stack slots mark them as such */ 4389 if ((reg && register_is_null(reg)) || 4390 (!reg && is_bpf_st_mem(insn) && insn->imm == 0)) { 4391 /* backtracking doesn't work for STACK_ZERO yet. */ 4392 err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno); 4393 if (err) 4394 return err; 4395 type = STACK_ZERO; 4396 } 4397 4398 /* Mark slots affected by this stack write. */ 4399 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) 4400 state->stack[spi].slot_type[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] = 4401 type; 4402 } 4403 return 0; 4404 } 4405 4406 /* Write the stack: 'stack[ptr_regno + off] = value_regno'. 'ptr_regno' is 4407 * known to contain a variable offset. 4408 * This function checks whether the write is permitted and conservatively 4409 * tracks the effects of the write, considering that each stack slot in the 4410 * dynamic range is potentially written to. 4411 * 4412 * 'off' includes 'regno->off'. 4413 * 'value_regno' can be -1, meaning that an unknown value is being written to 4414 * the stack. 4415 * 4416 * Spilled pointers in range are not marked as written because we don't know 4417 * what's going to be actually written. This means that read propagation for 4418 * future reads cannot be terminated by this write. 4419 * 4420 * For privileged programs, uninitialized stack slots are considered 4421 * initialized by this write (even though we don't know exactly what offsets 4422 * are going to be written to). The idea is that we don't want the verifier to 4423 * reject future reads that access slots written to through variable offsets. 4424 */ 4425 static int check_stack_write_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4426 /* func where register points to */ 4427 struct bpf_func_state *state, 4428 int ptr_regno, int off, int size, 4429 int value_regno, int insn_idx) 4430 { 4431 struct bpf_func_state *cur; /* state of the current function */ 4432 int min_off, max_off; 4433 int i, err; 4434 struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, *value_reg = NULL; 4435 struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx]; 4436 bool writing_zero = false; 4437 /* set if the fact that we're writing a zero is used to let any 4438 * stack slots remain STACK_ZERO 4439 */ 4440 bool zero_used = false; 4441 4442 cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe]; 4443 ptr_reg = &cur->regs[ptr_regno]; 4444 min_off = ptr_reg->smin_value + off; 4445 max_off = ptr_reg->smax_value + off + size; 4446 if (value_regno >= 0) 4447 value_reg = &cur->regs[value_regno]; 4448 if ((value_reg && register_is_null(value_reg)) || 4449 (!value_reg && is_bpf_st_mem(insn) && insn->imm == 0)) 4450 writing_zero = true; 4451 4452 err = grow_stack_state(state, round_up(-min_off, BPF_REG_SIZE)); 4453 if (err) 4454 return err; 4455 4456 for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) { 4457 int spi; 4458 4459 spi = __get_spi(i); 4460 err = destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(env, state, spi); 4461 if (err) 4462 return err; 4463 } 4464 4465 /* Variable offset writes destroy any spilled pointers in range. */ 4466 for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) { 4467 u8 new_type, *stype; 4468 int slot, spi; 4469 4470 slot = -i - 1; 4471 spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; 4472 stype = &state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE]; 4473 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi); 4474 4475 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && *stype != STACK_MISC && *stype != STACK_ZERO) { 4476 /* Reject the write if range we may write to has not 4477 * been initialized beforehand. If we didn't reject 4478 * here, the ptr status would be erased below (even 4479 * though not all slots are actually overwritten), 4480 * possibly opening the door to leaks. 4481 * 4482 * We do however catch STACK_INVALID case below, and 4483 * only allow reading possibly uninitialized memory 4484 * later for CAP_PERFMON, as the write may not happen to 4485 * that slot. 4486 */ 4487 verbose(env, "spilled ptr in range of var-offset stack write; insn %d, ptr off: %d", 4488 insn_idx, i); 4489 return -EINVAL; 4490 } 4491 4492 /* Erase all spilled pointers. */ 4493 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type = NOT_INIT; 4494 4495 /* Update the slot type. */ 4496 new_type = STACK_MISC; 4497 if (writing_zero && *stype == STACK_ZERO) { 4498 new_type = STACK_ZERO; 4499 zero_used = true; 4500 } 4501 /* If the slot is STACK_INVALID, we check whether it's OK to 4502 * pretend that it will be initialized by this write. The slot 4503 * might not actually be written to, and so if we mark it as 4504 * initialized future reads might leak uninitialized memory. 4505 * For privileged programs, we will accept such reads to slots 4506 * that may or may not be written because, if we're reject 4507 * them, the error would be too confusing. 4508 */ 4509 if (*stype == STACK_INVALID && !env->allow_uninit_stack) { 4510 verbose(env, "uninit stack in range of var-offset write prohibited for !root; insn %d, off: %d", 4511 insn_idx, i); 4512 return -EINVAL; 4513 } 4514 *stype = new_type; 4515 } 4516 if (zero_used) { 4517 /* backtracking doesn't work for STACK_ZERO yet. */ 4518 err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno); 4519 if (err) 4520 return err; 4521 } 4522 return 0; 4523 } 4524 4525 /* When register 'dst_regno' is assigned some values from stack[min_off, 4526 * max_off), we set the register's type according to the types of the 4527 * respective stack slots. If all the stack values are known to be zeros, then 4528 * so is the destination reg. Otherwise, the register is considered to be 4529 * SCALAR. This function does not deal with register filling; the caller must 4530 * ensure that all spilled registers in the stack range have been marked as 4531 * read. 4532 */ 4533 static void mark_reg_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4534 /* func where src register points to */ 4535 struct bpf_func_state *ptr_state, 4536 int min_off, int max_off, int dst_regno) 4537 { 4538 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 4539 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 4540 int i, slot, spi; 4541 u8 *stype; 4542 int zeros = 0; 4543 4544 for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) { 4545 slot = -i - 1; 4546 spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; 4547 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi); 4548 stype = ptr_state->stack[spi].slot_type; 4549 if (stype[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE] != STACK_ZERO) 4550 break; 4551 zeros++; 4552 } 4553 if (zeros == max_off - min_off) { 4554 /* any access_size read into register is zero extended, 4555 * so the whole register == const_zero 4556 */ 4557 __mark_reg_const_zero(&state->regs[dst_regno]); 4558 /* backtracking doesn't support STACK_ZERO yet, 4559 * so mark it precise here, so that later 4560 * backtracking can stop here. 4561 * Backtracking may not need this if this register 4562 * doesn't participate in pointer adjustment. 4563 * Forward propagation of precise flag is not 4564 * necessary either. This mark is only to stop 4565 * backtracking. Any register that contributed 4566 * to const 0 was marked precise before spill. 4567 */ 4568 state->regs[dst_regno].precise = true; 4569 } else { 4570 /* have read misc data from the stack */ 4571 mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, dst_regno); 4572 } 4573 state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 4574 } 4575 4576 /* Read the stack at 'off' and put the results into the register indicated by 4577 * 'dst_regno'. It handles reg filling if the addressed stack slot is a 4578 * spilled reg. 4579 * 4580 * 'dst_regno' can be -1, meaning that the read value is not going to a 4581 * register. 4582 * 4583 * The access is assumed to be within the current stack bounds. 4584 */ 4585 static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4586 /* func where src register points to */ 4587 struct bpf_func_state *reg_state, 4588 int off, int size, int dst_regno) 4589 { 4590 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 4591 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 4592 int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; 4593 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 4594 u8 *stype, type; 4595 4596 stype = reg_state->stack[spi].slot_type; 4597 reg = ®_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 4598 4599 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi); 4600 4601 if (is_spilled_reg(®_state->stack[spi])) { 4602 u8 spill_size = 1; 4603 4604 for (i = BPF_REG_SIZE - 1; i > 0 && stype[i - 1] == STACK_SPILL; i--) 4605 spill_size++; 4606 4607 if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE || spill_size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { 4608 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 4609 verbose_linfo(env, env->insn_idx, "; "); 4610 verbose(env, "invalid size of register fill\n"); 4611 return -EACCES; 4612 } 4613 4614 mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 4615 if (dst_regno < 0) 4616 return 0; 4617 4618 if (!(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && size == spill_size) { 4619 /* The earlier check_reg_arg() has decided the 4620 * subreg_def for this insn. Save it first. 4621 */ 4622 s32 subreg_def = state->regs[dst_regno].subreg_def; 4623 4624 copy_register_state(&state->regs[dst_regno], reg); 4625 state->regs[dst_regno].subreg_def = subreg_def; 4626 } else { 4627 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { 4628 type = stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE]; 4629 if (type == STACK_SPILL) 4630 continue; 4631 if (type == STACK_MISC) 4632 continue; 4633 if (type == STACK_INVALID && env->allow_uninit_stack) 4634 continue; 4635 verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n", 4636 off, i, size); 4637 return -EACCES; 4638 } 4639 mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, dst_regno); 4640 } 4641 state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 4642 return 0; 4643 } 4644 4645 if (dst_regno >= 0) { 4646 /* restore register state from stack */ 4647 copy_register_state(&state->regs[dst_regno], reg); 4648 /* mark reg as written since spilled pointer state likely 4649 * has its liveness marks cleared by is_state_visited() 4650 * which resets stack/reg liveness for state transitions 4651 */ 4652 state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 4653 } else if (__is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, reg)) { 4654 /* If dst_regno==-1, the caller is asking us whether 4655 * it is acceptable to use this value as a SCALAR_VALUE 4656 * (e.g. for XADD). 4657 * We must not allow unprivileged callers to do that 4658 * with spilled pointers. 4659 */ 4660 verbose(env, "leaking pointer from stack off %d\n", 4661 off); 4662 return -EACCES; 4663 } 4664 mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 4665 } else { 4666 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { 4667 type = stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE]; 4668 if (type == STACK_MISC) 4669 continue; 4670 if (type == STACK_ZERO) 4671 continue; 4672 if (type == STACK_INVALID && env->allow_uninit_stack) 4673 continue; 4674 verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n", 4675 off, i, size); 4676 return -EACCES; 4677 } 4678 mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 4679 if (dst_regno >= 0) 4680 mark_reg_stack_read(env, reg_state, off, off + size, dst_regno); 4681 } 4682 return 0; 4683 } 4684 4685 enum bpf_access_src { 4686 ACCESS_DIRECT = 1, /* the access is performed by an instruction */ 4687 ACCESS_HELPER = 2, /* the access is performed by a helper */ 4688 }; 4689 4690 static int check_stack_range_initialized(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4691 int regno, int off, int access_size, 4692 bool zero_size_allowed, 4693 enum bpf_access_src type, 4694 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta); 4695 4696 static struct bpf_reg_state *reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 4697 { 4698 return cur_regs(env) + regno; 4699 } 4700 4701 /* Read the stack at 'ptr_regno + off' and put the result into the register 4702 * 'dst_regno'. 4703 * 'off' includes the pointer register's fixed offset(i.e. 'ptr_regno.off'), 4704 * but not its variable offset. 4705 * 'size' is assumed to be <= reg size and the access is assumed to be aligned. 4706 * 4707 * As opposed to check_stack_read_fixed_off, this function doesn't deal with 4708 * filling registers (i.e. reads of spilled register cannot be detected when 4709 * the offset is not fixed). We conservatively mark 'dst_regno' as containing 4710 * SCALAR_VALUE. That's why we assert that the 'ptr_regno' has a variable 4711 * offset; for a fixed offset check_stack_read_fixed_off should be used 4712 * instead. 4713 */ 4714 static int check_stack_read_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4715 int ptr_regno, int off, int size, int dst_regno) 4716 { 4717 /* The state of the source register. */ 4718 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno); 4719 struct bpf_func_state *ptr_state = func(env, reg); 4720 int err; 4721 int min_off, max_off; 4722 4723 /* Note that we pass a NULL meta, so raw access will not be permitted. 4724 */ 4725 err = check_stack_range_initialized(env, ptr_regno, off, size, 4726 false, ACCESS_DIRECT, NULL); 4727 if (err) 4728 return err; 4729 4730 min_off = reg->smin_value + off; 4731 max_off = reg->smax_value + off; 4732 mark_reg_stack_read(env, ptr_state, min_off, max_off + size, dst_regno); 4733 return 0; 4734 } 4735 4736 /* check_stack_read dispatches to check_stack_read_fixed_off or 4737 * check_stack_read_var_off. 4738 * 4739 * The caller must ensure that the offset falls within the allocated stack 4740 * bounds. 4741 * 4742 * 'dst_regno' is a register which will receive the value from the stack. It 4743 * can be -1, meaning that the read value is not going to a register. 4744 */ 4745 static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4746 int ptr_regno, int off, int size, 4747 int dst_regno) 4748 { 4749 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno); 4750 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 4751 int err; 4752 /* Some accesses are only permitted with a static offset. */ 4753 bool var_off = !tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 4754 4755 /* The offset is required to be static when reads don't go to a 4756 * register, in order to not leak pointers (see 4757 * check_stack_read_fixed_off). 4758 */ 4759 if (dst_regno < 0 && var_off) { 4760 char tn_buf[48]; 4761 4762 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 4763 verbose(env, "variable offset stack pointer cannot be passed into helper function; var_off=%s off=%d size=%d\n", 4764 tn_buf, off, size); 4765 return -EACCES; 4766 } 4767 /* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for simplicity 4768 * since it requires corresponding support in Spectre masking for stack 4769 * ALU. See also retrieve_ptr_limit(). The check in 4770 * check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic() called by 4771 * adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() prevents users from creating stack pointers 4772 * with variable offsets, therefore no check is required here. Further, 4773 * just checking it here would be insufficient as speculative stack 4774 * writes could still lead to unsafe speculative behaviour. 4775 */ 4776 if (!var_off) { 4777 off += reg->var_off.value; 4778 err = check_stack_read_fixed_off(env, state, off, size, 4779 dst_regno); 4780 } else { 4781 /* Variable offset stack reads need more conservative handling 4782 * than fixed offset ones. Note that dst_regno >= 0 on this 4783 * branch. 4784 */ 4785 err = check_stack_read_var_off(env, ptr_regno, off, size, 4786 dst_regno); 4787 } 4788 return err; 4789 } 4790 4791 4792 /* check_stack_write dispatches to check_stack_write_fixed_off or 4793 * check_stack_write_var_off. 4794 * 4795 * 'ptr_regno' is the register used as a pointer into the stack. 4796 * 'off' includes 'ptr_regno->off', but not its variable offset (if any). 4797 * 'value_regno' is the register whose value we're writing to the stack. It can 4798 * be -1, meaning that we're not writing from a register. 4799 * 4800 * The caller must ensure that the offset falls within the maximum stack size. 4801 */ 4802 static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4803 int ptr_regno, int off, int size, 4804 int value_regno, int insn_idx) 4805 { 4806 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno); 4807 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 4808 int err; 4809 4810 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 4811 off += reg->var_off.value; 4812 err = check_stack_write_fixed_off(env, state, off, size, 4813 value_regno, insn_idx); 4814 } else { 4815 /* Variable offset stack reads need more conservative handling 4816 * than fixed offset ones. 4817 */ 4818 err = check_stack_write_var_off(env, state, 4819 ptr_regno, off, size, 4820 value_regno, insn_idx); 4821 } 4822 return err; 4823 } 4824 4825 static int check_map_access_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 4826 int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type) 4827 { 4828 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 4829 struct bpf_map *map = regs[regno].map_ptr; 4830 u32 cap = bpf_map_flags_to_cap(map); 4831 4832 if (type == BPF_WRITE && !(cap & BPF_MAP_CAN_WRITE)) { 4833 verbose(env, "write into map forbidden, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", 4834 map->value_size, off, size); 4835 return -EACCES; 4836 } 4837 4838 if (type == BPF_READ && !(cap & BPF_MAP_CAN_READ)) { 4839 verbose(env, "read from map forbidden, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", 4840 map->value_size, off, size); 4841 return -EACCES; 4842 } 4843 4844 return 0; 4845 } 4846 4847 /* check read/write into memory region (e.g., map value, ringbuf sample, etc) */ 4848 static int __check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 4849 int off, int size, u32 mem_size, 4850 bool zero_size_allowed) 4851 { 4852 bool size_ok = size > 0 || (size == 0 && zero_size_allowed); 4853 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 4854 4855 if (off >= 0 && size_ok && (u64)off + size <= mem_size) 4856 return 0; 4857 4858 reg = &cur_regs(env)[regno]; 4859 switch (reg->type) { 4860 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 4861 verbose(env, "invalid access to map key, key_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", 4862 mem_size, off, size); 4863 break; 4864 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 4865 verbose(env, "invalid access to map value, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", 4866 mem_size, off, size); 4867 break; 4868 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 4869 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 4870 case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: 4871 verbose(env, "invalid access to packet, off=%d size=%d, R%d(id=%d,off=%d,r=%d)\n", 4872 off, size, regno, reg->id, off, mem_size); 4873 break; 4874 case PTR_TO_MEM: 4875 default: 4876 verbose(env, "invalid access to memory, mem_size=%u off=%d size=%d\n", 4877 mem_size, off, size); 4878 } 4879 4880 return -EACCES; 4881 } 4882 4883 /* check read/write into a memory region with possible variable offset */ 4884 static int check_mem_region_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 4885 int off, int size, u32 mem_size, 4886 bool zero_size_allowed) 4887 { 4888 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 4889 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 4890 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno]; 4891 int err; 4892 4893 /* We may have adjusted the register pointing to memory region, so we 4894 * need to try adding each of min_value and max_value to off 4895 * to make sure our theoretical access will be safe. 4896 * 4897 * The minimum value is only important with signed 4898 * comparisons where we can't assume the floor of a 4899 * value is 0. If we are using signed variables for our 4900 * index'es we need to make sure that whatever we use 4901 * will have a set floor within our range. 4902 */ 4903 if (reg->smin_value < 0 && 4904 (reg->smin_value == S64_MIN || 4905 (off + reg->smin_value != (s64)(s32)(off + reg->smin_value)) || 4906 reg->smin_value + off < 0)) { 4907 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", 4908 regno); 4909 return -EACCES; 4910 } 4911 err = __check_mem_access(env, regno, reg->smin_value + off, size, 4912 mem_size, zero_size_allowed); 4913 if (err) { 4914 verbose(env, "R%d min value is outside of the allowed memory range\n", 4915 regno); 4916 return err; 4917 } 4918 4919 /* If we haven't set a max value then we need to bail since we can't be 4920 * sure we won't do bad things. 4921 * If reg->umax_value + off could overflow, treat that as unbounded too. 4922 */ 4923 if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 4924 verbose(env, "R%d unbounded memory access, make sure to bounds check any such access\n", 4925 regno); 4926 return -EACCES; 4927 } 4928 err = __check_mem_access(env, regno, reg->umax_value + off, size, 4929 mem_size, zero_size_allowed); 4930 if (err) { 4931 verbose(env, "R%d max value is outside of the allowed memory range\n", 4932 regno); 4933 return err; 4934 } 4935 4936 return 0; 4937 } 4938 4939 static int __check_ptr_off_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4940 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno, 4941 bool fixed_off_ok) 4942 { 4943 /* Access to this pointer-typed register or passing it to a helper 4944 * is only allowed in its original, unmodified form. 4945 */ 4946 4947 if (reg->off < 0) { 4948 verbose(env, "negative offset %s ptr R%d off=%d disallowed\n", 4949 reg_type_str(env, reg->type), regno, reg->off); 4950 return -EACCES; 4951 } 4952 4953 if (!fixed_off_ok && reg->off) { 4954 verbose(env, "dereference of modified %s ptr R%d off=%d disallowed\n", 4955 reg_type_str(env, reg->type), regno, reg->off); 4956 return -EACCES; 4957 } 4958 4959 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) { 4960 char tn_buf[48]; 4961 4962 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 4963 verbose(env, "variable %s access var_off=%s disallowed\n", 4964 reg_type_str(env, reg->type), tn_buf); 4965 return -EACCES; 4966 } 4967 4968 return 0; 4969 } 4970 4971 int check_ptr_off_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4972 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno) 4973 { 4974 return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, false); 4975 } 4976 4977 static int map_kptr_match_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4978 struct btf_field *kptr_field, 4979 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno) 4980 { 4981 const char *targ_name = btf_type_name(kptr_field->kptr.btf, kptr_field->kptr.btf_id); 4982 int perm_flags = PTR_MAYBE_NULL | PTR_TRUSTED | MEM_RCU; 4983 const char *reg_name = ""; 4984 4985 /* Only unreferenced case accepts untrusted pointers */ 4986 if (kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_UNREF) 4987 perm_flags |= PTR_UNTRUSTED; 4988 4989 if (base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID || (type_flag(reg->type) & ~perm_flags)) 4990 goto bad_type; 4991 4992 if (!btf_is_kernel(reg->btf)) { 4993 verbose(env, "R%d must point to kernel BTF\n", regno); 4994 return -EINVAL; 4995 } 4996 /* We need to verify reg->type and reg->btf, before accessing reg->btf */ 4997 reg_name = btf_type_name(reg->btf, reg->btf_id); 4998 4999 /* For ref_ptr case, release function check should ensure we get one 5000 * referenced PTR_TO_BTF_ID, and that its fixed offset is 0. For the 5001 * normal store of unreferenced kptr, we must ensure var_off is zero. 5002 * Since ref_ptr cannot be accessed directly by BPF insns, checks for 5003 * reg->off and reg->ref_obj_id are not needed here. 5004 */ 5005 if (__check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, true)) 5006 return -EACCES; 5007 5008 /* A full type match is needed, as BTF can be vmlinux or module BTF, and 5009 * we also need to take into account the reg->off. 5010 * 5011 * We want to support cases like: 5012 * 5013 * struct foo { 5014 * struct bar br; 5015 * struct baz bz; 5016 * }; 5017 * 5018 * struct foo *v; 5019 * v = func(); // PTR_TO_BTF_ID 5020 * val->foo = v; // reg->off is zero, btf and btf_id match type 5021 * val->bar = &v->br; // reg->off is still zero, but we need to retry with 5022 * // first member type of struct after comparison fails 5023 * val->baz = &v->bz; // reg->off is non-zero, so struct needs to be walked 5024 * // to match type 5025 * 5026 * In the kptr_ref case, check_func_arg_reg_off already ensures reg->off 5027 * is zero. We must also ensure that btf_struct_ids_match does not walk 5028 * the struct to match type against first member of struct, i.e. reject 5029 * second case from above. Hence, when type is BPF_KPTR_REF, we set 5030 * strict mode to true for type match. 5031 */ 5032 if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg->btf, reg->btf_id, reg->off, 5033 kptr_field->kptr.btf, kptr_field->kptr.btf_id, 5034 kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_REF)) 5035 goto bad_type; 5036 return 0; 5037 bad_type: 5038 verbose(env, "invalid kptr access, R%d type=%s%s ", regno, 5039 reg_type_str(env, reg->type), reg_name); 5040 verbose(env, "expected=%s%s", reg_type_str(env, PTR_TO_BTF_ID), targ_name); 5041 if (kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_UNREF) 5042 verbose(env, " or %s%s\n", reg_type_str(env, PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED), 5043 targ_name); 5044 else 5045 verbose(env, "\n"); 5046 return -EINVAL; 5047 } 5048 5049 /* The non-sleepable programs and sleepable programs with explicit bpf_rcu_read_lock() 5050 * can dereference RCU protected pointers and result is PTR_TRUSTED. 5051 */ 5052 static bool in_rcu_cs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 5053 { 5054 return env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock || !env->prog->aux->sleepable; 5055 } 5056 5057 /* Once GCC supports btf_type_tag the following mechanism will be replaced with tag check */ 5058 BTF_SET_START(rcu_protected_types) 5059 BTF_ID(struct, prog_test_ref_kfunc) 5060 BTF_ID(struct, cgroup) 5061 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_cpumask) 5062 BTF_ID(struct, task_struct) 5063 BTF_SET_END(rcu_protected_types) 5064 5065 static bool rcu_protected_object(const struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id) 5066 { 5067 if (!btf_is_kernel(btf)) 5068 return false; 5069 return btf_id_set_contains(&rcu_protected_types, btf_id); 5070 } 5071 5072 static bool rcu_safe_kptr(const struct btf_field *field) 5073 { 5074 const struct btf_field_kptr *kptr = &field->kptr; 5075 5076 return field->type == BPF_KPTR_REF && rcu_protected_object(kptr->btf, kptr->btf_id); 5077 } 5078 5079 static int check_map_kptr_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 5080 int value_regno, int insn_idx, 5081 struct btf_field *kptr_field) 5082 { 5083 struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx]; 5084 int class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); 5085 struct bpf_reg_state *val_reg; 5086 5087 /* Things we already checked for in check_map_access and caller: 5088 * - Reject cases where variable offset may touch kptr 5089 * - size of access (must be BPF_DW) 5090 * - tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) 5091 * - kptr_field->offset == off + reg->var_off.value 5092 */ 5093 /* Only BPF_[LDX,STX,ST] | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW is supported */ 5094 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) { 5095 verbose(env, "kptr in map can only be accessed using BPF_MEM instruction mode\n"); 5096 return -EACCES; 5097 } 5098 5099 /* We only allow loading referenced kptr, since it will be marked as 5100 * untrusted, similar to unreferenced kptr. 5101 */ 5102 if (class != BPF_LDX && kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_REF) { 5103 verbose(env, "store to referenced kptr disallowed\n"); 5104 return -EACCES; 5105 } 5106 5107 if (class == BPF_LDX) { 5108 val_reg = reg_state(env, value_regno); 5109 /* We can simply mark the value_regno receiving the pointer 5110 * value from map as PTR_TO_BTF_ID, with the correct type. 5111 */ 5112 mark_btf_ld_reg(env, cur_regs(env), value_regno, PTR_TO_BTF_ID, kptr_field->kptr.btf, 5113 kptr_field->kptr.btf_id, 5114 rcu_safe_kptr(kptr_field) && in_rcu_cs(env) ? 5115 PTR_MAYBE_NULL | MEM_RCU : 5116 PTR_MAYBE_NULL | PTR_UNTRUSTED); 5117 /* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg */ 5118 val_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 5119 } else if (class == BPF_STX) { 5120 val_reg = reg_state(env, value_regno); 5121 if (!register_is_null(val_reg) && 5122 map_kptr_match_type(env, kptr_field, val_reg, value_regno)) 5123 return -EACCES; 5124 } else if (class == BPF_ST) { 5125 if (insn->imm) { 5126 verbose(env, "BPF_ST imm must be 0 when storing to kptr at off=%u\n", 5127 kptr_field->offset); 5128 return -EACCES; 5129 } 5130 } else { 5131 verbose(env, "kptr in map can only be accessed using BPF_LDX/BPF_STX/BPF_ST\n"); 5132 return -EACCES; 5133 } 5134 return 0; 5135 } 5136 5137 /* check read/write into a map element with possible variable offset */ 5138 static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 5139 int off, int size, bool zero_size_allowed, 5140 enum bpf_access_src src) 5141 { 5142 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 5143 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 5144 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno]; 5145 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 5146 struct btf_record *rec; 5147 int err, i; 5148 5149 err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size, map->value_size, 5150 zero_size_allowed); 5151 if (err) 5152 return err; 5153 5154 if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(map->record)) 5155 return 0; 5156 rec = map->record; 5157 for (i = 0; i < rec->cnt; i++) { 5158 struct btf_field *field = &rec->fields[i]; 5159 u32 p = field->offset; 5160 5161 /* If any part of a field can be touched by load/store, reject 5162 * this program. To check that [x1, x2) overlaps with [y1, y2), 5163 * it is sufficient to check x1 < y2 && y1 < x2. 5164 */ 5165 if (reg->smin_value + off < p + btf_field_type_size(field->type) && 5166 p < reg->umax_value + off + size) { 5167 switch (field->type) { 5168 case BPF_KPTR_UNREF: 5169 case BPF_KPTR_REF: 5170 if (src != ACCESS_DIRECT) { 5171 verbose(env, "kptr cannot be accessed indirectly by helper\n"); 5172 return -EACCES; 5173 } 5174 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 5175 verbose(env, "kptr access cannot have variable offset\n"); 5176 return -EACCES; 5177 } 5178 if (p != off + reg->var_off.value) { 5179 verbose(env, "kptr access misaligned expected=%u off=%llu\n", 5180 p, off + reg->var_off.value); 5181 return -EACCES; 5182 } 5183 if (size != bpf_size_to_bytes(BPF_DW)) { 5184 verbose(env, "kptr access size must be BPF_DW\n"); 5185 return -EACCES; 5186 } 5187 break; 5188 default: 5189 verbose(env, "%s cannot be accessed directly by load/store\n", 5190 btf_field_type_name(field->type)); 5191 return -EACCES; 5192 } 5193 } 5194 } 5195 return 0; 5196 } 5197 5198 #define MAX_PACKET_OFF 0xffff 5199 5200 static bool may_access_direct_pkt_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5201 const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 5202 enum bpf_access_type t) 5203 { 5204 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 5205 5206 switch (prog_type) { 5207 /* Program types only with direct read access go here! */ 5208 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN: 5209 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_OUT: 5210 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_SEG6LOCAL: 5211 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT: 5212 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR: 5213 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB: 5214 if (t == BPF_WRITE) 5215 return false; 5216 fallthrough; 5217 5218 /* Program types with direct read + write access go here! */ 5219 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: 5220 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT: 5221 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP: 5222 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT: 5223 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_SKB: 5224 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_MSG: 5225 if (meta) 5226 return meta->pkt_access; 5227 5228 env->seen_direct_write = true; 5229 return true; 5230 5231 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT: 5232 if (t == BPF_WRITE) 5233 env->seen_direct_write = true; 5234 5235 return true; 5236 5237 default: 5238 return false; 5239 } 5240 } 5241 5242 static int check_packet_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off, 5243 int size, bool zero_size_allowed) 5244 { 5245 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 5246 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; 5247 int err; 5248 5249 /* We may have added a variable offset to the packet pointer; but any 5250 * reg->range we have comes after that. We are only checking the fixed 5251 * offset. 5252 */ 5253 5254 /* We don't allow negative numbers, because we aren't tracking enough 5255 * detail to prove they're safe. 5256 */ 5257 if (reg->smin_value < 0) { 5258 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", 5259 regno); 5260 return -EACCES; 5261 } 5262 5263 err = reg->range < 0 ? -EINVAL : 5264 __check_mem_access(env, regno, off, size, reg->range, 5265 zero_size_allowed); 5266 if (err) { 5267 verbose(env, "R%d offset is outside of the packet\n", regno); 5268 return err; 5269 } 5270 5271 /* __check_mem_access has made sure "off + size - 1" is within u16. 5272 * reg->umax_value can't be bigger than MAX_PACKET_OFF which is 0xffff, 5273 * otherwise find_good_pkt_pointers would have refused to set range info 5274 * that __check_mem_access would have rejected this pkt access. 5275 * Therefore, "off + reg->umax_value + size - 1" won't overflow u32. 5276 */ 5277 env->prog->aux->max_pkt_offset = 5278 max_t(u32, env->prog->aux->max_pkt_offset, 5279 off + reg->umax_value + size - 1); 5280 5281 return err; 5282 } 5283 5284 /* check access to 'struct bpf_context' fields. Supports fixed offsets only */ 5285 static int check_ctx_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, int off, int size, 5286 enum bpf_access_type t, enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type, 5287 struct btf **btf, u32 *btf_id) 5288 { 5289 struct bpf_insn_access_aux info = { 5290 .reg_type = *reg_type, 5291 .log = &env->log, 5292 }; 5293 5294 if (env->ops->is_valid_access && 5295 env->ops->is_valid_access(off, size, t, env->prog, &info)) { 5296 /* A non zero info.ctx_field_size indicates that this field is a 5297 * candidate for later verifier transformation to load the whole 5298 * field and then apply a mask when accessed with a narrower 5299 * access than actual ctx access size. A zero info.ctx_field_size 5300 * will only allow for whole field access and rejects any other 5301 * type of narrower access. 5302 */ 5303 *reg_type = info.reg_type; 5304 5305 if (base_type(*reg_type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 5306 *btf = info.btf; 5307 *btf_id = info.btf_id; 5308 } else { 5309 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ctx_field_size = info.ctx_field_size; 5310 } 5311 /* remember the offset of last byte accessed in ctx */ 5312 if (env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset < off + size) 5313 env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset = off + size; 5314 return 0; 5315 } 5316 5317 verbose(env, "invalid bpf_context access off=%d size=%d\n", off, size); 5318 return -EACCES; 5319 } 5320 5321 static int check_flow_keys_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off, 5322 int size) 5323 { 5324 if (size < 0 || off < 0 || 5325 (u64)off + size > sizeof(struct bpf_flow_keys)) { 5326 verbose(env, "invalid access to flow keys off=%d size=%d\n", 5327 off, size); 5328 return -EACCES; 5329 } 5330 return 0; 5331 } 5332 5333 static int check_sock_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, 5334 u32 regno, int off, int size, 5335 enum bpf_access_type t) 5336 { 5337 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 5338 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; 5339 struct bpf_insn_access_aux info = {}; 5340 bool valid; 5341 5342 if (reg->smin_value < 0) { 5343 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", 5344 regno); 5345 return -EACCES; 5346 } 5347 5348 switch (reg->type) { 5349 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 5350 valid = bpf_sock_common_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); 5351 break; 5352 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 5353 valid = bpf_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); 5354 break; 5355 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 5356 valid = bpf_tcp_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); 5357 break; 5358 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 5359 valid = bpf_xdp_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); 5360 break; 5361 default: 5362 valid = false; 5363 } 5364 5365 5366 if (valid) { 5367 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ctx_field_size = 5368 info.ctx_field_size; 5369 return 0; 5370 } 5371 5372 verbose(env, "R%d invalid %s access off=%d size=%d\n", 5373 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type), off, size); 5374 5375 return -EACCES; 5376 } 5377 5378 static bool is_pointer_value(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 5379 { 5380 return __is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, reg_state(env, regno)); 5381 } 5382 5383 static bool is_ctx_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 5384 { 5385 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 5386 5387 return reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX; 5388 } 5389 5390 static bool is_sk_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 5391 { 5392 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 5393 5394 return type_is_sk_pointer(reg->type); 5395 } 5396 5397 static bool is_pkt_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 5398 { 5399 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 5400 5401 return type_is_pkt_pointer(reg->type); 5402 } 5403 5404 static bool is_flow_key_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 5405 { 5406 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 5407 5408 /* Separate to is_ctx_reg() since we still want to allow BPF_ST here. */ 5409 return reg->type == PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS; 5410 } 5411 5412 static bool is_trusted_reg(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 5413 { 5414 /* A referenced register is always trusted. */ 5415 if (reg->ref_obj_id) 5416 return true; 5417 5418 /* If a register is not referenced, it is trusted if it has the 5419 * MEM_ALLOC or PTR_TRUSTED type modifiers, and no others. Some of the 5420 * other type modifiers may be safe, but we elect to take an opt-in 5421 * approach here as some (e.g. PTR_UNTRUSTED and PTR_MAYBE_NULL) are 5422 * not. 5423 * 5424 * Eventually, we should make PTR_TRUSTED the single source of truth 5425 * for whether a register is trusted. 5426 */ 5427 return type_flag(reg->type) & BPF_REG_TRUSTED_MODIFIERS && 5428 !bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg->type); 5429 } 5430 5431 static bool is_rcu_reg(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 5432 { 5433 return reg->type & MEM_RCU; 5434 } 5435 5436 static void clear_trusted_flags(enum bpf_type_flag *flag) 5437 { 5438 *flag &= ~(BPF_REG_TRUSTED_MODIFIERS | MEM_RCU); 5439 } 5440 5441 static int check_pkt_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5442 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 5443 int off, int size, bool strict) 5444 { 5445 struct tnum reg_off; 5446 int ip_align; 5447 5448 /* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */ 5449 if (!strict || size == 1) 5450 return 0; 5451 5452 /* For platforms that do not have a Kconfig enabling 5453 * CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS the value of 5454 * NET_IP_ALIGN is universally set to '2'. And on platforms 5455 * that do set CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS, we get 5456 * to this code only in strict mode where we want to emulate 5457 * the NET_IP_ALIGN==2 checking. Therefore use an 5458 * unconditional IP align value of '2'. 5459 */ 5460 ip_align = 2; 5461 5462 reg_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, tnum_const(ip_align + reg->off + off)); 5463 if (!tnum_is_aligned(reg_off, size)) { 5464 char tn_buf[48]; 5465 5466 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 5467 verbose(env, 5468 "misaligned packet access off %d+%s+%d+%d size %d\n", 5469 ip_align, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size); 5470 return -EACCES; 5471 } 5472 5473 return 0; 5474 } 5475 5476 static int check_generic_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5477 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 5478 const char *pointer_desc, 5479 int off, int size, bool strict) 5480 { 5481 struct tnum reg_off; 5482 5483 /* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */ 5484 if (!strict || size == 1) 5485 return 0; 5486 5487 reg_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, tnum_const(reg->off + off)); 5488 if (!tnum_is_aligned(reg_off, size)) { 5489 char tn_buf[48]; 5490 5491 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 5492 verbose(env, "misaligned %saccess off %s+%d+%d size %d\n", 5493 pointer_desc, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size); 5494 return -EACCES; 5495 } 5496 5497 return 0; 5498 } 5499 5500 static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5501 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int off, 5502 int size, bool strict_alignment_once) 5503 { 5504 bool strict = env->strict_alignment || strict_alignment_once; 5505 const char *pointer_desc = ""; 5506 5507 switch (reg->type) { 5508 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 5509 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 5510 /* Special case, because of NET_IP_ALIGN. Given metadata sits 5511 * right in front, treat it the very same way. 5512 */ 5513 return check_pkt_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size, strict); 5514 case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS: 5515 pointer_desc = "flow keys "; 5516 break; 5517 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 5518 pointer_desc = "key "; 5519 break; 5520 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 5521 pointer_desc = "value "; 5522 break; 5523 case PTR_TO_CTX: 5524 pointer_desc = "context "; 5525 break; 5526 case PTR_TO_STACK: 5527 pointer_desc = "stack "; 5528 /* The stack spill tracking logic in check_stack_write_fixed_off() 5529 * and check_stack_read_fixed_off() relies on stack accesses being 5530 * aligned. 5531 */ 5532 strict = true; 5533 break; 5534 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 5535 pointer_desc = "sock "; 5536 break; 5537 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 5538 pointer_desc = "sock_common "; 5539 break; 5540 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 5541 pointer_desc = "tcp_sock "; 5542 break; 5543 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 5544 pointer_desc = "xdp_sock "; 5545 break; 5546 default: 5547 break; 5548 } 5549 return check_generic_ptr_alignment(env, reg, pointer_desc, off, size, 5550 strict); 5551 } 5552 5553 static int update_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5554 const struct bpf_func_state *func, 5555 int off) 5556 { 5557 u16 stack = env->subprog_info[func->subprogno].stack_depth; 5558 5559 if (stack >= -off) 5560 return 0; 5561 5562 /* update known max for given subprogram */ 5563 env->subprog_info[func->subprogno].stack_depth = -off; 5564 return 0; 5565 } 5566 5567 /* starting from main bpf function walk all instructions of the function 5568 * and recursively walk all callees that given function can call. 5569 * Ignore jump and exit insns. 5570 * Since recursion is prevented by check_cfg() this algorithm 5571 * only needs a local stack of MAX_CALL_FRAMES to remember callsites 5572 */ 5573 static int check_max_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 5574 { 5575 int depth = 0, frame = 0, idx = 0, i = 0, subprog_end; 5576 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info; 5577 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 5578 bool tail_call_reachable = false; 5579 int ret_insn[MAX_CALL_FRAMES]; 5580 int ret_prog[MAX_CALL_FRAMES]; 5581 int j; 5582 5583 process_func: 5584 /* protect against potential stack overflow that might happen when 5585 * bpf2bpf calls get combined with tailcalls. Limit the caller's stack 5586 * depth for such case down to 256 so that the worst case scenario 5587 * would result in 8k stack size (32 which is tailcall limit * 256 = 5588 * 8k). 5589 * 5590 * To get the idea what might happen, see an example: 5591 * func1 -> sub rsp, 128 5592 * subfunc1 -> sub rsp, 256 5593 * tailcall1 -> add rsp, 256 5594 * func2 -> sub rsp, 192 (total stack size = 128 + 192 = 320) 5595 * subfunc2 -> sub rsp, 64 5596 * subfunc22 -> sub rsp, 128 5597 * tailcall2 -> add rsp, 128 5598 * func3 -> sub rsp, 32 (total stack size 128 + 192 + 64 + 32 = 416) 5599 * 5600 * tailcall will unwind the current stack frame but it will not get rid 5601 * of caller's stack as shown on the example above. 5602 */ 5603 if (idx && subprog[idx].has_tail_call && depth >= 256) { 5604 verbose(env, 5605 "tail_calls are not allowed when call stack of previous frames is %d bytes. Too large\n", 5606 depth); 5607 return -EACCES; 5608 } 5609 /* round up to 32-bytes, since this is granularity 5610 * of interpreter stack size 5611 */ 5612 depth += round_up(max_t(u32, subprog[idx].stack_depth, 1), 32); 5613 if (depth > MAX_BPF_STACK) { 5614 verbose(env, "combined stack size of %d calls is %d. Too large\n", 5615 frame + 1, depth); 5616 return -EACCES; 5617 } 5618 continue_func: 5619 subprog_end = subprog[idx + 1].start; 5620 for (; i < subprog_end; i++) { 5621 int next_insn; 5622 5623 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn + i) && !bpf_pseudo_func(insn + i)) 5624 continue; 5625 /* remember insn and function to return to */ 5626 ret_insn[frame] = i + 1; 5627 ret_prog[frame] = idx; 5628 5629 /* find the callee */ 5630 next_insn = i + insn[i].imm + 1; 5631 idx = find_subprog(env, next_insn); 5632 if (idx < 0) { 5633 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", 5634 next_insn); 5635 return -EFAULT; 5636 } 5637 if (subprog[idx].is_async_cb) { 5638 if (subprog[idx].has_tail_call) { 5639 verbose(env, "verifier bug. subprog has tail_call and async cb\n"); 5640 return -EFAULT; 5641 } 5642 /* async callbacks don't increase bpf prog stack size */ 5643 continue; 5644 } 5645 i = next_insn; 5646 5647 if (subprog[idx].has_tail_call) 5648 tail_call_reachable = true; 5649 5650 frame++; 5651 if (frame >= MAX_CALL_FRAMES) { 5652 verbose(env, "the call stack of %d frames is too deep !\n", 5653 frame); 5654 return -E2BIG; 5655 } 5656 goto process_func; 5657 } 5658 /* if tail call got detected across bpf2bpf calls then mark each of the 5659 * currently present subprog frames as tail call reachable subprogs; 5660 * this info will be utilized by JIT so that we will be preserving the 5661 * tail call counter throughout bpf2bpf calls combined with tailcalls 5662 */ 5663 if (tail_call_reachable) 5664 for (j = 0; j < frame; j++) 5665 subprog[ret_prog[j]].tail_call_reachable = true; 5666 if (subprog[0].tail_call_reachable) 5667 env->prog->aux->tail_call_reachable = true; 5668 5669 /* end of for() loop means the last insn of the 'subprog' 5670 * was reached. Doesn't matter whether it was JA or EXIT 5671 */ 5672 if (frame == 0) 5673 return 0; 5674 depth -= round_up(max_t(u32, subprog[idx].stack_depth, 1), 32); 5675 frame--; 5676 i = ret_insn[frame]; 5677 idx = ret_prog[frame]; 5678 goto continue_func; 5679 } 5680 5681 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON 5682 static int get_callee_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5683 const struct bpf_insn *insn, int idx) 5684 { 5685 int start = idx + insn->imm + 1, subprog; 5686 5687 subprog = find_subprog(env, start); 5688 if (subprog < 0) { 5689 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", 5690 start); 5691 return -EFAULT; 5692 } 5693 return env->subprog_info[subprog].stack_depth; 5694 } 5695 #endif 5696 5697 static int __check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5698 const char *buf_info, 5699 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 5700 int regno, int off, int size) 5701 { 5702 if (off < 0) { 5703 verbose(env, 5704 "R%d invalid %s buffer access: off=%d, size=%d\n", 5705 regno, buf_info, off, size); 5706 return -EACCES; 5707 } 5708 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) { 5709 char tn_buf[48]; 5710 5711 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 5712 verbose(env, 5713 "R%d invalid variable buffer offset: off=%d, var_off=%s\n", 5714 regno, off, tn_buf); 5715 return -EACCES; 5716 } 5717 5718 return 0; 5719 } 5720 5721 static int check_tp_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5722 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 5723 int regno, int off, int size) 5724 { 5725 int err; 5726 5727 err = __check_buffer_access(env, "tracepoint", reg, regno, off, size); 5728 if (err) 5729 return err; 5730 5731 if (off + size > env->prog->aux->max_tp_access) 5732 env->prog->aux->max_tp_access = off + size; 5733 5734 return 0; 5735 } 5736 5737 static int check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5738 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 5739 int regno, int off, int size, 5740 bool zero_size_allowed, 5741 u32 *max_access) 5742 { 5743 const char *buf_info = type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type) ? "rdonly" : "rdwr"; 5744 int err; 5745 5746 err = __check_buffer_access(env, buf_info, reg, regno, off, size); 5747 if (err) 5748 return err; 5749 5750 if (off + size > *max_access) 5751 *max_access = off + size; 5752 5753 return 0; 5754 } 5755 5756 /* BPF architecture zero extends alu32 ops into 64-bit registesr */ 5757 static void zext_32_to_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 5758 { 5759 reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off); 5760 __reg_assign_32_into_64(reg); 5761 } 5762 5763 /* truncate register to smaller size (in bytes) 5764 * must be called with size < BPF_REG_SIZE 5765 */ 5766 static void coerce_reg_to_size(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size) 5767 { 5768 u64 mask; 5769 5770 /* clear high bits in bit representation */ 5771 reg->var_off = tnum_cast(reg->var_off, size); 5772 5773 /* fix arithmetic bounds */ 5774 mask = ((u64)1 << (size * 8)) - 1; 5775 if ((reg->umin_value & ~mask) == (reg->umax_value & ~mask)) { 5776 reg->umin_value &= mask; 5777 reg->umax_value &= mask; 5778 } else { 5779 reg->umin_value = 0; 5780 reg->umax_value = mask; 5781 } 5782 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value; 5783 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value; 5784 5785 /* If size is smaller than 32bit register the 32bit register 5786 * values are also truncated so we push 64-bit bounds into 5787 * 32-bit bounds. Above were truncated < 32-bits already. 5788 */ 5789 if (size >= 4) 5790 return; 5791 __reg_combine_64_into_32(reg); 5792 } 5793 5794 static bool bpf_map_is_rdonly(const struct bpf_map *map) 5795 { 5796 /* A map is considered read-only if the following condition are true: 5797 * 5798 * 1) BPF program side cannot change any of the map content. The 5799 * BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG flag is throughout the lifetime of a map 5800 * and was set at map creation time. 5801 * 2) The map value(s) have been initialized from user space by a 5802 * loader and then "frozen", such that no new map update/delete 5803 * operations from syscall side are possible for the rest of 5804 * the map's lifetime from that point onwards. 5805 * 3) Any parallel/pending map update/delete operations from syscall 5806 * side have been completed. Only after that point, it's safe to 5807 * assume that map value(s) are immutable. 5808 */ 5809 return (map->map_flags & BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG) && 5810 READ_ONCE(map->frozen) && 5811 !bpf_map_write_active(map); 5812 } 5813 5814 static int bpf_map_direct_read(struct bpf_map *map, int off, int size, u64 *val) 5815 { 5816 void *ptr; 5817 u64 addr; 5818 int err; 5819 5820 err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &addr, off); 5821 if (err) 5822 return err; 5823 ptr = (void *)(long)addr + off; 5824 5825 switch (size) { 5826 case sizeof(u8): 5827 *val = (u64)*(u8 *)ptr; 5828 break; 5829 case sizeof(u16): 5830 *val = (u64)*(u16 *)ptr; 5831 break; 5832 case sizeof(u32): 5833 *val = (u64)*(u32 *)ptr; 5834 break; 5835 case sizeof(u64): 5836 *val = *(u64 *)ptr; 5837 break; 5838 default: 5839 return -EINVAL; 5840 } 5841 return 0; 5842 } 5843 5844 #define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(__type) __PASTE(__type, __safe_rcu) 5845 #define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(__type) __PASTE(__type, __safe_rcu_or_null) 5846 #define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(__type) __PASTE(__type, __safe_trusted) 5847 5848 /* 5849 * Allow list few fields as RCU trusted or full trusted. 5850 * This logic doesn't allow mix tagging and will be removed once GCC supports 5851 * btf_type_tag. 5852 */ 5853 5854 /* RCU trusted: these fields are trusted in RCU CS and never NULL */ 5855 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct task_struct) { 5856 const cpumask_t *cpus_ptr; 5857 struct css_set __rcu *cgroups; 5858 struct task_struct __rcu *real_parent; 5859 struct task_struct *group_leader; 5860 }; 5861 5862 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct cgroup) { 5863 /* cgrp->kn is always accessible as documented in kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c */ 5864 struct kernfs_node *kn; 5865 }; 5866 5867 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct css_set) { 5868 struct cgroup *dfl_cgrp; 5869 }; 5870 5871 /* RCU trusted: these fields are trusted in RCU CS and can be NULL */ 5872 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct mm_struct) { 5873 struct file __rcu *exe_file; 5874 }; 5875 5876 /* skb->sk, req->sk are not RCU protected, but we mark them as such 5877 * because bpf prog accessible sockets are SOCK_RCU_FREE. 5878 */ 5879 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct sk_buff) { 5880 struct sock *sk; 5881 }; 5882 5883 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct request_sock) { 5884 struct sock *sk; 5885 }; 5886 5887 /* full trusted: these fields are trusted even outside of RCU CS and never NULL */ 5888 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct bpf_iter_meta) { 5889 struct seq_file *seq; 5890 }; 5891 5892 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct bpf_iter__task) { 5893 struct bpf_iter_meta *meta; 5894 struct task_struct *task; 5895 }; 5896 5897 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct linux_binprm) { 5898 struct file *file; 5899 }; 5900 5901 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct file) { 5902 struct inode *f_inode; 5903 }; 5904 5905 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct dentry) { 5906 /* no negative dentry-s in places where bpf can see it */ 5907 struct inode *d_inode; 5908 }; 5909 5910 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct socket) { 5911 struct sock *sk; 5912 }; 5913 5914 static bool type_is_rcu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5915 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 5916 const char *field_name, u32 btf_id) 5917 { 5918 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct task_struct)); 5919 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct cgroup)); 5920 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct css_set)); 5921 5922 return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, field_name, btf_id, "__safe_rcu"); 5923 } 5924 5925 static bool type_is_rcu_or_null(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5926 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 5927 const char *field_name, u32 btf_id) 5928 { 5929 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct mm_struct)); 5930 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct sk_buff)); 5931 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct request_sock)); 5932 5933 return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, field_name, btf_id, "__safe_rcu_or_null"); 5934 } 5935 5936 static bool type_is_trusted(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5937 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 5938 const char *field_name, u32 btf_id) 5939 { 5940 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct bpf_iter_meta)); 5941 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct bpf_iter__task)); 5942 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct linux_binprm)); 5943 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct file)); 5944 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct dentry)); 5945 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct socket)); 5946 5947 return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, field_name, btf_id, "__safe_trusted"); 5948 } 5949 5950 static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5951 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, 5952 int regno, int off, int size, 5953 enum bpf_access_type atype, 5954 int value_regno) 5955 { 5956 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; 5957 const struct btf_type *t = btf_type_by_id(reg->btf, reg->btf_id); 5958 const char *tname = btf_name_by_offset(reg->btf, t->name_off); 5959 const char *field_name = NULL; 5960 enum bpf_type_flag flag = 0; 5961 u32 btf_id = 0; 5962 int ret; 5963 5964 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) { 5965 verbose(env, 5966 "'struct %s' access is allowed only to CAP_PERFMON and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n", 5967 tname); 5968 return -EPERM; 5969 } 5970 if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible && btf_is_kernel(reg->btf)) { 5971 verbose(env, 5972 "Cannot access kernel 'struct %s' from non-GPL compatible program\n", 5973 tname); 5974 return -EINVAL; 5975 } 5976 if (off < 0) { 5977 verbose(env, 5978 "R%d is ptr_%s invalid negative access: off=%d\n", 5979 regno, tname, off); 5980 return -EACCES; 5981 } 5982 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) { 5983 char tn_buf[48]; 5984 5985 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 5986 verbose(env, 5987 "R%d is ptr_%s invalid variable offset: off=%d, var_off=%s\n", 5988 regno, tname, off, tn_buf); 5989 return -EACCES; 5990 } 5991 5992 if (reg->type & MEM_USER) { 5993 verbose(env, 5994 "R%d is ptr_%s access user memory: off=%d\n", 5995 regno, tname, off); 5996 return -EACCES; 5997 } 5998 5999 if (reg->type & MEM_PERCPU) { 6000 verbose(env, 6001 "R%d is ptr_%s access percpu memory: off=%d\n", 6002 regno, tname, off); 6003 return -EACCES; 6004 } 6005 6006 if (env->ops->btf_struct_access && !type_is_alloc(reg->type) && atype == BPF_WRITE) { 6007 if (!btf_is_kernel(reg->btf)) { 6008 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: reg->btf must be kernel btf\n"); 6009 return -EFAULT; 6010 } 6011 ret = env->ops->btf_struct_access(&env->log, reg, off, size); 6012 } else { 6013 /* Writes are permitted with default btf_struct_access for 6014 * program allocated objects (which always have ref_obj_id > 0), 6015 * but not for untrusted PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC. 6016 */ 6017 if (atype != BPF_READ && !type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(reg->type)) { 6018 verbose(env, "only read is supported\n"); 6019 return -EACCES; 6020 } 6021 6022 if (type_is_alloc(reg->type) && !type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type) && 6023 !reg->ref_obj_id) { 6024 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: ref_obj_id for allocated object must be non-zero\n"); 6025 return -EFAULT; 6026 } 6027 6028 ret = btf_struct_access(&env->log, reg, off, size, atype, &btf_id, &flag, &field_name); 6029 } 6030 6031 if (ret < 0) 6032 return ret; 6033 6034 if (ret != PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 6035 /* just mark; */ 6036 6037 } else if (type_flag(reg->type) & PTR_UNTRUSTED) { 6038 /* If this is an untrusted pointer, all pointers formed by walking it 6039 * also inherit the untrusted flag. 6040 */ 6041 flag = PTR_UNTRUSTED; 6042 6043 } else if (is_trusted_reg(reg) || is_rcu_reg(reg)) { 6044 /* By default any pointer obtained from walking a trusted pointer is no 6045 * longer trusted, unless the field being accessed has explicitly been 6046 * marked as inheriting its parent's state of trust (either full or RCU). 6047 * For example: 6048 * 'cgroups' pointer is untrusted if task->cgroups dereference 6049 * happened in a sleepable program outside of bpf_rcu_read_lock() 6050 * section. In a non-sleepable program it's trusted while in RCU CS (aka MEM_RCU). 6051 * Note bpf_rcu_read_unlock() converts MEM_RCU pointers to PTR_UNTRUSTED. 6052 * 6053 * A regular RCU-protected pointer with __rcu tag can also be deemed 6054 * trusted if we are in an RCU CS. Such pointer can be NULL. 6055 */ 6056 if (type_is_trusted(env, reg, field_name, btf_id)) { 6057 flag |= PTR_TRUSTED; 6058 } else if (in_rcu_cs(env) && !type_may_be_null(reg->type)) { 6059 if (type_is_rcu(env, reg, field_name, btf_id)) { 6060 /* ignore __rcu tag and mark it MEM_RCU */ 6061 flag |= MEM_RCU; 6062 } else if (flag & MEM_RCU || 6063 type_is_rcu_or_null(env, reg, field_name, btf_id)) { 6064 /* __rcu tagged pointers can be NULL */ 6065 flag |= MEM_RCU | PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 6066 } else if (flag & (MEM_PERCPU | MEM_USER)) { 6067 /* keep as-is */ 6068 } else { 6069 /* walking unknown pointers yields old deprecated PTR_TO_BTF_ID */ 6070 clear_trusted_flags(&flag); 6071 } 6072 } else { 6073 /* 6074 * If not in RCU CS or MEM_RCU pointer can be NULL then 6075 * aggressively mark as untrusted otherwise such 6076 * pointers will be plain PTR_TO_BTF_ID without flags 6077 * and will be allowed to be passed into helpers for 6078 * compat reasons. 6079 */ 6080 flag = PTR_UNTRUSTED; 6081 } 6082 } else { 6083 /* Old compat. Deprecated */ 6084 clear_trusted_flags(&flag); 6085 } 6086 6087 if (atype == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 6088 mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, reg->btf, btf_id, flag); 6089 6090 return 0; 6091 } 6092 6093 static int check_ptr_to_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6094 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, 6095 int regno, int off, int size, 6096 enum bpf_access_type atype, 6097 int value_regno) 6098 { 6099 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; 6100 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 6101 struct bpf_reg_state map_reg; 6102 enum bpf_type_flag flag = 0; 6103 const struct btf_type *t; 6104 const char *tname; 6105 u32 btf_id; 6106 int ret; 6107 6108 if (!btf_vmlinux) { 6109 verbose(env, "map_ptr access not supported without CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF\n"); 6110 return -ENOTSUPP; 6111 } 6112 6113 if (!map->ops->map_btf_id || !*map->ops->map_btf_id) { 6114 verbose(env, "map_ptr access not supported for map type %d\n", 6115 map->map_type); 6116 return -ENOTSUPP; 6117 } 6118 6119 t = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, *map->ops->map_btf_id); 6120 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, t->name_off); 6121 6122 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) { 6123 verbose(env, 6124 "'struct %s' access is allowed only to CAP_PERFMON and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n", 6125 tname); 6126 return -EPERM; 6127 } 6128 6129 if (off < 0) { 6130 verbose(env, "R%d is %s invalid negative access: off=%d\n", 6131 regno, tname, off); 6132 return -EACCES; 6133 } 6134 6135 if (atype != BPF_READ) { 6136 verbose(env, "only read from %s is supported\n", tname); 6137 return -EACCES; 6138 } 6139 6140 /* Simulate access to a PTR_TO_BTF_ID */ 6141 memset(&map_reg, 0, sizeof(map_reg)); 6142 mark_btf_ld_reg(env, &map_reg, 0, PTR_TO_BTF_ID, btf_vmlinux, *map->ops->map_btf_id, 0); 6143 ret = btf_struct_access(&env->log, &map_reg, off, size, atype, &btf_id, &flag, NULL); 6144 if (ret < 0) 6145 return ret; 6146 6147 if (value_regno >= 0) 6148 mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, btf_vmlinux, btf_id, flag); 6149 6150 return 0; 6151 } 6152 6153 /* Check that the stack access at the given offset is within bounds. The 6154 * maximum valid offset is -1. 6155 * 6156 * The minimum valid offset is -MAX_BPF_STACK for writes, and 6157 * -state->allocated_stack for reads. 6158 */ 6159 static int check_stack_slot_within_bounds(int off, 6160 struct bpf_func_state *state, 6161 enum bpf_access_type t) 6162 { 6163 int min_valid_off; 6164 6165 if (t == BPF_WRITE) 6166 min_valid_off = -MAX_BPF_STACK; 6167 else 6168 min_valid_off = -state->allocated_stack; 6169 6170 if (off < min_valid_off || off > -1) 6171 return -EACCES; 6172 return 0; 6173 } 6174 6175 /* Check that the stack access at 'regno + off' falls within the maximum stack 6176 * bounds. 6177 * 6178 * 'off' includes `regno->offset`, but not its dynamic part (if any). 6179 */ 6180 static int check_stack_access_within_bounds( 6181 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6182 int regno, int off, int access_size, 6183 enum bpf_access_src src, enum bpf_access_type type) 6184 { 6185 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 6186 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; 6187 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 6188 int min_off, max_off; 6189 int err; 6190 char *err_extra; 6191 6192 if (src == ACCESS_HELPER) 6193 /* We don't know if helpers are reading or writing (or both). */ 6194 err_extra = " indirect access to"; 6195 else if (type == BPF_READ) 6196 err_extra = " read from"; 6197 else 6198 err_extra = " write to"; 6199 6200 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 6201 min_off = reg->var_off.value + off; 6202 if (access_size > 0) 6203 max_off = min_off + access_size - 1; 6204 else 6205 max_off = min_off; 6206 } else { 6207 if (reg->smax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || 6208 reg->smin_value <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 6209 verbose(env, "invalid unbounded variable-offset%s stack R%d\n", 6210 err_extra, regno); 6211 return -EACCES; 6212 } 6213 min_off = reg->smin_value + off; 6214 if (access_size > 0) 6215 max_off = reg->smax_value + off + access_size - 1; 6216 else 6217 max_off = min_off; 6218 } 6219 6220 err = check_stack_slot_within_bounds(min_off, state, type); 6221 if (!err) 6222 err = check_stack_slot_within_bounds(max_off, state, type); 6223 6224 if (err) { 6225 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 6226 verbose(env, "invalid%s stack R%d off=%d size=%d\n", 6227 err_extra, regno, off, access_size); 6228 } else { 6229 char tn_buf[48]; 6230 6231 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 6232 verbose(env, "invalid variable-offset%s stack R%d var_off=%s size=%d\n", 6233 err_extra, regno, tn_buf, access_size); 6234 } 6235 } 6236 return err; 6237 } 6238 6239 /* check whether memory at (regno + off) is accessible for t = (read | write) 6240 * if t==write, value_regno is a register which value is stored into memory 6241 * if t==read, value_regno is a register which will receive the value from memory 6242 * if t==write && value_regno==-1, some unknown value is stored into memory 6243 * if t==read && value_regno==-1, don't care what we read from memory 6244 */ 6245 static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regno, 6246 int off, int bpf_size, enum bpf_access_type t, 6247 int value_regno, bool strict_alignment_once) 6248 { 6249 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 6250 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; 6251 struct bpf_func_state *state; 6252 int size, err = 0; 6253 6254 size = bpf_size_to_bytes(bpf_size); 6255 if (size < 0) 6256 return size; 6257 6258 /* alignment checks will add in reg->off themselves */ 6259 err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size, strict_alignment_once); 6260 if (err) 6261 return err; 6262 6263 /* for access checks, reg->off is just part of off */ 6264 off += reg->off; 6265 6266 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY) { 6267 if (t == BPF_WRITE) { 6268 verbose(env, "write to change key R%d not allowed\n", regno); 6269 return -EACCES; 6270 } 6271 6272 err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size, 6273 reg->map_ptr->key_size, false); 6274 if (err) 6275 return err; 6276 if (value_regno >= 0) 6277 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 6278 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 6279 struct btf_field *kptr_field = NULL; 6280 6281 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 6282 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 6283 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into map\n", value_regno); 6284 return -EACCES; 6285 } 6286 err = check_map_access_type(env, regno, off, size, t); 6287 if (err) 6288 return err; 6289 err = check_map_access(env, regno, off, size, false, ACCESS_DIRECT); 6290 if (err) 6291 return err; 6292 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 6293 kptr_field = btf_record_find(reg->map_ptr->record, 6294 off + reg->var_off.value, BPF_KPTR); 6295 if (kptr_field) { 6296 err = check_map_kptr_access(env, regno, value_regno, insn_idx, kptr_field); 6297 } else if (t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) { 6298 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 6299 6300 /* if map is read-only, track its contents as scalars */ 6301 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) && 6302 bpf_map_is_rdonly(map) && 6303 map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) { 6304 int map_off = off + reg->var_off.value; 6305 u64 val = 0; 6306 6307 err = bpf_map_direct_read(map, map_off, size, 6308 &val); 6309 if (err) 6310 return err; 6311 6312 regs[value_regno].type = SCALAR_VALUE; 6313 __mark_reg_known(®s[value_regno], val); 6314 } else { 6315 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 6316 } 6317 } 6318 } else if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_MEM) { 6319 bool rdonly_mem = type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type); 6320 6321 if (type_may_be_null(reg->type)) { 6322 verbose(env, "R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n", regno, 6323 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 6324 return -EACCES; 6325 } 6326 6327 if (t == BPF_WRITE && rdonly_mem) { 6328 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", 6329 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 6330 return -EACCES; 6331 } 6332 6333 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 6334 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 6335 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", value_regno); 6336 return -EACCES; 6337 } 6338 6339 err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size, 6340 reg->mem_size, false); 6341 if (!err && value_regno >= 0 && (t == BPF_READ || rdonly_mem)) 6342 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 6343 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX) { 6344 enum bpf_reg_type reg_type = SCALAR_VALUE; 6345 struct btf *btf = NULL; 6346 u32 btf_id = 0; 6347 6348 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 6349 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 6350 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into ctx\n", value_regno); 6351 return -EACCES; 6352 } 6353 6354 err = check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno); 6355 if (err < 0) 6356 return err; 6357 6358 err = check_ctx_access(env, insn_idx, off, size, t, ®_type, &btf, 6359 &btf_id); 6360 if (err) 6361 verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; "); 6362 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) { 6363 /* ctx access returns either a scalar, or a 6364 * PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END]. In the latter 6365 * case, we know the offset is zero. 6366 */ 6367 if (reg_type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 6368 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 6369 } else { 6370 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, 6371 value_regno); 6372 if (type_may_be_null(reg_type)) 6373 regs[value_regno].id = ++env->id_gen; 6374 /* A load of ctx field could have different 6375 * actual load size with the one encoded in the 6376 * insn. When the dst is PTR, it is for sure not 6377 * a sub-register. 6378 */ 6379 regs[value_regno].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 6380 if (base_type(reg_type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 6381 regs[value_regno].btf = btf; 6382 regs[value_regno].btf_id = btf_id; 6383 } 6384 } 6385 regs[value_regno].type = reg_type; 6386 } 6387 6388 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 6389 /* Basic bounds checks. */ 6390 err = check_stack_access_within_bounds(env, regno, off, size, ACCESS_DIRECT, t); 6391 if (err) 6392 return err; 6393 6394 state = func(env, reg); 6395 err = update_stack_depth(env, state, off); 6396 if (err) 6397 return err; 6398 6399 if (t == BPF_READ) 6400 err = check_stack_read(env, regno, off, size, 6401 value_regno); 6402 else 6403 err = check_stack_write(env, regno, off, size, 6404 value_regno, insn_idx); 6405 } else if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg)) { 6406 if (t == BPF_WRITE && !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, t)) { 6407 verbose(env, "cannot write into packet\n"); 6408 return -EACCES; 6409 } 6410 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 6411 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 6412 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into packet\n", 6413 value_regno); 6414 return -EACCES; 6415 } 6416 err = check_packet_access(env, regno, off, size, false); 6417 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 6418 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 6419 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS) { 6420 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 6421 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 6422 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into flow keys\n", 6423 value_regno); 6424 return -EACCES; 6425 } 6426 6427 err = check_flow_keys_access(env, off, size); 6428 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 6429 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 6430 } else if (type_is_sk_pointer(reg->type)) { 6431 if (t == BPF_WRITE) { 6432 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", 6433 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 6434 return -EACCES; 6435 } 6436 err = check_sock_access(env, insn_idx, regno, off, size, t); 6437 if (!err && value_regno >= 0) 6438 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 6439 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER) { 6440 err = check_tp_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, off, size); 6441 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 6442 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 6443 } else if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID && 6444 !type_may_be_null(reg->type)) { 6445 err = check_ptr_to_btf_access(env, regs, regno, off, size, t, 6446 value_regno); 6447 } else if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP) { 6448 err = check_ptr_to_map_access(env, regs, regno, off, size, t, 6449 value_regno); 6450 } else if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BUF) { 6451 bool rdonly_mem = type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type); 6452 u32 *max_access; 6453 6454 if (rdonly_mem) { 6455 if (t == BPF_WRITE) { 6456 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", 6457 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 6458 return -EACCES; 6459 } 6460 max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdonly_access; 6461 } else { 6462 max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdwr_access; 6463 } 6464 6465 err = check_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, off, size, false, 6466 max_access); 6467 6468 if (!err && value_regno >= 0 && (rdonly_mem || t == BPF_READ)) 6469 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 6470 } else { 6471 verbose(env, "R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n", regno, 6472 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 6473 return -EACCES; 6474 } 6475 6476 if (!err && size < BPF_REG_SIZE && value_regno >= 0 && t == BPF_READ && 6477 regs[value_regno].type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 6478 /* b/h/w load zero-extends, mark upper bits as known 0 */ 6479 coerce_reg_to_size(®s[value_regno], size); 6480 } 6481 return err; 6482 } 6483 6484 static int check_atomic(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_insn *insn) 6485 { 6486 int load_reg; 6487 int err; 6488 6489 switch (insn->imm) { 6490 case BPF_ADD: 6491 case BPF_ADD | BPF_FETCH: 6492 case BPF_AND: 6493 case BPF_AND | BPF_FETCH: 6494 case BPF_OR: 6495 case BPF_OR | BPF_FETCH: 6496 case BPF_XOR: 6497 case BPF_XOR | BPF_FETCH: 6498 case BPF_XCHG: 6499 case BPF_CMPXCHG: 6500 break; 6501 default: 6502 verbose(env, "BPF_ATOMIC uses invalid atomic opcode %02x\n", insn->imm); 6503 return -EINVAL; 6504 } 6505 6506 if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_W && BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) { 6507 verbose(env, "invalid atomic operand size\n"); 6508 return -EINVAL; 6509 } 6510 6511 /* check src1 operand */ 6512 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 6513 if (err) 6514 return err; 6515 6516 /* check src2 operand */ 6517 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 6518 if (err) 6519 return err; 6520 6521 if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG) { 6522 /* Check comparison of R0 with memory location */ 6523 const u32 aux_reg = BPF_REG_0; 6524 6525 err = check_reg_arg(env, aux_reg, SRC_OP); 6526 if (err) 6527 return err; 6528 6529 if (is_pointer_value(env, aux_reg)) { 6530 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", aux_reg); 6531 return -EACCES; 6532 } 6533 } 6534 6535 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { 6536 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", insn->src_reg); 6537 return -EACCES; 6538 } 6539 6540 if (is_ctx_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) || 6541 is_pkt_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) || 6542 is_flow_key_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) || 6543 is_sk_reg(env, insn->dst_reg)) { 6544 verbose(env, "BPF_ATOMIC stores into R%d %s is not allowed\n", 6545 insn->dst_reg, 6546 reg_type_str(env, reg_state(env, insn->dst_reg)->type)); 6547 return -EACCES; 6548 } 6549 6550 if (insn->imm & BPF_FETCH) { 6551 if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG) 6552 load_reg = BPF_REG_0; 6553 else 6554 load_reg = insn->src_reg; 6555 6556 /* check and record load of old value */ 6557 err = check_reg_arg(env, load_reg, DST_OP); 6558 if (err) 6559 return err; 6560 } else { 6561 /* This instruction accesses a memory location but doesn't 6562 * actually load it into a register. 6563 */ 6564 load_reg = -1; 6565 } 6566 6567 /* Check whether we can read the memory, with second call for fetch 6568 * case to simulate the register fill. 6569 */ 6570 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, 6571 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, -1, true); 6572 if (!err && load_reg >= 0) 6573 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, 6574 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, load_reg, 6575 true); 6576 if (err) 6577 return err; 6578 6579 /* Check whether we can write into the same memory. */ 6580 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, 6581 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1, true); 6582 if (err) 6583 return err; 6584 6585 return 0; 6586 } 6587 6588 /* When register 'regno' is used to read the stack (either directly or through 6589 * a helper function) make sure that it's within stack boundary and, depending 6590 * on the access type, that all elements of the stack are initialized. 6591 * 6592 * 'off' includes 'regno->off', but not its dynamic part (if any). 6593 * 6594 * All registers that have been spilled on the stack in the slots within the 6595 * read offsets are marked as read. 6596 */ 6597 static int check_stack_range_initialized( 6598 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int off, 6599 int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed, 6600 enum bpf_access_src type, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 6601 { 6602 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 6603 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 6604 int err, min_off, max_off, i, j, slot, spi; 6605 char *err_extra = type == ACCESS_HELPER ? " indirect" : ""; 6606 enum bpf_access_type bounds_check_type; 6607 /* Some accesses can write anything into the stack, others are 6608 * read-only. 6609 */ 6610 bool clobber = false; 6611 6612 if (access_size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed) { 6613 verbose(env, "invalid zero-sized read\n"); 6614 return -EACCES; 6615 } 6616 6617 if (type == ACCESS_HELPER) { 6618 /* The bounds checks for writes are more permissive than for 6619 * reads. However, if raw_mode is not set, we'll do extra 6620 * checks below. 6621 */ 6622 bounds_check_type = BPF_WRITE; 6623 clobber = true; 6624 } else { 6625 bounds_check_type = BPF_READ; 6626 } 6627 err = check_stack_access_within_bounds(env, regno, off, access_size, 6628 type, bounds_check_type); 6629 if (err) 6630 return err; 6631 6632 6633 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 6634 min_off = max_off = reg->var_off.value + off; 6635 } else { 6636 /* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for 6637 * simplicity since it requires corresponding support in 6638 * Spectre masking for stack ALU. 6639 * See also retrieve_ptr_limit(). 6640 */ 6641 if (!env->bypass_spec_v1) { 6642 char tn_buf[48]; 6643 6644 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 6645 verbose(env, "R%d%s variable offset stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n", 6646 regno, err_extra, tn_buf); 6647 return -EACCES; 6648 } 6649 /* Only initialized buffer on stack is allowed to be accessed 6650 * with variable offset. With uninitialized buffer it's hard to 6651 * guarantee that whole memory is marked as initialized on 6652 * helper return since specific bounds are unknown what may 6653 * cause uninitialized stack leaking. 6654 */ 6655 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) 6656 meta = NULL; 6657 6658 min_off = reg->smin_value + off; 6659 max_off = reg->smax_value + off; 6660 } 6661 6662 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) { 6663 /* Ensure we won't be overwriting dynptrs when simulating byte 6664 * by byte access in check_helper_call using meta.access_size. 6665 * This would be a problem if we have a helper in the future 6666 * which takes: 6667 * 6668 * helper(uninit_mem, len, dynptr) 6669 * 6670 * Now, uninint_mem may overlap with dynptr pointer. Hence, it 6671 * may end up writing to dynptr itself when touching memory from 6672 * arg 1. This can be relaxed on a case by case basis for known 6673 * safe cases, but reject due to the possibilitiy of aliasing by 6674 * default. 6675 */ 6676 for (i = min_off; i < max_off + access_size; i++) { 6677 int stack_off = -i - 1; 6678 6679 spi = __get_spi(i); 6680 /* raw_mode may write past allocated_stack */ 6681 if (state->allocated_stack <= stack_off) 6682 continue; 6683 if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[stack_off % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_DYNPTR) { 6684 verbose(env, "potential write to dynptr at off=%d disallowed\n", i); 6685 return -EACCES; 6686 } 6687 } 6688 meta->access_size = access_size; 6689 meta->regno = regno; 6690 return 0; 6691 } 6692 6693 for (i = min_off; i < max_off + access_size; i++) { 6694 u8 *stype; 6695 6696 slot = -i - 1; 6697 spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; 6698 if (state->allocated_stack <= slot) 6699 goto err; 6700 stype = &state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE]; 6701 if (*stype == STACK_MISC) 6702 goto mark; 6703 if ((*stype == STACK_ZERO) || 6704 (*stype == STACK_INVALID && env->allow_uninit_stack)) { 6705 if (clobber) { 6706 /* helper can write anything into the stack */ 6707 *stype = STACK_MISC; 6708 } 6709 goto mark; 6710 } 6711 6712 if (is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[spi]) && 6713 (state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type == SCALAR_VALUE || 6714 env->allow_ptr_leaks)) { 6715 if (clobber) { 6716 __mark_reg_unknown(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr); 6717 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 6718 scrub_spilled_slot(&state->stack[spi].slot_type[j]); 6719 } 6720 goto mark; 6721 } 6722 6723 err: 6724 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 6725 verbose(env, "invalid%s read from stack R%d off %d+%d size %d\n", 6726 err_extra, regno, min_off, i - min_off, access_size); 6727 } else { 6728 char tn_buf[48]; 6729 6730 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 6731 verbose(env, "invalid%s read from stack R%d var_off %s+%d size %d\n", 6732 err_extra, regno, tn_buf, i - min_off, access_size); 6733 } 6734 return -EACCES; 6735 mark: 6736 /* reading any byte out of 8-byte 'spill_slot' will cause 6737 * the whole slot to be marked as 'read' 6738 */ 6739 mark_reg_read(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, 6740 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.parent, 6741 REG_LIVE_READ64); 6742 /* We do not set REG_LIVE_WRITTEN for stack slot, as we can not 6743 * be sure that whether stack slot is written to or not. Hence, 6744 * we must still conservatively propagate reads upwards even if 6745 * helper may write to the entire memory range. 6746 */ 6747 } 6748 return update_stack_depth(env, state, min_off); 6749 } 6750 6751 static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 6752 int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed, 6753 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 6754 { 6755 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 6756 u32 *max_access; 6757 6758 switch (base_type(reg->type)) { 6759 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 6760 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 6761 return check_packet_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, 6762 zero_size_allowed); 6763 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 6764 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) { 6765 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", regno, 6766 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 6767 return -EACCES; 6768 } 6769 return check_mem_region_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, 6770 reg->map_ptr->key_size, false); 6771 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 6772 if (check_map_access_type(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, 6773 meta && meta->raw_mode ? BPF_WRITE : 6774 BPF_READ)) 6775 return -EACCES; 6776 return check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, 6777 zero_size_allowed, ACCESS_HELPER); 6778 case PTR_TO_MEM: 6779 if (type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type)) { 6780 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) { 6781 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", regno, 6782 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 6783 return -EACCES; 6784 } 6785 } 6786 return check_mem_region_access(env, regno, reg->off, 6787 access_size, reg->mem_size, 6788 zero_size_allowed); 6789 case PTR_TO_BUF: 6790 if (type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type)) { 6791 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) { 6792 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", regno, 6793 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 6794 return -EACCES; 6795 } 6796 6797 max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdonly_access; 6798 } else { 6799 max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdwr_access; 6800 } 6801 return check_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, reg->off, 6802 access_size, zero_size_allowed, 6803 max_access); 6804 case PTR_TO_STACK: 6805 return check_stack_range_initialized( 6806 env, 6807 regno, reg->off, access_size, 6808 zero_size_allowed, ACCESS_HELPER, meta); 6809 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 6810 return check_ptr_to_btf_access(env, regs, regno, reg->off, 6811 access_size, BPF_READ, -1); 6812 case PTR_TO_CTX: 6813 /* in case the function doesn't know how to access the context, 6814 * (because we are in a program of type SYSCALL for example), we 6815 * can not statically check its size. 6816 * Dynamically check it now. 6817 */ 6818 if (!env->ops->convert_ctx_access) { 6819 enum bpf_access_type atype = meta && meta->raw_mode ? BPF_WRITE : BPF_READ; 6820 int offset = access_size - 1; 6821 6822 /* Allow zero-byte read from PTR_TO_CTX */ 6823 if (access_size == 0) 6824 return zero_size_allowed ? 0 : -EACCES; 6825 6826 return check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, regno, offset, BPF_B, 6827 atype, -1, false); 6828 } 6829 6830 fallthrough; 6831 default: /* scalar_value or invalid ptr */ 6832 /* Allow zero-byte read from NULL, regardless of pointer type */ 6833 if (zero_size_allowed && access_size == 0 && 6834 register_is_null(reg)) 6835 return 0; 6836 6837 verbose(env, "R%d type=%s ", regno, 6838 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 6839 verbose(env, "expected=%s\n", reg_type_str(env, PTR_TO_STACK)); 6840 return -EACCES; 6841 } 6842 } 6843 6844 static int check_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6845 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 6846 bool zero_size_allowed, 6847 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 6848 { 6849 int err; 6850 6851 /* This is used to refine r0 return value bounds for helpers 6852 * that enforce this value as an upper bound on return values. 6853 * See do_refine_retval_range() for helpers that can refine 6854 * the return value. C type of helper is u32 so we pull register 6855 * bound from umax_value however, if negative verifier errors 6856 * out. Only upper bounds can be learned because retval is an 6857 * int type and negative retvals are allowed. 6858 */ 6859 meta->msize_max_value = reg->umax_value; 6860 6861 /* The register is SCALAR_VALUE; the access check 6862 * happens using its boundaries. 6863 */ 6864 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 6865 /* For unprivileged variable accesses, disable raw 6866 * mode so that the program is required to 6867 * initialize all the memory that the helper could 6868 * just partially fill up. 6869 */ 6870 meta = NULL; 6871 6872 if (reg->smin_value < 0) { 6873 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned or 'var &= const'\n", 6874 regno); 6875 return -EACCES; 6876 } 6877 6878 if (reg->umin_value == 0) { 6879 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1, 0, 6880 zero_size_allowed, 6881 meta); 6882 if (err) 6883 return err; 6884 } 6885 6886 if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ) { 6887 verbose(env, "R%d unbounded memory access, use 'var &= const' or 'if (var < const)'\n", 6888 regno); 6889 return -EACCES; 6890 } 6891 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1, 6892 reg->umax_value, 6893 zero_size_allowed, meta); 6894 if (!err) 6895 err = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); 6896 return err; 6897 } 6898 6899 int check_mem_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 6900 u32 regno, u32 mem_size) 6901 { 6902 bool may_be_null = type_may_be_null(reg->type); 6903 struct bpf_reg_state saved_reg; 6904 struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta; 6905 int err; 6906 6907 if (register_is_null(reg)) 6908 return 0; 6909 6910 memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta)); 6911 /* Assuming that the register contains a value check if the memory 6912 * access is safe. Temporarily save and restore the register's state as 6913 * the conversion shouldn't be visible to a caller. 6914 */ 6915 if (may_be_null) { 6916 saved_reg = *reg; 6917 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(reg); 6918 } 6919 6920 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, mem_size, true, &meta); 6921 /* Check access for BPF_WRITE */ 6922 meta.raw_mode = true; 6923 err = err ?: check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, mem_size, true, &meta); 6924 6925 if (may_be_null) 6926 *reg = saved_reg; 6927 6928 return err; 6929 } 6930 6931 static int check_kfunc_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 6932 u32 regno) 6933 { 6934 struct bpf_reg_state *mem_reg = &cur_regs(env)[regno - 1]; 6935 bool may_be_null = type_may_be_null(mem_reg->type); 6936 struct bpf_reg_state saved_reg; 6937 struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta; 6938 int err; 6939 6940 WARN_ON_ONCE(regno < BPF_REG_2 || regno > BPF_REG_5); 6941 6942 memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta)); 6943 6944 if (may_be_null) { 6945 saved_reg = *mem_reg; 6946 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(mem_reg); 6947 } 6948 6949 err = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, true, &meta); 6950 /* Check access for BPF_WRITE */ 6951 meta.raw_mode = true; 6952 err = err ?: check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, true, &meta); 6953 6954 if (may_be_null) 6955 *mem_reg = saved_reg; 6956 return err; 6957 } 6958 6959 /* Implementation details: 6960 * bpf_map_lookup returns PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL. 6961 * bpf_obj_new returns PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_MAYBE_NULL. 6962 * Two bpf_map_lookups (even with the same key) will have different reg->id. 6963 * Two separate bpf_obj_new will also have different reg->id. 6964 * For traditional PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE or PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC, the verifier 6965 * clears reg->id after value_or_null->value transition, since the verifier only 6966 * cares about the range of access to valid map value pointer and doesn't care 6967 * about actual address of the map element. 6968 * For maps with 'struct bpf_spin_lock' inside map value the verifier keeps 6969 * reg->id > 0 after value_or_null->value transition. By doing so 6970 * two bpf_map_lookups will be considered two different pointers that 6971 * point to different bpf_spin_locks. Likewise for pointers to allocated objects 6972 * returned from bpf_obj_new. 6973 * The verifier allows taking only one bpf_spin_lock at a time to avoid 6974 * dead-locks. 6975 * Since only one bpf_spin_lock is allowed the checks are simpler than 6976 * reg_is_refcounted() logic. The verifier needs to remember only 6977 * one spin_lock instead of array of acquired_refs. 6978 * cur_state->active_lock remembers which map value element or allocated 6979 * object got locked and clears it after bpf_spin_unlock. 6980 */ 6981 static int process_spin_lock(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 6982 bool is_lock) 6983 { 6984 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 6985 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 6986 bool is_const = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 6987 u64 val = reg->var_off.value; 6988 struct bpf_map *map = NULL; 6989 struct btf *btf = NULL; 6990 struct btf_record *rec; 6991 6992 if (!is_const) { 6993 verbose(env, 6994 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. bpf_spin_lock has to be at the constant offset\n", 6995 regno); 6996 return -EINVAL; 6997 } 6998 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 6999 map = reg->map_ptr; 7000 if (!map->btf) { 7001 verbose(env, 7002 "map '%s' has to have BTF in order to use bpf_spin_lock\n", 7003 map->name); 7004 return -EINVAL; 7005 } 7006 } else { 7007 btf = reg->btf; 7008 } 7009 7010 rec = reg_btf_record(reg); 7011 if (!btf_record_has_field(rec, BPF_SPIN_LOCK)) { 7012 verbose(env, "%s '%s' has no valid bpf_spin_lock\n", map ? "map" : "local", 7013 map ? map->name : "kptr"); 7014 return -EINVAL; 7015 } 7016 if (rec->spin_lock_off != val + reg->off) { 7017 verbose(env, "off %lld doesn't point to 'struct bpf_spin_lock' that is at %d\n", 7018 val + reg->off, rec->spin_lock_off); 7019 return -EINVAL; 7020 } 7021 if (is_lock) { 7022 if (cur->active_lock.ptr) { 7023 verbose(env, 7024 "Locking two bpf_spin_locks are not allowed\n"); 7025 return -EINVAL; 7026 } 7027 if (map) 7028 cur->active_lock.ptr = map; 7029 else 7030 cur->active_lock.ptr = btf; 7031 cur->active_lock.id = reg->id; 7032 } else { 7033 void *ptr; 7034 7035 if (map) 7036 ptr = map; 7037 else 7038 ptr = btf; 7039 7040 if (!cur->active_lock.ptr) { 7041 verbose(env, "bpf_spin_unlock without taking a lock\n"); 7042 return -EINVAL; 7043 } 7044 if (cur->active_lock.ptr != ptr || 7045 cur->active_lock.id != reg->id) { 7046 verbose(env, "bpf_spin_unlock of different lock\n"); 7047 return -EINVAL; 7048 } 7049 7050 invalidate_non_owning_refs(env); 7051 7052 cur->active_lock.ptr = NULL; 7053 cur->active_lock.id = 0; 7054 } 7055 return 0; 7056 } 7057 7058 static int process_timer_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 7059 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 7060 { 7061 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 7062 bool is_const = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 7063 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 7064 u64 val = reg->var_off.value; 7065 7066 if (!is_const) { 7067 verbose(env, 7068 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. bpf_timer has to be at the constant offset\n", 7069 regno); 7070 return -EINVAL; 7071 } 7072 if (!map->btf) { 7073 verbose(env, "map '%s' has to have BTF in order to use bpf_timer\n", 7074 map->name); 7075 return -EINVAL; 7076 } 7077 if (!btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_TIMER)) { 7078 verbose(env, "map '%s' has no valid bpf_timer\n", map->name); 7079 return -EINVAL; 7080 } 7081 if (map->record->timer_off != val + reg->off) { 7082 verbose(env, "off %lld doesn't point to 'struct bpf_timer' that is at %d\n", 7083 val + reg->off, map->record->timer_off); 7084 return -EINVAL; 7085 } 7086 if (meta->map_ptr) { 7087 verbose(env, "verifier bug. Two map pointers in a timer helper\n"); 7088 return -EFAULT; 7089 } 7090 meta->map_uid = reg->map_uid; 7091 meta->map_ptr = map; 7092 return 0; 7093 } 7094 7095 static int process_kptr_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 7096 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 7097 { 7098 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 7099 struct bpf_map *map_ptr = reg->map_ptr; 7100 struct btf_field *kptr_field; 7101 u32 kptr_off; 7102 7103 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 7104 verbose(env, 7105 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. kptr has to be at the constant offset\n", 7106 regno); 7107 return -EINVAL; 7108 } 7109 if (!map_ptr->btf) { 7110 verbose(env, "map '%s' has to have BTF in order to use bpf_kptr_xchg\n", 7111 map_ptr->name); 7112 return -EINVAL; 7113 } 7114 if (!btf_record_has_field(map_ptr->record, BPF_KPTR)) { 7115 verbose(env, "map '%s' has no valid kptr\n", map_ptr->name); 7116 return -EINVAL; 7117 } 7118 7119 meta->map_ptr = map_ptr; 7120 kptr_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; 7121 kptr_field = btf_record_find(map_ptr->record, kptr_off, BPF_KPTR); 7122 if (!kptr_field) { 7123 verbose(env, "off=%d doesn't point to kptr\n", kptr_off); 7124 return -EACCES; 7125 } 7126 if (kptr_field->type != BPF_KPTR_REF) { 7127 verbose(env, "off=%d kptr isn't referenced kptr\n", kptr_off); 7128 return -EACCES; 7129 } 7130 meta->kptr_field = kptr_field; 7131 return 0; 7132 } 7133 7134 /* There are two register types representing a bpf_dynptr, one is PTR_TO_STACK 7135 * which points to a stack slot, and the other is CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR. 7136 * 7137 * In both cases we deal with the first 8 bytes, but need to mark the next 8 7138 * bytes as STACK_DYNPTR in case of PTR_TO_STACK. In case of 7139 * CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, we are guaranteed to get the beginning of the object. 7140 * 7141 * Mutability of bpf_dynptr is at two levels, one is at the level of struct 7142 * bpf_dynptr itself, i.e. whether the helper is receiving a pointer to struct 7143 * bpf_dynptr or pointer to const struct bpf_dynptr. In the former case, it can 7144 * mutate the view of the dynptr and also possibly destroy it. In the latter 7145 * case, it cannot mutate the bpf_dynptr itself but it can still mutate the 7146 * memory that dynptr points to. 7147 * 7148 * The verifier will keep track both levels of mutation (bpf_dynptr's in 7149 * reg->type and the memory's in reg->dynptr.type), but there is no support for 7150 * readonly dynptr view yet, hence only the first case is tracked and checked. 7151 * 7152 * This is consistent with how C applies the const modifier to a struct object, 7153 * where the pointer itself inside bpf_dynptr becomes const but not what it 7154 * points to. 7155 * 7156 * Helpers which do not mutate the bpf_dynptr set MEM_RDONLY in their argument 7157 * type, and declare it as 'const struct bpf_dynptr *' in their prototype. 7158 */ 7159 static int process_dynptr_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int insn_idx, 7160 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type, int clone_ref_obj_id) 7161 { 7162 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 7163 int err; 7164 7165 /* MEM_UNINIT and MEM_RDONLY are exclusive, when applied to an 7166 * ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR (or ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR | DYNPTR_TYPE_*): 7167 */ 7168 if ((arg_type & (MEM_UNINIT | MEM_RDONLY)) == (MEM_UNINIT | MEM_RDONLY)) { 7169 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: misconfigured dynptr helper type flags\n"); 7170 return -EFAULT; 7171 } 7172 7173 /* MEM_UNINIT - Points to memory that is an appropriate candidate for 7174 * constructing a mutable bpf_dynptr object. 7175 * 7176 * Currently, this is only possible with PTR_TO_STACK 7177 * pointing to a region of at least 16 bytes which doesn't 7178 * contain an existing bpf_dynptr. 7179 * 7180 * MEM_RDONLY - Points to a initialized bpf_dynptr that will not be 7181 * mutated or destroyed. However, the memory it points to 7182 * may be mutated. 7183 * 7184 * None - Points to a initialized dynptr that can be mutated and 7185 * destroyed, including mutation of the memory it points 7186 * to. 7187 */ 7188 if (arg_type & MEM_UNINIT) { 7189 int i; 7190 7191 if (!is_dynptr_reg_valid_uninit(env, reg)) { 7192 verbose(env, "Dynptr has to be an uninitialized dynptr\n"); 7193 return -EINVAL; 7194 } 7195 7196 /* we write BPF_DW bits (8 bytes) at a time */ 7197 for (i = 0; i < BPF_DYNPTR_SIZE; i += 8) { 7198 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, regno, 7199 i, BPF_DW, BPF_WRITE, -1, false); 7200 if (err) 7201 return err; 7202 } 7203 7204 err = mark_stack_slots_dynptr(env, reg, arg_type, insn_idx, clone_ref_obj_id); 7205 } else /* MEM_RDONLY and None case from above */ { 7206 /* For the reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK case, bpf_dynptr is never const */ 7207 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR && !(arg_type & MEM_RDONLY)) { 7208 verbose(env, "cannot pass pointer to const bpf_dynptr, the helper mutates it\n"); 7209 return -EINVAL; 7210 } 7211 7212 if (!is_dynptr_reg_valid_init(env, reg)) { 7213 verbose(env, 7214 "Expected an initialized dynptr as arg #%d\n", 7215 regno); 7216 return -EINVAL; 7217 } 7218 7219 /* Fold modifiers (in this case, MEM_RDONLY) when checking expected type */ 7220 if (!is_dynptr_type_expected(env, reg, arg_type & ~MEM_RDONLY)) { 7221 verbose(env, 7222 "Expected a dynptr of type %s as arg #%d\n", 7223 dynptr_type_str(arg_to_dynptr_type(arg_type)), regno); 7224 return -EINVAL; 7225 } 7226 7227 err = mark_dynptr_read(env, reg); 7228 } 7229 return err; 7230 } 7231 7232 static u32 iter_ref_obj_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int spi) 7233 { 7234 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 7235 7236 return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id; 7237 } 7238 7239 static bool is_iter_kfunc(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 7240 { 7241 return meta->kfunc_flags & (KF_ITER_NEW | KF_ITER_NEXT | KF_ITER_DESTROY); 7242 } 7243 7244 static bool is_iter_new_kfunc(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 7245 { 7246 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_ITER_NEW; 7247 } 7248 7249 static bool is_iter_next_kfunc(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 7250 { 7251 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_ITER_NEXT; 7252 } 7253 7254 static bool is_iter_destroy_kfunc(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 7255 { 7256 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_ITER_DESTROY; 7257 } 7258 7259 static bool is_kfunc_arg_iter(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, int arg) 7260 { 7261 /* btf_check_iter_kfuncs() guarantees that first argument of any iter 7262 * kfunc is iter state pointer 7263 */ 7264 return arg == 0 && is_iter_kfunc(meta); 7265 } 7266 7267 static int process_iter_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int insn_idx, 7268 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 7269 { 7270 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 7271 const struct btf_type *t; 7272 const struct btf_param *arg; 7273 int spi, err, i, nr_slots; 7274 u32 btf_id; 7275 7276 /* btf_check_iter_kfuncs() ensures we don't need to validate anything here */ 7277 arg = &btf_params(meta->func_proto)[0]; 7278 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(meta->btf, arg->type, NULL); /* PTR */ 7279 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(meta->btf, t->type, &btf_id); /* STRUCT */ 7280 nr_slots = t->size / BPF_REG_SIZE; 7281 7282 if (is_iter_new_kfunc(meta)) { 7283 /* bpf_iter_<type>_new() expects pointer to uninit iter state */ 7284 if (!is_iter_reg_valid_uninit(env, reg, nr_slots)) { 7285 verbose(env, "expected uninitialized iter_%s as arg #%d\n", 7286 iter_type_str(meta->btf, btf_id), regno); 7287 return -EINVAL; 7288 } 7289 7290 for (i = 0; i < nr_slots * 8; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) { 7291 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, regno, 7292 i, BPF_DW, BPF_WRITE, -1, false); 7293 if (err) 7294 return err; 7295 } 7296 7297 err = mark_stack_slots_iter(env, reg, insn_idx, meta->btf, btf_id, nr_slots); 7298 if (err) 7299 return err; 7300 } else { 7301 /* iter_next() or iter_destroy() expect initialized iter state*/ 7302 if (!is_iter_reg_valid_init(env, reg, meta->btf, btf_id, nr_slots)) { 7303 verbose(env, "expected an initialized iter_%s as arg #%d\n", 7304 iter_type_str(meta->btf, btf_id), regno); 7305 return -EINVAL; 7306 } 7307 7308 spi = iter_get_spi(env, reg, nr_slots); 7309 if (spi < 0) 7310 return spi; 7311 7312 err = mark_iter_read(env, reg, spi, nr_slots); 7313 if (err) 7314 return err; 7315 7316 /* remember meta->iter info for process_iter_next_call() */ 7317 meta->iter.spi = spi; 7318 meta->iter.frameno = reg->frameno; 7319 meta->ref_obj_id = iter_ref_obj_id(env, reg, spi); 7320 7321 if (is_iter_destroy_kfunc(meta)) { 7322 err = unmark_stack_slots_iter(env, reg, nr_slots); 7323 if (err) 7324 return err; 7325 } 7326 } 7327 7328 return 0; 7329 } 7330 7331 /* process_iter_next_call() is called when verifier gets to iterator's next 7332 * "method" (e.g., bpf_iter_num_next() for numbers iterator) call. We'll refer 7333 * to it as just "iter_next()" in comments below. 7334 * 7335 * BPF verifier relies on a crucial contract for any iter_next() 7336 * implementation: it should *eventually* return NULL, and once that happens 7337 * it should keep returning NULL. That is, once iterator exhausts elements to 7338 * iterate, it should never reset or spuriously return new elements. 7339 * 7340 * With the assumption of such contract, process_iter_next_call() simulates 7341 * a fork in the verifier state to validate loop logic correctness and safety 7342 * without having to simulate infinite amount of iterations. 7343 * 7344 * In current state, we first assume that iter_next() returned NULL and 7345 * iterator state is set to DRAINED (BPF_ITER_STATE_DRAINED). In such 7346 * conditions we should not form an infinite loop and should eventually reach 7347 * exit. 7348 * 7349 * Besides that, we also fork current state and enqueue it for later 7350 * verification. In a forked state we keep iterator state as ACTIVE 7351 * (BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE) and assume non-NULL return from iter_next(). We 7352 * also bump iteration depth to prevent erroneous infinite loop detection 7353 * later on (see iter_active_depths_differ() comment for details). In this 7354 * state we assume that we'll eventually loop back to another iter_next() 7355 * calls (it could be in exactly same location or in some other instruction, 7356 * it doesn't matter, we don't make any unnecessary assumptions about this, 7357 * everything revolves around iterator state in a stack slot, not which 7358 * instruction is calling iter_next()). When that happens, we either will come 7359 * to iter_next() with equivalent state and can conclude that next iteration 7360 * will proceed in exactly the same way as we just verified, so it's safe to 7361 * assume that loop converges. If not, we'll go on another iteration 7362 * simulation with a different input state, until all possible starting states 7363 * are validated or we reach maximum number of instructions limit. 7364 * 7365 * This way, we will either exhaustively discover all possible input states 7366 * that iterator loop can start with and eventually will converge, or we'll 7367 * effectively regress into bounded loop simulation logic and either reach 7368 * maximum number of instructions if loop is not provably convergent, or there 7369 * is some statically known limit on number of iterations (e.g., if there is 7370 * an explicit `if n > 100 then break;` statement somewhere in the loop). 7371 * 7372 * One very subtle but very important aspect is that we *always* simulate NULL 7373 * condition first (as the current state) before we simulate non-NULL case. 7374 * This has to do with intricacies of scalar precision tracking. By simulating 7375 * "exit condition" of iter_next() returning NULL first, we make sure all the 7376 * relevant precision marks *that will be set **after** we exit iterator loop* 7377 * are propagated backwards to common parent state of NULL and non-NULL 7378 * branches. Thanks to that, state equivalence checks done later in forked 7379 * state, when reaching iter_next() for ACTIVE iterator, can assume that 7380 * precision marks are finalized and won't change. Because simulating another 7381 * ACTIVE iterator iteration won't change them (because given same input 7382 * states we'll end up with exactly same output states which we are currently 7383 * comparing; and verification after the loop already propagated back what 7384 * needs to be **additionally** tracked as precise). It's subtle, grok 7385 * precision tracking for more intuitive understanding. 7386 */ 7387 static int process_iter_next_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, 7388 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 7389 { 7390 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur_st = env->cur_state, *queued_st; 7391 struct bpf_func_state *cur_fr = cur_st->frame[cur_st->curframe], *queued_fr; 7392 struct bpf_reg_state *cur_iter, *queued_iter; 7393 int iter_frameno = meta->iter.frameno; 7394 int iter_spi = meta->iter.spi; 7395 7396 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(struct bpf_iter); 7397 7398 cur_iter = &env->cur_state->frame[iter_frameno]->stack[iter_spi].spilled_ptr; 7399 7400 if (cur_iter->iter.state != BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE && 7401 cur_iter->iter.state != BPF_ITER_STATE_DRAINED) { 7402 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected iterator state %d (%s)\n", 7403 cur_iter->iter.state, iter_state_str(cur_iter->iter.state)); 7404 return -EFAULT; 7405 } 7406 7407 if (cur_iter->iter.state == BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE) { 7408 /* branch out active iter state */ 7409 queued_st = push_stack(env, insn_idx + 1, insn_idx, false); 7410 if (!queued_st) 7411 return -ENOMEM; 7412 7413 queued_iter = &queued_st->frame[iter_frameno]->stack[iter_spi].spilled_ptr; 7414 queued_iter->iter.state = BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE; 7415 queued_iter->iter.depth++; 7416 7417 queued_fr = queued_st->frame[queued_st->curframe]; 7418 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(&queued_fr->regs[BPF_REG_0]); 7419 } 7420 7421 /* switch to DRAINED state, but keep the depth unchanged */ 7422 /* mark current iter state as drained and assume returned NULL */ 7423 cur_iter->iter.state = BPF_ITER_STATE_DRAINED; 7424 __mark_reg_const_zero(&cur_fr->regs[BPF_REG_0]); 7425 7426 return 0; 7427 } 7428 7429 static bool arg_type_is_mem_size(enum bpf_arg_type type) 7430 { 7431 return type == ARG_CONST_SIZE || 7432 type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO; 7433 } 7434 7435 static bool arg_type_is_release(enum bpf_arg_type type) 7436 { 7437 return type & OBJ_RELEASE; 7438 } 7439 7440 static bool arg_type_is_dynptr(enum bpf_arg_type type) 7441 { 7442 return base_type(type) == ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR; 7443 } 7444 7445 static int int_ptr_type_to_size(enum bpf_arg_type type) 7446 { 7447 if (type == ARG_PTR_TO_INT) 7448 return sizeof(u32); 7449 else if (type == ARG_PTR_TO_LONG) 7450 return sizeof(u64); 7451 7452 return -EINVAL; 7453 } 7454 7455 static int resolve_map_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7456 const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 7457 enum bpf_arg_type *arg_type) 7458 { 7459 if (!meta->map_ptr) { 7460 /* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */ 7461 verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->type\n"); 7462 return -EACCES; 7463 } 7464 7465 switch (meta->map_ptr->map_type) { 7466 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP: 7467 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH: 7468 if (*arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 7469 *arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_SOCK_COMMON; 7470 } else { 7471 verbose(env, "invalid arg_type for sockmap/sockhash\n"); 7472 return -EINVAL; 7473 } 7474 break; 7475 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER: 7476 if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem) 7477 *arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 7478 break; 7479 default: 7480 break; 7481 } 7482 return 0; 7483 } 7484 7485 struct bpf_reg_types { 7486 const enum bpf_reg_type types[10]; 7487 u32 *btf_id; 7488 }; 7489 7490 static const struct bpf_reg_types sock_types = { 7491 .types = { 7492 PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON, 7493 PTR_TO_SOCKET, 7494 PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK, 7495 PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK, 7496 }, 7497 }; 7498 7499 #ifdef CONFIG_NET 7500 static const struct bpf_reg_types btf_id_sock_common_types = { 7501 .types = { 7502 PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON, 7503 PTR_TO_SOCKET, 7504 PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK, 7505 PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK, 7506 PTR_TO_BTF_ID, 7507 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED, 7508 }, 7509 .btf_id = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_SOCK_COMMON], 7510 }; 7511 #endif 7512 7513 static const struct bpf_reg_types mem_types = { 7514 .types = { 7515 PTR_TO_STACK, 7516 PTR_TO_PACKET, 7517 PTR_TO_PACKET_META, 7518 PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, 7519 PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, 7520 PTR_TO_MEM, 7521 PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RINGBUF, 7522 PTR_TO_BUF, 7523 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED, 7524 }, 7525 }; 7526 7527 static const struct bpf_reg_types int_ptr_types = { 7528 .types = { 7529 PTR_TO_STACK, 7530 PTR_TO_PACKET, 7531 PTR_TO_PACKET_META, 7532 PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, 7533 PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, 7534 }, 7535 }; 7536 7537 static const struct bpf_reg_types spin_lock_types = { 7538 .types = { 7539 PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, 7540 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC, 7541 } 7542 }; 7543 7544 static const struct bpf_reg_types fullsock_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_SOCKET } }; 7545 static const struct bpf_reg_types scalar_types = { .types = { SCALAR_VALUE } }; 7546 static const struct bpf_reg_types context_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_CTX } }; 7547 static const struct bpf_reg_types ringbuf_mem_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RINGBUF } }; 7548 static const struct bpf_reg_types const_map_ptr_types = { .types = { CONST_PTR_TO_MAP } }; 7549 static const struct bpf_reg_types btf_ptr_types = { 7550 .types = { 7551 PTR_TO_BTF_ID, 7552 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED, 7553 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_RCU, 7554 }, 7555 }; 7556 static const struct bpf_reg_types percpu_btf_ptr_types = { 7557 .types = { 7558 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU, 7559 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU | PTR_TRUSTED, 7560 } 7561 }; 7562 static const struct bpf_reg_types func_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_FUNC } }; 7563 static const struct bpf_reg_types stack_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_STACK } }; 7564 static const struct bpf_reg_types const_str_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE } }; 7565 static const struct bpf_reg_types timer_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE } }; 7566 static const struct bpf_reg_types kptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE } }; 7567 static const struct bpf_reg_types dynptr_types = { 7568 .types = { 7569 PTR_TO_STACK, 7570 CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, 7571 } 7572 }; 7573 7574 static const struct bpf_reg_types *compatible_reg_types[__BPF_ARG_TYPE_MAX] = { 7575 [ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY] = &mem_types, 7576 [ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE] = &mem_types, 7577 [ARG_CONST_SIZE] = &scalar_types, 7578 [ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO] = &scalar_types, 7579 [ARG_CONST_ALLOC_SIZE_OR_ZERO] = &scalar_types, 7580 [ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR] = &const_map_ptr_types, 7581 [ARG_PTR_TO_CTX] = &context_types, 7582 [ARG_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON] = &sock_types, 7583 #ifdef CONFIG_NET 7584 [ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_SOCK_COMMON] = &btf_id_sock_common_types, 7585 #endif 7586 [ARG_PTR_TO_SOCKET] = &fullsock_types, 7587 [ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID] = &btf_ptr_types, 7588 [ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK] = &spin_lock_types, 7589 [ARG_PTR_TO_MEM] = &mem_types, 7590 [ARG_PTR_TO_RINGBUF_MEM] = &ringbuf_mem_types, 7591 [ARG_PTR_TO_INT] = &int_ptr_types, 7592 [ARG_PTR_TO_LONG] = &int_ptr_types, 7593 [ARG_PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID] = &percpu_btf_ptr_types, 7594 [ARG_PTR_TO_FUNC] = &func_ptr_types, 7595 [ARG_PTR_TO_STACK] = &stack_ptr_types, 7596 [ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR] = &const_str_ptr_types, 7597 [ARG_PTR_TO_TIMER] = &timer_types, 7598 [ARG_PTR_TO_KPTR] = &kptr_types, 7599 [ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR] = &dynptr_types, 7600 }; 7601 7602 static int check_reg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 7603 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type, 7604 const u32 *arg_btf_id, 7605 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 7606 { 7607 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 7608 enum bpf_reg_type expected, type = reg->type; 7609 const struct bpf_reg_types *compatible; 7610 int i, j; 7611 7612 compatible = compatible_reg_types[base_type(arg_type)]; 7613 if (!compatible) { 7614 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unsupported arg type %d\n", arg_type); 7615 return -EFAULT; 7616 } 7617 7618 /* ARG_PTR_TO_MEM + RDONLY is compatible with PTR_TO_MEM and PTR_TO_MEM + RDONLY, 7619 * but ARG_PTR_TO_MEM is compatible only with PTR_TO_MEM and NOT with PTR_TO_MEM + RDONLY 7620 * 7621 * Same for MAYBE_NULL: 7622 * 7623 * ARG_PTR_TO_MEM + MAYBE_NULL is compatible with PTR_TO_MEM and PTR_TO_MEM + MAYBE_NULL, 7624 * but ARG_PTR_TO_MEM is compatible only with PTR_TO_MEM but NOT with PTR_TO_MEM + MAYBE_NULL 7625 * 7626 * ARG_PTR_TO_MEM is compatible with PTR_TO_MEM that is tagged with a dynptr type. 7627 * 7628 * Therefore we fold these flags depending on the arg_type before comparison. 7629 */ 7630 if (arg_type & MEM_RDONLY) 7631 type &= ~MEM_RDONLY; 7632 if (arg_type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL) 7633 type &= ~PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 7634 if (base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM) 7635 type &= ~DYNPTR_TYPE_FLAG_MASK; 7636 7637 if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg && type_is_alloc(type)) 7638 type &= ~MEM_ALLOC; 7639 7640 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(compatible->types); i++) { 7641 expected = compatible->types[i]; 7642 if (expected == NOT_INIT) 7643 break; 7644 7645 if (type == expected) 7646 goto found; 7647 } 7648 7649 verbose(env, "R%d type=%s expected=", regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 7650 for (j = 0; j + 1 < i; j++) 7651 verbose(env, "%s, ", reg_type_str(env, compatible->types[j])); 7652 verbose(env, "%s\n", reg_type_str(env, compatible->types[j])); 7653 return -EACCES; 7654 7655 found: 7656 if (base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID) 7657 return 0; 7658 7659 if (compatible == &mem_types) { 7660 if (!(arg_type & MEM_RDONLY)) { 7661 verbose(env, 7662 "%s() may write into memory pointed by R%d type=%s\n", 7663 func_id_name(meta->func_id), 7664 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 7665 return -EACCES; 7666 } 7667 return 0; 7668 } 7669 7670 switch ((int)reg->type) { 7671 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 7672 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED: 7673 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_RCU: 7674 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_MAYBE_NULL: 7675 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_MAYBE_NULL | MEM_RCU: 7676 { 7677 /* For bpf_sk_release, it needs to match against first member 7678 * 'struct sock_common', hence make an exception for it. This 7679 * allows bpf_sk_release to work for multiple socket types. 7680 */ 7681 bool strict_type_match = arg_type_is_release(arg_type) && 7682 meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_release; 7683 7684 if (type_may_be_null(reg->type) && 7685 (!type_may_be_null(arg_type) || arg_type_is_release(arg_type))) { 7686 verbose(env, "Possibly NULL pointer passed to helper arg%d\n", regno); 7687 return -EACCES; 7688 } 7689 7690 if (!arg_btf_id) { 7691 if (!compatible->btf_id) { 7692 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: missing arg compatible BTF ID\n"); 7693 return -EFAULT; 7694 } 7695 arg_btf_id = compatible->btf_id; 7696 } 7697 7698 if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) { 7699 if (map_kptr_match_type(env, meta->kptr_field, reg, regno)) 7700 return -EACCES; 7701 } else { 7702 if (arg_btf_id == BPF_PTR_POISON) { 7703 verbose(env, "verifier internal error:"); 7704 verbose(env, "R%d has non-overwritten BPF_PTR_POISON type\n", 7705 regno); 7706 return -EACCES; 7707 } 7708 7709 if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg->btf, reg->btf_id, reg->off, 7710 btf_vmlinux, *arg_btf_id, 7711 strict_type_match)) { 7712 verbose(env, "R%d is of type %s but %s is expected\n", 7713 regno, btf_type_name(reg->btf, reg->btf_id), 7714 btf_type_name(btf_vmlinux, *arg_btf_id)); 7715 return -EACCES; 7716 } 7717 } 7718 break; 7719 } 7720 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC: 7721 if (meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_spin_lock && meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock && 7722 meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) { 7723 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unimplemented handling of MEM_ALLOC\n"); 7724 return -EFAULT; 7725 } 7726 /* Handled by helper specific checks */ 7727 break; 7728 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU: 7729 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU | PTR_TRUSTED: 7730 /* Handled by helper specific checks */ 7731 break; 7732 default: 7733 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: invalid PTR_TO_BTF_ID register for type match\n"); 7734 return -EFAULT; 7735 } 7736 return 0; 7737 } 7738 7739 static struct btf_field * 7740 reg_find_field_offset(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, s32 off, u32 fields) 7741 { 7742 struct btf_field *field; 7743 struct btf_record *rec; 7744 7745 rec = reg_btf_record(reg); 7746 if (!rec) 7747 return NULL; 7748 7749 field = btf_record_find(rec, off, fields); 7750 if (!field) 7751 return NULL; 7752 7753 return field; 7754 } 7755 7756 int check_func_arg_reg_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7757 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno, 7758 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type) 7759 { 7760 u32 type = reg->type; 7761 7762 /* When referenced register is passed to release function, its fixed 7763 * offset must be 0. 7764 * 7765 * We will check arg_type_is_release reg has ref_obj_id when storing 7766 * meta->release_regno. 7767 */ 7768 if (arg_type_is_release(arg_type)) { 7769 /* ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR with OBJ_RELEASE is a bit special, as it 7770 * may not directly point to the object being released, but to 7771 * dynptr pointing to such object, which might be at some offset 7772 * on the stack. In that case, we simply to fallback to the 7773 * default handling. 7774 */ 7775 if (arg_type_is_dynptr(arg_type) && type == PTR_TO_STACK) 7776 return 0; 7777 7778 if ((type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(type) || type_is_non_owning_ref(type)) && reg->off) { 7779 if (reg_find_field_offset(reg, reg->off, BPF_GRAPH_NODE_OR_ROOT)) 7780 return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, true); 7781 7782 verbose(env, "R%d must have zero offset when passed to release func\n", 7783 regno); 7784 verbose(env, "No graph node or root found at R%d type:%s off:%d\n", regno, 7785 btf_type_name(reg->btf, reg->btf_id), reg->off); 7786 return -EINVAL; 7787 } 7788 7789 /* Doing check_ptr_off_reg check for the offset will catch this 7790 * because fixed_off_ok is false, but checking here allows us 7791 * to give the user a better error message. 7792 */ 7793 if (reg->off) { 7794 verbose(env, "R%d must have zero offset when passed to release func or trusted arg to kfunc\n", 7795 regno); 7796 return -EINVAL; 7797 } 7798 return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, false); 7799 } 7800 7801 switch (type) { 7802 /* Pointer types where both fixed and variable offset is explicitly allowed: */ 7803 case PTR_TO_STACK: 7804 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 7805 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 7806 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 7807 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 7808 case PTR_TO_MEM: 7809 case PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY: 7810 case PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RINGBUF: 7811 case PTR_TO_BUF: 7812 case PTR_TO_BUF | MEM_RDONLY: 7813 case SCALAR_VALUE: 7814 return 0; 7815 /* All the rest must be rejected, except PTR_TO_BTF_ID which allows 7816 * fixed offset. 7817 */ 7818 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 7819 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC: 7820 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED: 7821 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_RCU: 7822 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | NON_OWN_REF: 7823 /* When referenced PTR_TO_BTF_ID is passed to release function, 7824 * its fixed offset must be 0. In the other cases, fixed offset 7825 * can be non-zero. This was already checked above. So pass 7826 * fixed_off_ok as true to allow fixed offset for all other 7827 * cases. var_off always must be 0 for PTR_TO_BTF_ID, hence we 7828 * still need to do checks instead of returning. 7829 */ 7830 return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, true); 7831 default: 7832 return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, false); 7833 } 7834 } 7835 7836 static struct bpf_reg_state *get_dynptr_arg_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7837 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, 7838 struct bpf_reg_state *regs) 7839 { 7840 struct bpf_reg_state *state = NULL; 7841 int i; 7842 7843 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS; i++) 7844 if (arg_type_is_dynptr(fn->arg_type[i])) { 7845 if (state) { 7846 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: multiple dynptr args\n"); 7847 return NULL; 7848 } 7849 state = ®s[BPF_REG_1 + i]; 7850 } 7851 7852 if (!state) 7853 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no dynptr arg found\n"); 7854 7855 return state; 7856 } 7857 7858 static int dynptr_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 7859 { 7860 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 7861 int spi; 7862 7863 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 7864 return reg->id; 7865 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 7866 if (spi < 0) 7867 return spi; 7868 return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.id; 7869 } 7870 7871 static int dynptr_ref_obj_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 7872 { 7873 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 7874 int spi; 7875 7876 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 7877 return reg->ref_obj_id; 7878 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 7879 if (spi < 0) 7880 return spi; 7881 return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id; 7882 } 7883 7884 static enum bpf_dynptr_type dynptr_get_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7885 struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 7886 { 7887 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 7888 int spi; 7889 7890 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 7891 return reg->dynptr.type; 7892 7893 spi = __get_spi(reg->off); 7894 if (spi < 0) { 7895 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: invalid spi when querying dynptr type\n"); 7896 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID; 7897 } 7898 7899 return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type; 7900 } 7901 7902 static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg, 7903 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 7904 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, 7905 int insn_idx) 7906 { 7907 u32 regno = BPF_REG_1 + arg; 7908 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 7909 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type = fn->arg_type[arg]; 7910 enum bpf_reg_type type = reg->type; 7911 u32 *arg_btf_id = NULL; 7912 int err = 0; 7913 7914 if (arg_type == ARG_DONTCARE) 7915 return 0; 7916 7917 err = check_reg_arg(env, regno, SRC_OP); 7918 if (err) 7919 return err; 7920 7921 if (arg_type == ARG_ANYTHING) { 7922 if (is_pointer_value(env, regno)) { 7923 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into helper function\n", 7924 regno); 7925 return -EACCES; 7926 } 7927 return 0; 7928 } 7929 7930 if (type_is_pkt_pointer(type) && 7931 !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, meta, BPF_READ)) { 7932 verbose(env, "helper access to the packet is not allowed\n"); 7933 return -EACCES; 7934 } 7935 7936 if (base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 7937 err = resolve_map_arg_type(env, meta, &arg_type); 7938 if (err) 7939 return err; 7940 } 7941 7942 if (register_is_null(reg) && type_may_be_null(arg_type)) 7943 /* A NULL register has a SCALAR_VALUE type, so skip 7944 * type checking. 7945 */ 7946 goto skip_type_check; 7947 7948 /* arg_btf_id and arg_size are in a union. */ 7949 if (base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID || 7950 base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK) 7951 arg_btf_id = fn->arg_btf_id[arg]; 7952 7953 err = check_reg_type(env, regno, arg_type, arg_btf_id, meta); 7954 if (err) 7955 return err; 7956 7957 err = check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, regno, arg_type); 7958 if (err) 7959 return err; 7960 7961 skip_type_check: 7962 if (arg_type_is_release(arg_type)) { 7963 if (arg_type_is_dynptr(arg_type)) { 7964 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 7965 int spi; 7966 7967 /* Only dynptr created on stack can be released, thus 7968 * the get_spi and stack state checks for spilled_ptr 7969 * should only be done before process_dynptr_func for 7970 * PTR_TO_STACK. 7971 */ 7972 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 7973 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 7974 if (spi < 0 || !state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id) { 7975 verbose(env, "arg %d is an unacquired reference\n", regno); 7976 return -EINVAL; 7977 } 7978 } else { 7979 verbose(env, "cannot release unowned const bpf_dynptr\n"); 7980 return -EINVAL; 7981 } 7982 } else if (!reg->ref_obj_id && !register_is_null(reg)) { 7983 verbose(env, "R%d must be referenced when passed to release function\n", 7984 regno); 7985 return -EINVAL; 7986 } 7987 if (meta->release_regno) { 7988 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: more than one release argument\n"); 7989 return -EFAULT; 7990 } 7991 meta->release_regno = regno; 7992 } 7993 7994 if (reg->ref_obj_id) { 7995 if (meta->ref_obj_id) { 7996 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: more than one arg with ref_obj_id R%d %u %u\n", 7997 regno, reg->ref_obj_id, 7998 meta->ref_obj_id); 7999 return -EFAULT; 8000 } 8001 meta->ref_obj_id = reg->ref_obj_id; 8002 } 8003 8004 switch (base_type(arg_type)) { 8005 case ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR: 8006 /* bpf_map_xxx(map_ptr) call: remember that map_ptr */ 8007 if (meta->map_ptr) { 8008 /* Use map_uid (which is unique id of inner map) to reject: 8009 * inner_map1 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(outer_map, key1) 8010 * inner_map2 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(outer_map, key2) 8011 * if (inner_map1 && inner_map2) { 8012 * timer = bpf_map_lookup_elem(inner_map1); 8013 * if (timer) 8014 * // mismatch would have been allowed 8015 * bpf_timer_init(timer, inner_map2); 8016 * } 8017 * 8018 * Comparing map_ptr is enough to distinguish normal and outer maps. 8019 */ 8020 if (meta->map_ptr != reg->map_ptr || 8021 meta->map_uid != reg->map_uid) { 8022 verbose(env, 8023 "timer pointer in R1 map_uid=%d doesn't match map pointer in R2 map_uid=%d\n", 8024 meta->map_uid, reg->map_uid); 8025 return -EINVAL; 8026 } 8027 } 8028 meta->map_ptr = reg->map_ptr; 8029 meta->map_uid = reg->map_uid; 8030 break; 8031 case ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 8032 /* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., key) call: 8033 * check that [key, key + map->key_size) are within 8034 * stack limits and initialized 8035 */ 8036 if (!meta->map_ptr) { 8037 /* in function declaration map_ptr must come before 8038 * map_key, so that it's verified and known before 8039 * we have to check map_key here. Otherwise it means 8040 * that kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier 8041 */ 8042 verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->key\n"); 8043 return -EACCES; 8044 } 8045 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, 8046 meta->map_ptr->key_size, false, 8047 NULL); 8048 break; 8049 case ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 8050 if (type_may_be_null(arg_type) && register_is_null(reg)) 8051 return 0; 8052 8053 /* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., value) call: 8054 * check [value, value + map->value_size) validity 8055 */ 8056 if (!meta->map_ptr) { 8057 /* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */ 8058 verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->value\n"); 8059 return -EACCES; 8060 } 8061 meta->raw_mode = arg_type & MEM_UNINIT; 8062 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, 8063 meta->map_ptr->value_size, false, 8064 meta); 8065 break; 8066 case ARG_PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID: 8067 if (!reg->btf_id) { 8068 verbose(env, "Helper has invalid btf_id in R%d\n", regno); 8069 return -EACCES; 8070 } 8071 meta->ret_btf = reg->btf; 8072 meta->ret_btf_id = reg->btf_id; 8073 break; 8074 case ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK: 8075 if (in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(env)) { 8076 verbose(env, "can't spin_{lock,unlock} in rbtree cb\n"); 8077 return -EACCES; 8078 } 8079 if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_spin_lock) { 8080 err = process_spin_lock(env, regno, true); 8081 if (err) 8082 return err; 8083 } else if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock) { 8084 err = process_spin_lock(env, regno, false); 8085 if (err) 8086 return err; 8087 } else { 8088 verbose(env, "verifier internal error\n"); 8089 return -EFAULT; 8090 } 8091 break; 8092 case ARG_PTR_TO_TIMER: 8093 err = process_timer_func(env, regno, meta); 8094 if (err) 8095 return err; 8096 break; 8097 case ARG_PTR_TO_FUNC: 8098 meta->subprogno = reg->subprogno; 8099 break; 8100 case ARG_PTR_TO_MEM: 8101 /* The access to this pointer is only checked when we hit the 8102 * next is_mem_size argument below. 8103 */ 8104 meta->raw_mode = arg_type & MEM_UNINIT; 8105 if (arg_type & MEM_FIXED_SIZE) { 8106 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, 8107 fn->arg_size[arg], false, 8108 meta); 8109 } 8110 break; 8111 case ARG_CONST_SIZE: 8112 err = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, false, meta); 8113 break; 8114 case ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO: 8115 err = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, true, meta); 8116 break; 8117 case ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR: 8118 err = process_dynptr_func(env, regno, insn_idx, arg_type, 0); 8119 if (err) 8120 return err; 8121 break; 8122 case ARG_CONST_ALLOC_SIZE_OR_ZERO: 8123 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 8124 verbose(env, "R%d is not a known constant'\n", 8125 regno); 8126 return -EACCES; 8127 } 8128 meta->mem_size = reg->var_off.value; 8129 err = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); 8130 if (err) 8131 return err; 8132 break; 8133 case ARG_PTR_TO_INT: 8134 case ARG_PTR_TO_LONG: 8135 { 8136 int size = int_ptr_type_to_size(arg_type); 8137 8138 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, size, false, meta); 8139 if (err) 8140 return err; 8141 err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, 0, size, true); 8142 break; 8143 } 8144 case ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR: 8145 { 8146 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 8147 int map_off; 8148 u64 map_addr; 8149 char *str_ptr; 8150 8151 if (!bpf_map_is_rdonly(map)) { 8152 verbose(env, "R%d does not point to a readonly map'\n", regno); 8153 return -EACCES; 8154 } 8155 8156 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 8157 verbose(env, "R%d is not a constant address'\n", regno); 8158 return -EACCES; 8159 } 8160 8161 if (!map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) { 8162 verbose(env, "no direct value access support for this map type\n"); 8163 return -EACCES; 8164 } 8165 8166 err = check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off, 8167 map->value_size - reg->off, false, 8168 ACCESS_HELPER); 8169 if (err) 8170 return err; 8171 8172 map_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; 8173 err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &map_addr, map_off); 8174 if (err) { 8175 verbose(env, "direct value access on string failed\n"); 8176 return err; 8177 } 8178 8179 str_ptr = (char *)(long)(map_addr); 8180 if (!strnchr(str_ptr + map_off, map->value_size - map_off, 0)) { 8181 verbose(env, "string is not zero-terminated\n"); 8182 return -EINVAL; 8183 } 8184 break; 8185 } 8186 case ARG_PTR_TO_KPTR: 8187 err = process_kptr_func(env, regno, meta); 8188 if (err) 8189 return err; 8190 break; 8191 } 8192 8193 return err; 8194 } 8195 8196 static bool may_update_sockmap(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id) 8197 { 8198 enum bpf_attach_type eatype = env->prog->expected_attach_type; 8199 enum bpf_prog_type type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 8200 8201 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem) 8202 return false; 8203 8204 /* It's not possible to get access to a locked struct sock in these 8205 * contexts, so updating is safe. 8206 */ 8207 switch (type) { 8208 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: 8209 if (eatype == BPF_TRACE_ITER) 8210 return true; 8211 break; 8212 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER: 8213 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: 8214 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT: 8215 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP: 8216 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT: 8217 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR: 8218 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP: 8219 return true; 8220 default: 8221 break; 8222 } 8223 8224 verbose(env, "cannot update sockmap in this context\n"); 8225 return false; 8226 } 8227 8228 static bool allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 8229 { 8230 return env->prog->jit_requested && 8231 bpf_jit_supports_subprog_tailcalls(); 8232 } 8233 8234 static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8235 struct bpf_map *map, int func_id) 8236 { 8237 if (!map) 8238 return 0; 8239 8240 /* We need a two way check, first is from map perspective ... */ 8241 switch (map->map_type) { 8242 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY: 8243 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call) 8244 goto error; 8245 break; 8246 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY: 8247 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read && 8248 func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output && 8249 func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_output && 8250 func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read_value && 8251 func_id != BPF_FUNC_xdp_output) 8252 goto error; 8253 break; 8254 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF: 8255 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_output && 8256 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve && 8257 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_query && 8258 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve_dynptr && 8259 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_submit_dynptr && 8260 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_discard_dynptr) 8261 goto error; 8262 break; 8263 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF: 8264 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain) 8265 goto error; 8266 break; 8267 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE: 8268 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stackid) 8269 goto error; 8270 break; 8271 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY: 8272 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup && 8273 func_id != BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup) 8274 goto error; 8275 break; 8276 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE: 8277 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE: 8278 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage) 8279 goto error; 8280 break; 8281 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP: 8282 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP_HASH: 8283 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map && 8284 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) 8285 goto error; 8286 break; 8287 /* Restrict bpf side of cpumap and xskmap, open when use-cases 8288 * appear. 8289 */ 8290 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP: 8291 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map) 8292 goto error; 8293 break; 8294 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP: 8295 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map && 8296 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) 8297 goto error; 8298 break; 8299 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS: 8300 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS: 8301 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) 8302 goto error; 8303 break; 8304 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP: 8305 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map && 8306 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update && 8307 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem && 8308 func_id != BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_map && 8309 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport && 8310 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 8311 !may_update_sockmap(env, func_id)) 8312 goto error; 8313 break; 8314 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH: 8315 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_hash && 8316 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_hash_update && 8317 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem && 8318 func_id != BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_hash && 8319 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport && 8320 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 8321 !may_update_sockmap(env, func_id)) 8322 goto error; 8323 break; 8324 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY: 8325 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport) 8326 goto error; 8327 break; 8328 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE: 8329 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK: 8330 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem && 8331 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem && 8332 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem) 8333 goto error; 8334 break; 8335 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE: 8336 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get && 8337 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_delete && 8338 func_id != BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) 8339 goto error; 8340 break; 8341 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE: 8342 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get && 8343 func_id != BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_delete && 8344 func_id != BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) 8345 goto error; 8346 break; 8347 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE: 8348 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_task_storage_get && 8349 func_id != BPF_FUNC_task_storage_delete && 8350 func_id != BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) 8351 goto error; 8352 break; 8353 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE: 8354 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_get && 8355 func_id != BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_delete && 8356 func_id != BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) 8357 goto error; 8358 break; 8359 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER: 8360 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem && 8361 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem) 8362 goto error; 8363 break; 8364 default: 8365 break; 8366 } 8367 8368 /* ... and second from the function itself. */ 8369 switch (func_id) { 8370 case BPF_FUNC_tail_call: 8371 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY) 8372 goto error; 8373 if (env->subprog_cnt > 1 && !allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(env)) { 8374 verbose(env, "tail_calls are not allowed in non-JITed programs with bpf-to-bpf calls\n"); 8375 return -EINVAL; 8376 } 8377 break; 8378 case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read: 8379 case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output: 8380 case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read_value: 8381 case BPF_FUNC_skb_output: 8382 case BPF_FUNC_xdp_output: 8383 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY) 8384 goto error; 8385 break; 8386 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_output: 8387 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve: 8388 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_query: 8389 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve_dynptr: 8390 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_submit_dynptr: 8391 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_discard_dynptr: 8392 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF) 8393 goto error; 8394 break; 8395 case BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain: 8396 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF) 8397 goto error; 8398 break; 8399 case BPF_FUNC_get_stackid: 8400 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE) 8401 goto error; 8402 break; 8403 case BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup: 8404 case BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup: 8405 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY) 8406 goto error; 8407 break; 8408 case BPF_FUNC_redirect_map: 8409 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP && 8410 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP_HASH && 8411 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP && 8412 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP) 8413 goto error; 8414 break; 8415 case BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map: 8416 case BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_map: 8417 case BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update: 8418 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP) 8419 goto error; 8420 break; 8421 case BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_hash: 8422 case BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_hash: 8423 case BPF_FUNC_sock_hash_update: 8424 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH) 8425 goto error; 8426 break; 8427 case BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage: 8428 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE && 8429 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE) 8430 goto error; 8431 break; 8432 case BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport: 8433 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY && 8434 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP && 8435 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH) 8436 goto error; 8437 break; 8438 case BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem: 8439 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE && 8440 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK) 8441 goto error; 8442 break; 8443 case BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem: 8444 case BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem: 8445 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE && 8446 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK && 8447 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER) 8448 goto error; 8449 break; 8450 case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem: 8451 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY && 8452 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH && 8453 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_PERCPU_HASH) 8454 goto error; 8455 break; 8456 case BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get: 8457 case BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_delete: 8458 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE) 8459 goto error; 8460 break; 8461 case BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get: 8462 case BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_delete: 8463 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE) 8464 goto error; 8465 break; 8466 case BPF_FUNC_task_storage_get: 8467 case BPF_FUNC_task_storage_delete: 8468 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE) 8469 goto error; 8470 break; 8471 case BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_get: 8472 case BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_delete: 8473 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE) 8474 goto error; 8475 break; 8476 default: 8477 break; 8478 } 8479 8480 return 0; 8481 error: 8482 verbose(env, "cannot pass map_type %d into func %s#%d\n", 8483 map->map_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 8484 return -EINVAL; 8485 } 8486 8487 static bool check_raw_mode_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) 8488 { 8489 int count = 0; 8490 8491 if (fn->arg1_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) 8492 count++; 8493 if (fn->arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) 8494 count++; 8495 if (fn->arg3_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) 8496 count++; 8497 if (fn->arg4_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) 8498 count++; 8499 if (fn->arg5_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) 8500 count++; 8501 8502 /* We only support one arg being in raw mode at the moment, 8503 * which is sufficient for the helper functions we have 8504 * right now. 8505 */ 8506 return count <= 1; 8507 } 8508 8509 static bool check_args_pair_invalid(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, int arg) 8510 { 8511 bool is_fixed = fn->arg_type[arg] & MEM_FIXED_SIZE; 8512 bool has_size = fn->arg_size[arg] != 0; 8513 bool is_next_size = false; 8514 8515 if (arg + 1 < ARRAY_SIZE(fn->arg_type)) 8516 is_next_size = arg_type_is_mem_size(fn->arg_type[arg + 1]); 8517 8518 if (base_type(fn->arg_type[arg]) != ARG_PTR_TO_MEM) 8519 return is_next_size; 8520 8521 return has_size == is_next_size || is_next_size == is_fixed; 8522 } 8523 8524 static bool check_arg_pair_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) 8525 { 8526 /* bpf_xxx(..., buf, len) call will access 'len' 8527 * bytes from memory 'buf'. Both arg types need 8528 * to be paired, so make sure there's no buggy 8529 * helper function specification. 8530 */ 8531 if (arg_type_is_mem_size(fn->arg1_type) || 8532 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 0) || 8533 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 1) || 8534 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 2) || 8535 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 3) || 8536 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 4)) 8537 return false; 8538 8539 return true; 8540 } 8541 8542 static bool check_btf_id_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) 8543 { 8544 int i; 8545 8546 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(fn->arg_type); i++) { 8547 if (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) == ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID) 8548 return !!fn->arg_btf_id[i]; 8549 if (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) == ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK) 8550 return fn->arg_btf_id[i] == BPF_PTR_POISON; 8551 if (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) != ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID && fn->arg_btf_id[i] && 8552 /* arg_btf_id and arg_size are in a union. */ 8553 (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) != ARG_PTR_TO_MEM || 8554 !(fn->arg_type[i] & MEM_FIXED_SIZE))) 8555 return false; 8556 } 8557 8558 return true; 8559 } 8560 8561 static int check_func_proto(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, int func_id) 8562 { 8563 return check_raw_mode_ok(fn) && 8564 check_arg_pair_ok(fn) && 8565 check_btf_id_ok(fn) ? 0 : -EINVAL; 8566 } 8567 8568 /* Packet data might have moved, any old PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END] 8569 * are now invalid, so turn them into unknown SCALAR_VALUE. 8570 * 8571 * This also applies to dynptr slices belonging to skb and xdp dynptrs, 8572 * since these slices point to packet data. 8573 */ 8574 static void clear_all_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 8575 { 8576 struct bpf_func_state *state; 8577 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 8578 8579 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, state, reg, ({ 8580 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(reg) || reg_is_dynptr_slice_pkt(reg)) 8581 mark_reg_invalid(env, reg); 8582 })); 8583 } 8584 8585 enum { 8586 AT_PKT_END = -1, 8587 BEYOND_PKT_END = -2, 8588 }; 8589 8590 static void mark_pkt_end(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, int regn, bool range_open) 8591 { 8592 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 8593 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regn]; 8594 8595 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_PACKET) 8596 /* PTR_TO_PACKET_META is not supported yet */ 8597 return; 8598 8599 /* The 'reg' is pkt > pkt_end or pkt >= pkt_end. 8600 * How far beyond pkt_end it goes is unknown. 8601 * if (!range_open) it's the case of pkt >= pkt_end 8602 * if (range_open) it's the case of pkt > pkt_end 8603 * hence this pointer is at least 1 byte bigger than pkt_end 8604 */ 8605 if (range_open) 8606 reg->range = BEYOND_PKT_END; 8607 else 8608 reg->range = AT_PKT_END; 8609 } 8610 8611 /* The pointer with the specified id has released its reference to kernel 8612 * resources. Identify all copies of the same pointer and clear the reference. 8613 */ 8614 static int release_reference(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8615 int ref_obj_id) 8616 { 8617 struct bpf_func_state *state; 8618 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 8619 int err; 8620 8621 err = release_reference_state(cur_func(env), ref_obj_id); 8622 if (err) 8623 return err; 8624 8625 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, state, reg, ({ 8626 if (reg->ref_obj_id == ref_obj_id) 8627 mark_reg_invalid(env, reg); 8628 })); 8629 8630 return 0; 8631 } 8632 8633 static void invalidate_non_owning_refs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 8634 { 8635 struct bpf_func_state *unused; 8636 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 8637 8638 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, unused, reg, ({ 8639 if (type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type)) 8640 mark_reg_invalid(env, reg); 8641 })); 8642 } 8643 8644 static void clear_caller_saved_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8645 struct bpf_reg_state *regs) 8646 { 8647 int i; 8648 8649 /* after the call registers r0 - r5 were scratched */ 8650 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { 8651 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); 8652 check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); 8653 } 8654 } 8655 8656 typedef int (*set_callee_state_fn)(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8657 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 8658 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 8659 int insn_idx); 8660 8661 static int set_callee_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8662 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 8663 struct bpf_func_state *callee, int insn_idx); 8664 8665 static int __check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 8666 int *insn_idx, int subprog, 8667 set_callee_state_fn set_callee_state_cb) 8668 { 8669 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 8670 struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee; 8671 int err; 8672 8673 if (state->curframe + 1 >= MAX_CALL_FRAMES) { 8674 verbose(env, "the call stack of %d frames is too deep\n", 8675 state->curframe + 2); 8676 return -E2BIG; 8677 } 8678 8679 caller = state->frame[state->curframe]; 8680 if (state->frame[state->curframe + 1]) { 8681 verbose(env, "verifier bug. Frame %d already allocated\n", 8682 state->curframe + 1); 8683 return -EFAULT; 8684 } 8685 8686 err = btf_check_subprog_call(env, subprog, caller->regs); 8687 if (err == -EFAULT) 8688 return err; 8689 if (subprog_is_global(env, subprog)) { 8690 if (err) { 8691 verbose(env, "Caller passes invalid args into func#%d\n", 8692 subprog); 8693 return err; 8694 } else { 8695 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) 8696 verbose(env, 8697 "Func#%d is global and valid. Skipping.\n", 8698 subprog); 8699 clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs); 8700 8701 /* All global functions return a 64-bit SCALAR_VALUE */ 8702 mark_reg_unknown(env, caller->regs, BPF_REG_0); 8703 caller->regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 8704 8705 /* continue with next insn after call */ 8706 return 0; 8707 } 8708 } 8709 8710 /* set_callee_state is used for direct subprog calls, but we are 8711 * interested in validating only BPF helpers that can call subprogs as 8712 * callbacks 8713 */ 8714 if (set_callee_state_cb != set_callee_state) { 8715 if (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) && 8716 !is_callback_calling_kfunc(insn->imm)) { 8717 verbose(env, "verifier bug: kfunc %s#%d not marked as callback-calling\n", 8718 func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm); 8719 return -EFAULT; 8720 } else if (!bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) && 8721 !is_callback_calling_function(insn->imm)) { /* helper */ 8722 verbose(env, "verifier bug: helper %s#%d not marked as callback-calling\n", 8723 func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm); 8724 return -EFAULT; 8725 } 8726 } 8727 8728 if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 8729 insn->src_reg == 0 && 8730 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback) { 8731 struct bpf_verifier_state *async_cb; 8732 8733 /* there is no real recursion here. timer callbacks are async */ 8734 env->subprog_info[subprog].is_async_cb = true; 8735 async_cb = push_async_cb(env, env->subprog_info[subprog].start, 8736 *insn_idx, subprog); 8737 if (!async_cb) 8738 return -EFAULT; 8739 callee = async_cb->frame[0]; 8740 callee->async_entry_cnt = caller->async_entry_cnt + 1; 8741 8742 /* Convert bpf_timer_set_callback() args into timer callback args */ 8743 err = set_callee_state_cb(env, caller, callee, *insn_idx); 8744 if (err) 8745 return err; 8746 8747 clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs); 8748 mark_reg_unknown(env, caller->regs, BPF_REG_0); 8749 caller->regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 8750 /* continue with next insn after call */ 8751 return 0; 8752 } 8753 8754 callee = kzalloc(sizeof(*callee), GFP_KERNEL); 8755 if (!callee) 8756 return -ENOMEM; 8757 state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = callee; 8758 8759 /* callee cannot access r0, r6 - r9 for reading and has to write 8760 * into its own stack before reading from it. 8761 * callee can read/write into caller's stack 8762 */ 8763 init_func_state(env, callee, 8764 /* remember the callsite, it will be used by bpf_exit */ 8765 *insn_idx /* callsite */, 8766 state->curframe + 1 /* frameno within this callchain */, 8767 subprog /* subprog number within this prog */); 8768 8769 /* Transfer references to the callee */ 8770 err = copy_reference_state(callee, caller); 8771 if (err) 8772 goto err_out; 8773 8774 err = set_callee_state_cb(env, caller, callee, *insn_idx); 8775 if (err) 8776 goto err_out; 8777 8778 clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs); 8779 8780 /* only increment it after check_reg_arg() finished */ 8781 state->curframe++; 8782 8783 /* and go analyze first insn of the callee */ 8784 *insn_idx = env->subprog_info[subprog].start - 1; 8785 8786 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 8787 verbose(env, "caller:\n"); 8788 print_verifier_state(env, caller, true); 8789 verbose(env, "callee:\n"); 8790 print_verifier_state(env, callee, true); 8791 } 8792 return 0; 8793 8794 err_out: 8795 free_func_state(callee); 8796 state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = NULL; 8797 return err; 8798 } 8799 8800 int map_set_for_each_callback_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8801 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 8802 struct bpf_func_state *callee) 8803 { 8804 /* bpf_for_each_map_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *callback_fn, 8805 * void *callback_ctx, u64 flags); 8806 * callback_fn(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value, 8807 * void *callback_ctx); 8808 */ 8809 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1]; 8810 8811 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].type = PTR_TO_MAP_KEY; 8812 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]); 8813 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr; 8814 8815 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 8816 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); 8817 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr; 8818 8819 /* pointer to stack or null */ 8820 callee->regs[BPF_REG_4] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_3]; 8821 8822 /* unused */ 8823 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 8824 return 0; 8825 } 8826 8827 static int set_callee_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8828 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 8829 struct bpf_func_state *callee, int insn_idx) 8830 { 8831 int i; 8832 8833 /* copy r1 - r5 args that callee can access. The copy includes parent 8834 * pointers, which connects us up to the liveness chain 8835 */ 8836 for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) 8837 callee->regs[i] = caller->regs[i]; 8838 return 0; 8839 } 8840 8841 static int check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 8842 int *insn_idx) 8843 { 8844 int subprog, target_insn; 8845 8846 target_insn = *insn_idx + insn->imm + 1; 8847 subprog = find_subprog(env, target_insn); 8848 if (subprog < 0) { 8849 verbose(env, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", 8850 target_insn); 8851 return -EFAULT; 8852 } 8853 8854 return __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx, subprog, set_callee_state); 8855 } 8856 8857 static int set_map_elem_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8858 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 8859 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 8860 int insn_idx) 8861 { 8862 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; 8863 struct bpf_map *map; 8864 int err; 8865 8866 if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(insn_aux)) { 8867 verbose(env, "tail_call abusing map_ptr\n"); 8868 return -EINVAL; 8869 } 8870 8871 map = BPF_MAP_PTR(insn_aux->map_ptr_state); 8872 if (!map->ops->map_set_for_each_callback_args || 8873 !map->ops->map_for_each_callback) { 8874 verbose(env, "callback function not allowed for map\n"); 8875 return -ENOTSUPP; 8876 } 8877 8878 err = map->ops->map_set_for_each_callback_args(env, caller, callee); 8879 if (err) 8880 return err; 8881 8882 callee->in_callback_fn = true; 8883 callee->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 1); 8884 return 0; 8885 } 8886 8887 static int set_loop_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8888 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 8889 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 8890 int insn_idx) 8891 { 8892 /* bpf_loop(u32 nr_loops, void *callback_fn, void *callback_ctx, 8893 * u64 flags); 8894 * callback_fn(u32 index, void *callback_ctx); 8895 */ 8896 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1].type = SCALAR_VALUE; 8897 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_3]; 8898 8899 /* unused */ 8900 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); 8901 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]); 8902 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 8903 8904 callee->in_callback_fn = true; 8905 callee->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 1); 8906 return 0; 8907 } 8908 8909 static int set_timer_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8910 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 8911 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 8912 int insn_idx) 8913 { 8914 struct bpf_map *map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr; 8915 8916 /* bpf_timer_set_callback(struct bpf_timer *timer, void *callback_fn); 8917 * callback_fn(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value); 8918 */ 8919 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1].type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; 8920 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_1]); 8921 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr = map_ptr; 8922 8923 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].type = PTR_TO_MAP_KEY; 8924 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]); 8925 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].map_ptr = map_ptr; 8926 8927 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 8928 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); 8929 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].map_ptr = map_ptr; 8930 8931 /* unused */ 8932 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]); 8933 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 8934 callee->in_async_callback_fn = true; 8935 callee->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 1); 8936 return 0; 8937 } 8938 8939 static int set_find_vma_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8940 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 8941 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 8942 int insn_idx) 8943 { 8944 /* bpf_find_vma(struct task_struct *task, u64 addr, 8945 * void *callback_fn, void *callback_ctx, u64 flags) 8946 * (callback_fn)(struct task_struct *task, 8947 * struct vm_area_struct *vma, void *callback_ctx); 8948 */ 8949 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1]; 8950 8951 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 8952 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]); 8953 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].btf = btf_vmlinux; 8954 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].btf_id = btf_tracing_ids[BTF_TRACING_TYPE_VMA], 8955 8956 /* pointer to stack or null */ 8957 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_4]; 8958 8959 /* unused */ 8960 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]); 8961 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 8962 callee->in_callback_fn = true; 8963 callee->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 1); 8964 return 0; 8965 } 8966 8967 static int set_user_ringbuf_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8968 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 8969 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 8970 int insn_idx) 8971 { 8972 /* bpf_user_ringbuf_drain(struct bpf_map *map, void *callback_fn, void 8973 * callback_ctx, u64 flags); 8974 * callback_fn(const struct bpf_dynptr_t* dynptr, void *callback_ctx); 8975 */ 8976 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_0]); 8977 mark_dynptr_cb_reg(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_1], BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL); 8978 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_3]; 8979 8980 /* unused */ 8981 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); 8982 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]); 8983 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 8984 8985 callee->in_callback_fn = true; 8986 callee->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 1); 8987 return 0; 8988 } 8989 8990 static int set_rbtree_add_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8991 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 8992 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 8993 int insn_idx) 8994 { 8995 /* void bpf_rbtree_add_impl(struct bpf_rb_root *root, struct bpf_rb_node *node, 8996 * bool (less)(struct bpf_rb_node *a, const struct bpf_rb_node *b)); 8997 * 8998 * 'struct bpf_rb_node *node' arg to bpf_rbtree_add_impl is the same PTR_TO_BTF_ID w/ offset 8999 * that 'less' callback args will be receiving. However, 'node' arg was release_reference'd 9000 * by this point, so look at 'root' 9001 */ 9002 struct btf_field *field; 9003 9004 field = reg_find_field_offset(&caller->regs[BPF_REG_1], caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].off, 9005 BPF_RB_ROOT); 9006 if (!field || !field->graph_root.value_btf_id) 9007 return -EFAULT; 9008 9009 mark_reg_graph_node(callee->regs, BPF_REG_1, &field->graph_root); 9010 ref_set_non_owning(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_1]); 9011 mark_reg_graph_node(callee->regs, BPF_REG_2, &field->graph_root); 9012 ref_set_non_owning(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]); 9013 9014 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); 9015 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]); 9016 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 9017 callee->in_callback_fn = true; 9018 callee->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 1); 9019 return 0; 9020 } 9021 9022 static bool is_rbtree_lock_required_kfunc(u32 btf_id); 9023 9024 /* Are we currently verifying the callback for a rbtree helper that must 9025 * be called with lock held? If so, no need to complain about unreleased 9026 * lock 9027 */ 9028 static bool in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 9029 { 9030 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 9031 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 9032 struct bpf_func_state *callee; 9033 int kfunc_btf_id; 9034 9035 if (!state->curframe) 9036 return false; 9037 9038 callee = state->frame[state->curframe]; 9039 9040 if (!callee->in_callback_fn) 9041 return false; 9042 9043 kfunc_btf_id = insn[callee->callsite].imm; 9044 return is_rbtree_lock_required_kfunc(kfunc_btf_id); 9045 } 9046 9047 static int prepare_func_exit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *insn_idx) 9048 { 9049 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 9050 struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee; 9051 struct bpf_reg_state *r0; 9052 int err; 9053 9054 callee = state->frame[state->curframe]; 9055 r0 = &callee->regs[BPF_REG_0]; 9056 if (r0->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 9057 /* technically it's ok to return caller's stack pointer 9058 * (or caller's caller's pointer) back to the caller, 9059 * since these pointers are valid. Only current stack 9060 * pointer will be invalid as soon as function exits, 9061 * but let's be conservative 9062 */ 9063 verbose(env, "cannot return stack pointer to the caller\n"); 9064 return -EINVAL; 9065 } 9066 9067 caller = state->frame[state->curframe - 1]; 9068 if (callee->in_callback_fn) { 9069 /* enforce R0 return value range [0, 1]. */ 9070 struct tnum range = callee->callback_ret_range; 9071 9072 if (r0->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 9073 verbose(env, "R0 not a scalar value\n"); 9074 return -EACCES; 9075 } 9076 if (!tnum_in(range, r0->var_off)) { 9077 verbose_invalid_scalar(env, r0, &range, "callback return", "R0"); 9078 return -EINVAL; 9079 } 9080 } else { 9081 /* return to the caller whatever r0 had in the callee */ 9082 caller->regs[BPF_REG_0] = *r0; 9083 } 9084 9085 /* callback_fn frame should have released its own additions to parent's 9086 * reference state at this point, or check_reference_leak would 9087 * complain, hence it must be the same as the caller. There is no need 9088 * to copy it back. 9089 */ 9090 if (!callee->in_callback_fn) { 9091 /* Transfer references to the caller */ 9092 err = copy_reference_state(caller, callee); 9093 if (err) 9094 return err; 9095 } 9096 9097 *insn_idx = callee->callsite + 1; 9098 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 9099 verbose(env, "returning from callee:\n"); 9100 print_verifier_state(env, callee, true); 9101 verbose(env, "to caller at %d:\n", *insn_idx); 9102 print_verifier_state(env, caller, true); 9103 } 9104 /* clear everything in the callee */ 9105 free_func_state(callee); 9106 state->frame[state->curframe--] = NULL; 9107 return 0; 9108 } 9109 9110 static void do_refine_retval_range(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, int ret_type, 9111 int func_id, 9112 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 9113 { 9114 struct bpf_reg_state *ret_reg = ®s[BPF_REG_0]; 9115 9116 if (ret_type != RET_INTEGER || 9117 (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stack && 9118 func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_task_stack && 9119 func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_str && 9120 func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel_str && 9121 func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_user_str)) 9122 return; 9123 9124 ret_reg->smax_value = meta->msize_max_value; 9125 ret_reg->s32_max_value = meta->msize_max_value; 9126 ret_reg->smin_value = -MAX_ERRNO; 9127 ret_reg->s32_min_value = -MAX_ERRNO; 9128 reg_bounds_sync(ret_reg); 9129 } 9130 9131 static int 9132 record_func_map(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 9133 int func_id, int insn_idx) 9134 { 9135 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; 9136 struct bpf_map *map = meta->map_ptr; 9137 9138 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call && 9139 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 9140 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem && 9141 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem && 9142 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem && 9143 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem && 9144 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem && 9145 func_id != BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem && 9146 func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map && 9147 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem) 9148 return 0; 9149 9150 if (map == NULL) { 9151 verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n"); 9152 return -EINVAL; 9153 } 9154 9155 /* In case of read-only, some additional restrictions 9156 * need to be applied in order to prevent altering the 9157 * state of the map from program side. 9158 */ 9159 if ((map->map_flags & BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG) && 9160 (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem || 9161 func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem || 9162 func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem || 9163 func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem)) { 9164 verbose(env, "write into map forbidden\n"); 9165 return -EACCES; 9166 } 9167 9168 if (!BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state)) 9169 bpf_map_ptr_store(aux, meta->map_ptr, 9170 !meta->map_ptr->bypass_spec_v1); 9171 else if (BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state) != meta->map_ptr) 9172 bpf_map_ptr_store(aux, BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON, 9173 !meta->map_ptr->bypass_spec_v1); 9174 return 0; 9175 } 9176 9177 static int 9178 record_func_key(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 9179 int func_id, int insn_idx) 9180 { 9181 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; 9182 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg; 9183 struct bpf_map *map = meta->map_ptr; 9184 u64 val, max; 9185 int err; 9186 9187 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call) 9188 return 0; 9189 if (!map || map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY) { 9190 verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n"); 9191 return -EINVAL; 9192 } 9193 9194 reg = ®s[BPF_REG_3]; 9195 val = reg->var_off.value; 9196 max = map->max_entries; 9197 9198 if (!(register_is_const(reg) && val < max)) { 9199 bpf_map_key_store(aux, BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON); 9200 return 0; 9201 } 9202 9203 err = mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_3); 9204 if (err) 9205 return err; 9206 if (bpf_map_key_unseen(aux)) 9207 bpf_map_key_store(aux, val); 9208 else if (!bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux) && 9209 bpf_map_key_immediate(aux) != val) 9210 bpf_map_key_store(aux, BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON); 9211 return 0; 9212 } 9213 9214 static int check_reference_leak(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 9215 { 9216 struct bpf_func_state *state = cur_func(env); 9217 bool refs_lingering = false; 9218 int i; 9219 9220 if (state->frameno && !state->in_callback_fn) 9221 return 0; 9222 9223 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) { 9224 if (state->in_callback_fn && state->refs[i].callback_ref != state->frameno) 9225 continue; 9226 verbose(env, "Unreleased reference id=%d alloc_insn=%d\n", 9227 state->refs[i].id, state->refs[i].insn_idx); 9228 refs_lingering = true; 9229 } 9230 return refs_lingering ? -EINVAL : 0; 9231 } 9232 9233 static int check_bpf_snprintf_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9234 struct bpf_reg_state *regs) 9235 { 9236 struct bpf_reg_state *fmt_reg = ®s[BPF_REG_3]; 9237 struct bpf_reg_state *data_len_reg = ®s[BPF_REG_5]; 9238 struct bpf_map *fmt_map = fmt_reg->map_ptr; 9239 struct bpf_bprintf_data data = {}; 9240 int err, fmt_map_off, num_args; 9241 u64 fmt_addr; 9242 char *fmt; 9243 9244 /* data must be an array of u64 */ 9245 if (data_len_reg->var_off.value % 8) 9246 return -EINVAL; 9247 num_args = data_len_reg->var_off.value / 8; 9248 9249 /* fmt being ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR guarantees that var_off is const 9250 * and map_direct_value_addr is set. 9251 */ 9252 fmt_map_off = fmt_reg->off + fmt_reg->var_off.value; 9253 err = fmt_map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(fmt_map, &fmt_addr, 9254 fmt_map_off); 9255 if (err) { 9256 verbose(env, "verifier bug\n"); 9257 return -EFAULT; 9258 } 9259 fmt = (char *)(long)fmt_addr + fmt_map_off; 9260 9261 /* We are also guaranteed that fmt+fmt_map_off is NULL terminated, we 9262 * can focus on validating the format specifiers. 9263 */ 9264 err = bpf_bprintf_prepare(fmt, UINT_MAX, NULL, num_args, &data); 9265 if (err < 0) 9266 verbose(env, "Invalid format string\n"); 9267 9268 return err; 9269 } 9270 9271 static int check_get_func_ip(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 9272 { 9273 enum bpf_prog_type type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 9274 int func_id = BPF_FUNC_get_func_ip; 9275 9276 if (type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING) { 9277 if (!bpf_prog_has_trampoline(env->prog)) { 9278 verbose(env, "func %s#%d supported only for fentry/fexit/fmod_ret programs\n", 9279 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 9280 return -ENOTSUPP; 9281 } 9282 return 0; 9283 } else if (type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE) { 9284 return 0; 9285 } 9286 9287 verbose(env, "func %s#%d not supported for program type %d\n", 9288 func_id_name(func_id), func_id, type); 9289 return -ENOTSUPP; 9290 } 9291 9292 static struct bpf_insn_aux_data *cur_aux(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 9293 { 9294 return &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx]; 9295 } 9296 9297 static bool loop_flag_is_zero(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 9298 { 9299 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 9300 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[BPF_REG_4]; 9301 bool reg_is_null = register_is_null(reg); 9302 9303 if (reg_is_null) 9304 mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_4); 9305 9306 return reg_is_null; 9307 } 9308 9309 static void update_loop_inline_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 subprogno) 9310 { 9311 struct bpf_loop_inline_state *state = &cur_aux(env)->loop_inline_state; 9312 9313 if (!state->initialized) { 9314 state->initialized = 1; 9315 state->fit_for_inline = loop_flag_is_zero(env); 9316 state->callback_subprogno = subprogno; 9317 return; 9318 } 9319 9320 if (!state->fit_for_inline) 9321 return; 9322 9323 state->fit_for_inline = (loop_flag_is_zero(env) && 9324 state->callback_subprogno == subprogno); 9325 } 9326 9327 static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 9328 int *insn_idx_p) 9329 { 9330 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 9331 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn = NULL; 9332 enum bpf_return_type ret_type; 9333 enum bpf_type_flag ret_flag; 9334 struct bpf_reg_state *regs; 9335 struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta; 9336 int insn_idx = *insn_idx_p; 9337 bool changes_data; 9338 int i, err, func_id; 9339 9340 /* find function prototype */ 9341 func_id = insn->imm; 9342 if (func_id < 0 || func_id >= __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID) { 9343 verbose(env, "invalid func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), 9344 func_id); 9345 return -EINVAL; 9346 } 9347 9348 if (env->ops->get_func_proto) 9349 fn = env->ops->get_func_proto(func_id, env->prog); 9350 if (!fn) { 9351 verbose(env, "unknown func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), 9352 func_id); 9353 return -EINVAL; 9354 } 9355 9356 /* eBPF programs must be GPL compatible to use GPL-ed functions */ 9357 if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible && fn->gpl_only) { 9358 verbose(env, "cannot call GPL-restricted function from non-GPL compatible program\n"); 9359 return -EINVAL; 9360 } 9361 9362 if (fn->allowed && !fn->allowed(env->prog)) { 9363 verbose(env, "helper call is not allowed in probe\n"); 9364 return -EINVAL; 9365 } 9366 9367 if (!env->prog->aux->sleepable && fn->might_sleep) { 9368 verbose(env, "helper call might sleep in a non-sleepable prog\n"); 9369 return -EINVAL; 9370 } 9371 9372 /* With LD_ABS/IND some JITs save/restore skb from r1. */ 9373 changes_data = bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(fn->func); 9374 if (changes_data && fn->arg1_type != ARG_PTR_TO_CTX) { 9375 verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d: r1 != ctx\n", 9376 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 9377 return -EINVAL; 9378 } 9379 9380 memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta)); 9381 meta.pkt_access = fn->pkt_access; 9382 9383 err = check_func_proto(fn, func_id); 9384 if (err) { 9385 verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n", 9386 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 9387 return err; 9388 } 9389 9390 if (env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock) { 9391 if (fn->might_sleep) { 9392 verbose(env, "sleepable helper %s#%d in rcu_read_lock region\n", 9393 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 9394 return -EINVAL; 9395 } 9396 9397 if (env->prog->aux->sleepable && is_storage_get_function(func_id)) 9398 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].storage_get_func_atomic = true; 9399 } 9400 9401 meta.func_id = func_id; 9402 /* check args */ 9403 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS; i++) { 9404 err = check_func_arg(env, i, &meta, fn, insn_idx); 9405 if (err) 9406 return err; 9407 } 9408 9409 err = record_func_map(env, &meta, func_id, insn_idx); 9410 if (err) 9411 return err; 9412 9413 err = record_func_key(env, &meta, func_id, insn_idx); 9414 if (err) 9415 return err; 9416 9417 /* Mark slots with STACK_MISC in case of raw mode, stack offset 9418 * is inferred from register state. 9419 */ 9420 for (i = 0; i < meta.access_size; i++) { 9421 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, meta.regno, i, BPF_B, 9422 BPF_WRITE, -1, false); 9423 if (err) 9424 return err; 9425 } 9426 9427 regs = cur_regs(env); 9428 9429 if (meta.release_regno) { 9430 err = -EINVAL; 9431 /* This can only be set for PTR_TO_STACK, as CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR cannot 9432 * be released by any dynptr helper. Hence, unmark_stack_slots_dynptr 9433 * is safe to do directly. 9434 */ 9435 if (arg_type_is_dynptr(fn->arg_type[meta.release_regno - BPF_REG_1])) { 9436 if (regs[meta.release_regno].type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) { 9437 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR cannot be released\n"); 9438 return -EFAULT; 9439 } 9440 err = unmark_stack_slots_dynptr(env, ®s[meta.release_regno]); 9441 } else if (meta.ref_obj_id) { 9442 err = release_reference(env, meta.ref_obj_id); 9443 } else if (register_is_null(®s[meta.release_regno])) { 9444 /* meta.ref_obj_id can only be 0 if register that is meant to be 9445 * released is NULL, which must be > R0. 9446 */ 9447 err = 0; 9448 } 9449 if (err) { 9450 verbose(env, "func %s#%d reference has not been acquired before\n", 9451 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 9452 return err; 9453 } 9454 } 9455 9456 switch (func_id) { 9457 case BPF_FUNC_tail_call: 9458 err = check_reference_leak(env); 9459 if (err) { 9460 verbose(env, "tail_call would lead to reference leak\n"); 9461 return err; 9462 } 9463 break; 9464 case BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage: 9465 /* check that flags argument in get_local_storage(map, flags) is 0, 9466 * this is required because get_local_storage() can't return an error. 9467 */ 9468 if (!register_is_null(®s[BPF_REG_2])) { 9469 verbose(env, "get_local_storage() doesn't support non-zero flags\n"); 9470 return -EINVAL; 9471 } 9472 break; 9473 case BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem: 9474 err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno, 9475 set_map_elem_callback_state); 9476 break; 9477 case BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback: 9478 err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno, 9479 set_timer_callback_state); 9480 break; 9481 case BPF_FUNC_find_vma: 9482 err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno, 9483 set_find_vma_callback_state); 9484 break; 9485 case BPF_FUNC_snprintf: 9486 err = check_bpf_snprintf_call(env, regs); 9487 break; 9488 case BPF_FUNC_loop: 9489 update_loop_inline_state(env, meta.subprogno); 9490 err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno, 9491 set_loop_callback_state); 9492 break; 9493 case BPF_FUNC_dynptr_from_mem: 9494 if (regs[BPF_REG_1].type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 9495 verbose(env, "Unsupported reg type %s for bpf_dynptr_from_mem data\n", 9496 reg_type_str(env, regs[BPF_REG_1].type)); 9497 return -EACCES; 9498 } 9499 break; 9500 case BPF_FUNC_set_retval: 9501 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM && 9502 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_LSM_CGROUP) { 9503 if (!env->prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) { 9504 /* Make sure programs that attach to void 9505 * hooks don't try to modify return value. 9506 */ 9507 verbose(env, "BPF_LSM_CGROUP that attach to void LSM hooks can't modify return value!\n"); 9508 return -EINVAL; 9509 } 9510 } 9511 break; 9512 case BPF_FUNC_dynptr_data: 9513 { 9514 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 9515 int id, ref_obj_id; 9516 9517 reg = get_dynptr_arg_reg(env, fn, regs); 9518 if (!reg) 9519 return -EFAULT; 9520 9521 9522 if (meta.dynptr_id) { 9523 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: meta.dynptr_id already set\n"); 9524 return -EFAULT; 9525 } 9526 if (meta.ref_obj_id) { 9527 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: meta.ref_obj_id already set\n"); 9528 return -EFAULT; 9529 } 9530 9531 id = dynptr_id(env, reg); 9532 if (id < 0) { 9533 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: failed to obtain dynptr id\n"); 9534 return id; 9535 } 9536 9537 ref_obj_id = dynptr_ref_obj_id(env, reg); 9538 if (ref_obj_id < 0) { 9539 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: failed to obtain dynptr ref_obj_id\n"); 9540 return ref_obj_id; 9541 } 9542 9543 meta.dynptr_id = id; 9544 meta.ref_obj_id = ref_obj_id; 9545 9546 break; 9547 } 9548 case BPF_FUNC_dynptr_write: 9549 { 9550 enum bpf_dynptr_type dynptr_type; 9551 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 9552 9553 reg = get_dynptr_arg_reg(env, fn, regs); 9554 if (!reg) 9555 return -EFAULT; 9556 9557 dynptr_type = dynptr_get_type(env, reg); 9558 if (dynptr_type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID) 9559 return -EFAULT; 9560 9561 if (dynptr_type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB) 9562 /* this will trigger clear_all_pkt_pointers(), which will 9563 * invalidate all dynptr slices associated with the skb 9564 */ 9565 changes_data = true; 9566 9567 break; 9568 } 9569 case BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain: 9570 err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno, 9571 set_user_ringbuf_callback_state); 9572 break; 9573 } 9574 9575 if (err) 9576 return err; 9577 9578 /* reset caller saved regs */ 9579 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { 9580 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); 9581 check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); 9582 } 9583 9584 /* helper call returns 64-bit value. */ 9585 regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 9586 9587 /* update return register (already marked as written above) */ 9588 ret_type = fn->ret_type; 9589 ret_flag = type_flag(ret_type); 9590 9591 switch (base_type(ret_type)) { 9592 case RET_INTEGER: 9593 /* sets type to SCALAR_VALUE */ 9594 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 9595 break; 9596 case RET_VOID: 9597 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = NOT_INIT; 9598 break; 9599 case RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 9600 /* There is no offset yet applied, variable or fixed */ 9601 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 9602 /* remember map_ptr, so that check_map_access() 9603 * can check 'value_size' boundary of memory access 9604 * to map element returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem() 9605 */ 9606 if (meta.map_ptr == NULL) { 9607 verbose(env, 9608 "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n"); 9609 return -EINVAL; 9610 } 9611 regs[BPF_REG_0].map_ptr = meta.map_ptr; 9612 regs[BPF_REG_0].map_uid = meta.map_uid; 9613 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE | ret_flag; 9614 if (!type_may_be_null(ret_type) && 9615 btf_record_has_field(meta.map_ptr->record, BPF_SPIN_LOCK)) { 9616 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; 9617 } 9618 break; 9619 case RET_PTR_TO_SOCKET: 9620 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 9621 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_SOCKET | ret_flag; 9622 break; 9623 case RET_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 9624 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 9625 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON | ret_flag; 9626 break; 9627 case RET_PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 9628 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 9629 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK | ret_flag; 9630 break; 9631 case RET_PTR_TO_MEM: 9632 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 9633 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM | ret_flag; 9634 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = meta.mem_size; 9635 break; 9636 case RET_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_BTF_ID: 9637 { 9638 const struct btf_type *t; 9639 9640 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 9641 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(meta.ret_btf, meta.ret_btf_id, NULL); 9642 if (!btf_type_is_struct(t)) { 9643 u32 tsize; 9644 const struct btf_type *ret; 9645 const char *tname; 9646 9647 /* resolve the type size of ksym. */ 9648 ret = btf_resolve_size(meta.ret_btf, t, &tsize); 9649 if (IS_ERR(ret)) { 9650 tname = btf_name_by_offset(meta.ret_btf, t->name_off); 9651 verbose(env, "unable to resolve the size of type '%s': %ld\n", 9652 tname, PTR_ERR(ret)); 9653 return -EINVAL; 9654 } 9655 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM | ret_flag; 9656 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = tsize; 9657 } else { 9658 /* MEM_RDONLY may be carried from ret_flag, but it 9659 * doesn't apply on PTR_TO_BTF_ID. Fold it, otherwise 9660 * it will confuse the check of PTR_TO_BTF_ID in 9661 * check_mem_access(). 9662 */ 9663 ret_flag &= ~MEM_RDONLY; 9664 9665 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | ret_flag; 9666 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = meta.ret_btf; 9667 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta.ret_btf_id; 9668 } 9669 break; 9670 } 9671 case RET_PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 9672 { 9673 struct btf *ret_btf; 9674 int ret_btf_id; 9675 9676 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 9677 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | ret_flag; 9678 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) { 9679 ret_btf = meta.kptr_field->kptr.btf; 9680 ret_btf_id = meta.kptr_field->kptr.btf_id; 9681 if (!btf_is_kernel(ret_btf)) 9682 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_ALLOC; 9683 } else { 9684 if (fn->ret_btf_id == BPF_PTR_POISON) { 9685 verbose(env, "verifier internal error:"); 9686 verbose(env, "func %s has non-overwritten BPF_PTR_POISON return type\n", 9687 func_id_name(func_id)); 9688 return -EINVAL; 9689 } 9690 ret_btf = btf_vmlinux; 9691 ret_btf_id = *fn->ret_btf_id; 9692 } 9693 if (ret_btf_id == 0) { 9694 verbose(env, "invalid return type %u of func %s#%d\n", 9695 base_type(ret_type), func_id_name(func_id), 9696 func_id); 9697 return -EINVAL; 9698 } 9699 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = ret_btf; 9700 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ret_btf_id; 9701 break; 9702 } 9703 default: 9704 verbose(env, "unknown return type %u of func %s#%d\n", 9705 base_type(ret_type), func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 9706 return -EINVAL; 9707 } 9708 9709 if (type_may_be_null(regs[BPF_REG_0].type)) 9710 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; 9711 9712 if (helper_multiple_ref_obj_use(func_id, meta.map_ptr)) { 9713 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: func %s#%d sets ref_obj_id more than once\n", 9714 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 9715 return -EFAULT; 9716 } 9717 9718 if (is_dynptr_ref_function(func_id)) 9719 regs[BPF_REG_0].dynptr_id = meta.dynptr_id; 9720 9721 if (is_ptr_cast_function(func_id) || is_dynptr_ref_function(func_id)) { 9722 /* For release_reference() */ 9723 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = meta.ref_obj_id; 9724 } else if (is_acquire_function(func_id, meta.map_ptr)) { 9725 int id = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx); 9726 9727 if (id < 0) 9728 return id; 9729 /* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg() */ 9730 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = id; 9731 /* For release_reference() */ 9732 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = id; 9733 } 9734 9735 do_refine_retval_range(regs, fn->ret_type, func_id, &meta); 9736 9737 err = check_map_func_compatibility(env, meta.map_ptr, func_id); 9738 if (err) 9739 return err; 9740 9741 if ((func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stack || 9742 func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_task_stack) && 9743 !env->prog->has_callchain_buf) { 9744 const char *err_str; 9745 9746 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS 9747 err = get_callchain_buffers(sysctl_perf_event_max_stack); 9748 err_str = "cannot get callchain buffer for func %s#%d\n"; 9749 #else 9750 err = -ENOTSUPP; 9751 err_str = "func %s#%d not supported without CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS\n"; 9752 #endif 9753 if (err) { 9754 verbose(env, err_str, func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 9755 return err; 9756 } 9757 9758 env->prog->has_callchain_buf = true; 9759 } 9760 9761 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stackid || func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stack) 9762 env->prog->call_get_stack = true; 9763 9764 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_func_ip) { 9765 if (check_get_func_ip(env)) 9766 return -ENOTSUPP; 9767 env->prog->call_get_func_ip = true; 9768 } 9769 9770 if (changes_data) 9771 clear_all_pkt_pointers(env); 9772 return 0; 9773 } 9774 9775 /* mark_btf_func_reg_size() is used when the reg size is determined by 9776 * the BTF func_proto's return value size and argument. 9777 */ 9778 static void mark_btf_func_reg_size(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 9779 size_t reg_size) 9780 { 9781 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &cur_regs(env)[regno]; 9782 9783 if (regno == BPF_REG_0) { 9784 /* Function return value */ 9785 reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 9786 reg->subreg_def = reg_size == sizeof(u64) ? 9787 DEF_NOT_SUBREG : env->insn_idx + 1; 9788 } else { 9789 /* Function argument */ 9790 if (reg_size == sizeof(u64)) { 9791 mark_insn_zext(env, reg); 9792 mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 9793 } else { 9794 mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ32); 9795 } 9796 } 9797 } 9798 9799 static bool is_kfunc_acquire(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 9800 { 9801 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_ACQUIRE; 9802 } 9803 9804 static bool is_kfunc_release(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 9805 { 9806 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_RELEASE; 9807 } 9808 9809 static bool is_kfunc_trusted_args(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 9810 { 9811 return (meta->kfunc_flags & KF_TRUSTED_ARGS) || is_kfunc_release(meta); 9812 } 9813 9814 static bool is_kfunc_sleepable(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 9815 { 9816 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_SLEEPABLE; 9817 } 9818 9819 static bool is_kfunc_destructive(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 9820 { 9821 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_DESTRUCTIVE; 9822 } 9823 9824 static bool is_kfunc_rcu(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 9825 { 9826 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_RCU; 9827 } 9828 9829 static bool __kfunc_param_match_suffix(const struct btf *btf, 9830 const struct btf_param *arg, 9831 const char *suffix) 9832 { 9833 int suffix_len = strlen(suffix), len; 9834 const char *param_name; 9835 9836 /* In the future, this can be ported to use BTF tagging */ 9837 param_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf, arg->name_off); 9838 if (str_is_empty(param_name)) 9839 return false; 9840 len = strlen(param_name); 9841 if (len < suffix_len) 9842 return false; 9843 param_name += len - suffix_len; 9844 return !strncmp(param_name, suffix, suffix_len); 9845 } 9846 9847 static bool is_kfunc_arg_mem_size(const struct btf *btf, 9848 const struct btf_param *arg, 9849 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 9850 { 9851 const struct btf_type *t; 9852 9853 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, arg->type, NULL); 9854 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(t) || reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 9855 return false; 9856 9857 return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__sz"); 9858 } 9859 9860 static bool is_kfunc_arg_const_mem_size(const struct btf *btf, 9861 const struct btf_param *arg, 9862 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 9863 { 9864 const struct btf_type *t; 9865 9866 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, arg->type, NULL); 9867 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(t) || reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 9868 return false; 9869 9870 return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__szk"); 9871 } 9872 9873 static bool is_kfunc_arg_optional(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 9874 { 9875 return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__opt"); 9876 } 9877 9878 static bool is_kfunc_arg_constant(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 9879 { 9880 return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__k"); 9881 } 9882 9883 static bool is_kfunc_arg_ignore(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 9884 { 9885 return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__ign"); 9886 } 9887 9888 static bool is_kfunc_arg_alloc_obj(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 9889 { 9890 return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__alloc"); 9891 } 9892 9893 static bool is_kfunc_arg_uninit(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 9894 { 9895 return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__uninit"); 9896 } 9897 9898 static bool is_kfunc_arg_refcounted_kptr(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 9899 { 9900 return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__refcounted_kptr"); 9901 } 9902 9903 static bool is_kfunc_arg_scalar_with_name(const struct btf *btf, 9904 const struct btf_param *arg, 9905 const char *name) 9906 { 9907 int len, target_len = strlen(name); 9908 const char *param_name; 9909 9910 param_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf, arg->name_off); 9911 if (str_is_empty(param_name)) 9912 return false; 9913 len = strlen(param_name); 9914 if (len != target_len) 9915 return false; 9916 if (strcmp(param_name, name)) 9917 return false; 9918 9919 return true; 9920 } 9921 9922 enum { 9923 KF_ARG_DYNPTR_ID, 9924 KF_ARG_LIST_HEAD_ID, 9925 KF_ARG_LIST_NODE_ID, 9926 KF_ARG_RB_ROOT_ID, 9927 KF_ARG_RB_NODE_ID, 9928 }; 9929 9930 BTF_ID_LIST(kf_arg_btf_ids) 9931 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_dynptr_kern) 9932 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_list_head) 9933 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_list_node) 9934 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_rb_root) 9935 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_rb_node) 9936 9937 static bool __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(const struct btf *btf, 9938 const struct btf_param *arg, int type) 9939 { 9940 const struct btf_type *t; 9941 u32 res_id; 9942 9943 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, arg->type, NULL); 9944 if (!t) 9945 return false; 9946 if (!btf_type_is_ptr(t)) 9947 return false; 9948 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, t->type, &res_id); 9949 if (!t) 9950 return false; 9951 return btf_types_are_same(btf, res_id, btf_vmlinux, kf_arg_btf_ids[type]); 9952 } 9953 9954 static bool is_kfunc_arg_dynptr(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 9955 { 9956 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_DYNPTR_ID); 9957 } 9958 9959 static bool is_kfunc_arg_list_head(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 9960 { 9961 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_LIST_HEAD_ID); 9962 } 9963 9964 static bool is_kfunc_arg_list_node(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 9965 { 9966 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_LIST_NODE_ID); 9967 } 9968 9969 static bool is_kfunc_arg_rbtree_root(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 9970 { 9971 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_RB_ROOT_ID); 9972 } 9973 9974 static bool is_kfunc_arg_rbtree_node(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 9975 { 9976 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_RB_NODE_ID); 9977 } 9978 9979 static bool is_kfunc_arg_callback(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struct btf *btf, 9980 const struct btf_param *arg) 9981 { 9982 const struct btf_type *t; 9983 9984 t = btf_type_resolve_func_ptr(btf, arg->type, NULL); 9985 if (!t) 9986 return false; 9987 9988 return true; 9989 } 9990 9991 /* Returns true if struct is composed of scalars, 4 levels of nesting allowed */ 9992 static bool __btf_type_is_scalar_struct(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9993 const struct btf *btf, 9994 const struct btf_type *t, int rec) 9995 { 9996 const struct btf_type *member_type; 9997 const struct btf_member *member; 9998 u32 i; 9999 10000 if (!btf_type_is_struct(t)) 10001 return false; 10002 10003 for_each_member(i, t, member) { 10004 const struct btf_array *array; 10005 10006 member_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, member->type, NULL); 10007 if (btf_type_is_struct(member_type)) { 10008 if (rec >= 3) { 10009 verbose(env, "max struct nesting depth exceeded\n"); 10010 return false; 10011 } 10012 if (!__btf_type_is_scalar_struct(env, btf, member_type, rec + 1)) 10013 return false; 10014 continue; 10015 } 10016 if (btf_type_is_array(member_type)) { 10017 array = btf_array(member_type); 10018 if (!array->nelems) 10019 return false; 10020 member_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, array->type, NULL); 10021 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(member_type)) 10022 return false; 10023 continue; 10024 } 10025 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(member_type)) 10026 return false; 10027 } 10028 return true; 10029 } 10030 10031 10032 static u32 *reg2btf_ids[__BPF_REG_TYPE_MAX] = { 10033 #ifdef CONFIG_NET 10034 [PTR_TO_SOCKET] = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_SOCK], 10035 [PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON] = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_SOCK_COMMON], 10036 [PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK] = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_TCP], 10037 #endif 10038 }; 10039 10040 enum kfunc_ptr_arg_type { 10041 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX, 10042 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID, /* Allocated object */ 10043 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR, /* Refcounted local kptr */ 10044 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, 10045 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ITER, 10046 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD, 10047 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_NODE, 10048 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID, /* Also covers reg2btf_ids conversions */ 10049 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM, 10050 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE, /* Size derived from next argument, skip it */ 10051 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CALLBACK, 10052 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_ROOT, 10053 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_NODE, 10054 }; 10055 10056 enum special_kfunc_type { 10057 KF_bpf_obj_new_impl, 10058 KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl, 10059 KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl, 10060 KF_bpf_list_push_front_impl, 10061 KF_bpf_list_push_back_impl, 10062 KF_bpf_list_pop_front, 10063 KF_bpf_list_pop_back, 10064 KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx, 10065 KF_bpf_rdonly_cast, 10066 KF_bpf_rcu_read_lock, 10067 KF_bpf_rcu_read_unlock, 10068 KF_bpf_rbtree_remove, 10069 KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl, 10070 KF_bpf_rbtree_first, 10071 KF_bpf_dynptr_from_skb, 10072 KF_bpf_dynptr_from_xdp, 10073 KF_bpf_dynptr_slice, 10074 KF_bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr, 10075 KF_bpf_dynptr_clone, 10076 }; 10077 10078 BTF_SET_START(special_kfunc_set) 10079 BTF_ID(func, bpf_obj_new_impl) 10080 BTF_ID(func, bpf_obj_drop_impl) 10081 BTF_ID(func, bpf_refcount_acquire_impl) 10082 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_push_front_impl) 10083 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_push_back_impl) 10084 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_pop_front) 10085 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_pop_back) 10086 BTF_ID(func, bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx) 10087 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rdonly_cast) 10088 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_remove) 10089 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_add_impl) 10090 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_first) 10091 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_from_skb) 10092 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_from_xdp) 10093 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_slice) 10094 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr) 10095 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_clone) 10096 BTF_SET_END(special_kfunc_set) 10097 10098 BTF_ID_LIST(special_kfunc_list) 10099 BTF_ID(func, bpf_obj_new_impl) 10100 BTF_ID(func, bpf_obj_drop_impl) 10101 BTF_ID(func, bpf_refcount_acquire_impl) 10102 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_push_front_impl) 10103 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_push_back_impl) 10104 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_pop_front) 10105 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_pop_back) 10106 BTF_ID(func, bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx) 10107 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rdonly_cast) 10108 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rcu_read_lock) 10109 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rcu_read_unlock) 10110 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_remove) 10111 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_add_impl) 10112 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_first) 10113 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_from_skb) 10114 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_from_xdp) 10115 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_slice) 10116 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr) 10117 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_clone) 10118 10119 static bool is_kfunc_ret_null(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 10120 { 10121 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl] && 10122 meta->arg_owning_ref) { 10123 return false; 10124 } 10125 10126 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_RET_NULL; 10127 } 10128 10129 static bool is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_lock(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 10130 { 10131 return meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rcu_read_lock]; 10132 } 10133 10134 static bool is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_unlock(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 10135 { 10136 return meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rcu_read_unlock]; 10137 } 10138 10139 static enum kfunc_ptr_arg_type 10140 get_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10141 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 10142 const struct btf_type *t, const struct btf_type *ref_t, 10143 const char *ref_tname, const struct btf_param *args, 10144 int argno, int nargs) 10145 { 10146 u32 regno = argno + 1; 10147 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 10148 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; 10149 bool arg_mem_size = false; 10150 10151 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx]) 10152 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX; 10153 10154 /* In this function, we verify the kfunc's BTF as per the argument type, 10155 * leaving the rest of the verification with respect to the register 10156 * type to our caller. When a set of conditions hold in the BTF type of 10157 * arguments, we resolve it to a known kfunc_ptr_arg_type. 10158 */ 10159 if (btf_get_prog_ctx_type(&env->log, meta->btf, t, resolve_prog_type(env->prog), argno)) 10160 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX; 10161 10162 if (is_kfunc_arg_alloc_obj(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 10163 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID; 10164 10165 if (is_kfunc_arg_refcounted_kptr(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 10166 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR; 10167 10168 if (is_kfunc_arg_dynptr(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 10169 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR; 10170 10171 if (is_kfunc_arg_iter(meta, argno)) 10172 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ITER; 10173 10174 if (is_kfunc_arg_list_head(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 10175 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD; 10176 10177 if (is_kfunc_arg_list_node(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 10178 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_NODE; 10179 10180 if (is_kfunc_arg_rbtree_root(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 10181 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_ROOT; 10182 10183 if (is_kfunc_arg_rbtree_node(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 10184 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_NODE; 10185 10186 if ((base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID || reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)])) { 10187 if (!btf_type_is_struct(ref_t)) { 10188 verbose(env, "kernel function %s args#%d pointer type %s %s is not supported\n", 10189 meta->func_name, argno, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname); 10190 return -EINVAL; 10191 } 10192 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 10193 } 10194 10195 if (is_kfunc_arg_callback(env, meta->btf, &args[argno])) 10196 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CALLBACK; 10197 10198 10199 if (argno + 1 < nargs && 10200 (is_kfunc_arg_mem_size(meta->btf, &args[argno + 1], ®s[regno + 1]) || 10201 is_kfunc_arg_const_mem_size(meta->btf, &args[argno + 1], ®s[regno + 1]))) 10202 arg_mem_size = true; 10203 10204 /* This is the catch all argument type of register types supported by 10205 * check_helper_mem_access. However, we only allow when argument type is 10206 * pointer to scalar, or struct composed (recursively) of scalars. When 10207 * arg_mem_size is true, the pointer can be void *. 10208 */ 10209 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(ref_t) && !__btf_type_is_scalar_struct(env, meta->btf, ref_t, 0) && 10210 (arg_mem_size ? !btf_type_is_void(ref_t) : 1)) { 10211 verbose(env, "arg#%d pointer type %s %s must point to %sscalar, or struct with scalar\n", 10212 argno, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname, arg_mem_size ? "void, " : ""); 10213 return -EINVAL; 10214 } 10215 return arg_mem_size ? KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE : KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM; 10216 } 10217 10218 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10219 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 10220 const struct btf_type *ref_t, 10221 const char *ref_tname, u32 ref_id, 10222 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 10223 int argno) 10224 { 10225 const struct btf_type *reg_ref_t; 10226 bool strict_type_match = false; 10227 const struct btf *reg_btf; 10228 const char *reg_ref_tname; 10229 u32 reg_ref_id; 10230 10231 if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 10232 reg_btf = reg->btf; 10233 reg_ref_id = reg->btf_id; 10234 } else { 10235 reg_btf = btf_vmlinux; 10236 reg_ref_id = *reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)]; 10237 } 10238 10239 /* Enforce strict type matching for calls to kfuncs that are acquiring 10240 * or releasing a reference, or are no-cast aliases. We do _not_ 10241 * enforce strict matching for plain KF_TRUSTED_ARGS kfuncs by default, 10242 * as we want to enable BPF programs to pass types that are bitwise 10243 * equivalent without forcing them to explicitly cast with something 10244 * like bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx(). 10245 * 10246 * For example, say we had a type like the following: 10247 * 10248 * struct bpf_cpumask { 10249 * cpumask_t cpumask; 10250 * refcount_t usage; 10251 * }; 10252 * 10253 * Note that as specified in <linux/cpumask.h>, cpumask_t is typedef'ed 10254 * to a struct cpumask, so it would be safe to pass a struct 10255 * bpf_cpumask * to a kfunc expecting a struct cpumask *. 10256 * 10257 * The philosophy here is similar to how we allow scalars of different 10258 * types to be passed to kfuncs as long as the size is the same. The 10259 * only difference here is that we're simply allowing 10260 * btf_struct_ids_match() to walk the struct at the 0th offset, and 10261 * resolve types. 10262 */ 10263 if (is_kfunc_acquire(meta) || 10264 (is_kfunc_release(meta) && reg->ref_obj_id) || 10265 btf_type_ids_nocast_alias(&env->log, reg_btf, reg_ref_id, meta->btf, ref_id)) 10266 strict_type_match = true; 10267 10268 WARN_ON_ONCE(is_kfunc_trusted_args(meta) && reg->off); 10269 10270 reg_ref_t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(reg_btf, reg_ref_id, ®_ref_id); 10271 reg_ref_tname = btf_name_by_offset(reg_btf, reg_ref_t->name_off); 10272 if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg_btf, reg_ref_id, reg->off, meta->btf, ref_id, strict_type_match)) { 10273 verbose(env, "kernel function %s args#%d expected pointer to %s %s but R%d has a pointer to %s %s\n", 10274 meta->func_name, argno, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname, argno + 1, 10275 btf_type_str(reg_ref_t), reg_ref_tname); 10276 return -EINVAL; 10277 } 10278 return 0; 10279 } 10280 10281 static int ref_set_non_owning(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 10282 { 10283 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 10284 10285 if (!state->active_lock.ptr) { 10286 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: ref_set_non_owning w/o active lock\n"); 10287 return -EFAULT; 10288 } 10289 10290 if (type_flag(reg->type) & NON_OWN_REF) { 10291 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: NON_OWN_REF already set\n"); 10292 return -EFAULT; 10293 } 10294 10295 reg->type |= NON_OWN_REF; 10296 return 0; 10297 } 10298 10299 static int ref_convert_owning_non_owning(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 ref_obj_id) 10300 { 10301 struct bpf_func_state *state, *unused; 10302 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 10303 int i; 10304 10305 state = cur_func(env); 10306 10307 if (!ref_obj_id) { 10308 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: ref_obj_id is zero for " 10309 "owning -> non-owning conversion\n"); 10310 return -EFAULT; 10311 } 10312 10313 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) { 10314 if (state->refs[i].id != ref_obj_id) 10315 continue; 10316 10317 /* Clear ref_obj_id here so release_reference doesn't clobber 10318 * the whole reg 10319 */ 10320 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, unused, reg, ({ 10321 if (reg->ref_obj_id == ref_obj_id) { 10322 reg->ref_obj_id = 0; 10323 ref_set_non_owning(env, reg); 10324 } 10325 })); 10326 return 0; 10327 } 10328 10329 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: ref state missing for ref_obj_id\n"); 10330 return -EFAULT; 10331 } 10332 10333 /* Implementation details: 10334 * 10335 * Each register points to some region of memory, which we define as an 10336 * allocation. Each allocation may embed a bpf_spin_lock which protects any 10337 * special BPF objects (bpf_list_head, bpf_rb_root, etc.) part of the same 10338 * allocation. The lock and the data it protects are colocated in the same 10339 * memory region. 10340 * 10341 * Hence, everytime a register holds a pointer value pointing to such 10342 * allocation, the verifier preserves a unique reg->id for it. 10343 * 10344 * The verifier remembers the lock 'ptr' and the lock 'id' whenever 10345 * bpf_spin_lock is called. 10346 * 10347 * To enable this, lock state in the verifier captures two values: 10348 * active_lock.ptr = Register's type specific pointer 10349 * active_lock.id = A unique ID for each register pointer value 10350 * 10351 * Currently, PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE and PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC are the two 10352 * supported register types. 10353 * 10354 * The active_lock.ptr in case of map values is the reg->map_ptr, and in case of 10355 * allocated objects is the reg->btf pointer. 10356 * 10357 * The active_lock.id is non-unique for maps supporting direct_value_addr, as we 10358 * can establish the provenance of the map value statically for each distinct 10359 * lookup into such maps. They always contain a single map value hence unique 10360 * IDs for each pseudo load pessimizes the algorithm and rejects valid programs. 10361 * 10362 * So, in case of global variables, they use array maps with max_entries = 1, 10363 * hence their active_lock.ptr becomes map_ptr and id = 0 (since they all point 10364 * into the same map value as max_entries is 1, as described above). 10365 * 10366 * In case of inner map lookups, the inner map pointer has same map_ptr as the 10367 * outer map pointer (in verifier context), but each lookup into an inner map 10368 * assigns a fresh reg->id to the lookup, so while lookups into distinct inner 10369 * maps from the same outer map share the same map_ptr as active_lock.ptr, they 10370 * will get different reg->id assigned to each lookup, hence different 10371 * active_lock.id. 10372 * 10373 * In case of allocated objects, active_lock.ptr is the reg->btf, and the 10374 * reg->id is a unique ID preserved after the NULL pointer check on the pointer 10375 * returned from bpf_obj_new. Each allocation receives a new reg->id. 10376 */ 10377 static int check_reg_allocation_locked(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 10378 { 10379 void *ptr; 10380 u32 id; 10381 10382 switch ((int)reg->type) { 10383 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 10384 ptr = reg->map_ptr; 10385 break; 10386 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC: 10387 ptr = reg->btf; 10388 break; 10389 default: 10390 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unknown reg type for lock check\n"); 10391 return -EFAULT; 10392 } 10393 id = reg->id; 10394 10395 if (!env->cur_state->active_lock.ptr) 10396 return -EINVAL; 10397 if (env->cur_state->active_lock.ptr != ptr || 10398 env->cur_state->active_lock.id != id) { 10399 verbose(env, "held lock and object are not in the same allocation\n"); 10400 return -EINVAL; 10401 } 10402 return 0; 10403 } 10404 10405 static bool is_bpf_list_api_kfunc(u32 btf_id) 10406 { 10407 return btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_front_impl] || 10408 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_back_impl] || 10409 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_pop_front] || 10410 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_pop_back]; 10411 } 10412 10413 static bool is_bpf_rbtree_api_kfunc(u32 btf_id) 10414 { 10415 return btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl] || 10416 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_remove] || 10417 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_first]; 10418 } 10419 10420 static bool is_bpf_graph_api_kfunc(u32 btf_id) 10421 { 10422 return is_bpf_list_api_kfunc(btf_id) || is_bpf_rbtree_api_kfunc(btf_id) || 10423 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl]; 10424 } 10425 10426 static bool is_callback_calling_kfunc(u32 btf_id) 10427 { 10428 return btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]; 10429 } 10430 10431 static bool is_rbtree_lock_required_kfunc(u32 btf_id) 10432 { 10433 return is_bpf_rbtree_api_kfunc(btf_id); 10434 } 10435 10436 static bool check_kfunc_is_graph_root_api(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10437 enum btf_field_type head_field_type, 10438 u32 kfunc_btf_id) 10439 { 10440 bool ret; 10441 10442 switch (head_field_type) { 10443 case BPF_LIST_HEAD: 10444 ret = is_bpf_list_api_kfunc(kfunc_btf_id); 10445 break; 10446 case BPF_RB_ROOT: 10447 ret = is_bpf_rbtree_api_kfunc(kfunc_btf_id); 10448 break; 10449 default: 10450 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected graph root argument type %s\n", 10451 btf_field_type_name(head_field_type)); 10452 return false; 10453 } 10454 10455 if (!ret) 10456 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: %s head arg for unknown kfunc\n", 10457 btf_field_type_name(head_field_type)); 10458 return ret; 10459 } 10460 10461 static bool check_kfunc_is_graph_node_api(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10462 enum btf_field_type node_field_type, 10463 u32 kfunc_btf_id) 10464 { 10465 bool ret; 10466 10467 switch (node_field_type) { 10468 case BPF_LIST_NODE: 10469 ret = (kfunc_btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_front_impl] || 10470 kfunc_btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_back_impl]); 10471 break; 10472 case BPF_RB_NODE: 10473 ret = (kfunc_btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_remove] || 10474 kfunc_btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]); 10475 break; 10476 default: 10477 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected graph node argument type %s\n", 10478 btf_field_type_name(node_field_type)); 10479 return false; 10480 } 10481 10482 if (!ret) 10483 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: %s node arg for unknown kfunc\n", 10484 btf_field_type_name(node_field_type)); 10485 return ret; 10486 } 10487 10488 static int 10489 __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_root(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10490 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 10491 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 10492 enum btf_field_type head_field_type, 10493 struct btf_field **head_field) 10494 { 10495 const char *head_type_name; 10496 struct btf_field *field; 10497 struct btf_record *rec; 10498 u32 head_off; 10499 10500 if (meta->btf != btf_vmlinux) { 10501 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected btf mismatch in kfunc call\n"); 10502 return -EFAULT; 10503 } 10504 10505 if (!check_kfunc_is_graph_root_api(env, head_field_type, meta->func_id)) 10506 return -EFAULT; 10507 10508 head_type_name = btf_field_type_name(head_field_type); 10509 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 10510 verbose(env, 10511 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. %s has to be at the constant offset\n", 10512 regno, head_type_name); 10513 return -EINVAL; 10514 } 10515 10516 rec = reg_btf_record(reg); 10517 head_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; 10518 field = btf_record_find(rec, head_off, head_field_type); 10519 if (!field) { 10520 verbose(env, "%s not found at offset=%u\n", head_type_name, head_off); 10521 return -EINVAL; 10522 } 10523 10524 /* All functions require bpf_list_head to be protected using a bpf_spin_lock */ 10525 if (check_reg_allocation_locked(env, reg)) { 10526 verbose(env, "bpf_spin_lock at off=%d must be held for %s\n", 10527 rec->spin_lock_off, head_type_name); 10528 return -EINVAL; 10529 } 10530 10531 if (*head_field) { 10532 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: repeating %s arg\n", head_type_name); 10533 return -EFAULT; 10534 } 10535 *head_field = field; 10536 return 0; 10537 } 10538 10539 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_head(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10540 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 10541 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 10542 { 10543 return __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_root(env, reg, regno, meta, BPF_LIST_HEAD, 10544 &meta->arg_list_head.field); 10545 } 10546 10547 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_rbtree_root(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10548 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 10549 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 10550 { 10551 return __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_root(env, reg, regno, meta, BPF_RB_ROOT, 10552 &meta->arg_rbtree_root.field); 10553 } 10554 10555 static int 10556 __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_node(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10557 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 10558 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 10559 enum btf_field_type head_field_type, 10560 enum btf_field_type node_field_type, 10561 struct btf_field **node_field) 10562 { 10563 const char *node_type_name; 10564 const struct btf_type *et, *t; 10565 struct btf_field *field; 10566 u32 node_off; 10567 10568 if (meta->btf != btf_vmlinux) { 10569 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected btf mismatch in kfunc call\n"); 10570 return -EFAULT; 10571 } 10572 10573 if (!check_kfunc_is_graph_node_api(env, node_field_type, meta->func_id)) 10574 return -EFAULT; 10575 10576 node_type_name = btf_field_type_name(node_field_type); 10577 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 10578 verbose(env, 10579 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. %s has to be at the constant offset\n", 10580 regno, node_type_name); 10581 return -EINVAL; 10582 } 10583 10584 node_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; 10585 field = reg_find_field_offset(reg, node_off, node_field_type); 10586 if (!field || field->offset != node_off) { 10587 verbose(env, "%s not found at offset=%u\n", node_type_name, node_off); 10588 return -EINVAL; 10589 } 10590 10591 field = *node_field; 10592 10593 et = btf_type_by_id(field->graph_root.btf, field->graph_root.value_btf_id); 10594 t = btf_type_by_id(reg->btf, reg->btf_id); 10595 if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg->btf, reg->btf_id, 0, field->graph_root.btf, 10596 field->graph_root.value_btf_id, true)) { 10597 verbose(env, "operation on %s expects arg#1 %s at offset=%d " 10598 "in struct %s, but arg is at offset=%d in struct %s\n", 10599 btf_field_type_name(head_field_type), 10600 btf_field_type_name(node_field_type), 10601 field->graph_root.node_offset, 10602 btf_name_by_offset(field->graph_root.btf, et->name_off), 10603 node_off, btf_name_by_offset(reg->btf, t->name_off)); 10604 return -EINVAL; 10605 } 10606 meta->arg_btf = reg->btf; 10607 meta->arg_btf_id = reg->btf_id; 10608 10609 if (node_off != field->graph_root.node_offset) { 10610 verbose(env, "arg#1 offset=%d, but expected %s at offset=%d in struct %s\n", 10611 node_off, btf_field_type_name(node_field_type), 10612 field->graph_root.node_offset, 10613 btf_name_by_offset(field->graph_root.btf, et->name_off)); 10614 return -EINVAL; 10615 } 10616 10617 return 0; 10618 } 10619 10620 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_node(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10621 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 10622 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 10623 { 10624 return __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_node(env, reg, regno, meta, 10625 BPF_LIST_HEAD, BPF_LIST_NODE, 10626 &meta->arg_list_head.field); 10627 } 10628 10629 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_rbtree_node(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10630 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 10631 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 10632 { 10633 return __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_node(env, reg, regno, meta, 10634 BPF_RB_ROOT, BPF_RB_NODE, 10635 &meta->arg_rbtree_root.field); 10636 } 10637 10638 static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 10639 int insn_idx) 10640 { 10641 const char *func_name = meta->func_name, *ref_tname; 10642 const struct btf *btf = meta->btf; 10643 const struct btf_param *args; 10644 struct btf_record *rec; 10645 u32 i, nargs; 10646 int ret; 10647 10648 args = (const struct btf_param *)(meta->func_proto + 1); 10649 nargs = btf_type_vlen(meta->func_proto); 10650 if (nargs > MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS) { 10651 verbose(env, "Function %s has %d > %d args\n", func_name, nargs, 10652 MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS); 10653 return -EINVAL; 10654 } 10655 10656 /* Check that BTF function arguments match actual types that the 10657 * verifier sees. 10658 */ 10659 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) { 10660 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[i + 1]; 10661 const struct btf_type *t, *ref_t, *resolve_ret; 10662 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type = ARG_DONTCARE; 10663 u32 regno = i + 1, ref_id, type_size; 10664 bool is_ret_buf_sz = false; 10665 int kf_arg_type; 10666 10667 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, args[i].type, NULL); 10668 10669 if (is_kfunc_arg_ignore(btf, &args[i])) 10670 continue; 10671 10672 if (btf_type_is_scalar(t)) { 10673 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 10674 verbose(env, "R%d is not a scalar\n", regno); 10675 return -EINVAL; 10676 } 10677 10678 if (is_kfunc_arg_constant(meta->btf, &args[i])) { 10679 if (meta->arg_constant.found) { 10680 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: only one constant argument permitted\n"); 10681 return -EFAULT; 10682 } 10683 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 10684 verbose(env, "R%d must be a known constant\n", regno); 10685 return -EINVAL; 10686 } 10687 ret = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); 10688 if (ret < 0) 10689 return ret; 10690 meta->arg_constant.found = true; 10691 meta->arg_constant.value = reg->var_off.value; 10692 } else if (is_kfunc_arg_scalar_with_name(btf, &args[i], "rdonly_buf_size")) { 10693 meta->r0_rdonly = true; 10694 is_ret_buf_sz = true; 10695 } else if (is_kfunc_arg_scalar_with_name(btf, &args[i], "rdwr_buf_size")) { 10696 is_ret_buf_sz = true; 10697 } 10698 10699 if (is_ret_buf_sz) { 10700 if (meta->r0_size) { 10701 verbose(env, "2 or more rdonly/rdwr_buf_size parameters for kfunc"); 10702 return -EINVAL; 10703 } 10704 10705 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 10706 verbose(env, "R%d is not a const\n", regno); 10707 return -EINVAL; 10708 } 10709 10710 meta->r0_size = reg->var_off.value; 10711 ret = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); 10712 if (ret) 10713 return ret; 10714 } 10715 continue; 10716 } 10717 10718 if (!btf_type_is_ptr(t)) { 10719 verbose(env, "Unrecognized arg#%d type %s\n", i, btf_type_str(t)); 10720 return -EINVAL; 10721 } 10722 10723 if ((is_kfunc_trusted_args(meta) || is_kfunc_rcu(meta)) && 10724 (register_is_null(reg) || type_may_be_null(reg->type))) { 10725 verbose(env, "Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg%d\n", i); 10726 return -EACCES; 10727 } 10728 10729 if (reg->ref_obj_id) { 10730 if (is_kfunc_release(meta) && meta->ref_obj_id) { 10731 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: more than one arg with ref_obj_id R%d %u %u\n", 10732 regno, reg->ref_obj_id, 10733 meta->ref_obj_id); 10734 return -EFAULT; 10735 } 10736 meta->ref_obj_id = reg->ref_obj_id; 10737 if (is_kfunc_release(meta)) 10738 meta->release_regno = regno; 10739 } 10740 10741 ref_t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, t->type, &ref_id); 10742 ref_tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, ref_t->name_off); 10743 10744 kf_arg_type = get_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(env, meta, t, ref_t, ref_tname, args, i, nargs); 10745 if (kf_arg_type < 0) 10746 return kf_arg_type; 10747 10748 switch (kf_arg_type) { 10749 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID: 10750 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 10751 if (!is_kfunc_trusted_args(meta) && !is_kfunc_rcu(meta)) 10752 break; 10753 10754 if (!is_trusted_reg(reg)) { 10755 if (!is_kfunc_rcu(meta)) { 10756 verbose(env, "R%d must be referenced or trusted\n", regno); 10757 return -EINVAL; 10758 } 10759 if (!is_rcu_reg(reg)) { 10760 verbose(env, "R%d must be a rcu pointer\n", regno); 10761 return -EINVAL; 10762 } 10763 } 10764 10765 fallthrough; 10766 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX: 10767 /* Trusted arguments have the same offset checks as release arguments */ 10768 arg_type |= OBJ_RELEASE; 10769 break; 10770 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR: 10771 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ITER: 10772 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD: 10773 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_NODE: 10774 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_ROOT: 10775 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_NODE: 10776 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM: 10777 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE: 10778 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CALLBACK: 10779 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR: 10780 /* Trusted by default */ 10781 break; 10782 default: 10783 WARN_ON_ONCE(1); 10784 return -EFAULT; 10785 } 10786 10787 if (is_kfunc_release(meta) && reg->ref_obj_id) 10788 arg_type |= OBJ_RELEASE; 10789 ret = check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, regno, arg_type); 10790 if (ret < 0) 10791 return ret; 10792 10793 switch (kf_arg_type) { 10794 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX: 10795 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_CTX) { 10796 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to ctx, but got %s\n", i, btf_type_str(t)); 10797 return -EINVAL; 10798 } 10799 10800 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx]) { 10801 ret = get_kern_ctx_btf_id(&env->log, resolve_prog_type(env->prog)); 10802 if (ret < 0) 10803 return -EINVAL; 10804 meta->ret_btf_id = ret; 10805 } 10806 break; 10807 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID: 10808 if (reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) { 10809 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to allocated object\n", i); 10810 return -EINVAL; 10811 } 10812 if (!reg->ref_obj_id) { 10813 verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n"); 10814 return -EINVAL; 10815 } 10816 if (meta->btf == btf_vmlinux && 10817 meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl]) { 10818 meta->arg_btf = reg->btf; 10819 meta->arg_btf_id = reg->btf_id; 10820 } 10821 break; 10822 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR: 10823 { 10824 enum bpf_arg_type dynptr_arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR; 10825 int clone_ref_obj_id = 0; 10826 10827 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_STACK && 10828 reg->type != CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) { 10829 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to stack or dynptr_ptr\n", i); 10830 return -EINVAL; 10831 } 10832 10833 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 10834 dynptr_arg_type |= MEM_RDONLY; 10835 10836 if (is_kfunc_arg_uninit(btf, &args[i])) 10837 dynptr_arg_type |= MEM_UNINIT; 10838 10839 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_from_skb]) { 10840 dynptr_arg_type |= DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB; 10841 } else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_from_xdp]) { 10842 dynptr_arg_type |= DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP; 10843 } else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_clone] && 10844 (dynptr_arg_type & MEM_UNINIT)) { 10845 enum bpf_dynptr_type parent_type = meta->initialized_dynptr.type; 10846 10847 if (parent_type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID) { 10848 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no dynptr type for parent of clone\n"); 10849 return -EFAULT; 10850 } 10851 10852 dynptr_arg_type |= (unsigned int)get_dynptr_type_flag(parent_type); 10853 clone_ref_obj_id = meta->initialized_dynptr.ref_obj_id; 10854 if (dynptr_type_refcounted(parent_type) && !clone_ref_obj_id) { 10855 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: missing ref obj id for parent of clone\n"); 10856 return -EFAULT; 10857 } 10858 } 10859 10860 ret = process_dynptr_func(env, regno, insn_idx, dynptr_arg_type, clone_ref_obj_id); 10861 if (ret < 0) 10862 return ret; 10863 10864 if (!(dynptr_arg_type & MEM_UNINIT)) { 10865 int id = dynptr_id(env, reg); 10866 10867 if (id < 0) { 10868 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: failed to obtain dynptr id\n"); 10869 return id; 10870 } 10871 meta->initialized_dynptr.id = id; 10872 meta->initialized_dynptr.type = dynptr_get_type(env, reg); 10873 meta->initialized_dynptr.ref_obj_id = dynptr_ref_obj_id(env, reg); 10874 } 10875 10876 break; 10877 } 10878 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ITER: 10879 ret = process_iter_arg(env, regno, insn_idx, meta); 10880 if (ret < 0) 10881 return ret; 10882 break; 10883 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD: 10884 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE && 10885 reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) { 10886 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to map value or allocated object\n", i); 10887 return -EINVAL; 10888 } 10889 if (reg->type == (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC) && !reg->ref_obj_id) { 10890 verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n"); 10891 return -EINVAL; 10892 } 10893 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_head(env, reg, regno, meta); 10894 if (ret < 0) 10895 return ret; 10896 break; 10897 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_ROOT: 10898 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE && 10899 reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) { 10900 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to map value or allocated object\n", i); 10901 return -EINVAL; 10902 } 10903 if (reg->type == (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC) && !reg->ref_obj_id) { 10904 verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n"); 10905 return -EINVAL; 10906 } 10907 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_rbtree_root(env, reg, regno, meta); 10908 if (ret < 0) 10909 return ret; 10910 break; 10911 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_NODE: 10912 if (reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) { 10913 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to allocated object\n", i); 10914 return -EINVAL; 10915 } 10916 if (!reg->ref_obj_id) { 10917 verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n"); 10918 return -EINVAL; 10919 } 10920 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_node(env, reg, regno, meta); 10921 if (ret < 0) 10922 return ret; 10923 break; 10924 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_NODE: 10925 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_remove]) { 10926 if (!type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type) || reg->ref_obj_id) { 10927 verbose(env, "rbtree_remove node input must be non-owning ref\n"); 10928 return -EINVAL; 10929 } 10930 if (in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(env)) { 10931 verbose(env, "rbtree_remove not allowed in rbtree cb\n"); 10932 return -EINVAL; 10933 } 10934 } else { 10935 if (reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) { 10936 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to allocated object\n", i); 10937 return -EINVAL; 10938 } 10939 if (!reg->ref_obj_id) { 10940 verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n"); 10941 return -EINVAL; 10942 } 10943 } 10944 10945 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_rbtree_node(env, reg, regno, meta); 10946 if (ret < 0) 10947 return ret; 10948 break; 10949 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 10950 /* Only base_type is checked, further checks are done here */ 10951 if ((base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID || 10952 (bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg->type) && !is_rcu_reg(reg))) && 10953 !reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)]) { 10954 verbose(env, "arg#%d is %s ", i, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 10955 verbose(env, "expected %s or socket\n", 10956 reg_type_str(env, base_type(reg->type) | 10957 (type_flag(reg->type) & BPF_REG_TRUSTED_MODIFIERS))); 10958 return -EINVAL; 10959 } 10960 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_btf_id(env, reg, ref_t, ref_tname, ref_id, meta, i); 10961 if (ret < 0) 10962 return ret; 10963 break; 10964 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM: 10965 resolve_ret = btf_resolve_size(btf, ref_t, &type_size); 10966 if (IS_ERR(resolve_ret)) { 10967 verbose(env, "arg#%d reference type('%s %s') size cannot be determined: %ld\n", 10968 i, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname, PTR_ERR(resolve_ret)); 10969 return -EINVAL; 10970 } 10971 ret = check_mem_reg(env, reg, regno, type_size); 10972 if (ret < 0) 10973 return ret; 10974 break; 10975 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE: 10976 { 10977 struct bpf_reg_state *buff_reg = ®s[regno]; 10978 const struct btf_param *buff_arg = &args[i]; 10979 struct bpf_reg_state *size_reg = ®s[regno + 1]; 10980 const struct btf_param *size_arg = &args[i + 1]; 10981 10982 if (!register_is_null(buff_reg) || !is_kfunc_arg_optional(meta->btf, buff_arg)) { 10983 ret = check_kfunc_mem_size_reg(env, size_reg, regno + 1); 10984 if (ret < 0) { 10985 verbose(env, "arg#%d arg#%d memory, len pair leads to invalid memory access\n", i, i + 1); 10986 return ret; 10987 } 10988 } 10989 10990 if (is_kfunc_arg_const_mem_size(meta->btf, size_arg, size_reg)) { 10991 if (meta->arg_constant.found) { 10992 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: only one constant argument permitted\n"); 10993 return -EFAULT; 10994 } 10995 if (!tnum_is_const(size_reg->var_off)) { 10996 verbose(env, "R%d must be a known constant\n", regno + 1); 10997 return -EINVAL; 10998 } 10999 meta->arg_constant.found = true; 11000 meta->arg_constant.value = size_reg->var_off.value; 11001 } 11002 11003 /* Skip next '__sz' or '__szk' argument */ 11004 i++; 11005 break; 11006 } 11007 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CALLBACK: 11008 meta->subprogno = reg->subprogno; 11009 break; 11010 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR: 11011 if (!type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(reg->type)) { 11012 verbose(env, "arg#%d is neither owning or non-owning ref\n", i); 11013 return -EINVAL; 11014 } 11015 if (!type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type)) 11016 meta->arg_owning_ref = true; 11017 11018 rec = reg_btf_record(reg); 11019 if (!rec) { 11020 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: Couldn't find btf_record\n"); 11021 return -EFAULT; 11022 } 11023 11024 if (rec->refcount_off < 0) { 11025 verbose(env, "arg#%d doesn't point to a type with bpf_refcount field\n", i); 11026 return -EINVAL; 11027 } 11028 if (rec->refcount_off >= 0) { 11029 verbose(env, "bpf_refcount_acquire calls are disabled for now\n"); 11030 return -EINVAL; 11031 } 11032 meta->arg_btf = reg->btf; 11033 meta->arg_btf_id = reg->btf_id; 11034 break; 11035 } 11036 } 11037 11038 if (is_kfunc_release(meta) && !meta->release_regno) { 11039 verbose(env, "release kernel function %s expects refcounted PTR_TO_BTF_ID\n", 11040 func_name); 11041 return -EINVAL; 11042 } 11043 11044 return 0; 11045 } 11046 11047 static int fetch_kfunc_meta(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11048 struct bpf_insn *insn, 11049 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 11050 const char **kfunc_name) 11051 { 11052 const struct btf_type *func, *func_proto; 11053 u32 func_id, *kfunc_flags; 11054 const char *func_name; 11055 struct btf *desc_btf; 11056 11057 if (kfunc_name) 11058 *kfunc_name = NULL; 11059 11060 if (!insn->imm) 11061 return -EINVAL; 11062 11063 desc_btf = find_kfunc_desc_btf(env, insn->off); 11064 if (IS_ERR(desc_btf)) 11065 return PTR_ERR(desc_btf); 11066 11067 func_id = insn->imm; 11068 func = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, func_id); 11069 func_name = btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf, func->name_off); 11070 if (kfunc_name) 11071 *kfunc_name = func_name; 11072 func_proto = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, func->type); 11073 11074 kfunc_flags = btf_kfunc_id_set_contains(desc_btf, func_id, env->prog); 11075 if (!kfunc_flags) { 11076 return -EACCES; 11077 } 11078 11079 memset(meta, 0, sizeof(*meta)); 11080 meta->btf = desc_btf; 11081 meta->func_id = func_id; 11082 meta->kfunc_flags = *kfunc_flags; 11083 meta->func_proto = func_proto; 11084 meta->func_name = func_name; 11085 11086 return 0; 11087 } 11088 11089 static int check_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 11090 int *insn_idx_p) 11091 { 11092 const struct btf_type *t, *ptr_type; 11093 u32 i, nargs, ptr_type_id, release_ref_obj_id; 11094 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 11095 const char *func_name, *ptr_type_name; 11096 bool sleepable, rcu_lock, rcu_unlock; 11097 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta meta; 11098 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux; 11099 int err, insn_idx = *insn_idx_p; 11100 const struct btf_param *args; 11101 const struct btf_type *ret_t; 11102 struct btf *desc_btf; 11103 11104 /* skip for now, but return error when we find this in fixup_kfunc_call */ 11105 if (!insn->imm) 11106 return 0; 11107 11108 err = fetch_kfunc_meta(env, insn, &meta, &func_name); 11109 if (err == -EACCES && func_name) 11110 verbose(env, "calling kernel function %s is not allowed\n", func_name); 11111 if (err) 11112 return err; 11113 desc_btf = meta.btf; 11114 insn_aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; 11115 11116 insn_aux->is_iter_next = is_iter_next_kfunc(&meta); 11117 11118 if (is_kfunc_destructive(&meta) && !capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT)) { 11119 verbose(env, "destructive kfunc calls require CAP_SYS_BOOT capability\n"); 11120 return -EACCES; 11121 } 11122 11123 sleepable = is_kfunc_sleepable(&meta); 11124 if (sleepable && !env->prog->aux->sleepable) { 11125 verbose(env, "program must be sleepable to call sleepable kfunc %s\n", func_name); 11126 return -EACCES; 11127 } 11128 11129 rcu_lock = is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_lock(&meta); 11130 rcu_unlock = is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_unlock(&meta); 11131 11132 if (env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock) { 11133 struct bpf_func_state *state; 11134 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 11135 11136 if (rcu_lock) { 11137 verbose(env, "nested rcu read lock (kernel function %s)\n", func_name); 11138 return -EINVAL; 11139 } else if (rcu_unlock) { 11140 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, state, reg, ({ 11141 if (reg->type & MEM_RCU) { 11142 reg->type &= ~(MEM_RCU | PTR_MAYBE_NULL); 11143 reg->type |= PTR_UNTRUSTED; 11144 } 11145 })); 11146 env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock = false; 11147 } else if (sleepable) { 11148 verbose(env, "kernel func %s is sleepable within rcu_read_lock region\n", func_name); 11149 return -EACCES; 11150 } 11151 } else if (rcu_lock) { 11152 env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock = true; 11153 } else if (rcu_unlock) { 11154 verbose(env, "unmatched rcu read unlock (kernel function %s)\n", func_name); 11155 return -EINVAL; 11156 } 11157 11158 /* Check the arguments */ 11159 err = check_kfunc_args(env, &meta, insn_idx); 11160 if (err < 0) 11161 return err; 11162 /* In case of release function, we get register number of refcounted 11163 * PTR_TO_BTF_ID in bpf_kfunc_arg_meta, do the release now. 11164 */ 11165 if (meta.release_regno) { 11166 err = release_reference(env, regs[meta.release_regno].ref_obj_id); 11167 if (err) { 11168 verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d reference has not been acquired before\n", 11169 func_name, meta.func_id); 11170 return err; 11171 } 11172 } 11173 11174 if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_front_impl] || 11175 meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_back_impl] || 11176 meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]) { 11177 release_ref_obj_id = regs[BPF_REG_2].ref_obj_id; 11178 insn_aux->insert_off = regs[BPF_REG_2].off; 11179 insn_aux->kptr_struct_meta = btf_find_struct_meta(meta.arg_btf, meta.arg_btf_id); 11180 err = ref_convert_owning_non_owning(env, release_ref_obj_id); 11181 if (err) { 11182 verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d conversion of owning ref to non-owning failed\n", 11183 func_name, meta.func_id); 11184 return err; 11185 } 11186 11187 err = release_reference(env, release_ref_obj_id); 11188 if (err) { 11189 verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d reference has not been acquired before\n", 11190 func_name, meta.func_id); 11191 return err; 11192 } 11193 } 11194 11195 if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]) { 11196 err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno, 11197 set_rbtree_add_callback_state); 11198 if (err) { 11199 verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d failed callback verification\n", 11200 func_name, meta.func_id); 11201 return err; 11202 } 11203 } 11204 11205 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) 11206 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); 11207 11208 /* Check return type */ 11209 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(desc_btf, meta.func_proto->type, NULL); 11210 11211 if (is_kfunc_acquire(&meta) && !btf_type_is_struct_ptr(meta.btf, t)) { 11212 /* Only exception is bpf_obj_new_impl */ 11213 if (meta.btf != btf_vmlinux || 11214 (meta.func_id != special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_new_impl] && 11215 meta.func_id != special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl])) { 11216 verbose(env, "acquire kernel function does not return PTR_TO_BTF_ID\n"); 11217 return -EINVAL; 11218 } 11219 } 11220 11221 if (btf_type_is_scalar(t)) { 11222 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 11223 mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, BPF_REG_0, t->size); 11224 } else if (btf_type_is_ptr(t)) { 11225 ptr_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(desc_btf, t->type, &ptr_type_id); 11226 11227 if (meta.btf == btf_vmlinux && btf_id_set_contains(&special_kfunc_set, meta.func_id)) { 11228 if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_new_impl]) { 11229 struct btf *ret_btf; 11230 u32 ret_btf_id; 11231 11232 if (unlikely(!bpf_global_ma_set)) 11233 return -ENOMEM; 11234 11235 if (((u64)(u32)meta.arg_constant.value) != meta.arg_constant.value) { 11236 verbose(env, "local type ID argument must be in range [0, U32_MAX]\n"); 11237 return -EINVAL; 11238 } 11239 11240 ret_btf = env->prog->aux->btf; 11241 ret_btf_id = meta.arg_constant.value; 11242 11243 /* This may be NULL due to user not supplying a BTF */ 11244 if (!ret_btf) { 11245 verbose(env, "bpf_obj_new requires prog BTF\n"); 11246 return -EINVAL; 11247 } 11248 11249 ret_t = btf_type_by_id(ret_btf, ret_btf_id); 11250 if (!ret_t || !__btf_type_is_struct(ret_t)) { 11251 verbose(env, "bpf_obj_new type ID argument must be of a struct\n"); 11252 return -EINVAL; 11253 } 11254 11255 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 11256 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC; 11257 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = ret_btf; 11258 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ret_btf_id; 11259 11260 insn_aux->obj_new_size = ret_t->size; 11261 insn_aux->kptr_struct_meta = 11262 btf_find_struct_meta(ret_btf, ret_btf_id); 11263 } else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl]) { 11264 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 11265 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC; 11266 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = meta.arg_btf; 11267 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta.arg_btf_id; 11268 11269 insn_aux->kptr_struct_meta = 11270 btf_find_struct_meta(meta.arg_btf, 11271 meta.arg_btf_id); 11272 } else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_pop_front] || 11273 meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_pop_back]) { 11274 struct btf_field *field = meta.arg_list_head.field; 11275 11276 mark_reg_graph_node(regs, BPF_REG_0, &field->graph_root); 11277 } else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_remove] || 11278 meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_first]) { 11279 struct btf_field *field = meta.arg_rbtree_root.field; 11280 11281 mark_reg_graph_node(regs, BPF_REG_0, &field->graph_root); 11282 } else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx]) { 11283 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 11284 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED; 11285 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = desc_btf; 11286 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta.ret_btf_id; 11287 } else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rdonly_cast]) { 11288 ret_t = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, meta.arg_constant.value); 11289 if (!ret_t || !btf_type_is_struct(ret_t)) { 11290 verbose(env, 11291 "kfunc bpf_rdonly_cast type ID argument must be of a struct\n"); 11292 return -EINVAL; 11293 } 11294 11295 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 11296 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED; 11297 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = desc_btf; 11298 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta.arg_constant.value; 11299 } else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_slice] || 11300 meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr]) { 11301 enum bpf_type_flag type_flag = get_dynptr_type_flag(meta.initialized_dynptr.type); 11302 11303 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 11304 11305 if (!meta.arg_constant.found) { 11306 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: bpf_dynptr_slice(_rdwr) no constant size\n"); 11307 return -EFAULT; 11308 } 11309 11310 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = meta.arg_constant.value; 11311 11312 /* PTR_MAYBE_NULL will be added when is_kfunc_ret_null is checked */ 11313 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM | type_flag; 11314 11315 if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_slice]) { 11316 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_RDONLY; 11317 } else { 11318 /* this will set env->seen_direct_write to true */ 11319 if (!may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, BPF_WRITE)) { 11320 verbose(env, "the prog does not allow writes to packet data\n"); 11321 return -EINVAL; 11322 } 11323 } 11324 11325 if (!meta.initialized_dynptr.id) { 11326 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no dynptr id\n"); 11327 return -EFAULT; 11328 } 11329 regs[BPF_REG_0].dynptr_id = meta.initialized_dynptr.id; 11330 11331 /* we don't need to set BPF_REG_0's ref obj id 11332 * because packet slices are not refcounted (see 11333 * dynptr_type_refcounted) 11334 */ 11335 } else { 11336 verbose(env, "kernel function %s unhandled dynamic return type\n", 11337 meta.func_name); 11338 return -EFAULT; 11339 } 11340 } else if (!__btf_type_is_struct(ptr_type)) { 11341 if (!meta.r0_size) { 11342 __u32 sz; 11343 11344 if (!IS_ERR(btf_resolve_size(desc_btf, ptr_type, &sz))) { 11345 meta.r0_size = sz; 11346 meta.r0_rdonly = true; 11347 } 11348 } 11349 if (!meta.r0_size) { 11350 ptr_type_name = btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf, 11351 ptr_type->name_off); 11352 verbose(env, 11353 "kernel function %s returns pointer type %s %s is not supported\n", 11354 func_name, 11355 btf_type_str(ptr_type), 11356 ptr_type_name); 11357 return -EINVAL; 11358 } 11359 11360 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 11361 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM; 11362 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = meta.r0_size; 11363 11364 if (meta.r0_rdonly) 11365 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_RDONLY; 11366 11367 /* Ensures we don't access the memory after a release_reference() */ 11368 if (meta.ref_obj_id) 11369 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = meta.ref_obj_id; 11370 } else { 11371 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 11372 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = desc_btf; 11373 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 11374 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ptr_type_id; 11375 } 11376 11377 if (is_kfunc_ret_null(&meta)) { 11378 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 11379 /* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg, see 93c230e3f5bd6 */ 11380 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; 11381 } 11382 mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, BPF_REG_0, sizeof(void *)); 11383 if (is_kfunc_acquire(&meta)) { 11384 int id = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx); 11385 11386 if (id < 0) 11387 return id; 11388 if (is_kfunc_ret_null(&meta)) 11389 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = id; 11390 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = id; 11391 } else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_first]) { 11392 ref_set_non_owning(env, ®s[BPF_REG_0]); 11393 } 11394 11395 if (reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(®s[BPF_REG_0]) && !regs[BPF_REG_0].id) 11396 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; 11397 } else if (btf_type_is_void(t)) { 11398 if (meta.btf == btf_vmlinux && btf_id_set_contains(&special_kfunc_set, meta.func_id)) { 11399 if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl]) { 11400 insn_aux->kptr_struct_meta = 11401 btf_find_struct_meta(meta.arg_btf, 11402 meta.arg_btf_id); 11403 } 11404 } 11405 } 11406 11407 nargs = btf_type_vlen(meta.func_proto); 11408 args = (const struct btf_param *)(meta.func_proto + 1); 11409 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) { 11410 u32 regno = i + 1; 11411 11412 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(desc_btf, args[i].type, NULL); 11413 if (btf_type_is_ptr(t)) 11414 mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, regno, sizeof(void *)); 11415 else 11416 /* scalar. ensured by btf_check_kfunc_arg_match() */ 11417 mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, regno, t->size); 11418 } 11419 11420 if (is_iter_next_kfunc(&meta)) { 11421 err = process_iter_next_call(env, insn_idx, &meta); 11422 if (err) 11423 return err; 11424 } 11425 11426 return 0; 11427 } 11428 11429 static bool signed_add_overflows(s64 a, s64 b) 11430 { 11431 /* Do the add in u64, where overflow is well-defined */ 11432 s64 res = (s64)((u64)a + (u64)b); 11433 11434 if (b < 0) 11435 return res > a; 11436 return res < a; 11437 } 11438 11439 static bool signed_add32_overflows(s32 a, s32 b) 11440 { 11441 /* Do the add in u32, where overflow is well-defined */ 11442 s32 res = (s32)((u32)a + (u32)b); 11443 11444 if (b < 0) 11445 return res > a; 11446 return res < a; 11447 } 11448 11449 static bool signed_sub_overflows(s64 a, s64 b) 11450 { 11451 /* Do the sub in u64, where overflow is well-defined */ 11452 s64 res = (s64)((u64)a - (u64)b); 11453 11454 if (b < 0) 11455 return res < a; 11456 return res > a; 11457 } 11458 11459 static bool signed_sub32_overflows(s32 a, s32 b) 11460 { 11461 /* Do the sub in u32, where overflow is well-defined */ 11462 s32 res = (s32)((u32)a - (u32)b); 11463 11464 if (b < 0) 11465 return res < a; 11466 return res > a; 11467 } 11468 11469 static bool check_reg_sane_offset(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11470 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 11471 enum bpf_reg_type type) 11472 { 11473 bool known = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 11474 s64 val = reg->var_off.value; 11475 s64 smin = reg->smin_value; 11476 11477 if (known && (val >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || val <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF)) { 11478 verbose(env, "math between %s pointer and %lld is not allowed\n", 11479 reg_type_str(env, type), val); 11480 return false; 11481 } 11482 11483 if (reg->off >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || reg->off <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 11484 verbose(env, "%s pointer offset %d is not allowed\n", 11485 reg_type_str(env, type), reg->off); 11486 return false; 11487 } 11488 11489 if (smin == S64_MIN) { 11490 verbose(env, "math between %s pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed\n", 11491 reg_type_str(env, type)); 11492 return false; 11493 } 11494 11495 if (smin >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || smin <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 11496 verbose(env, "value %lld makes %s pointer be out of bounds\n", 11497 smin, reg_type_str(env, type)); 11498 return false; 11499 } 11500 11501 return true; 11502 } 11503 11504 enum { 11505 REASON_BOUNDS = -1, 11506 REASON_TYPE = -2, 11507 REASON_PATHS = -3, 11508 REASON_LIMIT = -4, 11509 REASON_STACK = -5, 11510 }; 11511 11512 static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, 11513 u32 *alu_limit, bool mask_to_left) 11514 { 11515 u32 max = 0, ptr_limit = 0; 11516 11517 switch (ptr_reg->type) { 11518 case PTR_TO_STACK: 11519 /* Offset 0 is out-of-bounds, but acceptable start for the 11520 * left direction, see BPF_REG_FP. Also, unknown scalar 11521 * offset where we would need to deal with min/max bounds is 11522 * currently prohibited for unprivileged. 11523 */ 11524 max = MAX_BPF_STACK + mask_to_left; 11525 ptr_limit = -(ptr_reg->var_off.value + ptr_reg->off); 11526 break; 11527 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 11528 max = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size; 11529 ptr_limit = (mask_to_left ? 11530 ptr_reg->smin_value : 11531 ptr_reg->umax_value) + ptr_reg->off; 11532 break; 11533 default: 11534 return REASON_TYPE; 11535 } 11536 11537 if (ptr_limit >= max) 11538 return REASON_LIMIT; 11539 *alu_limit = ptr_limit; 11540 return 0; 11541 } 11542 11543 static bool can_skip_alu_sanitation(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11544 const struct bpf_insn *insn) 11545 { 11546 return env->bypass_spec_v1 || BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K; 11547 } 11548 11549 static int update_alu_sanitation_state(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, 11550 u32 alu_state, u32 alu_limit) 11551 { 11552 /* If we arrived here from different branches with different 11553 * state or limits to sanitize, then this won't work. 11554 */ 11555 if (aux->alu_state && 11556 (aux->alu_state != alu_state || 11557 aux->alu_limit != alu_limit)) 11558 return REASON_PATHS; 11559 11560 /* Corresponding fixup done in do_misc_fixups(). */ 11561 aux->alu_state = alu_state; 11562 aux->alu_limit = alu_limit; 11563 return 0; 11564 } 11565 11566 static int sanitize_val_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11567 struct bpf_insn *insn) 11568 { 11569 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env); 11570 11571 if (can_skip_alu_sanitation(env, insn)) 11572 return 0; 11573 11574 return update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER, 0); 11575 } 11576 11577 static bool sanitize_needed(u8 opcode) 11578 { 11579 return opcode == BPF_ADD || opcode == BPF_SUB; 11580 } 11581 11582 struct bpf_sanitize_info { 11583 struct bpf_insn_aux_data aux; 11584 bool mask_to_left; 11585 }; 11586 11587 static struct bpf_verifier_state * 11588 sanitize_speculative_path(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11589 const struct bpf_insn *insn, 11590 u32 next_idx, u32 curr_idx) 11591 { 11592 struct bpf_verifier_state *branch; 11593 struct bpf_reg_state *regs; 11594 11595 branch = push_stack(env, next_idx, curr_idx, true); 11596 if (branch && insn) { 11597 regs = branch->frame[branch->curframe]->regs; 11598 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) { 11599 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 11600 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 11601 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 11602 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->src_reg); 11603 } 11604 } 11605 return branch; 11606 } 11607 11608 static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11609 struct bpf_insn *insn, 11610 const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, 11611 const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg, 11612 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 11613 struct bpf_sanitize_info *info, 11614 const bool commit_window) 11615 { 11616 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = commit_window ? cur_aux(env) : &info->aux; 11617 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 11618 bool off_is_imm = tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off); 11619 bool off_is_neg = off_reg->smin_value < 0; 11620 bool ptr_is_dst_reg = ptr_reg == dst_reg; 11621 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 11622 u32 alu_state, alu_limit; 11623 struct bpf_reg_state tmp; 11624 bool ret; 11625 int err; 11626 11627 if (can_skip_alu_sanitation(env, insn)) 11628 return 0; 11629 11630 /* We already marked aux for masking from non-speculative 11631 * paths, thus we got here in the first place. We only care 11632 * to explore bad access from here. 11633 */ 11634 if (vstate->speculative) 11635 goto do_sim; 11636 11637 if (!commit_window) { 11638 if (!tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off) && 11639 (off_reg->smin_value < 0) != (off_reg->smax_value < 0)) 11640 return REASON_BOUNDS; 11641 11642 info->mask_to_left = (opcode == BPF_ADD && off_is_neg) || 11643 (opcode == BPF_SUB && !off_is_neg); 11644 } 11645 11646 err = retrieve_ptr_limit(ptr_reg, &alu_limit, info->mask_to_left); 11647 if (err < 0) 11648 return err; 11649 11650 if (commit_window) { 11651 /* In commit phase we narrow the masking window based on 11652 * the observed pointer move after the simulated operation. 11653 */ 11654 alu_state = info->aux.alu_state; 11655 alu_limit = abs(info->aux.alu_limit - alu_limit); 11656 } else { 11657 alu_state = off_is_neg ? BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE : 0; 11658 alu_state |= off_is_imm ? BPF_ALU_IMMEDIATE : 0; 11659 alu_state |= ptr_is_dst_reg ? 11660 BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC : BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST; 11661 11662 /* Limit pruning on unknown scalars to enable deep search for 11663 * potential masking differences from other program paths. 11664 */ 11665 if (!off_is_imm) 11666 env->explore_alu_limits = true; 11667 } 11668 11669 err = update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, alu_state, alu_limit); 11670 if (err < 0) 11671 return err; 11672 do_sim: 11673 /* If we're in commit phase, we're done here given we already 11674 * pushed the truncated dst_reg into the speculative verification 11675 * stack. 11676 * 11677 * Also, when register is a known constant, we rewrite register-based 11678 * operation to immediate-based, and thus do not need masking (and as 11679 * a consequence, do not need to simulate the zero-truncation either). 11680 */ 11681 if (commit_window || off_is_imm) 11682 return 0; 11683 11684 /* Simulate and find potential out-of-bounds access under 11685 * speculative execution from truncation as a result of 11686 * masking when off was not within expected range. If off 11687 * sits in dst, then we temporarily need to move ptr there 11688 * to simulate dst (== 0) +/-= ptr. Needed, for example, 11689 * for cases where we use K-based arithmetic in one direction 11690 * and truncated reg-based in the other in order to explore 11691 * bad access. 11692 */ 11693 if (!ptr_is_dst_reg) { 11694 tmp = *dst_reg; 11695 copy_register_state(dst_reg, ptr_reg); 11696 } 11697 ret = sanitize_speculative_path(env, NULL, env->insn_idx + 1, 11698 env->insn_idx); 11699 if (!ptr_is_dst_reg && ret) 11700 *dst_reg = tmp; 11701 return !ret ? REASON_STACK : 0; 11702 } 11703 11704 static void sanitize_mark_insn_seen(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 11705 { 11706 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 11707 11708 /* If we simulate paths under speculation, we don't update the 11709 * insn as 'seen' such that when we verify unreachable paths in 11710 * the non-speculative domain, sanitize_dead_code() can still 11711 * rewrite/sanitize them. 11712 */ 11713 if (!vstate->speculative) 11714 env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = env->pass_cnt; 11715 } 11716 11717 static int sanitize_err(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11718 const struct bpf_insn *insn, int reason, 11719 const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg, 11720 const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg) 11721 { 11722 static const char *err = "pointer arithmetic with it prohibited for !root"; 11723 const char *op = BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_ADD ? "add" : "sub"; 11724 u32 dst = insn->dst_reg, src = insn->src_reg; 11725 11726 switch (reason) { 11727 case REASON_BOUNDS: 11728 verbose(env, "R%d has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds, %s\n", 11729 off_reg == dst_reg ? dst : src, err); 11730 break; 11731 case REASON_TYPE: 11732 verbose(env, "R%d has pointer with unsupported alu operation, %s\n", 11733 off_reg == dst_reg ? src : dst, err); 11734 break; 11735 case REASON_PATHS: 11736 verbose(env, "R%d tried to %s from different maps, paths or scalars, %s\n", 11737 dst, op, err); 11738 break; 11739 case REASON_LIMIT: 11740 verbose(env, "R%d tried to %s beyond pointer bounds, %s\n", 11741 dst, op, err); 11742 break; 11743 case REASON_STACK: 11744 verbose(env, "R%d could not be pushed for speculative verification, %s\n", 11745 dst, err); 11746 break; 11747 default: 11748 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unknown reason (%d)\n", 11749 reason); 11750 break; 11751 } 11752 11753 return -EACCES; 11754 } 11755 11756 /* check that stack access falls within stack limits and that 'reg' doesn't 11757 * have a variable offset. 11758 * 11759 * Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for simplicity since it 11760 * requires corresponding support in Spectre masking for stack ALU. See also 11761 * retrieve_ptr_limit(). 11762 * 11763 * 11764 * 'off' includes 'reg->off'. 11765 */ 11766 static int check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic( 11767 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11768 int regno, 11769 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 11770 int off) 11771 { 11772 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 11773 char tn_buf[48]; 11774 11775 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 11776 verbose(env, "R%d variable stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s off=%d\n", 11777 regno, tn_buf, off); 11778 return -EACCES; 11779 } 11780 11781 if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK) { 11782 verbose(env, "R%d stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, " 11783 "prohibited for !root; off=%d\n", regno, off); 11784 return -EACCES; 11785 } 11786 11787 return 0; 11788 } 11789 11790 static int sanitize_check_bounds(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11791 const struct bpf_insn *insn, 11792 const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg) 11793 { 11794 u32 dst = insn->dst_reg; 11795 11796 /* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds 11797 * in order to be able to sanitize access later on. 11798 */ 11799 if (env->bypass_spec_v1) 11800 return 0; 11801 11802 switch (dst_reg->type) { 11803 case PTR_TO_STACK: 11804 if (check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic(env, dst, dst_reg, 11805 dst_reg->off + dst_reg->var_off.value)) 11806 return -EACCES; 11807 break; 11808 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 11809 if (check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1, false, ACCESS_HELPER)) { 11810 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, " 11811 "prohibited for !root\n", dst); 11812 return -EACCES; 11813 } 11814 break; 11815 default: 11816 break; 11817 } 11818 11819 return 0; 11820 } 11821 11822 /* Handles arithmetic on a pointer and a scalar: computes new min/max and var_off. 11823 * Caller should also handle BPF_MOV case separately. 11824 * If we return -EACCES, caller may want to try again treating pointer as a 11825 * scalar. So we only emit a diagnostic if !env->allow_ptr_leaks. 11826 */ 11827 static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11828 struct bpf_insn *insn, 11829 const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, 11830 const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg) 11831 { 11832 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 11833 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 11834 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *dst_reg; 11835 bool known = tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off); 11836 s64 smin_val = off_reg->smin_value, smax_val = off_reg->smax_value, 11837 smin_ptr = ptr_reg->smin_value, smax_ptr = ptr_reg->smax_value; 11838 u64 umin_val = off_reg->umin_value, umax_val = off_reg->umax_value, 11839 umin_ptr = ptr_reg->umin_value, umax_ptr = ptr_reg->umax_value; 11840 struct bpf_sanitize_info info = {}; 11841 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 11842 u32 dst = insn->dst_reg; 11843 int ret; 11844 11845 dst_reg = ®s[dst]; 11846 11847 if ((known && (smin_val != smax_val || umin_val != umax_val)) || 11848 smin_val > smax_val || umin_val > umax_val) { 11849 /* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds derived from 11850 * e.g. dead branches. 11851 */ 11852 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 11853 return 0; 11854 } 11855 11856 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) { 11857 /* 32-bit ALU ops on pointers produce (meaningless) scalars */ 11858 if (opcode == BPF_SUB && env->allow_ptr_leaks) { 11859 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 11860 return 0; 11861 } 11862 11863 verbose(env, 11864 "R%d 32-bit pointer arithmetic prohibited\n", 11865 dst); 11866 return -EACCES; 11867 } 11868 11869 if (ptr_reg->type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL) { 11870 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited, null-check it first\n", 11871 dst, reg_type_str(env, ptr_reg->type)); 11872 return -EACCES; 11873 } 11874 11875 switch (base_type(ptr_reg->type)) { 11876 case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP: 11877 /* smin_val represents the known value */ 11878 if (known && smin_val == 0 && opcode == BPF_ADD) 11879 break; 11880 fallthrough; 11881 case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: 11882 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 11883 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 11884 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 11885 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 11886 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited\n", 11887 dst, reg_type_str(env, ptr_reg->type)); 11888 return -EACCES; 11889 default: 11890 break; 11891 } 11892 11893 /* In case of 'scalar += pointer', dst_reg inherits pointer type and id. 11894 * The id may be overwritten later if we create a new variable offset. 11895 */ 11896 dst_reg->type = ptr_reg->type; 11897 dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id; 11898 11899 if (!check_reg_sane_offset(env, off_reg, ptr_reg->type) || 11900 !check_reg_sane_offset(env, ptr_reg, ptr_reg->type)) 11901 return -EINVAL; 11902 11903 /* pointer types do not carry 32-bit bounds at the moment. */ 11904 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 11905 11906 if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) { 11907 ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg, 11908 &info, false); 11909 if (ret < 0) 11910 return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg); 11911 } 11912 11913 switch (opcode) { 11914 case BPF_ADD: 11915 /* We can take a fixed offset as long as it doesn't overflow 11916 * the s32 'off' field 11917 */ 11918 if (known && (ptr_reg->off + smin_val == 11919 (s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off + smin_val))) { 11920 /* pointer += K. Accumulate it into fixed offset */ 11921 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr; 11922 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr; 11923 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr; 11924 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr; 11925 dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off; 11926 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off + smin_val; 11927 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; 11928 break; 11929 } 11930 /* A new variable offset is created. Note that off_reg->off 11931 * == 0, since it's a scalar. 11932 * dst_reg gets the pointer type and since some positive 11933 * integer value was added to the pointer, give it a new 'id' 11934 * if it's a PTR_TO_PACKET. 11935 * this creates a new 'base' pointer, off_reg (variable) gets 11936 * added into the variable offset, and we copy the fixed offset 11937 * from ptr_reg. 11938 */ 11939 if (signed_add_overflows(smin_ptr, smin_val) || 11940 signed_add_overflows(smax_ptr, smax_val)) { 11941 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 11942 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 11943 } else { 11944 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr + smin_val; 11945 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr + smax_val; 11946 } 11947 if (umin_ptr + umin_val < umin_ptr || 11948 umax_ptr + umax_val < umax_ptr) { 11949 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 11950 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 11951 } else { 11952 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr + umin_val; 11953 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr + umax_val; 11954 } 11955 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off); 11956 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off; 11957 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; 11958 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) { 11959 dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 11960 /* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */ 11961 memset(&dst_reg->raw, 0, sizeof(dst_reg->raw)); 11962 } 11963 break; 11964 case BPF_SUB: 11965 if (dst_reg == off_reg) { 11966 /* scalar -= pointer. Creates an unknown scalar */ 11967 verbose(env, "R%d tried to subtract pointer from scalar\n", 11968 dst); 11969 return -EACCES; 11970 } 11971 /* We don't allow subtraction from FP, because (according to 11972 * test_verifier.c test "invalid fp arithmetic", JITs might not 11973 * be able to deal with it. 11974 */ 11975 if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 11976 verbose(env, "R%d subtraction from stack pointer prohibited\n", 11977 dst); 11978 return -EACCES; 11979 } 11980 if (known && (ptr_reg->off - smin_val == 11981 (s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off - smin_val))) { 11982 /* pointer -= K. Subtract it from fixed offset */ 11983 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr; 11984 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr; 11985 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr; 11986 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr; 11987 dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off; 11988 dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id; 11989 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off - smin_val; 11990 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; 11991 break; 11992 } 11993 /* A new variable offset is created. If the subtrahend is known 11994 * nonnegative, then any reg->range we had before is still good. 11995 */ 11996 if (signed_sub_overflows(smin_ptr, smax_val) || 11997 signed_sub_overflows(smax_ptr, smin_val)) { 11998 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 11999 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 12000 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 12001 } else { 12002 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr - smax_val; 12003 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr - smin_val; 12004 } 12005 if (umin_ptr < umax_val) { 12006 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 12007 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 12008 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 12009 } else { 12010 /* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */ 12011 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr - umax_val; 12012 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr - umin_val; 12013 } 12014 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off); 12015 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off; 12016 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; 12017 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) { 12018 dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 12019 /* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */ 12020 if (smin_val < 0) 12021 memset(&dst_reg->raw, 0, sizeof(dst_reg->raw)); 12022 } 12023 break; 12024 case BPF_AND: 12025 case BPF_OR: 12026 case BPF_XOR: 12027 /* bitwise ops on pointers are troublesome, prohibit. */ 12028 verbose(env, "R%d bitwise operator %s on pointer prohibited\n", 12029 dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); 12030 return -EACCES; 12031 default: 12032 /* other operators (e.g. MUL,LSH) produce non-pointer results */ 12033 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic with %s operator prohibited\n", 12034 dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); 12035 return -EACCES; 12036 } 12037 12038 if (!check_reg_sane_offset(env, dst_reg, ptr_reg->type)) 12039 return -EINVAL; 12040 reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg); 12041 if (sanitize_check_bounds(env, insn, dst_reg) < 0) 12042 return -EACCES; 12043 if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) { 12044 ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, dst_reg, off_reg, dst_reg, 12045 &info, true); 12046 if (ret < 0) 12047 return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg); 12048 } 12049 12050 return 0; 12051 } 12052 12053 static void scalar32_min_max_add(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12054 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 12055 { 12056 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 12057 s32 smax_val = src_reg->s32_max_value; 12058 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 12059 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 12060 12061 if (signed_add32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_min_value, smin_val) || 12062 signed_add32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_max_value, smax_val)) { 12063 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 12064 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 12065 } else { 12066 dst_reg->s32_min_value += smin_val; 12067 dst_reg->s32_max_value += smax_val; 12068 } 12069 if (dst_reg->u32_min_value + umin_val < umin_val || 12070 dst_reg->u32_max_value + umax_val < umax_val) { 12071 dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0; 12072 dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 12073 } else { 12074 dst_reg->u32_min_value += umin_val; 12075 dst_reg->u32_max_value += umax_val; 12076 } 12077 } 12078 12079 static void scalar_min_max_add(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12080 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 12081 { 12082 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 12083 s64 smax_val = src_reg->smax_value; 12084 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 12085 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 12086 12087 if (signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smin_val) || 12088 signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smax_val)) { 12089 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 12090 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 12091 } else { 12092 dst_reg->smin_value += smin_val; 12093 dst_reg->smax_value += smax_val; 12094 } 12095 if (dst_reg->umin_value + umin_val < umin_val || 12096 dst_reg->umax_value + umax_val < umax_val) { 12097 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 12098 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 12099 } else { 12100 dst_reg->umin_value += umin_val; 12101 dst_reg->umax_value += umax_val; 12102 } 12103 } 12104 12105 static void scalar32_min_max_sub(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12106 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 12107 { 12108 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 12109 s32 smax_val = src_reg->s32_max_value; 12110 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 12111 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 12112 12113 if (signed_sub32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_min_value, smax_val) || 12114 signed_sub32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_max_value, smin_val)) { 12115 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 12116 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 12117 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 12118 } else { 12119 dst_reg->s32_min_value -= smax_val; 12120 dst_reg->s32_max_value -= smin_val; 12121 } 12122 if (dst_reg->u32_min_value < umax_val) { 12123 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 12124 dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0; 12125 dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 12126 } else { 12127 /* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */ 12128 dst_reg->u32_min_value -= umax_val; 12129 dst_reg->u32_max_value -= umin_val; 12130 } 12131 } 12132 12133 static void scalar_min_max_sub(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12134 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 12135 { 12136 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 12137 s64 smax_val = src_reg->smax_value; 12138 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 12139 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 12140 12141 if (signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smax_val) || 12142 signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smin_val)) { 12143 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 12144 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 12145 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 12146 } else { 12147 dst_reg->smin_value -= smax_val; 12148 dst_reg->smax_value -= smin_val; 12149 } 12150 if (dst_reg->umin_value < umax_val) { 12151 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 12152 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 12153 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 12154 } else { 12155 /* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */ 12156 dst_reg->umin_value -= umax_val; 12157 dst_reg->umax_value -= umin_val; 12158 } 12159 } 12160 12161 static void scalar32_min_max_mul(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12162 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 12163 { 12164 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 12165 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 12166 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 12167 12168 if (smin_val < 0 || dst_reg->s32_min_value < 0) { 12169 /* Ain't nobody got time to multiply that sign */ 12170 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 12171 return; 12172 } 12173 /* Both values are positive, so we can work with unsigned and 12174 * copy the result to signed (unless it exceeds S32_MAX). 12175 */ 12176 if (umax_val > U16_MAX || dst_reg->u32_max_value > U16_MAX) { 12177 /* Potential overflow, we know nothing */ 12178 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 12179 return; 12180 } 12181 dst_reg->u32_min_value *= umin_val; 12182 dst_reg->u32_max_value *= umax_val; 12183 if (dst_reg->u32_max_value > S32_MAX) { 12184 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 12185 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 12186 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 12187 } else { 12188 dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; 12189 dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; 12190 } 12191 } 12192 12193 static void scalar_min_max_mul(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12194 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 12195 { 12196 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 12197 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 12198 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 12199 12200 if (smin_val < 0 || dst_reg->smin_value < 0) { 12201 /* Ain't nobody got time to multiply that sign */ 12202 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 12203 return; 12204 } 12205 /* Both values are positive, so we can work with unsigned and 12206 * copy the result to signed (unless it exceeds S64_MAX). 12207 */ 12208 if (umax_val > U32_MAX || dst_reg->umax_value > U32_MAX) { 12209 /* Potential overflow, we know nothing */ 12210 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 12211 return; 12212 } 12213 dst_reg->umin_value *= umin_val; 12214 dst_reg->umax_value *= umax_val; 12215 if (dst_reg->umax_value > S64_MAX) { 12216 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 12217 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 12218 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 12219 } else { 12220 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; 12221 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; 12222 } 12223 } 12224 12225 static void scalar32_min_max_and(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12226 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 12227 { 12228 bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 12229 bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 12230 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 12231 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 12232 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 12233 12234 if (src_known && dst_known) { 12235 __mark_reg32_known(dst_reg, var32_off.value); 12236 return; 12237 } 12238 12239 /* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently 12240 * bitwise. Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima. 12241 */ 12242 dst_reg->u32_min_value = var32_off.value; 12243 dst_reg->u32_max_value = min(dst_reg->u32_max_value, umax_val); 12244 if (dst_reg->s32_min_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) { 12245 /* Lose signed bounds when ANDing negative numbers, 12246 * ain't nobody got time for that. 12247 */ 12248 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 12249 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 12250 } else { 12251 /* ANDing two positives gives a positive, so safe to 12252 * cast result into s64. 12253 */ 12254 dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; 12255 dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; 12256 } 12257 } 12258 12259 static void scalar_min_max_and(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12260 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 12261 { 12262 bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 12263 bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 12264 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 12265 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 12266 12267 if (src_known && dst_known) { 12268 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value); 12269 return; 12270 } 12271 12272 /* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently 12273 * bitwise. Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima. 12274 */ 12275 dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value; 12276 dst_reg->umax_value = min(dst_reg->umax_value, umax_val); 12277 if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) { 12278 /* Lose signed bounds when ANDing negative numbers, 12279 * ain't nobody got time for that. 12280 */ 12281 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 12282 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 12283 } else { 12284 /* ANDing two positives gives a positive, so safe to 12285 * cast result into s64. 12286 */ 12287 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; 12288 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; 12289 } 12290 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */ 12291 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 12292 } 12293 12294 static void scalar32_min_max_or(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12295 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 12296 { 12297 bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 12298 bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 12299 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 12300 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 12301 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 12302 12303 if (src_known && dst_known) { 12304 __mark_reg32_known(dst_reg, var32_off.value); 12305 return; 12306 } 12307 12308 /* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the 12309 * maximum of the operands' minima 12310 */ 12311 dst_reg->u32_min_value = max(dst_reg->u32_min_value, umin_val); 12312 dst_reg->u32_max_value = var32_off.value | var32_off.mask; 12313 if (dst_reg->s32_min_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) { 12314 /* Lose signed bounds when ORing negative numbers, 12315 * ain't nobody got time for that. 12316 */ 12317 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 12318 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 12319 } else { 12320 /* ORing two positives gives a positive, so safe to 12321 * cast result into s64. 12322 */ 12323 dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; 12324 dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; 12325 } 12326 } 12327 12328 static void scalar_min_max_or(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12329 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 12330 { 12331 bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 12332 bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 12333 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 12334 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 12335 12336 if (src_known && dst_known) { 12337 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value); 12338 return; 12339 } 12340 12341 /* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the 12342 * maximum of the operands' minima 12343 */ 12344 dst_reg->umin_value = max(dst_reg->umin_value, umin_val); 12345 dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value | dst_reg->var_off.mask; 12346 if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) { 12347 /* Lose signed bounds when ORing negative numbers, 12348 * ain't nobody got time for that. 12349 */ 12350 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 12351 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 12352 } else { 12353 /* ORing two positives gives a positive, so safe to 12354 * cast result into s64. 12355 */ 12356 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; 12357 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; 12358 } 12359 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */ 12360 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 12361 } 12362 12363 static void scalar32_min_max_xor(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12364 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 12365 { 12366 bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 12367 bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 12368 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 12369 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 12370 12371 if (src_known && dst_known) { 12372 __mark_reg32_known(dst_reg, var32_off.value); 12373 return; 12374 } 12375 12376 /* We get both minimum and maximum from the var32_off. */ 12377 dst_reg->u32_min_value = var32_off.value; 12378 dst_reg->u32_max_value = var32_off.value | var32_off.mask; 12379 12380 if (dst_reg->s32_min_value >= 0 && smin_val >= 0) { 12381 /* XORing two positive sign numbers gives a positive, 12382 * so safe to cast u32 result into s32. 12383 */ 12384 dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; 12385 dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; 12386 } else { 12387 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 12388 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 12389 } 12390 } 12391 12392 static void scalar_min_max_xor(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12393 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 12394 { 12395 bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 12396 bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 12397 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 12398 12399 if (src_known && dst_known) { 12400 /* dst_reg->var_off.value has been updated earlier */ 12401 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value); 12402 return; 12403 } 12404 12405 /* We get both minimum and maximum from the var_off. */ 12406 dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value; 12407 dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value | dst_reg->var_off.mask; 12408 12409 if (dst_reg->smin_value >= 0 && smin_val >= 0) { 12410 /* XORing two positive sign numbers gives a positive, 12411 * so safe to cast u64 result into s64. 12412 */ 12413 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; 12414 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; 12415 } else { 12416 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 12417 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 12418 } 12419 12420 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 12421 } 12422 12423 static void __scalar32_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12424 u64 umin_val, u64 umax_val) 12425 { 12426 /* We lose all sign bit information (except what we can pick 12427 * up from var_off) 12428 */ 12429 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 12430 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 12431 /* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */ 12432 if (umax_val > 31 || dst_reg->u32_max_value > 1ULL << (31 - umax_val)) { 12433 dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0; 12434 dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 12435 } else { 12436 dst_reg->u32_min_value <<= umin_val; 12437 dst_reg->u32_max_value <<= umax_val; 12438 } 12439 } 12440 12441 static void scalar32_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12442 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 12443 { 12444 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 12445 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 12446 /* u32 alu operation will zext upper bits */ 12447 struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 12448 12449 __scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val); 12450 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(tnum_lshift(subreg, umin_val)); 12451 /* Not required but being careful mark reg64 bounds as unknown so 12452 * that we are forced to pick them up from tnum and zext later and 12453 * if some path skips this step we are still safe. 12454 */ 12455 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 12456 __update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg); 12457 } 12458 12459 static void __scalar64_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12460 u64 umin_val, u64 umax_val) 12461 { 12462 /* Special case <<32 because it is a common compiler pattern to sign 12463 * extend subreg by doing <<32 s>>32. In this case if 32bit bounds are 12464 * positive we know this shift will also be positive so we can track 12465 * bounds correctly. Otherwise we lose all sign bit information except 12466 * what we can pick up from var_off. Perhaps we can generalize this 12467 * later to shifts of any length. 12468 */ 12469 if (umin_val == 32 && umax_val == 32 && dst_reg->s32_max_value >= 0) 12470 dst_reg->smax_value = (s64)dst_reg->s32_max_value << 32; 12471 else 12472 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 12473 12474 if (umin_val == 32 && umax_val == 32 && dst_reg->s32_min_value >= 0) 12475 dst_reg->smin_value = (s64)dst_reg->s32_min_value << 32; 12476 else 12477 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 12478 12479 /* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */ 12480 if (dst_reg->umax_value > 1ULL << (63 - umax_val)) { 12481 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 12482 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 12483 } else { 12484 dst_reg->umin_value <<= umin_val; 12485 dst_reg->umax_value <<= umax_val; 12486 } 12487 } 12488 12489 static void scalar_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12490 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 12491 { 12492 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 12493 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 12494 12495 /* scalar64 calc uses 32bit unshifted bounds so must be called first */ 12496 __scalar64_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val); 12497 __scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val); 12498 12499 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_lshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val); 12500 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */ 12501 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 12502 } 12503 12504 static void scalar32_min_max_rsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12505 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 12506 { 12507 struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 12508 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 12509 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 12510 12511 /* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift. If the value in dst_reg might 12512 * be negative, then either: 12513 * 1) src_reg might be zero, so the sign bit of the result is 12514 * unknown, so we lose our signed bounds 12515 * 2) it's known negative, thus the unsigned bounds capture the 12516 * signed bounds 12517 * 3) the signed bounds cross zero, so they tell us nothing 12518 * about the result 12519 * If the value in dst_reg is known nonnegative, then again the 12520 * unsigned bounds capture the signed bounds. 12521 * Thus, in all cases it suffices to blow away our signed bounds 12522 * and rely on inferring new ones from the unsigned bounds and 12523 * var_off of the result. 12524 */ 12525 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 12526 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 12527 12528 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(subreg, umin_val); 12529 dst_reg->u32_min_value >>= umax_val; 12530 dst_reg->u32_max_value >>= umin_val; 12531 12532 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 12533 __update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg); 12534 } 12535 12536 static void scalar_min_max_rsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12537 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 12538 { 12539 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 12540 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 12541 12542 /* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift. If the value in dst_reg might 12543 * be negative, then either: 12544 * 1) src_reg might be zero, so the sign bit of the result is 12545 * unknown, so we lose our signed bounds 12546 * 2) it's known negative, thus the unsigned bounds capture the 12547 * signed bounds 12548 * 3) the signed bounds cross zero, so they tell us nothing 12549 * about the result 12550 * If the value in dst_reg is known nonnegative, then again the 12551 * unsigned bounds capture the signed bounds. 12552 * Thus, in all cases it suffices to blow away our signed bounds 12553 * and rely on inferring new ones from the unsigned bounds and 12554 * var_off of the result. 12555 */ 12556 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 12557 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 12558 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val); 12559 dst_reg->umin_value >>= umax_val; 12560 dst_reg->umax_value >>= umin_val; 12561 12562 /* Its not easy to operate on alu32 bounds here because it depends 12563 * on bits being shifted in. Take easy way out and mark unbounded 12564 * so we can recalculate later from tnum. 12565 */ 12566 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 12567 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 12568 } 12569 12570 static void scalar32_min_max_arsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12571 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 12572 { 12573 u64 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 12574 12575 /* Upon reaching here, src_known is true and 12576 * umax_val is equal to umin_val. 12577 */ 12578 dst_reg->s32_min_value = (u32)(((s32)dst_reg->s32_min_value) >> umin_val); 12579 dst_reg->s32_max_value = (u32)(((s32)dst_reg->s32_max_value) >> umin_val); 12580 12581 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_arshift(tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off), umin_val, 32); 12582 12583 /* blow away the dst_reg umin_value/umax_value and rely on 12584 * dst_reg var_off to refine the result. 12585 */ 12586 dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0; 12587 dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 12588 12589 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 12590 __update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg); 12591 } 12592 12593 static void scalar_min_max_arsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12594 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 12595 { 12596 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 12597 12598 /* Upon reaching here, src_known is true and umax_val is equal 12599 * to umin_val. 12600 */ 12601 dst_reg->smin_value >>= umin_val; 12602 dst_reg->smax_value >>= umin_val; 12603 12604 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_arshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val, 64); 12605 12606 /* blow away the dst_reg umin_value/umax_value and rely on 12607 * dst_reg var_off to refine the result. 12608 */ 12609 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 12610 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 12611 12612 /* Its not easy to operate on alu32 bounds here because it depends 12613 * on bits being shifted in from upper 32-bits. Take easy way out 12614 * and mark unbounded so we can recalculate later from tnum. 12615 */ 12616 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 12617 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 12618 } 12619 12620 /* WARNING: This function does calculations on 64-bit values, but the actual 12621 * execution may occur on 32-bit values. Therefore, things like bitshifts 12622 * need extra checks in the 32-bit case. 12623 */ 12624 static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12625 struct bpf_insn *insn, 12626 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 12627 struct bpf_reg_state src_reg) 12628 { 12629 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 12630 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 12631 bool src_known; 12632 s64 smin_val, smax_val; 12633 u64 umin_val, umax_val; 12634 s32 s32_min_val, s32_max_val; 12635 u32 u32_min_val, u32_max_val; 12636 u64 insn_bitness = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) ? 64 : 32; 12637 bool alu32 = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64); 12638 int ret; 12639 12640 smin_val = src_reg.smin_value; 12641 smax_val = src_reg.smax_value; 12642 umin_val = src_reg.umin_value; 12643 umax_val = src_reg.umax_value; 12644 12645 s32_min_val = src_reg.s32_min_value; 12646 s32_max_val = src_reg.s32_max_value; 12647 u32_min_val = src_reg.u32_min_value; 12648 u32_max_val = src_reg.u32_max_value; 12649 12650 if (alu32) { 12651 src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg.var_off); 12652 if ((src_known && 12653 (s32_min_val != s32_max_val || u32_min_val != u32_max_val)) || 12654 s32_min_val > s32_max_val || u32_min_val > u32_max_val) { 12655 /* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds 12656 * derived from e.g. dead branches. 12657 */ 12658 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 12659 return 0; 12660 } 12661 } else { 12662 src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg.var_off); 12663 if ((src_known && 12664 (smin_val != smax_val || umin_val != umax_val)) || 12665 smin_val > smax_val || umin_val > umax_val) { 12666 /* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds 12667 * derived from e.g. dead branches. 12668 */ 12669 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 12670 return 0; 12671 } 12672 } 12673 12674 if (!src_known && 12675 opcode != BPF_ADD && opcode != BPF_SUB && opcode != BPF_AND) { 12676 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 12677 return 0; 12678 } 12679 12680 if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) { 12681 ret = sanitize_val_alu(env, insn); 12682 if (ret < 0) 12683 return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, NULL, NULL); 12684 } 12685 12686 /* Calculate sign/unsigned bounds and tnum for alu32 and alu64 bit ops. 12687 * There are two classes of instructions: The first class we track both 12688 * alu32 and alu64 sign/unsigned bounds independently this provides the 12689 * greatest amount of precision when alu operations are mixed with jmp32 12690 * operations. These operations are BPF_ADD, BPF_SUB, BPF_MUL, BPF_ADD, 12691 * and BPF_OR. This is possible because these ops have fairly easy to 12692 * understand and calculate behavior in both 32-bit and 64-bit alu ops. 12693 * See alu32 verifier tests for examples. The second class of 12694 * operations, BPF_LSH, BPF_RSH, and BPF_ARSH, however are not so easy 12695 * with regards to tracking sign/unsigned bounds because the bits may 12696 * cross subreg boundaries in the alu64 case. When this happens we mark 12697 * the reg unbounded in the subreg bound space and use the resulting 12698 * tnum to calculate an approximation of the sign/unsigned bounds. 12699 */ 12700 switch (opcode) { 12701 case BPF_ADD: 12702 scalar32_min_max_add(dst_reg, &src_reg); 12703 scalar_min_max_add(dst_reg, &src_reg); 12704 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 12705 break; 12706 case BPF_SUB: 12707 scalar32_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &src_reg); 12708 scalar_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &src_reg); 12709 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 12710 break; 12711 case BPF_MUL: 12712 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_mul(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 12713 scalar32_min_max_mul(dst_reg, &src_reg); 12714 scalar_min_max_mul(dst_reg, &src_reg); 12715 break; 12716 case BPF_AND: 12717 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_and(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 12718 scalar32_min_max_and(dst_reg, &src_reg); 12719 scalar_min_max_and(dst_reg, &src_reg); 12720 break; 12721 case BPF_OR: 12722 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_or(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 12723 scalar32_min_max_or(dst_reg, &src_reg); 12724 scalar_min_max_or(dst_reg, &src_reg); 12725 break; 12726 case BPF_XOR: 12727 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_xor(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 12728 scalar32_min_max_xor(dst_reg, &src_reg); 12729 scalar_min_max_xor(dst_reg, &src_reg); 12730 break; 12731 case BPF_LSH: 12732 if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) { 12733 /* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined. 12734 * This includes shifts by a negative number. 12735 */ 12736 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 12737 break; 12738 } 12739 if (alu32) 12740 scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 12741 else 12742 scalar_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 12743 break; 12744 case BPF_RSH: 12745 if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) { 12746 /* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined. 12747 * This includes shifts by a negative number. 12748 */ 12749 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 12750 break; 12751 } 12752 if (alu32) 12753 scalar32_min_max_rsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 12754 else 12755 scalar_min_max_rsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 12756 break; 12757 case BPF_ARSH: 12758 if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) { 12759 /* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined. 12760 * This includes shifts by a negative number. 12761 */ 12762 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 12763 break; 12764 } 12765 if (alu32) 12766 scalar32_min_max_arsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 12767 else 12768 scalar_min_max_arsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 12769 break; 12770 default: 12771 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 12772 break; 12773 } 12774 12775 /* ALU32 ops are zero extended into 64bit register */ 12776 if (alu32) 12777 zext_32_to_64(dst_reg); 12778 reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg); 12779 return 0; 12780 } 12781 12782 /* Handles ALU ops other than BPF_END, BPF_NEG and BPF_MOV: computes new min/max 12783 * and var_off. 12784 */ 12785 static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12786 struct bpf_insn *insn) 12787 { 12788 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 12789 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 12790 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *dst_reg, *src_reg; 12791 struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, off_reg = {0}; 12792 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 12793 int err; 12794 12795 dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg]; 12796 src_reg = NULL; 12797 if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 12798 ptr_reg = dst_reg; 12799 else 12800 /* Make sure ID is cleared otherwise dst_reg min/max could be 12801 * incorrectly propagated into other registers by find_equal_scalars() 12802 */ 12803 dst_reg->id = 0; 12804 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 12805 src_reg = ®s[insn->src_reg]; 12806 if (src_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 12807 if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 12808 /* Combining two pointers by any ALU op yields 12809 * an arbitrary scalar. Disallow all math except 12810 * pointer subtraction 12811 */ 12812 if (opcode == BPF_SUB && env->allow_ptr_leaks) { 12813 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 12814 return 0; 12815 } 12816 verbose(env, "R%d pointer %s pointer prohibited\n", 12817 insn->dst_reg, 12818 bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); 12819 return -EACCES; 12820 } else { 12821 /* scalar += pointer 12822 * This is legal, but we have to reverse our 12823 * src/dest handling in computing the range 12824 */ 12825 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->dst_reg); 12826 if (err) 12827 return err; 12828 return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, 12829 src_reg, dst_reg); 12830 } 12831 } else if (ptr_reg) { 12832 /* pointer += scalar */ 12833 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg); 12834 if (err) 12835 return err; 12836 return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, 12837 dst_reg, src_reg); 12838 } else if (dst_reg->precise) { 12839 /* if dst_reg is precise, src_reg should be precise as well */ 12840 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg); 12841 if (err) 12842 return err; 12843 } 12844 } else { 12845 /* Pretend the src is a reg with a known value, since we only 12846 * need to be able to read from this state. 12847 */ 12848 off_reg.type = SCALAR_VALUE; 12849 __mark_reg_known(&off_reg, insn->imm); 12850 src_reg = &off_reg; 12851 if (ptr_reg) /* pointer += K */ 12852 return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, 12853 ptr_reg, src_reg); 12854 } 12855 12856 /* Got here implies adding two SCALAR_VALUEs */ 12857 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ptr_reg)) { 12858 print_verifier_state(env, state, true); 12859 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected ptr_reg\n"); 12860 return -EINVAL; 12861 } 12862 if (WARN_ON(!src_reg)) { 12863 print_verifier_state(env, state, true); 12864 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no src_reg\n"); 12865 return -EINVAL; 12866 } 12867 return adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(env, insn, dst_reg, *src_reg); 12868 } 12869 12870 /* check validity of 32-bit and 64-bit arithmetic operations */ 12871 static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 12872 { 12873 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 12874 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 12875 int err; 12876 12877 if (opcode == BPF_END || opcode == BPF_NEG) { 12878 if (opcode == BPF_NEG) { 12879 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || 12880 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 12881 insn->off != 0 || insn->imm != 0) { 12882 verbose(env, "BPF_NEG uses reserved fields\n"); 12883 return -EINVAL; 12884 } 12885 } else { 12886 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 || 12887 (insn->imm != 16 && insn->imm != 32 && insn->imm != 64) || 12888 BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) { 12889 verbose(env, "BPF_END uses reserved fields\n"); 12890 return -EINVAL; 12891 } 12892 } 12893 12894 /* check src operand */ 12895 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 12896 if (err) 12897 return err; 12898 12899 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) { 12900 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n", 12901 insn->dst_reg); 12902 return -EACCES; 12903 } 12904 12905 /* check dest operand */ 12906 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP); 12907 if (err) 12908 return err; 12909 12910 } else if (opcode == BPF_MOV) { 12911 12912 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 12913 if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) { 12914 verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n"); 12915 return -EINVAL; 12916 } 12917 12918 /* check src operand */ 12919 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 12920 if (err) 12921 return err; 12922 } else { 12923 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) { 12924 verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n"); 12925 return -EINVAL; 12926 } 12927 } 12928 12929 /* check dest operand, mark as required later */ 12930 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK); 12931 if (err) 12932 return err; 12933 12934 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 12935 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg = regs + insn->src_reg; 12936 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg = regs + insn->dst_reg; 12937 12938 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) { 12939 /* case: R1 = R2 12940 * copy register state to dest reg 12941 */ 12942 if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && !src_reg->id) 12943 /* Assign src and dst registers the same ID 12944 * that will be used by find_equal_scalars() 12945 * to propagate min/max range. 12946 */ 12947 src_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 12948 copy_register_state(dst_reg, src_reg); 12949 dst_reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 12950 dst_reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 12951 } else { 12952 /* R1 = (u32) R2 */ 12953 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { 12954 verbose(env, 12955 "R%d partial copy of pointer\n", 12956 insn->src_reg); 12957 return -EACCES; 12958 } else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 12959 bool is_src_reg_u32 = src_reg->umax_value <= U32_MAX; 12960 12961 if (is_src_reg_u32 && !src_reg->id) 12962 src_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 12963 copy_register_state(dst_reg, src_reg); 12964 /* Make sure ID is cleared if src_reg is not in u32 range otherwise 12965 * dst_reg min/max could be incorrectly 12966 * propagated into src_reg by find_equal_scalars() 12967 */ 12968 if (!is_src_reg_u32) 12969 dst_reg->id = 0; 12970 dst_reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 12971 dst_reg->subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1; 12972 } else { 12973 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, 12974 insn->dst_reg); 12975 } 12976 zext_32_to_64(dst_reg); 12977 reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg); 12978 } 12979 } else { 12980 /* case: R = imm 12981 * remember the value we stored into this reg 12982 */ 12983 /* clear any state __mark_reg_known doesn't set */ 12984 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 12985 regs[insn->dst_reg].type = SCALAR_VALUE; 12986 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) { 12987 __mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg, 12988 insn->imm); 12989 } else { 12990 __mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg, 12991 (u32)insn->imm); 12992 } 12993 } 12994 12995 } else if (opcode > BPF_END) { 12996 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_ALU opcode %x\n", opcode); 12997 return -EINVAL; 12998 12999 } else { /* all other ALU ops: and, sub, xor, add, ... */ 13000 13001 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 13002 if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) { 13003 verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n"); 13004 return -EINVAL; 13005 } 13006 /* check src1 operand */ 13007 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 13008 if (err) 13009 return err; 13010 } else { 13011 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) { 13012 verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n"); 13013 return -EINVAL; 13014 } 13015 } 13016 13017 /* check src2 operand */ 13018 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 13019 if (err) 13020 return err; 13021 13022 if ((opcode == BPF_MOD || opcode == BPF_DIV) && 13023 BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && insn->imm == 0) { 13024 verbose(env, "div by zero\n"); 13025 return -EINVAL; 13026 } 13027 13028 if ((opcode == BPF_LSH || opcode == BPF_RSH || 13029 opcode == BPF_ARSH) && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) { 13030 int size = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 ? 64 : 32; 13031 13032 if (insn->imm < 0 || insn->imm >= size) { 13033 verbose(env, "invalid shift %d\n", insn->imm); 13034 return -EINVAL; 13035 } 13036 } 13037 13038 /* check dest operand */ 13039 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK); 13040 if (err) 13041 return err; 13042 13043 return adjust_reg_min_max_vals(env, insn); 13044 } 13045 13046 return 0; 13047 } 13048 13049 static void find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, 13050 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 13051 enum bpf_reg_type type, 13052 bool range_right_open) 13053 { 13054 struct bpf_func_state *state; 13055 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 13056 int new_range; 13057 13058 if (dst_reg->off < 0 || 13059 (dst_reg->off == 0 && range_right_open)) 13060 /* This doesn't give us any range */ 13061 return; 13062 13063 if (dst_reg->umax_value > MAX_PACKET_OFF || 13064 dst_reg->umax_value + dst_reg->off > MAX_PACKET_OFF) 13065 /* Risk of overflow. For instance, ptr + (1<<63) may be less 13066 * than pkt_end, but that's because it's also less than pkt. 13067 */ 13068 return; 13069 13070 new_range = dst_reg->off; 13071 if (range_right_open) 13072 new_range++; 13073 13074 /* Examples for register markings: 13075 * 13076 * pkt_data in dst register: 13077 * 13078 * r2 = r3; 13079 * r2 += 8; 13080 * if (r2 > pkt_end) goto <handle exception> 13081 * <access okay> 13082 * 13083 * r2 = r3; 13084 * r2 += 8; 13085 * if (r2 < pkt_end) goto <access okay> 13086 * <handle exception> 13087 * 13088 * Where: 13089 * r2 == dst_reg, pkt_end == src_reg 13090 * r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0) 13091 * r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0) 13092 * 13093 * pkt_data in src register: 13094 * 13095 * r2 = r3; 13096 * r2 += 8; 13097 * if (pkt_end >= r2) goto <access okay> 13098 * <handle exception> 13099 * 13100 * r2 = r3; 13101 * r2 += 8; 13102 * if (pkt_end <= r2) goto <handle exception> 13103 * <access okay> 13104 * 13105 * Where: 13106 * pkt_end == dst_reg, r2 == src_reg 13107 * r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0) 13108 * r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0) 13109 * 13110 * Find register r3 and mark its range as r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8) 13111 * or r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8-1), so that range of bytes [r3, r3 + 8) 13112 * and [r3, r3 + 8-1) respectively is safe to access depending on 13113 * the check. 13114 */ 13115 13116 /* If our ids match, then we must have the same max_value. And we 13117 * don't care about the other reg's fixed offset, since if it's too big 13118 * the range won't allow anything. 13119 * dst_reg->off is known < MAX_PACKET_OFF, therefore it fits in a u16. 13120 */ 13121 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(vstate, state, reg, ({ 13122 if (reg->type == type && reg->id == dst_reg->id) 13123 /* keep the maximum range already checked */ 13124 reg->range = max(reg->range, new_range); 13125 })); 13126 } 13127 13128 static int is_branch32_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 val, u8 opcode) 13129 { 13130 struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off); 13131 s32 sval = (s32)val; 13132 13133 switch (opcode) { 13134 case BPF_JEQ: 13135 if (tnum_is_const(subreg)) 13136 return !!tnum_equals_const(subreg, val); 13137 else if (val < reg->u32_min_value || val > reg->u32_max_value) 13138 return 0; 13139 break; 13140 case BPF_JNE: 13141 if (tnum_is_const(subreg)) 13142 return !tnum_equals_const(subreg, val); 13143 else if (val < reg->u32_min_value || val > reg->u32_max_value) 13144 return 1; 13145 break; 13146 case BPF_JSET: 13147 if ((~subreg.mask & subreg.value) & val) 13148 return 1; 13149 if (!((subreg.mask | subreg.value) & val)) 13150 return 0; 13151 break; 13152 case BPF_JGT: 13153 if (reg->u32_min_value > val) 13154 return 1; 13155 else if (reg->u32_max_value <= val) 13156 return 0; 13157 break; 13158 case BPF_JSGT: 13159 if (reg->s32_min_value > sval) 13160 return 1; 13161 else if (reg->s32_max_value <= sval) 13162 return 0; 13163 break; 13164 case BPF_JLT: 13165 if (reg->u32_max_value < val) 13166 return 1; 13167 else if (reg->u32_min_value >= val) 13168 return 0; 13169 break; 13170 case BPF_JSLT: 13171 if (reg->s32_max_value < sval) 13172 return 1; 13173 else if (reg->s32_min_value >= sval) 13174 return 0; 13175 break; 13176 case BPF_JGE: 13177 if (reg->u32_min_value >= val) 13178 return 1; 13179 else if (reg->u32_max_value < val) 13180 return 0; 13181 break; 13182 case BPF_JSGE: 13183 if (reg->s32_min_value >= sval) 13184 return 1; 13185 else if (reg->s32_max_value < sval) 13186 return 0; 13187 break; 13188 case BPF_JLE: 13189 if (reg->u32_max_value <= val) 13190 return 1; 13191 else if (reg->u32_min_value > val) 13192 return 0; 13193 break; 13194 case BPF_JSLE: 13195 if (reg->s32_max_value <= sval) 13196 return 1; 13197 else if (reg->s32_min_value > sval) 13198 return 0; 13199 break; 13200 } 13201 13202 return -1; 13203 } 13204 13205 13206 static int is_branch64_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 val, u8 opcode) 13207 { 13208 s64 sval = (s64)val; 13209 13210 switch (opcode) { 13211 case BPF_JEQ: 13212 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 13213 return !!tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, val); 13214 else if (val < reg->umin_value || val > reg->umax_value) 13215 return 0; 13216 break; 13217 case BPF_JNE: 13218 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 13219 return !tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, val); 13220 else if (val < reg->umin_value || val > reg->umax_value) 13221 return 1; 13222 break; 13223 case BPF_JSET: 13224 if ((~reg->var_off.mask & reg->var_off.value) & val) 13225 return 1; 13226 if (!((reg->var_off.mask | reg->var_off.value) & val)) 13227 return 0; 13228 break; 13229 case BPF_JGT: 13230 if (reg->umin_value > val) 13231 return 1; 13232 else if (reg->umax_value <= val) 13233 return 0; 13234 break; 13235 case BPF_JSGT: 13236 if (reg->smin_value > sval) 13237 return 1; 13238 else if (reg->smax_value <= sval) 13239 return 0; 13240 break; 13241 case BPF_JLT: 13242 if (reg->umax_value < val) 13243 return 1; 13244 else if (reg->umin_value >= val) 13245 return 0; 13246 break; 13247 case BPF_JSLT: 13248 if (reg->smax_value < sval) 13249 return 1; 13250 else if (reg->smin_value >= sval) 13251 return 0; 13252 break; 13253 case BPF_JGE: 13254 if (reg->umin_value >= val) 13255 return 1; 13256 else if (reg->umax_value < val) 13257 return 0; 13258 break; 13259 case BPF_JSGE: 13260 if (reg->smin_value >= sval) 13261 return 1; 13262 else if (reg->smax_value < sval) 13263 return 0; 13264 break; 13265 case BPF_JLE: 13266 if (reg->umax_value <= val) 13267 return 1; 13268 else if (reg->umin_value > val) 13269 return 0; 13270 break; 13271 case BPF_JSLE: 13272 if (reg->smax_value <= sval) 13273 return 1; 13274 else if (reg->smin_value > sval) 13275 return 0; 13276 break; 13277 } 13278 13279 return -1; 13280 } 13281 13282 /* compute branch direction of the expression "if (reg opcode val) goto target;" 13283 * and return: 13284 * 1 - branch will be taken and "goto target" will be executed 13285 * 0 - branch will not be taken and fall-through to next insn 13286 * -1 - unknown. Example: "if (reg < 5)" is unknown when register value 13287 * range [0,10] 13288 */ 13289 static int is_branch_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 val, u8 opcode, 13290 bool is_jmp32) 13291 { 13292 if (__is_pointer_value(false, reg)) { 13293 if (!reg_not_null(reg)) 13294 return -1; 13295 13296 /* If pointer is valid tests against zero will fail so we can 13297 * use this to direct branch taken. 13298 */ 13299 if (val != 0) 13300 return -1; 13301 13302 switch (opcode) { 13303 case BPF_JEQ: 13304 return 0; 13305 case BPF_JNE: 13306 return 1; 13307 default: 13308 return -1; 13309 } 13310 } 13311 13312 if (is_jmp32) 13313 return is_branch32_taken(reg, val, opcode); 13314 return is_branch64_taken(reg, val, opcode); 13315 } 13316 13317 static int flip_opcode(u32 opcode) 13318 { 13319 /* How can we transform "a <op> b" into "b <op> a"? */ 13320 static const u8 opcode_flip[16] = { 13321 /* these stay the same */ 13322 [BPF_JEQ >> 4] = BPF_JEQ, 13323 [BPF_JNE >> 4] = BPF_JNE, 13324 [BPF_JSET >> 4] = BPF_JSET, 13325 /* these swap "lesser" and "greater" (L and G in the opcodes) */ 13326 [BPF_JGE >> 4] = BPF_JLE, 13327 [BPF_JGT >> 4] = BPF_JLT, 13328 [BPF_JLE >> 4] = BPF_JGE, 13329 [BPF_JLT >> 4] = BPF_JGT, 13330 [BPF_JSGE >> 4] = BPF_JSLE, 13331 [BPF_JSGT >> 4] = BPF_JSLT, 13332 [BPF_JSLE >> 4] = BPF_JSGE, 13333 [BPF_JSLT >> 4] = BPF_JSGT 13334 }; 13335 return opcode_flip[opcode >> 4]; 13336 } 13337 13338 static int is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 13339 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg, 13340 u8 opcode) 13341 { 13342 struct bpf_reg_state *pkt; 13343 13344 if (src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) { 13345 pkt = dst_reg; 13346 } else if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) { 13347 pkt = src_reg; 13348 opcode = flip_opcode(opcode); 13349 } else { 13350 return -1; 13351 } 13352 13353 if (pkt->range >= 0) 13354 return -1; 13355 13356 switch (opcode) { 13357 case BPF_JLE: 13358 /* pkt <= pkt_end */ 13359 fallthrough; 13360 case BPF_JGT: 13361 /* pkt > pkt_end */ 13362 if (pkt->range == BEYOND_PKT_END) 13363 /* pkt has at last one extra byte beyond pkt_end */ 13364 return opcode == BPF_JGT; 13365 break; 13366 case BPF_JLT: 13367 /* pkt < pkt_end */ 13368 fallthrough; 13369 case BPF_JGE: 13370 /* pkt >= pkt_end */ 13371 if (pkt->range == BEYOND_PKT_END || pkt->range == AT_PKT_END) 13372 return opcode == BPF_JGE; 13373 break; 13374 } 13375 return -1; 13376 } 13377 13378 /* Adjusts the register min/max values in the case that the dst_reg is the 13379 * variable register that we are working on, and src_reg is a constant or we're 13380 * simply doing a BPF_K check. 13381 * In JEQ/JNE cases we also adjust the var_off values. 13382 */ 13383 static void reg_set_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg, 13384 struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg, 13385 u64 val, u32 val32, 13386 u8 opcode, bool is_jmp32) 13387 { 13388 struct tnum false_32off = tnum_subreg(false_reg->var_off); 13389 struct tnum false_64off = false_reg->var_off; 13390 struct tnum true_32off = tnum_subreg(true_reg->var_off); 13391 struct tnum true_64off = true_reg->var_off; 13392 s64 sval = (s64)val; 13393 s32 sval32 = (s32)val32; 13394 13395 /* If the dst_reg is a pointer, we can't learn anything about its 13396 * variable offset from the compare (unless src_reg were a pointer into 13397 * the same object, but we don't bother with that. 13398 * Since false_reg and true_reg have the same type by construction, we 13399 * only need to check one of them for pointerness. 13400 */ 13401 if (__is_pointer_value(false, false_reg)) 13402 return; 13403 13404 switch (opcode) { 13405 /* JEQ/JNE comparison doesn't change the register equivalence. 13406 * 13407 * r1 = r2; 13408 * if (r1 == 42) goto label; 13409 * ... 13410 * label: // here both r1 and r2 are known to be 42. 13411 * 13412 * Hence when marking register as known preserve it's ID. 13413 */ 13414 case BPF_JEQ: 13415 if (is_jmp32) { 13416 __mark_reg32_known(true_reg, val32); 13417 true_32off = tnum_subreg(true_reg->var_off); 13418 } else { 13419 ___mark_reg_known(true_reg, val); 13420 true_64off = true_reg->var_off; 13421 } 13422 break; 13423 case BPF_JNE: 13424 if (is_jmp32) { 13425 __mark_reg32_known(false_reg, val32); 13426 false_32off = tnum_subreg(false_reg->var_off); 13427 } else { 13428 ___mark_reg_known(false_reg, val); 13429 false_64off = false_reg->var_off; 13430 } 13431 break; 13432 case BPF_JSET: 13433 if (is_jmp32) { 13434 false_32off = tnum_and(false_32off, tnum_const(~val32)); 13435 if (is_power_of_2(val32)) 13436 true_32off = tnum_or(true_32off, 13437 tnum_const(val32)); 13438 } else { 13439 false_64off = tnum_and(false_64off, tnum_const(~val)); 13440 if (is_power_of_2(val)) 13441 true_64off = tnum_or(true_64off, 13442 tnum_const(val)); 13443 } 13444 break; 13445 case BPF_JGE: 13446 case BPF_JGT: 13447 { 13448 if (is_jmp32) { 13449 u32 false_umax = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val32 : val32 - 1; 13450 u32 true_umin = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val32 + 1 : val32; 13451 13452 false_reg->u32_max_value = min(false_reg->u32_max_value, 13453 false_umax); 13454 true_reg->u32_min_value = max(true_reg->u32_min_value, 13455 true_umin); 13456 } else { 13457 u64 false_umax = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val : val - 1; 13458 u64 true_umin = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val + 1 : val; 13459 13460 false_reg->umax_value = min(false_reg->umax_value, false_umax); 13461 true_reg->umin_value = max(true_reg->umin_value, true_umin); 13462 } 13463 break; 13464 } 13465 case BPF_JSGE: 13466 case BPF_JSGT: 13467 { 13468 if (is_jmp32) { 13469 s32 false_smax = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval32 : sval32 - 1; 13470 s32 true_smin = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval32 + 1 : sval32; 13471 13472 false_reg->s32_max_value = min(false_reg->s32_max_value, false_smax); 13473 true_reg->s32_min_value = max(true_reg->s32_min_value, true_smin); 13474 } else { 13475 s64 false_smax = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval : sval - 1; 13476 s64 true_smin = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval + 1 : sval; 13477 13478 false_reg->smax_value = min(false_reg->smax_value, false_smax); 13479 true_reg->smin_value = max(true_reg->smin_value, true_smin); 13480 } 13481 break; 13482 } 13483 case BPF_JLE: 13484 case BPF_JLT: 13485 { 13486 if (is_jmp32) { 13487 u32 false_umin = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val32 : val32 + 1; 13488 u32 true_umax = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val32 - 1 : val32; 13489 13490 false_reg->u32_min_value = max(false_reg->u32_min_value, 13491 false_umin); 13492 true_reg->u32_max_value = min(true_reg->u32_max_value, 13493 true_umax); 13494 } else { 13495 u64 false_umin = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val : val + 1; 13496 u64 true_umax = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val - 1 : val; 13497 13498 false_reg->umin_value = max(false_reg->umin_value, false_umin); 13499 true_reg->umax_value = min(true_reg->umax_value, true_umax); 13500 } 13501 break; 13502 } 13503 case BPF_JSLE: 13504 case BPF_JSLT: 13505 { 13506 if (is_jmp32) { 13507 s32 false_smin = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval32 : sval32 + 1; 13508 s32 true_smax = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval32 - 1 : sval32; 13509 13510 false_reg->s32_min_value = max(false_reg->s32_min_value, false_smin); 13511 true_reg->s32_max_value = min(true_reg->s32_max_value, true_smax); 13512 } else { 13513 s64 false_smin = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval : sval + 1; 13514 s64 true_smax = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval - 1 : sval; 13515 13516 false_reg->smin_value = max(false_reg->smin_value, false_smin); 13517 true_reg->smax_value = min(true_reg->smax_value, true_smax); 13518 } 13519 break; 13520 } 13521 default: 13522 return; 13523 } 13524 13525 if (is_jmp32) { 13526 false_reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(false_64off), 13527 tnum_subreg(false_32off)); 13528 true_reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(true_64off), 13529 tnum_subreg(true_32off)); 13530 __reg_combine_32_into_64(false_reg); 13531 __reg_combine_32_into_64(true_reg); 13532 } else { 13533 false_reg->var_off = false_64off; 13534 true_reg->var_off = true_64off; 13535 __reg_combine_64_into_32(false_reg); 13536 __reg_combine_64_into_32(true_reg); 13537 } 13538 } 13539 13540 /* Same as above, but for the case that dst_reg holds a constant and src_reg is 13541 * the variable reg. 13542 */ 13543 static void reg_set_min_max_inv(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg, 13544 struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg, 13545 u64 val, u32 val32, 13546 u8 opcode, bool is_jmp32) 13547 { 13548 opcode = flip_opcode(opcode); 13549 /* This uses zero as "not present in table"; luckily the zero opcode, 13550 * BPF_JA, can't get here. 13551 */ 13552 if (opcode) 13553 reg_set_min_max(true_reg, false_reg, val, val32, opcode, is_jmp32); 13554 } 13555 13556 /* Regs are known to be equal, so intersect their min/max/var_off */ 13557 static void __reg_combine_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg, 13558 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg) 13559 { 13560 src_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->umin_value = max(src_reg->umin_value, 13561 dst_reg->umin_value); 13562 src_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->umax_value = min(src_reg->umax_value, 13563 dst_reg->umax_value); 13564 src_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->smin_value = max(src_reg->smin_value, 13565 dst_reg->smin_value); 13566 src_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->smax_value = min(src_reg->smax_value, 13567 dst_reg->smax_value); 13568 src_reg->var_off = dst_reg->var_off = tnum_intersect(src_reg->var_off, 13569 dst_reg->var_off); 13570 reg_bounds_sync(src_reg); 13571 reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg); 13572 } 13573 13574 static void reg_combine_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *true_src, 13575 struct bpf_reg_state *true_dst, 13576 struct bpf_reg_state *false_src, 13577 struct bpf_reg_state *false_dst, 13578 u8 opcode) 13579 { 13580 switch (opcode) { 13581 case BPF_JEQ: 13582 __reg_combine_min_max(true_src, true_dst); 13583 break; 13584 case BPF_JNE: 13585 __reg_combine_min_max(false_src, false_dst); 13586 break; 13587 } 13588 } 13589 13590 static void mark_ptr_or_null_reg(struct bpf_func_state *state, 13591 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 id, 13592 bool is_null) 13593 { 13594 if (type_may_be_null(reg->type) && reg->id == id && 13595 (is_rcu_reg(reg) || !WARN_ON_ONCE(!reg->id))) { 13596 /* Old offset (both fixed and variable parts) should have been 13597 * known-zero, because we don't allow pointer arithmetic on 13598 * pointers that might be NULL. If we see this happening, don't 13599 * convert the register. 13600 * 13601 * But in some cases, some helpers that return local kptrs 13602 * advance offset for the returned pointer. In those cases, it 13603 * is fine to expect to see reg->off. 13604 */ 13605 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(reg->smin_value || reg->smax_value || !tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0))) 13606 return; 13607 if (!(type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(reg->type) || type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type)) && 13608 WARN_ON_ONCE(reg->off)) 13609 return; 13610 13611 if (is_null) { 13612 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 13613 /* We don't need id and ref_obj_id from this point 13614 * onwards anymore, thus we should better reset it, 13615 * so that state pruning has chances to take effect. 13616 */ 13617 reg->id = 0; 13618 reg->ref_obj_id = 0; 13619 13620 return; 13621 } 13622 13623 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(reg); 13624 13625 if (!reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(reg)) { 13626 /* For not-NULL ptr, reg->ref_obj_id will be reset 13627 * in release_reference(). 13628 * 13629 * reg->id is still used by spin_lock ptr. Other 13630 * than spin_lock ptr type, reg->id can be reset. 13631 */ 13632 reg->id = 0; 13633 } 13634 } 13635 } 13636 13637 /* The logic is similar to find_good_pkt_pointers(), both could eventually 13638 * be folded together at some point. 13639 */ 13640 static void mark_ptr_or_null_regs(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, u32 regno, 13641 bool is_null) 13642 { 13643 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 13644 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg; 13645 u32 ref_obj_id = regs[regno].ref_obj_id; 13646 u32 id = regs[regno].id; 13647 13648 if (ref_obj_id && ref_obj_id == id && is_null) 13649 /* regs[regno] is in the " == NULL" branch. 13650 * No one could have freed the reference state before 13651 * doing the NULL check. 13652 */ 13653 WARN_ON_ONCE(release_reference_state(state, id)); 13654 13655 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(vstate, state, reg, ({ 13656 mark_ptr_or_null_reg(state, reg, id, is_null); 13657 })); 13658 } 13659 13660 static bool try_match_pkt_pointers(const struct bpf_insn *insn, 13661 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 13662 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg, 13663 struct bpf_verifier_state *this_branch, 13664 struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch) 13665 { 13666 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_X) 13667 return false; 13668 13669 /* Pointers are always 64-bit. */ 13670 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP32) 13671 return false; 13672 13673 switch (BPF_OP(insn->code)) { 13674 case BPF_JGT: 13675 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 13676 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || 13677 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 13678 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { 13679 /* pkt_data' > pkt_end, pkt_meta' > pkt_data */ 13680 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg, 13681 dst_reg->type, false); 13682 mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, true); 13683 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 13684 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || 13685 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 13686 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { 13687 /* pkt_end > pkt_data', pkt_data > pkt_meta' */ 13688 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, src_reg, 13689 src_reg->type, true); 13690 mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->src_reg, false); 13691 } else { 13692 return false; 13693 } 13694 break; 13695 case BPF_JLT: 13696 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 13697 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || 13698 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 13699 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { 13700 /* pkt_data' < pkt_end, pkt_meta' < pkt_data */ 13701 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg, 13702 dst_reg->type, true); 13703 mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, false); 13704 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 13705 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || 13706 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 13707 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { 13708 /* pkt_end < pkt_data', pkt_data > pkt_meta' */ 13709 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, src_reg, 13710 src_reg->type, false); 13711 mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->src_reg, true); 13712 } else { 13713 return false; 13714 } 13715 break; 13716 case BPF_JGE: 13717 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 13718 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || 13719 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 13720 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { 13721 /* pkt_data' >= pkt_end, pkt_meta' >= pkt_data */ 13722 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg, 13723 dst_reg->type, true); 13724 mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, false); 13725 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 13726 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || 13727 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 13728 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { 13729 /* pkt_end >= pkt_data', pkt_data >= pkt_meta' */ 13730 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, src_reg, 13731 src_reg->type, false); 13732 mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->src_reg, true); 13733 } else { 13734 return false; 13735 } 13736 break; 13737 case BPF_JLE: 13738 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 13739 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || 13740 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 13741 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { 13742 /* pkt_data' <= pkt_end, pkt_meta' <= pkt_data */ 13743 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg, 13744 dst_reg->type, false); 13745 mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, true); 13746 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 13747 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || 13748 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 13749 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { 13750 /* pkt_end <= pkt_data', pkt_data <= pkt_meta' */ 13751 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, src_reg, 13752 src_reg->type, true); 13753 mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->src_reg, false); 13754 } else { 13755 return false; 13756 } 13757 break; 13758 default: 13759 return false; 13760 } 13761 13762 return true; 13763 } 13764 13765 static void find_equal_scalars(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, 13766 struct bpf_reg_state *known_reg) 13767 { 13768 struct bpf_func_state *state; 13769 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 13770 13771 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(vstate, state, reg, ({ 13772 if (reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->id == known_reg->id) 13773 copy_register_state(reg, known_reg); 13774 })); 13775 } 13776 13777 static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 13778 struct bpf_insn *insn, int *insn_idx) 13779 { 13780 struct bpf_verifier_state *this_branch = env->cur_state; 13781 struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch; 13782 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]->regs; 13783 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, *other_branch_regs, *src_reg = NULL; 13784 struct bpf_reg_state *eq_branch_regs; 13785 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 13786 bool is_jmp32; 13787 int pred = -1; 13788 int err; 13789 13790 /* Only conditional jumps are expected to reach here. */ 13791 if (opcode == BPF_JA || opcode > BPF_JSLE) { 13792 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_JMP/JMP32 opcode %x\n", opcode); 13793 return -EINVAL; 13794 } 13795 13796 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 13797 if (insn->imm != 0) { 13798 verbose(env, "BPF_JMP/JMP32 uses reserved fields\n"); 13799 return -EINVAL; 13800 } 13801 13802 /* check src1 operand */ 13803 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 13804 if (err) 13805 return err; 13806 13807 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { 13808 verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n", 13809 insn->src_reg); 13810 return -EACCES; 13811 } 13812 src_reg = ®s[insn->src_reg]; 13813 } else { 13814 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) { 13815 verbose(env, "BPF_JMP/JMP32 uses reserved fields\n"); 13816 return -EINVAL; 13817 } 13818 } 13819 13820 /* check src2 operand */ 13821 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 13822 if (err) 13823 return err; 13824 13825 dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg]; 13826 is_jmp32 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP32; 13827 13828 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) { 13829 pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, insn->imm, opcode, is_jmp32); 13830 } else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && 13831 is_jmp32 && tnum_is_const(tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off))) { 13832 pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, 13833 tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off).value, 13834 opcode, 13835 is_jmp32); 13836 } else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && 13837 !is_jmp32 && tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off)) { 13838 pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, 13839 src_reg->var_off.value, 13840 opcode, 13841 is_jmp32); 13842 } else if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && 13843 is_jmp32 && tnum_is_const(tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off))) { 13844 pred = is_branch_taken(src_reg, 13845 tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off).value, 13846 flip_opcode(opcode), 13847 is_jmp32); 13848 } else if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && 13849 !is_jmp32 && tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off)) { 13850 pred = is_branch_taken(src_reg, 13851 dst_reg->var_off.value, 13852 flip_opcode(opcode), 13853 is_jmp32); 13854 } else if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(dst_reg) && 13855 reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(src_reg) && 13856 !is_jmp32) { 13857 pred = is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken(dst_reg, src_reg, opcode); 13858 } 13859 13860 if (pred >= 0) { 13861 /* If we get here with a dst_reg pointer type it is because 13862 * above is_branch_taken() special cased the 0 comparison. 13863 */ 13864 if (!__is_pointer_value(false, dst_reg)) 13865 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->dst_reg); 13866 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && !err && 13867 !__is_pointer_value(false, src_reg)) 13868 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg); 13869 if (err) 13870 return err; 13871 } 13872 13873 if (pred == 1) { 13874 /* Only follow the goto, ignore fall-through. If needed, push 13875 * the fall-through branch for simulation under speculative 13876 * execution. 13877 */ 13878 if (!env->bypass_spec_v1 && 13879 !sanitize_speculative_path(env, insn, *insn_idx + 1, 13880 *insn_idx)) 13881 return -EFAULT; 13882 *insn_idx += insn->off; 13883 return 0; 13884 } else if (pred == 0) { 13885 /* Only follow the fall-through branch, since that's where the 13886 * program will go. If needed, push the goto branch for 13887 * simulation under speculative execution. 13888 */ 13889 if (!env->bypass_spec_v1 && 13890 !sanitize_speculative_path(env, insn, 13891 *insn_idx + insn->off + 1, 13892 *insn_idx)) 13893 return -EFAULT; 13894 return 0; 13895 } 13896 13897 other_branch = push_stack(env, *insn_idx + insn->off + 1, *insn_idx, 13898 false); 13899 if (!other_branch) 13900 return -EFAULT; 13901 other_branch_regs = other_branch->frame[other_branch->curframe]->regs; 13902 13903 /* detect if we are comparing against a constant value so we can adjust 13904 * our min/max values for our dst register. 13905 * this is only legit if both are scalars (or pointers to the same 13906 * object, I suppose, see the PTR_MAYBE_NULL related if block below), 13907 * because otherwise the different base pointers mean the offsets aren't 13908 * comparable. 13909 */ 13910 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 13911 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg = ®s[insn->src_reg]; 13912 13913 if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && 13914 src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 13915 if (tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off) || 13916 (is_jmp32 && 13917 tnum_is_const(tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off)))) 13918 reg_set_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg], 13919 dst_reg, 13920 src_reg->var_off.value, 13921 tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off).value, 13922 opcode, is_jmp32); 13923 else if (tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off) || 13924 (is_jmp32 && 13925 tnum_is_const(tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off)))) 13926 reg_set_min_max_inv(&other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg], 13927 src_reg, 13928 dst_reg->var_off.value, 13929 tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off).value, 13930 opcode, is_jmp32); 13931 else if (!is_jmp32 && 13932 (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE)) 13933 /* Comparing for equality, we can combine knowledge */ 13934 reg_combine_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg], 13935 &other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg], 13936 src_reg, dst_reg, opcode); 13937 if (src_reg->id && 13938 !WARN_ON_ONCE(src_reg->id != other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg].id)) { 13939 find_equal_scalars(this_branch, src_reg); 13940 find_equal_scalars(other_branch, &other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg]); 13941 } 13942 13943 } 13944 } else if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 13945 reg_set_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg], 13946 dst_reg, insn->imm, (u32)insn->imm, 13947 opcode, is_jmp32); 13948 } 13949 13950 if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && dst_reg->id && 13951 !WARN_ON_ONCE(dst_reg->id != other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg].id)) { 13952 find_equal_scalars(this_branch, dst_reg); 13953 find_equal_scalars(other_branch, &other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg]); 13954 } 13955 13956 /* if one pointer register is compared to another pointer 13957 * register check if PTR_MAYBE_NULL could be lifted. 13958 * E.g. register A - maybe null 13959 * register B - not null 13960 * for JNE A, B, ... - A is not null in the false branch; 13961 * for JEQ A, B, ... - A is not null in the true branch. 13962 * 13963 * Since PTR_TO_BTF_ID points to a kernel struct that does 13964 * not need to be null checked by the BPF program, i.e., 13965 * could be null even without PTR_MAYBE_NULL marking, so 13966 * only propagate nullness when neither reg is that type. 13967 */ 13968 if (!is_jmp32 && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && 13969 __is_pointer_value(false, src_reg) && __is_pointer_value(false, dst_reg) && 13970 type_may_be_null(src_reg->type) != type_may_be_null(dst_reg->type) && 13971 base_type(src_reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID && 13972 base_type(dst_reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 13973 eq_branch_regs = NULL; 13974 switch (opcode) { 13975 case BPF_JEQ: 13976 eq_branch_regs = other_branch_regs; 13977 break; 13978 case BPF_JNE: 13979 eq_branch_regs = regs; 13980 break; 13981 default: 13982 /* do nothing */ 13983 break; 13984 } 13985 if (eq_branch_regs) { 13986 if (type_may_be_null(src_reg->type)) 13987 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(&eq_branch_regs[insn->src_reg]); 13988 else 13989 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(&eq_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg]); 13990 } 13991 } 13992 13993 /* detect if R == 0 where R is returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem(). 13994 * NOTE: these optimizations below are related with pointer comparison 13995 * which will never be JMP32. 13996 */ 13997 if (!is_jmp32 && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && 13998 insn->imm == 0 && (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE) && 13999 type_may_be_null(dst_reg->type)) { 14000 /* Mark all identical registers in each branch as either 14001 * safe or unknown depending R == 0 or R != 0 conditional. 14002 */ 14003 mark_ptr_or_null_regs(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, 14004 opcode == BPF_JNE); 14005 mark_ptr_or_null_regs(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, 14006 opcode == BPF_JEQ); 14007 } else if (!try_match_pkt_pointers(insn, dst_reg, ®s[insn->src_reg], 14008 this_branch, other_branch) && 14009 is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) { 14010 verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n", 14011 insn->dst_reg); 14012 return -EACCES; 14013 } 14014 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) 14015 print_insn_state(env, this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]); 14016 return 0; 14017 } 14018 14019 /* verify BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */ 14020 static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 14021 { 14022 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env); 14023 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 14024 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg; 14025 struct bpf_map *map; 14026 int err; 14027 14028 if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) { 14029 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD_IMM insn\n"); 14030 return -EINVAL; 14031 } 14032 if (insn->off != 0) { 14033 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_IMM64 uses reserved fields\n"); 14034 return -EINVAL; 14035 } 14036 14037 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP); 14038 if (err) 14039 return err; 14040 14041 dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg]; 14042 if (insn->src_reg == 0) { 14043 u64 imm = ((u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32) | (u32)insn->imm; 14044 14045 dst_reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 14046 __mark_reg_known(®s[insn->dst_reg], imm); 14047 return 0; 14048 } 14049 14050 /* All special src_reg cases are listed below. From this point onwards 14051 * we either succeed and assign a corresponding dst_reg->type after 14052 * zeroing the offset, or fail and reject the program. 14053 */ 14054 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 14055 14056 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_BTF_ID) { 14057 dst_reg->type = aux->btf_var.reg_type; 14058 switch (base_type(dst_reg->type)) { 14059 case PTR_TO_MEM: 14060 dst_reg->mem_size = aux->btf_var.mem_size; 14061 break; 14062 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 14063 dst_reg->btf = aux->btf_var.btf; 14064 dst_reg->btf_id = aux->btf_var.btf_id; 14065 break; 14066 default: 14067 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 14068 return -EFAULT; 14069 } 14070 return 0; 14071 } 14072 14073 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) { 14074 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 14075 u32 subprogno = find_subprog(env, 14076 env->insn_idx + insn->imm + 1); 14077 14078 if (!aux->func_info) { 14079 verbose(env, "missing btf func_info\n"); 14080 return -EINVAL; 14081 } 14082 if (aux->func_info_aux[subprogno].linkage != BTF_FUNC_STATIC) { 14083 verbose(env, "callback function not static\n"); 14084 return -EINVAL; 14085 } 14086 14087 dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_FUNC; 14088 dst_reg->subprogno = subprogno; 14089 return 0; 14090 } 14091 14092 map = env->used_maps[aux->map_index]; 14093 dst_reg->map_ptr = map; 14094 14095 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE || 14096 insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE) { 14097 dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 14098 dst_reg->off = aux->map_off; 14099 WARN_ON_ONCE(map->max_entries != 1); 14100 /* We want reg->id to be same (0) as map_value is not distinct */ 14101 } else if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD || 14102 insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX) { 14103 dst_reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; 14104 } else { 14105 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 14106 return -EINVAL; 14107 } 14108 14109 return 0; 14110 } 14111 14112 static bool may_access_skb(enum bpf_prog_type type) 14113 { 14114 switch (type) { 14115 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER: 14116 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: 14117 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT: 14118 return true; 14119 default: 14120 return false; 14121 } 14122 } 14123 14124 /* verify safety of LD_ABS|LD_IND instructions: 14125 * - they can only appear in the programs where ctx == skb 14126 * - since they are wrappers of function calls, they scratch R1-R5 registers, 14127 * preserve R6-R9, and store return value into R0 14128 * 14129 * Implicit input: 14130 * ctx == skb == R6 == CTX 14131 * 14132 * Explicit input: 14133 * SRC == any register 14134 * IMM == 32-bit immediate 14135 * 14136 * Output: 14137 * R0 - 8/16/32-bit skb data converted to cpu endianness 14138 */ 14139 static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 14140 { 14141 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 14142 static const int ctx_reg = BPF_REG_6; 14143 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); 14144 int i, err; 14145 14146 if (!may_access_skb(resolve_prog_type(env->prog))) { 14147 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] instructions not allowed for this program type\n"); 14148 return -EINVAL; 14149 } 14150 14151 if (!env->ops->gen_ld_abs) { 14152 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 14153 return -EINVAL; 14154 } 14155 14156 if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 || 14157 BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW || 14158 (mode == BPF_ABS && insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0)) { 14159 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] uses reserved fields\n"); 14160 return -EINVAL; 14161 } 14162 14163 /* check whether implicit source operand (register R6) is readable */ 14164 err = check_reg_arg(env, ctx_reg, SRC_OP); 14165 if (err) 14166 return err; 14167 14168 /* Disallow usage of BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] with reference tracking, as 14169 * gen_ld_abs() may terminate the program at runtime, leading to 14170 * reference leak. 14171 */ 14172 err = check_reference_leak(env); 14173 if (err) { 14174 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] cannot be mixed with socket references\n"); 14175 return err; 14176 } 14177 14178 if (env->cur_state->active_lock.ptr) { 14179 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] cannot be used inside bpf_spin_lock-ed region\n"); 14180 return -EINVAL; 14181 } 14182 14183 if (env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock) { 14184 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] cannot be used inside bpf_rcu_read_lock-ed region\n"); 14185 return -EINVAL; 14186 } 14187 14188 if (regs[ctx_reg].type != PTR_TO_CTX) { 14189 verbose(env, 14190 "at the time of BPF_LD_ABS|IND R6 != pointer to skb\n"); 14191 return -EINVAL; 14192 } 14193 14194 if (mode == BPF_IND) { 14195 /* check explicit source operand */ 14196 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 14197 if (err) 14198 return err; 14199 } 14200 14201 err = check_ptr_off_reg(env, ®s[ctx_reg], ctx_reg); 14202 if (err < 0) 14203 return err; 14204 14205 /* reset caller saved regs to unreadable */ 14206 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { 14207 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); 14208 check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); 14209 } 14210 14211 /* mark destination R0 register as readable, since it contains 14212 * the value fetched from the packet. 14213 * Already marked as written above. 14214 */ 14215 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 14216 /* ld_abs load up to 32-bit skb data. */ 14217 regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1; 14218 return 0; 14219 } 14220 14221 static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 14222 { 14223 struct tnum enforce_attach_type_range = tnum_unknown; 14224 const struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 14225 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 14226 struct tnum range = tnum_range(0, 1); 14227 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 14228 int err; 14229 struct bpf_func_state *frame = env->cur_state->frame[0]; 14230 const bool is_subprog = frame->subprogno; 14231 14232 /* LSM and struct_ops func-ptr's return type could be "void" */ 14233 if (!is_subprog) { 14234 switch (prog_type) { 14235 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: 14236 if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_LSM_CGROUP) 14237 /* See below, can be 0 or 0-1 depending on hook. */ 14238 break; 14239 fallthrough; 14240 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS: 14241 if (!prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) 14242 return 0; 14243 break; 14244 default: 14245 break; 14246 } 14247 } 14248 14249 /* eBPF calling convention is such that R0 is used 14250 * to return the value from eBPF program. 14251 * Make sure that it's readable at this time 14252 * of bpf_exit, which means that program wrote 14253 * something into it earlier 14254 */ 14255 err = check_reg_arg(env, BPF_REG_0, SRC_OP); 14256 if (err) 14257 return err; 14258 14259 if (is_pointer_value(env, BPF_REG_0)) { 14260 verbose(env, "R0 leaks addr as return value\n"); 14261 return -EACCES; 14262 } 14263 14264 reg = cur_regs(env) + BPF_REG_0; 14265 14266 if (frame->in_async_callback_fn) { 14267 /* enforce return zero from async callbacks like timer */ 14268 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 14269 verbose(env, "In async callback the register R0 is not a known value (%s)\n", 14270 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 14271 return -EINVAL; 14272 } 14273 14274 if (!tnum_in(tnum_const(0), reg->var_off)) { 14275 verbose_invalid_scalar(env, reg, &range, "async callback", "R0"); 14276 return -EINVAL; 14277 } 14278 return 0; 14279 } 14280 14281 if (is_subprog) { 14282 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 14283 verbose(env, "At subprogram exit the register R0 is not a scalar value (%s)\n", 14284 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 14285 return -EINVAL; 14286 } 14287 return 0; 14288 } 14289 14290 switch (prog_type) { 14291 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR: 14292 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UDP4_RECVMSG || 14293 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UDP6_RECVMSG || 14294 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETPEERNAME || 14295 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETPEERNAME || 14296 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETSOCKNAME || 14297 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETSOCKNAME) 14298 range = tnum_range(1, 1); 14299 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_BIND || 14300 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_BIND) 14301 range = tnum_range(0, 3); 14302 break; 14303 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB: 14304 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET_EGRESS) { 14305 range = tnum_range(0, 3); 14306 enforce_attach_type_range = tnum_range(2, 3); 14307 } 14308 break; 14309 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK: 14310 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS: 14311 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_DEVICE: 14312 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SYSCTL: 14313 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT: 14314 break; 14315 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT: 14316 if (!env->prog->aux->attach_btf_id) 14317 return 0; 14318 range = tnum_const(0); 14319 break; 14320 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: 14321 switch (env->prog->expected_attach_type) { 14322 case BPF_TRACE_FENTRY: 14323 case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT: 14324 range = tnum_const(0); 14325 break; 14326 case BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP: 14327 case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN: 14328 return 0; 14329 case BPF_TRACE_ITER: 14330 break; 14331 default: 14332 return -ENOTSUPP; 14333 } 14334 break; 14335 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP: 14336 range = tnum_range(SK_DROP, SK_PASS); 14337 break; 14338 14339 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: 14340 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type != BPF_LSM_CGROUP) { 14341 /* Regular BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM programs can return 14342 * any value. 14343 */ 14344 return 0; 14345 } 14346 if (!env->prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) { 14347 /* Make sure programs that attach to void 14348 * hooks don't try to modify return value. 14349 */ 14350 range = tnum_range(1, 1); 14351 } 14352 break; 14353 14354 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_NETFILTER: 14355 range = tnum_range(NF_DROP, NF_ACCEPT); 14356 break; 14357 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT: 14358 /* freplace program can return anything as its return value 14359 * depends on the to-be-replaced kernel func or bpf program. 14360 */ 14361 default: 14362 return 0; 14363 } 14364 14365 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 14366 verbose(env, "At program exit the register R0 is not a known value (%s)\n", 14367 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 14368 return -EINVAL; 14369 } 14370 14371 if (!tnum_in(range, reg->var_off)) { 14372 verbose_invalid_scalar(env, reg, &range, "program exit", "R0"); 14373 if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_LSM_CGROUP && 14374 prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM && 14375 !prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) 14376 verbose(env, "Note, BPF_LSM_CGROUP that attach to void LSM hooks can't modify return value!\n"); 14377 return -EINVAL; 14378 } 14379 14380 if (!tnum_is_unknown(enforce_attach_type_range) && 14381 tnum_in(enforce_attach_type_range, reg->var_off)) 14382 env->prog->enforce_expected_attach_type = 1; 14383 return 0; 14384 } 14385 14386 /* non-recursive DFS pseudo code 14387 * 1 procedure DFS-iterative(G,v): 14388 * 2 label v as discovered 14389 * 3 let S be a stack 14390 * 4 S.push(v) 14391 * 5 while S is not empty 14392 * 6 t <- S.peek() 14393 * 7 if t is what we're looking for: 14394 * 8 return t 14395 * 9 for all edges e in G.adjacentEdges(t) do 14396 * 10 if edge e is already labelled 14397 * 11 continue with the next edge 14398 * 12 w <- G.adjacentVertex(t,e) 14399 * 13 if vertex w is not discovered and not explored 14400 * 14 label e as tree-edge 14401 * 15 label w as discovered 14402 * 16 S.push(w) 14403 * 17 continue at 5 14404 * 18 else if vertex w is discovered 14405 * 19 label e as back-edge 14406 * 20 else 14407 * 21 // vertex w is explored 14408 * 22 label e as forward- or cross-edge 14409 * 23 label t as explored 14410 * 24 S.pop() 14411 * 14412 * convention: 14413 * 0x10 - discovered 14414 * 0x11 - discovered and fall-through edge labelled 14415 * 0x12 - discovered and fall-through and branch edges labelled 14416 * 0x20 - explored 14417 */ 14418 14419 enum { 14420 DISCOVERED = 0x10, 14421 EXPLORED = 0x20, 14422 FALLTHROUGH = 1, 14423 BRANCH = 2, 14424 }; 14425 14426 static u32 state_htab_size(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 14427 { 14428 return env->prog->len; 14429 } 14430 14431 static struct bpf_verifier_state_list **explored_state( 14432 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 14433 int idx) 14434 { 14435 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 14436 struct bpf_func_state *state = cur->frame[cur->curframe]; 14437 14438 return &env->explored_states[(idx ^ state->callsite) % state_htab_size(env)]; 14439 } 14440 14441 static void mark_prune_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx) 14442 { 14443 env->insn_aux_data[idx].prune_point = true; 14444 } 14445 14446 static bool is_prune_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 14447 { 14448 return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].prune_point; 14449 } 14450 14451 static void mark_force_checkpoint(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx) 14452 { 14453 env->insn_aux_data[idx].force_checkpoint = true; 14454 } 14455 14456 static bool is_force_checkpoint(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 14457 { 14458 return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].force_checkpoint; 14459 } 14460 14461 14462 enum { 14463 DONE_EXPLORING = 0, 14464 KEEP_EXPLORING = 1, 14465 }; 14466 14467 /* t, w, e - match pseudo-code above: 14468 * t - index of current instruction 14469 * w - next instruction 14470 * e - edge 14471 */ 14472 static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 14473 bool loop_ok) 14474 { 14475 int *insn_stack = env->cfg.insn_stack; 14476 int *insn_state = env->cfg.insn_state; 14477 14478 if (e == FALLTHROUGH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | FALLTHROUGH)) 14479 return DONE_EXPLORING; 14480 14481 if (e == BRANCH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | BRANCH)) 14482 return DONE_EXPLORING; 14483 14484 if (w < 0 || w >= env->prog->len) { 14485 verbose_linfo(env, t, "%d: ", t); 14486 verbose(env, "jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", t, w); 14487 return -EINVAL; 14488 } 14489 14490 if (e == BRANCH) { 14491 /* mark branch target for state pruning */ 14492 mark_prune_point(env, w); 14493 mark_jmp_point(env, w); 14494 } 14495 14496 if (insn_state[w] == 0) { 14497 /* tree-edge */ 14498 insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e; 14499 insn_state[w] = DISCOVERED; 14500 if (env->cfg.cur_stack >= env->prog->len) 14501 return -E2BIG; 14502 insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack++] = w; 14503 return KEEP_EXPLORING; 14504 } else if ((insn_state[w] & 0xF0) == DISCOVERED) { 14505 if (loop_ok && env->bpf_capable) 14506 return DONE_EXPLORING; 14507 verbose_linfo(env, t, "%d: ", t); 14508 verbose_linfo(env, w, "%d: ", w); 14509 verbose(env, "back-edge from insn %d to %d\n", t, w); 14510 return -EINVAL; 14511 } else if (insn_state[w] == EXPLORED) { 14512 /* forward- or cross-edge */ 14513 insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e; 14514 } else { 14515 verbose(env, "insn state internal bug\n"); 14516 return -EFAULT; 14517 } 14518 return DONE_EXPLORING; 14519 } 14520 14521 static int visit_func_call_insn(int t, struct bpf_insn *insns, 14522 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 14523 bool visit_callee) 14524 { 14525 int ret; 14526 14527 ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, false); 14528 if (ret) 14529 return ret; 14530 14531 mark_prune_point(env, t + 1); 14532 /* when we exit from subprog, we need to record non-linear history */ 14533 mark_jmp_point(env, t + 1); 14534 14535 if (visit_callee) { 14536 mark_prune_point(env, t); 14537 ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].imm + 1, BRANCH, env, 14538 /* It's ok to allow recursion from CFG point of 14539 * view. __check_func_call() will do the actual 14540 * check. 14541 */ 14542 bpf_pseudo_func(insns + t)); 14543 } 14544 return ret; 14545 } 14546 14547 /* Visits the instruction at index t and returns one of the following: 14548 * < 0 - an error occurred 14549 * DONE_EXPLORING - the instruction was fully explored 14550 * KEEP_EXPLORING - there is still work to be done before it is fully explored 14551 */ 14552 static int visit_insn(int t, struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 14553 { 14554 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi, *insn = &insns[t]; 14555 int ret; 14556 14557 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) 14558 return visit_func_call_insn(t, insns, env, true); 14559 14560 /* All non-branch instructions have a single fall-through edge. */ 14561 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_JMP && 14562 BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_JMP32) 14563 return push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, false); 14564 14565 switch (BPF_OP(insn->code)) { 14566 case BPF_EXIT: 14567 return DONE_EXPLORING; 14568 14569 case BPF_CALL: 14570 if (insn->src_reg == 0 && insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback) 14571 /* Mark this call insn as a prune point to trigger 14572 * is_state_visited() check before call itself is 14573 * processed by __check_func_call(). Otherwise new 14574 * async state will be pushed for further exploration. 14575 */ 14576 mark_prune_point(env, t); 14577 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) { 14578 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta meta; 14579 14580 ret = fetch_kfunc_meta(env, insn, &meta, NULL); 14581 if (ret == 0 && is_iter_next_kfunc(&meta)) { 14582 mark_prune_point(env, t); 14583 /* Checking and saving state checkpoints at iter_next() call 14584 * is crucial for fast convergence of open-coded iterator loop 14585 * logic, so we need to force it. If we don't do that, 14586 * is_state_visited() might skip saving a checkpoint, causing 14587 * unnecessarily long sequence of not checkpointed 14588 * instructions and jumps, leading to exhaustion of jump 14589 * history buffer, and potentially other undesired outcomes. 14590 * It is expected that with correct open-coded iterators 14591 * convergence will happen quickly, so we don't run a risk of 14592 * exhausting memory. 14593 */ 14594 mark_force_checkpoint(env, t); 14595 } 14596 } 14597 return visit_func_call_insn(t, insns, env, insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL); 14598 14599 case BPF_JA: 14600 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K) 14601 return -EINVAL; 14602 14603 /* unconditional jump with single edge */ 14604 ret = push_insn(t, t + insn->off + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, 14605 true); 14606 if (ret) 14607 return ret; 14608 14609 mark_prune_point(env, t + insn->off + 1); 14610 mark_jmp_point(env, t + insn->off + 1); 14611 14612 return ret; 14613 14614 default: 14615 /* conditional jump with two edges */ 14616 mark_prune_point(env, t); 14617 14618 ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, true); 14619 if (ret) 14620 return ret; 14621 14622 return push_insn(t, t + insn->off + 1, BRANCH, env, true); 14623 } 14624 } 14625 14626 /* non-recursive depth-first-search to detect loops in BPF program 14627 * loop == back-edge in directed graph 14628 */ 14629 static int check_cfg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 14630 { 14631 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 14632 int *insn_stack, *insn_state; 14633 int ret = 0; 14634 int i; 14635 14636 insn_state = env->cfg.insn_state = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL); 14637 if (!insn_state) 14638 return -ENOMEM; 14639 14640 insn_stack = env->cfg.insn_stack = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL); 14641 if (!insn_stack) { 14642 kvfree(insn_state); 14643 return -ENOMEM; 14644 } 14645 14646 insn_state[0] = DISCOVERED; /* mark 1st insn as discovered */ 14647 insn_stack[0] = 0; /* 0 is the first instruction */ 14648 env->cfg.cur_stack = 1; 14649 14650 while (env->cfg.cur_stack > 0) { 14651 int t = insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack - 1]; 14652 14653 ret = visit_insn(t, env); 14654 switch (ret) { 14655 case DONE_EXPLORING: 14656 insn_state[t] = EXPLORED; 14657 env->cfg.cur_stack--; 14658 break; 14659 case KEEP_EXPLORING: 14660 break; 14661 default: 14662 if (ret > 0) { 14663 verbose(env, "visit_insn internal bug\n"); 14664 ret = -EFAULT; 14665 } 14666 goto err_free; 14667 } 14668 } 14669 14670 if (env->cfg.cur_stack < 0) { 14671 verbose(env, "pop stack internal bug\n"); 14672 ret = -EFAULT; 14673 goto err_free; 14674 } 14675 14676 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 14677 if (insn_state[i] != EXPLORED) { 14678 verbose(env, "unreachable insn %d\n", i); 14679 ret = -EINVAL; 14680 goto err_free; 14681 } 14682 } 14683 ret = 0; /* cfg looks good */ 14684 14685 err_free: 14686 kvfree(insn_state); 14687 kvfree(insn_stack); 14688 env->cfg.insn_state = env->cfg.insn_stack = NULL; 14689 return ret; 14690 } 14691 14692 static int check_abnormal_return(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 14693 { 14694 int i; 14695 14696 for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 14697 if (env->subprog_info[i].has_ld_abs) { 14698 verbose(env, "LD_ABS is not allowed in subprogs without BTF\n"); 14699 return -EINVAL; 14700 } 14701 if (env->subprog_info[i].has_tail_call) { 14702 verbose(env, "tail_call is not allowed in subprogs without BTF\n"); 14703 return -EINVAL; 14704 } 14705 } 14706 return 0; 14707 } 14708 14709 /* The minimum supported BTF func info size */ 14710 #define MIN_BPF_FUNCINFO_SIZE 8 14711 #define MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE 252 14712 14713 static int check_btf_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 14714 const union bpf_attr *attr, 14715 bpfptr_t uattr) 14716 { 14717 const struct btf_type *type, *func_proto, *ret_type; 14718 u32 i, nfuncs, urec_size, min_size; 14719 u32 krec_size = sizeof(struct bpf_func_info); 14720 struct bpf_func_info *krecord; 14721 struct bpf_func_info_aux *info_aux = NULL; 14722 struct bpf_prog *prog; 14723 const struct btf *btf; 14724 bpfptr_t urecord; 14725 u32 prev_offset = 0; 14726 bool scalar_return; 14727 int ret = -ENOMEM; 14728 14729 nfuncs = attr->func_info_cnt; 14730 if (!nfuncs) { 14731 if (check_abnormal_return(env)) 14732 return -EINVAL; 14733 return 0; 14734 } 14735 14736 if (nfuncs != env->subprog_cnt) { 14737 verbose(env, "number of funcs in func_info doesn't match number of subprogs\n"); 14738 return -EINVAL; 14739 } 14740 14741 urec_size = attr->func_info_rec_size; 14742 if (urec_size < MIN_BPF_FUNCINFO_SIZE || 14743 urec_size > MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE || 14744 urec_size % sizeof(u32)) { 14745 verbose(env, "invalid func info rec size %u\n", urec_size); 14746 return -EINVAL; 14747 } 14748 14749 prog = env->prog; 14750 btf = prog->aux->btf; 14751 14752 urecord = make_bpfptr(attr->func_info, uattr.is_kernel); 14753 min_size = min_t(u32, krec_size, urec_size); 14754 14755 krecord = kvcalloc(nfuncs, krec_size, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); 14756 if (!krecord) 14757 return -ENOMEM; 14758 info_aux = kcalloc(nfuncs, sizeof(*info_aux), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); 14759 if (!info_aux) 14760 goto err_free; 14761 14762 for (i = 0; i < nfuncs; i++) { 14763 ret = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(urecord, krec_size, urec_size); 14764 if (ret) { 14765 if (ret == -E2BIG) { 14766 verbose(env, "nonzero tailing record in func info"); 14767 /* set the size kernel expects so loader can zero 14768 * out the rest of the record. 14769 */ 14770 if (copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr, 14771 offsetof(union bpf_attr, func_info_rec_size), 14772 &min_size, sizeof(min_size))) 14773 ret = -EFAULT; 14774 } 14775 goto err_free; 14776 } 14777 14778 if (copy_from_bpfptr(&krecord[i], urecord, min_size)) { 14779 ret = -EFAULT; 14780 goto err_free; 14781 } 14782 14783 /* check insn_off */ 14784 ret = -EINVAL; 14785 if (i == 0) { 14786 if (krecord[i].insn_off) { 14787 verbose(env, 14788 "nonzero insn_off %u for the first func info record", 14789 krecord[i].insn_off); 14790 goto err_free; 14791 } 14792 } else if (krecord[i].insn_off <= prev_offset) { 14793 verbose(env, 14794 "same or smaller insn offset (%u) than previous func info record (%u)", 14795 krecord[i].insn_off, prev_offset); 14796 goto err_free; 14797 } 14798 14799 if (env->subprog_info[i].start != krecord[i].insn_off) { 14800 verbose(env, "func_info BTF section doesn't match subprog layout in BPF program\n"); 14801 goto err_free; 14802 } 14803 14804 /* check type_id */ 14805 type = btf_type_by_id(btf, krecord[i].type_id); 14806 if (!type || !btf_type_is_func(type)) { 14807 verbose(env, "invalid type id %d in func info", 14808 krecord[i].type_id); 14809 goto err_free; 14810 } 14811 info_aux[i].linkage = BTF_INFO_VLEN(type->info); 14812 14813 func_proto = btf_type_by_id(btf, type->type); 14814 if (unlikely(!func_proto || !btf_type_is_func_proto(func_proto))) 14815 /* btf_func_check() already verified it during BTF load */ 14816 goto err_free; 14817 ret_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, func_proto->type, NULL); 14818 scalar_return = 14819 btf_type_is_small_int(ret_type) || btf_is_any_enum(ret_type); 14820 if (i && !scalar_return && env->subprog_info[i].has_ld_abs) { 14821 verbose(env, "LD_ABS is only allowed in functions that return 'int'.\n"); 14822 goto err_free; 14823 } 14824 if (i && !scalar_return && env->subprog_info[i].has_tail_call) { 14825 verbose(env, "tail_call is only allowed in functions that return 'int'.\n"); 14826 goto err_free; 14827 } 14828 14829 prev_offset = krecord[i].insn_off; 14830 bpfptr_add(&urecord, urec_size); 14831 } 14832 14833 prog->aux->func_info = krecord; 14834 prog->aux->func_info_cnt = nfuncs; 14835 prog->aux->func_info_aux = info_aux; 14836 return 0; 14837 14838 err_free: 14839 kvfree(krecord); 14840 kfree(info_aux); 14841 return ret; 14842 } 14843 14844 static void adjust_btf_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 14845 { 14846 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 14847 int i; 14848 14849 if (!aux->func_info) 14850 return; 14851 14852 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) 14853 aux->func_info[i].insn_off = env->subprog_info[i].start; 14854 } 14855 14856 #define MIN_BPF_LINEINFO_SIZE offsetofend(struct bpf_line_info, line_col) 14857 #define MAX_LINEINFO_REC_SIZE MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE 14858 14859 static int check_btf_line(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 14860 const union bpf_attr *attr, 14861 bpfptr_t uattr) 14862 { 14863 u32 i, s, nr_linfo, ncopy, expected_size, rec_size, prev_offset = 0; 14864 struct bpf_subprog_info *sub; 14865 struct bpf_line_info *linfo; 14866 struct bpf_prog *prog; 14867 const struct btf *btf; 14868 bpfptr_t ulinfo; 14869 int err; 14870 14871 nr_linfo = attr->line_info_cnt; 14872 if (!nr_linfo) 14873 return 0; 14874 if (nr_linfo > INT_MAX / sizeof(struct bpf_line_info)) 14875 return -EINVAL; 14876 14877 rec_size = attr->line_info_rec_size; 14878 if (rec_size < MIN_BPF_LINEINFO_SIZE || 14879 rec_size > MAX_LINEINFO_REC_SIZE || 14880 rec_size & (sizeof(u32) - 1)) 14881 return -EINVAL; 14882 14883 /* Need to zero it in case the userspace may 14884 * pass in a smaller bpf_line_info object. 14885 */ 14886 linfo = kvcalloc(nr_linfo, sizeof(struct bpf_line_info), 14887 GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); 14888 if (!linfo) 14889 return -ENOMEM; 14890 14891 prog = env->prog; 14892 btf = prog->aux->btf; 14893 14894 s = 0; 14895 sub = env->subprog_info; 14896 ulinfo = make_bpfptr(attr->line_info, uattr.is_kernel); 14897 expected_size = sizeof(struct bpf_line_info); 14898 ncopy = min_t(u32, expected_size, rec_size); 14899 for (i = 0; i < nr_linfo; i++) { 14900 err = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(ulinfo, expected_size, rec_size); 14901 if (err) { 14902 if (err == -E2BIG) { 14903 verbose(env, "nonzero tailing record in line_info"); 14904 if (copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr, 14905 offsetof(union bpf_attr, line_info_rec_size), 14906 &expected_size, sizeof(expected_size))) 14907 err = -EFAULT; 14908 } 14909 goto err_free; 14910 } 14911 14912 if (copy_from_bpfptr(&linfo[i], ulinfo, ncopy)) { 14913 err = -EFAULT; 14914 goto err_free; 14915 } 14916 14917 /* 14918 * Check insn_off to ensure 14919 * 1) strictly increasing AND 14920 * 2) bounded by prog->len 14921 * 14922 * The linfo[0].insn_off == 0 check logically falls into 14923 * the later "missing bpf_line_info for func..." case 14924 * because the first linfo[0].insn_off must be the 14925 * first sub also and the first sub must have 14926 * subprog_info[0].start == 0. 14927 */ 14928 if ((i && linfo[i].insn_off <= prev_offset) || 14929 linfo[i].insn_off >= prog->len) { 14930 verbose(env, "Invalid line_info[%u].insn_off:%u (prev_offset:%u prog->len:%u)\n", 14931 i, linfo[i].insn_off, prev_offset, 14932 prog->len); 14933 err = -EINVAL; 14934 goto err_free; 14935 } 14936 14937 if (!prog->insnsi[linfo[i].insn_off].code) { 14938 verbose(env, 14939 "Invalid insn code at line_info[%u].insn_off\n", 14940 i); 14941 err = -EINVAL; 14942 goto err_free; 14943 } 14944 14945 if (!btf_name_by_offset(btf, linfo[i].line_off) || 14946 !btf_name_by_offset(btf, linfo[i].file_name_off)) { 14947 verbose(env, "Invalid line_info[%u].line_off or .file_name_off\n", i); 14948 err = -EINVAL; 14949 goto err_free; 14950 } 14951 14952 if (s != env->subprog_cnt) { 14953 if (linfo[i].insn_off == sub[s].start) { 14954 sub[s].linfo_idx = i; 14955 s++; 14956 } else if (sub[s].start < linfo[i].insn_off) { 14957 verbose(env, "missing bpf_line_info for func#%u\n", s); 14958 err = -EINVAL; 14959 goto err_free; 14960 } 14961 } 14962 14963 prev_offset = linfo[i].insn_off; 14964 bpfptr_add(&ulinfo, rec_size); 14965 } 14966 14967 if (s != env->subprog_cnt) { 14968 verbose(env, "missing bpf_line_info for %u funcs starting from func#%u\n", 14969 env->subprog_cnt - s, s); 14970 err = -EINVAL; 14971 goto err_free; 14972 } 14973 14974 prog->aux->linfo = linfo; 14975 prog->aux->nr_linfo = nr_linfo; 14976 14977 return 0; 14978 14979 err_free: 14980 kvfree(linfo); 14981 return err; 14982 } 14983 14984 #define MIN_CORE_RELO_SIZE sizeof(struct bpf_core_relo) 14985 #define MAX_CORE_RELO_SIZE MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE 14986 14987 static int check_core_relo(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 14988 const union bpf_attr *attr, 14989 bpfptr_t uattr) 14990 { 14991 u32 i, nr_core_relo, ncopy, expected_size, rec_size; 14992 struct bpf_core_relo core_relo = {}; 14993 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 14994 const struct btf *btf = prog->aux->btf; 14995 struct bpf_core_ctx ctx = { 14996 .log = &env->log, 14997 .btf = btf, 14998 }; 14999 bpfptr_t u_core_relo; 15000 int err; 15001 15002 nr_core_relo = attr->core_relo_cnt; 15003 if (!nr_core_relo) 15004 return 0; 15005 if (nr_core_relo > INT_MAX / sizeof(struct bpf_core_relo)) 15006 return -EINVAL; 15007 15008 rec_size = attr->core_relo_rec_size; 15009 if (rec_size < MIN_CORE_RELO_SIZE || 15010 rec_size > MAX_CORE_RELO_SIZE || 15011 rec_size % sizeof(u32)) 15012 return -EINVAL; 15013 15014 u_core_relo = make_bpfptr(attr->core_relos, uattr.is_kernel); 15015 expected_size = sizeof(struct bpf_core_relo); 15016 ncopy = min_t(u32, expected_size, rec_size); 15017 15018 /* Unlike func_info and line_info, copy and apply each CO-RE 15019 * relocation record one at a time. 15020 */ 15021 for (i = 0; i < nr_core_relo; i++) { 15022 /* future proofing when sizeof(bpf_core_relo) changes */ 15023 err = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(u_core_relo, expected_size, rec_size); 15024 if (err) { 15025 if (err == -E2BIG) { 15026 verbose(env, "nonzero tailing record in core_relo"); 15027 if (copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr, 15028 offsetof(union bpf_attr, core_relo_rec_size), 15029 &expected_size, sizeof(expected_size))) 15030 err = -EFAULT; 15031 } 15032 break; 15033 } 15034 15035 if (copy_from_bpfptr(&core_relo, u_core_relo, ncopy)) { 15036 err = -EFAULT; 15037 break; 15038 } 15039 15040 if (core_relo.insn_off % 8 || core_relo.insn_off / 8 >= prog->len) { 15041 verbose(env, "Invalid core_relo[%u].insn_off:%u prog->len:%u\n", 15042 i, core_relo.insn_off, prog->len); 15043 err = -EINVAL; 15044 break; 15045 } 15046 15047 err = bpf_core_apply(&ctx, &core_relo, i, 15048 &prog->insnsi[core_relo.insn_off / 8]); 15049 if (err) 15050 break; 15051 bpfptr_add(&u_core_relo, rec_size); 15052 } 15053 return err; 15054 } 15055 15056 static int check_btf_info(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 15057 const union bpf_attr *attr, 15058 bpfptr_t uattr) 15059 { 15060 struct btf *btf; 15061 int err; 15062 15063 if (!attr->func_info_cnt && !attr->line_info_cnt) { 15064 if (check_abnormal_return(env)) 15065 return -EINVAL; 15066 return 0; 15067 } 15068 15069 btf = btf_get_by_fd(attr->prog_btf_fd); 15070 if (IS_ERR(btf)) 15071 return PTR_ERR(btf); 15072 if (btf_is_kernel(btf)) { 15073 btf_put(btf); 15074 return -EACCES; 15075 } 15076 env->prog->aux->btf = btf; 15077 15078 err = check_btf_func(env, attr, uattr); 15079 if (err) 15080 return err; 15081 15082 err = check_btf_line(env, attr, uattr); 15083 if (err) 15084 return err; 15085 15086 err = check_core_relo(env, attr, uattr); 15087 if (err) 15088 return err; 15089 15090 return 0; 15091 } 15092 15093 /* check %cur's range satisfies %old's */ 15094 static bool range_within(struct bpf_reg_state *old, 15095 struct bpf_reg_state *cur) 15096 { 15097 return old->umin_value <= cur->umin_value && 15098 old->umax_value >= cur->umax_value && 15099 old->smin_value <= cur->smin_value && 15100 old->smax_value >= cur->smax_value && 15101 old->u32_min_value <= cur->u32_min_value && 15102 old->u32_max_value >= cur->u32_max_value && 15103 old->s32_min_value <= cur->s32_min_value && 15104 old->s32_max_value >= cur->s32_max_value; 15105 } 15106 15107 /* If in the old state two registers had the same id, then they need to have 15108 * the same id in the new state as well. But that id could be different from 15109 * the old state, so we need to track the mapping from old to new ids. 15110 * Once we have seen that, say, a reg with old id 5 had new id 9, any subsequent 15111 * regs with old id 5 must also have new id 9 for the new state to be safe. But 15112 * regs with a different old id could still have new id 9, we don't care about 15113 * that. 15114 * So we look through our idmap to see if this old id has been seen before. If 15115 * so, we require the new id to match; otherwise, we add the id pair to the map. 15116 */ 15117 static bool check_ids(u32 old_id, u32 cur_id, struct bpf_id_pair *idmap) 15118 { 15119 unsigned int i; 15120 15121 /* either both IDs should be set or both should be zero */ 15122 if (!!old_id != !!cur_id) 15123 return false; 15124 15125 if (old_id == 0) /* cur_id == 0 as well */ 15126 return true; 15127 15128 for (i = 0; i < BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE; i++) { 15129 if (!idmap[i].old) { 15130 /* Reached an empty slot; haven't seen this id before */ 15131 idmap[i].old = old_id; 15132 idmap[i].cur = cur_id; 15133 return true; 15134 } 15135 if (idmap[i].old == old_id) 15136 return idmap[i].cur == cur_id; 15137 } 15138 /* We ran out of idmap slots, which should be impossible */ 15139 WARN_ON_ONCE(1); 15140 return false; 15141 } 15142 15143 static void clean_func_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 15144 struct bpf_func_state *st) 15145 { 15146 enum bpf_reg_liveness live; 15147 int i, j; 15148 15149 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) { 15150 live = st->regs[i].live; 15151 /* liveness must not touch this register anymore */ 15152 st->regs[i].live |= REG_LIVE_DONE; 15153 if (!(live & REG_LIVE_READ)) 15154 /* since the register is unused, clear its state 15155 * to make further comparison simpler 15156 */ 15157 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &st->regs[i]); 15158 } 15159 15160 for (i = 0; i < st->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 15161 live = st->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live; 15162 /* liveness must not touch this stack slot anymore */ 15163 st->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_DONE; 15164 if (!(live & REG_LIVE_READ)) { 15165 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &st->stack[i].spilled_ptr); 15166 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 15167 st->stack[i].slot_type[j] = STACK_INVALID; 15168 } 15169 } 15170 } 15171 15172 static void clean_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 15173 struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 15174 { 15175 int i; 15176 15177 if (st->frame[0]->regs[0].live & REG_LIVE_DONE) 15178 /* all regs in this state in all frames were already marked */ 15179 return; 15180 15181 for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) 15182 clean_func_state(env, st->frame[i]); 15183 } 15184 15185 /* the parentage chains form a tree. 15186 * the verifier states are added to state lists at given insn and 15187 * pushed into state stack for future exploration. 15188 * when the verifier reaches bpf_exit insn some of the verifer states 15189 * stored in the state lists have their final liveness state already, 15190 * but a lot of states will get revised from liveness point of view when 15191 * the verifier explores other branches. 15192 * Example: 15193 * 1: r0 = 1 15194 * 2: if r1 == 100 goto pc+1 15195 * 3: r0 = 2 15196 * 4: exit 15197 * when the verifier reaches exit insn the register r0 in the state list of 15198 * insn 2 will be seen as !REG_LIVE_READ. Then the verifier pops the other_branch 15199 * of insn 2 and goes exploring further. At the insn 4 it will walk the 15200 * parentage chain from insn 4 into insn 2 and will mark r0 as REG_LIVE_READ. 15201 * 15202 * Since the verifier pushes the branch states as it sees them while exploring 15203 * the program the condition of walking the branch instruction for the second 15204 * time means that all states below this branch were already explored and 15205 * their final liveness marks are already propagated. 15206 * Hence when the verifier completes the search of state list in is_state_visited() 15207 * we can call this clean_live_states() function to mark all liveness states 15208 * as REG_LIVE_DONE to indicate that 'parent' pointers of 'struct bpf_reg_state' 15209 * will not be used. 15210 * This function also clears the registers and stack for states that !READ 15211 * to simplify state merging. 15212 * 15213 * Important note here that walking the same branch instruction in the callee 15214 * doesn't meant that the states are DONE. The verifier has to compare 15215 * the callsites 15216 */ 15217 static void clean_live_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn, 15218 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 15219 { 15220 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl; 15221 int i; 15222 15223 sl = *explored_state(env, insn); 15224 while (sl) { 15225 if (sl->state.branches) 15226 goto next; 15227 if (sl->state.insn_idx != insn || 15228 sl->state.curframe != cur->curframe) 15229 goto next; 15230 for (i = 0; i <= cur->curframe; i++) 15231 if (sl->state.frame[i]->callsite != cur->frame[i]->callsite) 15232 goto next; 15233 clean_verifier_state(env, &sl->state); 15234 next: 15235 sl = sl->next; 15236 } 15237 } 15238 15239 static bool regs_exact(const struct bpf_reg_state *rold, 15240 const struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, 15241 struct bpf_id_pair *idmap) 15242 { 15243 return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0 && 15244 check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap) && 15245 check_ids(rold->ref_obj_id, rcur->ref_obj_id, idmap); 15246 } 15247 15248 /* Returns true if (rold safe implies rcur safe) */ 15249 static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold, 15250 struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, struct bpf_id_pair *idmap) 15251 { 15252 if (!(rold->live & REG_LIVE_READ)) 15253 /* explored state didn't use this */ 15254 return true; 15255 if (rold->type == NOT_INIT) 15256 /* explored state can't have used this */ 15257 return true; 15258 if (rcur->type == NOT_INIT) 15259 return false; 15260 15261 /* Enforce that register types have to match exactly, including their 15262 * modifiers (like PTR_MAYBE_NULL, MEM_RDONLY, etc), as a general 15263 * rule. 15264 * 15265 * One can make a point that using a pointer register as unbounded 15266 * SCALAR would be technically acceptable, but this could lead to 15267 * pointer leaks because scalars are allowed to leak while pointers 15268 * are not. We could make this safe in special cases if root is 15269 * calling us, but it's probably not worth the hassle. 15270 * 15271 * Also, register types that are *not* MAYBE_NULL could technically be 15272 * safe to use as their MAYBE_NULL variants (e.g., PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE 15273 * is safe to be used as PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, provided both point 15274 * to the same map). 15275 * However, if the old MAYBE_NULL register then got NULL checked, 15276 * doing so could have affected others with the same id, and we can't 15277 * check for that because we lost the id when we converted to 15278 * a non-MAYBE_NULL variant. 15279 * So, as a general rule we don't allow mixing MAYBE_NULL and 15280 * non-MAYBE_NULL registers as well. 15281 */ 15282 if (rold->type != rcur->type) 15283 return false; 15284 15285 switch (base_type(rold->type)) { 15286 case SCALAR_VALUE: 15287 if (regs_exact(rold, rcur, idmap)) 15288 return true; 15289 if (env->explore_alu_limits) 15290 return false; 15291 if (!rold->precise) 15292 return true; 15293 /* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */ 15294 return range_within(rold, rcur) && 15295 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off); 15296 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 15297 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 15298 case PTR_TO_MEM: 15299 case PTR_TO_BUF: 15300 case PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER: 15301 /* If the new min/max/var_off satisfy the old ones and 15302 * everything else matches, we are OK. 15303 */ 15304 return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off)) == 0 && 15305 range_within(rold, rcur) && 15306 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off) && 15307 check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap) && 15308 check_ids(rold->ref_obj_id, rcur->ref_obj_id, idmap); 15309 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 15310 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 15311 /* We must have at least as much range as the old ptr 15312 * did, so that any accesses which were safe before are 15313 * still safe. This is true even if old range < old off, 15314 * since someone could have accessed through (ptr - k), or 15315 * even done ptr -= k in a register, to get a safe access. 15316 */ 15317 if (rold->range > rcur->range) 15318 return false; 15319 /* If the offsets don't match, we can't trust our alignment; 15320 * nor can we be sure that we won't fall out of range. 15321 */ 15322 if (rold->off != rcur->off) 15323 return false; 15324 /* id relations must be preserved */ 15325 if (!check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap)) 15326 return false; 15327 /* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */ 15328 return range_within(rold, rcur) && 15329 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off); 15330 case PTR_TO_STACK: 15331 /* two stack pointers are equal only if they're pointing to 15332 * the same stack frame, since fp-8 in foo != fp-8 in bar 15333 */ 15334 return regs_exact(rold, rcur, idmap) && rold->frameno == rcur->frameno; 15335 default: 15336 return regs_exact(rold, rcur, idmap); 15337 } 15338 } 15339 15340 static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old, 15341 struct bpf_func_state *cur, struct bpf_id_pair *idmap) 15342 { 15343 int i, spi; 15344 15345 /* walk slots of the explored stack and ignore any additional 15346 * slots in the current stack, since explored(safe) state 15347 * didn't use them 15348 */ 15349 for (i = 0; i < old->allocated_stack; i++) { 15350 struct bpf_reg_state *old_reg, *cur_reg; 15351 15352 spi = i / BPF_REG_SIZE; 15353 15354 if (!(old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live & REG_LIVE_READ)) { 15355 i += BPF_REG_SIZE - 1; 15356 /* explored state didn't use this */ 15357 continue; 15358 } 15359 15360 if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_INVALID) 15361 continue; 15362 15363 if (env->allow_uninit_stack && 15364 old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_MISC) 15365 continue; 15366 15367 /* explored stack has more populated slots than current stack 15368 * and these slots were used 15369 */ 15370 if (i >= cur->allocated_stack) 15371 return false; 15372 15373 /* if old state was safe with misc data in the stack 15374 * it will be safe with zero-initialized stack. 15375 * The opposite is not true 15376 */ 15377 if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_MISC && 15378 cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_ZERO) 15379 continue; 15380 if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] != 15381 cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE]) 15382 /* Ex: old explored (safe) state has STACK_SPILL in 15383 * this stack slot, but current has STACK_MISC -> 15384 * this verifier states are not equivalent, 15385 * return false to continue verification of this path 15386 */ 15387 return false; 15388 if (i % BPF_REG_SIZE != BPF_REG_SIZE - 1) 15389 continue; 15390 /* Both old and cur are having same slot_type */ 15391 switch (old->stack[spi].slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE - 1]) { 15392 case STACK_SPILL: 15393 /* when explored and current stack slot are both storing 15394 * spilled registers, check that stored pointers types 15395 * are the same as well. 15396 * Ex: explored safe path could have stored 15397 * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -8} 15398 * but current path has stored: 15399 * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -16} 15400 * such verifier states are not equivalent. 15401 * return false to continue verification of this path 15402 */ 15403 if (!regsafe(env, &old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, 15404 &cur->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, idmap)) 15405 return false; 15406 break; 15407 case STACK_DYNPTR: 15408 old_reg = &old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 15409 cur_reg = &cur->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 15410 if (old_reg->dynptr.type != cur_reg->dynptr.type || 15411 old_reg->dynptr.first_slot != cur_reg->dynptr.first_slot || 15412 !check_ids(old_reg->ref_obj_id, cur_reg->ref_obj_id, idmap)) 15413 return false; 15414 break; 15415 case STACK_ITER: 15416 old_reg = &old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 15417 cur_reg = &cur->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 15418 /* iter.depth is not compared between states as it 15419 * doesn't matter for correctness and would otherwise 15420 * prevent convergence; we maintain it only to prevent 15421 * infinite loop check triggering, see 15422 * iter_active_depths_differ() 15423 */ 15424 if (old_reg->iter.btf != cur_reg->iter.btf || 15425 old_reg->iter.btf_id != cur_reg->iter.btf_id || 15426 old_reg->iter.state != cur_reg->iter.state || 15427 /* ignore {old_reg,cur_reg}->iter.depth, see above */ 15428 !check_ids(old_reg->ref_obj_id, cur_reg->ref_obj_id, idmap)) 15429 return false; 15430 break; 15431 case STACK_MISC: 15432 case STACK_ZERO: 15433 case STACK_INVALID: 15434 continue; 15435 /* Ensure that new unhandled slot types return false by default */ 15436 default: 15437 return false; 15438 } 15439 } 15440 return true; 15441 } 15442 15443 static bool refsafe(struct bpf_func_state *old, struct bpf_func_state *cur, 15444 struct bpf_id_pair *idmap) 15445 { 15446 int i; 15447 15448 if (old->acquired_refs != cur->acquired_refs) 15449 return false; 15450 15451 for (i = 0; i < old->acquired_refs; i++) { 15452 if (!check_ids(old->refs[i].id, cur->refs[i].id, idmap)) 15453 return false; 15454 } 15455 15456 return true; 15457 } 15458 15459 /* compare two verifier states 15460 * 15461 * all states stored in state_list are known to be valid, since 15462 * verifier reached 'bpf_exit' instruction through them 15463 * 15464 * this function is called when verifier exploring different branches of 15465 * execution popped from the state stack. If it sees an old state that has 15466 * more strict register state and more strict stack state then this execution 15467 * branch doesn't need to be explored further, since verifier already 15468 * concluded that more strict state leads to valid finish. 15469 * 15470 * Therefore two states are equivalent if register state is more conservative 15471 * and explored stack state is more conservative than the current one. 15472 * Example: 15473 * explored current 15474 * (slot1=INV slot2=MISC) == (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC) 15475 * (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC) != (slot1=INV slot2=MISC) 15476 * 15477 * In other words if current stack state (one being explored) has more 15478 * valid slots than old one that already passed validation, it means 15479 * the verifier can stop exploring and conclude that current state is valid too 15480 * 15481 * Similarly with registers. If explored state has register type as invalid 15482 * whereas register type in current state is meaningful, it means that 15483 * the current state will reach 'bpf_exit' instruction safely 15484 */ 15485 static bool func_states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old, 15486 struct bpf_func_state *cur) 15487 { 15488 int i; 15489 15490 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) 15491 if (!regsafe(env, &old->regs[i], &cur->regs[i], 15492 env->idmap_scratch)) 15493 return false; 15494 15495 if (!stacksafe(env, old, cur, env->idmap_scratch)) 15496 return false; 15497 15498 if (!refsafe(old, cur, env->idmap_scratch)) 15499 return false; 15500 15501 return true; 15502 } 15503 15504 static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 15505 struct bpf_verifier_state *old, 15506 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 15507 { 15508 int i; 15509 15510 if (old->curframe != cur->curframe) 15511 return false; 15512 15513 memset(env->idmap_scratch, 0, sizeof(env->idmap_scratch)); 15514 15515 /* Verification state from speculative execution simulation 15516 * must never prune a non-speculative execution one. 15517 */ 15518 if (old->speculative && !cur->speculative) 15519 return false; 15520 15521 if (old->active_lock.ptr != cur->active_lock.ptr) 15522 return false; 15523 15524 /* Old and cur active_lock's have to be either both present 15525 * or both absent. 15526 */ 15527 if (!!old->active_lock.id != !!cur->active_lock.id) 15528 return false; 15529 15530 if (old->active_lock.id && 15531 !check_ids(old->active_lock.id, cur->active_lock.id, env->idmap_scratch)) 15532 return false; 15533 15534 if (old->active_rcu_lock != cur->active_rcu_lock) 15535 return false; 15536 15537 /* for states to be equal callsites have to be the same 15538 * and all frame states need to be equivalent 15539 */ 15540 for (i = 0; i <= old->curframe; i++) { 15541 if (old->frame[i]->callsite != cur->frame[i]->callsite) 15542 return false; 15543 if (!func_states_equal(env, old->frame[i], cur->frame[i])) 15544 return false; 15545 } 15546 return true; 15547 } 15548 15549 /* Return 0 if no propagation happened. Return negative error code if error 15550 * happened. Otherwise, return the propagated bit. 15551 */ 15552 static int propagate_liveness_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 15553 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 15554 struct bpf_reg_state *parent_reg) 15555 { 15556 u8 parent_flag = parent_reg->live & REG_LIVE_READ; 15557 u8 flag = reg->live & REG_LIVE_READ; 15558 int err; 15559 15560 /* When comes here, read flags of PARENT_REG or REG could be any of 15561 * REG_LIVE_READ64, REG_LIVE_READ32, REG_LIVE_NONE. There is no need 15562 * of propagation if PARENT_REG has strongest REG_LIVE_READ64. 15563 */ 15564 if (parent_flag == REG_LIVE_READ64 || 15565 /* Or if there is no read flag from REG. */ 15566 !flag || 15567 /* Or if the read flag from REG is the same as PARENT_REG. */ 15568 parent_flag == flag) 15569 return 0; 15570 15571 err = mark_reg_read(env, reg, parent_reg, flag); 15572 if (err) 15573 return err; 15574 15575 return flag; 15576 } 15577 15578 /* A write screens off any subsequent reads; but write marks come from the 15579 * straight-line code between a state and its parent. When we arrive at an 15580 * equivalent state (jump target or such) we didn't arrive by the straight-line 15581 * code, so read marks in the state must propagate to the parent regardless 15582 * of the state's write marks. That's what 'parent == state->parent' comparison 15583 * in mark_reg_read() is for. 15584 */ 15585 static int propagate_liveness(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 15586 const struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, 15587 struct bpf_verifier_state *vparent) 15588 { 15589 struct bpf_reg_state *state_reg, *parent_reg; 15590 struct bpf_func_state *state, *parent; 15591 int i, frame, err = 0; 15592 15593 if (vparent->curframe != vstate->curframe) { 15594 WARN(1, "propagate_live: parent frame %d current frame %d\n", 15595 vparent->curframe, vstate->curframe); 15596 return -EFAULT; 15597 } 15598 /* Propagate read liveness of registers... */ 15599 BUILD_BUG_ON(BPF_REG_FP + 1 != MAX_BPF_REG); 15600 for (frame = 0; frame <= vstate->curframe; frame++) { 15601 parent = vparent->frame[frame]; 15602 state = vstate->frame[frame]; 15603 parent_reg = parent->regs; 15604 state_reg = state->regs; 15605 /* We don't need to worry about FP liveness, it's read-only */ 15606 for (i = frame < vstate->curframe ? BPF_REG_6 : 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) { 15607 err = propagate_liveness_reg(env, &state_reg[i], 15608 &parent_reg[i]); 15609 if (err < 0) 15610 return err; 15611 if (err == REG_LIVE_READ64) 15612 mark_insn_zext(env, &parent_reg[i]); 15613 } 15614 15615 /* Propagate stack slots. */ 15616 for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE && 15617 i < parent->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 15618 parent_reg = &parent->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 15619 state_reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 15620 err = propagate_liveness_reg(env, state_reg, 15621 parent_reg); 15622 if (err < 0) 15623 return err; 15624 } 15625 } 15626 return 0; 15627 } 15628 15629 /* find precise scalars in the previous equivalent state and 15630 * propagate them into the current state 15631 */ 15632 static int propagate_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 15633 const struct bpf_verifier_state *old) 15634 { 15635 struct bpf_reg_state *state_reg; 15636 struct bpf_func_state *state; 15637 int i, err = 0, fr; 15638 bool first; 15639 15640 for (fr = old->curframe; fr >= 0; fr--) { 15641 state = old->frame[fr]; 15642 state_reg = state->regs; 15643 first = true; 15644 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++, state_reg++) { 15645 if (state_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || 15646 !state_reg->precise || 15647 !(state_reg->live & REG_LIVE_READ)) 15648 continue; 15649 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 15650 if (first) 15651 verbose(env, "frame %d: propagating r%d", fr, i); 15652 else 15653 verbose(env, ",r%d", i); 15654 } 15655 bt_set_frame_reg(&env->bt, fr, i); 15656 first = false; 15657 } 15658 15659 for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 15660 if (!is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[i])) 15661 continue; 15662 state_reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 15663 if (state_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || 15664 !state_reg->precise || 15665 !(state_reg->live & REG_LIVE_READ)) 15666 continue; 15667 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 15668 if (first) 15669 verbose(env, "frame %d: propagating fp%d", 15670 fr, (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE); 15671 else 15672 verbose(env, ",fp%d", (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE); 15673 } 15674 bt_set_frame_slot(&env->bt, fr, i); 15675 first = false; 15676 } 15677 if (!first) 15678 verbose(env, "\n"); 15679 } 15680 15681 err = mark_chain_precision_batch(env); 15682 if (err < 0) 15683 return err; 15684 15685 return 0; 15686 } 15687 15688 static bool states_maybe_looping(struct bpf_verifier_state *old, 15689 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 15690 { 15691 struct bpf_func_state *fold, *fcur; 15692 int i, fr = cur->curframe; 15693 15694 if (old->curframe != fr) 15695 return false; 15696 15697 fold = old->frame[fr]; 15698 fcur = cur->frame[fr]; 15699 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) 15700 if (memcmp(&fold->regs[i], &fcur->regs[i], 15701 offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, parent))) 15702 return false; 15703 return true; 15704 } 15705 15706 static bool is_iter_next_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 15707 { 15708 return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].is_iter_next; 15709 } 15710 15711 /* is_state_visited() handles iter_next() (see process_iter_next_call() for 15712 * terminology) calls specially: as opposed to bounded BPF loops, it *expects* 15713 * states to match, which otherwise would look like an infinite loop. So while 15714 * iter_next() calls are taken care of, we still need to be careful and 15715 * prevent erroneous and too eager declaration of "ininite loop", when 15716 * iterators are involved. 15717 * 15718 * Here's a situation in pseudo-BPF assembly form: 15719 * 15720 * 0: again: ; set up iter_next() call args 15721 * 1: r1 = &it ; <CHECKPOINT HERE> 15722 * 2: call bpf_iter_num_next ; this is iter_next() call 15723 * 3: if r0 == 0 goto done 15724 * 4: ... something useful here ... 15725 * 5: goto again ; another iteration 15726 * 6: done: 15727 * 7: r1 = &it 15728 * 8: call bpf_iter_num_destroy ; clean up iter state 15729 * 9: exit 15730 * 15731 * This is a typical loop. Let's assume that we have a prune point at 1:, 15732 * before we get to `call bpf_iter_num_next` (e.g., because of that `goto 15733 * again`, assuming other heuristics don't get in a way). 15734 * 15735 * When we first time come to 1:, let's say we have some state X. We proceed 15736 * to 2:, fork states, enqueue ACTIVE, validate NULL case successfully, exit. 15737 * Now we come back to validate that forked ACTIVE state. We proceed through 15738 * 3-5, come to goto, jump to 1:. Let's assume our state didn't change, so we 15739 * are converging. But the problem is that we don't know that yet, as this 15740 * convergence has to happen at iter_next() call site only. So if nothing is 15741 * done, at 1: verifier will use bounded loop logic and declare infinite 15742 * looping (and would be *technically* correct, if not for iterator's 15743 * "eventual sticky NULL" contract, see process_iter_next_call()). But we 15744 * don't want that. So what we do in process_iter_next_call() when we go on 15745 * another ACTIVE iteration, we bump slot->iter.depth, to mark that it's 15746 * a different iteration. So when we suspect an infinite loop, we additionally 15747 * check if any of the *ACTIVE* iterator states depths differ. If yes, we 15748 * pretend we are not looping and wait for next iter_next() call. 15749 * 15750 * This only applies to ACTIVE state. In DRAINED state we don't expect to 15751 * loop, because that would actually mean infinite loop, as DRAINED state is 15752 * "sticky", and so we'll keep returning into the same instruction with the 15753 * same state (at least in one of possible code paths). 15754 * 15755 * This approach allows to keep infinite loop heuristic even in the face of 15756 * active iterator. E.g., C snippet below is and will be detected as 15757 * inifintely looping: 15758 * 15759 * struct bpf_iter_num it; 15760 * int *p, x; 15761 * 15762 * bpf_iter_num_new(&it, 0, 10); 15763 * while ((p = bpf_iter_num_next(&t))) { 15764 * x = p; 15765 * while (x--) {} // <<-- infinite loop here 15766 * } 15767 * 15768 */ 15769 static bool iter_active_depths_differ(struct bpf_verifier_state *old, struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 15770 { 15771 struct bpf_reg_state *slot, *cur_slot; 15772 struct bpf_func_state *state; 15773 int i, fr; 15774 15775 for (fr = old->curframe; fr >= 0; fr--) { 15776 state = old->frame[fr]; 15777 for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 15778 if (state->stack[i].slot_type[0] != STACK_ITER) 15779 continue; 15780 15781 slot = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 15782 if (slot->iter.state != BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE) 15783 continue; 15784 15785 cur_slot = &cur->frame[fr]->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 15786 if (cur_slot->iter.depth != slot->iter.depth) 15787 return true; 15788 } 15789 } 15790 return false; 15791 } 15792 15793 static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 15794 { 15795 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *new_sl; 15796 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl, **pprev; 15797 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state, *new; 15798 int i, j, err, states_cnt = 0; 15799 bool force_new_state = env->test_state_freq || is_force_checkpoint(env, insn_idx); 15800 bool add_new_state = force_new_state; 15801 15802 /* bpf progs typically have pruning point every 4 instructions 15803 * http://vger.kernel.org/bpfconf2019.html#session-1 15804 * Do not add new state for future pruning if the verifier hasn't seen 15805 * at least 2 jumps and at least 8 instructions. 15806 * This heuristics helps decrease 'total_states' and 'peak_states' metric. 15807 * In tests that amounts to up to 50% reduction into total verifier 15808 * memory consumption and 20% verifier time speedup. 15809 */ 15810 if (env->jmps_processed - env->prev_jmps_processed >= 2 && 15811 env->insn_processed - env->prev_insn_processed >= 8) 15812 add_new_state = true; 15813 15814 pprev = explored_state(env, insn_idx); 15815 sl = *pprev; 15816 15817 clean_live_states(env, insn_idx, cur); 15818 15819 while (sl) { 15820 states_cnt++; 15821 if (sl->state.insn_idx != insn_idx) 15822 goto next; 15823 15824 if (sl->state.branches) { 15825 struct bpf_func_state *frame = sl->state.frame[sl->state.curframe]; 15826 15827 if (frame->in_async_callback_fn && 15828 frame->async_entry_cnt != cur->frame[cur->curframe]->async_entry_cnt) { 15829 /* Different async_entry_cnt means that the verifier is 15830 * processing another entry into async callback. 15831 * Seeing the same state is not an indication of infinite 15832 * loop or infinite recursion. 15833 * But finding the same state doesn't mean that it's safe 15834 * to stop processing the current state. The previous state 15835 * hasn't yet reached bpf_exit, since state.branches > 0. 15836 * Checking in_async_callback_fn alone is not enough either. 15837 * Since the verifier still needs to catch infinite loops 15838 * inside async callbacks. 15839 */ 15840 goto skip_inf_loop_check; 15841 } 15842 /* BPF open-coded iterators loop detection is special. 15843 * states_maybe_looping() logic is too simplistic in detecting 15844 * states that *might* be equivalent, because it doesn't know 15845 * about ID remapping, so don't even perform it. 15846 * See process_iter_next_call() and iter_active_depths_differ() 15847 * for overview of the logic. When current and one of parent 15848 * states are detected as equivalent, it's a good thing: we prove 15849 * convergence and can stop simulating further iterations. 15850 * It's safe to assume that iterator loop will finish, taking into 15851 * account iter_next() contract of eventually returning 15852 * sticky NULL result. 15853 */ 15854 if (is_iter_next_insn(env, insn_idx)) { 15855 if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur)) { 15856 struct bpf_func_state *cur_frame; 15857 struct bpf_reg_state *iter_state, *iter_reg; 15858 int spi; 15859 15860 cur_frame = cur->frame[cur->curframe]; 15861 /* btf_check_iter_kfuncs() enforces that 15862 * iter state pointer is always the first arg 15863 */ 15864 iter_reg = &cur_frame->regs[BPF_REG_1]; 15865 /* current state is valid due to states_equal(), 15866 * so we can assume valid iter and reg state, 15867 * no need for extra (re-)validations 15868 */ 15869 spi = __get_spi(iter_reg->off + iter_reg->var_off.value); 15870 iter_state = &func(env, iter_reg)->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 15871 if (iter_state->iter.state == BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE) 15872 goto hit; 15873 } 15874 goto skip_inf_loop_check; 15875 } 15876 /* attempt to detect infinite loop to avoid unnecessary doomed work */ 15877 if (states_maybe_looping(&sl->state, cur) && 15878 states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur) && 15879 !iter_active_depths_differ(&sl->state, cur)) { 15880 verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; "); 15881 verbose(env, "infinite loop detected at insn %d\n", insn_idx); 15882 return -EINVAL; 15883 } 15884 /* if the verifier is processing a loop, avoid adding new state 15885 * too often, since different loop iterations have distinct 15886 * states and may not help future pruning. 15887 * This threshold shouldn't be too low to make sure that 15888 * a loop with large bound will be rejected quickly. 15889 * The most abusive loop will be: 15890 * r1 += 1 15891 * if r1 < 1000000 goto pc-2 15892 * 1M insn_procssed limit / 100 == 10k peak states. 15893 * This threshold shouldn't be too high either, since states 15894 * at the end of the loop are likely to be useful in pruning. 15895 */ 15896 skip_inf_loop_check: 15897 if (!force_new_state && 15898 env->jmps_processed - env->prev_jmps_processed < 20 && 15899 env->insn_processed - env->prev_insn_processed < 100) 15900 add_new_state = false; 15901 goto miss; 15902 } 15903 if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur)) { 15904 hit: 15905 sl->hit_cnt++; 15906 /* reached equivalent register/stack state, 15907 * prune the search. 15908 * Registers read by the continuation are read by us. 15909 * If we have any write marks in env->cur_state, they 15910 * will prevent corresponding reads in the continuation 15911 * from reaching our parent (an explored_state). Our 15912 * own state will get the read marks recorded, but 15913 * they'll be immediately forgotten as we're pruning 15914 * this state and will pop a new one. 15915 */ 15916 err = propagate_liveness(env, &sl->state, cur); 15917 15918 /* if previous state reached the exit with precision and 15919 * current state is equivalent to it (except precsion marks) 15920 * the precision needs to be propagated back in 15921 * the current state. 15922 */ 15923 err = err ? : push_jmp_history(env, cur); 15924 err = err ? : propagate_precision(env, &sl->state); 15925 if (err) 15926 return err; 15927 return 1; 15928 } 15929 miss: 15930 /* when new state is not going to be added do not increase miss count. 15931 * Otherwise several loop iterations will remove the state 15932 * recorded earlier. The goal of these heuristics is to have 15933 * states from some iterations of the loop (some in the beginning 15934 * and some at the end) to help pruning. 15935 */ 15936 if (add_new_state) 15937 sl->miss_cnt++; 15938 /* heuristic to determine whether this state is beneficial 15939 * to keep checking from state equivalence point of view. 15940 * Higher numbers increase max_states_per_insn and verification time, 15941 * but do not meaningfully decrease insn_processed. 15942 */ 15943 if (sl->miss_cnt > sl->hit_cnt * 3 + 3) { 15944 /* the state is unlikely to be useful. Remove it to 15945 * speed up verification 15946 */ 15947 *pprev = sl->next; 15948 if (sl->state.frame[0]->regs[0].live & REG_LIVE_DONE) { 15949 u32 br = sl->state.branches; 15950 15951 WARN_ONCE(br, 15952 "BUG live_done but branches_to_explore %d\n", 15953 br); 15954 free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false); 15955 kfree(sl); 15956 env->peak_states--; 15957 } else { 15958 /* cannot free this state, since parentage chain may 15959 * walk it later. Add it for free_list instead to 15960 * be freed at the end of verification 15961 */ 15962 sl->next = env->free_list; 15963 env->free_list = sl; 15964 } 15965 sl = *pprev; 15966 continue; 15967 } 15968 next: 15969 pprev = &sl->next; 15970 sl = *pprev; 15971 } 15972 15973 if (env->max_states_per_insn < states_cnt) 15974 env->max_states_per_insn = states_cnt; 15975 15976 if (!env->bpf_capable && states_cnt > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES) 15977 return 0; 15978 15979 if (!add_new_state) 15980 return 0; 15981 15982 /* There were no equivalent states, remember the current one. 15983 * Technically the current state is not proven to be safe yet, 15984 * but it will either reach outer most bpf_exit (which means it's safe) 15985 * or it will be rejected. When there are no loops the verifier won't be 15986 * seeing this tuple (frame[0].callsite, frame[1].callsite, .. insn_idx) 15987 * again on the way to bpf_exit. 15988 * When looping the sl->state.branches will be > 0 and this state 15989 * will not be considered for equivalence until branches == 0. 15990 */ 15991 new_sl = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list), GFP_KERNEL); 15992 if (!new_sl) 15993 return -ENOMEM; 15994 env->total_states++; 15995 env->peak_states++; 15996 env->prev_jmps_processed = env->jmps_processed; 15997 env->prev_insn_processed = env->insn_processed; 15998 15999 /* forget precise markings we inherited, see __mark_chain_precision */ 16000 if (env->bpf_capable) 16001 mark_all_scalars_imprecise(env, cur); 16002 16003 /* add new state to the head of linked list */ 16004 new = &new_sl->state; 16005 err = copy_verifier_state(new, cur); 16006 if (err) { 16007 free_verifier_state(new, false); 16008 kfree(new_sl); 16009 return err; 16010 } 16011 new->insn_idx = insn_idx; 16012 WARN_ONCE(new->branches != 1, 16013 "BUG is_state_visited:branches_to_explore=%d insn %d\n", new->branches, insn_idx); 16014 16015 cur->parent = new; 16016 cur->first_insn_idx = insn_idx; 16017 clear_jmp_history(cur); 16018 new_sl->next = *explored_state(env, insn_idx); 16019 *explored_state(env, insn_idx) = new_sl; 16020 /* connect new state to parentage chain. Current frame needs all 16021 * registers connected. Only r6 - r9 of the callers are alive (pushed 16022 * to the stack implicitly by JITs) so in callers' frames connect just 16023 * r6 - r9 as an optimization. Callers will have r1 - r5 connected to 16024 * the state of the call instruction (with WRITTEN set), and r0 comes 16025 * from callee with its full parentage chain, anyway. 16026 */ 16027 /* clear write marks in current state: the writes we did are not writes 16028 * our child did, so they don't screen off its reads from us. 16029 * (There are no read marks in current state, because reads always mark 16030 * their parent and current state never has children yet. Only 16031 * explored_states can get read marks.) 16032 */ 16033 for (j = 0; j <= cur->curframe; j++) { 16034 for (i = j < cur->curframe ? BPF_REG_6 : 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) 16035 cur->frame[j]->regs[i].parent = &new->frame[j]->regs[i]; 16036 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) 16037 cur->frame[j]->regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE; 16038 } 16039 16040 /* all stack frames are accessible from callee, clear them all */ 16041 for (j = 0; j <= cur->curframe; j++) { 16042 struct bpf_func_state *frame = cur->frame[j]; 16043 struct bpf_func_state *newframe = new->frame[j]; 16044 16045 for (i = 0; i < frame->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 16046 frame->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live = REG_LIVE_NONE; 16047 frame->stack[i].spilled_ptr.parent = 16048 &newframe->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 16049 } 16050 } 16051 return 0; 16052 } 16053 16054 /* Return true if it's OK to have the same insn return a different type. */ 16055 static bool reg_type_mismatch_ok(enum bpf_reg_type type) 16056 { 16057 switch (base_type(type)) { 16058 case PTR_TO_CTX: 16059 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 16060 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 16061 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 16062 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 16063 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 16064 return false; 16065 default: 16066 return true; 16067 } 16068 } 16069 16070 /* If an instruction was previously used with particular pointer types, then we 16071 * need to be careful to avoid cases such as the below, where it may be ok 16072 * for one branch accessing the pointer, but not ok for the other branch: 16073 * 16074 * R1 = sock_ptr 16075 * goto X; 16076 * ... 16077 * R1 = some_other_valid_ptr; 16078 * goto X; 16079 * ... 16080 * R2 = *(u32 *)(R1 + 0); 16081 */ 16082 static bool reg_type_mismatch(enum bpf_reg_type src, enum bpf_reg_type prev) 16083 { 16084 return src != prev && (!reg_type_mismatch_ok(src) || 16085 !reg_type_mismatch_ok(prev)); 16086 } 16087 16088 static int save_aux_ptr_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, enum bpf_reg_type type, 16089 bool allow_trust_missmatch) 16090 { 16091 enum bpf_reg_type *prev_type = &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].ptr_type; 16092 16093 if (*prev_type == NOT_INIT) { 16094 /* Saw a valid insn 16095 * dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + off) 16096 * save type to validate intersecting paths 16097 */ 16098 *prev_type = type; 16099 } else if (reg_type_mismatch(type, *prev_type)) { 16100 /* Abuser program is trying to use the same insn 16101 * dst_reg = *(u32*) (src_reg + off) 16102 * with different pointer types: 16103 * src_reg == ctx in one branch and 16104 * src_reg == stack|map in some other branch. 16105 * Reject it. 16106 */ 16107 if (allow_trust_missmatch && 16108 base_type(type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID && 16109 base_type(*prev_type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 16110 /* 16111 * Have to support a use case when one path through 16112 * the program yields TRUSTED pointer while another 16113 * is UNTRUSTED. Fallback to UNTRUSTED to generate 16114 * BPF_PROBE_MEM. 16115 */ 16116 *prev_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED; 16117 } else { 16118 verbose(env, "same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n"); 16119 return -EINVAL; 16120 } 16121 } 16122 16123 return 0; 16124 } 16125 16126 static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 16127 { 16128 bool pop_log = !(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2); 16129 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 16130 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; 16131 struct bpf_reg_state *regs; 16132 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 16133 bool do_print_state = false; 16134 int prev_insn_idx = -1; 16135 16136 for (;;) { 16137 struct bpf_insn *insn; 16138 u8 class; 16139 int err; 16140 16141 env->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx; 16142 if (env->insn_idx >= insn_cnt) { 16143 verbose(env, "invalid insn idx %d insn_cnt %d\n", 16144 env->insn_idx, insn_cnt); 16145 return -EFAULT; 16146 } 16147 16148 insn = &insns[env->insn_idx]; 16149 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); 16150 16151 if (++env->insn_processed > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS) { 16152 verbose(env, 16153 "BPF program is too large. Processed %d insn\n", 16154 env->insn_processed); 16155 return -E2BIG; 16156 } 16157 16158 state->last_insn_idx = env->prev_insn_idx; 16159 16160 if (is_prune_point(env, env->insn_idx)) { 16161 err = is_state_visited(env, env->insn_idx); 16162 if (err < 0) 16163 return err; 16164 if (err == 1) { 16165 /* found equivalent state, can prune the search */ 16166 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 16167 if (do_print_state) 16168 verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d%s: safe\n", 16169 env->prev_insn_idx, env->insn_idx, 16170 env->cur_state->speculative ? 16171 " (speculative execution)" : ""); 16172 else 16173 verbose(env, "%d: safe\n", env->insn_idx); 16174 } 16175 goto process_bpf_exit; 16176 } 16177 } 16178 16179 if (is_jmp_point(env, env->insn_idx)) { 16180 err = push_jmp_history(env, state); 16181 if (err) 16182 return err; 16183 } 16184 16185 if (signal_pending(current)) 16186 return -EAGAIN; 16187 16188 if (need_resched()) 16189 cond_resched(); 16190 16191 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2 && do_print_state) { 16192 verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d%s:", 16193 env->prev_insn_idx, env->insn_idx, 16194 env->cur_state->speculative ? 16195 " (speculative execution)" : ""); 16196 print_verifier_state(env, state->frame[state->curframe], true); 16197 do_print_state = false; 16198 } 16199 16200 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 16201 const struct bpf_insn_cbs cbs = { 16202 .cb_call = disasm_kfunc_name, 16203 .cb_print = verbose, 16204 .private_data = env, 16205 }; 16206 16207 if (verifier_state_scratched(env)) 16208 print_insn_state(env, state->frame[state->curframe]); 16209 16210 verbose_linfo(env, env->insn_idx, "; "); 16211 env->prev_log_pos = env->log.end_pos; 16212 verbose(env, "%d: ", env->insn_idx); 16213 print_bpf_insn(&cbs, insn, env->allow_ptr_leaks); 16214 env->prev_insn_print_pos = env->log.end_pos - env->prev_log_pos; 16215 env->prev_log_pos = env->log.end_pos; 16216 } 16217 16218 if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) { 16219 err = bpf_prog_offload_verify_insn(env, env->insn_idx, 16220 env->prev_insn_idx); 16221 if (err) 16222 return err; 16223 } 16224 16225 regs = cur_regs(env); 16226 sanitize_mark_insn_seen(env); 16227 prev_insn_idx = env->insn_idx; 16228 16229 if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) { 16230 err = check_alu_op(env, insn); 16231 if (err) 16232 return err; 16233 16234 } else if (class == BPF_LDX) { 16235 enum bpf_reg_type src_reg_type; 16236 16237 /* check for reserved fields is already done */ 16238 16239 /* check src operand */ 16240 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 16241 if (err) 16242 return err; 16243 16244 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK); 16245 if (err) 16246 return err; 16247 16248 src_reg_type = regs[insn->src_reg].type; 16249 16250 /* check that memory (src_reg + off) is readable, 16251 * the state of dst_reg will be updated by this func 16252 */ 16253 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->src_reg, 16254 insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), 16255 BPF_READ, insn->dst_reg, false); 16256 if (err) 16257 return err; 16258 16259 err = save_aux_ptr_type(env, src_reg_type, true); 16260 if (err) 16261 return err; 16262 } else if (class == BPF_STX) { 16263 enum bpf_reg_type dst_reg_type; 16264 16265 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC) { 16266 err = check_atomic(env, env->insn_idx, insn); 16267 if (err) 16268 return err; 16269 env->insn_idx++; 16270 continue; 16271 } 16272 16273 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0) { 16274 verbose(env, "BPF_STX uses reserved fields\n"); 16275 return -EINVAL; 16276 } 16277 16278 /* check src1 operand */ 16279 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 16280 if (err) 16281 return err; 16282 /* check src2 operand */ 16283 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 16284 if (err) 16285 return err; 16286 16287 dst_reg_type = regs[insn->dst_reg].type; 16288 16289 /* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */ 16290 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, 16291 insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), 16292 BPF_WRITE, insn->src_reg, false); 16293 if (err) 16294 return err; 16295 16296 err = save_aux_ptr_type(env, dst_reg_type, false); 16297 if (err) 16298 return err; 16299 } else if (class == BPF_ST) { 16300 enum bpf_reg_type dst_reg_type; 16301 16302 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || 16303 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) { 16304 verbose(env, "BPF_ST uses reserved fields\n"); 16305 return -EINVAL; 16306 } 16307 /* check src operand */ 16308 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 16309 if (err) 16310 return err; 16311 16312 dst_reg_type = regs[insn->dst_reg].type; 16313 16314 /* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */ 16315 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, 16316 insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), 16317 BPF_WRITE, -1, false); 16318 if (err) 16319 return err; 16320 16321 err = save_aux_ptr_type(env, dst_reg_type, false); 16322 if (err) 16323 return err; 16324 } else if (class == BPF_JMP || class == BPF_JMP32) { 16325 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 16326 16327 env->jmps_processed++; 16328 if (opcode == BPF_CALL) { 16329 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || 16330 (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL 16331 && insn->off != 0) || 16332 (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 && 16333 insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL && 16334 insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) || 16335 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 16336 class == BPF_JMP32) { 16337 verbose(env, "BPF_CALL uses reserved fields\n"); 16338 return -EINVAL; 16339 } 16340 16341 if (env->cur_state->active_lock.ptr) { 16342 if ((insn->src_reg == BPF_REG_0 && insn->imm != BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock) || 16343 (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) || 16344 (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL && 16345 (insn->off != 0 || !is_bpf_graph_api_kfunc(insn->imm)))) { 16346 verbose(env, "function calls are not allowed while holding a lock\n"); 16347 return -EINVAL; 16348 } 16349 } 16350 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 16351 err = check_func_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); 16352 else if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) 16353 err = check_kfunc_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); 16354 else 16355 err = check_helper_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); 16356 if (err) 16357 return err; 16358 16359 mark_reg_scratched(env, BPF_REG_0); 16360 } else if (opcode == BPF_JA) { 16361 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || 16362 insn->imm != 0 || 16363 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 16364 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 16365 class == BPF_JMP32) { 16366 verbose(env, "BPF_JA uses reserved fields\n"); 16367 return -EINVAL; 16368 } 16369 16370 env->insn_idx += insn->off + 1; 16371 continue; 16372 16373 } else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) { 16374 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || 16375 insn->imm != 0 || 16376 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 16377 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 16378 class == BPF_JMP32) { 16379 verbose(env, "BPF_EXIT uses reserved fields\n"); 16380 return -EINVAL; 16381 } 16382 16383 if (env->cur_state->active_lock.ptr && 16384 !in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(env)) { 16385 verbose(env, "bpf_spin_unlock is missing\n"); 16386 return -EINVAL; 16387 } 16388 16389 if (env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock) { 16390 verbose(env, "bpf_rcu_read_unlock is missing\n"); 16391 return -EINVAL; 16392 } 16393 16394 /* We must do check_reference_leak here before 16395 * prepare_func_exit to handle the case when 16396 * state->curframe > 0, it may be a callback 16397 * function, for which reference_state must 16398 * match caller reference state when it exits. 16399 */ 16400 err = check_reference_leak(env); 16401 if (err) 16402 return err; 16403 16404 if (state->curframe) { 16405 /* exit from nested function */ 16406 err = prepare_func_exit(env, &env->insn_idx); 16407 if (err) 16408 return err; 16409 do_print_state = true; 16410 continue; 16411 } 16412 16413 err = check_return_code(env); 16414 if (err) 16415 return err; 16416 process_bpf_exit: 16417 mark_verifier_state_scratched(env); 16418 update_branch_counts(env, env->cur_state); 16419 err = pop_stack(env, &prev_insn_idx, 16420 &env->insn_idx, pop_log); 16421 if (err < 0) { 16422 if (err != -ENOENT) 16423 return err; 16424 break; 16425 } else { 16426 do_print_state = true; 16427 continue; 16428 } 16429 } else { 16430 err = check_cond_jmp_op(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); 16431 if (err) 16432 return err; 16433 } 16434 } else if (class == BPF_LD) { 16435 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); 16436 16437 if (mode == BPF_ABS || mode == BPF_IND) { 16438 err = check_ld_abs(env, insn); 16439 if (err) 16440 return err; 16441 16442 } else if (mode == BPF_IMM) { 16443 err = check_ld_imm(env, insn); 16444 if (err) 16445 return err; 16446 16447 env->insn_idx++; 16448 sanitize_mark_insn_seen(env); 16449 } else { 16450 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD mode\n"); 16451 return -EINVAL; 16452 } 16453 } else { 16454 verbose(env, "unknown insn class %d\n", class); 16455 return -EINVAL; 16456 } 16457 16458 env->insn_idx++; 16459 } 16460 16461 return 0; 16462 } 16463 16464 static int find_btf_percpu_datasec(struct btf *btf) 16465 { 16466 const struct btf_type *t; 16467 const char *tname; 16468 int i, n; 16469 16470 /* 16471 * Both vmlinux and module each have their own ".data..percpu" 16472 * DATASECs in BTF. So for module's case, we need to skip vmlinux BTF 16473 * types to look at only module's own BTF types. 16474 */ 16475 n = btf_nr_types(btf); 16476 if (btf_is_module(btf)) 16477 i = btf_nr_types(btf_vmlinux); 16478 else 16479 i = 1; 16480 16481 for(; i < n; i++) { 16482 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, i); 16483 if (BTF_INFO_KIND(t->info) != BTF_KIND_DATASEC) 16484 continue; 16485 16486 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off); 16487 if (!strcmp(tname, ".data..percpu")) 16488 return i; 16489 } 16490 16491 return -ENOENT; 16492 } 16493 16494 /* replace pseudo btf_id with kernel symbol address */ 16495 static int check_pseudo_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 16496 struct bpf_insn *insn, 16497 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 16498 { 16499 const struct btf_var_secinfo *vsi; 16500 const struct btf_type *datasec; 16501 struct btf_mod_pair *btf_mod; 16502 const struct btf_type *t; 16503 const char *sym_name; 16504 bool percpu = false; 16505 u32 type, id = insn->imm; 16506 struct btf *btf; 16507 s32 datasec_id; 16508 u64 addr; 16509 int i, btf_fd, err; 16510 16511 btf_fd = insn[1].imm; 16512 if (btf_fd) { 16513 btf = btf_get_by_fd(btf_fd); 16514 if (IS_ERR(btf)) { 16515 verbose(env, "invalid module BTF object FD specified.\n"); 16516 return -EINVAL; 16517 } 16518 } else { 16519 if (!btf_vmlinux) { 16520 verbose(env, "kernel is missing BTF, make sure CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF=y is specified in Kconfig.\n"); 16521 return -EINVAL; 16522 } 16523 btf = btf_vmlinux; 16524 btf_get(btf); 16525 } 16526 16527 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, id); 16528 if (!t) { 16529 verbose(env, "ldimm64 insn specifies invalid btf_id %d.\n", id); 16530 err = -ENOENT; 16531 goto err_put; 16532 } 16533 16534 if (!btf_type_is_var(t) && !btf_type_is_func(t)) { 16535 verbose(env, "pseudo btf_id %d in ldimm64 isn't KIND_VAR or KIND_FUNC\n", id); 16536 err = -EINVAL; 16537 goto err_put; 16538 } 16539 16540 sym_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off); 16541 addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(sym_name); 16542 if (!addr) { 16543 verbose(env, "ldimm64 failed to find the address for kernel symbol '%s'.\n", 16544 sym_name); 16545 err = -ENOENT; 16546 goto err_put; 16547 } 16548 insn[0].imm = (u32)addr; 16549 insn[1].imm = addr >> 32; 16550 16551 if (btf_type_is_func(t)) { 16552 aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY; 16553 aux->btf_var.mem_size = 0; 16554 goto check_btf; 16555 } 16556 16557 datasec_id = find_btf_percpu_datasec(btf); 16558 if (datasec_id > 0) { 16559 datasec = btf_type_by_id(btf, datasec_id); 16560 for_each_vsi(i, datasec, vsi) { 16561 if (vsi->type == id) { 16562 percpu = true; 16563 break; 16564 } 16565 } 16566 } 16567 16568 type = t->type; 16569 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, type, NULL); 16570 if (percpu) { 16571 aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU; 16572 aux->btf_var.btf = btf; 16573 aux->btf_var.btf_id = type; 16574 } else if (!btf_type_is_struct(t)) { 16575 const struct btf_type *ret; 16576 const char *tname; 16577 u32 tsize; 16578 16579 /* resolve the type size of ksym. */ 16580 ret = btf_resolve_size(btf, t, &tsize); 16581 if (IS_ERR(ret)) { 16582 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off); 16583 verbose(env, "ldimm64 unable to resolve the size of type '%s': %ld\n", 16584 tname, PTR_ERR(ret)); 16585 err = -EINVAL; 16586 goto err_put; 16587 } 16588 aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY; 16589 aux->btf_var.mem_size = tsize; 16590 } else { 16591 aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 16592 aux->btf_var.btf = btf; 16593 aux->btf_var.btf_id = type; 16594 } 16595 check_btf: 16596 /* check whether we recorded this BTF (and maybe module) already */ 16597 for (i = 0; i < env->used_btf_cnt; i++) { 16598 if (env->used_btfs[i].btf == btf) { 16599 btf_put(btf); 16600 return 0; 16601 } 16602 } 16603 16604 if (env->used_btf_cnt >= MAX_USED_BTFS) { 16605 err = -E2BIG; 16606 goto err_put; 16607 } 16608 16609 btf_mod = &env->used_btfs[env->used_btf_cnt]; 16610 btf_mod->btf = btf; 16611 btf_mod->module = NULL; 16612 16613 /* if we reference variables from kernel module, bump its refcount */ 16614 if (btf_is_module(btf)) { 16615 btf_mod->module = btf_try_get_module(btf); 16616 if (!btf_mod->module) { 16617 err = -ENXIO; 16618 goto err_put; 16619 } 16620 } 16621 16622 env->used_btf_cnt++; 16623 16624 return 0; 16625 err_put: 16626 btf_put(btf); 16627 return err; 16628 } 16629 16630 static bool is_tracing_prog_type(enum bpf_prog_type type) 16631 { 16632 switch (type) { 16633 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE: 16634 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT: 16635 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT: 16636 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT: 16637 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT_WRITABLE: 16638 return true; 16639 default: 16640 return false; 16641 } 16642 } 16643 16644 static int check_map_prog_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 16645 struct bpf_map *map, 16646 struct bpf_prog *prog) 16647 16648 { 16649 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(prog); 16650 16651 if (btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_LIST_HEAD) || 16652 btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_RB_ROOT)) { 16653 if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type)) { 16654 verbose(env, "tracing progs cannot use bpf_{list_head,rb_root} yet\n"); 16655 return -EINVAL; 16656 } 16657 } 16658 16659 if (btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_SPIN_LOCK)) { 16660 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) { 16661 verbose(env, "socket filter progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n"); 16662 return -EINVAL; 16663 } 16664 16665 if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type)) { 16666 verbose(env, "tracing progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n"); 16667 return -EINVAL; 16668 } 16669 16670 if (prog->aux->sleepable) { 16671 verbose(env, "sleepable progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n"); 16672 return -EINVAL; 16673 } 16674 } 16675 16676 if (btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_TIMER)) { 16677 if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type)) { 16678 verbose(env, "tracing progs cannot use bpf_timer yet\n"); 16679 return -EINVAL; 16680 } 16681 } 16682 16683 if ((bpf_prog_is_offloaded(prog->aux) || bpf_map_is_offloaded(map)) && 16684 !bpf_offload_prog_map_match(prog, map)) { 16685 verbose(env, "offload device mismatch between prog and map\n"); 16686 return -EINVAL; 16687 } 16688 16689 if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) { 16690 verbose(env, "bpf_struct_ops map cannot be used in prog\n"); 16691 return -EINVAL; 16692 } 16693 16694 if (prog->aux->sleepable) 16695 switch (map->map_type) { 16696 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH: 16697 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_HASH: 16698 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY: 16699 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH: 16700 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY: 16701 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_PERCPU_HASH: 16702 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS: 16703 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS: 16704 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF: 16705 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF: 16706 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE: 16707 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE: 16708 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE: 16709 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE: 16710 break; 16711 default: 16712 verbose(env, 16713 "Sleepable programs can only use array, hash, ringbuf and local storage maps\n"); 16714 return -EINVAL; 16715 } 16716 16717 return 0; 16718 } 16719 16720 static bool bpf_map_is_cgroup_storage(struct bpf_map *map) 16721 { 16722 return (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE || 16723 map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE); 16724 } 16725 16726 /* find and rewrite pseudo imm in ld_imm64 instructions: 16727 * 16728 * 1. if it accesses map FD, replace it with actual map pointer. 16729 * 2. if it accesses btf_id of a VAR, replace it with pointer to the var. 16730 * 16731 * NOTE: btf_vmlinux is required for converting pseudo btf_id. 16732 */ 16733 static int resolve_pseudo_ldimm64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 16734 { 16735 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 16736 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 16737 int i, j, err; 16738 16739 err = bpf_prog_calc_tag(env->prog); 16740 if (err) 16741 return err; 16742 16743 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 16744 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX && 16745 (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0)) { 16746 verbose(env, "BPF_LDX uses reserved fields\n"); 16747 return -EINVAL; 16748 } 16749 16750 if (insn[0].code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) { 16751 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux; 16752 struct bpf_map *map; 16753 struct fd f; 16754 u64 addr; 16755 u32 fd; 16756 16757 if (i == insn_cnt - 1 || insn[1].code != 0 || 16758 insn[1].dst_reg != 0 || insn[1].src_reg != 0 || 16759 insn[1].off != 0) { 16760 verbose(env, "invalid bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n"); 16761 return -EINVAL; 16762 } 16763 16764 if (insn[0].src_reg == 0) 16765 /* valid generic load 64-bit imm */ 16766 goto next_insn; 16767 16768 if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_BTF_ID) { 16769 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i]; 16770 err = check_pseudo_btf_id(env, insn, aux); 16771 if (err) 16772 return err; 16773 goto next_insn; 16774 } 16775 16776 if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) { 16777 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i]; 16778 aux->ptr_type = PTR_TO_FUNC; 16779 goto next_insn; 16780 } 16781 16782 /* In final convert_pseudo_ld_imm64() step, this is 16783 * converted into regular 64-bit imm load insn. 16784 */ 16785 switch (insn[0].src_reg) { 16786 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE: 16787 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE: 16788 break; 16789 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD: 16790 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX: 16791 if (insn[1].imm == 0) 16792 break; 16793 fallthrough; 16794 default: 16795 verbose(env, "unrecognized bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n"); 16796 return -EINVAL; 16797 } 16798 16799 switch (insn[0].src_reg) { 16800 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE: 16801 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX: 16802 if (bpfptr_is_null(env->fd_array)) { 16803 verbose(env, "fd_idx without fd_array is invalid\n"); 16804 return -EPROTO; 16805 } 16806 if (copy_from_bpfptr_offset(&fd, env->fd_array, 16807 insn[0].imm * sizeof(fd), 16808 sizeof(fd))) 16809 return -EFAULT; 16810 break; 16811 default: 16812 fd = insn[0].imm; 16813 break; 16814 } 16815 16816 f = fdget(fd); 16817 map = __bpf_map_get(f); 16818 if (IS_ERR(map)) { 16819 verbose(env, "fd %d is not pointing to valid bpf_map\n", 16820 insn[0].imm); 16821 return PTR_ERR(map); 16822 } 16823 16824 err = check_map_prog_compatibility(env, map, env->prog); 16825 if (err) { 16826 fdput(f); 16827 return err; 16828 } 16829 16830 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i]; 16831 if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD || 16832 insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX) { 16833 addr = (unsigned long)map; 16834 } else { 16835 u32 off = insn[1].imm; 16836 16837 if (off >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 16838 verbose(env, "direct value offset of %u is not allowed\n", off); 16839 fdput(f); 16840 return -EINVAL; 16841 } 16842 16843 if (!map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) { 16844 verbose(env, "no direct value access support for this map type\n"); 16845 fdput(f); 16846 return -EINVAL; 16847 } 16848 16849 err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &addr, off); 16850 if (err) { 16851 verbose(env, "invalid access to map value pointer, value_size=%u off=%u\n", 16852 map->value_size, off); 16853 fdput(f); 16854 return err; 16855 } 16856 16857 aux->map_off = off; 16858 addr += off; 16859 } 16860 16861 insn[0].imm = (u32)addr; 16862 insn[1].imm = addr >> 32; 16863 16864 /* check whether we recorded this map already */ 16865 for (j = 0; j < env->used_map_cnt; j++) { 16866 if (env->used_maps[j] == map) { 16867 aux->map_index = j; 16868 fdput(f); 16869 goto next_insn; 16870 } 16871 } 16872 16873 if (env->used_map_cnt >= MAX_USED_MAPS) { 16874 fdput(f); 16875 return -E2BIG; 16876 } 16877 16878 /* hold the map. If the program is rejected by verifier, 16879 * the map will be released by release_maps() or it 16880 * will be used by the valid program until it's unloaded 16881 * and all maps are released in free_used_maps() 16882 */ 16883 bpf_map_inc(map); 16884 16885 aux->map_index = env->used_map_cnt; 16886 env->used_maps[env->used_map_cnt++] = map; 16887 16888 if (bpf_map_is_cgroup_storage(map) && 16889 bpf_cgroup_storage_assign(env->prog->aux, map)) { 16890 verbose(env, "only one cgroup storage of each type is allowed\n"); 16891 fdput(f); 16892 return -EBUSY; 16893 } 16894 16895 fdput(f); 16896 next_insn: 16897 insn++; 16898 i++; 16899 continue; 16900 } 16901 16902 /* Basic sanity check before we invest more work here. */ 16903 if (!bpf_opcode_in_insntable(insn->code)) { 16904 verbose(env, "unknown opcode %02x\n", insn->code); 16905 return -EINVAL; 16906 } 16907 } 16908 16909 /* now all pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions load valid 16910 * 'struct bpf_map *' into a register instead of user map_fd. 16911 * These pointers will be used later by verifier to validate map access. 16912 */ 16913 return 0; 16914 } 16915 16916 /* drop refcnt of maps used by the rejected program */ 16917 static void release_maps(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 16918 { 16919 __bpf_free_used_maps(env->prog->aux, env->used_maps, 16920 env->used_map_cnt); 16921 } 16922 16923 /* drop refcnt of maps used by the rejected program */ 16924 static void release_btfs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 16925 { 16926 __bpf_free_used_btfs(env->prog->aux, env->used_btfs, 16927 env->used_btf_cnt); 16928 } 16929 16930 /* convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic BPF_LD_IMM64 */ 16931 static void convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 16932 { 16933 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 16934 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 16935 int i; 16936 16937 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 16938 if (insn->code != (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) 16939 continue; 16940 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) 16941 continue; 16942 insn->src_reg = 0; 16943 } 16944 } 16945 16946 /* single env->prog->insni[off] instruction was replaced with the range 16947 * insni[off, off + cnt). Adjust corresponding insn_aux_data by copying 16948 * [0, off) and [off, end) to new locations, so the patched range stays zero 16949 */ 16950 static void adjust_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 16951 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *new_data, 16952 struct bpf_prog *new_prog, u32 off, u32 cnt) 16953 { 16954 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *old_data = env->insn_aux_data; 16955 struct bpf_insn *insn = new_prog->insnsi; 16956 u32 old_seen = old_data[off].seen; 16957 u32 prog_len; 16958 int i; 16959 16960 /* aux info at OFF always needs adjustment, no matter fast path 16961 * (cnt == 1) is taken or not. There is no guarantee INSN at OFF is the 16962 * original insn at old prog. 16963 */ 16964 old_data[off].zext_dst = insn_has_def32(env, insn + off + cnt - 1); 16965 16966 if (cnt == 1) 16967 return; 16968 prog_len = new_prog->len; 16969 16970 memcpy(new_data, old_data, sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * off); 16971 memcpy(new_data + off + cnt - 1, old_data + off, 16972 sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * (prog_len - off - cnt + 1)); 16973 for (i = off; i < off + cnt - 1; i++) { 16974 /* Expand insni[off]'s seen count to the patched range. */ 16975 new_data[i].seen = old_seen; 16976 new_data[i].zext_dst = insn_has_def32(env, insn + i); 16977 } 16978 env->insn_aux_data = new_data; 16979 vfree(old_data); 16980 } 16981 16982 static void adjust_subprog_starts(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 len) 16983 { 16984 int i; 16985 16986 if (len == 1) 16987 return; 16988 /* NOTE: fake 'exit' subprog should be updated as well. */ 16989 for (i = 0; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 16990 if (env->subprog_info[i].start <= off) 16991 continue; 16992 env->subprog_info[i].start += len - 1; 16993 } 16994 } 16995 16996 static void adjust_poke_descs(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 off, u32 len) 16997 { 16998 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *tab = prog->aux->poke_tab; 16999 int i, sz = prog->aux->size_poke_tab; 17000 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *desc; 17001 17002 for (i = 0; i < sz; i++) { 17003 desc = &tab[i]; 17004 if (desc->insn_idx <= off) 17005 continue; 17006 desc->insn_idx += len - 1; 17007 } 17008 } 17009 17010 static struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, 17011 const struct bpf_insn *patch, u32 len) 17012 { 17013 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 17014 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *new_data = NULL; 17015 17016 if (len > 1) { 17017 new_data = vzalloc(array_size(env->prog->len + len - 1, 17018 sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data))); 17019 if (!new_data) 17020 return NULL; 17021 } 17022 17023 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_single(env->prog, off, patch, len); 17024 if (IS_ERR(new_prog)) { 17025 if (PTR_ERR(new_prog) == -ERANGE) 17026 verbose(env, 17027 "insn %d cannot be patched due to 16-bit range\n", 17028 env->insn_aux_data[off].orig_idx); 17029 vfree(new_data); 17030 return NULL; 17031 } 17032 adjust_insn_aux_data(env, new_data, new_prog, off, len); 17033 adjust_subprog_starts(env, off, len); 17034 adjust_poke_descs(new_prog, off, len); 17035 return new_prog; 17036 } 17037 17038 static int adjust_subprog_starts_after_remove(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 17039 u32 off, u32 cnt) 17040 { 17041 int i, j; 17042 17043 /* find first prog starting at or after off (first to remove) */ 17044 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) 17045 if (env->subprog_info[i].start >= off) 17046 break; 17047 /* find first prog starting at or after off + cnt (first to stay) */ 17048 for (j = i; j < env->subprog_cnt; j++) 17049 if (env->subprog_info[j].start >= off + cnt) 17050 break; 17051 /* if j doesn't start exactly at off + cnt, we are just removing 17052 * the front of previous prog 17053 */ 17054 if (env->subprog_info[j].start != off + cnt) 17055 j--; 17056 17057 if (j > i) { 17058 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 17059 int move; 17060 17061 /* move fake 'exit' subprog as well */ 17062 move = env->subprog_cnt + 1 - j; 17063 17064 memmove(env->subprog_info + i, 17065 env->subprog_info + j, 17066 sizeof(*env->subprog_info) * move); 17067 env->subprog_cnt -= j - i; 17068 17069 /* remove func_info */ 17070 if (aux->func_info) { 17071 move = aux->func_info_cnt - j; 17072 17073 memmove(aux->func_info + i, 17074 aux->func_info + j, 17075 sizeof(*aux->func_info) * move); 17076 aux->func_info_cnt -= j - i; 17077 /* func_info->insn_off is set after all code rewrites, 17078 * in adjust_btf_func() - no need to adjust 17079 */ 17080 } 17081 } else { 17082 /* convert i from "first prog to remove" to "first to adjust" */ 17083 if (env->subprog_info[i].start == off) 17084 i++; 17085 } 17086 17087 /* update fake 'exit' subprog as well */ 17088 for (; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++) 17089 env->subprog_info[i].start -= cnt; 17090 17091 return 0; 17092 } 17093 17094 static int bpf_adj_linfo_after_remove(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, 17095 u32 cnt) 17096 { 17097 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 17098 u32 i, l_off, l_cnt, nr_linfo; 17099 struct bpf_line_info *linfo; 17100 17101 nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; 17102 if (!nr_linfo) 17103 return 0; 17104 17105 linfo = prog->aux->linfo; 17106 17107 /* find first line info to remove, count lines to be removed */ 17108 for (i = 0; i < nr_linfo; i++) 17109 if (linfo[i].insn_off >= off) 17110 break; 17111 17112 l_off = i; 17113 l_cnt = 0; 17114 for (; i < nr_linfo; i++) 17115 if (linfo[i].insn_off < off + cnt) 17116 l_cnt++; 17117 else 17118 break; 17119 17120 /* First live insn doesn't match first live linfo, it needs to "inherit" 17121 * last removed linfo. prog is already modified, so prog->len == off 17122 * means no live instructions after (tail of the program was removed). 17123 */ 17124 if (prog->len != off && l_cnt && 17125 (i == nr_linfo || linfo[i].insn_off != off + cnt)) { 17126 l_cnt--; 17127 linfo[--i].insn_off = off + cnt; 17128 } 17129 17130 /* remove the line info which refer to the removed instructions */ 17131 if (l_cnt) { 17132 memmove(linfo + l_off, linfo + i, 17133 sizeof(*linfo) * (nr_linfo - i)); 17134 17135 prog->aux->nr_linfo -= l_cnt; 17136 nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; 17137 } 17138 17139 /* pull all linfo[i].insn_off >= off + cnt in by cnt */ 17140 for (i = l_off; i < nr_linfo; i++) 17141 linfo[i].insn_off -= cnt; 17142 17143 /* fix up all subprogs (incl. 'exit') which start >= off */ 17144 for (i = 0; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++) 17145 if (env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx > l_off) { 17146 /* program may have started in the removed region but 17147 * may not be fully removed 17148 */ 17149 if (env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx >= l_off + l_cnt) 17150 env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx -= l_cnt; 17151 else 17152 env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx = l_off; 17153 } 17154 17155 return 0; 17156 } 17157 17158 static int verifier_remove_insns(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 cnt) 17159 { 17160 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 17161 unsigned int orig_prog_len = env->prog->len; 17162 int err; 17163 17164 if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) 17165 bpf_prog_offload_remove_insns(env, off, cnt); 17166 17167 err = bpf_remove_insns(env->prog, off, cnt); 17168 if (err) 17169 return err; 17170 17171 err = adjust_subprog_starts_after_remove(env, off, cnt); 17172 if (err) 17173 return err; 17174 17175 err = bpf_adj_linfo_after_remove(env, off, cnt); 17176 if (err) 17177 return err; 17178 17179 memmove(aux_data + off, aux_data + off + cnt, 17180 sizeof(*aux_data) * (orig_prog_len - off - cnt)); 17181 17182 return 0; 17183 } 17184 17185 /* The verifier does more data flow analysis than llvm and will not 17186 * explore branches that are dead at run time. Malicious programs can 17187 * have dead code too. Therefore replace all dead at-run-time code 17188 * with 'ja -1'. 17189 * 17190 * Just nops are not optimal, e.g. if they would sit at the end of the 17191 * program and through another bug we would manage to jump there, then 17192 * we'd execute beyond program memory otherwise. Returning exception 17193 * code also wouldn't work since we can have subprogs where the dead 17194 * code could be located. 17195 */ 17196 static void sanitize_dead_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 17197 { 17198 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 17199 struct bpf_insn trap = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, -1); 17200 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 17201 const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 17202 int i; 17203 17204 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 17205 if (aux_data[i].seen) 17206 continue; 17207 memcpy(insn + i, &trap, sizeof(trap)); 17208 aux_data[i].zext_dst = false; 17209 } 17210 } 17211 17212 static bool insn_is_cond_jump(u8 code) 17213 { 17214 u8 op; 17215 17216 if (BPF_CLASS(code) == BPF_JMP32) 17217 return true; 17218 17219 if (BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP) 17220 return false; 17221 17222 op = BPF_OP(code); 17223 return op != BPF_JA && op != BPF_EXIT && op != BPF_CALL; 17224 } 17225 17226 static void opt_hard_wire_dead_code_branches(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 17227 { 17228 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 17229 struct bpf_insn ja = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0); 17230 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 17231 const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 17232 int i; 17233 17234 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 17235 if (!insn_is_cond_jump(insn->code)) 17236 continue; 17237 17238 if (!aux_data[i + 1].seen) 17239 ja.off = insn->off; 17240 else if (!aux_data[i + 1 + insn->off].seen) 17241 ja.off = 0; 17242 else 17243 continue; 17244 17245 if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) 17246 bpf_prog_offload_replace_insn(env, i, &ja); 17247 17248 memcpy(insn, &ja, sizeof(ja)); 17249 } 17250 } 17251 17252 static int opt_remove_dead_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 17253 { 17254 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 17255 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 17256 int i, err; 17257 17258 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 17259 int j; 17260 17261 j = 0; 17262 while (i + j < insn_cnt && !aux_data[i + j].seen) 17263 j++; 17264 if (!j) 17265 continue; 17266 17267 err = verifier_remove_insns(env, i, j); 17268 if (err) 17269 return err; 17270 insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 17271 } 17272 17273 return 0; 17274 } 17275 17276 static int opt_remove_nops(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 17277 { 17278 const struct bpf_insn ja = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0); 17279 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 17280 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 17281 int i, err; 17282 17283 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 17284 if (memcmp(&insn[i], &ja, sizeof(ja))) 17285 continue; 17286 17287 err = verifier_remove_insns(env, i, 1); 17288 if (err) 17289 return err; 17290 insn_cnt--; 17291 i--; 17292 } 17293 17294 return 0; 17295 } 17296 17297 static int opt_subreg_zext_lo32_rnd_hi32(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 17298 const union bpf_attr *attr) 17299 { 17300 struct bpf_insn *patch, zext_patch[2], rnd_hi32_patch[4]; 17301 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = env->insn_aux_data; 17302 int i, patch_len, delta = 0, len = env->prog->len; 17303 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; 17304 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 17305 bool rnd_hi32; 17306 17307 rnd_hi32 = attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_TEST_RND_HI32; 17308 zext_patch[1] = BPF_ZEXT_REG(0); 17309 rnd_hi32_patch[1] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_AX, 0); 17310 rnd_hi32_patch[2] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_AX, 32); 17311 rnd_hi32_patch[3] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, 0, BPF_REG_AX); 17312 for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { 17313 int adj_idx = i + delta; 17314 struct bpf_insn insn; 17315 int load_reg; 17316 17317 insn = insns[adj_idx]; 17318 load_reg = insn_def_regno(&insn); 17319 if (!aux[adj_idx].zext_dst) { 17320 u8 code, class; 17321 u32 imm_rnd; 17322 17323 if (!rnd_hi32) 17324 continue; 17325 17326 code = insn.code; 17327 class = BPF_CLASS(code); 17328 if (load_reg == -1) 17329 continue; 17330 17331 /* NOTE: arg "reg" (the fourth one) is only used for 17332 * BPF_STX + SRC_OP, so it is safe to pass NULL 17333 * here. 17334 */ 17335 if (is_reg64(env, &insn, load_reg, NULL, DST_OP)) { 17336 if (class == BPF_LD && 17337 BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_IMM) 17338 i++; 17339 continue; 17340 } 17341 17342 /* ctx load could be transformed into wider load. */ 17343 if (class == BPF_LDX && 17344 aux[adj_idx].ptr_type == PTR_TO_CTX) 17345 continue; 17346 17347 imm_rnd = get_random_u32(); 17348 rnd_hi32_patch[0] = insn; 17349 rnd_hi32_patch[1].imm = imm_rnd; 17350 rnd_hi32_patch[3].dst_reg = load_reg; 17351 patch = rnd_hi32_patch; 17352 patch_len = 4; 17353 goto apply_patch_buffer; 17354 } 17355 17356 /* Add in an zero-extend instruction if a) the JIT has requested 17357 * it or b) it's a CMPXCHG. 17358 * 17359 * The latter is because: BPF_CMPXCHG always loads a value into 17360 * R0, therefore always zero-extends. However some archs' 17361 * equivalent instruction only does this load when the 17362 * comparison is successful. This detail of CMPXCHG is 17363 * orthogonal to the general zero-extension behaviour of the 17364 * CPU, so it's treated independently of bpf_jit_needs_zext. 17365 */ 17366 if (!bpf_jit_needs_zext() && !is_cmpxchg_insn(&insn)) 17367 continue; 17368 17369 /* Zero-extension is done by the caller. */ 17370 if (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(&insn)) 17371 continue; 17372 17373 if (WARN_ON(load_reg == -1)) { 17374 verbose(env, "verifier bug. zext_dst is set, but no reg is defined\n"); 17375 return -EFAULT; 17376 } 17377 17378 zext_patch[0] = insn; 17379 zext_patch[1].dst_reg = load_reg; 17380 zext_patch[1].src_reg = load_reg; 17381 patch = zext_patch; 17382 patch_len = 2; 17383 apply_patch_buffer: 17384 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, adj_idx, patch, patch_len); 17385 if (!new_prog) 17386 return -ENOMEM; 17387 env->prog = new_prog; 17388 insns = new_prog->insnsi; 17389 aux = env->insn_aux_data; 17390 delta += patch_len - 1; 17391 } 17392 17393 return 0; 17394 } 17395 17396 /* convert load instructions that access fields of a context type into a 17397 * sequence of instructions that access fields of the underlying structure: 17398 * struct __sk_buff -> struct sk_buff 17399 * struct bpf_sock_ops -> struct sock 17400 */ 17401 static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 17402 { 17403 const struct bpf_verifier_ops *ops = env->ops; 17404 int i, cnt, size, ctx_field_size, delta = 0; 17405 const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 17406 struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16], *insn; 17407 u32 target_size, size_default, off; 17408 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 17409 enum bpf_access_type type; 17410 bool is_narrower_load; 17411 17412 if (ops->gen_prologue || env->seen_direct_write) { 17413 if (!ops->gen_prologue) { 17414 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 17415 return -EINVAL; 17416 } 17417 cnt = ops->gen_prologue(insn_buf, env->seen_direct_write, 17418 env->prog); 17419 if (cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) { 17420 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 17421 return -EINVAL; 17422 } else if (cnt) { 17423 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, 0, insn_buf, cnt); 17424 if (!new_prog) 17425 return -ENOMEM; 17426 17427 env->prog = new_prog; 17428 delta += cnt - 1; 17429 } 17430 } 17431 17432 if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) 17433 return 0; 17434 17435 insn = env->prog->insnsi + delta; 17436 17437 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 17438 bpf_convert_ctx_access_t convert_ctx_access; 17439 17440 if (insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || 17441 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || 17442 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || 17443 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW)) { 17444 type = BPF_READ; 17445 } else if (insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || 17446 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || 17447 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || 17448 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW) || 17449 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || 17450 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || 17451 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || 17452 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW)) { 17453 type = BPF_WRITE; 17454 } else { 17455 continue; 17456 } 17457 17458 if (type == BPF_WRITE && 17459 env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].sanitize_stack_spill) { 17460 struct bpf_insn patch[] = { 17461 *insn, 17462 BPF_ST_NOSPEC(), 17463 }; 17464 17465 cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(patch); 17466 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, patch, cnt); 17467 if (!new_prog) 17468 return -ENOMEM; 17469 17470 delta += cnt - 1; 17471 env->prog = new_prog; 17472 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 17473 continue; 17474 } 17475 17476 switch ((int)env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ptr_type) { 17477 case PTR_TO_CTX: 17478 if (!ops->convert_ctx_access) 17479 continue; 17480 convert_ctx_access = ops->convert_ctx_access; 17481 break; 17482 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 17483 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 17484 convert_ctx_access = bpf_sock_convert_ctx_access; 17485 break; 17486 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 17487 convert_ctx_access = bpf_tcp_sock_convert_ctx_access; 17488 break; 17489 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 17490 convert_ctx_access = bpf_xdp_sock_convert_ctx_access; 17491 break; 17492 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 17493 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED: 17494 /* PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC always has a valid lifetime, unlike 17495 * PTR_TO_BTF_ID, and an active ref_obj_id, but the same cannot 17496 * be said once it is marked PTR_UNTRUSTED, hence we must handle 17497 * any faults for loads into such types. BPF_WRITE is disallowed 17498 * for this case. 17499 */ 17500 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_UNTRUSTED: 17501 if (type == BPF_READ) { 17502 insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEM | 17503 BPF_SIZE((insn)->code); 17504 env->prog->aux->num_exentries++; 17505 } 17506 continue; 17507 default: 17508 continue; 17509 } 17510 17511 ctx_field_size = env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ctx_field_size; 17512 size = BPF_LDST_BYTES(insn); 17513 17514 /* If the read access is a narrower load of the field, 17515 * convert to a 4/8-byte load, to minimum program type specific 17516 * convert_ctx_access changes. If conversion is successful, 17517 * we will apply proper mask to the result. 17518 */ 17519 is_narrower_load = size < ctx_field_size; 17520 size_default = bpf_ctx_off_adjust_machine(ctx_field_size); 17521 off = insn->off; 17522 if (is_narrower_load) { 17523 u8 size_code; 17524 17525 if (type == BPF_WRITE) { 17526 verbose(env, "bpf verifier narrow ctx access misconfigured\n"); 17527 return -EINVAL; 17528 } 17529 17530 size_code = BPF_H; 17531 if (ctx_field_size == 4) 17532 size_code = BPF_W; 17533 else if (ctx_field_size == 8) 17534 size_code = BPF_DW; 17535 17536 insn->off = off & ~(size_default - 1); 17537 insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | size_code; 17538 } 17539 17540 target_size = 0; 17541 cnt = convert_ctx_access(type, insn, insn_buf, env->prog, 17542 &target_size); 17543 if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf) || 17544 (ctx_field_size && !target_size)) { 17545 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 17546 return -EINVAL; 17547 } 17548 17549 if (is_narrower_load && size < target_size) { 17550 u8 shift = bpf_ctx_narrow_access_offset( 17551 off, size, size_default) * 8; 17552 if (shift && cnt + 1 >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) { 17553 verbose(env, "bpf verifier narrow ctx load misconfigured\n"); 17554 return -EINVAL; 17555 } 17556 if (ctx_field_size <= 4) { 17557 if (shift) 17558 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_RSH, 17559 insn->dst_reg, 17560 shift); 17561 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg, 17562 (1 << size * 8) - 1); 17563 } else { 17564 if (shift) 17565 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH, 17566 insn->dst_reg, 17567 shift); 17568 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg, 17569 (1ULL << size * 8) - 1); 17570 } 17571 } 17572 17573 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 17574 if (!new_prog) 17575 return -ENOMEM; 17576 17577 delta += cnt - 1; 17578 17579 /* keep walking new program and skip insns we just inserted */ 17580 env->prog = new_prog; 17581 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 17582 } 17583 17584 return 0; 17585 } 17586 17587 static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 17588 { 17589 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog, **func, *tmp; 17590 int i, j, subprog_start, subprog_end = 0, len, subprog; 17591 struct bpf_map *map_ptr; 17592 struct bpf_insn *insn; 17593 void *old_bpf_func; 17594 int err, num_exentries; 17595 17596 if (env->subprog_cnt <= 1) 17597 return 0; 17598 17599 for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { 17600 if (!bpf_pseudo_func(insn) && !bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 17601 continue; 17602 17603 /* Upon error here we cannot fall back to interpreter but 17604 * need a hard reject of the program. Thus -EFAULT is 17605 * propagated in any case. 17606 */ 17607 subprog = find_subprog(env, i + insn->imm + 1); 17608 if (subprog < 0) { 17609 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", 17610 i + insn->imm + 1); 17611 return -EFAULT; 17612 } 17613 /* temporarily remember subprog id inside insn instead of 17614 * aux_data, since next loop will split up all insns into funcs 17615 */ 17616 insn->off = subprog; 17617 /* remember original imm in case JIT fails and fallback 17618 * to interpreter will be needed 17619 */ 17620 env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm = insn->imm; 17621 /* point imm to __bpf_call_base+1 from JITs point of view */ 17622 insn->imm = 1; 17623 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) 17624 /* jit (e.g. x86_64) may emit fewer instructions 17625 * if it learns a u32 imm is the same as a u64 imm. 17626 * Force a non zero here. 17627 */ 17628 insn[1].imm = 1; 17629 } 17630 17631 err = bpf_prog_alloc_jited_linfo(prog); 17632 if (err) 17633 goto out_undo_insn; 17634 17635 err = -ENOMEM; 17636 func = kcalloc(env->subprog_cnt, sizeof(prog), GFP_KERNEL); 17637 if (!func) 17638 goto out_undo_insn; 17639 17640 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 17641 subprog_start = subprog_end; 17642 subprog_end = env->subprog_info[i + 1].start; 17643 17644 len = subprog_end - subprog_start; 17645 /* bpf_prog_run() doesn't call subprogs directly, 17646 * hence main prog stats include the runtime of subprogs. 17647 * subprogs don't have IDs and not reachable via prog_get_next_id 17648 * func[i]->stats will never be accessed and stays NULL 17649 */ 17650 func[i] = bpf_prog_alloc_no_stats(bpf_prog_size(len), GFP_USER); 17651 if (!func[i]) 17652 goto out_free; 17653 memcpy(func[i]->insnsi, &prog->insnsi[subprog_start], 17654 len * sizeof(struct bpf_insn)); 17655 func[i]->type = prog->type; 17656 func[i]->len = len; 17657 if (bpf_prog_calc_tag(func[i])) 17658 goto out_free; 17659 func[i]->is_func = 1; 17660 func[i]->aux->func_idx = i; 17661 /* Below members will be freed only at prog->aux */ 17662 func[i]->aux->btf = prog->aux->btf; 17663 func[i]->aux->func_info = prog->aux->func_info; 17664 func[i]->aux->func_info_cnt = prog->aux->func_info_cnt; 17665 func[i]->aux->poke_tab = prog->aux->poke_tab; 17666 func[i]->aux->size_poke_tab = prog->aux->size_poke_tab; 17667 17668 for (j = 0; j < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; j++) { 17669 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *poke; 17670 17671 poke = &prog->aux->poke_tab[j]; 17672 if (poke->insn_idx < subprog_end && 17673 poke->insn_idx >= subprog_start) 17674 poke->aux = func[i]->aux; 17675 } 17676 17677 func[i]->aux->name[0] = 'F'; 17678 func[i]->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth; 17679 func[i]->jit_requested = 1; 17680 func[i]->blinding_requested = prog->blinding_requested; 17681 func[i]->aux->kfunc_tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 17682 func[i]->aux->kfunc_btf_tab = prog->aux->kfunc_btf_tab; 17683 func[i]->aux->linfo = prog->aux->linfo; 17684 func[i]->aux->nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; 17685 func[i]->aux->jited_linfo = prog->aux->jited_linfo; 17686 func[i]->aux->linfo_idx = env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx; 17687 num_exentries = 0; 17688 insn = func[i]->insnsi; 17689 for (j = 0; j < func[i]->len; j++, insn++) { 17690 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX && 17691 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEM) 17692 num_exentries++; 17693 } 17694 func[i]->aux->num_exentries = num_exentries; 17695 func[i]->aux->tail_call_reachable = env->subprog_info[i].tail_call_reachable; 17696 func[i] = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]); 17697 if (!func[i]->jited) { 17698 err = -ENOTSUPP; 17699 goto out_free; 17700 } 17701 cond_resched(); 17702 } 17703 17704 /* at this point all bpf functions were successfully JITed 17705 * now populate all bpf_calls with correct addresses and 17706 * run last pass of JIT 17707 */ 17708 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 17709 insn = func[i]->insnsi; 17710 for (j = 0; j < func[i]->len; j++, insn++) { 17711 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { 17712 subprog = insn->off; 17713 insn[0].imm = (u32)(long)func[subprog]->bpf_func; 17714 insn[1].imm = ((u64)(long)func[subprog]->bpf_func) >> 32; 17715 continue; 17716 } 17717 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 17718 continue; 17719 subprog = insn->off; 17720 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(func[subprog]->bpf_func); 17721 } 17722 17723 /* we use the aux data to keep a list of the start addresses 17724 * of the JITed images for each function in the program 17725 * 17726 * for some architectures, such as powerpc64, the imm field 17727 * might not be large enough to hold the offset of the start 17728 * address of the callee's JITed image from __bpf_call_base 17729 * 17730 * in such cases, we can lookup the start address of a callee 17731 * by using its subprog id, available from the off field of 17732 * the call instruction, as an index for this list 17733 */ 17734 func[i]->aux->func = func; 17735 func[i]->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt; 17736 } 17737 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 17738 old_bpf_func = func[i]->bpf_func; 17739 tmp = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]); 17740 if (tmp != func[i] || func[i]->bpf_func != old_bpf_func) { 17741 verbose(env, "JIT doesn't support bpf-to-bpf calls\n"); 17742 err = -ENOTSUPP; 17743 goto out_free; 17744 } 17745 cond_resched(); 17746 } 17747 17748 /* finally lock prog and jit images for all functions and 17749 * populate kallsysm 17750 */ 17751 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 17752 bpf_prog_lock_ro(func[i]); 17753 bpf_prog_kallsyms_add(func[i]); 17754 } 17755 17756 /* Last step: make now unused interpreter insns from main 17757 * prog consistent for later dump requests, so they can 17758 * later look the same as if they were interpreted only. 17759 */ 17760 for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { 17761 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { 17762 insn[0].imm = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm; 17763 insn[1].imm = insn->off; 17764 insn->off = 0; 17765 continue; 17766 } 17767 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 17768 continue; 17769 insn->off = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm; 17770 subprog = find_subprog(env, i + insn->off + 1); 17771 insn->imm = subprog; 17772 } 17773 17774 prog->jited = 1; 17775 prog->bpf_func = func[0]->bpf_func; 17776 prog->jited_len = func[0]->jited_len; 17777 prog->aux->func = func; 17778 prog->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt; 17779 bpf_prog_jit_attempt_done(prog); 17780 return 0; 17781 out_free: 17782 /* We failed JIT'ing, so at this point we need to unregister poke 17783 * descriptors from subprogs, so that kernel is not attempting to 17784 * patch it anymore as we're freeing the subprog JIT memory. 17785 */ 17786 for (i = 0; i < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; i++) { 17787 map_ptr = prog->aux->poke_tab[i].tail_call.map; 17788 map_ptr->ops->map_poke_untrack(map_ptr, prog->aux); 17789 } 17790 /* At this point we're guaranteed that poke descriptors are not 17791 * live anymore. We can just unlink its descriptor table as it's 17792 * released with the main prog. 17793 */ 17794 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 17795 if (!func[i]) 17796 continue; 17797 func[i]->aux->poke_tab = NULL; 17798 bpf_jit_free(func[i]); 17799 } 17800 kfree(func); 17801 out_undo_insn: 17802 /* cleanup main prog to be interpreted */ 17803 prog->jit_requested = 0; 17804 prog->blinding_requested = 0; 17805 for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { 17806 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 17807 continue; 17808 insn->off = 0; 17809 insn->imm = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm; 17810 } 17811 bpf_prog_jit_attempt_done(prog); 17812 return err; 17813 } 17814 17815 static int fixup_call_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 17816 { 17817 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON 17818 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 17819 struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi; 17820 bool has_kfunc_call = bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call(prog); 17821 int i, depth; 17822 #endif 17823 int err = 0; 17824 17825 if (env->prog->jit_requested && 17826 !bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) { 17827 err = jit_subprogs(env); 17828 if (err == 0) 17829 return 0; 17830 if (err == -EFAULT) 17831 return err; 17832 } 17833 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON 17834 if (has_kfunc_call) { 17835 verbose(env, "calling kernel functions are not allowed in non-JITed programs\n"); 17836 return -EINVAL; 17837 } 17838 if (env->subprog_cnt > 1 && env->prog->aux->tail_call_reachable) { 17839 /* When JIT fails the progs with bpf2bpf calls and tail_calls 17840 * have to be rejected, since interpreter doesn't support them yet. 17841 */ 17842 verbose(env, "tail_calls are not allowed in non-JITed programs with bpf-to-bpf calls\n"); 17843 return -EINVAL; 17844 } 17845 for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { 17846 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { 17847 /* When JIT fails the progs with callback calls 17848 * have to be rejected, since interpreter doesn't support them yet. 17849 */ 17850 verbose(env, "callbacks are not allowed in non-JITed programs\n"); 17851 return -EINVAL; 17852 } 17853 17854 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 17855 continue; 17856 depth = get_callee_stack_depth(env, insn, i); 17857 if (depth < 0) 17858 return depth; 17859 bpf_patch_call_args(insn, depth); 17860 } 17861 err = 0; 17862 #endif 17863 return err; 17864 } 17865 17866 /* replace a generic kfunc with a specialized version if necessary */ 17867 static void specialize_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 17868 u32 func_id, u16 offset, unsigned long *addr) 17869 { 17870 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 17871 bool seen_direct_write; 17872 void *xdp_kfunc; 17873 bool is_rdonly; 17874 17875 if (bpf_dev_bound_kfunc_id(func_id)) { 17876 xdp_kfunc = bpf_dev_bound_resolve_kfunc(prog, func_id); 17877 if (xdp_kfunc) { 17878 *addr = (unsigned long)xdp_kfunc; 17879 return; 17880 } 17881 /* fallback to default kfunc when not supported by netdev */ 17882 } 17883 17884 if (offset) 17885 return; 17886 17887 if (func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_from_skb]) { 17888 seen_direct_write = env->seen_direct_write; 17889 is_rdonly = !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, BPF_WRITE); 17890 17891 if (is_rdonly) 17892 *addr = (unsigned long)bpf_dynptr_from_skb_rdonly; 17893 17894 /* restore env->seen_direct_write to its original value, since 17895 * may_access_direct_pkt_data mutates it 17896 */ 17897 env->seen_direct_write = seen_direct_write; 17898 } 17899 } 17900 17901 static void __fixup_collection_insert_kfunc(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux, 17902 u16 struct_meta_reg, 17903 u16 node_offset_reg, 17904 struct bpf_insn *insn, 17905 struct bpf_insn *insn_buf, 17906 int *cnt) 17907 { 17908 struct btf_struct_meta *kptr_struct_meta = insn_aux->kptr_struct_meta; 17909 struct bpf_insn addr[2] = { BPF_LD_IMM64(struct_meta_reg, (long)kptr_struct_meta) }; 17910 17911 insn_buf[0] = addr[0]; 17912 insn_buf[1] = addr[1]; 17913 insn_buf[2] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(node_offset_reg, insn_aux->insert_off); 17914 insn_buf[3] = *insn; 17915 *cnt = 4; 17916 } 17917 17918 static int fixup_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 17919 struct bpf_insn *insn_buf, int insn_idx, int *cnt) 17920 { 17921 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc; 17922 17923 if (!insn->imm) { 17924 verbose(env, "invalid kernel function call not eliminated in verifier pass\n"); 17925 return -EINVAL; 17926 } 17927 17928 *cnt = 0; 17929 17930 /* insn->imm has the btf func_id. Replace it with an offset relative to 17931 * __bpf_call_base, unless the JIT needs to call functions that are 17932 * further than 32 bits away (bpf_jit_supports_far_kfunc_call()). 17933 */ 17934 desc = find_kfunc_desc(env->prog, insn->imm, insn->off); 17935 if (!desc) { 17936 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: kernel function descriptor not found for func_id %u\n", 17937 insn->imm); 17938 return -EFAULT; 17939 } 17940 17941 if (!bpf_jit_supports_far_kfunc_call()) 17942 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(desc->addr); 17943 if (insn->off) 17944 return 0; 17945 if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_new_impl]) { 17946 struct btf_struct_meta *kptr_struct_meta = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].kptr_struct_meta; 17947 struct bpf_insn addr[2] = { BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_2, (long)kptr_struct_meta) }; 17948 u64 obj_new_size = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].obj_new_size; 17949 17950 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_1, obj_new_size); 17951 insn_buf[1] = addr[0]; 17952 insn_buf[2] = addr[1]; 17953 insn_buf[3] = *insn; 17954 *cnt = 4; 17955 } else if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl] || 17956 desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl]) { 17957 struct btf_struct_meta *kptr_struct_meta = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].kptr_struct_meta; 17958 struct bpf_insn addr[2] = { BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_2, (long)kptr_struct_meta) }; 17959 17960 insn_buf[0] = addr[0]; 17961 insn_buf[1] = addr[1]; 17962 insn_buf[2] = *insn; 17963 *cnt = 3; 17964 } else if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_back_impl] || 17965 desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_front_impl] || 17966 desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]) { 17967 int struct_meta_reg = BPF_REG_3; 17968 int node_offset_reg = BPF_REG_4; 17969 17970 /* rbtree_add has extra 'less' arg, so args-to-fixup are in diff regs */ 17971 if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]) { 17972 struct_meta_reg = BPF_REG_4; 17973 node_offset_reg = BPF_REG_5; 17974 } 17975 17976 __fixup_collection_insert_kfunc(&env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx], struct_meta_reg, 17977 node_offset_reg, insn, insn_buf, cnt); 17978 } else if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx] || 17979 desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rdonly_cast]) { 17980 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1); 17981 *cnt = 1; 17982 } 17983 return 0; 17984 } 17985 17986 /* Do various post-verification rewrites in a single program pass. 17987 * These rewrites simplify JIT and interpreter implementations. 17988 */ 17989 static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 17990 { 17991 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 17992 enum bpf_attach_type eatype = prog->expected_attach_type; 17993 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(prog); 17994 struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi; 17995 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn; 17996 const int insn_cnt = prog->len; 17997 const struct bpf_map_ops *ops; 17998 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux; 17999 struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16]; 18000 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 18001 struct bpf_map *map_ptr; 18002 int i, ret, cnt, delta = 0; 18003 18004 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 18005 /* Make divide-by-zero exceptions impossible. */ 18006 if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOD | BPF_X) || 18007 insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_DIV | BPF_X) || 18008 insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_MOD | BPF_X) || 18009 insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_DIV | BPF_X)) { 18010 bool is64 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64; 18011 bool isdiv = BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_DIV; 18012 struct bpf_insn *patchlet; 18013 struct bpf_insn chk_and_div[] = { 18014 /* [R,W]x div 0 -> 0 */ 18015 BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) | 18016 BPF_JNE | BPF_K, insn->src_reg, 18017 0, 2, 0), 18018 BPF_ALU32_REG(BPF_XOR, insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg), 18019 BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1), 18020 *insn, 18021 }; 18022 struct bpf_insn chk_and_mod[] = { 18023 /* [R,W]x mod 0 -> [R,W]x */ 18024 BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) | 18025 BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, insn->src_reg, 18026 0, 1 + (is64 ? 0 : 1), 0), 18027 *insn, 18028 BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1), 18029 BPF_MOV32_REG(insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg), 18030 }; 18031 18032 patchlet = isdiv ? chk_and_div : chk_and_mod; 18033 cnt = isdiv ? ARRAY_SIZE(chk_and_div) : 18034 ARRAY_SIZE(chk_and_mod) - (is64 ? 2 : 0); 18035 18036 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, patchlet, cnt); 18037 if (!new_prog) 18038 return -ENOMEM; 18039 18040 delta += cnt - 1; 18041 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 18042 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 18043 continue; 18044 } 18045 18046 /* Implement LD_ABS and LD_IND with a rewrite, if supported by the program type. */ 18047 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LD && 18048 (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS || 18049 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND)) { 18050 cnt = env->ops->gen_ld_abs(insn, insn_buf); 18051 if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) { 18052 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 18053 return -EINVAL; 18054 } 18055 18056 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 18057 if (!new_prog) 18058 return -ENOMEM; 18059 18060 delta += cnt - 1; 18061 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 18062 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 18063 continue; 18064 } 18065 18066 /* Rewrite pointer arithmetic to mitigate speculation attacks. */ 18067 if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ADD | BPF_X) || 18068 insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_SUB | BPF_X)) { 18069 const u8 code_add = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ADD | BPF_X; 18070 const u8 code_sub = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_SUB | BPF_X; 18071 struct bpf_insn *patch = &insn_buf[0]; 18072 bool issrc, isneg, isimm; 18073 u32 off_reg; 18074 18075 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta]; 18076 if (!aux->alu_state || 18077 aux->alu_state == BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER) 18078 continue; 18079 18080 isneg = aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE; 18081 issrc = (aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_SANITIZE) == 18082 BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC; 18083 isimm = aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_IMMEDIATE; 18084 18085 off_reg = issrc ? insn->src_reg : insn->dst_reg; 18086 if (isimm) { 18087 *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, aux->alu_limit); 18088 } else { 18089 if (isneg) 18090 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1); 18091 *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, aux->alu_limit); 18092 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg); 18093 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg); 18094 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_NEG, BPF_REG_AX, 0); 18095 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ARSH, BPF_REG_AX, 63); 18096 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg); 18097 } 18098 if (!issrc) 18099 *patch++ = BPF_MOV64_REG(insn->dst_reg, insn->src_reg); 18100 insn->src_reg = BPF_REG_AX; 18101 if (isneg) 18102 insn->code = insn->code == code_add ? 18103 code_sub : code_add; 18104 *patch++ = *insn; 18105 if (issrc && isneg && !isimm) 18106 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1); 18107 cnt = patch - insn_buf; 18108 18109 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 18110 if (!new_prog) 18111 return -ENOMEM; 18112 18113 delta += cnt - 1; 18114 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 18115 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 18116 continue; 18117 } 18118 18119 if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL)) 18120 continue; 18121 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 18122 continue; 18123 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) { 18124 ret = fixup_kfunc_call(env, insn, insn_buf, i + delta, &cnt); 18125 if (ret) 18126 return ret; 18127 if (cnt == 0) 18128 continue; 18129 18130 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 18131 if (!new_prog) 18132 return -ENOMEM; 18133 18134 delta += cnt - 1; 18135 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 18136 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 18137 continue; 18138 } 18139 18140 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm) 18141 prog->dst_needed = 1; 18142 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32) 18143 bpf_user_rnd_init_once(); 18144 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_override_return) 18145 prog->kprobe_override = 1; 18146 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) { 18147 /* If we tail call into other programs, we 18148 * cannot make any assumptions since they can 18149 * be replaced dynamically during runtime in 18150 * the program array. 18151 */ 18152 prog->cb_access = 1; 18153 if (!allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(env)) 18154 prog->aux->stack_depth = MAX_BPF_STACK; 18155 prog->aux->max_pkt_offset = MAX_PACKET_OFF; 18156 18157 /* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode to avoid 18158 * conditional branch in the interpreter for every normal 18159 * call and to prevent accidental JITing by JIT compiler 18160 * that doesn't support bpf_tail_call yet 18161 */ 18162 insn->imm = 0; 18163 insn->code = BPF_JMP | BPF_TAIL_CALL; 18164 18165 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta]; 18166 if (env->bpf_capable && !prog->blinding_requested && 18167 prog->jit_requested && 18168 !bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux) && 18169 !bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux) && 18170 !bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux)) { 18171 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor desc = { 18172 .reason = BPF_POKE_REASON_TAIL_CALL, 18173 .tail_call.map = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state), 18174 .tail_call.key = bpf_map_key_immediate(aux), 18175 .insn_idx = i + delta, 18176 }; 18177 18178 ret = bpf_jit_add_poke_descriptor(prog, &desc); 18179 if (ret < 0) { 18180 verbose(env, "adding tail call poke descriptor failed\n"); 18181 return ret; 18182 } 18183 18184 insn->imm = ret + 1; 18185 continue; 18186 } 18187 18188 if (!bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux)) 18189 continue; 18190 18191 /* instead of changing every JIT dealing with tail_call 18192 * emit two extra insns: 18193 * if (index >= max_entries) goto out; 18194 * index &= array->index_mask; 18195 * to avoid out-of-bounds cpu speculation 18196 */ 18197 if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux)) { 18198 verbose(env, "tail_call abusing map_ptr\n"); 18199 return -EINVAL; 18200 } 18201 18202 map_ptr = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state); 18203 insn_buf[0] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_3, 18204 map_ptr->max_entries, 2); 18205 insn_buf[1] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_3, 18206 container_of(map_ptr, 18207 struct bpf_array, 18208 map)->index_mask); 18209 insn_buf[2] = *insn; 18210 cnt = 3; 18211 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 18212 if (!new_prog) 18213 return -ENOMEM; 18214 18215 delta += cnt - 1; 18216 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 18217 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 18218 continue; 18219 } 18220 18221 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback) { 18222 /* The verifier will process callback_fn as many times as necessary 18223 * with different maps and the register states prepared by 18224 * set_timer_callback_state will be accurate. 18225 * 18226 * The following use case is valid: 18227 * map1 is shared by prog1, prog2, prog3. 18228 * prog1 calls bpf_timer_init for some map1 elements 18229 * prog2 calls bpf_timer_set_callback for some map1 elements. 18230 * Those that were not bpf_timer_init-ed will return -EINVAL. 18231 * prog3 calls bpf_timer_start for some map1 elements. 18232 * Those that were not both bpf_timer_init-ed and 18233 * bpf_timer_set_callback-ed will return -EINVAL. 18234 */ 18235 struct bpf_insn ld_addrs[2] = { 18236 BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_3, (long)prog->aux), 18237 }; 18238 18239 insn_buf[0] = ld_addrs[0]; 18240 insn_buf[1] = ld_addrs[1]; 18241 insn_buf[2] = *insn; 18242 cnt = 3; 18243 18244 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 18245 if (!new_prog) 18246 return -ENOMEM; 18247 18248 delta += cnt - 1; 18249 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 18250 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 18251 goto patch_call_imm; 18252 } 18253 18254 if (is_storage_get_function(insn->imm)) { 18255 if (!env->prog->aux->sleepable || 18256 env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].storage_get_func_atomic) 18257 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_5, (__force __s32)GFP_ATOMIC); 18258 else 18259 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_5, (__force __s32)GFP_KERNEL); 18260 insn_buf[1] = *insn; 18261 cnt = 2; 18262 18263 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 18264 if (!new_prog) 18265 return -ENOMEM; 18266 18267 delta += cnt - 1; 18268 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 18269 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 18270 goto patch_call_imm; 18271 } 18272 18273 /* BPF_EMIT_CALL() assumptions in some of the map_gen_lookup 18274 * and other inlining handlers are currently limited to 64 bit 18275 * only. 18276 */ 18277 if (prog->jit_requested && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 && 18278 (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem || 18279 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem || 18280 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem || 18281 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem || 18282 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem || 18283 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem || 18284 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_redirect_map || 18285 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem || 18286 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem)) { 18287 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta]; 18288 if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux)) 18289 goto patch_call_imm; 18290 18291 map_ptr = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state); 18292 ops = map_ptr->ops; 18293 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 18294 ops->map_gen_lookup) { 18295 cnt = ops->map_gen_lookup(map_ptr, insn_buf); 18296 if (cnt == -EOPNOTSUPP) 18297 goto patch_map_ops_generic; 18298 if (cnt <= 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) { 18299 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 18300 return -EINVAL; 18301 } 18302 18303 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, 18304 insn_buf, cnt); 18305 if (!new_prog) 18306 return -ENOMEM; 18307 18308 delta += cnt - 1; 18309 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 18310 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 18311 continue; 18312 } 18313 18314 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_lookup_elem, 18315 (void *(*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key))NULL)); 18316 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_delete_elem, 18317 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key))NULL)); 18318 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_update_elem, 18319 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value, 18320 u64 flags))NULL)); 18321 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_push_elem, 18322 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value, 18323 u64 flags))NULL)); 18324 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_pop_elem, 18325 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value))NULL)); 18326 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_peek_elem, 18327 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value))NULL)); 18328 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_redirect, 18329 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, u64 index, u64 flags))NULL)); 18330 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_for_each_callback, 18331 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, 18332 bpf_callback_t callback_fn, 18333 void *callback_ctx, 18334 u64 flags))NULL)); 18335 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_lookup_percpu_elem, 18336 (void *(*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, u32 cpu))NULL)); 18337 18338 patch_map_ops_generic: 18339 switch (insn->imm) { 18340 case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem: 18341 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_lookup_elem); 18342 continue; 18343 case BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem: 18344 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_update_elem); 18345 continue; 18346 case BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem: 18347 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_delete_elem); 18348 continue; 18349 case BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem: 18350 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_push_elem); 18351 continue; 18352 case BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem: 18353 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_pop_elem); 18354 continue; 18355 case BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem: 18356 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_peek_elem); 18357 continue; 18358 case BPF_FUNC_redirect_map: 18359 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_redirect); 18360 continue; 18361 case BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem: 18362 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_for_each_callback); 18363 continue; 18364 case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem: 18365 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_lookup_percpu_elem); 18366 continue; 18367 } 18368 18369 goto patch_call_imm; 18370 } 18371 18372 /* Implement bpf_jiffies64 inline. */ 18373 if (prog->jit_requested && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 && 18374 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_jiffies64) { 18375 struct bpf_insn ld_jiffies_addr[2] = { 18376 BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_0, 18377 (unsigned long)&jiffies), 18378 }; 18379 18380 insn_buf[0] = ld_jiffies_addr[0]; 18381 insn_buf[1] = ld_jiffies_addr[1]; 18382 insn_buf[2] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 18383 BPF_REG_0, 0); 18384 cnt = 3; 18385 18386 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, 18387 cnt); 18388 if (!new_prog) 18389 return -ENOMEM; 18390 18391 delta += cnt - 1; 18392 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 18393 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 18394 continue; 18395 } 18396 18397 /* Implement bpf_get_func_arg inline. */ 18398 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 18399 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_arg) { 18400 /* Load nr_args from ctx - 8 */ 18401 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -8); 18402 insn_buf[1] = BPF_JMP32_REG(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_0, 6); 18403 insn_buf[2] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_2, 3); 18404 insn_buf[3] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1); 18405 insn_buf[4] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2, 0); 18406 insn_buf[5] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, 0); 18407 insn_buf[6] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0); 18408 insn_buf[7] = BPF_JMP_A(1); 18409 insn_buf[8] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, -EINVAL); 18410 cnt = 9; 18411 18412 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 18413 if (!new_prog) 18414 return -ENOMEM; 18415 18416 delta += cnt - 1; 18417 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 18418 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 18419 continue; 18420 } 18421 18422 /* Implement bpf_get_func_ret inline. */ 18423 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 18424 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_ret) { 18425 if (eatype == BPF_TRACE_FEXIT || 18426 eatype == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) { 18427 /* Load nr_args from ctx - 8 */ 18428 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -8); 18429 insn_buf[1] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_0, 3); 18430 insn_buf[2] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1); 18431 insn_buf[3] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, 0); 18432 insn_buf[4] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, 0); 18433 insn_buf[5] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0); 18434 cnt = 6; 18435 } else { 18436 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, -EOPNOTSUPP); 18437 cnt = 1; 18438 } 18439 18440 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 18441 if (!new_prog) 18442 return -ENOMEM; 18443 18444 delta += cnt - 1; 18445 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 18446 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 18447 continue; 18448 } 18449 18450 /* Implement get_func_arg_cnt inline. */ 18451 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 18452 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_arg_cnt) { 18453 /* Load nr_args from ctx - 8 */ 18454 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -8); 18455 18456 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, 1); 18457 if (!new_prog) 18458 return -ENOMEM; 18459 18460 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 18461 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 18462 continue; 18463 } 18464 18465 /* Implement bpf_get_func_ip inline. */ 18466 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 18467 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_ip) { 18468 /* Load IP address from ctx - 16 */ 18469 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -16); 18470 18471 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, 1); 18472 if (!new_prog) 18473 return -ENOMEM; 18474 18475 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 18476 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 18477 continue; 18478 } 18479 18480 patch_call_imm: 18481 fn = env->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm, env->prog); 18482 /* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed 18483 * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions 18484 */ 18485 if (!fn->func) { 18486 verbose(env, 18487 "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n", 18488 func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm); 18489 return -EFAULT; 18490 } 18491 insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base; 18492 } 18493 18494 /* Since poke tab is now finalized, publish aux to tracker. */ 18495 for (i = 0; i < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; i++) { 18496 map_ptr = prog->aux->poke_tab[i].tail_call.map; 18497 if (!map_ptr->ops->map_poke_track || 18498 !map_ptr->ops->map_poke_untrack || 18499 !map_ptr->ops->map_poke_run) { 18500 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 18501 return -EINVAL; 18502 } 18503 18504 ret = map_ptr->ops->map_poke_track(map_ptr, prog->aux); 18505 if (ret < 0) { 18506 verbose(env, "tracking tail call prog failed\n"); 18507 return ret; 18508 } 18509 } 18510 18511 sort_kfunc_descs_by_imm_off(env->prog); 18512 18513 return 0; 18514 } 18515 18516 static struct bpf_prog *inline_bpf_loop(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 18517 int position, 18518 s32 stack_base, 18519 u32 callback_subprogno, 18520 u32 *cnt) 18521 { 18522 s32 r6_offset = stack_base + 0 * BPF_REG_SIZE; 18523 s32 r7_offset = stack_base + 1 * BPF_REG_SIZE; 18524 s32 r8_offset = stack_base + 2 * BPF_REG_SIZE; 18525 int reg_loop_max = BPF_REG_6; 18526 int reg_loop_cnt = BPF_REG_7; 18527 int reg_loop_ctx = BPF_REG_8; 18528 18529 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 18530 u32 callback_start; 18531 u32 call_insn_offset; 18532 s32 callback_offset; 18533 18534 /* This represents an inlined version of bpf_iter.c:bpf_loop, 18535 * be careful to modify this code in sync. 18536 */ 18537 struct bpf_insn insn_buf[] = { 18538 /* Return error and jump to the end of the patch if 18539 * expected number of iterations is too big. 18540 */ 18541 BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JLE, BPF_REG_1, BPF_MAX_LOOPS, 2), 18542 BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_0, -E2BIG), 18543 BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 16), 18544 /* spill R6, R7, R8 to use these as loop vars */ 18545 BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_6, r6_offset), 18546 BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_7, r7_offset), 18547 BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_8, r8_offset), 18548 /* initialize loop vars */ 18549 BPF_MOV64_REG(reg_loop_max, BPF_REG_1), 18550 BPF_MOV32_IMM(reg_loop_cnt, 0), 18551 BPF_MOV64_REG(reg_loop_ctx, BPF_REG_3), 18552 /* loop header, 18553 * if reg_loop_cnt >= reg_loop_max skip the loop body 18554 */ 18555 BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGE, reg_loop_cnt, reg_loop_max, 5), 18556 /* callback call, 18557 * correct callback offset would be set after patching 18558 */ 18559 BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, reg_loop_cnt), 18560 BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, reg_loop_ctx), 18561 BPF_CALL_REL(0), 18562 /* increment loop counter */ 18563 BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, reg_loop_cnt, 1), 18564 /* jump to loop header if callback returned 0 */ 18565 BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, -6), 18566 /* return value of bpf_loop, 18567 * set R0 to the number of iterations 18568 */ 18569 BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, reg_loop_cnt), 18570 /* restore original values of R6, R7, R8 */ 18571 BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_10, r6_offset), 18572 BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_10, r7_offset), 18573 BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_10, r8_offset), 18574 }; 18575 18576 *cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf); 18577 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, position, insn_buf, *cnt); 18578 if (!new_prog) 18579 return new_prog; 18580 18581 /* callback start is known only after patching */ 18582 callback_start = env->subprog_info[callback_subprogno].start; 18583 /* Note: insn_buf[12] is an offset of BPF_CALL_REL instruction */ 18584 call_insn_offset = position + 12; 18585 callback_offset = callback_start - call_insn_offset - 1; 18586 new_prog->insnsi[call_insn_offset].imm = callback_offset; 18587 18588 return new_prog; 18589 } 18590 18591 static bool is_bpf_loop_call(struct bpf_insn *insn) 18592 { 18593 return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 18594 insn->src_reg == 0 && 18595 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_loop; 18596 } 18597 18598 /* For all sub-programs in the program (including main) check 18599 * insn_aux_data to see if there are bpf_loop calls that require 18600 * inlining. If such calls are found the calls are replaced with a 18601 * sequence of instructions produced by `inline_bpf_loop` function and 18602 * subprog stack_depth is increased by the size of 3 registers. 18603 * This stack space is used to spill values of the R6, R7, R8. These 18604 * registers are used to store the loop bound, counter and context 18605 * variables. 18606 */ 18607 static int optimize_bpf_loop(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 18608 { 18609 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprogs = env->subprog_info; 18610 int i, cur_subprog = 0, cnt, delta = 0; 18611 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 18612 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 18613 u16 stack_depth = subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth; 18614 u16 stack_depth_roundup = round_up(stack_depth, 8) - stack_depth; 18615 u16 stack_depth_extra = 0; 18616 18617 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 18618 struct bpf_loop_inline_state *inline_state = 18619 &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].loop_inline_state; 18620 18621 if (is_bpf_loop_call(insn) && inline_state->fit_for_inline) { 18622 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 18623 18624 stack_depth_extra = BPF_REG_SIZE * 3 + stack_depth_roundup; 18625 new_prog = inline_bpf_loop(env, 18626 i + delta, 18627 -(stack_depth + stack_depth_extra), 18628 inline_state->callback_subprogno, 18629 &cnt); 18630 if (!new_prog) 18631 return -ENOMEM; 18632 18633 delta += cnt - 1; 18634 env->prog = new_prog; 18635 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 18636 } 18637 18638 if (subprogs[cur_subprog + 1].start == i + delta + 1) { 18639 subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth += stack_depth_extra; 18640 cur_subprog++; 18641 stack_depth = subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth; 18642 stack_depth_roundup = round_up(stack_depth, 8) - stack_depth; 18643 stack_depth_extra = 0; 18644 } 18645 } 18646 18647 env->prog->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[0].stack_depth; 18648 18649 return 0; 18650 } 18651 18652 static void free_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 18653 { 18654 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl, *sln; 18655 int i; 18656 18657 sl = env->free_list; 18658 while (sl) { 18659 sln = sl->next; 18660 free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false); 18661 kfree(sl); 18662 sl = sln; 18663 } 18664 env->free_list = NULL; 18665 18666 if (!env->explored_states) 18667 return; 18668 18669 for (i = 0; i < state_htab_size(env); i++) { 18670 sl = env->explored_states[i]; 18671 18672 while (sl) { 18673 sln = sl->next; 18674 free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false); 18675 kfree(sl); 18676 sl = sln; 18677 } 18678 env->explored_states[i] = NULL; 18679 } 18680 } 18681 18682 static int do_check_common(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog) 18683 { 18684 bool pop_log = !(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2); 18685 struct bpf_verifier_state *state; 18686 struct bpf_reg_state *regs; 18687 int ret, i; 18688 18689 env->prev_linfo = NULL; 18690 env->pass_cnt++; 18691 18692 state = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state), GFP_KERNEL); 18693 if (!state) 18694 return -ENOMEM; 18695 state->curframe = 0; 18696 state->speculative = false; 18697 state->branches = 1; 18698 state->frame[0] = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_func_state), GFP_KERNEL); 18699 if (!state->frame[0]) { 18700 kfree(state); 18701 return -ENOMEM; 18702 } 18703 env->cur_state = state; 18704 init_func_state(env, state->frame[0], 18705 BPF_MAIN_FUNC /* callsite */, 18706 0 /* frameno */, 18707 subprog); 18708 state->first_insn_idx = env->subprog_info[subprog].start; 18709 state->last_insn_idx = -1; 18710 18711 regs = state->frame[state->curframe]->regs; 18712 if (subprog || env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) { 18713 ret = btf_prepare_func_args(env, subprog, regs); 18714 if (ret) 18715 goto out; 18716 for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) { 18717 if (regs[i].type == PTR_TO_CTX) 18718 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, i); 18719 else if (regs[i].type == SCALAR_VALUE) 18720 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, i); 18721 else if (base_type(regs[i].type) == PTR_TO_MEM) { 18722 const u32 mem_size = regs[i].mem_size; 18723 18724 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, i); 18725 regs[i].mem_size = mem_size; 18726 regs[i].id = ++env->id_gen; 18727 } 18728 } 18729 } else { 18730 /* 1st arg to a function */ 18731 regs[BPF_REG_1].type = PTR_TO_CTX; 18732 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_1); 18733 ret = btf_check_subprog_arg_match(env, subprog, regs); 18734 if (ret == -EFAULT) 18735 /* unlikely verifier bug. abort. 18736 * ret == 0 and ret < 0 are sadly acceptable for 18737 * main() function due to backward compatibility. 18738 * Like socket filter program may be written as: 18739 * int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) 18740 * and never dereference that ctx in the program. 18741 * 'struct pt_regs' is a type mismatch for socket 18742 * filter that should be using 'struct __sk_buff'. 18743 */ 18744 goto out; 18745 } 18746 18747 ret = do_check(env); 18748 out: 18749 /* check for NULL is necessary, since cur_state can be freed inside 18750 * do_check() under memory pressure. 18751 */ 18752 if (env->cur_state) { 18753 free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true); 18754 env->cur_state = NULL; 18755 } 18756 while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false)); 18757 if (!ret && pop_log) 18758 bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, 0); 18759 free_states(env); 18760 return ret; 18761 } 18762 18763 /* Verify all global functions in a BPF program one by one based on their BTF. 18764 * All global functions must pass verification. Otherwise the whole program is rejected. 18765 * Consider: 18766 * int bar(int); 18767 * int foo(int f) 18768 * { 18769 * return bar(f); 18770 * } 18771 * int bar(int b) 18772 * { 18773 * ... 18774 * } 18775 * foo() will be verified first for R1=any_scalar_value. During verification it 18776 * will be assumed that bar() already verified successfully and call to bar() 18777 * from foo() will be checked for type match only. Later bar() will be verified 18778 * independently to check that it's safe for R1=any_scalar_value. 18779 */ 18780 static int do_check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 18781 { 18782 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 18783 int i, ret; 18784 18785 if (!aux->func_info) 18786 return 0; 18787 18788 for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 18789 if (aux->func_info_aux[i].linkage != BTF_FUNC_GLOBAL) 18790 continue; 18791 env->insn_idx = env->subprog_info[i].start; 18792 WARN_ON_ONCE(env->insn_idx == 0); 18793 ret = do_check_common(env, i); 18794 if (ret) { 18795 return ret; 18796 } else if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 18797 verbose(env, 18798 "Func#%d is safe for any args that match its prototype\n", 18799 i); 18800 } 18801 } 18802 return 0; 18803 } 18804 18805 static int do_check_main(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 18806 { 18807 int ret; 18808 18809 env->insn_idx = 0; 18810 ret = do_check_common(env, 0); 18811 if (!ret) 18812 env->prog->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[0].stack_depth; 18813 return ret; 18814 } 18815 18816 18817 static void print_verification_stats(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 18818 { 18819 int i; 18820 18821 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_STATS) { 18822 verbose(env, "verification time %lld usec\n", 18823 div_u64(env->verification_time, 1000)); 18824 verbose(env, "stack depth "); 18825 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 18826 u32 depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth; 18827 18828 verbose(env, "%d", depth); 18829 if (i + 1 < env->subprog_cnt) 18830 verbose(env, "+"); 18831 } 18832 verbose(env, "\n"); 18833 } 18834 verbose(env, "processed %d insns (limit %d) max_states_per_insn %d " 18835 "total_states %d peak_states %d mark_read %d\n", 18836 env->insn_processed, BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS, 18837 env->max_states_per_insn, env->total_states, 18838 env->peak_states, env->longest_mark_read_walk); 18839 } 18840 18841 static int check_struct_ops_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 18842 { 18843 const struct btf_type *t, *func_proto; 18844 const struct bpf_struct_ops *st_ops; 18845 const struct btf_member *member; 18846 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 18847 u32 btf_id, member_idx; 18848 const char *mname; 18849 18850 if (!prog->gpl_compatible) { 18851 verbose(env, "struct ops programs must have a GPL compatible license\n"); 18852 return -EINVAL; 18853 } 18854 18855 btf_id = prog->aux->attach_btf_id; 18856 st_ops = bpf_struct_ops_find(btf_id); 18857 if (!st_ops) { 18858 verbose(env, "attach_btf_id %u is not a supported struct\n", 18859 btf_id); 18860 return -ENOTSUPP; 18861 } 18862 18863 t = st_ops->type; 18864 member_idx = prog->expected_attach_type; 18865 if (member_idx >= btf_type_vlen(t)) { 18866 verbose(env, "attach to invalid member idx %u of struct %s\n", 18867 member_idx, st_ops->name); 18868 return -EINVAL; 18869 } 18870 18871 member = &btf_type_member(t)[member_idx]; 18872 mname = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, member->name_off); 18873 func_proto = btf_type_resolve_func_ptr(btf_vmlinux, member->type, 18874 NULL); 18875 if (!func_proto) { 18876 verbose(env, "attach to invalid member %s(@idx %u) of struct %s\n", 18877 mname, member_idx, st_ops->name); 18878 return -EINVAL; 18879 } 18880 18881 if (st_ops->check_member) { 18882 int err = st_ops->check_member(t, member, prog); 18883 18884 if (err) { 18885 verbose(env, "attach to unsupported member %s of struct %s\n", 18886 mname, st_ops->name); 18887 return err; 18888 } 18889 } 18890 18891 prog->aux->attach_func_proto = func_proto; 18892 prog->aux->attach_func_name = mname; 18893 env->ops = st_ops->verifier_ops; 18894 18895 return 0; 18896 } 18897 #define SECURITY_PREFIX "security_" 18898 18899 static int check_attach_modify_return(unsigned long addr, const char *func_name) 18900 { 18901 if (within_error_injection_list(addr) || 18902 !strncmp(SECURITY_PREFIX, func_name, sizeof(SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1)) 18903 return 0; 18904 18905 return -EINVAL; 18906 } 18907 18908 /* list of non-sleepable functions that are otherwise on 18909 * ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION list 18910 */ 18911 BTF_SET_START(btf_non_sleepable_error_inject) 18912 /* Three functions below can be called from sleepable and non-sleepable context. 18913 * Assume non-sleepable from bpf safety point of view. 18914 */ 18915 BTF_ID(func, __filemap_add_folio) 18916 BTF_ID(func, should_fail_alloc_page) 18917 BTF_ID(func, should_failslab) 18918 BTF_SET_END(btf_non_sleepable_error_inject) 18919 18920 static int check_non_sleepable_error_inject(u32 btf_id) 18921 { 18922 return btf_id_set_contains(&btf_non_sleepable_error_inject, btf_id); 18923 } 18924 18925 int bpf_check_attach_target(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, 18926 const struct bpf_prog *prog, 18927 const struct bpf_prog *tgt_prog, 18928 u32 btf_id, 18929 struct bpf_attach_target_info *tgt_info) 18930 { 18931 bool prog_extension = prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT; 18932 const char prefix[] = "btf_trace_"; 18933 int ret = 0, subprog = -1, i; 18934 const struct btf_type *t; 18935 bool conservative = true; 18936 const char *tname; 18937 struct btf *btf; 18938 long addr = 0; 18939 struct module *mod = NULL; 18940 18941 if (!btf_id) { 18942 bpf_log(log, "Tracing programs must provide btf_id\n"); 18943 return -EINVAL; 18944 } 18945 btf = tgt_prog ? tgt_prog->aux->btf : prog->aux->attach_btf; 18946 if (!btf) { 18947 bpf_log(log, 18948 "FENTRY/FEXIT program can only be attached to another program annotated with BTF\n"); 18949 return -EINVAL; 18950 } 18951 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, btf_id); 18952 if (!t) { 18953 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is invalid\n", btf_id); 18954 return -EINVAL; 18955 } 18956 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off); 18957 if (!tname) { 18958 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u doesn't have a name\n", btf_id); 18959 return -EINVAL; 18960 } 18961 if (tgt_prog) { 18962 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = tgt_prog->aux; 18963 18964 if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(prog->aux) && 18965 !bpf_prog_dev_bound_match(prog, tgt_prog)) { 18966 bpf_log(log, "Target program bound device mismatch"); 18967 return -EINVAL; 18968 } 18969 18970 for (i = 0; i < aux->func_info_cnt; i++) 18971 if (aux->func_info[i].type_id == btf_id) { 18972 subprog = i; 18973 break; 18974 } 18975 if (subprog == -1) { 18976 bpf_log(log, "Subprog %s doesn't exist\n", tname); 18977 return -EINVAL; 18978 } 18979 conservative = aux->func_info_aux[subprog].unreliable; 18980 if (prog_extension) { 18981 if (conservative) { 18982 bpf_log(log, 18983 "Cannot replace static functions\n"); 18984 return -EINVAL; 18985 } 18986 if (!prog->jit_requested) { 18987 bpf_log(log, 18988 "Extension programs should be JITed\n"); 18989 return -EINVAL; 18990 } 18991 } 18992 if (!tgt_prog->jited) { 18993 bpf_log(log, "Can attach to only JITed progs\n"); 18994 return -EINVAL; 18995 } 18996 if (tgt_prog->type == prog->type) { 18997 /* Cannot fentry/fexit another fentry/fexit program. 18998 * Cannot attach program extension to another extension. 18999 * It's ok to attach fentry/fexit to extension program. 19000 */ 19001 bpf_log(log, "Cannot recursively attach\n"); 19002 return -EINVAL; 19003 } 19004 if (tgt_prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 19005 prog_extension && 19006 (tgt_prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FENTRY || 19007 tgt_prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FEXIT)) { 19008 /* Program extensions can extend all program types 19009 * except fentry/fexit. The reason is the following. 19010 * The fentry/fexit programs are used for performance 19011 * analysis, stats and can be attached to any program 19012 * type except themselves. When extension program is 19013 * replacing XDP function it is necessary to allow 19014 * performance analysis of all functions. Both original 19015 * XDP program and its program extension. Hence 19016 * attaching fentry/fexit to BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT is 19017 * allowed. If extending of fentry/fexit was allowed it 19018 * would be possible to create long call chain 19019 * fentry->extension->fentry->extension beyond 19020 * reasonable stack size. Hence extending fentry is not 19021 * allowed. 19022 */ 19023 bpf_log(log, "Cannot extend fentry/fexit\n"); 19024 return -EINVAL; 19025 } 19026 } else { 19027 if (prog_extension) { 19028 bpf_log(log, "Cannot replace kernel functions\n"); 19029 return -EINVAL; 19030 } 19031 } 19032 19033 switch (prog->expected_attach_type) { 19034 case BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP: 19035 if (tgt_prog) { 19036 bpf_log(log, 19037 "Only FENTRY/FEXIT progs are attachable to another BPF prog\n"); 19038 return -EINVAL; 19039 } 19040 if (!btf_type_is_typedef(t)) { 19041 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a typedef\n", 19042 btf_id); 19043 return -EINVAL; 19044 } 19045 if (strncmp(prefix, tname, sizeof(prefix) - 1)) { 19046 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u points to wrong type name %s\n", 19047 btf_id, tname); 19048 return -EINVAL; 19049 } 19050 tname += sizeof(prefix) - 1; 19051 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); 19052 if (!btf_type_is_ptr(t)) 19053 /* should never happen in valid vmlinux build */ 19054 return -EINVAL; 19055 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); 19056 if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t)) 19057 /* should never happen in valid vmlinux build */ 19058 return -EINVAL; 19059 19060 break; 19061 case BPF_TRACE_ITER: 19062 if (!btf_type_is_func(t)) { 19063 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a function\n", 19064 btf_id); 19065 return -EINVAL; 19066 } 19067 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); 19068 if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t)) 19069 return -EINVAL; 19070 ret = btf_distill_func_proto(log, btf, t, tname, &tgt_info->fmodel); 19071 if (ret) 19072 return ret; 19073 break; 19074 default: 19075 if (!prog_extension) 19076 return -EINVAL; 19077 fallthrough; 19078 case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN: 19079 case BPF_LSM_MAC: 19080 case BPF_LSM_CGROUP: 19081 case BPF_TRACE_FENTRY: 19082 case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT: 19083 if (!btf_type_is_func(t)) { 19084 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a function\n", 19085 btf_id); 19086 return -EINVAL; 19087 } 19088 if (prog_extension && 19089 btf_check_type_match(log, prog, btf, t)) 19090 return -EINVAL; 19091 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); 19092 if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t)) 19093 return -EINVAL; 19094 19095 if ((prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type || prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type) && 19096 (!tgt_prog || prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type != tgt_prog->type || 19097 prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type != tgt_prog->expected_attach_type)) 19098 return -EINVAL; 19099 19100 if (tgt_prog && conservative) 19101 t = NULL; 19102 19103 ret = btf_distill_func_proto(log, btf, t, tname, &tgt_info->fmodel); 19104 if (ret < 0) 19105 return ret; 19106 19107 if (tgt_prog) { 19108 if (subprog == 0) 19109 addr = (long) tgt_prog->bpf_func; 19110 else 19111 addr = (long) tgt_prog->aux->func[subprog]->bpf_func; 19112 } else { 19113 if (btf_is_module(btf)) { 19114 mod = btf_try_get_module(btf); 19115 if (mod) 19116 addr = find_kallsyms_symbol_value(mod, tname); 19117 else 19118 addr = 0; 19119 } else { 19120 addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(tname); 19121 } 19122 if (!addr) { 19123 module_put(mod); 19124 bpf_log(log, 19125 "The address of function %s cannot be found\n", 19126 tname); 19127 return -ENOENT; 19128 } 19129 } 19130 19131 if (prog->aux->sleepable) { 19132 ret = -EINVAL; 19133 switch (prog->type) { 19134 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: 19135 19136 /* fentry/fexit/fmod_ret progs can be sleepable if they are 19137 * attached to ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION and are not in denylist. 19138 */ 19139 if (!check_non_sleepable_error_inject(btf_id) && 19140 within_error_injection_list(addr)) 19141 ret = 0; 19142 /* fentry/fexit/fmod_ret progs can also be sleepable if they are 19143 * in the fmodret id set with the KF_SLEEPABLE flag. 19144 */ 19145 else { 19146 u32 *flags = btf_kfunc_is_modify_return(btf, btf_id, 19147 prog); 19148 19149 if (flags && (*flags & KF_SLEEPABLE)) 19150 ret = 0; 19151 } 19152 break; 19153 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: 19154 /* LSM progs check that they are attached to bpf_lsm_*() funcs. 19155 * Only some of them are sleepable. 19156 */ 19157 if (bpf_lsm_is_sleepable_hook(btf_id)) 19158 ret = 0; 19159 break; 19160 default: 19161 break; 19162 } 19163 if (ret) { 19164 module_put(mod); 19165 bpf_log(log, "%s is not sleepable\n", tname); 19166 return ret; 19167 } 19168 } else if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) { 19169 if (tgt_prog) { 19170 module_put(mod); 19171 bpf_log(log, "can't modify return codes of BPF programs\n"); 19172 return -EINVAL; 19173 } 19174 ret = -EINVAL; 19175 if (btf_kfunc_is_modify_return(btf, btf_id, prog) || 19176 !check_attach_modify_return(addr, tname)) 19177 ret = 0; 19178 if (ret) { 19179 module_put(mod); 19180 bpf_log(log, "%s() is not modifiable\n", tname); 19181 return ret; 19182 } 19183 } 19184 19185 break; 19186 } 19187 tgt_info->tgt_addr = addr; 19188 tgt_info->tgt_name = tname; 19189 tgt_info->tgt_type = t; 19190 tgt_info->tgt_mod = mod; 19191 return 0; 19192 } 19193 19194 BTF_SET_START(btf_id_deny) 19195 BTF_ID_UNUSED 19196 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP 19197 BTF_ID(func, migrate_disable) 19198 BTF_ID(func, migrate_enable) 19199 #endif 19200 #if !defined CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU && !defined CONFIG_TINY_RCU 19201 BTF_ID(func, rcu_read_unlock_strict) 19202 #endif 19203 #if defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT) || defined(CONFIG_TRACE_PREEMPT_TOGGLE) 19204 BTF_ID(func, preempt_count_add) 19205 BTF_ID(func, preempt_count_sub) 19206 #endif 19207 #ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU 19208 BTF_ID(func, __rcu_read_lock) 19209 BTF_ID(func, __rcu_read_unlock) 19210 #endif 19211 BTF_SET_END(btf_id_deny) 19212 19213 static bool can_be_sleepable(struct bpf_prog *prog) 19214 { 19215 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING) { 19216 switch (prog->expected_attach_type) { 19217 case BPF_TRACE_FENTRY: 19218 case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT: 19219 case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN: 19220 case BPF_TRACE_ITER: 19221 return true; 19222 default: 19223 return false; 19224 } 19225 } 19226 return prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM || 19227 prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE /* only for uprobes */ || 19228 prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS; 19229 } 19230 19231 static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 19232 { 19233 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 19234 struct bpf_prog *tgt_prog = prog->aux->dst_prog; 19235 struct bpf_attach_target_info tgt_info = {}; 19236 u32 btf_id = prog->aux->attach_btf_id; 19237 struct bpf_trampoline *tr; 19238 int ret; 19239 u64 key; 19240 19241 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_SYSCALL) { 19242 if (prog->aux->sleepable) 19243 /* attach_btf_id checked to be zero already */ 19244 return 0; 19245 verbose(env, "Syscall programs can only be sleepable\n"); 19246 return -EINVAL; 19247 } 19248 19249 if (prog->aux->sleepable && !can_be_sleepable(prog)) { 19250 verbose(env, "Only fentry/fexit/fmod_ret, lsm, iter, uprobe, and struct_ops programs can be sleepable\n"); 19251 return -EINVAL; 19252 } 19253 19254 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) 19255 return check_struct_ops_btf_id(env); 19256 19257 if (prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 19258 prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM && 19259 prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) 19260 return 0; 19261 19262 ret = bpf_check_attach_target(&env->log, prog, tgt_prog, btf_id, &tgt_info); 19263 if (ret) 19264 return ret; 19265 19266 if (tgt_prog && prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) { 19267 /* to make freplace equivalent to their targets, they need to 19268 * inherit env->ops and expected_attach_type for the rest of the 19269 * verification 19270 */ 19271 env->ops = bpf_verifier_ops[tgt_prog->type]; 19272 prog->expected_attach_type = tgt_prog->expected_attach_type; 19273 } 19274 19275 /* store info about the attachment target that will be used later */ 19276 prog->aux->attach_func_proto = tgt_info.tgt_type; 19277 prog->aux->attach_func_name = tgt_info.tgt_name; 19278 prog->aux->mod = tgt_info.tgt_mod; 19279 19280 if (tgt_prog) { 19281 prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type = tgt_prog->type; 19282 prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type = tgt_prog->expected_attach_type; 19283 } 19284 19285 if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP) { 19286 prog->aux->attach_btf_trace = true; 19287 return 0; 19288 } else if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_ITER) { 19289 if (!bpf_iter_prog_supported(prog)) 19290 return -EINVAL; 19291 return 0; 19292 } 19293 19294 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) { 19295 ret = bpf_lsm_verify_prog(&env->log, prog); 19296 if (ret < 0) 19297 return ret; 19298 } else if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 19299 btf_id_set_contains(&btf_id_deny, btf_id)) { 19300 return -EINVAL; 19301 } 19302 19303 key = bpf_trampoline_compute_key(tgt_prog, prog->aux->attach_btf, btf_id); 19304 tr = bpf_trampoline_get(key, &tgt_info); 19305 if (!tr) 19306 return -ENOMEM; 19307 19308 prog->aux->dst_trampoline = tr; 19309 return 0; 19310 } 19311 19312 struct btf *bpf_get_btf_vmlinux(void) 19313 { 19314 if (!btf_vmlinux && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF)) { 19315 mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 19316 if (!btf_vmlinux) 19317 btf_vmlinux = btf_parse_vmlinux(); 19318 mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 19319 } 19320 return btf_vmlinux; 19321 } 19322 19323 int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr, __u32 uattr_size) 19324 { 19325 u64 start_time = ktime_get_ns(); 19326 struct bpf_verifier_env *env; 19327 int i, len, ret = -EINVAL, err; 19328 u32 log_true_size; 19329 bool is_priv; 19330 19331 /* no program is valid */ 19332 if (ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_verifier_ops) == 0) 19333 return -EINVAL; 19334 19335 /* 'struct bpf_verifier_env' can be global, but since it's not small, 19336 * allocate/free it every time bpf_check() is called 19337 */ 19338 env = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_env), GFP_KERNEL); 19339 if (!env) 19340 return -ENOMEM; 19341 19342 env->bt.env = env; 19343 19344 len = (*prog)->len; 19345 env->insn_aux_data = 19346 vzalloc(array_size(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data), len)); 19347 ret = -ENOMEM; 19348 if (!env->insn_aux_data) 19349 goto err_free_env; 19350 for (i = 0; i < len; i++) 19351 env->insn_aux_data[i].orig_idx = i; 19352 env->prog = *prog; 19353 env->ops = bpf_verifier_ops[env->prog->type]; 19354 env->fd_array = make_bpfptr(attr->fd_array, uattr.is_kernel); 19355 is_priv = bpf_capable(); 19356 19357 bpf_get_btf_vmlinux(); 19358 19359 /* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */ 19360 if (!is_priv) 19361 mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 19362 19363 /* user could have requested verbose verifier output 19364 * and supplied buffer to store the verification trace 19365 */ 19366 ret = bpf_vlog_init(&env->log, attr->log_level, 19367 (char __user *) (unsigned long) attr->log_buf, 19368 attr->log_size); 19369 if (ret) 19370 goto err_unlock; 19371 19372 mark_verifier_state_clean(env); 19373 19374 if (IS_ERR(btf_vmlinux)) { 19375 /* Either gcc or pahole or kernel are broken. */ 19376 verbose(env, "in-kernel BTF is malformed\n"); 19377 ret = PTR_ERR(btf_vmlinux); 19378 goto skip_full_check; 19379 } 19380 19381 env->strict_alignment = !!(attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT); 19382 if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS)) 19383 env->strict_alignment = true; 19384 if (attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_ANY_ALIGNMENT) 19385 env->strict_alignment = false; 19386 19387 env->allow_ptr_leaks = bpf_allow_ptr_leaks(); 19388 env->allow_uninit_stack = bpf_allow_uninit_stack(); 19389 env->bypass_spec_v1 = bpf_bypass_spec_v1(); 19390 env->bypass_spec_v4 = bpf_bypass_spec_v4(); 19391 env->bpf_capable = bpf_capable(); 19392 19393 if (is_priv) 19394 env->test_state_freq = attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ; 19395 19396 env->explored_states = kvcalloc(state_htab_size(env), 19397 sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list *), 19398 GFP_USER); 19399 ret = -ENOMEM; 19400 if (!env->explored_states) 19401 goto skip_full_check; 19402 19403 ret = add_subprog_and_kfunc(env); 19404 if (ret < 0) 19405 goto skip_full_check; 19406 19407 ret = check_subprogs(env); 19408 if (ret < 0) 19409 goto skip_full_check; 19410 19411 ret = check_btf_info(env, attr, uattr); 19412 if (ret < 0) 19413 goto skip_full_check; 19414 19415 ret = check_attach_btf_id(env); 19416 if (ret) 19417 goto skip_full_check; 19418 19419 ret = resolve_pseudo_ldimm64(env); 19420 if (ret < 0) 19421 goto skip_full_check; 19422 19423 if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) { 19424 ret = bpf_prog_offload_verifier_prep(env->prog); 19425 if (ret) 19426 goto skip_full_check; 19427 } 19428 19429 ret = check_cfg(env); 19430 if (ret < 0) 19431 goto skip_full_check; 19432 19433 ret = do_check_subprogs(env); 19434 ret = ret ?: do_check_main(env); 19435 19436 if (ret == 0 && bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) 19437 ret = bpf_prog_offload_finalize(env); 19438 19439 skip_full_check: 19440 kvfree(env->explored_states); 19441 19442 if (ret == 0) 19443 ret = check_max_stack_depth(env); 19444 19445 /* instruction rewrites happen after this point */ 19446 if (ret == 0) 19447 ret = optimize_bpf_loop(env); 19448 19449 if (is_priv) { 19450 if (ret == 0) 19451 opt_hard_wire_dead_code_branches(env); 19452 if (ret == 0) 19453 ret = opt_remove_dead_code(env); 19454 if (ret == 0) 19455 ret = opt_remove_nops(env); 19456 } else { 19457 if (ret == 0) 19458 sanitize_dead_code(env); 19459 } 19460 19461 if (ret == 0) 19462 /* program is valid, convert *(u32*)(ctx + off) accesses */ 19463 ret = convert_ctx_accesses(env); 19464 19465 if (ret == 0) 19466 ret = do_misc_fixups(env); 19467 19468 /* do 32-bit optimization after insn patching has done so those patched 19469 * insns could be handled correctly. 19470 */ 19471 if (ret == 0 && !bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) { 19472 ret = opt_subreg_zext_lo32_rnd_hi32(env, attr); 19473 env->prog->aux->verifier_zext = bpf_jit_needs_zext() ? !ret 19474 : false; 19475 } 19476 19477 if (ret == 0) 19478 ret = fixup_call_args(env); 19479 19480 env->verification_time = ktime_get_ns() - start_time; 19481 print_verification_stats(env); 19482 env->prog->aux->verified_insns = env->insn_processed; 19483 19484 /* preserve original error even if log finalization is successful */ 19485 err = bpf_vlog_finalize(&env->log, &log_true_size); 19486 if (err) 19487 ret = err; 19488 19489 if (uattr_size >= offsetofend(union bpf_attr, log_true_size) && 19490 copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr, offsetof(union bpf_attr, log_true_size), 19491 &log_true_size, sizeof(log_true_size))) { 19492 ret = -EFAULT; 19493 goto err_release_maps; 19494 } 19495 19496 if (ret) 19497 goto err_release_maps; 19498 19499 if (env->used_map_cnt) { 19500 /* if program passed verifier, update used_maps in bpf_prog_info */ 19501 env->prog->aux->used_maps = kmalloc_array(env->used_map_cnt, 19502 sizeof(env->used_maps[0]), 19503 GFP_KERNEL); 19504 19505 if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps) { 19506 ret = -ENOMEM; 19507 goto err_release_maps; 19508 } 19509 19510 memcpy(env->prog->aux->used_maps, env->used_maps, 19511 sizeof(env->used_maps[0]) * env->used_map_cnt); 19512 env->prog->aux->used_map_cnt = env->used_map_cnt; 19513 } 19514 if (env->used_btf_cnt) { 19515 /* if program passed verifier, update used_btfs in bpf_prog_aux */ 19516 env->prog->aux->used_btfs = kmalloc_array(env->used_btf_cnt, 19517 sizeof(env->used_btfs[0]), 19518 GFP_KERNEL); 19519 if (!env->prog->aux->used_btfs) { 19520 ret = -ENOMEM; 19521 goto err_release_maps; 19522 } 19523 19524 memcpy(env->prog->aux->used_btfs, env->used_btfs, 19525 sizeof(env->used_btfs[0]) * env->used_btf_cnt); 19526 env->prog->aux->used_btf_cnt = env->used_btf_cnt; 19527 } 19528 if (env->used_map_cnt || env->used_btf_cnt) { 19529 /* program is valid. Convert pseudo bpf_ld_imm64 into generic 19530 * bpf_ld_imm64 instructions 19531 */ 19532 convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(env); 19533 } 19534 19535 adjust_btf_func(env); 19536 19537 err_release_maps: 19538 if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps) 19539 /* if we didn't copy map pointers into bpf_prog_info, release 19540 * them now. Otherwise free_used_maps() will release them. 19541 */ 19542 release_maps(env); 19543 if (!env->prog->aux->used_btfs) 19544 release_btfs(env); 19545 19546 /* extension progs temporarily inherit the attach_type of their targets 19547 for verification purposes, so set it back to zero before returning 19548 */ 19549 if (env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) 19550 env->prog->expected_attach_type = 0; 19551 19552 *prog = env->prog; 19553 err_unlock: 19554 if (!is_priv) 19555 mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 19556 vfree(env->insn_aux_data); 19557 err_free_env: 19558 kfree(env); 19559 return ret; 19560 } 19561