1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only 2 /* Copyright (c) 2011-2014 PLUMgrid, http://plumgrid.com 3 * Copyright (c) 2016 Facebook 4 * Copyright (c) 2018 Covalent IO, Inc. http://covalent.io 5 */ 6 #include <uapi/linux/btf.h> 7 #include <linux/bpf-cgroup.h> 8 #include <linux/kernel.h> 9 #include <linux/types.h> 10 #include <linux/slab.h> 11 #include <linux/bpf.h> 12 #include <linux/btf.h> 13 #include <linux/bpf_verifier.h> 14 #include <linux/filter.h> 15 #include <net/netlink.h> 16 #include <linux/file.h> 17 #include <linux/vmalloc.h> 18 #include <linux/stringify.h> 19 #include <linux/bsearch.h> 20 #include <linux/sort.h> 21 #include <linux/perf_event.h> 22 #include <linux/ctype.h> 23 #include <linux/error-injection.h> 24 #include <linux/bpf_lsm.h> 25 #include <linux/btf_ids.h> 26 #include <linux/poison.h> 27 28 #include "disasm.h" 29 30 static const struct bpf_verifier_ops * const bpf_verifier_ops[] = { 31 #define BPF_PROG_TYPE(_id, _name, prog_ctx_type, kern_ctx_type) \ 32 [_id] = & _name ## _verifier_ops, 33 #define BPF_MAP_TYPE(_id, _ops) 34 #define BPF_LINK_TYPE(_id, _name) 35 #include <linux/bpf_types.h> 36 #undef BPF_PROG_TYPE 37 #undef BPF_MAP_TYPE 38 #undef BPF_LINK_TYPE 39 }; 40 41 /* bpf_check() is a static code analyzer that walks eBPF program 42 * instruction by instruction and updates register/stack state. 43 * All paths of conditional branches are analyzed until 'bpf_exit' insn. 44 * 45 * The first pass is depth-first-search to check that the program is a DAG. 46 * It rejects the following programs: 47 * - larger than BPF_MAXINSNS insns 48 * - if loop is present (detected via back-edge) 49 * - unreachable insns exist (shouldn't be a forest. program = one function) 50 * - out of bounds or malformed jumps 51 * The second pass is all possible path descent from the 1st insn. 52 * Since it's analyzing all paths through the program, the length of the 53 * analysis is limited to 64k insn, which may be hit even if total number of 54 * insn is less then 4K, but there are too many branches that change stack/regs. 55 * Number of 'branches to be analyzed' is limited to 1k 56 * 57 * On entry to each instruction, each register has a type, and the instruction 58 * changes the types of the registers depending on instruction semantics. 59 * If instruction is BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_5), then type of R5 is 60 * copied to R1. 61 * 62 * All registers are 64-bit. 63 * R0 - return register 64 * R1-R5 argument passing registers 65 * R6-R9 callee saved registers 66 * R10 - frame pointer read-only 67 * 68 * At the start of BPF program the register R1 contains a pointer to bpf_context 69 * and has type PTR_TO_CTX. 70 * 71 * Verifier tracks arithmetic operations on pointers in case: 72 * BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10), 73 * BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -20), 74 * 1st insn copies R10 (which has FRAME_PTR) type into R1 75 * and 2nd arithmetic instruction is pattern matched to recognize 76 * that it wants to construct a pointer to some element within stack. 77 * So after 2nd insn, the register R1 has type PTR_TO_STACK 78 * (and -20 constant is saved for further stack bounds checking). 79 * Meaning that this reg is a pointer to stack plus known immediate constant. 80 * 81 * Most of the time the registers have SCALAR_VALUE type, which 82 * means the register has some value, but it's not a valid pointer. 83 * (like pointer plus pointer becomes SCALAR_VALUE type) 84 * 85 * When verifier sees load or store instructions the type of base register 86 * can be: PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_CTX, PTR_TO_STACK, PTR_TO_SOCKET. These are 87 * four pointer types recognized by check_mem_access() function. 88 * 89 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE means that this register is pointing to 'map element value' 90 * and the range of [ptr, ptr + map's value_size) is accessible. 91 * 92 * registers used to pass values to function calls are checked against 93 * function argument constraints. 94 * 95 * ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY is one of such argument constraints. 96 * It means that the register type passed to this function must be 97 * PTR_TO_STACK and it will be used inside the function as 98 * 'pointer to map element key' 99 * 100 * For example the argument constraints for bpf_map_lookup_elem(): 101 * .ret_type = RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, 102 * .arg1_type = ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR, 103 * .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, 104 * 105 * ret_type says that this function returns 'pointer to map elem value or null' 106 * function expects 1st argument to be a const pointer to 'struct bpf_map' and 107 * 2nd argument should be a pointer to stack, which will be used inside 108 * the helper function as a pointer to map element key. 109 * 110 * On the kernel side the helper function looks like: 111 * u64 bpf_map_lookup_elem(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5) 112 * { 113 * struct bpf_map *map = (struct bpf_map *) (unsigned long) r1; 114 * void *key = (void *) (unsigned long) r2; 115 * void *value; 116 * 117 * here kernel can access 'key' and 'map' pointers safely, knowing that 118 * [key, key + map->key_size) bytes are valid and were initialized on 119 * the stack of eBPF program. 120 * } 121 * 122 * Corresponding eBPF program may look like: 123 * BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), // after this insn R2 type is FRAME_PTR 124 * BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -4), // after this insn R2 type is PTR_TO_STACK 125 * BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, map_fd), // after this insn R1 type is CONST_PTR_TO_MAP 126 * BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), 127 * here verifier looks at prototype of map_lookup_elem() and sees: 128 * .arg1_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR and R1->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP, which is ok, 129 * Now verifier knows that this map has key of R1->map_ptr->key_size bytes 130 * 131 * Then .arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY and R2->type == PTR_TO_STACK, ok so far, 132 * Now verifier checks that [R2, R2 + map's key_size) are within stack limits 133 * and were initialized prior to this call. 134 * If it's ok, then verifier allows this BPF_CALL insn and looks at 135 * .ret_type which is RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, so it sets 136 * R0->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL which means bpf_map_lookup_elem() function 137 * returns either pointer to map value or NULL. 138 * 139 * When type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL passes through 'if (reg != 0) goto +off' 140 * insn, the register holding that pointer in the true branch changes state to 141 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE and the same register changes state to CONST_IMM in the false 142 * branch. See check_cond_jmp_op(). 143 * 144 * After the call R0 is set to return type of the function and registers R1-R5 145 * are set to NOT_INIT to indicate that they are no longer readable. 146 * 147 * The following reference types represent a potential reference to a kernel 148 * resource which, after first being allocated, must be checked and freed by 149 * the BPF program: 150 * - PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL, PTR_TO_SOCKET 151 * 152 * When the verifier sees a helper call return a reference type, it allocates a 153 * pointer id for the reference and stores it in the current function state. 154 * Similar to the way that PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL is converted into 155 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL becomes PTR_TO_SOCKET when the type 156 * passes through a NULL-check conditional. For the branch wherein the state is 157 * changed to CONST_IMM, the verifier releases the reference. 158 * 159 * For each helper function that allocates a reference, such as 160 * bpf_sk_lookup_tcp(), there is a corresponding release function, such as 161 * bpf_sk_release(). When a reference type passes into the release function, 162 * the verifier also releases the reference. If any unchecked or unreleased 163 * reference remains at the end of the program, the verifier rejects it. 164 */ 165 166 /* verifier_state + insn_idx are pushed to stack when branch is encountered */ 167 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem { 168 /* verifer state is 'st' 169 * before processing instruction 'insn_idx' 170 * and after processing instruction 'prev_insn_idx' 171 */ 172 struct bpf_verifier_state st; 173 int insn_idx; 174 int prev_insn_idx; 175 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *next; 176 /* length of verifier log at the time this state was pushed on stack */ 177 u32 log_pos; 178 }; 179 180 #define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ 8192 181 #define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES 64 182 183 #define BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON (1ULL << 63) 184 #define BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN (1ULL << 62) 185 186 #define BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV 1UL 187 #define BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON ((void *)((0xeB9FUL << 1) + \ 188 POISON_POINTER_DELTA)) 189 #define BPF_MAP_PTR(X) ((struct bpf_map *)((X) & ~BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV)) 190 191 static int acquire_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx); 192 static int release_reference(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int ref_obj_id); 193 194 static bool bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 195 { 196 return BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state) == BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON; 197 } 198 199 static bool bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 200 { 201 return aux->map_ptr_state & BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV; 202 } 203 204 static void bpf_map_ptr_store(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, 205 const struct bpf_map *map, bool unpriv) 206 { 207 BUILD_BUG_ON((unsigned long)BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON & BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV); 208 unpriv |= bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux); 209 aux->map_ptr_state = (unsigned long)map | 210 (unpriv ? BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV : 0UL); 211 } 212 213 static bool bpf_map_key_poisoned(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 214 { 215 return aux->map_key_state & BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON; 216 } 217 218 static bool bpf_map_key_unseen(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 219 { 220 return !(aux->map_key_state & BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN); 221 } 222 223 static u64 bpf_map_key_immediate(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 224 { 225 return aux->map_key_state & ~(BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN | BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON); 226 } 227 228 static void bpf_map_key_store(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, u64 state) 229 { 230 bool poisoned = bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux); 231 232 aux->map_key_state = state | BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN | 233 (poisoned ? BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON : 0ULL); 234 } 235 236 static bool bpf_pseudo_call(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 237 { 238 return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 239 insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL; 240 } 241 242 static bool bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 243 { 244 return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 245 insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL; 246 } 247 248 struct bpf_call_arg_meta { 249 struct bpf_map *map_ptr; 250 bool raw_mode; 251 bool pkt_access; 252 u8 release_regno; 253 int regno; 254 int access_size; 255 int mem_size; 256 u64 msize_max_value; 257 int ref_obj_id; 258 int dynptr_id; 259 int map_uid; 260 int func_id; 261 struct btf *btf; 262 u32 btf_id; 263 struct btf *ret_btf; 264 u32 ret_btf_id; 265 u32 subprogno; 266 struct btf_field *kptr_field; 267 u8 uninit_dynptr_regno; 268 }; 269 270 struct btf *btf_vmlinux; 271 272 static DEFINE_MUTEX(bpf_verifier_lock); 273 274 static const struct bpf_line_info * 275 find_linfo(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 insn_off) 276 { 277 const struct bpf_line_info *linfo; 278 const struct bpf_prog *prog; 279 u32 i, nr_linfo; 280 281 prog = env->prog; 282 nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; 283 284 if (!nr_linfo || insn_off >= prog->len) 285 return NULL; 286 287 linfo = prog->aux->linfo; 288 for (i = 1; i < nr_linfo; i++) 289 if (insn_off < linfo[i].insn_off) 290 break; 291 292 return &linfo[i - 1]; 293 } 294 295 void bpf_verifier_vlog(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, const char *fmt, 296 va_list args) 297 { 298 unsigned int n; 299 300 n = vscnprintf(log->kbuf, BPF_VERIFIER_TMP_LOG_SIZE, fmt, args); 301 302 WARN_ONCE(n >= BPF_VERIFIER_TMP_LOG_SIZE - 1, 303 "verifier log line truncated - local buffer too short\n"); 304 305 if (log->level == BPF_LOG_KERNEL) { 306 bool newline = n > 0 && log->kbuf[n - 1] == '\n'; 307 308 pr_err("BPF: %s%s", log->kbuf, newline ? "" : "\n"); 309 return; 310 } 311 312 n = min(log->len_total - log->len_used - 1, n); 313 log->kbuf[n] = '\0'; 314 if (!copy_to_user(log->ubuf + log->len_used, log->kbuf, n + 1)) 315 log->len_used += n; 316 else 317 log->ubuf = NULL; 318 } 319 320 static void bpf_vlog_reset(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, u32 new_pos) 321 { 322 char zero = 0; 323 324 if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(log)) 325 return; 326 327 log->len_used = new_pos; 328 if (put_user(zero, log->ubuf + new_pos)) 329 log->ubuf = NULL; 330 } 331 332 /* log_level controls verbosity level of eBPF verifier. 333 * bpf_verifier_log_write() is used to dump the verification trace to the log, 334 * so the user can figure out what's wrong with the program 335 */ 336 __printf(2, 3) void bpf_verifier_log_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 337 const char *fmt, ...) 338 { 339 va_list args; 340 341 if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(&env->log)) 342 return; 343 344 va_start(args, fmt); 345 bpf_verifier_vlog(&env->log, fmt, args); 346 va_end(args); 347 } 348 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_verifier_log_write); 349 350 __printf(2, 3) static void verbose(void *private_data, const char *fmt, ...) 351 { 352 struct bpf_verifier_env *env = private_data; 353 va_list args; 354 355 if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(&env->log)) 356 return; 357 358 va_start(args, fmt); 359 bpf_verifier_vlog(&env->log, fmt, args); 360 va_end(args); 361 } 362 363 __printf(2, 3) void bpf_log(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, 364 const char *fmt, ...) 365 { 366 va_list args; 367 368 if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(log)) 369 return; 370 371 va_start(args, fmt); 372 bpf_verifier_vlog(log, fmt, args); 373 va_end(args); 374 } 375 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_log); 376 377 static const char *ltrim(const char *s) 378 { 379 while (isspace(*s)) 380 s++; 381 382 return s; 383 } 384 385 __printf(3, 4) static void verbose_linfo(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 386 u32 insn_off, 387 const char *prefix_fmt, ...) 388 { 389 const struct bpf_line_info *linfo; 390 391 if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(&env->log)) 392 return; 393 394 linfo = find_linfo(env, insn_off); 395 if (!linfo || linfo == env->prev_linfo) 396 return; 397 398 if (prefix_fmt) { 399 va_list args; 400 401 va_start(args, prefix_fmt); 402 bpf_verifier_vlog(&env->log, prefix_fmt, args); 403 va_end(args); 404 } 405 406 verbose(env, "%s\n", 407 ltrim(btf_name_by_offset(env->prog->aux->btf, 408 linfo->line_off))); 409 410 env->prev_linfo = linfo; 411 } 412 413 static void verbose_invalid_scalar(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 414 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 415 struct tnum *range, const char *ctx, 416 const char *reg_name) 417 { 418 char tn_buf[48]; 419 420 verbose(env, "At %s the register %s ", ctx, reg_name); 421 if (!tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off)) { 422 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 423 verbose(env, "has value %s", tn_buf); 424 } else { 425 verbose(env, "has unknown scalar value"); 426 } 427 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), *range); 428 verbose(env, " should have been in %s\n", tn_buf); 429 } 430 431 static bool type_is_pkt_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type) 432 { 433 type = base_type(type); 434 return type == PTR_TO_PACKET || 435 type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META; 436 } 437 438 static bool type_is_sk_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type) 439 { 440 return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET || 441 type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON || 442 type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK || 443 type == PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK; 444 } 445 446 static bool reg_type_not_null(enum bpf_reg_type type) 447 { 448 return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET || 449 type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK || 450 type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE || 451 type == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY || 452 type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON; 453 } 454 455 static bool type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(u32 type) 456 { 457 return base_type(type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID && type_flag(type) & MEM_ALLOC; 458 } 459 460 static struct btf_record *reg_btf_record(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 461 { 462 struct btf_record *rec = NULL; 463 struct btf_struct_meta *meta; 464 465 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 466 rec = reg->map_ptr->record; 467 } else if (type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(reg->type)) { 468 meta = btf_find_struct_meta(reg->btf, reg->btf_id); 469 if (meta) 470 rec = meta->record; 471 } 472 return rec; 473 } 474 475 static bool reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 476 { 477 return btf_record_has_field(reg_btf_record(reg), BPF_SPIN_LOCK); 478 } 479 480 static bool type_is_rdonly_mem(u32 type) 481 { 482 return type & MEM_RDONLY; 483 } 484 485 static bool type_may_be_null(u32 type) 486 { 487 return type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 488 } 489 490 static bool is_acquire_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id, 491 const struct bpf_map *map) 492 { 493 enum bpf_map_type map_type = map ? map->map_type : BPF_MAP_TYPE_UNSPEC; 494 495 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_tcp || 496 func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_udp || 497 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_lookup_tcp || 498 func_id == BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve || 499 func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) 500 return true; 501 502 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 503 (map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP || 504 map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH)) 505 return true; 506 507 return false; 508 } 509 510 static bool is_ptr_cast_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 511 { 512 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_tcp_sock || 513 func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_fullsock || 514 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_sock || 515 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp6_sock || 516 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_udp6_sock || 517 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_mptcp_sock || 518 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_timewait_sock || 519 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_request_sock; 520 } 521 522 static bool is_dynptr_ref_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 523 { 524 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_dynptr_data; 525 } 526 527 static bool is_callback_calling_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 528 { 529 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem || 530 func_id == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback || 531 func_id == BPF_FUNC_find_vma || 532 func_id == BPF_FUNC_loop || 533 func_id == BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain; 534 } 535 536 static bool is_storage_get_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 537 { 538 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get || 539 func_id == BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get || 540 func_id == BPF_FUNC_task_storage_get || 541 func_id == BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_get; 542 } 543 544 static bool helper_multiple_ref_obj_use(enum bpf_func_id func_id, 545 const struct bpf_map *map) 546 { 547 int ref_obj_uses = 0; 548 549 if (is_ptr_cast_function(func_id)) 550 ref_obj_uses++; 551 if (is_acquire_function(func_id, map)) 552 ref_obj_uses++; 553 if (is_dynptr_ref_function(func_id)) 554 ref_obj_uses++; 555 556 return ref_obj_uses > 1; 557 } 558 559 static bool is_cmpxchg_insn(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 560 { 561 return BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX && 562 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC && 563 insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG; 564 } 565 566 /* string representation of 'enum bpf_reg_type' 567 * 568 * Note that reg_type_str() can not appear more than once in a single verbose() 569 * statement. 570 */ 571 static const char *reg_type_str(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 572 enum bpf_reg_type type) 573 { 574 char postfix[16] = {0}, prefix[64] = {0}; 575 static const char * const str[] = { 576 [NOT_INIT] = "?", 577 [SCALAR_VALUE] = "scalar", 578 [PTR_TO_CTX] = "ctx", 579 [CONST_PTR_TO_MAP] = "map_ptr", 580 [PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE] = "map_value", 581 [PTR_TO_STACK] = "fp", 582 [PTR_TO_PACKET] = "pkt", 583 [PTR_TO_PACKET_META] = "pkt_meta", 584 [PTR_TO_PACKET_END] = "pkt_end", 585 [PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS] = "flow_keys", 586 [PTR_TO_SOCKET] = "sock", 587 [PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON] = "sock_common", 588 [PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK] = "tcp_sock", 589 [PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER] = "tp_buffer", 590 [PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK] = "xdp_sock", 591 [PTR_TO_BTF_ID] = "ptr_", 592 [PTR_TO_MEM] = "mem", 593 [PTR_TO_BUF] = "buf", 594 [PTR_TO_FUNC] = "func", 595 [PTR_TO_MAP_KEY] = "map_key", 596 [CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR] = "dynptr_ptr", 597 }; 598 599 if (type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL) { 600 if (base_type(type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) 601 strncpy(postfix, "or_null_", 16); 602 else 603 strncpy(postfix, "_or_null", 16); 604 } 605 606 snprintf(prefix, sizeof(prefix), "%s%s%s%s%s%s%s", 607 type & MEM_RDONLY ? "rdonly_" : "", 608 type & MEM_RINGBUF ? "ringbuf_" : "", 609 type & MEM_USER ? "user_" : "", 610 type & MEM_PERCPU ? "percpu_" : "", 611 type & MEM_RCU ? "rcu_" : "", 612 type & PTR_UNTRUSTED ? "untrusted_" : "", 613 type & PTR_TRUSTED ? "trusted_" : "" 614 ); 615 616 snprintf(env->type_str_buf, TYPE_STR_BUF_LEN, "%s%s%s", 617 prefix, str[base_type(type)], postfix); 618 return env->type_str_buf; 619 } 620 621 static char slot_type_char[] = { 622 [STACK_INVALID] = '?', 623 [STACK_SPILL] = 'r', 624 [STACK_MISC] = 'm', 625 [STACK_ZERO] = '0', 626 [STACK_DYNPTR] = 'd', 627 }; 628 629 static void print_liveness(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 630 enum bpf_reg_liveness live) 631 { 632 if (live & (REG_LIVE_READ | REG_LIVE_WRITTEN | REG_LIVE_DONE)) 633 verbose(env, "_"); 634 if (live & REG_LIVE_READ) 635 verbose(env, "r"); 636 if (live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN) 637 verbose(env, "w"); 638 if (live & REG_LIVE_DONE) 639 verbose(env, "D"); 640 } 641 642 static int __get_spi(s32 off) 643 { 644 return (-off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE; 645 } 646 647 static struct bpf_func_state *func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 648 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 649 { 650 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 651 652 return cur->frame[reg->frameno]; 653 } 654 655 static bool is_spi_bounds_valid(struct bpf_func_state *state, int spi, int nr_slots) 656 { 657 int allocated_slots = state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; 658 659 /* We need to check that slots between [spi - nr_slots + 1, spi] are 660 * within [0, allocated_stack). 661 * 662 * Please note that the spi grows downwards. For example, a dynptr 663 * takes the size of two stack slots; the first slot will be at 664 * spi and the second slot will be at spi - 1. 665 */ 666 return spi - nr_slots + 1 >= 0 && spi < allocated_slots; 667 } 668 669 static int dynptr_get_spi(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 670 { 671 int off, spi; 672 673 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 674 verbose(env, "dynptr has to be at a constant offset\n"); 675 return -EINVAL; 676 } 677 678 off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; 679 if (off % BPF_REG_SIZE) { 680 verbose(env, "cannot pass in dynptr at an offset=%d\n", off); 681 return -EINVAL; 682 } 683 684 spi = __get_spi(off); 685 if (spi < 1) { 686 verbose(env, "cannot pass in dynptr at an offset=%d\n", off); 687 return -EINVAL; 688 } 689 690 if (!is_spi_bounds_valid(func(env, reg), spi, BPF_DYNPTR_NR_SLOTS)) 691 return -ERANGE; 692 return spi; 693 } 694 695 static const char *kernel_type_name(const struct btf* btf, u32 id) 696 { 697 return btf_name_by_offset(btf, btf_type_by_id(btf, id)->name_off); 698 } 699 700 static void mark_reg_scratched(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno) 701 { 702 env->scratched_regs |= 1U << regno; 703 } 704 705 static void mark_stack_slot_scratched(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 spi) 706 { 707 env->scratched_stack_slots |= 1ULL << spi; 708 } 709 710 static bool reg_scratched(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno) 711 { 712 return (env->scratched_regs >> regno) & 1; 713 } 714 715 static bool stack_slot_scratched(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u64 regno) 716 { 717 return (env->scratched_stack_slots >> regno) & 1; 718 } 719 720 static bool verifier_state_scratched(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 721 { 722 return env->scratched_regs || env->scratched_stack_slots; 723 } 724 725 static void mark_verifier_state_clean(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 726 { 727 env->scratched_regs = 0U; 728 env->scratched_stack_slots = 0ULL; 729 } 730 731 /* Used for printing the entire verifier state. */ 732 static void mark_verifier_state_scratched(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 733 { 734 env->scratched_regs = ~0U; 735 env->scratched_stack_slots = ~0ULL; 736 } 737 738 static enum bpf_dynptr_type arg_to_dynptr_type(enum bpf_arg_type arg_type) 739 { 740 switch (arg_type & DYNPTR_TYPE_FLAG_MASK) { 741 case DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL: 742 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL; 743 case DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF: 744 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF; 745 default: 746 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID; 747 } 748 } 749 750 static bool dynptr_type_refcounted(enum bpf_dynptr_type type) 751 { 752 return type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF; 753 } 754 755 static void __mark_dynptr_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 756 enum bpf_dynptr_type type, 757 bool first_slot, int dynptr_id); 758 759 static void __mark_reg_not_init(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 760 struct bpf_reg_state *reg); 761 762 static void mark_dynptr_stack_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 763 struct bpf_reg_state *sreg1, 764 struct bpf_reg_state *sreg2, 765 enum bpf_dynptr_type type) 766 { 767 int id = ++env->id_gen; 768 769 __mark_dynptr_reg(sreg1, type, true, id); 770 __mark_dynptr_reg(sreg2, type, false, id); 771 } 772 773 static void mark_dynptr_cb_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 774 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 775 enum bpf_dynptr_type type) 776 { 777 __mark_dynptr_reg(reg, type, true, ++env->id_gen); 778 } 779 780 static int destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 781 struct bpf_func_state *state, int spi); 782 783 static int mark_stack_slots_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 784 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type, int insn_idx) 785 { 786 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 787 enum bpf_dynptr_type type; 788 int spi, i, id, err; 789 790 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 791 if (spi < 0) 792 return spi; 793 794 /* We cannot assume both spi and spi - 1 belong to the same dynptr, 795 * hence we need to call destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot twice for both, 796 * to ensure that for the following example: 797 * [d1][d1][d2][d2] 798 * spi 3 2 1 0 799 * So marking spi = 2 should lead to destruction of both d1 and d2. In 800 * case they do belong to same dynptr, second call won't see slot_type 801 * as STACK_DYNPTR and will simply skip destruction. 802 */ 803 err = destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(env, state, spi); 804 if (err) 805 return err; 806 err = destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(env, state, spi - 1); 807 if (err) 808 return err; 809 810 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 811 state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_DYNPTR; 812 state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] = STACK_DYNPTR; 813 } 814 815 type = arg_to_dynptr_type(arg_type); 816 if (type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID) 817 return -EINVAL; 818 819 mark_dynptr_stack_regs(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, 820 &state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr, type); 821 822 if (dynptr_type_refcounted(type)) { 823 /* The id is used to track proper releasing */ 824 id = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx); 825 if (id < 0) 826 return id; 827 828 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id = id; 829 state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id = id; 830 } 831 832 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 833 state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 834 835 return 0; 836 } 837 838 static int unmark_stack_slots_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 839 { 840 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 841 int spi, i; 842 843 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 844 if (spi < 0) 845 return spi; 846 847 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 848 state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID; 849 state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID; 850 } 851 852 /* Invalidate any slices associated with this dynptr */ 853 if (dynptr_type_refcounted(state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type)) 854 WARN_ON_ONCE(release_reference(env, state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id)); 855 856 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr); 857 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr); 858 859 /* Why do we need to set REG_LIVE_WRITTEN for STACK_INVALID slot? 860 * 861 * While we don't allow reading STACK_INVALID, it is still possible to 862 * do <8 byte writes marking some but not all slots as STACK_MISC. Then, 863 * helpers or insns can do partial read of that part without failing, 864 * but check_stack_range_initialized, check_stack_read_var_off, and 865 * check_stack_read_fixed_off will do mark_reg_read for all 8-bytes of 866 * the slot conservatively. Hence we need to prevent those liveness 867 * marking walks. 868 * 869 * This was not a problem before because STACK_INVALID is only set by 870 * default (where the default reg state has its reg->parent as NULL), or 871 * in clean_live_states after REG_LIVE_DONE (at which point 872 * mark_reg_read won't walk reg->parent chain), but not randomly during 873 * verifier state exploration (like we did above). Hence, for our case 874 * parentage chain will still be live (i.e. reg->parent may be 875 * non-NULL), while earlier reg->parent was NULL, so we need 876 * REG_LIVE_WRITTEN to screen off read marker propagation when it is 877 * done later on reads or by mark_dynptr_read as well to unnecessary 878 * mark registers in verifier state. 879 */ 880 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 881 state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 882 883 return 0; 884 } 885 886 static void __mark_reg_unknown(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 887 struct bpf_reg_state *reg); 888 889 static int destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 890 struct bpf_func_state *state, int spi) 891 { 892 struct bpf_func_state *fstate; 893 struct bpf_reg_state *dreg; 894 int i, dynptr_id; 895 896 /* We always ensure that STACK_DYNPTR is never set partially, 897 * hence just checking for slot_type[0] is enough. This is 898 * different for STACK_SPILL, where it may be only set for 899 * 1 byte, so code has to use is_spilled_reg. 900 */ 901 if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] != STACK_DYNPTR) 902 return 0; 903 904 /* Reposition spi to first slot */ 905 if (!state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.first_slot) 906 spi = spi + 1; 907 908 if (dynptr_type_refcounted(state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type)) { 909 verbose(env, "cannot overwrite referenced dynptr\n"); 910 return -EINVAL; 911 } 912 913 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi); 914 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi - 1); 915 916 /* Writing partially to one dynptr stack slot destroys both. */ 917 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 918 state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID; 919 state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID; 920 } 921 922 dynptr_id = state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.id; 923 /* Invalidate any slices associated with this dynptr */ 924 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, fstate, dreg, ({ 925 /* Dynptr slices are only PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL and PTR_TO_MEM */ 926 if (dreg->type != (PTR_TO_MEM | PTR_MAYBE_NULL) && dreg->type != PTR_TO_MEM) 927 continue; 928 if (dreg->dynptr_id == dynptr_id) { 929 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) 930 __mark_reg_not_init(env, dreg); 931 else 932 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dreg); 933 } 934 })); 935 936 /* Do not release reference state, we are destroying dynptr on stack, 937 * not using some helper to release it. Just reset register. 938 */ 939 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr); 940 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr); 941 942 /* Same reason as unmark_stack_slots_dynptr above */ 943 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 944 state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 945 946 return 0; 947 } 948 949 static bool is_dynptr_reg_valid_uninit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 950 int spi) 951 { 952 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 953 return false; 954 955 /* For -ERANGE (i.e. spi not falling into allocated stack slots), we 956 * will do check_mem_access to check and update stack bounds later, so 957 * return true for that case. 958 */ 959 if (spi < 0) 960 return spi == -ERANGE; 961 /* We allow overwriting existing unreferenced STACK_DYNPTR slots, see 962 * mark_stack_slots_dynptr which calls destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot to 963 * ensure dynptr objects at the slots we are touching are completely 964 * destructed before we reinitialize them for a new one. For referenced 965 * ones, destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot returns an error early instead of 966 * delaying it until the end where the user will get "Unreleased 967 * reference" error. 968 */ 969 return true; 970 } 971 972 static bool is_dynptr_reg_valid_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 973 int spi) 974 { 975 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 976 int i; 977 978 /* This already represents first slot of initialized bpf_dynptr */ 979 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 980 return true; 981 982 if (spi < 0) 983 return false; 984 if (!state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.first_slot) 985 return false; 986 987 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 988 if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] != STACK_DYNPTR || 989 state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] != STACK_DYNPTR) 990 return false; 991 } 992 993 return true; 994 } 995 996 static bool is_dynptr_type_expected(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 997 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type) 998 { 999 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 1000 enum bpf_dynptr_type dynptr_type; 1001 int spi; 1002 1003 /* ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR takes any type of dynptr */ 1004 if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 1005 return true; 1006 1007 dynptr_type = arg_to_dynptr_type(arg_type); 1008 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) { 1009 return reg->dynptr.type == dynptr_type; 1010 } else { 1011 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 1012 if (spi < 0) 1013 return false; 1014 return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type == dynptr_type; 1015 } 1016 } 1017 1018 /* The reg state of a pointer or a bounded scalar was saved when 1019 * it was spilled to the stack. 1020 */ 1021 static bool is_spilled_reg(const struct bpf_stack_state *stack) 1022 { 1023 return stack->slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE - 1] == STACK_SPILL; 1024 } 1025 1026 static void scrub_spilled_slot(u8 *stype) 1027 { 1028 if (*stype != STACK_INVALID) 1029 *stype = STACK_MISC; 1030 } 1031 1032 static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1033 const struct bpf_func_state *state, 1034 bool print_all) 1035 { 1036 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 1037 enum bpf_reg_type t; 1038 int i; 1039 1040 if (state->frameno) 1041 verbose(env, " frame%d:", state->frameno); 1042 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) { 1043 reg = &state->regs[i]; 1044 t = reg->type; 1045 if (t == NOT_INIT) 1046 continue; 1047 if (!print_all && !reg_scratched(env, i)) 1048 continue; 1049 verbose(env, " R%d", i); 1050 print_liveness(env, reg->live); 1051 verbose(env, "="); 1052 if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->precise) 1053 verbose(env, "P"); 1054 if ((t == SCALAR_VALUE || t == PTR_TO_STACK) && 1055 tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 1056 /* reg->off should be 0 for SCALAR_VALUE */ 1057 verbose(env, "%s", t == SCALAR_VALUE ? "" : reg_type_str(env, t)); 1058 verbose(env, "%lld", reg->var_off.value + reg->off); 1059 } else { 1060 const char *sep = ""; 1061 1062 verbose(env, "%s", reg_type_str(env, t)); 1063 if (base_type(t) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) 1064 verbose(env, "%s", kernel_type_name(reg->btf, reg->btf_id)); 1065 verbose(env, "("); 1066 /* 1067 * _a stands for append, was shortened to avoid multiline statements below. 1068 * This macro is used to output a comma separated list of attributes. 1069 */ 1070 #define verbose_a(fmt, ...) ({ verbose(env, "%s" fmt, sep, __VA_ARGS__); sep = ","; }) 1071 1072 if (reg->id) 1073 verbose_a("id=%d", reg->id); 1074 if (reg->ref_obj_id) 1075 verbose_a("ref_obj_id=%d", reg->ref_obj_id); 1076 if (t != SCALAR_VALUE) 1077 verbose_a("off=%d", reg->off); 1078 if (type_is_pkt_pointer(t)) 1079 verbose_a("r=%d", reg->range); 1080 else if (base_type(t) == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP || 1081 base_type(t) == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY || 1082 base_type(t) == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) 1083 verbose_a("ks=%d,vs=%d", 1084 reg->map_ptr->key_size, 1085 reg->map_ptr->value_size); 1086 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 1087 /* Typically an immediate SCALAR_VALUE, but 1088 * could be a pointer whose offset is too big 1089 * for reg->off 1090 */ 1091 verbose_a("imm=%llx", reg->var_off.value); 1092 } else { 1093 if (reg->smin_value != reg->umin_value && 1094 reg->smin_value != S64_MIN) 1095 verbose_a("smin=%lld", (long long)reg->smin_value); 1096 if (reg->smax_value != reg->umax_value && 1097 reg->smax_value != S64_MAX) 1098 verbose_a("smax=%lld", (long long)reg->smax_value); 1099 if (reg->umin_value != 0) 1100 verbose_a("umin=%llu", (unsigned long long)reg->umin_value); 1101 if (reg->umax_value != U64_MAX) 1102 verbose_a("umax=%llu", (unsigned long long)reg->umax_value); 1103 if (!tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off)) { 1104 char tn_buf[48]; 1105 1106 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 1107 verbose_a("var_off=%s", tn_buf); 1108 } 1109 if (reg->s32_min_value != reg->smin_value && 1110 reg->s32_min_value != S32_MIN) 1111 verbose_a("s32_min=%d", (int)(reg->s32_min_value)); 1112 if (reg->s32_max_value != reg->smax_value && 1113 reg->s32_max_value != S32_MAX) 1114 verbose_a("s32_max=%d", (int)(reg->s32_max_value)); 1115 if (reg->u32_min_value != reg->umin_value && 1116 reg->u32_min_value != U32_MIN) 1117 verbose_a("u32_min=%d", (int)(reg->u32_min_value)); 1118 if (reg->u32_max_value != reg->umax_value && 1119 reg->u32_max_value != U32_MAX) 1120 verbose_a("u32_max=%d", (int)(reg->u32_max_value)); 1121 } 1122 #undef verbose_a 1123 1124 verbose(env, ")"); 1125 } 1126 } 1127 for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 1128 char types_buf[BPF_REG_SIZE + 1]; 1129 bool valid = false; 1130 int j; 1131 1132 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) { 1133 if (state->stack[i].slot_type[j] != STACK_INVALID) 1134 valid = true; 1135 types_buf[j] = slot_type_char[ 1136 state->stack[i].slot_type[j]]; 1137 } 1138 types_buf[BPF_REG_SIZE] = 0; 1139 if (!valid) 1140 continue; 1141 if (!print_all && !stack_slot_scratched(env, i)) 1142 continue; 1143 verbose(env, " fp%d", (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE); 1144 print_liveness(env, state->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live); 1145 if (is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[i])) { 1146 reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 1147 t = reg->type; 1148 verbose(env, "=%s", t == SCALAR_VALUE ? "" : reg_type_str(env, t)); 1149 if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->precise) 1150 verbose(env, "P"); 1151 if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 1152 verbose(env, "%lld", reg->var_off.value + reg->off); 1153 } else { 1154 verbose(env, "=%s", types_buf); 1155 } 1156 } 1157 if (state->acquired_refs && state->refs[0].id) { 1158 verbose(env, " refs=%d", state->refs[0].id); 1159 for (i = 1; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) 1160 if (state->refs[i].id) 1161 verbose(env, ",%d", state->refs[i].id); 1162 } 1163 if (state->in_callback_fn) 1164 verbose(env, " cb"); 1165 if (state->in_async_callback_fn) 1166 verbose(env, " async_cb"); 1167 verbose(env, "\n"); 1168 mark_verifier_state_clean(env); 1169 } 1170 1171 static inline u32 vlog_alignment(u32 pos) 1172 { 1173 return round_up(max(pos + BPF_LOG_MIN_ALIGNMENT / 2, BPF_LOG_ALIGNMENT), 1174 BPF_LOG_MIN_ALIGNMENT) - pos - 1; 1175 } 1176 1177 static void print_insn_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1178 const struct bpf_func_state *state) 1179 { 1180 if (env->prev_log_len && env->prev_log_len == env->log.len_used) { 1181 /* remove new line character */ 1182 bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, env->prev_log_len - 1); 1183 verbose(env, "%*c;", vlog_alignment(env->prev_insn_print_len), ' '); 1184 } else { 1185 verbose(env, "%d:", env->insn_idx); 1186 } 1187 print_verifier_state(env, state, false); 1188 } 1189 1190 /* copy array src of length n * size bytes to dst. dst is reallocated if it's too 1191 * small to hold src. This is different from krealloc since we don't want to preserve 1192 * the contents of dst. 1193 * 1194 * Leaves dst untouched if src is NULL or length is zero. Returns NULL if memory could 1195 * not be allocated. 1196 */ 1197 static void *copy_array(void *dst, const void *src, size_t n, size_t size, gfp_t flags) 1198 { 1199 size_t alloc_bytes; 1200 void *orig = dst; 1201 size_t bytes; 1202 1203 if (ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(src)) 1204 goto out; 1205 1206 if (unlikely(check_mul_overflow(n, size, &bytes))) 1207 return NULL; 1208 1209 alloc_bytes = max(ksize(orig), kmalloc_size_roundup(bytes)); 1210 dst = krealloc(orig, alloc_bytes, flags); 1211 if (!dst) { 1212 kfree(orig); 1213 return NULL; 1214 } 1215 1216 memcpy(dst, src, bytes); 1217 out: 1218 return dst ? dst : ZERO_SIZE_PTR; 1219 } 1220 1221 /* resize an array from old_n items to new_n items. the array is reallocated if it's too 1222 * small to hold new_n items. new items are zeroed out if the array grows. 1223 * 1224 * Contrary to krealloc_array, does not free arr if new_n is zero. 1225 */ 1226 static void *realloc_array(void *arr, size_t old_n, size_t new_n, size_t size) 1227 { 1228 size_t alloc_size; 1229 void *new_arr; 1230 1231 if (!new_n || old_n == new_n) 1232 goto out; 1233 1234 alloc_size = kmalloc_size_roundup(size_mul(new_n, size)); 1235 new_arr = krealloc(arr, alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL); 1236 if (!new_arr) { 1237 kfree(arr); 1238 return NULL; 1239 } 1240 arr = new_arr; 1241 1242 if (new_n > old_n) 1243 memset(arr + old_n * size, 0, (new_n - old_n) * size); 1244 1245 out: 1246 return arr ? arr : ZERO_SIZE_PTR; 1247 } 1248 1249 static int copy_reference_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, const struct bpf_func_state *src) 1250 { 1251 dst->refs = copy_array(dst->refs, src->refs, src->acquired_refs, 1252 sizeof(struct bpf_reference_state), GFP_KERNEL); 1253 if (!dst->refs) 1254 return -ENOMEM; 1255 1256 dst->acquired_refs = src->acquired_refs; 1257 return 0; 1258 } 1259 1260 static int copy_stack_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, const struct bpf_func_state *src) 1261 { 1262 size_t n = src->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; 1263 1264 dst->stack = copy_array(dst->stack, src->stack, n, sizeof(struct bpf_stack_state), 1265 GFP_KERNEL); 1266 if (!dst->stack) 1267 return -ENOMEM; 1268 1269 dst->allocated_stack = src->allocated_stack; 1270 return 0; 1271 } 1272 1273 static int resize_reference_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, size_t n) 1274 { 1275 state->refs = realloc_array(state->refs, state->acquired_refs, n, 1276 sizeof(struct bpf_reference_state)); 1277 if (!state->refs) 1278 return -ENOMEM; 1279 1280 state->acquired_refs = n; 1281 return 0; 1282 } 1283 1284 static int grow_stack_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, int size) 1285 { 1286 size_t old_n = state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE, n = size / BPF_REG_SIZE; 1287 1288 if (old_n >= n) 1289 return 0; 1290 1291 state->stack = realloc_array(state->stack, old_n, n, sizeof(struct bpf_stack_state)); 1292 if (!state->stack) 1293 return -ENOMEM; 1294 1295 state->allocated_stack = size; 1296 return 0; 1297 } 1298 1299 /* Acquire a pointer id from the env and update the state->refs to include 1300 * this new pointer reference. 1301 * On success, returns a valid pointer id to associate with the register 1302 * On failure, returns a negative errno. 1303 */ 1304 static int acquire_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 1305 { 1306 struct bpf_func_state *state = cur_func(env); 1307 int new_ofs = state->acquired_refs; 1308 int id, err; 1309 1310 err = resize_reference_state(state, state->acquired_refs + 1); 1311 if (err) 1312 return err; 1313 id = ++env->id_gen; 1314 state->refs[new_ofs].id = id; 1315 state->refs[new_ofs].insn_idx = insn_idx; 1316 state->refs[new_ofs].callback_ref = state->in_callback_fn ? state->frameno : 0; 1317 1318 return id; 1319 } 1320 1321 /* release function corresponding to acquire_reference_state(). Idempotent. */ 1322 static int release_reference_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, int ptr_id) 1323 { 1324 int i, last_idx; 1325 1326 last_idx = state->acquired_refs - 1; 1327 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) { 1328 if (state->refs[i].id == ptr_id) { 1329 /* Cannot release caller references in callbacks */ 1330 if (state->in_callback_fn && state->refs[i].callback_ref != state->frameno) 1331 return -EINVAL; 1332 if (last_idx && i != last_idx) 1333 memcpy(&state->refs[i], &state->refs[last_idx], 1334 sizeof(*state->refs)); 1335 memset(&state->refs[last_idx], 0, sizeof(*state->refs)); 1336 state->acquired_refs--; 1337 return 0; 1338 } 1339 } 1340 return -EINVAL; 1341 } 1342 1343 static void free_func_state(struct bpf_func_state *state) 1344 { 1345 if (!state) 1346 return; 1347 kfree(state->refs); 1348 kfree(state->stack); 1349 kfree(state); 1350 } 1351 1352 static void clear_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_state *state) 1353 { 1354 kfree(state->jmp_history); 1355 state->jmp_history = NULL; 1356 state->jmp_history_cnt = 0; 1357 } 1358 1359 static void free_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, 1360 bool free_self) 1361 { 1362 int i; 1363 1364 for (i = 0; i <= state->curframe; i++) { 1365 free_func_state(state->frame[i]); 1366 state->frame[i] = NULL; 1367 } 1368 clear_jmp_history(state); 1369 if (free_self) 1370 kfree(state); 1371 } 1372 1373 /* copy verifier state from src to dst growing dst stack space 1374 * when necessary to accommodate larger src stack 1375 */ 1376 static int copy_func_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, 1377 const struct bpf_func_state *src) 1378 { 1379 int err; 1380 1381 memcpy(dst, src, offsetof(struct bpf_func_state, acquired_refs)); 1382 err = copy_reference_state(dst, src); 1383 if (err) 1384 return err; 1385 return copy_stack_state(dst, src); 1386 } 1387 1388 static int copy_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *dst_state, 1389 const struct bpf_verifier_state *src) 1390 { 1391 struct bpf_func_state *dst; 1392 int i, err; 1393 1394 dst_state->jmp_history = copy_array(dst_state->jmp_history, src->jmp_history, 1395 src->jmp_history_cnt, sizeof(struct bpf_idx_pair), 1396 GFP_USER); 1397 if (!dst_state->jmp_history) 1398 return -ENOMEM; 1399 dst_state->jmp_history_cnt = src->jmp_history_cnt; 1400 1401 /* if dst has more stack frames then src frame, free them */ 1402 for (i = src->curframe + 1; i <= dst_state->curframe; i++) { 1403 free_func_state(dst_state->frame[i]); 1404 dst_state->frame[i] = NULL; 1405 } 1406 dst_state->speculative = src->speculative; 1407 dst_state->active_rcu_lock = src->active_rcu_lock; 1408 dst_state->curframe = src->curframe; 1409 dst_state->active_lock.ptr = src->active_lock.ptr; 1410 dst_state->active_lock.id = src->active_lock.id; 1411 dst_state->branches = src->branches; 1412 dst_state->parent = src->parent; 1413 dst_state->first_insn_idx = src->first_insn_idx; 1414 dst_state->last_insn_idx = src->last_insn_idx; 1415 for (i = 0; i <= src->curframe; i++) { 1416 dst = dst_state->frame[i]; 1417 if (!dst) { 1418 dst = kzalloc(sizeof(*dst), GFP_KERNEL); 1419 if (!dst) 1420 return -ENOMEM; 1421 dst_state->frame[i] = dst; 1422 } 1423 err = copy_func_state(dst, src->frame[i]); 1424 if (err) 1425 return err; 1426 } 1427 return 0; 1428 } 1429 1430 static void update_branch_counts(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 1431 { 1432 while (st) { 1433 u32 br = --st->branches; 1434 1435 /* WARN_ON(br > 1) technically makes sense here, 1436 * but see comment in push_stack(), hence: 1437 */ 1438 WARN_ONCE((int)br < 0, 1439 "BUG update_branch_counts:branches_to_explore=%d\n", 1440 br); 1441 if (br) 1442 break; 1443 st = st->parent; 1444 } 1445 } 1446 1447 static int pop_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *prev_insn_idx, 1448 int *insn_idx, bool pop_log) 1449 { 1450 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 1451 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem, *head = env->head; 1452 int err; 1453 1454 if (env->head == NULL) 1455 return -ENOENT; 1456 1457 if (cur) { 1458 err = copy_verifier_state(cur, &head->st); 1459 if (err) 1460 return err; 1461 } 1462 if (pop_log) 1463 bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, head->log_pos); 1464 if (insn_idx) 1465 *insn_idx = head->insn_idx; 1466 if (prev_insn_idx) 1467 *prev_insn_idx = head->prev_insn_idx; 1468 elem = head->next; 1469 free_verifier_state(&head->st, false); 1470 kfree(head); 1471 env->head = elem; 1472 env->stack_size--; 1473 return 0; 1474 } 1475 1476 static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1477 int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx, 1478 bool speculative) 1479 { 1480 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 1481 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem; 1482 int err; 1483 1484 elem = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem), GFP_KERNEL); 1485 if (!elem) 1486 goto err; 1487 1488 elem->insn_idx = insn_idx; 1489 elem->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx; 1490 elem->next = env->head; 1491 elem->log_pos = env->log.len_used; 1492 env->head = elem; 1493 env->stack_size++; 1494 err = copy_verifier_state(&elem->st, cur); 1495 if (err) 1496 goto err; 1497 elem->st.speculative |= speculative; 1498 if (env->stack_size > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ) { 1499 verbose(env, "The sequence of %d jumps is too complex.\n", 1500 env->stack_size); 1501 goto err; 1502 } 1503 if (elem->st.parent) { 1504 ++elem->st.parent->branches; 1505 /* WARN_ON(branches > 2) technically makes sense here, 1506 * but 1507 * 1. speculative states will bump 'branches' for non-branch 1508 * instructions 1509 * 2. is_state_visited() heuristics may decide not to create 1510 * a new state for a sequence of branches and all such current 1511 * and cloned states will be pointing to a single parent state 1512 * which might have large 'branches' count. 1513 */ 1514 } 1515 return &elem->st; 1516 err: 1517 free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true); 1518 env->cur_state = NULL; 1519 /* pop all elements and return */ 1520 while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false)); 1521 return NULL; 1522 } 1523 1524 #define CALLER_SAVED_REGS 6 1525 static const int caller_saved[CALLER_SAVED_REGS] = { 1526 BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_5 1527 }; 1528 1529 /* This helper doesn't clear reg->id */ 1530 static void ___mark_reg_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm) 1531 { 1532 reg->var_off = tnum_const(imm); 1533 reg->smin_value = (s64)imm; 1534 reg->smax_value = (s64)imm; 1535 reg->umin_value = imm; 1536 reg->umax_value = imm; 1537 1538 reg->s32_min_value = (s32)imm; 1539 reg->s32_max_value = (s32)imm; 1540 reg->u32_min_value = (u32)imm; 1541 reg->u32_max_value = (u32)imm; 1542 } 1543 1544 /* Mark the unknown part of a register (variable offset or scalar value) as 1545 * known to have the value @imm. 1546 */ 1547 static void __mark_reg_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm) 1548 { 1549 /* Clear off and union(map_ptr, range) */ 1550 memset(((u8 *)reg) + sizeof(reg->type), 0, 1551 offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off) - sizeof(reg->type)); 1552 reg->id = 0; 1553 reg->ref_obj_id = 0; 1554 ___mark_reg_known(reg, imm); 1555 } 1556 1557 static void __mark_reg32_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm) 1558 { 1559 reg->var_off = tnum_const_subreg(reg->var_off, imm); 1560 reg->s32_min_value = (s32)imm; 1561 reg->s32_max_value = (s32)imm; 1562 reg->u32_min_value = (u32)imm; 1563 reg->u32_max_value = (u32)imm; 1564 } 1565 1566 /* Mark the 'variable offset' part of a register as zero. This should be 1567 * used only on registers holding a pointer type. 1568 */ 1569 static void __mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1570 { 1571 __mark_reg_known(reg, 0); 1572 } 1573 1574 static void __mark_reg_const_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1575 { 1576 __mark_reg_known(reg, 0); 1577 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 1578 } 1579 1580 static void mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1581 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) 1582 { 1583 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { 1584 verbose(env, "mark_reg_known_zero(regs, %u)\n", regno); 1585 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs */ 1586 for (regno = 0; regno < MAX_BPF_REG; regno++) 1587 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); 1588 return; 1589 } 1590 __mark_reg_known_zero(regs + regno); 1591 } 1592 1593 static void __mark_dynptr_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, enum bpf_dynptr_type type, 1594 bool first_slot, int dynptr_id) 1595 { 1596 /* reg->type has no meaning for STACK_DYNPTR, but when we set reg for 1597 * callback arguments, it does need to be CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, so simply 1598 * set it unconditionally as it is ignored for STACK_DYNPTR anyway. 1599 */ 1600 __mark_reg_known_zero(reg); 1601 reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR; 1602 /* Give each dynptr a unique id to uniquely associate slices to it. */ 1603 reg->id = dynptr_id; 1604 reg->dynptr.type = type; 1605 reg->dynptr.first_slot = first_slot; 1606 } 1607 1608 static void mark_ptr_not_null_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1609 { 1610 if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 1611 const struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 1612 1613 if (map->inner_map_meta) { 1614 reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; 1615 reg->map_ptr = map->inner_map_meta; 1616 /* transfer reg's id which is unique for every map_lookup_elem 1617 * as UID of the inner map. 1618 */ 1619 if (btf_record_has_field(map->inner_map_meta->record, BPF_TIMER)) 1620 reg->map_uid = reg->id; 1621 } else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP) { 1622 reg->type = PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK; 1623 } else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP || 1624 map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH) { 1625 reg->type = PTR_TO_SOCKET; 1626 } else { 1627 reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 1628 } 1629 return; 1630 } 1631 1632 reg->type &= ~PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 1633 } 1634 1635 static bool reg_is_pkt_pointer(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1636 { 1637 return type_is_pkt_pointer(reg->type); 1638 } 1639 1640 static bool reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1641 { 1642 return reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg) || 1643 reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END; 1644 } 1645 1646 /* Unmodified PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END] register from ctx access. */ 1647 static bool reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 1648 enum bpf_reg_type which) 1649 { 1650 /* The register can already have a range from prior markings. 1651 * This is fine as long as it hasn't been advanced from its 1652 * origin. 1653 */ 1654 return reg->type == which && 1655 reg->id == 0 && 1656 reg->off == 0 && 1657 tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0); 1658 } 1659 1660 /* Reset the min/max bounds of a register */ 1661 static void __mark_reg_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1662 { 1663 reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 1664 reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 1665 reg->umin_value = 0; 1666 reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 1667 1668 reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 1669 reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 1670 reg->u32_min_value = 0; 1671 reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 1672 } 1673 1674 static void __mark_reg64_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1675 { 1676 reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 1677 reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 1678 reg->umin_value = 0; 1679 reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 1680 } 1681 1682 static void __mark_reg32_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1683 { 1684 reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 1685 reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 1686 reg->u32_min_value = 0; 1687 reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 1688 } 1689 1690 static void __update_reg32_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1691 { 1692 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off); 1693 1694 /* min signed is max(sign bit) | min(other bits) */ 1695 reg->s32_min_value = max_t(s32, reg->s32_min_value, 1696 var32_off.value | (var32_off.mask & S32_MIN)); 1697 /* max signed is min(sign bit) | max(other bits) */ 1698 reg->s32_max_value = min_t(s32, reg->s32_max_value, 1699 var32_off.value | (var32_off.mask & S32_MAX)); 1700 reg->u32_min_value = max_t(u32, reg->u32_min_value, (u32)var32_off.value); 1701 reg->u32_max_value = min(reg->u32_max_value, 1702 (u32)(var32_off.value | var32_off.mask)); 1703 } 1704 1705 static void __update_reg64_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1706 { 1707 /* min signed is max(sign bit) | min(other bits) */ 1708 reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, reg->smin_value, 1709 reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask & S64_MIN)); 1710 /* max signed is min(sign bit) | max(other bits) */ 1711 reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, reg->smax_value, 1712 reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask & S64_MAX)); 1713 reg->umin_value = max(reg->umin_value, reg->var_off.value); 1714 reg->umax_value = min(reg->umax_value, 1715 reg->var_off.value | reg->var_off.mask); 1716 } 1717 1718 static void __update_reg_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1719 { 1720 __update_reg32_bounds(reg); 1721 __update_reg64_bounds(reg); 1722 } 1723 1724 /* Uses signed min/max values to inform unsigned, and vice-versa */ 1725 static void __reg32_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1726 { 1727 /* Learn sign from signed bounds. 1728 * If we cannot cross the sign boundary, then signed and unsigned bounds 1729 * are the same, so combine. This works even in the negative case, e.g. 1730 * -3 s<= x s<= -1 implies 0xf...fd u<= x u<= 0xf...ff. 1731 */ 1732 if (reg->s32_min_value >= 0 || reg->s32_max_value < 0) { 1733 reg->s32_min_value = reg->u32_min_value = 1734 max_t(u32, reg->s32_min_value, reg->u32_min_value); 1735 reg->s32_max_value = reg->u32_max_value = 1736 min_t(u32, reg->s32_max_value, reg->u32_max_value); 1737 return; 1738 } 1739 /* Learn sign from unsigned bounds. Signed bounds cross the sign 1740 * boundary, so we must be careful. 1741 */ 1742 if ((s32)reg->u32_max_value >= 0) { 1743 /* Positive. We can't learn anything from the smin, but smax 1744 * is positive, hence safe. 1745 */ 1746 reg->s32_min_value = reg->u32_min_value; 1747 reg->s32_max_value = reg->u32_max_value = 1748 min_t(u32, reg->s32_max_value, reg->u32_max_value); 1749 } else if ((s32)reg->u32_min_value < 0) { 1750 /* Negative. We can't learn anything from the smax, but smin 1751 * is negative, hence safe. 1752 */ 1753 reg->s32_min_value = reg->u32_min_value = 1754 max_t(u32, reg->s32_min_value, reg->u32_min_value); 1755 reg->s32_max_value = reg->u32_max_value; 1756 } 1757 } 1758 1759 static void __reg64_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1760 { 1761 /* Learn sign from signed bounds. 1762 * If we cannot cross the sign boundary, then signed and unsigned bounds 1763 * are the same, so combine. This works even in the negative case, e.g. 1764 * -3 s<= x s<= -1 implies 0xf...fd u<= x u<= 0xf...ff. 1765 */ 1766 if (reg->smin_value >= 0 || reg->smax_value < 0) { 1767 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->smin_value, 1768 reg->umin_value); 1769 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->smax_value, 1770 reg->umax_value); 1771 return; 1772 } 1773 /* Learn sign from unsigned bounds. Signed bounds cross the sign 1774 * boundary, so we must be careful. 1775 */ 1776 if ((s64)reg->umax_value >= 0) { 1777 /* Positive. We can't learn anything from the smin, but smax 1778 * is positive, hence safe. 1779 */ 1780 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value; 1781 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->smax_value, 1782 reg->umax_value); 1783 } else if ((s64)reg->umin_value < 0) { 1784 /* Negative. We can't learn anything from the smax, but smin 1785 * is negative, hence safe. 1786 */ 1787 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->smin_value, 1788 reg->umin_value); 1789 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value; 1790 } 1791 } 1792 1793 static void __reg_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1794 { 1795 __reg32_deduce_bounds(reg); 1796 __reg64_deduce_bounds(reg); 1797 } 1798 1799 /* Attempts to improve var_off based on unsigned min/max information */ 1800 static void __reg_bound_offset(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1801 { 1802 struct tnum var64_off = tnum_intersect(reg->var_off, 1803 tnum_range(reg->umin_value, 1804 reg->umax_value)); 1805 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_intersect(tnum_subreg(reg->var_off), 1806 tnum_range(reg->u32_min_value, 1807 reg->u32_max_value)); 1808 1809 reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(var64_off), var32_off); 1810 } 1811 1812 static void reg_bounds_sync(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1813 { 1814 /* We might have learned new bounds from the var_off. */ 1815 __update_reg_bounds(reg); 1816 /* We might have learned something about the sign bit. */ 1817 __reg_deduce_bounds(reg); 1818 /* We might have learned some bits from the bounds. */ 1819 __reg_bound_offset(reg); 1820 /* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds 1821 * slightly, e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc), 1822 * then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax. 1823 */ 1824 __update_reg_bounds(reg); 1825 } 1826 1827 static bool __reg32_bound_s64(s32 a) 1828 { 1829 return a >= 0 && a <= S32_MAX; 1830 } 1831 1832 static void __reg_assign_32_into_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1833 { 1834 reg->umin_value = reg->u32_min_value; 1835 reg->umax_value = reg->u32_max_value; 1836 1837 /* Attempt to pull 32-bit signed bounds into 64-bit bounds but must 1838 * be positive otherwise set to worse case bounds and refine later 1839 * from tnum. 1840 */ 1841 if (__reg32_bound_s64(reg->s32_min_value) && 1842 __reg32_bound_s64(reg->s32_max_value)) { 1843 reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value; 1844 reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value; 1845 } else { 1846 reg->smin_value = 0; 1847 reg->smax_value = U32_MAX; 1848 } 1849 } 1850 1851 static void __reg_combine_32_into_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1852 { 1853 /* special case when 64-bit register has upper 32-bit register 1854 * zeroed. Typically happens after zext or <<32, >>32 sequence 1855 * allowing us to use 32-bit bounds directly, 1856 */ 1857 if (tnum_equals_const(tnum_clear_subreg(reg->var_off), 0)) { 1858 __reg_assign_32_into_64(reg); 1859 } else { 1860 /* Otherwise the best we can do is push lower 32bit known and 1861 * unknown bits into register (var_off set from jmp logic) 1862 * then learn as much as possible from the 64-bit tnum 1863 * known and unknown bits. The previous smin/smax bounds are 1864 * invalid here because of jmp32 compare so mark them unknown 1865 * so they do not impact tnum bounds calculation. 1866 */ 1867 __mark_reg64_unbounded(reg); 1868 } 1869 reg_bounds_sync(reg); 1870 } 1871 1872 static bool __reg64_bound_s32(s64 a) 1873 { 1874 return a >= S32_MIN && a <= S32_MAX; 1875 } 1876 1877 static bool __reg64_bound_u32(u64 a) 1878 { 1879 return a >= U32_MIN && a <= U32_MAX; 1880 } 1881 1882 static void __reg_combine_64_into_32(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1883 { 1884 __mark_reg32_unbounded(reg); 1885 if (__reg64_bound_s32(reg->smin_value) && __reg64_bound_s32(reg->smax_value)) { 1886 reg->s32_min_value = (s32)reg->smin_value; 1887 reg->s32_max_value = (s32)reg->smax_value; 1888 } 1889 if (__reg64_bound_u32(reg->umin_value) && __reg64_bound_u32(reg->umax_value)) { 1890 reg->u32_min_value = (u32)reg->umin_value; 1891 reg->u32_max_value = (u32)reg->umax_value; 1892 } 1893 reg_bounds_sync(reg); 1894 } 1895 1896 /* Mark a register as having a completely unknown (scalar) value. */ 1897 static void __mark_reg_unknown(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1898 struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1899 { 1900 /* 1901 * Clear type, off, and union(map_ptr, range) and 1902 * padding between 'type' and union 1903 */ 1904 memset(reg, 0, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off)); 1905 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 1906 reg->id = 0; 1907 reg->ref_obj_id = 0; 1908 reg->var_off = tnum_unknown; 1909 reg->frameno = 0; 1910 reg->precise = !env->bpf_capable; 1911 __mark_reg_unbounded(reg); 1912 } 1913 1914 static void mark_reg_unknown(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1915 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) 1916 { 1917 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { 1918 verbose(env, "mark_reg_unknown(regs, %u)\n", regno); 1919 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs except FP */ 1920 for (regno = 0; regno < BPF_REG_FP; regno++) 1921 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); 1922 return; 1923 } 1924 __mark_reg_unknown(env, regs + regno); 1925 } 1926 1927 static void __mark_reg_not_init(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1928 struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1929 { 1930 __mark_reg_unknown(env, reg); 1931 reg->type = NOT_INIT; 1932 } 1933 1934 static void mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1935 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) 1936 { 1937 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { 1938 verbose(env, "mark_reg_not_init(regs, %u)\n", regno); 1939 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs except FP */ 1940 for (regno = 0; regno < BPF_REG_FP; regno++) 1941 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); 1942 return; 1943 } 1944 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); 1945 } 1946 1947 static void mark_btf_ld_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1948 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno, 1949 enum bpf_reg_type reg_type, 1950 struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id, 1951 enum bpf_type_flag flag) 1952 { 1953 if (reg_type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 1954 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, regno); 1955 return; 1956 } 1957 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, regno); 1958 regs[regno].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | flag; 1959 regs[regno].btf = btf; 1960 regs[regno].btf_id = btf_id; 1961 } 1962 1963 #define DEF_NOT_SUBREG (0) 1964 static void init_reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1965 struct bpf_func_state *state) 1966 { 1967 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs; 1968 int i; 1969 1970 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) { 1971 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, i); 1972 regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE; 1973 regs[i].parent = NULL; 1974 regs[i].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 1975 } 1976 1977 /* frame pointer */ 1978 regs[BPF_REG_FP].type = PTR_TO_STACK; 1979 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_FP); 1980 regs[BPF_REG_FP].frameno = state->frameno; 1981 } 1982 1983 #define BPF_MAIN_FUNC (-1) 1984 static void init_func_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1985 struct bpf_func_state *state, 1986 int callsite, int frameno, int subprogno) 1987 { 1988 state->callsite = callsite; 1989 state->frameno = frameno; 1990 state->subprogno = subprogno; 1991 state->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 0); 1992 init_reg_state(env, state); 1993 mark_verifier_state_scratched(env); 1994 } 1995 1996 /* Similar to push_stack(), but for async callbacks */ 1997 static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_async_cb(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1998 int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx, 1999 int subprog) 2000 { 2001 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem; 2002 struct bpf_func_state *frame; 2003 2004 elem = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem), GFP_KERNEL); 2005 if (!elem) 2006 goto err; 2007 2008 elem->insn_idx = insn_idx; 2009 elem->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx; 2010 elem->next = env->head; 2011 elem->log_pos = env->log.len_used; 2012 env->head = elem; 2013 env->stack_size++; 2014 if (env->stack_size > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ) { 2015 verbose(env, 2016 "The sequence of %d jumps is too complex for async cb.\n", 2017 env->stack_size); 2018 goto err; 2019 } 2020 /* Unlike push_stack() do not copy_verifier_state(). 2021 * The caller state doesn't matter. 2022 * This is async callback. It starts in a fresh stack. 2023 * Initialize it similar to do_check_common(). 2024 */ 2025 elem->st.branches = 1; 2026 frame = kzalloc(sizeof(*frame), GFP_KERNEL); 2027 if (!frame) 2028 goto err; 2029 init_func_state(env, frame, 2030 BPF_MAIN_FUNC /* callsite */, 2031 0 /* frameno within this callchain */, 2032 subprog /* subprog number within this prog */); 2033 elem->st.frame[0] = frame; 2034 return &elem->st; 2035 err: 2036 free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true); 2037 env->cur_state = NULL; 2038 /* pop all elements and return */ 2039 while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false)); 2040 return NULL; 2041 } 2042 2043 2044 enum reg_arg_type { 2045 SRC_OP, /* register is used as source operand */ 2046 DST_OP, /* register is used as destination operand */ 2047 DST_OP_NO_MARK /* same as above, check only, don't mark */ 2048 }; 2049 2050 static int cmp_subprogs(const void *a, const void *b) 2051 { 2052 return ((struct bpf_subprog_info *)a)->start - 2053 ((struct bpf_subprog_info *)b)->start; 2054 } 2055 2056 static int find_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off) 2057 { 2058 struct bpf_subprog_info *p; 2059 2060 p = bsearch(&off, env->subprog_info, env->subprog_cnt, 2061 sizeof(env->subprog_info[0]), cmp_subprogs); 2062 if (!p) 2063 return -ENOENT; 2064 return p - env->subprog_info; 2065 2066 } 2067 2068 static int add_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off) 2069 { 2070 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 2071 int ret; 2072 2073 if (off >= insn_cnt || off < 0) { 2074 verbose(env, "call to invalid destination\n"); 2075 return -EINVAL; 2076 } 2077 ret = find_subprog(env, off); 2078 if (ret >= 0) 2079 return ret; 2080 if (env->subprog_cnt >= BPF_MAX_SUBPROGS) { 2081 verbose(env, "too many subprograms\n"); 2082 return -E2BIG; 2083 } 2084 /* determine subprog starts. The end is one before the next starts */ 2085 env->subprog_info[env->subprog_cnt++].start = off; 2086 sort(env->subprog_info, env->subprog_cnt, 2087 sizeof(env->subprog_info[0]), cmp_subprogs, NULL); 2088 return env->subprog_cnt - 1; 2089 } 2090 2091 #define MAX_KFUNC_DESCS 256 2092 #define MAX_KFUNC_BTFS 256 2093 2094 struct bpf_kfunc_desc { 2095 struct btf_func_model func_model; 2096 u32 func_id; 2097 s32 imm; 2098 u16 offset; 2099 }; 2100 2101 struct bpf_kfunc_btf { 2102 struct btf *btf; 2103 struct module *module; 2104 u16 offset; 2105 }; 2106 2107 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab { 2108 struct bpf_kfunc_desc descs[MAX_KFUNC_DESCS]; 2109 u32 nr_descs; 2110 }; 2111 2112 struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab { 2113 struct bpf_kfunc_btf descs[MAX_KFUNC_BTFS]; 2114 u32 nr_descs; 2115 }; 2116 2117 static int kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id_off(const void *a, const void *b) 2118 { 2119 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d0 = a; 2120 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d1 = b; 2121 2122 /* func_id is not greater than BTF_MAX_TYPE */ 2123 return d0->func_id - d1->func_id ?: d0->offset - d1->offset; 2124 } 2125 2126 static int kfunc_btf_cmp_by_off(const void *a, const void *b) 2127 { 2128 const struct bpf_kfunc_btf *d0 = a; 2129 const struct bpf_kfunc_btf *d1 = b; 2130 2131 return d0->offset - d1->offset; 2132 } 2133 2134 static const struct bpf_kfunc_desc * 2135 find_kfunc_desc(const struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 func_id, u16 offset) 2136 { 2137 struct bpf_kfunc_desc desc = { 2138 .func_id = func_id, 2139 .offset = offset, 2140 }; 2141 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab; 2142 2143 tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 2144 return bsearch(&desc, tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, 2145 sizeof(tab->descs[0]), kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id_off); 2146 } 2147 2148 static struct btf *__find_kfunc_desc_btf(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2149 s16 offset) 2150 { 2151 struct bpf_kfunc_btf kf_btf = { .offset = offset }; 2152 struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab *tab; 2153 struct bpf_kfunc_btf *b; 2154 struct module *mod; 2155 struct btf *btf; 2156 int btf_fd; 2157 2158 tab = env->prog->aux->kfunc_btf_tab; 2159 b = bsearch(&kf_btf, tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, 2160 sizeof(tab->descs[0]), kfunc_btf_cmp_by_off); 2161 if (!b) { 2162 if (tab->nr_descs == MAX_KFUNC_BTFS) { 2163 verbose(env, "too many different module BTFs\n"); 2164 return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG); 2165 } 2166 2167 if (bpfptr_is_null(env->fd_array)) { 2168 verbose(env, "kfunc offset > 0 without fd_array is invalid\n"); 2169 return ERR_PTR(-EPROTO); 2170 } 2171 2172 if (copy_from_bpfptr_offset(&btf_fd, env->fd_array, 2173 offset * sizeof(btf_fd), 2174 sizeof(btf_fd))) 2175 return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); 2176 2177 btf = btf_get_by_fd(btf_fd); 2178 if (IS_ERR(btf)) { 2179 verbose(env, "invalid module BTF fd specified\n"); 2180 return btf; 2181 } 2182 2183 if (!btf_is_module(btf)) { 2184 verbose(env, "BTF fd for kfunc is not a module BTF\n"); 2185 btf_put(btf); 2186 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); 2187 } 2188 2189 mod = btf_try_get_module(btf); 2190 if (!mod) { 2191 btf_put(btf); 2192 return ERR_PTR(-ENXIO); 2193 } 2194 2195 b = &tab->descs[tab->nr_descs++]; 2196 b->btf = btf; 2197 b->module = mod; 2198 b->offset = offset; 2199 2200 sort(tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, sizeof(tab->descs[0]), 2201 kfunc_btf_cmp_by_off, NULL); 2202 } 2203 return b->btf; 2204 } 2205 2206 void bpf_free_kfunc_btf_tab(struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab *tab) 2207 { 2208 if (!tab) 2209 return; 2210 2211 while (tab->nr_descs--) { 2212 module_put(tab->descs[tab->nr_descs].module); 2213 btf_put(tab->descs[tab->nr_descs].btf); 2214 } 2215 kfree(tab); 2216 } 2217 2218 static struct btf *find_kfunc_desc_btf(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, s16 offset) 2219 { 2220 if (offset) { 2221 if (offset < 0) { 2222 /* In the future, this can be allowed to increase limit 2223 * of fd index into fd_array, interpreted as u16. 2224 */ 2225 verbose(env, "negative offset disallowed for kernel module function call\n"); 2226 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); 2227 } 2228 2229 return __find_kfunc_desc_btf(env, offset); 2230 } 2231 return btf_vmlinux ?: ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); 2232 } 2233 2234 static int add_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 func_id, s16 offset) 2235 { 2236 const struct btf_type *func, *func_proto; 2237 struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab *btf_tab; 2238 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab; 2239 struct bpf_prog_aux *prog_aux; 2240 struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc; 2241 const char *func_name; 2242 struct btf *desc_btf; 2243 unsigned long call_imm; 2244 unsigned long addr; 2245 int err; 2246 2247 prog_aux = env->prog->aux; 2248 tab = prog_aux->kfunc_tab; 2249 btf_tab = prog_aux->kfunc_btf_tab; 2250 if (!tab) { 2251 if (!btf_vmlinux) { 2252 verbose(env, "calling kernel function is not supported without CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF\n"); 2253 return -ENOTSUPP; 2254 } 2255 2256 if (!env->prog->jit_requested) { 2257 verbose(env, "JIT is required for calling kernel function\n"); 2258 return -ENOTSUPP; 2259 } 2260 2261 if (!bpf_jit_supports_kfunc_call()) { 2262 verbose(env, "JIT does not support calling kernel function\n"); 2263 return -ENOTSUPP; 2264 } 2265 2266 if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible) { 2267 verbose(env, "cannot call kernel function from non-GPL compatible program\n"); 2268 return -EINVAL; 2269 } 2270 2271 tab = kzalloc(sizeof(*tab), GFP_KERNEL); 2272 if (!tab) 2273 return -ENOMEM; 2274 prog_aux->kfunc_tab = tab; 2275 } 2276 2277 /* func_id == 0 is always invalid, but instead of returning an error, be 2278 * conservative and wait until the code elimination pass before returning 2279 * error, so that invalid calls that get pruned out can be in BPF programs 2280 * loaded from userspace. It is also required that offset be untouched 2281 * for such calls. 2282 */ 2283 if (!func_id && !offset) 2284 return 0; 2285 2286 if (!btf_tab && offset) { 2287 btf_tab = kzalloc(sizeof(*btf_tab), GFP_KERNEL); 2288 if (!btf_tab) 2289 return -ENOMEM; 2290 prog_aux->kfunc_btf_tab = btf_tab; 2291 } 2292 2293 desc_btf = find_kfunc_desc_btf(env, offset); 2294 if (IS_ERR(desc_btf)) { 2295 verbose(env, "failed to find BTF for kernel function\n"); 2296 return PTR_ERR(desc_btf); 2297 } 2298 2299 if (find_kfunc_desc(env->prog, func_id, offset)) 2300 return 0; 2301 2302 if (tab->nr_descs == MAX_KFUNC_DESCS) { 2303 verbose(env, "too many different kernel function calls\n"); 2304 return -E2BIG; 2305 } 2306 2307 func = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, func_id); 2308 if (!func || !btf_type_is_func(func)) { 2309 verbose(env, "kernel btf_id %u is not a function\n", 2310 func_id); 2311 return -EINVAL; 2312 } 2313 func_proto = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, func->type); 2314 if (!func_proto || !btf_type_is_func_proto(func_proto)) { 2315 verbose(env, "kernel function btf_id %u does not have a valid func_proto\n", 2316 func_id); 2317 return -EINVAL; 2318 } 2319 2320 func_name = btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf, func->name_off); 2321 addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(func_name); 2322 if (!addr) { 2323 verbose(env, "cannot find address for kernel function %s\n", 2324 func_name); 2325 return -EINVAL; 2326 } 2327 2328 call_imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(addr); 2329 /* Check whether or not the relative offset overflows desc->imm */ 2330 if ((unsigned long)(s32)call_imm != call_imm) { 2331 verbose(env, "address of kernel function %s is out of range\n", 2332 func_name); 2333 return -EINVAL; 2334 } 2335 2336 if (bpf_dev_bound_kfunc_id(func_id)) { 2337 err = bpf_dev_bound_kfunc_check(&env->log, prog_aux); 2338 if (err) 2339 return err; 2340 } 2341 2342 desc = &tab->descs[tab->nr_descs++]; 2343 desc->func_id = func_id; 2344 desc->imm = call_imm; 2345 desc->offset = offset; 2346 err = btf_distill_func_proto(&env->log, desc_btf, 2347 func_proto, func_name, 2348 &desc->func_model); 2349 if (!err) 2350 sort(tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, sizeof(tab->descs[0]), 2351 kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id_off, NULL); 2352 return err; 2353 } 2354 2355 static int kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm(const void *a, const void *b) 2356 { 2357 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d0 = a; 2358 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d1 = b; 2359 2360 if (d0->imm > d1->imm) 2361 return 1; 2362 else if (d0->imm < d1->imm) 2363 return -1; 2364 return 0; 2365 } 2366 2367 static void sort_kfunc_descs_by_imm(struct bpf_prog *prog) 2368 { 2369 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab; 2370 2371 tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 2372 if (!tab) 2373 return; 2374 2375 sort(tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, sizeof(tab->descs[0]), 2376 kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm, NULL); 2377 } 2378 2379 bool bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call(const struct bpf_prog *prog) 2380 { 2381 return !!prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 2382 } 2383 2384 const struct btf_func_model * 2385 bpf_jit_find_kfunc_model(const struct bpf_prog *prog, 2386 const struct bpf_insn *insn) 2387 { 2388 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc desc = { 2389 .imm = insn->imm, 2390 }; 2391 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *res; 2392 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab; 2393 2394 tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 2395 res = bsearch(&desc, tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, 2396 sizeof(tab->descs[0]), kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm); 2397 2398 return res ? &res->func_model : NULL; 2399 } 2400 2401 static int add_subprog_and_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 2402 { 2403 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info; 2404 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 2405 int i, ret, insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 2406 2407 /* Add entry function. */ 2408 ret = add_subprog(env, 0); 2409 if (ret) 2410 return ret; 2411 2412 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 2413 if (!bpf_pseudo_func(insn) && !bpf_pseudo_call(insn) && 2414 !bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn)) 2415 continue; 2416 2417 if (!env->bpf_capable) { 2418 verbose(env, "loading/calling other bpf or kernel functions are allowed for CAP_BPF and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"); 2419 return -EPERM; 2420 } 2421 2422 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn) || bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 2423 ret = add_subprog(env, i + insn->imm + 1); 2424 else 2425 ret = add_kfunc_call(env, insn->imm, insn->off); 2426 2427 if (ret < 0) 2428 return ret; 2429 } 2430 2431 /* Add a fake 'exit' subprog which could simplify subprog iteration 2432 * logic. 'subprog_cnt' should not be increased. 2433 */ 2434 subprog[env->subprog_cnt].start = insn_cnt; 2435 2436 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) 2437 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) 2438 verbose(env, "func#%d @%d\n", i, subprog[i].start); 2439 2440 return 0; 2441 } 2442 2443 static int check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 2444 { 2445 int i, subprog_start, subprog_end, off, cur_subprog = 0; 2446 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info; 2447 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 2448 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 2449 2450 /* now check that all jumps are within the same subprog */ 2451 subprog_start = subprog[cur_subprog].start; 2452 subprog_end = subprog[cur_subprog + 1].start; 2453 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 2454 u8 code = insn[i].code; 2455 2456 if (code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 2457 insn[i].imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call && 2458 insn[i].src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 2459 subprog[cur_subprog].has_tail_call = true; 2460 if (BPF_CLASS(code) == BPF_LD && 2461 (BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_ABS || BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_IND)) 2462 subprog[cur_subprog].has_ld_abs = true; 2463 if (BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP && BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP32) 2464 goto next; 2465 if (BPF_OP(code) == BPF_EXIT || BPF_OP(code) == BPF_CALL) 2466 goto next; 2467 off = i + insn[i].off + 1; 2468 if (off < subprog_start || off >= subprog_end) { 2469 verbose(env, "jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", i, off); 2470 return -EINVAL; 2471 } 2472 next: 2473 if (i == subprog_end - 1) { 2474 /* to avoid fall-through from one subprog into another 2475 * the last insn of the subprog should be either exit 2476 * or unconditional jump back 2477 */ 2478 if (code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT) && 2479 code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_JA)) { 2480 verbose(env, "last insn is not an exit or jmp\n"); 2481 return -EINVAL; 2482 } 2483 subprog_start = subprog_end; 2484 cur_subprog++; 2485 if (cur_subprog < env->subprog_cnt) 2486 subprog_end = subprog[cur_subprog + 1].start; 2487 } 2488 } 2489 return 0; 2490 } 2491 2492 /* Parentage chain of this register (or stack slot) should take care of all 2493 * issues like callee-saved registers, stack slot allocation time, etc. 2494 */ 2495 static int mark_reg_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2496 const struct bpf_reg_state *state, 2497 struct bpf_reg_state *parent, u8 flag) 2498 { 2499 bool writes = parent == state->parent; /* Observe write marks */ 2500 int cnt = 0; 2501 2502 while (parent) { 2503 /* if read wasn't screened by an earlier write ... */ 2504 if (writes && state->live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN) 2505 break; 2506 if (parent->live & REG_LIVE_DONE) { 2507 verbose(env, "verifier BUG type %s var_off %lld off %d\n", 2508 reg_type_str(env, parent->type), 2509 parent->var_off.value, parent->off); 2510 return -EFAULT; 2511 } 2512 /* The first condition is more likely to be true than the 2513 * second, checked it first. 2514 */ 2515 if ((parent->live & REG_LIVE_READ) == flag || 2516 parent->live & REG_LIVE_READ64) 2517 /* The parentage chain never changes and 2518 * this parent was already marked as LIVE_READ. 2519 * There is no need to keep walking the chain again and 2520 * keep re-marking all parents as LIVE_READ. 2521 * This case happens when the same register is read 2522 * multiple times without writes into it in-between. 2523 * Also, if parent has the stronger REG_LIVE_READ64 set, 2524 * then no need to set the weak REG_LIVE_READ32. 2525 */ 2526 break; 2527 /* ... then we depend on parent's value */ 2528 parent->live |= flag; 2529 /* REG_LIVE_READ64 overrides REG_LIVE_READ32. */ 2530 if (flag == REG_LIVE_READ64) 2531 parent->live &= ~REG_LIVE_READ32; 2532 state = parent; 2533 parent = state->parent; 2534 writes = true; 2535 cnt++; 2536 } 2537 2538 if (env->longest_mark_read_walk < cnt) 2539 env->longest_mark_read_walk = cnt; 2540 return 0; 2541 } 2542 2543 static int mark_dynptr_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2544 { 2545 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 2546 int spi, ret; 2547 2548 /* For CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, it must have already been done by 2549 * check_reg_arg in check_helper_call and mark_btf_func_reg_size in 2550 * check_kfunc_call. 2551 */ 2552 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 2553 return 0; 2554 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 2555 if (spi < 0) 2556 return spi; 2557 /* Caller ensures dynptr is valid and initialized, which means spi is in 2558 * bounds and spi is the first dynptr slot. Simply mark stack slot as 2559 * read. 2560 */ 2561 ret = mark_reg_read(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, 2562 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 2563 if (ret) 2564 return ret; 2565 return mark_reg_read(env, &state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr, 2566 state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 2567 } 2568 2569 /* This function is supposed to be used by the following 32-bit optimization 2570 * code only. It returns TRUE if the source or destination register operates 2571 * on 64-bit, otherwise return FALSE. 2572 */ 2573 static bool is_reg64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 2574 u32 regno, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, enum reg_arg_type t) 2575 { 2576 u8 code, class, op; 2577 2578 code = insn->code; 2579 class = BPF_CLASS(code); 2580 op = BPF_OP(code); 2581 if (class == BPF_JMP) { 2582 /* BPF_EXIT for "main" will reach here. Return TRUE 2583 * conservatively. 2584 */ 2585 if (op == BPF_EXIT) 2586 return true; 2587 if (op == BPF_CALL) { 2588 /* BPF to BPF call will reach here because of marking 2589 * caller saved clobber with DST_OP_NO_MARK for which we 2590 * don't care the register def because they are anyway 2591 * marked as NOT_INIT already. 2592 */ 2593 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 2594 return false; 2595 /* Helper call will reach here because of arg type 2596 * check, conservatively return TRUE. 2597 */ 2598 if (t == SRC_OP) 2599 return true; 2600 2601 return false; 2602 } 2603 } 2604 2605 if (class == BPF_ALU64 || class == BPF_JMP || 2606 /* BPF_END always use BPF_ALU class. */ 2607 (class == BPF_ALU && op == BPF_END && insn->imm == 64)) 2608 return true; 2609 2610 if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_JMP32) 2611 return false; 2612 2613 if (class == BPF_LDX) { 2614 if (t != SRC_OP) 2615 return BPF_SIZE(code) == BPF_DW; 2616 /* LDX source must be ptr. */ 2617 return true; 2618 } 2619 2620 if (class == BPF_STX) { 2621 /* BPF_STX (including atomic variants) has multiple source 2622 * operands, one of which is a ptr. Check whether the caller is 2623 * asking about it. 2624 */ 2625 if (t == SRC_OP && reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 2626 return true; 2627 return BPF_SIZE(code) == BPF_DW; 2628 } 2629 2630 if (class == BPF_LD) { 2631 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(code); 2632 2633 /* LD_IMM64 */ 2634 if (mode == BPF_IMM) 2635 return true; 2636 2637 /* Both LD_IND and LD_ABS return 32-bit data. */ 2638 if (t != SRC_OP) 2639 return false; 2640 2641 /* Implicit ctx ptr. */ 2642 if (regno == BPF_REG_6) 2643 return true; 2644 2645 /* Explicit source could be any width. */ 2646 return true; 2647 } 2648 2649 if (class == BPF_ST) 2650 /* The only source register for BPF_ST is a ptr. */ 2651 return true; 2652 2653 /* Conservatively return true at default. */ 2654 return true; 2655 } 2656 2657 /* Return the regno defined by the insn, or -1. */ 2658 static int insn_def_regno(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 2659 { 2660 switch (BPF_CLASS(insn->code)) { 2661 case BPF_JMP: 2662 case BPF_JMP32: 2663 case BPF_ST: 2664 return -1; 2665 case BPF_STX: 2666 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC && 2667 (insn->imm & BPF_FETCH)) { 2668 if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG) 2669 return BPF_REG_0; 2670 else 2671 return insn->src_reg; 2672 } else { 2673 return -1; 2674 } 2675 default: 2676 return insn->dst_reg; 2677 } 2678 } 2679 2680 /* Return TRUE if INSN has defined any 32-bit value explicitly. */ 2681 static bool insn_has_def32(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 2682 { 2683 int dst_reg = insn_def_regno(insn); 2684 2685 if (dst_reg == -1) 2686 return false; 2687 2688 return !is_reg64(env, insn, dst_reg, NULL, DST_OP); 2689 } 2690 2691 static void mark_insn_zext(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2692 struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2693 { 2694 s32 def_idx = reg->subreg_def; 2695 2696 if (def_idx == DEF_NOT_SUBREG) 2697 return; 2698 2699 env->insn_aux_data[def_idx - 1].zext_dst = true; 2700 /* The dst will be zero extended, so won't be sub-register anymore. */ 2701 reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 2702 } 2703 2704 static int check_reg_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 2705 enum reg_arg_type t) 2706 { 2707 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 2708 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 2709 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi + env->insn_idx; 2710 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, *regs = state->regs; 2711 bool rw64; 2712 2713 if (regno >= MAX_BPF_REG) { 2714 verbose(env, "R%d is invalid\n", regno); 2715 return -EINVAL; 2716 } 2717 2718 mark_reg_scratched(env, regno); 2719 2720 reg = ®s[regno]; 2721 rw64 = is_reg64(env, insn, regno, reg, t); 2722 if (t == SRC_OP) { 2723 /* check whether register used as source operand can be read */ 2724 if (reg->type == NOT_INIT) { 2725 verbose(env, "R%d !read_ok\n", regno); 2726 return -EACCES; 2727 } 2728 /* We don't need to worry about FP liveness because it's read-only */ 2729 if (regno == BPF_REG_FP) 2730 return 0; 2731 2732 if (rw64) 2733 mark_insn_zext(env, reg); 2734 2735 return mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, 2736 rw64 ? REG_LIVE_READ64 : REG_LIVE_READ32); 2737 } else { 2738 /* check whether register used as dest operand can be written to */ 2739 if (regno == BPF_REG_FP) { 2740 verbose(env, "frame pointer is read only\n"); 2741 return -EACCES; 2742 } 2743 reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 2744 reg->subreg_def = rw64 ? DEF_NOT_SUBREG : env->insn_idx + 1; 2745 if (t == DST_OP) 2746 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, regno); 2747 } 2748 return 0; 2749 } 2750 2751 static void mark_jmp_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx) 2752 { 2753 env->insn_aux_data[idx].jmp_point = true; 2754 } 2755 2756 static bool is_jmp_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 2757 { 2758 return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].jmp_point; 2759 } 2760 2761 /* for any branch, call, exit record the history of jmps in the given state */ 2762 static int push_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2763 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 2764 { 2765 u32 cnt = cur->jmp_history_cnt; 2766 struct bpf_idx_pair *p; 2767 size_t alloc_size; 2768 2769 if (!is_jmp_point(env, env->insn_idx)) 2770 return 0; 2771 2772 cnt++; 2773 alloc_size = kmalloc_size_roundup(size_mul(cnt, sizeof(*p))); 2774 p = krealloc(cur->jmp_history, alloc_size, GFP_USER); 2775 if (!p) 2776 return -ENOMEM; 2777 p[cnt - 1].idx = env->insn_idx; 2778 p[cnt - 1].prev_idx = env->prev_insn_idx; 2779 cur->jmp_history = p; 2780 cur->jmp_history_cnt = cnt; 2781 return 0; 2782 } 2783 2784 /* Backtrack one insn at a time. If idx is not at the top of recorded 2785 * history then previous instruction came from straight line execution. 2786 */ 2787 static int get_prev_insn_idx(struct bpf_verifier_state *st, int i, 2788 u32 *history) 2789 { 2790 u32 cnt = *history; 2791 2792 if (cnt && st->jmp_history[cnt - 1].idx == i) { 2793 i = st->jmp_history[cnt - 1].prev_idx; 2794 (*history)--; 2795 } else { 2796 i--; 2797 } 2798 return i; 2799 } 2800 2801 static const char *disasm_kfunc_name(void *data, const struct bpf_insn *insn) 2802 { 2803 const struct btf_type *func; 2804 struct btf *desc_btf; 2805 2806 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) 2807 return NULL; 2808 2809 desc_btf = find_kfunc_desc_btf(data, insn->off); 2810 if (IS_ERR(desc_btf)) 2811 return "<error>"; 2812 2813 func = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, insn->imm); 2814 return btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf, func->name_off); 2815 } 2816 2817 /* For given verifier state backtrack_insn() is called from the last insn to 2818 * the first insn. Its purpose is to compute a bitmask of registers and 2819 * stack slots that needs precision in the parent verifier state. 2820 */ 2821 static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx, 2822 u32 *reg_mask, u64 *stack_mask) 2823 { 2824 const struct bpf_insn_cbs cbs = { 2825 .cb_call = disasm_kfunc_name, 2826 .cb_print = verbose, 2827 .private_data = env, 2828 }; 2829 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi + idx; 2830 u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); 2831 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 2832 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); 2833 u32 dreg = 1u << insn->dst_reg; 2834 u32 sreg = 1u << insn->src_reg; 2835 u32 spi; 2836 2837 if (insn->code == 0) 2838 return 0; 2839 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 2840 verbose(env, "regs=%x stack=%llx before ", *reg_mask, *stack_mask); 2841 verbose(env, "%d: ", idx); 2842 print_bpf_insn(&cbs, insn, env->allow_ptr_leaks); 2843 } 2844 2845 if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) { 2846 if (!(*reg_mask & dreg)) 2847 return 0; 2848 if (opcode == BPF_MOV) { 2849 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 2850 /* dreg = sreg 2851 * dreg needs precision after this insn 2852 * sreg needs precision before this insn 2853 */ 2854 *reg_mask &= ~dreg; 2855 *reg_mask |= sreg; 2856 } else { 2857 /* dreg = K 2858 * dreg needs precision after this insn. 2859 * Corresponding register is already marked 2860 * as precise=true in this verifier state. 2861 * No further markings in parent are necessary 2862 */ 2863 *reg_mask &= ~dreg; 2864 } 2865 } else { 2866 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 2867 /* dreg += sreg 2868 * both dreg and sreg need precision 2869 * before this insn 2870 */ 2871 *reg_mask |= sreg; 2872 } /* else dreg += K 2873 * dreg still needs precision before this insn 2874 */ 2875 } 2876 } else if (class == BPF_LDX) { 2877 if (!(*reg_mask & dreg)) 2878 return 0; 2879 *reg_mask &= ~dreg; 2880 2881 /* scalars can only be spilled into stack w/o losing precision. 2882 * Load from any other memory can be zero extended. 2883 * The desire to keep that precision is already indicated 2884 * by 'precise' mark in corresponding register of this state. 2885 * No further tracking necessary. 2886 */ 2887 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_FP) 2888 return 0; 2889 2890 /* dreg = *(u64 *)[fp - off] was a fill from the stack. 2891 * that [fp - off] slot contains scalar that needs to be 2892 * tracked with precision 2893 */ 2894 spi = (-insn->off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE; 2895 if (spi >= 64) { 2896 verbose(env, "BUG spi %d\n", spi); 2897 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 2898 return -EFAULT; 2899 } 2900 *stack_mask |= 1ull << spi; 2901 } else if (class == BPF_STX || class == BPF_ST) { 2902 if (*reg_mask & dreg) 2903 /* stx & st shouldn't be using _scalar_ dst_reg 2904 * to access memory. It means backtracking 2905 * encountered a case of pointer subtraction. 2906 */ 2907 return -ENOTSUPP; 2908 /* scalars can only be spilled into stack */ 2909 if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_FP) 2910 return 0; 2911 spi = (-insn->off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE; 2912 if (spi >= 64) { 2913 verbose(env, "BUG spi %d\n", spi); 2914 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 2915 return -EFAULT; 2916 } 2917 if (!(*stack_mask & (1ull << spi))) 2918 return 0; 2919 *stack_mask &= ~(1ull << spi); 2920 if (class == BPF_STX) 2921 *reg_mask |= sreg; 2922 } else if (class == BPF_JMP || class == BPF_JMP32) { 2923 if (opcode == BPF_CALL) { 2924 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 2925 return -ENOTSUPP; 2926 /* BPF helpers that invoke callback subprogs are 2927 * equivalent to BPF_PSEUDO_CALL above 2928 */ 2929 if (insn->src_reg == 0 && is_callback_calling_function(insn->imm)) 2930 return -ENOTSUPP; 2931 /* kfunc with imm==0 is invalid and fixup_kfunc_call will 2932 * catch this error later. Make backtracking conservative 2933 * with ENOTSUPP. 2934 */ 2935 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL && insn->imm == 0) 2936 return -ENOTSUPP; 2937 /* regular helper call sets R0 */ 2938 *reg_mask &= ~1; 2939 if (*reg_mask & 0x3f) { 2940 /* if backtracing was looking for registers R1-R5 2941 * they should have been found already. 2942 */ 2943 verbose(env, "BUG regs %x\n", *reg_mask); 2944 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 2945 return -EFAULT; 2946 } 2947 } else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) { 2948 return -ENOTSUPP; 2949 } 2950 } else if (class == BPF_LD) { 2951 if (!(*reg_mask & dreg)) 2952 return 0; 2953 *reg_mask &= ~dreg; 2954 /* It's ld_imm64 or ld_abs or ld_ind. 2955 * For ld_imm64 no further tracking of precision 2956 * into parent is necessary 2957 */ 2958 if (mode == BPF_IND || mode == BPF_ABS) 2959 /* to be analyzed */ 2960 return -ENOTSUPP; 2961 } 2962 return 0; 2963 } 2964 2965 /* the scalar precision tracking algorithm: 2966 * . at the start all registers have precise=false. 2967 * . scalar ranges are tracked as normal through alu and jmp insns. 2968 * . once precise value of the scalar register is used in: 2969 * . ptr + scalar alu 2970 * . if (scalar cond K|scalar) 2971 * . helper_call(.., scalar, ...) where ARG_CONST is expected 2972 * backtrack through the verifier states and mark all registers and 2973 * stack slots with spilled constants that these scalar regisers 2974 * should be precise. 2975 * . during state pruning two registers (or spilled stack slots) 2976 * are equivalent if both are not precise. 2977 * 2978 * Note the verifier cannot simply walk register parentage chain, 2979 * since many different registers and stack slots could have been 2980 * used to compute single precise scalar. 2981 * 2982 * The approach of starting with precise=true for all registers and then 2983 * backtrack to mark a register as not precise when the verifier detects 2984 * that program doesn't care about specific value (e.g., when helper 2985 * takes register as ARG_ANYTHING parameter) is not safe. 2986 * 2987 * It's ok to walk single parentage chain of the verifier states. 2988 * It's possible that this backtracking will go all the way till 1st insn. 2989 * All other branches will be explored for needing precision later. 2990 * 2991 * The backtracking needs to deal with cases like: 2992 * R8=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=1952,imm=0) R9_w=map_value(id=0,off=40,ks=4,vs=1952,imm=0) 2993 * r9 -= r8 2994 * r5 = r9 2995 * if r5 > 0x79f goto pc+7 2996 * R5_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=1951,var_off=(0x0; 0x7ff)) 2997 * r5 += 1 2998 * ... 2999 * call bpf_perf_event_output#25 3000 * where .arg5_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO 3001 * 3002 * and this case: 3003 * r6 = 1 3004 * call foo // uses callee's r6 inside to compute r0 3005 * r0 += r6 3006 * if r0 == 0 goto 3007 * 3008 * to track above reg_mask/stack_mask needs to be independent for each frame. 3009 * 3010 * Also if parent's curframe > frame where backtracking started, 3011 * the verifier need to mark registers in both frames, otherwise callees 3012 * may incorrectly prune callers. This is similar to 3013 * commit 7640ead93924 ("bpf: verifier: make sure callees don't prune with caller differences") 3014 * 3015 * For now backtracking falls back into conservative marking. 3016 */ 3017 static void mark_all_scalars_precise(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3018 struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 3019 { 3020 struct bpf_func_state *func; 3021 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 3022 int i, j; 3023 3024 /* big hammer: mark all scalars precise in this path. 3025 * pop_stack may still get !precise scalars. 3026 * We also skip current state and go straight to first parent state, 3027 * because precision markings in current non-checkpointed state are 3028 * not needed. See why in the comment in __mark_chain_precision below. 3029 */ 3030 for (st = st->parent; st; st = st->parent) { 3031 for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) { 3032 func = st->frame[i]; 3033 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_FP; j++) { 3034 reg = &func->regs[j]; 3035 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 3036 continue; 3037 reg->precise = true; 3038 } 3039 for (j = 0; j < func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) { 3040 if (!is_spilled_reg(&func->stack[j])) 3041 continue; 3042 reg = &func->stack[j].spilled_ptr; 3043 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 3044 continue; 3045 reg->precise = true; 3046 } 3047 } 3048 } 3049 } 3050 3051 static void mark_all_scalars_imprecise(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 3052 { 3053 struct bpf_func_state *func; 3054 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 3055 int i, j; 3056 3057 for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) { 3058 func = st->frame[i]; 3059 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_FP; j++) { 3060 reg = &func->regs[j]; 3061 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 3062 continue; 3063 reg->precise = false; 3064 } 3065 for (j = 0; j < func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) { 3066 if (!is_spilled_reg(&func->stack[j])) 3067 continue; 3068 reg = &func->stack[j].spilled_ptr; 3069 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 3070 continue; 3071 reg->precise = false; 3072 } 3073 } 3074 } 3075 3076 /* 3077 * __mark_chain_precision() backtracks BPF program instruction sequence and 3078 * chain of verifier states making sure that register *regno* (if regno >= 0) 3079 * and/or stack slot *spi* (if spi >= 0) are marked as precisely tracked 3080 * SCALARS, as well as any other registers and slots that contribute to 3081 * a tracked state of given registers/stack slots, depending on specific BPF 3082 * assembly instructions (see backtrack_insns() for exact instruction handling 3083 * logic). This backtracking relies on recorded jmp_history and is able to 3084 * traverse entire chain of parent states. This process ends only when all the 3085 * necessary registers/slots and their transitive dependencies are marked as 3086 * precise. 3087 * 3088 * One important and subtle aspect is that precise marks *do not matter* in 3089 * the currently verified state (current state). It is important to understand 3090 * why this is the case. 3091 * 3092 * First, note that current state is the state that is not yet "checkpointed", 3093 * i.e., it is not yet put into env->explored_states, and it has no children 3094 * states as well. It's ephemeral, and can end up either a) being discarded if 3095 * compatible explored state is found at some point or BPF_EXIT instruction is 3096 * reached or b) checkpointed and put into env->explored_states, branching out 3097 * into one or more children states. 3098 * 3099 * In the former case, precise markings in current state are completely 3100 * ignored by state comparison code (see regsafe() for details). Only 3101 * checkpointed ("old") state precise markings are important, and if old 3102 * state's register/slot is precise, regsafe() assumes current state's 3103 * register/slot as precise and checks value ranges exactly and precisely. If 3104 * states turn out to be compatible, current state's necessary precise 3105 * markings and any required parent states' precise markings are enforced 3106 * after the fact with propagate_precision() logic, after the fact. But it's 3107 * important to realize that in this case, even after marking current state 3108 * registers/slots as precise, we immediately discard current state. So what 3109 * actually matters is any of the precise markings propagated into current 3110 * state's parent states, which are always checkpointed (due to b) case above). 3111 * As such, for scenario a) it doesn't matter if current state has precise 3112 * markings set or not. 3113 * 3114 * Now, for the scenario b), checkpointing and forking into child(ren) 3115 * state(s). Note that before current state gets to checkpointing step, any 3116 * processed instruction always assumes precise SCALAR register/slot 3117 * knowledge: if precise value or range is useful to prune jump branch, BPF 3118 * verifier takes this opportunity enthusiastically. Similarly, when 3119 * register's value is used to calculate offset or memory address, exact 3120 * knowledge of SCALAR range is assumed, checked, and enforced. So, similar to 3121 * what we mentioned above about state comparison ignoring precise markings 3122 * during state comparison, BPF verifier ignores and also assumes precise 3123 * markings *at will* during instruction verification process. But as verifier 3124 * assumes precision, it also propagates any precision dependencies across 3125 * parent states, which are not yet finalized, so can be further restricted 3126 * based on new knowledge gained from restrictions enforced by their children 3127 * states. This is so that once those parent states are finalized, i.e., when 3128 * they have no more active children state, state comparison logic in 3129 * is_state_visited() would enforce strict and precise SCALAR ranges, if 3130 * required for correctness. 3131 * 3132 * To build a bit more intuition, note also that once a state is checkpointed, 3133 * the path we took to get to that state is not important. This is crucial 3134 * property for state pruning. When state is checkpointed and finalized at 3135 * some instruction index, it can be correctly and safely used to "short 3136 * circuit" any *compatible* state that reaches exactly the same instruction 3137 * index. I.e., if we jumped to that instruction from a completely different 3138 * code path than original finalized state was derived from, it doesn't 3139 * matter, current state can be discarded because from that instruction 3140 * forward having a compatible state will ensure we will safely reach the 3141 * exit. States describe preconditions for further exploration, but completely 3142 * forget the history of how we got here. 3143 * 3144 * This also means that even if we needed precise SCALAR range to get to 3145 * finalized state, but from that point forward *that same* SCALAR register is 3146 * never used in a precise context (i.e., it's precise value is not needed for 3147 * correctness), it's correct and safe to mark such register as "imprecise" 3148 * (i.e., precise marking set to false). This is what we rely on when we do 3149 * not set precise marking in current state. If no child state requires 3150 * precision for any given SCALAR register, it's safe to dictate that it can 3151 * be imprecise. If any child state does require this register to be precise, 3152 * we'll mark it precise later retroactively during precise markings 3153 * propagation from child state to parent states. 3154 * 3155 * Skipping precise marking setting in current state is a mild version of 3156 * relying on the above observation. But we can utilize this property even 3157 * more aggressively by proactively forgetting any precise marking in the 3158 * current state (which we inherited from the parent state), right before we 3159 * checkpoint it and branch off into new child state. This is done by 3160 * mark_all_scalars_imprecise() to hopefully get more permissive and generic 3161 * finalized states which help in short circuiting more future states. 3162 */ 3163 static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int frame, int regno, 3164 int spi) 3165 { 3166 struct bpf_verifier_state *st = env->cur_state; 3167 int first_idx = st->first_insn_idx; 3168 int last_idx = env->insn_idx; 3169 struct bpf_func_state *func; 3170 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 3171 u32 reg_mask = regno >= 0 ? 1u << regno : 0; 3172 u64 stack_mask = spi >= 0 ? 1ull << spi : 0; 3173 bool skip_first = true; 3174 bool new_marks = false; 3175 int i, err; 3176 3177 if (!env->bpf_capable) 3178 return 0; 3179 3180 /* Do sanity checks against current state of register and/or stack 3181 * slot, but don't set precise flag in current state, as precision 3182 * tracking in the current state is unnecessary. 3183 */ 3184 func = st->frame[frame]; 3185 if (regno >= 0) { 3186 reg = &func->regs[regno]; 3187 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 3188 WARN_ONCE(1, "backtracing misuse"); 3189 return -EFAULT; 3190 } 3191 new_marks = true; 3192 } 3193 3194 while (spi >= 0) { 3195 if (!is_spilled_reg(&func->stack[spi])) { 3196 stack_mask = 0; 3197 break; 3198 } 3199 reg = &func->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 3200 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 3201 stack_mask = 0; 3202 break; 3203 } 3204 new_marks = true; 3205 break; 3206 } 3207 3208 if (!new_marks) 3209 return 0; 3210 if (!reg_mask && !stack_mask) 3211 return 0; 3212 3213 for (;;) { 3214 DECLARE_BITMAP(mask, 64); 3215 u32 history = st->jmp_history_cnt; 3216 3217 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) 3218 verbose(env, "last_idx %d first_idx %d\n", last_idx, first_idx); 3219 3220 if (last_idx < 0) { 3221 /* we are at the entry into subprog, which 3222 * is expected for global funcs, but only if 3223 * requested precise registers are R1-R5 3224 * (which are global func's input arguments) 3225 */ 3226 if (st->curframe == 0 && 3227 st->frame[0]->subprogno > 0 && 3228 st->frame[0]->callsite == BPF_MAIN_FUNC && 3229 stack_mask == 0 && (reg_mask & ~0x3e) == 0) { 3230 bitmap_from_u64(mask, reg_mask); 3231 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) { 3232 reg = &st->frame[0]->regs[i]; 3233 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 3234 reg_mask &= ~(1u << i); 3235 continue; 3236 } 3237 reg->precise = true; 3238 } 3239 return 0; 3240 } 3241 3242 verbose(env, "BUG backtracing func entry subprog %d reg_mask %x stack_mask %llx\n", 3243 st->frame[0]->subprogno, reg_mask, stack_mask); 3244 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 3245 return -EFAULT; 3246 } 3247 3248 for (i = last_idx;;) { 3249 if (skip_first) { 3250 err = 0; 3251 skip_first = false; 3252 } else { 3253 err = backtrack_insn(env, i, ®_mask, &stack_mask); 3254 } 3255 if (err == -ENOTSUPP) { 3256 mark_all_scalars_precise(env, st); 3257 return 0; 3258 } else if (err) { 3259 return err; 3260 } 3261 if (!reg_mask && !stack_mask) 3262 /* Found assignment(s) into tracked register in this state. 3263 * Since this state is already marked, just return. 3264 * Nothing to be tracked further in the parent state. 3265 */ 3266 return 0; 3267 if (i == first_idx) 3268 break; 3269 i = get_prev_insn_idx(st, i, &history); 3270 if (i >= env->prog->len) { 3271 /* This can happen if backtracking reached insn 0 3272 * and there are still reg_mask or stack_mask 3273 * to backtrack. 3274 * It means the backtracking missed the spot where 3275 * particular register was initialized with a constant. 3276 */ 3277 verbose(env, "BUG backtracking idx %d\n", i); 3278 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 3279 return -EFAULT; 3280 } 3281 } 3282 st = st->parent; 3283 if (!st) 3284 break; 3285 3286 new_marks = false; 3287 func = st->frame[frame]; 3288 bitmap_from_u64(mask, reg_mask); 3289 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) { 3290 reg = &func->regs[i]; 3291 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 3292 reg_mask &= ~(1u << i); 3293 continue; 3294 } 3295 if (!reg->precise) 3296 new_marks = true; 3297 reg->precise = true; 3298 } 3299 3300 bitmap_from_u64(mask, stack_mask); 3301 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 64) { 3302 if (i >= func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE) { 3303 /* the sequence of instructions: 3304 * 2: (bf) r3 = r10 3305 * 3: (7b) *(u64 *)(r3 -8) = r0 3306 * 4: (79) r4 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8) 3307 * doesn't contain jmps. It's backtracked 3308 * as a single block. 3309 * During backtracking insn 3 is not recognized as 3310 * stack access, so at the end of backtracking 3311 * stack slot fp-8 is still marked in stack_mask. 3312 * However the parent state may not have accessed 3313 * fp-8 and it's "unallocated" stack space. 3314 * In such case fallback to conservative. 3315 */ 3316 mark_all_scalars_precise(env, st); 3317 return 0; 3318 } 3319 3320 if (!is_spilled_reg(&func->stack[i])) { 3321 stack_mask &= ~(1ull << i); 3322 continue; 3323 } 3324 reg = &func->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 3325 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 3326 stack_mask &= ~(1ull << i); 3327 continue; 3328 } 3329 if (!reg->precise) 3330 new_marks = true; 3331 reg->precise = true; 3332 } 3333 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 3334 verbose(env, "parent %s regs=%x stack=%llx marks:", 3335 new_marks ? "didn't have" : "already had", 3336 reg_mask, stack_mask); 3337 print_verifier_state(env, func, true); 3338 } 3339 3340 if (!reg_mask && !stack_mask) 3341 break; 3342 if (!new_marks) 3343 break; 3344 3345 last_idx = st->last_insn_idx; 3346 first_idx = st->first_insn_idx; 3347 } 3348 return 0; 3349 } 3350 3351 int mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 3352 { 3353 return __mark_chain_precision(env, env->cur_state->curframe, regno, -1); 3354 } 3355 3356 static int mark_chain_precision_frame(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int frame, int regno) 3357 { 3358 return __mark_chain_precision(env, frame, regno, -1); 3359 } 3360 3361 static int mark_chain_precision_stack_frame(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int frame, int spi) 3362 { 3363 return __mark_chain_precision(env, frame, -1, spi); 3364 } 3365 3366 static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type) 3367 { 3368 switch (base_type(type)) { 3369 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 3370 case PTR_TO_STACK: 3371 case PTR_TO_CTX: 3372 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 3373 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 3374 case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: 3375 case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS: 3376 case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP: 3377 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 3378 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 3379 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 3380 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 3381 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 3382 case PTR_TO_BUF: 3383 case PTR_TO_MEM: 3384 case PTR_TO_FUNC: 3385 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 3386 return true; 3387 default: 3388 return false; 3389 } 3390 } 3391 3392 /* Does this register contain a constant zero? */ 3393 static bool register_is_null(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 3394 { 3395 return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0); 3396 } 3397 3398 static bool register_is_const(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 3399 { 3400 return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 3401 } 3402 3403 static bool __is_scalar_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 3404 { 3405 return tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off) && 3406 reg->smin_value == S64_MIN && reg->smax_value == S64_MAX && 3407 reg->umin_value == 0 && reg->umax_value == U64_MAX && 3408 reg->s32_min_value == S32_MIN && reg->s32_max_value == S32_MAX && 3409 reg->u32_min_value == 0 && reg->u32_max_value == U32_MAX; 3410 } 3411 3412 static bool register_is_bounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 3413 { 3414 return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && !__is_scalar_unbounded(reg); 3415 } 3416 3417 static bool __is_pointer_value(bool allow_ptr_leaks, 3418 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 3419 { 3420 if (allow_ptr_leaks) 3421 return false; 3422 3423 return reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE; 3424 } 3425 3426 static void save_register_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, 3427 int spi, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 3428 int size) 3429 { 3430 int i; 3431 3432 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr = *reg; 3433 if (size == BPF_REG_SIZE) 3434 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 3435 3436 for (i = BPF_REG_SIZE; i > BPF_REG_SIZE - size; i--) 3437 state->stack[spi].slot_type[i - 1] = STACK_SPILL; 3438 3439 /* size < 8 bytes spill */ 3440 for (; i; i--) 3441 scrub_spilled_slot(&state->stack[spi].slot_type[i - 1]); 3442 } 3443 3444 /* check_stack_{read,write}_fixed_off functions track spill/fill of registers, 3445 * stack boundary and alignment are checked in check_mem_access() 3446 */ 3447 static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3448 /* stack frame we're writing to */ 3449 struct bpf_func_state *state, 3450 int off, int size, int value_regno, 3451 int insn_idx) 3452 { 3453 struct bpf_func_state *cur; /* state of the current function */ 3454 int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE, err; 3455 u32 dst_reg = env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx].dst_reg; 3456 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = NULL; 3457 3458 err = grow_stack_state(state, round_up(slot + 1, BPF_REG_SIZE)); 3459 if (err) 3460 return err; 3461 /* caller checked that off % size == 0 and -MAX_BPF_STACK <= off < 0, 3462 * so it's aligned access and [off, off + size) are within stack limits 3463 */ 3464 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && 3465 state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL && 3466 size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { 3467 verbose(env, "attempt to corrupt spilled pointer on stack\n"); 3468 return -EACCES; 3469 } 3470 3471 cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe]; 3472 if (value_regno >= 0) 3473 reg = &cur->regs[value_regno]; 3474 if (!env->bypass_spec_v4) { 3475 bool sanitize = reg && is_spillable_regtype(reg->type); 3476 3477 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { 3478 u8 type = state->stack[spi].slot_type[i]; 3479 3480 if (type != STACK_MISC && type != STACK_ZERO) { 3481 sanitize = true; 3482 break; 3483 } 3484 } 3485 3486 if (sanitize) 3487 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].sanitize_stack_spill = true; 3488 } 3489 3490 err = destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(env, state, spi); 3491 if (err) 3492 return err; 3493 3494 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi); 3495 if (reg && !(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && register_is_bounded(reg) && 3496 !register_is_null(reg) && env->bpf_capable) { 3497 if (dst_reg != BPF_REG_FP) { 3498 /* The backtracking logic can only recognize explicit 3499 * stack slot address like [fp - 8]. Other spill of 3500 * scalar via different register has to be conservative. 3501 * Backtrack from here and mark all registers as precise 3502 * that contributed into 'reg' being a constant. 3503 */ 3504 err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno); 3505 if (err) 3506 return err; 3507 } 3508 save_register_state(state, spi, reg, size); 3509 } else if (reg && is_spillable_regtype(reg->type)) { 3510 /* register containing pointer is being spilled into stack */ 3511 if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { 3512 verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; "); 3513 verbose(env, "invalid size of register spill\n"); 3514 return -EACCES; 3515 } 3516 if (state != cur && reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 3517 verbose(env, "cannot spill pointers to stack into stack frame of the caller\n"); 3518 return -EINVAL; 3519 } 3520 save_register_state(state, spi, reg, size); 3521 } else { 3522 u8 type = STACK_MISC; 3523 3524 /* regular write of data into stack destroys any spilled ptr */ 3525 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type = NOT_INIT; 3526 /* Mark slots as STACK_MISC if they belonged to spilled ptr. */ 3527 if (is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[spi])) 3528 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) 3529 scrub_spilled_slot(&state->stack[spi].slot_type[i]); 3530 3531 /* only mark the slot as written if all 8 bytes were written 3532 * otherwise read propagation may incorrectly stop too soon 3533 * when stack slots are partially written. 3534 * This heuristic means that read propagation will be 3535 * conservative, since it will add reg_live_read marks 3536 * to stack slots all the way to first state when programs 3537 * writes+reads less than 8 bytes 3538 */ 3539 if (size == BPF_REG_SIZE) 3540 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 3541 3542 /* when we zero initialize stack slots mark them as such */ 3543 if (reg && register_is_null(reg)) { 3544 /* backtracking doesn't work for STACK_ZERO yet. */ 3545 err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno); 3546 if (err) 3547 return err; 3548 type = STACK_ZERO; 3549 } 3550 3551 /* Mark slots affected by this stack write. */ 3552 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) 3553 state->stack[spi].slot_type[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] = 3554 type; 3555 } 3556 return 0; 3557 } 3558 3559 /* Write the stack: 'stack[ptr_regno + off] = value_regno'. 'ptr_regno' is 3560 * known to contain a variable offset. 3561 * This function checks whether the write is permitted and conservatively 3562 * tracks the effects of the write, considering that each stack slot in the 3563 * dynamic range is potentially written to. 3564 * 3565 * 'off' includes 'regno->off'. 3566 * 'value_regno' can be -1, meaning that an unknown value is being written to 3567 * the stack. 3568 * 3569 * Spilled pointers in range are not marked as written because we don't know 3570 * what's going to be actually written. This means that read propagation for 3571 * future reads cannot be terminated by this write. 3572 * 3573 * For privileged programs, uninitialized stack slots are considered 3574 * initialized by this write (even though we don't know exactly what offsets 3575 * are going to be written to). The idea is that we don't want the verifier to 3576 * reject future reads that access slots written to through variable offsets. 3577 */ 3578 static int check_stack_write_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3579 /* func where register points to */ 3580 struct bpf_func_state *state, 3581 int ptr_regno, int off, int size, 3582 int value_regno, int insn_idx) 3583 { 3584 struct bpf_func_state *cur; /* state of the current function */ 3585 int min_off, max_off; 3586 int i, err; 3587 struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, *value_reg = NULL; 3588 bool writing_zero = false; 3589 /* set if the fact that we're writing a zero is used to let any 3590 * stack slots remain STACK_ZERO 3591 */ 3592 bool zero_used = false; 3593 3594 cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe]; 3595 ptr_reg = &cur->regs[ptr_regno]; 3596 min_off = ptr_reg->smin_value + off; 3597 max_off = ptr_reg->smax_value + off + size; 3598 if (value_regno >= 0) 3599 value_reg = &cur->regs[value_regno]; 3600 if (value_reg && register_is_null(value_reg)) 3601 writing_zero = true; 3602 3603 err = grow_stack_state(state, round_up(-min_off, BPF_REG_SIZE)); 3604 if (err) 3605 return err; 3606 3607 for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) { 3608 int spi; 3609 3610 spi = __get_spi(i); 3611 err = destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(env, state, spi); 3612 if (err) 3613 return err; 3614 } 3615 3616 /* Variable offset writes destroy any spilled pointers in range. */ 3617 for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) { 3618 u8 new_type, *stype; 3619 int slot, spi; 3620 3621 slot = -i - 1; 3622 spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; 3623 stype = &state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE]; 3624 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi); 3625 3626 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && *stype != STACK_MISC && *stype != STACK_ZERO) { 3627 /* Reject the write if range we may write to has not 3628 * been initialized beforehand. If we didn't reject 3629 * here, the ptr status would be erased below (even 3630 * though not all slots are actually overwritten), 3631 * possibly opening the door to leaks. 3632 * 3633 * We do however catch STACK_INVALID case below, and 3634 * only allow reading possibly uninitialized memory 3635 * later for CAP_PERFMON, as the write may not happen to 3636 * that slot. 3637 */ 3638 verbose(env, "spilled ptr in range of var-offset stack write; insn %d, ptr off: %d", 3639 insn_idx, i); 3640 return -EINVAL; 3641 } 3642 3643 /* Erase all spilled pointers. */ 3644 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type = NOT_INIT; 3645 3646 /* Update the slot type. */ 3647 new_type = STACK_MISC; 3648 if (writing_zero && *stype == STACK_ZERO) { 3649 new_type = STACK_ZERO; 3650 zero_used = true; 3651 } 3652 /* If the slot is STACK_INVALID, we check whether it's OK to 3653 * pretend that it will be initialized by this write. The slot 3654 * might not actually be written to, and so if we mark it as 3655 * initialized future reads might leak uninitialized memory. 3656 * For privileged programs, we will accept such reads to slots 3657 * that may or may not be written because, if we're reject 3658 * them, the error would be too confusing. 3659 */ 3660 if (*stype == STACK_INVALID && !env->allow_uninit_stack) { 3661 verbose(env, "uninit stack in range of var-offset write prohibited for !root; insn %d, off: %d", 3662 insn_idx, i); 3663 return -EINVAL; 3664 } 3665 *stype = new_type; 3666 } 3667 if (zero_used) { 3668 /* backtracking doesn't work for STACK_ZERO yet. */ 3669 err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno); 3670 if (err) 3671 return err; 3672 } 3673 return 0; 3674 } 3675 3676 /* When register 'dst_regno' is assigned some values from stack[min_off, 3677 * max_off), we set the register's type according to the types of the 3678 * respective stack slots. If all the stack values are known to be zeros, then 3679 * so is the destination reg. Otherwise, the register is considered to be 3680 * SCALAR. This function does not deal with register filling; the caller must 3681 * ensure that all spilled registers in the stack range have been marked as 3682 * read. 3683 */ 3684 static void mark_reg_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3685 /* func where src register points to */ 3686 struct bpf_func_state *ptr_state, 3687 int min_off, int max_off, int dst_regno) 3688 { 3689 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 3690 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 3691 int i, slot, spi; 3692 u8 *stype; 3693 int zeros = 0; 3694 3695 for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) { 3696 slot = -i - 1; 3697 spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; 3698 stype = ptr_state->stack[spi].slot_type; 3699 if (stype[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE] != STACK_ZERO) 3700 break; 3701 zeros++; 3702 } 3703 if (zeros == max_off - min_off) { 3704 /* any access_size read into register is zero extended, 3705 * so the whole register == const_zero 3706 */ 3707 __mark_reg_const_zero(&state->regs[dst_regno]); 3708 /* backtracking doesn't support STACK_ZERO yet, 3709 * so mark it precise here, so that later 3710 * backtracking can stop here. 3711 * Backtracking may not need this if this register 3712 * doesn't participate in pointer adjustment. 3713 * Forward propagation of precise flag is not 3714 * necessary either. This mark is only to stop 3715 * backtracking. Any register that contributed 3716 * to const 0 was marked precise before spill. 3717 */ 3718 state->regs[dst_regno].precise = true; 3719 } else { 3720 /* have read misc data from the stack */ 3721 mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, dst_regno); 3722 } 3723 state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 3724 } 3725 3726 /* Read the stack at 'off' and put the results into the register indicated by 3727 * 'dst_regno'. It handles reg filling if the addressed stack slot is a 3728 * spilled reg. 3729 * 3730 * 'dst_regno' can be -1, meaning that the read value is not going to a 3731 * register. 3732 * 3733 * The access is assumed to be within the current stack bounds. 3734 */ 3735 static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3736 /* func where src register points to */ 3737 struct bpf_func_state *reg_state, 3738 int off, int size, int dst_regno) 3739 { 3740 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 3741 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 3742 int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; 3743 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 3744 u8 *stype, type; 3745 3746 stype = reg_state->stack[spi].slot_type; 3747 reg = ®_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 3748 3749 if (is_spilled_reg(®_state->stack[spi])) { 3750 u8 spill_size = 1; 3751 3752 for (i = BPF_REG_SIZE - 1; i > 0 && stype[i - 1] == STACK_SPILL; i--) 3753 spill_size++; 3754 3755 if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE || spill_size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { 3756 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 3757 verbose_linfo(env, env->insn_idx, "; "); 3758 verbose(env, "invalid size of register fill\n"); 3759 return -EACCES; 3760 } 3761 3762 mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 3763 if (dst_regno < 0) 3764 return 0; 3765 3766 if (!(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && size == spill_size) { 3767 /* The earlier check_reg_arg() has decided the 3768 * subreg_def for this insn. Save it first. 3769 */ 3770 s32 subreg_def = state->regs[dst_regno].subreg_def; 3771 3772 state->regs[dst_regno] = *reg; 3773 state->regs[dst_regno].subreg_def = subreg_def; 3774 } else { 3775 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { 3776 type = stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE]; 3777 if (type == STACK_SPILL) 3778 continue; 3779 if (type == STACK_MISC) 3780 continue; 3781 verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n", 3782 off, i, size); 3783 return -EACCES; 3784 } 3785 mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, dst_regno); 3786 } 3787 state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 3788 return 0; 3789 } 3790 3791 if (dst_regno >= 0) { 3792 /* restore register state from stack */ 3793 state->regs[dst_regno] = *reg; 3794 /* mark reg as written since spilled pointer state likely 3795 * has its liveness marks cleared by is_state_visited() 3796 * which resets stack/reg liveness for state transitions 3797 */ 3798 state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 3799 } else if (__is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, reg)) { 3800 /* If dst_regno==-1, the caller is asking us whether 3801 * it is acceptable to use this value as a SCALAR_VALUE 3802 * (e.g. for XADD). 3803 * We must not allow unprivileged callers to do that 3804 * with spilled pointers. 3805 */ 3806 verbose(env, "leaking pointer from stack off %d\n", 3807 off); 3808 return -EACCES; 3809 } 3810 mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 3811 } else { 3812 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { 3813 type = stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE]; 3814 if (type == STACK_MISC) 3815 continue; 3816 if (type == STACK_ZERO) 3817 continue; 3818 verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n", 3819 off, i, size); 3820 return -EACCES; 3821 } 3822 mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 3823 if (dst_regno >= 0) 3824 mark_reg_stack_read(env, reg_state, off, off + size, dst_regno); 3825 } 3826 return 0; 3827 } 3828 3829 enum bpf_access_src { 3830 ACCESS_DIRECT = 1, /* the access is performed by an instruction */ 3831 ACCESS_HELPER = 2, /* the access is performed by a helper */ 3832 }; 3833 3834 static int check_stack_range_initialized(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3835 int regno, int off, int access_size, 3836 bool zero_size_allowed, 3837 enum bpf_access_src type, 3838 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta); 3839 3840 static struct bpf_reg_state *reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 3841 { 3842 return cur_regs(env) + regno; 3843 } 3844 3845 /* Read the stack at 'ptr_regno + off' and put the result into the register 3846 * 'dst_regno'. 3847 * 'off' includes the pointer register's fixed offset(i.e. 'ptr_regno.off'), 3848 * but not its variable offset. 3849 * 'size' is assumed to be <= reg size and the access is assumed to be aligned. 3850 * 3851 * As opposed to check_stack_read_fixed_off, this function doesn't deal with 3852 * filling registers (i.e. reads of spilled register cannot be detected when 3853 * the offset is not fixed). We conservatively mark 'dst_regno' as containing 3854 * SCALAR_VALUE. That's why we assert that the 'ptr_regno' has a variable 3855 * offset; for a fixed offset check_stack_read_fixed_off should be used 3856 * instead. 3857 */ 3858 static int check_stack_read_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3859 int ptr_regno, int off, int size, int dst_regno) 3860 { 3861 /* The state of the source register. */ 3862 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno); 3863 struct bpf_func_state *ptr_state = func(env, reg); 3864 int err; 3865 int min_off, max_off; 3866 3867 /* Note that we pass a NULL meta, so raw access will not be permitted. 3868 */ 3869 err = check_stack_range_initialized(env, ptr_regno, off, size, 3870 false, ACCESS_DIRECT, NULL); 3871 if (err) 3872 return err; 3873 3874 min_off = reg->smin_value + off; 3875 max_off = reg->smax_value + off; 3876 mark_reg_stack_read(env, ptr_state, min_off, max_off + size, dst_regno); 3877 return 0; 3878 } 3879 3880 /* check_stack_read dispatches to check_stack_read_fixed_off or 3881 * check_stack_read_var_off. 3882 * 3883 * The caller must ensure that the offset falls within the allocated stack 3884 * bounds. 3885 * 3886 * 'dst_regno' is a register which will receive the value from the stack. It 3887 * can be -1, meaning that the read value is not going to a register. 3888 */ 3889 static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3890 int ptr_regno, int off, int size, 3891 int dst_regno) 3892 { 3893 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno); 3894 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 3895 int err; 3896 /* Some accesses are only permitted with a static offset. */ 3897 bool var_off = !tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 3898 3899 /* The offset is required to be static when reads don't go to a 3900 * register, in order to not leak pointers (see 3901 * check_stack_read_fixed_off). 3902 */ 3903 if (dst_regno < 0 && var_off) { 3904 char tn_buf[48]; 3905 3906 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 3907 verbose(env, "variable offset stack pointer cannot be passed into helper function; var_off=%s off=%d size=%d\n", 3908 tn_buf, off, size); 3909 return -EACCES; 3910 } 3911 /* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for simplicity 3912 * since it requires corresponding support in Spectre masking for stack 3913 * ALU. See also retrieve_ptr_limit(). 3914 */ 3915 if (!env->bypass_spec_v1 && var_off) { 3916 char tn_buf[48]; 3917 3918 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 3919 verbose(env, "R%d variable offset stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n", 3920 ptr_regno, tn_buf); 3921 return -EACCES; 3922 } 3923 3924 if (!var_off) { 3925 off += reg->var_off.value; 3926 err = check_stack_read_fixed_off(env, state, off, size, 3927 dst_regno); 3928 } else { 3929 /* Variable offset stack reads need more conservative handling 3930 * than fixed offset ones. Note that dst_regno >= 0 on this 3931 * branch. 3932 */ 3933 err = check_stack_read_var_off(env, ptr_regno, off, size, 3934 dst_regno); 3935 } 3936 return err; 3937 } 3938 3939 3940 /* check_stack_write dispatches to check_stack_write_fixed_off or 3941 * check_stack_write_var_off. 3942 * 3943 * 'ptr_regno' is the register used as a pointer into the stack. 3944 * 'off' includes 'ptr_regno->off', but not its variable offset (if any). 3945 * 'value_regno' is the register whose value we're writing to the stack. It can 3946 * be -1, meaning that we're not writing from a register. 3947 * 3948 * The caller must ensure that the offset falls within the maximum stack size. 3949 */ 3950 static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3951 int ptr_regno, int off, int size, 3952 int value_regno, int insn_idx) 3953 { 3954 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno); 3955 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 3956 int err; 3957 3958 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 3959 off += reg->var_off.value; 3960 err = check_stack_write_fixed_off(env, state, off, size, 3961 value_regno, insn_idx); 3962 } else { 3963 /* Variable offset stack reads need more conservative handling 3964 * than fixed offset ones. 3965 */ 3966 err = check_stack_write_var_off(env, state, 3967 ptr_regno, off, size, 3968 value_regno, insn_idx); 3969 } 3970 return err; 3971 } 3972 3973 static int check_map_access_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 3974 int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type) 3975 { 3976 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 3977 struct bpf_map *map = regs[regno].map_ptr; 3978 u32 cap = bpf_map_flags_to_cap(map); 3979 3980 if (type == BPF_WRITE && !(cap & BPF_MAP_CAN_WRITE)) { 3981 verbose(env, "write into map forbidden, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", 3982 map->value_size, off, size); 3983 return -EACCES; 3984 } 3985 3986 if (type == BPF_READ && !(cap & BPF_MAP_CAN_READ)) { 3987 verbose(env, "read from map forbidden, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", 3988 map->value_size, off, size); 3989 return -EACCES; 3990 } 3991 3992 return 0; 3993 } 3994 3995 /* check read/write into memory region (e.g., map value, ringbuf sample, etc) */ 3996 static int __check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 3997 int off, int size, u32 mem_size, 3998 bool zero_size_allowed) 3999 { 4000 bool size_ok = size > 0 || (size == 0 && zero_size_allowed); 4001 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 4002 4003 if (off >= 0 && size_ok && (u64)off + size <= mem_size) 4004 return 0; 4005 4006 reg = &cur_regs(env)[regno]; 4007 switch (reg->type) { 4008 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 4009 verbose(env, "invalid access to map key, key_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", 4010 mem_size, off, size); 4011 break; 4012 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 4013 verbose(env, "invalid access to map value, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", 4014 mem_size, off, size); 4015 break; 4016 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 4017 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 4018 case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: 4019 verbose(env, "invalid access to packet, off=%d size=%d, R%d(id=%d,off=%d,r=%d)\n", 4020 off, size, regno, reg->id, off, mem_size); 4021 break; 4022 case PTR_TO_MEM: 4023 default: 4024 verbose(env, "invalid access to memory, mem_size=%u off=%d size=%d\n", 4025 mem_size, off, size); 4026 } 4027 4028 return -EACCES; 4029 } 4030 4031 /* check read/write into a memory region with possible variable offset */ 4032 static int check_mem_region_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 4033 int off, int size, u32 mem_size, 4034 bool zero_size_allowed) 4035 { 4036 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 4037 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 4038 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno]; 4039 int err; 4040 4041 /* We may have adjusted the register pointing to memory region, so we 4042 * need to try adding each of min_value and max_value to off 4043 * to make sure our theoretical access will be safe. 4044 * 4045 * The minimum value is only important with signed 4046 * comparisons where we can't assume the floor of a 4047 * value is 0. If we are using signed variables for our 4048 * index'es we need to make sure that whatever we use 4049 * will have a set floor within our range. 4050 */ 4051 if (reg->smin_value < 0 && 4052 (reg->smin_value == S64_MIN || 4053 (off + reg->smin_value != (s64)(s32)(off + reg->smin_value)) || 4054 reg->smin_value + off < 0)) { 4055 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", 4056 regno); 4057 return -EACCES; 4058 } 4059 err = __check_mem_access(env, regno, reg->smin_value + off, size, 4060 mem_size, zero_size_allowed); 4061 if (err) { 4062 verbose(env, "R%d min value is outside of the allowed memory range\n", 4063 regno); 4064 return err; 4065 } 4066 4067 /* If we haven't set a max value then we need to bail since we can't be 4068 * sure we won't do bad things. 4069 * If reg->umax_value + off could overflow, treat that as unbounded too. 4070 */ 4071 if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 4072 verbose(env, "R%d unbounded memory access, make sure to bounds check any such access\n", 4073 regno); 4074 return -EACCES; 4075 } 4076 err = __check_mem_access(env, regno, reg->umax_value + off, size, 4077 mem_size, zero_size_allowed); 4078 if (err) { 4079 verbose(env, "R%d max value is outside of the allowed memory range\n", 4080 regno); 4081 return err; 4082 } 4083 4084 return 0; 4085 } 4086 4087 static int __check_ptr_off_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4088 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno, 4089 bool fixed_off_ok) 4090 { 4091 /* Access to this pointer-typed register or passing it to a helper 4092 * is only allowed in its original, unmodified form. 4093 */ 4094 4095 if (reg->off < 0) { 4096 verbose(env, "negative offset %s ptr R%d off=%d disallowed\n", 4097 reg_type_str(env, reg->type), regno, reg->off); 4098 return -EACCES; 4099 } 4100 4101 if (!fixed_off_ok && reg->off) { 4102 verbose(env, "dereference of modified %s ptr R%d off=%d disallowed\n", 4103 reg_type_str(env, reg->type), regno, reg->off); 4104 return -EACCES; 4105 } 4106 4107 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) { 4108 char tn_buf[48]; 4109 4110 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 4111 verbose(env, "variable %s access var_off=%s disallowed\n", 4112 reg_type_str(env, reg->type), tn_buf); 4113 return -EACCES; 4114 } 4115 4116 return 0; 4117 } 4118 4119 int check_ptr_off_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4120 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno) 4121 { 4122 return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, false); 4123 } 4124 4125 static int map_kptr_match_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4126 struct btf_field *kptr_field, 4127 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno) 4128 { 4129 const char *targ_name = kernel_type_name(kptr_field->kptr.btf, kptr_field->kptr.btf_id); 4130 int perm_flags = PTR_MAYBE_NULL | PTR_TRUSTED; 4131 const char *reg_name = ""; 4132 4133 /* Only unreferenced case accepts untrusted pointers */ 4134 if (kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_UNREF) 4135 perm_flags |= PTR_UNTRUSTED; 4136 4137 if (base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID || (type_flag(reg->type) & ~perm_flags)) 4138 goto bad_type; 4139 4140 if (!btf_is_kernel(reg->btf)) { 4141 verbose(env, "R%d must point to kernel BTF\n", regno); 4142 return -EINVAL; 4143 } 4144 /* We need to verify reg->type and reg->btf, before accessing reg->btf */ 4145 reg_name = kernel_type_name(reg->btf, reg->btf_id); 4146 4147 /* For ref_ptr case, release function check should ensure we get one 4148 * referenced PTR_TO_BTF_ID, and that its fixed offset is 0. For the 4149 * normal store of unreferenced kptr, we must ensure var_off is zero. 4150 * Since ref_ptr cannot be accessed directly by BPF insns, checks for 4151 * reg->off and reg->ref_obj_id are not needed here. 4152 */ 4153 if (__check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, true)) 4154 return -EACCES; 4155 4156 /* A full type match is needed, as BTF can be vmlinux or module BTF, and 4157 * we also need to take into account the reg->off. 4158 * 4159 * We want to support cases like: 4160 * 4161 * struct foo { 4162 * struct bar br; 4163 * struct baz bz; 4164 * }; 4165 * 4166 * struct foo *v; 4167 * v = func(); // PTR_TO_BTF_ID 4168 * val->foo = v; // reg->off is zero, btf and btf_id match type 4169 * val->bar = &v->br; // reg->off is still zero, but we need to retry with 4170 * // first member type of struct after comparison fails 4171 * val->baz = &v->bz; // reg->off is non-zero, so struct needs to be walked 4172 * // to match type 4173 * 4174 * In the kptr_ref case, check_func_arg_reg_off already ensures reg->off 4175 * is zero. We must also ensure that btf_struct_ids_match does not walk 4176 * the struct to match type against first member of struct, i.e. reject 4177 * second case from above. Hence, when type is BPF_KPTR_REF, we set 4178 * strict mode to true for type match. 4179 */ 4180 if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg->btf, reg->btf_id, reg->off, 4181 kptr_field->kptr.btf, kptr_field->kptr.btf_id, 4182 kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_REF)) 4183 goto bad_type; 4184 return 0; 4185 bad_type: 4186 verbose(env, "invalid kptr access, R%d type=%s%s ", regno, 4187 reg_type_str(env, reg->type), reg_name); 4188 verbose(env, "expected=%s%s", reg_type_str(env, PTR_TO_BTF_ID), targ_name); 4189 if (kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_UNREF) 4190 verbose(env, " or %s%s\n", reg_type_str(env, PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED), 4191 targ_name); 4192 else 4193 verbose(env, "\n"); 4194 return -EINVAL; 4195 } 4196 4197 static int check_map_kptr_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 4198 int value_regno, int insn_idx, 4199 struct btf_field *kptr_field) 4200 { 4201 struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx]; 4202 int class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); 4203 struct bpf_reg_state *val_reg; 4204 4205 /* Things we already checked for in check_map_access and caller: 4206 * - Reject cases where variable offset may touch kptr 4207 * - size of access (must be BPF_DW) 4208 * - tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) 4209 * - kptr_field->offset == off + reg->var_off.value 4210 */ 4211 /* Only BPF_[LDX,STX,ST] | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW is supported */ 4212 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) { 4213 verbose(env, "kptr in map can only be accessed using BPF_MEM instruction mode\n"); 4214 return -EACCES; 4215 } 4216 4217 /* We only allow loading referenced kptr, since it will be marked as 4218 * untrusted, similar to unreferenced kptr. 4219 */ 4220 if (class != BPF_LDX && kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_REF) { 4221 verbose(env, "store to referenced kptr disallowed\n"); 4222 return -EACCES; 4223 } 4224 4225 if (class == BPF_LDX) { 4226 val_reg = reg_state(env, value_regno); 4227 /* We can simply mark the value_regno receiving the pointer 4228 * value from map as PTR_TO_BTF_ID, with the correct type. 4229 */ 4230 mark_btf_ld_reg(env, cur_regs(env), value_regno, PTR_TO_BTF_ID, kptr_field->kptr.btf, 4231 kptr_field->kptr.btf_id, PTR_MAYBE_NULL | PTR_UNTRUSTED); 4232 /* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg */ 4233 val_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 4234 } else if (class == BPF_STX) { 4235 val_reg = reg_state(env, value_regno); 4236 if (!register_is_null(val_reg) && 4237 map_kptr_match_type(env, kptr_field, val_reg, value_regno)) 4238 return -EACCES; 4239 } else if (class == BPF_ST) { 4240 if (insn->imm) { 4241 verbose(env, "BPF_ST imm must be 0 when storing to kptr at off=%u\n", 4242 kptr_field->offset); 4243 return -EACCES; 4244 } 4245 } else { 4246 verbose(env, "kptr in map can only be accessed using BPF_LDX/BPF_STX/BPF_ST\n"); 4247 return -EACCES; 4248 } 4249 return 0; 4250 } 4251 4252 /* check read/write into a map element with possible variable offset */ 4253 static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 4254 int off, int size, bool zero_size_allowed, 4255 enum bpf_access_src src) 4256 { 4257 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 4258 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 4259 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno]; 4260 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 4261 struct btf_record *rec; 4262 int err, i; 4263 4264 err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size, map->value_size, 4265 zero_size_allowed); 4266 if (err) 4267 return err; 4268 4269 if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(map->record)) 4270 return 0; 4271 rec = map->record; 4272 for (i = 0; i < rec->cnt; i++) { 4273 struct btf_field *field = &rec->fields[i]; 4274 u32 p = field->offset; 4275 4276 /* If any part of a field can be touched by load/store, reject 4277 * this program. To check that [x1, x2) overlaps with [y1, y2), 4278 * it is sufficient to check x1 < y2 && y1 < x2. 4279 */ 4280 if (reg->smin_value + off < p + btf_field_type_size(field->type) && 4281 p < reg->umax_value + off + size) { 4282 switch (field->type) { 4283 case BPF_KPTR_UNREF: 4284 case BPF_KPTR_REF: 4285 if (src != ACCESS_DIRECT) { 4286 verbose(env, "kptr cannot be accessed indirectly by helper\n"); 4287 return -EACCES; 4288 } 4289 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 4290 verbose(env, "kptr access cannot have variable offset\n"); 4291 return -EACCES; 4292 } 4293 if (p != off + reg->var_off.value) { 4294 verbose(env, "kptr access misaligned expected=%u off=%llu\n", 4295 p, off + reg->var_off.value); 4296 return -EACCES; 4297 } 4298 if (size != bpf_size_to_bytes(BPF_DW)) { 4299 verbose(env, "kptr access size must be BPF_DW\n"); 4300 return -EACCES; 4301 } 4302 break; 4303 default: 4304 verbose(env, "%s cannot be accessed directly by load/store\n", 4305 btf_field_type_name(field->type)); 4306 return -EACCES; 4307 } 4308 } 4309 } 4310 return 0; 4311 } 4312 4313 #define MAX_PACKET_OFF 0xffff 4314 4315 static bool may_access_direct_pkt_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4316 const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 4317 enum bpf_access_type t) 4318 { 4319 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 4320 4321 switch (prog_type) { 4322 /* Program types only with direct read access go here! */ 4323 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN: 4324 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_OUT: 4325 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_SEG6LOCAL: 4326 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT: 4327 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR: 4328 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB: 4329 if (t == BPF_WRITE) 4330 return false; 4331 fallthrough; 4332 4333 /* Program types with direct read + write access go here! */ 4334 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: 4335 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT: 4336 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP: 4337 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT: 4338 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_SKB: 4339 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_MSG: 4340 if (meta) 4341 return meta->pkt_access; 4342 4343 env->seen_direct_write = true; 4344 return true; 4345 4346 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT: 4347 if (t == BPF_WRITE) 4348 env->seen_direct_write = true; 4349 4350 return true; 4351 4352 default: 4353 return false; 4354 } 4355 } 4356 4357 static int check_packet_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off, 4358 int size, bool zero_size_allowed) 4359 { 4360 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 4361 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; 4362 int err; 4363 4364 /* We may have added a variable offset to the packet pointer; but any 4365 * reg->range we have comes after that. We are only checking the fixed 4366 * offset. 4367 */ 4368 4369 /* We don't allow negative numbers, because we aren't tracking enough 4370 * detail to prove they're safe. 4371 */ 4372 if (reg->smin_value < 0) { 4373 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", 4374 regno); 4375 return -EACCES; 4376 } 4377 4378 err = reg->range < 0 ? -EINVAL : 4379 __check_mem_access(env, regno, off, size, reg->range, 4380 zero_size_allowed); 4381 if (err) { 4382 verbose(env, "R%d offset is outside of the packet\n", regno); 4383 return err; 4384 } 4385 4386 /* __check_mem_access has made sure "off + size - 1" is within u16. 4387 * reg->umax_value can't be bigger than MAX_PACKET_OFF which is 0xffff, 4388 * otherwise find_good_pkt_pointers would have refused to set range info 4389 * that __check_mem_access would have rejected this pkt access. 4390 * Therefore, "off + reg->umax_value + size - 1" won't overflow u32. 4391 */ 4392 env->prog->aux->max_pkt_offset = 4393 max_t(u32, env->prog->aux->max_pkt_offset, 4394 off + reg->umax_value + size - 1); 4395 4396 return err; 4397 } 4398 4399 /* check access to 'struct bpf_context' fields. Supports fixed offsets only */ 4400 static int check_ctx_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, int off, int size, 4401 enum bpf_access_type t, enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type, 4402 struct btf **btf, u32 *btf_id) 4403 { 4404 struct bpf_insn_access_aux info = { 4405 .reg_type = *reg_type, 4406 .log = &env->log, 4407 }; 4408 4409 if (env->ops->is_valid_access && 4410 env->ops->is_valid_access(off, size, t, env->prog, &info)) { 4411 /* A non zero info.ctx_field_size indicates that this field is a 4412 * candidate for later verifier transformation to load the whole 4413 * field and then apply a mask when accessed with a narrower 4414 * access than actual ctx access size. A zero info.ctx_field_size 4415 * will only allow for whole field access and rejects any other 4416 * type of narrower access. 4417 */ 4418 *reg_type = info.reg_type; 4419 4420 if (base_type(*reg_type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 4421 *btf = info.btf; 4422 *btf_id = info.btf_id; 4423 } else { 4424 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ctx_field_size = info.ctx_field_size; 4425 } 4426 /* remember the offset of last byte accessed in ctx */ 4427 if (env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset < off + size) 4428 env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset = off + size; 4429 return 0; 4430 } 4431 4432 verbose(env, "invalid bpf_context access off=%d size=%d\n", off, size); 4433 return -EACCES; 4434 } 4435 4436 static int check_flow_keys_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off, 4437 int size) 4438 { 4439 if (size < 0 || off < 0 || 4440 (u64)off + size > sizeof(struct bpf_flow_keys)) { 4441 verbose(env, "invalid access to flow keys off=%d size=%d\n", 4442 off, size); 4443 return -EACCES; 4444 } 4445 return 0; 4446 } 4447 4448 static int check_sock_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, 4449 u32 regno, int off, int size, 4450 enum bpf_access_type t) 4451 { 4452 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 4453 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; 4454 struct bpf_insn_access_aux info = {}; 4455 bool valid; 4456 4457 if (reg->smin_value < 0) { 4458 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", 4459 regno); 4460 return -EACCES; 4461 } 4462 4463 switch (reg->type) { 4464 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 4465 valid = bpf_sock_common_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); 4466 break; 4467 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 4468 valid = bpf_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); 4469 break; 4470 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 4471 valid = bpf_tcp_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); 4472 break; 4473 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 4474 valid = bpf_xdp_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); 4475 break; 4476 default: 4477 valid = false; 4478 } 4479 4480 4481 if (valid) { 4482 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ctx_field_size = 4483 info.ctx_field_size; 4484 return 0; 4485 } 4486 4487 verbose(env, "R%d invalid %s access off=%d size=%d\n", 4488 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type), off, size); 4489 4490 return -EACCES; 4491 } 4492 4493 static bool is_pointer_value(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 4494 { 4495 return __is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, reg_state(env, regno)); 4496 } 4497 4498 static bool is_ctx_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 4499 { 4500 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 4501 4502 return reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX; 4503 } 4504 4505 static bool is_sk_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 4506 { 4507 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 4508 4509 return type_is_sk_pointer(reg->type); 4510 } 4511 4512 static bool is_pkt_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 4513 { 4514 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 4515 4516 return type_is_pkt_pointer(reg->type); 4517 } 4518 4519 static bool is_flow_key_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 4520 { 4521 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 4522 4523 /* Separate to is_ctx_reg() since we still want to allow BPF_ST here. */ 4524 return reg->type == PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS; 4525 } 4526 4527 static bool is_trusted_reg(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 4528 { 4529 /* A referenced register is always trusted. */ 4530 if (reg->ref_obj_id) 4531 return true; 4532 4533 /* If a register is not referenced, it is trusted if it has the 4534 * MEM_ALLOC or PTR_TRUSTED type modifiers, and no others. Some of the 4535 * other type modifiers may be safe, but we elect to take an opt-in 4536 * approach here as some (e.g. PTR_UNTRUSTED and PTR_MAYBE_NULL) are 4537 * not. 4538 * 4539 * Eventually, we should make PTR_TRUSTED the single source of truth 4540 * for whether a register is trusted. 4541 */ 4542 return type_flag(reg->type) & BPF_REG_TRUSTED_MODIFIERS && 4543 !bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg->type); 4544 } 4545 4546 static bool is_rcu_reg(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 4547 { 4548 return reg->type & MEM_RCU; 4549 } 4550 4551 static int check_pkt_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4552 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 4553 int off, int size, bool strict) 4554 { 4555 struct tnum reg_off; 4556 int ip_align; 4557 4558 /* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */ 4559 if (!strict || size == 1) 4560 return 0; 4561 4562 /* For platforms that do not have a Kconfig enabling 4563 * CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS the value of 4564 * NET_IP_ALIGN is universally set to '2'. And on platforms 4565 * that do set CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS, we get 4566 * to this code only in strict mode where we want to emulate 4567 * the NET_IP_ALIGN==2 checking. Therefore use an 4568 * unconditional IP align value of '2'. 4569 */ 4570 ip_align = 2; 4571 4572 reg_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, tnum_const(ip_align + reg->off + off)); 4573 if (!tnum_is_aligned(reg_off, size)) { 4574 char tn_buf[48]; 4575 4576 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 4577 verbose(env, 4578 "misaligned packet access off %d+%s+%d+%d size %d\n", 4579 ip_align, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size); 4580 return -EACCES; 4581 } 4582 4583 return 0; 4584 } 4585 4586 static int check_generic_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4587 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 4588 const char *pointer_desc, 4589 int off, int size, bool strict) 4590 { 4591 struct tnum reg_off; 4592 4593 /* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */ 4594 if (!strict || size == 1) 4595 return 0; 4596 4597 reg_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, tnum_const(reg->off + off)); 4598 if (!tnum_is_aligned(reg_off, size)) { 4599 char tn_buf[48]; 4600 4601 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 4602 verbose(env, "misaligned %saccess off %s+%d+%d size %d\n", 4603 pointer_desc, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size); 4604 return -EACCES; 4605 } 4606 4607 return 0; 4608 } 4609 4610 static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4611 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int off, 4612 int size, bool strict_alignment_once) 4613 { 4614 bool strict = env->strict_alignment || strict_alignment_once; 4615 const char *pointer_desc = ""; 4616 4617 switch (reg->type) { 4618 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 4619 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 4620 /* Special case, because of NET_IP_ALIGN. Given metadata sits 4621 * right in front, treat it the very same way. 4622 */ 4623 return check_pkt_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size, strict); 4624 case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS: 4625 pointer_desc = "flow keys "; 4626 break; 4627 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 4628 pointer_desc = "key "; 4629 break; 4630 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 4631 pointer_desc = "value "; 4632 break; 4633 case PTR_TO_CTX: 4634 pointer_desc = "context "; 4635 break; 4636 case PTR_TO_STACK: 4637 pointer_desc = "stack "; 4638 /* The stack spill tracking logic in check_stack_write_fixed_off() 4639 * and check_stack_read_fixed_off() relies on stack accesses being 4640 * aligned. 4641 */ 4642 strict = true; 4643 break; 4644 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 4645 pointer_desc = "sock "; 4646 break; 4647 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 4648 pointer_desc = "sock_common "; 4649 break; 4650 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 4651 pointer_desc = "tcp_sock "; 4652 break; 4653 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 4654 pointer_desc = "xdp_sock "; 4655 break; 4656 default: 4657 break; 4658 } 4659 return check_generic_ptr_alignment(env, reg, pointer_desc, off, size, 4660 strict); 4661 } 4662 4663 static int update_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4664 const struct bpf_func_state *func, 4665 int off) 4666 { 4667 u16 stack = env->subprog_info[func->subprogno].stack_depth; 4668 4669 if (stack >= -off) 4670 return 0; 4671 4672 /* update known max for given subprogram */ 4673 env->subprog_info[func->subprogno].stack_depth = -off; 4674 return 0; 4675 } 4676 4677 /* starting from main bpf function walk all instructions of the function 4678 * and recursively walk all callees that given function can call. 4679 * Ignore jump and exit insns. 4680 * Since recursion is prevented by check_cfg() this algorithm 4681 * only needs a local stack of MAX_CALL_FRAMES to remember callsites 4682 */ 4683 static int check_max_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 4684 { 4685 int depth = 0, frame = 0, idx = 0, i = 0, subprog_end; 4686 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info; 4687 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 4688 bool tail_call_reachable = false; 4689 int ret_insn[MAX_CALL_FRAMES]; 4690 int ret_prog[MAX_CALL_FRAMES]; 4691 int j; 4692 4693 process_func: 4694 /* protect against potential stack overflow that might happen when 4695 * bpf2bpf calls get combined with tailcalls. Limit the caller's stack 4696 * depth for such case down to 256 so that the worst case scenario 4697 * would result in 8k stack size (32 which is tailcall limit * 256 = 4698 * 8k). 4699 * 4700 * To get the idea what might happen, see an example: 4701 * func1 -> sub rsp, 128 4702 * subfunc1 -> sub rsp, 256 4703 * tailcall1 -> add rsp, 256 4704 * func2 -> sub rsp, 192 (total stack size = 128 + 192 = 320) 4705 * subfunc2 -> sub rsp, 64 4706 * subfunc22 -> sub rsp, 128 4707 * tailcall2 -> add rsp, 128 4708 * func3 -> sub rsp, 32 (total stack size 128 + 192 + 64 + 32 = 416) 4709 * 4710 * tailcall will unwind the current stack frame but it will not get rid 4711 * of caller's stack as shown on the example above. 4712 */ 4713 if (idx && subprog[idx].has_tail_call && depth >= 256) { 4714 verbose(env, 4715 "tail_calls are not allowed when call stack of previous frames is %d bytes. Too large\n", 4716 depth); 4717 return -EACCES; 4718 } 4719 /* round up to 32-bytes, since this is granularity 4720 * of interpreter stack size 4721 */ 4722 depth += round_up(max_t(u32, subprog[idx].stack_depth, 1), 32); 4723 if (depth > MAX_BPF_STACK) { 4724 verbose(env, "combined stack size of %d calls is %d. Too large\n", 4725 frame + 1, depth); 4726 return -EACCES; 4727 } 4728 continue_func: 4729 subprog_end = subprog[idx + 1].start; 4730 for (; i < subprog_end; i++) { 4731 int next_insn; 4732 4733 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn + i) && !bpf_pseudo_func(insn + i)) 4734 continue; 4735 /* remember insn and function to return to */ 4736 ret_insn[frame] = i + 1; 4737 ret_prog[frame] = idx; 4738 4739 /* find the callee */ 4740 next_insn = i + insn[i].imm + 1; 4741 idx = find_subprog(env, next_insn); 4742 if (idx < 0) { 4743 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", 4744 next_insn); 4745 return -EFAULT; 4746 } 4747 if (subprog[idx].is_async_cb) { 4748 if (subprog[idx].has_tail_call) { 4749 verbose(env, "verifier bug. subprog has tail_call and async cb\n"); 4750 return -EFAULT; 4751 } 4752 /* async callbacks don't increase bpf prog stack size */ 4753 continue; 4754 } 4755 i = next_insn; 4756 4757 if (subprog[idx].has_tail_call) 4758 tail_call_reachable = true; 4759 4760 frame++; 4761 if (frame >= MAX_CALL_FRAMES) { 4762 verbose(env, "the call stack of %d frames is too deep !\n", 4763 frame); 4764 return -E2BIG; 4765 } 4766 goto process_func; 4767 } 4768 /* if tail call got detected across bpf2bpf calls then mark each of the 4769 * currently present subprog frames as tail call reachable subprogs; 4770 * this info will be utilized by JIT so that we will be preserving the 4771 * tail call counter throughout bpf2bpf calls combined with tailcalls 4772 */ 4773 if (tail_call_reachable) 4774 for (j = 0; j < frame; j++) 4775 subprog[ret_prog[j]].tail_call_reachable = true; 4776 if (subprog[0].tail_call_reachable) 4777 env->prog->aux->tail_call_reachable = true; 4778 4779 /* end of for() loop means the last insn of the 'subprog' 4780 * was reached. Doesn't matter whether it was JA or EXIT 4781 */ 4782 if (frame == 0) 4783 return 0; 4784 depth -= round_up(max_t(u32, subprog[idx].stack_depth, 1), 32); 4785 frame--; 4786 i = ret_insn[frame]; 4787 idx = ret_prog[frame]; 4788 goto continue_func; 4789 } 4790 4791 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON 4792 static int get_callee_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4793 const struct bpf_insn *insn, int idx) 4794 { 4795 int start = idx + insn->imm + 1, subprog; 4796 4797 subprog = find_subprog(env, start); 4798 if (subprog < 0) { 4799 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", 4800 start); 4801 return -EFAULT; 4802 } 4803 return env->subprog_info[subprog].stack_depth; 4804 } 4805 #endif 4806 4807 static int __check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4808 const char *buf_info, 4809 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 4810 int regno, int off, int size) 4811 { 4812 if (off < 0) { 4813 verbose(env, 4814 "R%d invalid %s buffer access: off=%d, size=%d\n", 4815 regno, buf_info, off, size); 4816 return -EACCES; 4817 } 4818 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) { 4819 char tn_buf[48]; 4820 4821 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 4822 verbose(env, 4823 "R%d invalid variable buffer offset: off=%d, var_off=%s\n", 4824 regno, off, tn_buf); 4825 return -EACCES; 4826 } 4827 4828 return 0; 4829 } 4830 4831 static int check_tp_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4832 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 4833 int regno, int off, int size) 4834 { 4835 int err; 4836 4837 err = __check_buffer_access(env, "tracepoint", reg, regno, off, size); 4838 if (err) 4839 return err; 4840 4841 if (off + size > env->prog->aux->max_tp_access) 4842 env->prog->aux->max_tp_access = off + size; 4843 4844 return 0; 4845 } 4846 4847 static int check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4848 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 4849 int regno, int off, int size, 4850 bool zero_size_allowed, 4851 u32 *max_access) 4852 { 4853 const char *buf_info = type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type) ? "rdonly" : "rdwr"; 4854 int err; 4855 4856 err = __check_buffer_access(env, buf_info, reg, regno, off, size); 4857 if (err) 4858 return err; 4859 4860 if (off + size > *max_access) 4861 *max_access = off + size; 4862 4863 return 0; 4864 } 4865 4866 /* BPF architecture zero extends alu32 ops into 64-bit registesr */ 4867 static void zext_32_to_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 4868 { 4869 reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off); 4870 __reg_assign_32_into_64(reg); 4871 } 4872 4873 /* truncate register to smaller size (in bytes) 4874 * must be called with size < BPF_REG_SIZE 4875 */ 4876 static void coerce_reg_to_size(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size) 4877 { 4878 u64 mask; 4879 4880 /* clear high bits in bit representation */ 4881 reg->var_off = tnum_cast(reg->var_off, size); 4882 4883 /* fix arithmetic bounds */ 4884 mask = ((u64)1 << (size * 8)) - 1; 4885 if ((reg->umin_value & ~mask) == (reg->umax_value & ~mask)) { 4886 reg->umin_value &= mask; 4887 reg->umax_value &= mask; 4888 } else { 4889 reg->umin_value = 0; 4890 reg->umax_value = mask; 4891 } 4892 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value; 4893 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value; 4894 4895 /* If size is smaller than 32bit register the 32bit register 4896 * values are also truncated so we push 64-bit bounds into 4897 * 32-bit bounds. Above were truncated < 32-bits already. 4898 */ 4899 if (size >= 4) 4900 return; 4901 __reg_combine_64_into_32(reg); 4902 } 4903 4904 static bool bpf_map_is_rdonly(const struct bpf_map *map) 4905 { 4906 /* A map is considered read-only if the following condition are true: 4907 * 4908 * 1) BPF program side cannot change any of the map content. The 4909 * BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG flag is throughout the lifetime of a map 4910 * and was set at map creation time. 4911 * 2) The map value(s) have been initialized from user space by a 4912 * loader and then "frozen", such that no new map update/delete 4913 * operations from syscall side are possible for the rest of 4914 * the map's lifetime from that point onwards. 4915 * 3) Any parallel/pending map update/delete operations from syscall 4916 * side have been completed. Only after that point, it's safe to 4917 * assume that map value(s) are immutable. 4918 */ 4919 return (map->map_flags & BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG) && 4920 READ_ONCE(map->frozen) && 4921 !bpf_map_write_active(map); 4922 } 4923 4924 static int bpf_map_direct_read(struct bpf_map *map, int off, int size, u64 *val) 4925 { 4926 void *ptr; 4927 u64 addr; 4928 int err; 4929 4930 err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &addr, off); 4931 if (err) 4932 return err; 4933 ptr = (void *)(long)addr + off; 4934 4935 switch (size) { 4936 case sizeof(u8): 4937 *val = (u64)*(u8 *)ptr; 4938 break; 4939 case sizeof(u16): 4940 *val = (u64)*(u16 *)ptr; 4941 break; 4942 case sizeof(u32): 4943 *val = (u64)*(u32 *)ptr; 4944 break; 4945 case sizeof(u64): 4946 *val = *(u64 *)ptr; 4947 break; 4948 default: 4949 return -EINVAL; 4950 } 4951 return 0; 4952 } 4953 4954 #define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_NESTED(__type) __PASTE(__type, __safe_fields) 4955 4956 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_NESTED(struct task_struct) { 4957 const cpumask_t *cpus_ptr; 4958 }; 4959 4960 static bool nested_ptr_is_trusted(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4961 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 4962 int off) 4963 { 4964 /* If its parent is not trusted, it can't regain its trusted status. */ 4965 if (!is_trusted_reg(reg)) 4966 return false; 4967 4968 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_NESTED(struct task_struct)); 4969 4970 return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, off); 4971 } 4972 4973 static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4974 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, 4975 int regno, int off, int size, 4976 enum bpf_access_type atype, 4977 int value_regno) 4978 { 4979 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; 4980 const struct btf_type *t = btf_type_by_id(reg->btf, reg->btf_id); 4981 const char *tname = btf_name_by_offset(reg->btf, t->name_off); 4982 enum bpf_type_flag flag = 0; 4983 u32 btf_id; 4984 int ret; 4985 4986 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) { 4987 verbose(env, 4988 "'struct %s' access is allowed only to CAP_PERFMON and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n", 4989 tname); 4990 return -EPERM; 4991 } 4992 if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible && btf_is_kernel(reg->btf)) { 4993 verbose(env, 4994 "Cannot access kernel 'struct %s' from non-GPL compatible program\n", 4995 tname); 4996 return -EINVAL; 4997 } 4998 if (off < 0) { 4999 verbose(env, 5000 "R%d is ptr_%s invalid negative access: off=%d\n", 5001 regno, tname, off); 5002 return -EACCES; 5003 } 5004 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) { 5005 char tn_buf[48]; 5006 5007 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 5008 verbose(env, 5009 "R%d is ptr_%s invalid variable offset: off=%d, var_off=%s\n", 5010 regno, tname, off, tn_buf); 5011 return -EACCES; 5012 } 5013 5014 if (reg->type & MEM_USER) { 5015 verbose(env, 5016 "R%d is ptr_%s access user memory: off=%d\n", 5017 regno, tname, off); 5018 return -EACCES; 5019 } 5020 5021 if (reg->type & MEM_PERCPU) { 5022 verbose(env, 5023 "R%d is ptr_%s access percpu memory: off=%d\n", 5024 regno, tname, off); 5025 return -EACCES; 5026 } 5027 5028 if (env->ops->btf_struct_access && !type_is_alloc(reg->type)) { 5029 if (!btf_is_kernel(reg->btf)) { 5030 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: reg->btf must be kernel btf\n"); 5031 return -EFAULT; 5032 } 5033 ret = env->ops->btf_struct_access(&env->log, reg, off, size, atype, &btf_id, &flag); 5034 } else { 5035 /* Writes are permitted with default btf_struct_access for 5036 * program allocated objects (which always have ref_obj_id > 0), 5037 * but not for untrusted PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC. 5038 */ 5039 if (atype != BPF_READ && reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) { 5040 verbose(env, "only read is supported\n"); 5041 return -EACCES; 5042 } 5043 5044 if (type_is_alloc(reg->type) && !reg->ref_obj_id) { 5045 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: ref_obj_id for allocated object must be non-zero\n"); 5046 return -EFAULT; 5047 } 5048 5049 ret = btf_struct_access(&env->log, reg, off, size, atype, &btf_id, &flag); 5050 } 5051 5052 if (ret < 0) 5053 return ret; 5054 5055 /* If this is an untrusted pointer, all pointers formed by walking it 5056 * also inherit the untrusted flag. 5057 */ 5058 if (type_flag(reg->type) & PTR_UNTRUSTED) 5059 flag |= PTR_UNTRUSTED; 5060 5061 /* By default any pointer obtained from walking a trusted pointer is no 5062 * longer trusted, unless the field being accessed has explicitly been 5063 * marked as inheriting its parent's state of trust. 5064 * 5065 * An RCU-protected pointer can also be deemed trusted if we are in an 5066 * RCU read region. This case is handled below. 5067 */ 5068 if (nested_ptr_is_trusted(env, reg, off)) 5069 flag |= PTR_TRUSTED; 5070 else 5071 flag &= ~PTR_TRUSTED; 5072 5073 if (flag & MEM_RCU) { 5074 /* Mark value register as MEM_RCU only if it is protected by 5075 * bpf_rcu_read_lock() and the ptr reg is rcu or trusted. MEM_RCU 5076 * itself can already indicate trustedness inside the rcu 5077 * read lock region. Also mark rcu pointer as PTR_MAYBE_NULL since 5078 * it could be null in some cases. 5079 */ 5080 if (!env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock || 5081 !(is_trusted_reg(reg) || is_rcu_reg(reg))) 5082 flag &= ~MEM_RCU; 5083 else 5084 flag |= PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 5085 } else if (reg->type & MEM_RCU) { 5086 /* ptr (reg) is marked as MEM_RCU, but the struct field is not tagged 5087 * with __rcu. Mark the flag as PTR_UNTRUSTED conservatively. 5088 */ 5089 flag |= PTR_UNTRUSTED; 5090 } 5091 5092 if (atype == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 5093 mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, reg->btf, btf_id, flag); 5094 5095 return 0; 5096 } 5097 5098 static int check_ptr_to_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5099 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, 5100 int regno, int off, int size, 5101 enum bpf_access_type atype, 5102 int value_regno) 5103 { 5104 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; 5105 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 5106 struct bpf_reg_state map_reg; 5107 enum bpf_type_flag flag = 0; 5108 const struct btf_type *t; 5109 const char *tname; 5110 u32 btf_id; 5111 int ret; 5112 5113 if (!btf_vmlinux) { 5114 verbose(env, "map_ptr access not supported without CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF\n"); 5115 return -ENOTSUPP; 5116 } 5117 5118 if (!map->ops->map_btf_id || !*map->ops->map_btf_id) { 5119 verbose(env, "map_ptr access not supported for map type %d\n", 5120 map->map_type); 5121 return -ENOTSUPP; 5122 } 5123 5124 t = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, *map->ops->map_btf_id); 5125 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, t->name_off); 5126 5127 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) { 5128 verbose(env, 5129 "'struct %s' access is allowed only to CAP_PERFMON and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n", 5130 tname); 5131 return -EPERM; 5132 } 5133 5134 if (off < 0) { 5135 verbose(env, "R%d is %s invalid negative access: off=%d\n", 5136 regno, tname, off); 5137 return -EACCES; 5138 } 5139 5140 if (atype != BPF_READ) { 5141 verbose(env, "only read from %s is supported\n", tname); 5142 return -EACCES; 5143 } 5144 5145 /* Simulate access to a PTR_TO_BTF_ID */ 5146 memset(&map_reg, 0, sizeof(map_reg)); 5147 mark_btf_ld_reg(env, &map_reg, 0, PTR_TO_BTF_ID, btf_vmlinux, *map->ops->map_btf_id, 0); 5148 ret = btf_struct_access(&env->log, &map_reg, off, size, atype, &btf_id, &flag); 5149 if (ret < 0) 5150 return ret; 5151 5152 if (value_regno >= 0) 5153 mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, btf_vmlinux, btf_id, flag); 5154 5155 return 0; 5156 } 5157 5158 /* Check that the stack access at the given offset is within bounds. The 5159 * maximum valid offset is -1. 5160 * 5161 * The minimum valid offset is -MAX_BPF_STACK for writes, and 5162 * -state->allocated_stack for reads. 5163 */ 5164 static int check_stack_slot_within_bounds(int off, 5165 struct bpf_func_state *state, 5166 enum bpf_access_type t) 5167 { 5168 int min_valid_off; 5169 5170 if (t == BPF_WRITE) 5171 min_valid_off = -MAX_BPF_STACK; 5172 else 5173 min_valid_off = -state->allocated_stack; 5174 5175 if (off < min_valid_off || off > -1) 5176 return -EACCES; 5177 return 0; 5178 } 5179 5180 /* Check that the stack access at 'regno + off' falls within the maximum stack 5181 * bounds. 5182 * 5183 * 'off' includes `regno->offset`, but not its dynamic part (if any). 5184 */ 5185 static int check_stack_access_within_bounds( 5186 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5187 int regno, int off, int access_size, 5188 enum bpf_access_src src, enum bpf_access_type type) 5189 { 5190 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 5191 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; 5192 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 5193 int min_off, max_off; 5194 int err; 5195 char *err_extra; 5196 5197 if (src == ACCESS_HELPER) 5198 /* We don't know if helpers are reading or writing (or both). */ 5199 err_extra = " indirect access to"; 5200 else if (type == BPF_READ) 5201 err_extra = " read from"; 5202 else 5203 err_extra = " write to"; 5204 5205 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 5206 min_off = reg->var_off.value + off; 5207 if (access_size > 0) 5208 max_off = min_off + access_size - 1; 5209 else 5210 max_off = min_off; 5211 } else { 5212 if (reg->smax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || 5213 reg->smin_value <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 5214 verbose(env, "invalid unbounded variable-offset%s stack R%d\n", 5215 err_extra, regno); 5216 return -EACCES; 5217 } 5218 min_off = reg->smin_value + off; 5219 if (access_size > 0) 5220 max_off = reg->smax_value + off + access_size - 1; 5221 else 5222 max_off = min_off; 5223 } 5224 5225 err = check_stack_slot_within_bounds(min_off, state, type); 5226 if (!err) 5227 err = check_stack_slot_within_bounds(max_off, state, type); 5228 5229 if (err) { 5230 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 5231 verbose(env, "invalid%s stack R%d off=%d size=%d\n", 5232 err_extra, regno, off, access_size); 5233 } else { 5234 char tn_buf[48]; 5235 5236 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 5237 verbose(env, "invalid variable-offset%s stack R%d var_off=%s size=%d\n", 5238 err_extra, regno, tn_buf, access_size); 5239 } 5240 } 5241 return err; 5242 } 5243 5244 /* check whether memory at (regno + off) is accessible for t = (read | write) 5245 * if t==write, value_regno is a register which value is stored into memory 5246 * if t==read, value_regno is a register which will receive the value from memory 5247 * if t==write && value_regno==-1, some unknown value is stored into memory 5248 * if t==read && value_regno==-1, don't care what we read from memory 5249 */ 5250 static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regno, 5251 int off, int bpf_size, enum bpf_access_type t, 5252 int value_regno, bool strict_alignment_once) 5253 { 5254 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 5255 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; 5256 struct bpf_func_state *state; 5257 int size, err = 0; 5258 5259 size = bpf_size_to_bytes(bpf_size); 5260 if (size < 0) 5261 return size; 5262 5263 /* alignment checks will add in reg->off themselves */ 5264 err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size, strict_alignment_once); 5265 if (err) 5266 return err; 5267 5268 /* for access checks, reg->off is just part of off */ 5269 off += reg->off; 5270 5271 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY) { 5272 if (t == BPF_WRITE) { 5273 verbose(env, "write to change key R%d not allowed\n", regno); 5274 return -EACCES; 5275 } 5276 5277 err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size, 5278 reg->map_ptr->key_size, false); 5279 if (err) 5280 return err; 5281 if (value_regno >= 0) 5282 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 5283 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 5284 struct btf_field *kptr_field = NULL; 5285 5286 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 5287 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 5288 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into map\n", value_regno); 5289 return -EACCES; 5290 } 5291 err = check_map_access_type(env, regno, off, size, t); 5292 if (err) 5293 return err; 5294 err = check_map_access(env, regno, off, size, false, ACCESS_DIRECT); 5295 if (err) 5296 return err; 5297 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 5298 kptr_field = btf_record_find(reg->map_ptr->record, 5299 off + reg->var_off.value, BPF_KPTR); 5300 if (kptr_field) { 5301 err = check_map_kptr_access(env, regno, value_regno, insn_idx, kptr_field); 5302 } else if (t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) { 5303 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 5304 5305 /* if map is read-only, track its contents as scalars */ 5306 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) && 5307 bpf_map_is_rdonly(map) && 5308 map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) { 5309 int map_off = off + reg->var_off.value; 5310 u64 val = 0; 5311 5312 err = bpf_map_direct_read(map, map_off, size, 5313 &val); 5314 if (err) 5315 return err; 5316 5317 regs[value_regno].type = SCALAR_VALUE; 5318 __mark_reg_known(®s[value_regno], val); 5319 } else { 5320 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 5321 } 5322 } 5323 } else if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_MEM) { 5324 bool rdonly_mem = type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type); 5325 5326 if (type_may_be_null(reg->type)) { 5327 verbose(env, "R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n", regno, 5328 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 5329 return -EACCES; 5330 } 5331 5332 if (t == BPF_WRITE && rdonly_mem) { 5333 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", 5334 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 5335 return -EACCES; 5336 } 5337 5338 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 5339 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 5340 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", value_regno); 5341 return -EACCES; 5342 } 5343 5344 err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size, 5345 reg->mem_size, false); 5346 if (!err && value_regno >= 0 && (t == BPF_READ || rdonly_mem)) 5347 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 5348 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX) { 5349 enum bpf_reg_type reg_type = SCALAR_VALUE; 5350 struct btf *btf = NULL; 5351 u32 btf_id = 0; 5352 5353 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 5354 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 5355 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into ctx\n", value_regno); 5356 return -EACCES; 5357 } 5358 5359 err = check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno); 5360 if (err < 0) 5361 return err; 5362 5363 err = check_ctx_access(env, insn_idx, off, size, t, ®_type, &btf, 5364 &btf_id); 5365 if (err) 5366 verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; "); 5367 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) { 5368 /* ctx access returns either a scalar, or a 5369 * PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END]. In the latter 5370 * case, we know the offset is zero. 5371 */ 5372 if (reg_type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 5373 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 5374 } else { 5375 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, 5376 value_regno); 5377 if (type_may_be_null(reg_type)) 5378 regs[value_regno].id = ++env->id_gen; 5379 /* A load of ctx field could have different 5380 * actual load size with the one encoded in the 5381 * insn. When the dst is PTR, it is for sure not 5382 * a sub-register. 5383 */ 5384 regs[value_regno].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 5385 if (base_type(reg_type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 5386 regs[value_regno].btf = btf; 5387 regs[value_regno].btf_id = btf_id; 5388 } 5389 } 5390 regs[value_regno].type = reg_type; 5391 } 5392 5393 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 5394 /* Basic bounds checks. */ 5395 err = check_stack_access_within_bounds(env, regno, off, size, ACCESS_DIRECT, t); 5396 if (err) 5397 return err; 5398 5399 state = func(env, reg); 5400 err = update_stack_depth(env, state, off); 5401 if (err) 5402 return err; 5403 5404 if (t == BPF_READ) 5405 err = check_stack_read(env, regno, off, size, 5406 value_regno); 5407 else 5408 err = check_stack_write(env, regno, off, size, 5409 value_regno, insn_idx); 5410 } else if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg)) { 5411 if (t == BPF_WRITE && !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, t)) { 5412 verbose(env, "cannot write into packet\n"); 5413 return -EACCES; 5414 } 5415 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 5416 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 5417 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into packet\n", 5418 value_regno); 5419 return -EACCES; 5420 } 5421 err = check_packet_access(env, regno, off, size, false); 5422 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 5423 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 5424 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS) { 5425 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 5426 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 5427 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into flow keys\n", 5428 value_regno); 5429 return -EACCES; 5430 } 5431 5432 err = check_flow_keys_access(env, off, size); 5433 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 5434 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 5435 } else if (type_is_sk_pointer(reg->type)) { 5436 if (t == BPF_WRITE) { 5437 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", 5438 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 5439 return -EACCES; 5440 } 5441 err = check_sock_access(env, insn_idx, regno, off, size, t); 5442 if (!err && value_regno >= 0) 5443 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 5444 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER) { 5445 err = check_tp_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, off, size); 5446 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 5447 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 5448 } else if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID && 5449 !type_may_be_null(reg->type)) { 5450 err = check_ptr_to_btf_access(env, regs, regno, off, size, t, 5451 value_regno); 5452 } else if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP) { 5453 err = check_ptr_to_map_access(env, regs, regno, off, size, t, 5454 value_regno); 5455 } else if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BUF) { 5456 bool rdonly_mem = type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type); 5457 u32 *max_access; 5458 5459 if (rdonly_mem) { 5460 if (t == BPF_WRITE) { 5461 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", 5462 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 5463 return -EACCES; 5464 } 5465 max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdonly_access; 5466 } else { 5467 max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdwr_access; 5468 } 5469 5470 err = check_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, off, size, false, 5471 max_access); 5472 5473 if (!err && value_regno >= 0 && (rdonly_mem || t == BPF_READ)) 5474 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 5475 } else { 5476 verbose(env, "R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n", regno, 5477 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 5478 return -EACCES; 5479 } 5480 5481 if (!err && size < BPF_REG_SIZE && value_regno >= 0 && t == BPF_READ && 5482 regs[value_regno].type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 5483 /* b/h/w load zero-extends, mark upper bits as known 0 */ 5484 coerce_reg_to_size(®s[value_regno], size); 5485 } 5486 return err; 5487 } 5488 5489 static int check_atomic(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_insn *insn) 5490 { 5491 int load_reg; 5492 int err; 5493 5494 switch (insn->imm) { 5495 case BPF_ADD: 5496 case BPF_ADD | BPF_FETCH: 5497 case BPF_AND: 5498 case BPF_AND | BPF_FETCH: 5499 case BPF_OR: 5500 case BPF_OR | BPF_FETCH: 5501 case BPF_XOR: 5502 case BPF_XOR | BPF_FETCH: 5503 case BPF_XCHG: 5504 case BPF_CMPXCHG: 5505 break; 5506 default: 5507 verbose(env, "BPF_ATOMIC uses invalid atomic opcode %02x\n", insn->imm); 5508 return -EINVAL; 5509 } 5510 5511 if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_W && BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) { 5512 verbose(env, "invalid atomic operand size\n"); 5513 return -EINVAL; 5514 } 5515 5516 /* check src1 operand */ 5517 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 5518 if (err) 5519 return err; 5520 5521 /* check src2 operand */ 5522 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 5523 if (err) 5524 return err; 5525 5526 if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG) { 5527 /* Check comparison of R0 with memory location */ 5528 const u32 aux_reg = BPF_REG_0; 5529 5530 err = check_reg_arg(env, aux_reg, SRC_OP); 5531 if (err) 5532 return err; 5533 5534 if (is_pointer_value(env, aux_reg)) { 5535 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", aux_reg); 5536 return -EACCES; 5537 } 5538 } 5539 5540 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { 5541 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", insn->src_reg); 5542 return -EACCES; 5543 } 5544 5545 if (is_ctx_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) || 5546 is_pkt_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) || 5547 is_flow_key_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) || 5548 is_sk_reg(env, insn->dst_reg)) { 5549 verbose(env, "BPF_ATOMIC stores into R%d %s is not allowed\n", 5550 insn->dst_reg, 5551 reg_type_str(env, reg_state(env, insn->dst_reg)->type)); 5552 return -EACCES; 5553 } 5554 5555 if (insn->imm & BPF_FETCH) { 5556 if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG) 5557 load_reg = BPF_REG_0; 5558 else 5559 load_reg = insn->src_reg; 5560 5561 /* check and record load of old value */ 5562 err = check_reg_arg(env, load_reg, DST_OP); 5563 if (err) 5564 return err; 5565 } else { 5566 /* This instruction accesses a memory location but doesn't 5567 * actually load it into a register. 5568 */ 5569 load_reg = -1; 5570 } 5571 5572 /* Check whether we can read the memory, with second call for fetch 5573 * case to simulate the register fill. 5574 */ 5575 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, 5576 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, -1, true); 5577 if (!err && load_reg >= 0) 5578 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, 5579 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, load_reg, 5580 true); 5581 if (err) 5582 return err; 5583 5584 /* Check whether we can write into the same memory. */ 5585 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, 5586 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1, true); 5587 if (err) 5588 return err; 5589 5590 return 0; 5591 } 5592 5593 /* When register 'regno' is used to read the stack (either directly or through 5594 * a helper function) make sure that it's within stack boundary and, depending 5595 * on the access type, that all elements of the stack are initialized. 5596 * 5597 * 'off' includes 'regno->off', but not its dynamic part (if any). 5598 * 5599 * All registers that have been spilled on the stack in the slots within the 5600 * read offsets are marked as read. 5601 */ 5602 static int check_stack_range_initialized( 5603 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int off, 5604 int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed, 5605 enum bpf_access_src type, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 5606 { 5607 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 5608 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 5609 int err, min_off, max_off, i, j, slot, spi; 5610 char *err_extra = type == ACCESS_HELPER ? " indirect" : ""; 5611 enum bpf_access_type bounds_check_type; 5612 /* Some accesses can write anything into the stack, others are 5613 * read-only. 5614 */ 5615 bool clobber = false; 5616 5617 if (access_size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed) { 5618 verbose(env, "invalid zero-sized read\n"); 5619 return -EACCES; 5620 } 5621 5622 if (type == ACCESS_HELPER) { 5623 /* The bounds checks for writes are more permissive than for 5624 * reads. However, if raw_mode is not set, we'll do extra 5625 * checks below. 5626 */ 5627 bounds_check_type = BPF_WRITE; 5628 clobber = true; 5629 } else { 5630 bounds_check_type = BPF_READ; 5631 } 5632 err = check_stack_access_within_bounds(env, regno, off, access_size, 5633 type, bounds_check_type); 5634 if (err) 5635 return err; 5636 5637 5638 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 5639 min_off = max_off = reg->var_off.value + off; 5640 } else { 5641 /* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for 5642 * simplicity since it requires corresponding support in 5643 * Spectre masking for stack ALU. 5644 * See also retrieve_ptr_limit(). 5645 */ 5646 if (!env->bypass_spec_v1) { 5647 char tn_buf[48]; 5648 5649 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 5650 verbose(env, "R%d%s variable offset stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n", 5651 regno, err_extra, tn_buf); 5652 return -EACCES; 5653 } 5654 /* Only initialized buffer on stack is allowed to be accessed 5655 * with variable offset. With uninitialized buffer it's hard to 5656 * guarantee that whole memory is marked as initialized on 5657 * helper return since specific bounds are unknown what may 5658 * cause uninitialized stack leaking. 5659 */ 5660 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) 5661 meta = NULL; 5662 5663 min_off = reg->smin_value + off; 5664 max_off = reg->smax_value + off; 5665 } 5666 5667 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) { 5668 /* Ensure we won't be overwriting dynptrs when simulating byte 5669 * by byte access in check_helper_call using meta.access_size. 5670 * This would be a problem if we have a helper in the future 5671 * which takes: 5672 * 5673 * helper(uninit_mem, len, dynptr) 5674 * 5675 * Now, uninint_mem may overlap with dynptr pointer. Hence, it 5676 * may end up writing to dynptr itself when touching memory from 5677 * arg 1. This can be relaxed on a case by case basis for known 5678 * safe cases, but reject due to the possibilitiy of aliasing by 5679 * default. 5680 */ 5681 for (i = min_off; i < max_off + access_size; i++) { 5682 int stack_off = -i - 1; 5683 5684 spi = __get_spi(i); 5685 /* raw_mode may write past allocated_stack */ 5686 if (state->allocated_stack <= stack_off) 5687 continue; 5688 if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[stack_off % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_DYNPTR) { 5689 verbose(env, "potential write to dynptr at off=%d disallowed\n", i); 5690 return -EACCES; 5691 } 5692 } 5693 meta->access_size = access_size; 5694 meta->regno = regno; 5695 return 0; 5696 } 5697 5698 for (i = min_off; i < max_off + access_size; i++) { 5699 u8 *stype; 5700 5701 slot = -i - 1; 5702 spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; 5703 if (state->allocated_stack <= slot) 5704 goto err; 5705 stype = &state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE]; 5706 if (*stype == STACK_MISC) 5707 goto mark; 5708 if (*stype == STACK_ZERO) { 5709 if (clobber) { 5710 /* helper can write anything into the stack */ 5711 *stype = STACK_MISC; 5712 } 5713 goto mark; 5714 } 5715 5716 if (is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[spi]) && 5717 (state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type == SCALAR_VALUE || 5718 env->allow_ptr_leaks)) { 5719 if (clobber) { 5720 __mark_reg_unknown(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr); 5721 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 5722 scrub_spilled_slot(&state->stack[spi].slot_type[j]); 5723 } 5724 goto mark; 5725 } 5726 5727 err: 5728 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 5729 verbose(env, "invalid%s read from stack R%d off %d+%d size %d\n", 5730 err_extra, regno, min_off, i - min_off, access_size); 5731 } else { 5732 char tn_buf[48]; 5733 5734 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 5735 verbose(env, "invalid%s read from stack R%d var_off %s+%d size %d\n", 5736 err_extra, regno, tn_buf, i - min_off, access_size); 5737 } 5738 return -EACCES; 5739 mark: 5740 /* reading any byte out of 8-byte 'spill_slot' will cause 5741 * the whole slot to be marked as 'read' 5742 */ 5743 mark_reg_read(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, 5744 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.parent, 5745 REG_LIVE_READ64); 5746 /* We do not set REG_LIVE_WRITTEN for stack slot, as we can not 5747 * be sure that whether stack slot is written to or not. Hence, 5748 * we must still conservatively propagate reads upwards even if 5749 * helper may write to the entire memory range. 5750 */ 5751 } 5752 return update_stack_depth(env, state, min_off); 5753 } 5754 5755 static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 5756 int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed, 5757 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 5758 { 5759 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 5760 u32 *max_access; 5761 5762 switch (base_type(reg->type)) { 5763 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 5764 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 5765 return check_packet_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, 5766 zero_size_allowed); 5767 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 5768 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) { 5769 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", regno, 5770 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 5771 return -EACCES; 5772 } 5773 return check_mem_region_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, 5774 reg->map_ptr->key_size, false); 5775 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 5776 if (check_map_access_type(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, 5777 meta && meta->raw_mode ? BPF_WRITE : 5778 BPF_READ)) 5779 return -EACCES; 5780 return check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, 5781 zero_size_allowed, ACCESS_HELPER); 5782 case PTR_TO_MEM: 5783 if (type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type)) { 5784 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) { 5785 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", regno, 5786 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 5787 return -EACCES; 5788 } 5789 } 5790 return check_mem_region_access(env, regno, reg->off, 5791 access_size, reg->mem_size, 5792 zero_size_allowed); 5793 case PTR_TO_BUF: 5794 if (type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type)) { 5795 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) { 5796 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", regno, 5797 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 5798 return -EACCES; 5799 } 5800 5801 max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdonly_access; 5802 } else { 5803 max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdwr_access; 5804 } 5805 return check_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, reg->off, 5806 access_size, zero_size_allowed, 5807 max_access); 5808 case PTR_TO_STACK: 5809 return check_stack_range_initialized( 5810 env, 5811 regno, reg->off, access_size, 5812 zero_size_allowed, ACCESS_HELPER, meta); 5813 case PTR_TO_CTX: 5814 /* in case the function doesn't know how to access the context, 5815 * (because we are in a program of type SYSCALL for example), we 5816 * can not statically check its size. 5817 * Dynamically check it now. 5818 */ 5819 if (!env->ops->convert_ctx_access) { 5820 enum bpf_access_type atype = meta && meta->raw_mode ? BPF_WRITE : BPF_READ; 5821 int offset = access_size - 1; 5822 5823 /* Allow zero-byte read from PTR_TO_CTX */ 5824 if (access_size == 0) 5825 return zero_size_allowed ? 0 : -EACCES; 5826 5827 return check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, regno, offset, BPF_B, 5828 atype, -1, false); 5829 } 5830 5831 fallthrough; 5832 default: /* scalar_value or invalid ptr */ 5833 /* Allow zero-byte read from NULL, regardless of pointer type */ 5834 if (zero_size_allowed && access_size == 0 && 5835 register_is_null(reg)) 5836 return 0; 5837 5838 verbose(env, "R%d type=%s ", regno, 5839 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 5840 verbose(env, "expected=%s\n", reg_type_str(env, PTR_TO_STACK)); 5841 return -EACCES; 5842 } 5843 } 5844 5845 static int check_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5846 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 5847 bool zero_size_allowed, 5848 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 5849 { 5850 int err; 5851 5852 /* This is used to refine r0 return value bounds for helpers 5853 * that enforce this value as an upper bound on return values. 5854 * See do_refine_retval_range() for helpers that can refine 5855 * the return value. C type of helper is u32 so we pull register 5856 * bound from umax_value however, if negative verifier errors 5857 * out. Only upper bounds can be learned because retval is an 5858 * int type and negative retvals are allowed. 5859 */ 5860 meta->msize_max_value = reg->umax_value; 5861 5862 /* The register is SCALAR_VALUE; the access check 5863 * happens using its boundaries. 5864 */ 5865 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 5866 /* For unprivileged variable accesses, disable raw 5867 * mode so that the program is required to 5868 * initialize all the memory that the helper could 5869 * just partially fill up. 5870 */ 5871 meta = NULL; 5872 5873 if (reg->smin_value < 0) { 5874 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned or 'var &= const'\n", 5875 regno); 5876 return -EACCES; 5877 } 5878 5879 if (reg->umin_value == 0) { 5880 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1, 0, 5881 zero_size_allowed, 5882 meta); 5883 if (err) 5884 return err; 5885 } 5886 5887 if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ) { 5888 verbose(env, "R%d unbounded memory access, use 'var &= const' or 'if (var < const)'\n", 5889 regno); 5890 return -EACCES; 5891 } 5892 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1, 5893 reg->umax_value, 5894 zero_size_allowed, meta); 5895 if (!err) 5896 err = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); 5897 return err; 5898 } 5899 5900 int check_mem_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 5901 u32 regno, u32 mem_size) 5902 { 5903 bool may_be_null = type_may_be_null(reg->type); 5904 struct bpf_reg_state saved_reg; 5905 struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta; 5906 int err; 5907 5908 if (register_is_null(reg)) 5909 return 0; 5910 5911 memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta)); 5912 /* Assuming that the register contains a value check if the memory 5913 * access is safe. Temporarily save and restore the register's state as 5914 * the conversion shouldn't be visible to a caller. 5915 */ 5916 if (may_be_null) { 5917 saved_reg = *reg; 5918 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(reg); 5919 } 5920 5921 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, mem_size, true, &meta); 5922 /* Check access for BPF_WRITE */ 5923 meta.raw_mode = true; 5924 err = err ?: check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, mem_size, true, &meta); 5925 5926 if (may_be_null) 5927 *reg = saved_reg; 5928 5929 return err; 5930 } 5931 5932 static int check_kfunc_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 5933 u32 regno) 5934 { 5935 struct bpf_reg_state *mem_reg = &cur_regs(env)[regno - 1]; 5936 bool may_be_null = type_may_be_null(mem_reg->type); 5937 struct bpf_reg_state saved_reg; 5938 struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta; 5939 int err; 5940 5941 WARN_ON_ONCE(regno < BPF_REG_2 || regno > BPF_REG_5); 5942 5943 memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta)); 5944 5945 if (may_be_null) { 5946 saved_reg = *mem_reg; 5947 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(mem_reg); 5948 } 5949 5950 err = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, true, &meta); 5951 /* Check access for BPF_WRITE */ 5952 meta.raw_mode = true; 5953 err = err ?: check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, true, &meta); 5954 5955 if (may_be_null) 5956 *mem_reg = saved_reg; 5957 return err; 5958 } 5959 5960 /* Implementation details: 5961 * bpf_map_lookup returns PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL. 5962 * bpf_obj_new returns PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_MAYBE_NULL. 5963 * Two bpf_map_lookups (even with the same key) will have different reg->id. 5964 * Two separate bpf_obj_new will also have different reg->id. 5965 * For traditional PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE or PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC, the verifier 5966 * clears reg->id after value_or_null->value transition, since the verifier only 5967 * cares about the range of access to valid map value pointer and doesn't care 5968 * about actual address of the map element. 5969 * For maps with 'struct bpf_spin_lock' inside map value the verifier keeps 5970 * reg->id > 0 after value_or_null->value transition. By doing so 5971 * two bpf_map_lookups will be considered two different pointers that 5972 * point to different bpf_spin_locks. Likewise for pointers to allocated objects 5973 * returned from bpf_obj_new. 5974 * The verifier allows taking only one bpf_spin_lock at a time to avoid 5975 * dead-locks. 5976 * Since only one bpf_spin_lock is allowed the checks are simpler than 5977 * reg_is_refcounted() logic. The verifier needs to remember only 5978 * one spin_lock instead of array of acquired_refs. 5979 * cur_state->active_lock remembers which map value element or allocated 5980 * object got locked and clears it after bpf_spin_unlock. 5981 */ 5982 static int process_spin_lock(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 5983 bool is_lock) 5984 { 5985 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 5986 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 5987 bool is_const = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 5988 u64 val = reg->var_off.value; 5989 struct bpf_map *map = NULL; 5990 struct btf *btf = NULL; 5991 struct btf_record *rec; 5992 5993 if (!is_const) { 5994 verbose(env, 5995 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. bpf_spin_lock has to be at the constant offset\n", 5996 regno); 5997 return -EINVAL; 5998 } 5999 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 6000 map = reg->map_ptr; 6001 if (!map->btf) { 6002 verbose(env, 6003 "map '%s' has to have BTF in order to use bpf_spin_lock\n", 6004 map->name); 6005 return -EINVAL; 6006 } 6007 } else { 6008 btf = reg->btf; 6009 } 6010 6011 rec = reg_btf_record(reg); 6012 if (!btf_record_has_field(rec, BPF_SPIN_LOCK)) { 6013 verbose(env, "%s '%s' has no valid bpf_spin_lock\n", map ? "map" : "local", 6014 map ? map->name : "kptr"); 6015 return -EINVAL; 6016 } 6017 if (rec->spin_lock_off != val + reg->off) { 6018 verbose(env, "off %lld doesn't point to 'struct bpf_spin_lock' that is at %d\n", 6019 val + reg->off, rec->spin_lock_off); 6020 return -EINVAL; 6021 } 6022 if (is_lock) { 6023 if (cur->active_lock.ptr) { 6024 verbose(env, 6025 "Locking two bpf_spin_locks are not allowed\n"); 6026 return -EINVAL; 6027 } 6028 if (map) 6029 cur->active_lock.ptr = map; 6030 else 6031 cur->active_lock.ptr = btf; 6032 cur->active_lock.id = reg->id; 6033 } else { 6034 struct bpf_func_state *fstate = cur_func(env); 6035 void *ptr; 6036 int i; 6037 6038 if (map) 6039 ptr = map; 6040 else 6041 ptr = btf; 6042 6043 if (!cur->active_lock.ptr) { 6044 verbose(env, "bpf_spin_unlock without taking a lock\n"); 6045 return -EINVAL; 6046 } 6047 if (cur->active_lock.ptr != ptr || 6048 cur->active_lock.id != reg->id) { 6049 verbose(env, "bpf_spin_unlock of different lock\n"); 6050 return -EINVAL; 6051 } 6052 cur->active_lock.ptr = NULL; 6053 cur->active_lock.id = 0; 6054 6055 for (i = fstate->acquired_refs - 1; i >= 0; i--) { 6056 int err; 6057 6058 /* Complain on error because this reference state cannot 6059 * be freed before this point, as bpf_spin_lock critical 6060 * section does not allow functions that release the 6061 * allocated object immediately. 6062 */ 6063 if (!fstate->refs[i].release_on_unlock) 6064 continue; 6065 err = release_reference(env, fstate->refs[i].id); 6066 if (err) { 6067 verbose(env, "failed to release release_on_unlock reference"); 6068 return err; 6069 } 6070 } 6071 } 6072 return 0; 6073 } 6074 6075 static int process_timer_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 6076 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 6077 { 6078 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 6079 bool is_const = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 6080 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 6081 u64 val = reg->var_off.value; 6082 6083 if (!is_const) { 6084 verbose(env, 6085 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. bpf_timer has to be at the constant offset\n", 6086 regno); 6087 return -EINVAL; 6088 } 6089 if (!map->btf) { 6090 verbose(env, "map '%s' has to have BTF in order to use bpf_timer\n", 6091 map->name); 6092 return -EINVAL; 6093 } 6094 if (!btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_TIMER)) { 6095 verbose(env, "map '%s' has no valid bpf_timer\n", map->name); 6096 return -EINVAL; 6097 } 6098 if (map->record->timer_off != val + reg->off) { 6099 verbose(env, "off %lld doesn't point to 'struct bpf_timer' that is at %d\n", 6100 val + reg->off, map->record->timer_off); 6101 return -EINVAL; 6102 } 6103 if (meta->map_ptr) { 6104 verbose(env, "verifier bug. Two map pointers in a timer helper\n"); 6105 return -EFAULT; 6106 } 6107 meta->map_uid = reg->map_uid; 6108 meta->map_ptr = map; 6109 return 0; 6110 } 6111 6112 static int process_kptr_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 6113 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 6114 { 6115 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 6116 struct bpf_map *map_ptr = reg->map_ptr; 6117 struct btf_field *kptr_field; 6118 u32 kptr_off; 6119 6120 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 6121 verbose(env, 6122 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. kptr has to be at the constant offset\n", 6123 regno); 6124 return -EINVAL; 6125 } 6126 if (!map_ptr->btf) { 6127 verbose(env, "map '%s' has to have BTF in order to use bpf_kptr_xchg\n", 6128 map_ptr->name); 6129 return -EINVAL; 6130 } 6131 if (!btf_record_has_field(map_ptr->record, BPF_KPTR)) { 6132 verbose(env, "map '%s' has no valid kptr\n", map_ptr->name); 6133 return -EINVAL; 6134 } 6135 6136 meta->map_ptr = map_ptr; 6137 kptr_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; 6138 kptr_field = btf_record_find(map_ptr->record, kptr_off, BPF_KPTR); 6139 if (!kptr_field) { 6140 verbose(env, "off=%d doesn't point to kptr\n", kptr_off); 6141 return -EACCES; 6142 } 6143 if (kptr_field->type != BPF_KPTR_REF) { 6144 verbose(env, "off=%d kptr isn't referenced kptr\n", kptr_off); 6145 return -EACCES; 6146 } 6147 meta->kptr_field = kptr_field; 6148 return 0; 6149 } 6150 6151 /* There are two register types representing a bpf_dynptr, one is PTR_TO_STACK 6152 * which points to a stack slot, and the other is CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR. 6153 * 6154 * In both cases we deal with the first 8 bytes, but need to mark the next 8 6155 * bytes as STACK_DYNPTR in case of PTR_TO_STACK. In case of 6156 * CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, we are guaranteed to get the beginning of the object. 6157 * 6158 * Mutability of bpf_dynptr is at two levels, one is at the level of struct 6159 * bpf_dynptr itself, i.e. whether the helper is receiving a pointer to struct 6160 * bpf_dynptr or pointer to const struct bpf_dynptr. In the former case, it can 6161 * mutate the view of the dynptr and also possibly destroy it. In the latter 6162 * case, it cannot mutate the bpf_dynptr itself but it can still mutate the 6163 * memory that dynptr points to. 6164 * 6165 * The verifier will keep track both levels of mutation (bpf_dynptr's in 6166 * reg->type and the memory's in reg->dynptr.type), but there is no support for 6167 * readonly dynptr view yet, hence only the first case is tracked and checked. 6168 * 6169 * This is consistent with how C applies the const modifier to a struct object, 6170 * where the pointer itself inside bpf_dynptr becomes const but not what it 6171 * points to. 6172 * 6173 * Helpers which do not mutate the bpf_dynptr set MEM_RDONLY in their argument 6174 * type, and declare it as 'const struct bpf_dynptr *' in their prototype. 6175 */ 6176 int process_dynptr_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 6177 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 6178 { 6179 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 6180 int spi = 0; 6181 6182 /* MEM_UNINIT and MEM_RDONLY are exclusive, when applied to an 6183 * ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR (or ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR | DYNPTR_TYPE_*): 6184 */ 6185 if ((arg_type & (MEM_UNINIT | MEM_RDONLY)) == (MEM_UNINIT | MEM_RDONLY)) { 6186 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: misconfigured dynptr helper type flags\n"); 6187 return -EFAULT; 6188 } 6189 /* CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR already has fixed and var_off as 0 due to 6190 * check_func_arg_reg_off's logic. We only need to check offset 6191 * and its alignment for PTR_TO_STACK. 6192 */ 6193 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 6194 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 6195 if (spi < 0 && spi != -ERANGE) 6196 return spi; 6197 } 6198 6199 /* MEM_UNINIT - Points to memory that is an appropriate candidate for 6200 * constructing a mutable bpf_dynptr object. 6201 * 6202 * Currently, this is only possible with PTR_TO_STACK 6203 * pointing to a region of at least 16 bytes which doesn't 6204 * contain an existing bpf_dynptr. 6205 * 6206 * MEM_RDONLY - Points to a initialized bpf_dynptr that will not be 6207 * mutated or destroyed. However, the memory it points to 6208 * may be mutated. 6209 * 6210 * None - Points to a initialized dynptr that can be mutated and 6211 * destroyed, including mutation of the memory it points 6212 * to. 6213 */ 6214 if (arg_type & MEM_UNINIT) { 6215 if (!is_dynptr_reg_valid_uninit(env, reg, spi)) { 6216 verbose(env, "Dynptr has to be an uninitialized dynptr\n"); 6217 return -EINVAL; 6218 } 6219 6220 /* We only support one dynptr being uninitialized at the moment, 6221 * which is sufficient for the helper functions we have right now. 6222 */ 6223 if (meta->uninit_dynptr_regno) { 6224 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: multiple uninitialized dynptr args\n"); 6225 return -EFAULT; 6226 } 6227 6228 meta->uninit_dynptr_regno = regno; 6229 } else /* MEM_RDONLY and None case from above */ { 6230 int err; 6231 6232 /* For the reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK case, bpf_dynptr is never const */ 6233 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR && !(arg_type & MEM_RDONLY)) { 6234 verbose(env, "cannot pass pointer to const bpf_dynptr, the helper mutates it\n"); 6235 return -EINVAL; 6236 } 6237 6238 if (!is_dynptr_reg_valid_init(env, reg, spi)) { 6239 verbose(env, 6240 "Expected an initialized dynptr as arg #%d\n", 6241 regno); 6242 return -EINVAL; 6243 } 6244 6245 /* Fold modifiers (in this case, MEM_RDONLY) when checking expected type */ 6246 if (!is_dynptr_type_expected(env, reg, arg_type & ~MEM_RDONLY)) { 6247 const char *err_extra = ""; 6248 6249 switch (arg_type & DYNPTR_TYPE_FLAG_MASK) { 6250 case DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL: 6251 err_extra = "local"; 6252 break; 6253 case DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF: 6254 err_extra = "ringbuf"; 6255 break; 6256 default: 6257 err_extra = "<unknown>"; 6258 break; 6259 } 6260 verbose(env, 6261 "Expected a dynptr of type %s as arg #%d\n", 6262 err_extra, regno); 6263 return -EINVAL; 6264 } 6265 6266 err = mark_dynptr_read(env, reg); 6267 if (err) 6268 return err; 6269 } 6270 return 0; 6271 } 6272 6273 static bool arg_type_is_mem_size(enum bpf_arg_type type) 6274 { 6275 return type == ARG_CONST_SIZE || 6276 type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO; 6277 } 6278 6279 static bool arg_type_is_release(enum bpf_arg_type type) 6280 { 6281 return type & OBJ_RELEASE; 6282 } 6283 6284 static bool arg_type_is_dynptr(enum bpf_arg_type type) 6285 { 6286 return base_type(type) == ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR; 6287 } 6288 6289 static int int_ptr_type_to_size(enum bpf_arg_type type) 6290 { 6291 if (type == ARG_PTR_TO_INT) 6292 return sizeof(u32); 6293 else if (type == ARG_PTR_TO_LONG) 6294 return sizeof(u64); 6295 6296 return -EINVAL; 6297 } 6298 6299 static int resolve_map_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6300 const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 6301 enum bpf_arg_type *arg_type) 6302 { 6303 if (!meta->map_ptr) { 6304 /* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */ 6305 verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->type\n"); 6306 return -EACCES; 6307 } 6308 6309 switch (meta->map_ptr->map_type) { 6310 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP: 6311 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH: 6312 if (*arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 6313 *arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_SOCK_COMMON; 6314 } else { 6315 verbose(env, "invalid arg_type for sockmap/sockhash\n"); 6316 return -EINVAL; 6317 } 6318 break; 6319 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER: 6320 if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem) 6321 *arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 6322 break; 6323 default: 6324 break; 6325 } 6326 return 0; 6327 } 6328 6329 struct bpf_reg_types { 6330 const enum bpf_reg_type types[10]; 6331 u32 *btf_id; 6332 }; 6333 6334 static const struct bpf_reg_types sock_types = { 6335 .types = { 6336 PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON, 6337 PTR_TO_SOCKET, 6338 PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK, 6339 PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK, 6340 }, 6341 }; 6342 6343 #ifdef CONFIG_NET 6344 static const struct bpf_reg_types btf_id_sock_common_types = { 6345 .types = { 6346 PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON, 6347 PTR_TO_SOCKET, 6348 PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK, 6349 PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK, 6350 PTR_TO_BTF_ID, 6351 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED, 6352 }, 6353 .btf_id = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_SOCK_COMMON], 6354 }; 6355 #endif 6356 6357 static const struct bpf_reg_types mem_types = { 6358 .types = { 6359 PTR_TO_STACK, 6360 PTR_TO_PACKET, 6361 PTR_TO_PACKET_META, 6362 PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, 6363 PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, 6364 PTR_TO_MEM, 6365 PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RINGBUF, 6366 PTR_TO_BUF, 6367 }, 6368 }; 6369 6370 static const struct bpf_reg_types int_ptr_types = { 6371 .types = { 6372 PTR_TO_STACK, 6373 PTR_TO_PACKET, 6374 PTR_TO_PACKET_META, 6375 PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, 6376 PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, 6377 }, 6378 }; 6379 6380 static const struct bpf_reg_types spin_lock_types = { 6381 .types = { 6382 PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, 6383 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC, 6384 } 6385 }; 6386 6387 static const struct bpf_reg_types fullsock_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_SOCKET } }; 6388 static const struct bpf_reg_types scalar_types = { .types = { SCALAR_VALUE } }; 6389 static const struct bpf_reg_types context_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_CTX } }; 6390 static const struct bpf_reg_types ringbuf_mem_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RINGBUF } }; 6391 static const struct bpf_reg_types const_map_ptr_types = { .types = { CONST_PTR_TO_MAP } }; 6392 static const struct bpf_reg_types btf_ptr_types = { 6393 .types = { 6394 PTR_TO_BTF_ID, 6395 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED, 6396 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_RCU, 6397 }, 6398 }; 6399 static const struct bpf_reg_types percpu_btf_ptr_types = { 6400 .types = { 6401 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU, 6402 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU | PTR_TRUSTED, 6403 } 6404 }; 6405 static const struct bpf_reg_types func_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_FUNC } }; 6406 static const struct bpf_reg_types stack_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_STACK } }; 6407 static const struct bpf_reg_types const_str_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE } }; 6408 static const struct bpf_reg_types timer_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE } }; 6409 static const struct bpf_reg_types kptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE } }; 6410 static const struct bpf_reg_types dynptr_types = { 6411 .types = { 6412 PTR_TO_STACK, 6413 CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, 6414 } 6415 }; 6416 6417 static const struct bpf_reg_types *compatible_reg_types[__BPF_ARG_TYPE_MAX] = { 6418 [ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY] = &mem_types, 6419 [ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE] = &mem_types, 6420 [ARG_CONST_SIZE] = &scalar_types, 6421 [ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO] = &scalar_types, 6422 [ARG_CONST_ALLOC_SIZE_OR_ZERO] = &scalar_types, 6423 [ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR] = &const_map_ptr_types, 6424 [ARG_PTR_TO_CTX] = &context_types, 6425 [ARG_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON] = &sock_types, 6426 #ifdef CONFIG_NET 6427 [ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_SOCK_COMMON] = &btf_id_sock_common_types, 6428 #endif 6429 [ARG_PTR_TO_SOCKET] = &fullsock_types, 6430 [ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID] = &btf_ptr_types, 6431 [ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK] = &spin_lock_types, 6432 [ARG_PTR_TO_MEM] = &mem_types, 6433 [ARG_PTR_TO_RINGBUF_MEM] = &ringbuf_mem_types, 6434 [ARG_PTR_TO_INT] = &int_ptr_types, 6435 [ARG_PTR_TO_LONG] = &int_ptr_types, 6436 [ARG_PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID] = &percpu_btf_ptr_types, 6437 [ARG_PTR_TO_FUNC] = &func_ptr_types, 6438 [ARG_PTR_TO_STACK] = &stack_ptr_types, 6439 [ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR] = &const_str_ptr_types, 6440 [ARG_PTR_TO_TIMER] = &timer_types, 6441 [ARG_PTR_TO_KPTR] = &kptr_types, 6442 [ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR] = &dynptr_types, 6443 }; 6444 6445 static int check_reg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 6446 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type, 6447 const u32 *arg_btf_id, 6448 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 6449 { 6450 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 6451 enum bpf_reg_type expected, type = reg->type; 6452 const struct bpf_reg_types *compatible; 6453 int i, j; 6454 6455 compatible = compatible_reg_types[base_type(arg_type)]; 6456 if (!compatible) { 6457 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unsupported arg type %d\n", arg_type); 6458 return -EFAULT; 6459 } 6460 6461 /* ARG_PTR_TO_MEM + RDONLY is compatible with PTR_TO_MEM and PTR_TO_MEM + RDONLY, 6462 * but ARG_PTR_TO_MEM is compatible only with PTR_TO_MEM and NOT with PTR_TO_MEM + RDONLY 6463 * 6464 * Same for MAYBE_NULL: 6465 * 6466 * ARG_PTR_TO_MEM + MAYBE_NULL is compatible with PTR_TO_MEM and PTR_TO_MEM + MAYBE_NULL, 6467 * but ARG_PTR_TO_MEM is compatible only with PTR_TO_MEM but NOT with PTR_TO_MEM + MAYBE_NULL 6468 * 6469 * Therefore we fold these flags depending on the arg_type before comparison. 6470 */ 6471 if (arg_type & MEM_RDONLY) 6472 type &= ~MEM_RDONLY; 6473 if (arg_type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL) 6474 type &= ~PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 6475 6476 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(compatible->types); i++) { 6477 expected = compatible->types[i]; 6478 if (expected == NOT_INIT) 6479 break; 6480 6481 if (type == expected) 6482 goto found; 6483 } 6484 6485 verbose(env, "R%d type=%s expected=", regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 6486 for (j = 0; j + 1 < i; j++) 6487 verbose(env, "%s, ", reg_type_str(env, compatible->types[j])); 6488 verbose(env, "%s\n", reg_type_str(env, compatible->types[j])); 6489 return -EACCES; 6490 6491 found: 6492 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID || reg->type & PTR_TRUSTED) { 6493 /* For bpf_sk_release, it needs to match against first member 6494 * 'struct sock_common', hence make an exception for it. This 6495 * allows bpf_sk_release to work for multiple socket types. 6496 */ 6497 bool strict_type_match = arg_type_is_release(arg_type) && 6498 meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_release; 6499 6500 if (!arg_btf_id) { 6501 if (!compatible->btf_id) { 6502 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: missing arg compatible BTF ID\n"); 6503 return -EFAULT; 6504 } 6505 arg_btf_id = compatible->btf_id; 6506 } 6507 6508 if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) { 6509 if (map_kptr_match_type(env, meta->kptr_field, reg, regno)) 6510 return -EACCES; 6511 } else { 6512 if (arg_btf_id == BPF_PTR_POISON) { 6513 verbose(env, "verifier internal error:"); 6514 verbose(env, "R%d has non-overwritten BPF_PTR_POISON type\n", 6515 regno); 6516 return -EACCES; 6517 } 6518 6519 if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg->btf, reg->btf_id, reg->off, 6520 btf_vmlinux, *arg_btf_id, 6521 strict_type_match)) { 6522 verbose(env, "R%d is of type %s but %s is expected\n", 6523 regno, kernel_type_name(reg->btf, reg->btf_id), 6524 kernel_type_name(btf_vmlinux, *arg_btf_id)); 6525 return -EACCES; 6526 } 6527 } 6528 } else if (type_is_alloc(reg->type)) { 6529 if (meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_spin_lock && meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock) { 6530 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unimplemented handling of MEM_ALLOC\n"); 6531 return -EFAULT; 6532 } 6533 } 6534 6535 return 0; 6536 } 6537 6538 int check_func_arg_reg_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6539 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno, 6540 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type) 6541 { 6542 u32 type = reg->type; 6543 6544 /* When referenced register is passed to release function, its fixed 6545 * offset must be 0. 6546 * 6547 * We will check arg_type_is_release reg has ref_obj_id when storing 6548 * meta->release_regno. 6549 */ 6550 if (arg_type_is_release(arg_type)) { 6551 /* ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR with OBJ_RELEASE is a bit special, as it 6552 * may not directly point to the object being released, but to 6553 * dynptr pointing to such object, which might be at some offset 6554 * on the stack. In that case, we simply to fallback to the 6555 * default handling. 6556 */ 6557 if (arg_type_is_dynptr(arg_type) && type == PTR_TO_STACK) 6558 return 0; 6559 /* Doing check_ptr_off_reg check for the offset will catch this 6560 * because fixed_off_ok is false, but checking here allows us 6561 * to give the user a better error message. 6562 */ 6563 if (reg->off) { 6564 verbose(env, "R%d must have zero offset when passed to release func or trusted arg to kfunc\n", 6565 regno); 6566 return -EINVAL; 6567 } 6568 return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, false); 6569 } 6570 6571 switch (type) { 6572 /* Pointer types where both fixed and variable offset is explicitly allowed: */ 6573 case PTR_TO_STACK: 6574 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 6575 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 6576 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 6577 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 6578 case PTR_TO_MEM: 6579 case PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY: 6580 case PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RINGBUF: 6581 case PTR_TO_BUF: 6582 case PTR_TO_BUF | MEM_RDONLY: 6583 case SCALAR_VALUE: 6584 return 0; 6585 /* All the rest must be rejected, except PTR_TO_BTF_ID which allows 6586 * fixed offset. 6587 */ 6588 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 6589 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC: 6590 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED: 6591 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_RCU: 6592 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_TRUSTED: 6593 /* When referenced PTR_TO_BTF_ID is passed to release function, 6594 * its fixed offset must be 0. In the other cases, fixed offset 6595 * can be non-zero. This was already checked above. So pass 6596 * fixed_off_ok as true to allow fixed offset for all other 6597 * cases. var_off always must be 0 for PTR_TO_BTF_ID, hence we 6598 * still need to do checks instead of returning. 6599 */ 6600 return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, true); 6601 default: 6602 return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, false); 6603 } 6604 } 6605 6606 static int dynptr_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 6607 { 6608 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 6609 int spi; 6610 6611 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 6612 return reg->id; 6613 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 6614 if (spi < 0) 6615 return spi; 6616 return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.id; 6617 } 6618 6619 static int dynptr_ref_obj_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 6620 { 6621 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 6622 int spi; 6623 6624 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 6625 return reg->ref_obj_id; 6626 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 6627 if (spi < 0) 6628 return spi; 6629 return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id; 6630 } 6631 6632 static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg, 6633 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 6634 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) 6635 { 6636 u32 regno = BPF_REG_1 + arg; 6637 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 6638 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type = fn->arg_type[arg]; 6639 enum bpf_reg_type type = reg->type; 6640 u32 *arg_btf_id = NULL; 6641 int err = 0; 6642 6643 if (arg_type == ARG_DONTCARE) 6644 return 0; 6645 6646 err = check_reg_arg(env, regno, SRC_OP); 6647 if (err) 6648 return err; 6649 6650 if (arg_type == ARG_ANYTHING) { 6651 if (is_pointer_value(env, regno)) { 6652 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into helper function\n", 6653 regno); 6654 return -EACCES; 6655 } 6656 return 0; 6657 } 6658 6659 if (type_is_pkt_pointer(type) && 6660 !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, meta, BPF_READ)) { 6661 verbose(env, "helper access to the packet is not allowed\n"); 6662 return -EACCES; 6663 } 6664 6665 if (base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 6666 err = resolve_map_arg_type(env, meta, &arg_type); 6667 if (err) 6668 return err; 6669 } 6670 6671 if (register_is_null(reg) && type_may_be_null(arg_type)) 6672 /* A NULL register has a SCALAR_VALUE type, so skip 6673 * type checking. 6674 */ 6675 goto skip_type_check; 6676 6677 /* arg_btf_id and arg_size are in a union. */ 6678 if (base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID || 6679 base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK) 6680 arg_btf_id = fn->arg_btf_id[arg]; 6681 6682 err = check_reg_type(env, regno, arg_type, arg_btf_id, meta); 6683 if (err) 6684 return err; 6685 6686 err = check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, regno, arg_type); 6687 if (err) 6688 return err; 6689 6690 skip_type_check: 6691 if (arg_type_is_release(arg_type)) { 6692 if (arg_type_is_dynptr(arg_type)) { 6693 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 6694 int spi; 6695 6696 /* Only dynptr created on stack can be released, thus 6697 * the get_spi and stack state checks for spilled_ptr 6698 * should only be done before process_dynptr_func for 6699 * PTR_TO_STACK. 6700 */ 6701 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 6702 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 6703 if (spi < 0 || !state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id) { 6704 verbose(env, "arg %d is an unacquired reference\n", regno); 6705 return -EINVAL; 6706 } 6707 } else { 6708 verbose(env, "cannot release unowned const bpf_dynptr\n"); 6709 return -EINVAL; 6710 } 6711 } else if (!reg->ref_obj_id && !register_is_null(reg)) { 6712 verbose(env, "R%d must be referenced when passed to release function\n", 6713 regno); 6714 return -EINVAL; 6715 } 6716 if (meta->release_regno) { 6717 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: more than one release argument\n"); 6718 return -EFAULT; 6719 } 6720 meta->release_regno = regno; 6721 } 6722 6723 if (reg->ref_obj_id) { 6724 if (meta->ref_obj_id) { 6725 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: more than one arg with ref_obj_id R%d %u %u\n", 6726 regno, reg->ref_obj_id, 6727 meta->ref_obj_id); 6728 return -EFAULT; 6729 } 6730 meta->ref_obj_id = reg->ref_obj_id; 6731 } 6732 6733 switch (base_type(arg_type)) { 6734 case ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR: 6735 /* bpf_map_xxx(map_ptr) call: remember that map_ptr */ 6736 if (meta->map_ptr) { 6737 /* Use map_uid (which is unique id of inner map) to reject: 6738 * inner_map1 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(outer_map, key1) 6739 * inner_map2 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(outer_map, key2) 6740 * if (inner_map1 && inner_map2) { 6741 * timer = bpf_map_lookup_elem(inner_map1); 6742 * if (timer) 6743 * // mismatch would have been allowed 6744 * bpf_timer_init(timer, inner_map2); 6745 * } 6746 * 6747 * Comparing map_ptr is enough to distinguish normal and outer maps. 6748 */ 6749 if (meta->map_ptr != reg->map_ptr || 6750 meta->map_uid != reg->map_uid) { 6751 verbose(env, 6752 "timer pointer in R1 map_uid=%d doesn't match map pointer in R2 map_uid=%d\n", 6753 meta->map_uid, reg->map_uid); 6754 return -EINVAL; 6755 } 6756 } 6757 meta->map_ptr = reg->map_ptr; 6758 meta->map_uid = reg->map_uid; 6759 break; 6760 case ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 6761 /* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., key) call: 6762 * check that [key, key + map->key_size) are within 6763 * stack limits and initialized 6764 */ 6765 if (!meta->map_ptr) { 6766 /* in function declaration map_ptr must come before 6767 * map_key, so that it's verified and known before 6768 * we have to check map_key here. Otherwise it means 6769 * that kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier 6770 */ 6771 verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->key\n"); 6772 return -EACCES; 6773 } 6774 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, 6775 meta->map_ptr->key_size, false, 6776 NULL); 6777 break; 6778 case ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 6779 if (type_may_be_null(arg_type) && register_is_null(reg)) 6780 return 0; 6781 6782 /* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., value) call: 6783 * check [value, value + map->value_size) validity 6784 */ 6785 if (!meta->map_ptr) { 6786 /* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */ 6787 verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->value\n"); 6788 return -EACCES; 6789 } 6790 meta->raw_mode = arg_type & MEM_UNINIT; 6791 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, 6792 meta->map_ptr->value_size, false, 6793 meta); 6794 break; 6795 case ARG_PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID: 6796 if (!reg->btf_id) { 6797 verbose(env, "Helper has invalid btf_id in R%d\n", regno); 6798 return -EACCES; 6799 } 6800 meta->ret_btf = reg->btf; 6801 meta->ret_btf_id = reg->btf_id; 6802 break; 6803 case ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK: 6804 if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_spin_lock) { 6805 err = process_spin_lock(env, regno, true); 6806 if (err) 6807 return err; 6808 } else if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock) { 6809 err = process_spin_lock(env, regno, false); 6810 if (err) 6811 return err; 6812 } else { 6813 verbose(env, "verifier internal error\n"); 6814 return -EFAULT; 6815 } 6816 break; 6817 case ARG_PTR_TO_TIMER: 6818 err = process_timer_func(env, regno, meta); 6819 if (err) 6820 return err; 6821 break; 6822 case ARG_PTR_TO_FUNC: 6823 meta->subprogno = reg->subprogno; 6824 break; 6825 case ARG_PTR_TO_MEM: 6826 /* The access to this pointer is only checked when we hit the 6827 * next is_mem_size argument below. 6828 */ 6829 meta->raw_mode = arg_type & MEM_UNINIT; 6830 if (arg_type & MEM_FIXED_SIZE) { 6831 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, 6832 fn->arg_size[arg], false, 6833 meta); 6834 } 6835 break; 6836 case ARG_CONST_SIZE: 6837 err = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, false, meta); 6838 break; 6839 case ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO: 6840 err = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, true, meta); 6841 break; 6842 case ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR: 6843 err = process_dynptr_func(env, regno, arg_type, meta); 6844 if (err) 6845 return err; 6846 break; 6847 case ARG_CONST_ALLOC_SIZE_OR_ZERO: 6848 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 6849 verbose(env, "R%d is not a known constant'\n", 6850 regno); 6851 return -EACCES; 6852 } 6853 meta->mem_size = reg->var_off.value; 6854 err = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); 6855 if (err) 6856 return err; 6857 break; 6858 case ARG_PTR_TO_INT: 6859 case ARG_PTR_TO_LONG: 6860 { 6861 int size = int_ptr_type_to_size(arg_type); 6862 6863 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, size, false, meta); 6864 if (err) 6865 return err; 6866 err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, 0, size, true); 6867 break; 6868 } 6869 case ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR: 6870 { 6871 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 6872 int map_off; 6873 u64 map_addr; 6874 char *str_ptr; 6875 6876 if (!bpf_map_is_rdonly(map)) { 6877 verbose(env, "R%d does not point to a readonly map'\n", regno); 6878 return -EACCES; 6879 } 6880 6881 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 6882 verbose(env, "R%d is not a constant address'\n", regno); 6883 return -EACCES; 6884 } 6885 6886 if (!map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) { 6887 verbose(env, "no direct value access support for this map type\n"); 6888 return -EACCES; 6889 } 6890 6891 err = check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off, 6892 map->value_size - reg->off, false, 6893 ACCESS_HELPER); 6894 if (err) 6895 return err; 6896 6897 map_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; 6898 err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &map_addr, map_off); 6899 if (err) { 6900 verbose(env, "direct value access on string failed\n"); 6901 return err; 6902 } 6903 6904 str_ptr = (char *)(long)(map_addr); 6905 if (!strnchr(str_ptr + map_off, map->value_size - map_off, 0)) { 6906 verbose(env, "string is not zero-terminated\n"); 6907 return -EINVAL; 6908 } 6909 break; 6910 } 6911 case ARG_PTR_TO_KPTR: 6912 err = process_kptr_func(env, regno, meta); 6913 if (err) 6914 return err; 6915 break; 6916 } 6917 6918 return err; 6919 } 6920 6921 static bool may_update_sockmap(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id) 6922 { 6923 enum bpf_attach_type eatype = env->prog->expected_attach_type; 6924 enum bpf_prog_type type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 6925 6926 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem) 6927 return false; 6928 6929 /* It's not possible to get access to a locked struct sock in these 6930 * contexts, so updating is safe. 6931 */ 6932 switch (type) { 6933 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: 6934 if (eatype == BPF_TRACE_ITER) 6935 return true; 6936 break; 6937 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER: 6938 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: 6939 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT: 6940 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP: 6941 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT: 6942 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR: 6943 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP: 6944 return true; 6945 default: 6946 break; 6947 } 6948 6949 verbose(env, "cannot update sockmap in this context\n"); 6950 return false; 6951 } 6952 6953 static bool allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 6954 { 6955 return env->prog->jit_requested && 6956 bpf_jit_supports_subprog_tailcalls(); 6957 } 6958 6959 static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6960 struct bpf_map *map, int func_id) 6961 { 6962 if (!map) 6963 return 0; 6964 6965 /* We need a two way check, first is from map perspective ... */ 6966 switch (map->map_type) { 6967 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY: 6968 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call) 6969 goto error; 6970 break; 6971 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY: 6972 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read && 6973 func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output && 6974 func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_output && 6975 func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read_value && 6976 func_id != BPF_FUNC_xdp_output) 6977 goto error; 6978 break; 6979 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF: 6980 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_output && 6981 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve && 6982 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_query && 6983 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve_dynptr && 6984 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_submit_dynptr && 6985 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_discard_dynptr) 6986 goto error; 6987 break; 6988 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF: 6989 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain) 6990 goto error; 6991 break; 6992 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE: 6993 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stackid) 6994 goto error; 6995 break; 6996 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY: 6997 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup && 6998 func_id != BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup) 6999 goto error; 7000 break; 7001 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE: 7002 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE: 7003 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage) 7004 goto error; 7005 break; 7006 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP: 7007 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP_HASH: 7008 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map && 7009 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) 7010 goto error; 7011 break; 7012 /* Restrict bpf side of cpumap and xskmap, open when use-cases 7013 * appear. 7014 */ 7015 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP: 7016 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map) 7017 goto error; 7018 break; 7019 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP: 7020 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map && 7021 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) 7022 goto error; 7023 break; 7024 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS: 7025 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS: 7026 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) 7027 goto error; 7028 break; 7029 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP: 7030 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map && 7031 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update && 7032 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem && 7033 func_id != BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_map && 7034 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport && 7035 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 7036 !may_update_sockmap(env, func_id)) 7037 goto error; 7038 break; 7039 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH: 7040 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_hash && 7041 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_hash_update && 7042 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem && 7043 func_id != BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_hash && 7044 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport && 7045 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 7046 !may_update_sockmap(env, func_id)) 7047 goto error; 7048 break; 7049 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY: 7050 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport) 7051 goto error; 7052 break; 7053 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE: 7054 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK: 7055 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem && 7056 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem && 7057 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem) 7058 goto error; 7059 break; 7060 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE: 7061 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get && 7062 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_delete) 7063 goto error; 7064 break; 7065 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE: 7066 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get && 7067 func_id != BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_delete) 7068 goto error; 7069 break; 7070 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE: 7071 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_task_storage_get && 7072 func_id != BPF_FUNC_task_storage_delete) 7073 goto error; 7074 break; 7075 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE: 7076 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_get && 7077 func_id != BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_delete) 7078 goto error; 7079 break; 7080 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER: 7081 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem && 7082 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem) 7083 goto error; 7084 break; 7085 default: 7086 break; 7087 } 7088 7089 /* ... and second from the function itself. */ 7090 switch (func_id) { 7091 case BPF_FUNC_tail_call: 7092 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY) 7093 goto error; 7094 if (env->subprog_cnt > 1 && !allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(env)) { 7095 verbose(env, "tail_calls are not allowed in non-JITed programs with bpf-to-bpf calls\n"); 7096 return -EINVAL; 7097 } 7098 break; 7099 case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read: 7100 case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output: 7101 case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read_value: 7102 case BPF_FUNC_skb_output: 7103 case BPF_FUNC_xdp_output: 7104 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY) 7105 goto error; 7106 break; 7107 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_output: 7108 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve: 7109 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_query: 7110 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve_dynptr: 7111 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_submit_dynptr: 7112 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_discard_dynptr: 7113 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF) 7114 goto error; 7115 break; 7116 case BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain: 7117 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF) 7118 goto error; 7119 break; 7120 case BPF_FUNC_get_stackid: 7121 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE) 7122 goto error; 7123 break; 7124 case BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup: 7125 case BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup: 7126 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY) 7127 goto error; 7128 break; 7129 case BPF_FUNC_redirect_map: 7130 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP && 7131 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP_HASH && 7132 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP && 7133 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP) 7134 goto error; 7135 break; 7136 case BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map: 7137 case BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_map: 7138 case BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update: 7139 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP) 7140 goto error; 7141 break; 7142 case BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_hash: 7143 case BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_hash: 7144 case BPF_FUNC_sock_hash_update: 7145 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH) 7146 goto error; 7147 break; 7148 case BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage: 7149 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE && 7150 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE) 7151 goto error; 7152 break; 7153 case BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport: 7154 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY && 7155 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP && 7156 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH) 7157 goto error; 7158 break; 7159 case BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem: 7160 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE && 7161 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK) 7162 goto error; 7163 break; 7164 case BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem: 7165 case BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem: 7166 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE && 7167 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK && 7168 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER) 7169 goto error; 7170 break; 7171 case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem: 7172 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY && 7173 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH && 7174 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_PERCPU_HASH) 7175 goto error; 7176 break; 7177 case BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get: 7178 case BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_delete: 7179 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE) 7180 goto error; 7181 break; 7182 case BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get: 7183 case BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_delete: 7184 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE) 7185 goto error; 7186 break; 7187 case BPF_FUNC_task_storage_get: 7188 case BPF_FUNC_task_storage_delete: 7189 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE) 7190 goto error; 7191 break; 7192 case BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_get: 7193 case BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_delete: 7194 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE) 7195 goto error; 7196 break; 7197 default: 7198 break; 7199 } 7200 7201 return 0; 7202 error: 7203 verbose(env, "cannot pass map_type %d into func %s#%d\n", 7204 map->map_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 7205 return -EINVAL; 7206 } 7207 7208 static bool check_raw_mode_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) 7209 { 7210 int count = 0; 7211 7212 if (fn->arg1_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) 7213 count++; 7214 if (fn->arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) 7215 count++; 7216 if (fn->arg3_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) 7217 count++; 7218 if (fn->arg4_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) 7219 count++; 7220 if (fn->arg5_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) 7221 count++; 7222 7223 /* We only support one arg being in raw mode at the moment, 7224 * which is sufficient for the helper functions we have 7225 * right now. 7226 */ 7227 return count <= 1; 7228 } 7229 7230 static bool check_args_pair_invalid(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, int arg) 7231 { 7232 bool is_fixed = fn->arg_type[arg] & MEM_FIXED_SIZE; 7233 bool has_size = fn->arg_size[arg] != 0; 7234 bool is_next_size = false; 7235 7236 if (arg + 1 < ARRAY_SIZE(fn->arg_type)) 7237 is_next_size = arg_type_is_mem_size(fn->arg_type[arg + 1]); 7238 7239 if (base_type(fn->arg_type[arg]) != ARG_PTR_TO_MEM) 7240 return is_next_size; 7241 7242 return has_size == is_next_size || is_next_size == is_fixed; 7243 } 7244 7245 static bool check_arg_pair_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) 7246 { 7247 /* bpf_xxx(..., buf, len) call will access 'len' 7248 * bytes from memory 'buf'. Both arg types need 7249 * to be paired, so make sure there's no buggy 7250 * helper function specification. 7251 */ 7252 if (arg_type_is_mem_size(fn->arg1_type) || 7253 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 0) || 7254 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 1) || 7255 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 2) || 7256 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 3) || 7257 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 4)) 7258 return false; 7259 7260 return true; 7261 } 7262 7263 static bool check_btf_id_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) 7264 { 7265 int i; 7266 7267 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(fn->arg_type); i++) { 7268 if (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) == ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID) 7269 return !!fn->arg_btf_id[i]; 7270 if (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) == ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK) 7271 return fn->arg_btf_id[i] == BPF_PTR_POISON; 7272 if (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) != ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID && fn->arg_btf_id[i] && 7273 /* arg_btf_id and arg_size are in a union. */ 7274 (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) != ARG_PTR_TO_MEM || 7275 !(fn->arg_type[i] & MEM_FIXED_SIZE))) 7276 return false; 7277 } 7278 7279 return true; 7280 } 7281 7282 static int check_func_proto(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, int func_id) 7283 { 7284 return check_raw_mode_ok(fn) && 7285 check_arg_pair_ok(fn) && 7286 check_btf_id_ok(fn) ? 0 : -EINVAL; 7287 } 7288 7289 /* Packet data might have moved, any old PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END] 7290 * are now invalid, so turn them into unknown SCALAR_VALUE. 7291 */ 7292 static void clear_all_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 7293 { 7294 struct bpf_func_state *state; 7295 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 7296 7297 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, state, reg, ({ 7298 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(reg)) 7299 __mark_reg_unknown(env, reg); 7300 })); 7301 } 7302 7303 enum { 7304 AT_PKT_END = -1, 7305 BEYOND_PKT_END = -2, 7306 }; 7307 7308 static void mark_pkt_end(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, int regn, bool range_open) 7309 { 7310 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 7311 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regn]; 7312 7313 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_PACKET) 7314 /* PTR_TO_PACKET_META is not supported yet */ 7315 return; 7316 7317 /* The 'reg' is pkt > pkt_end or pkt >= pkt_end. 7318 * How far beyond pkt_end it goes is unknown. 7319 * if (!range_open) it's the case of pkt >= pkt_end 7320 * if (range_open) it's the case of pkt > pkt_end 7321 * hence this pointer is at least 1 byte bigger than pkt_end 7322 */ 7323 if (range_open) 7324 reg->range = BEYOND_PKT_END; 7325 else 7326 reg->range = AT_PKT_END; 7327 } 7328 7329 /* The pointer with the specified id has released its reference to kernel 7330 * resources. Identify all copies of the same pointer and clear the reference. 7331 */ 7332 static int release_reference(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7333 int ref_obj_id) 7334 { 7335 struct bpf_func_state *state; 7336 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 7337 int err; 7338 7339 err = release_reference_state(cur_func(env), ref_obj_id); 7340 if (err) 7341 return err; 7342 7343 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, state, reg, ({ 7344 if (reg->ref_obj_id == ref_obj_id) { 7345 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) 7346 __mark_reg_not_init(env, reg); 7347 else 7348 __mark_reg_unknown(env, reg); 7349 } 7350 })); 7351 7352 return 0; 7353 } 7354 7355 static void clear_caller_saved_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7356 struct bpf_reg_state *regs) 7357 { 7358 int i; 7359 7360 /* after the call registers r0 - r5 were scratched */ 7361 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { 7362 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); 7363 check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); 7364 } 7365 } 7366 7367 typedef int (*set_callee_state_fn)(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7368 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 7369 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 7370 int insn_idx); 7371 7372 static int set_callee_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7373 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 7374 struct bpf_func_state *callee, int insn_idx); 7375 7376 static int __check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 7377 int *insn_idx, int subprog, 7378 set_callee_state_fn set_callee_state_cb) 7379 { 7380 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 7381 struct bpf_func_info_aux *func_info_aux; 7382 struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee; 7383 int err; 7384 bool is_global = false; 7385 7386 if (state->curframe + 1 >= MAX_CALL_FRAMES) { 7387 verbose(env, "the call stack of %d frames is too deep\n", 7388 state->curframe + 2); 7389 return -E2BIG; 7390 } 7391 7392 caller = state->frame[state->curframe]; 7393 if (state->frame[state->curframe + 1]) { 7394 verbose(env, "verifier bug. Frame %d already allocated\n", 7395 state->curframe + 1); 7396 return -EFAULT; 7397 } 7398 7399 func_info_aux = env->prog->aux->func_info_aux; 7400 if (func_info_aux) 7401 is_global = func_info_aux[subprog].linkage == BTF_FUNC_GLOBAL; 7402 err = btf_check_subprog_call(env, subprog, caller->regs); 7403 if (err == -EFAULT) 7404 return err; 7405 if (is_global) { 7406 if (err) { 7407 verbose(env, "Caller passes invalid args into func#%d\n", 7408 subprog); 7409 return err; 7410 } else { 7411 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) 7412 verbose(env, 7413 "Func#%d is global and valid. Skipping.\n", 7414 subprog); 7415 clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs); 7416 7417 /* All global functions return a 64-bit SCALAR_VALUE */ 7418 mark_reg_unknown(env, caller->regs, BPF_REG_0); 7419 caller->regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 7420 7421 /* continue with next insn after call */ 7422 return 0; 7423 } 7424 } 7425 7426 /* set_callee_state is used for direct subprog calls, but we are 7427 * interested in validating only BPF helpers that can call subprogs as 7428 * callbacks 7429 */ 7430 if (set_callee_state_cb != set_callee_state && !is_callback_calling_function(insn->imm)) { 7431 verbose(env, "verifier bug: helper %s#%d is not marked as callback-calling\n", 7432 func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm); 7433 return -EFAULT; 7434 } 7435 7436 if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 7437 insn->src_reg == 0 && 7438 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback) { 7439 struct bpf_verifier_state *async_cb; 7440 7441 /* there is no real recursion here. timer callbacks are async */ 7442 env->subprog_info[subprog].is_async_cb = true; 7443 async_cb = push_async_cb(env, env->subprog_info[subprog].start, 7444 *insn_idx, subprog); 7445 if (!async_cb) 7446 return -EFAULT; 7447 callee = async_cb->frame[0]; 7448 callee->async_entry_cnt = caller->async_entry_cnt + 1; 7449 7450 /* Convert bpf_timer_set_callback() args into timer callback args */ 7451 err = set_callee_state_cb(env, caller, callee, *insn_idx); 7452 if (err) 7453 return err; 7454 7455 clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs); 7456 mark_reg_unknown(env, caller->regs, BPF_REG_0); 7457 caller->regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 7458 /* continue with next insn after call */ 7459 return 0; 7460 } 7461 7462 callee = kzalloc(sizeof(*callee), GFP_KERNEL); 7463 if (!callee) 7464 return -ENOMEM; 7465 state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = callee; 7466 7467 /* callee cannot access r0, r6 - r9 for reading and has to write 7468 * into its own stack before reading from it. 7469 * callee can read/write into caller's stack 7470 */ 7471 init_func_state(env, callee, 7472 /* remember the callsite, it will be used by bpf_exit */ 7473 *insn_idx /* callsite */, 7474 state->curframe + 1 /* frameno within this callchain */, 7475 subprog /* subprog number within this prog */); 7476 7477 /* Transfer references to the callee */ 7478 err = copy_reference_state(callee, caller); 7479 if (err) 7480 goto err_out; 7481 7482 err = set_callee_state_cb(env, caller, callee, *insn_idx); 7483 if (err) 7484 goto err_out; 7485 7486 clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs); 7487 7488 /* only increment it after check_reg_arg() finished */ 7489 state->curframe++; 7490 7491 /* and go analyze first insn of the callee */ 7492 *insn_idx = env->subprog_info[subprog].start - 1; 7493 7494 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 7495 verbose(env, "caller:\n"); 7496 print_verifier_state(env, caller, true); 7497 verbose(env, "callee:\n"); 7498 print_verifier_state(env, callee, true); 7499 } 7500 return 0; 7501 7502 err_out: 7503 free_func_state(callee); 7504 state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = NULL; 7505 return err; 7506 } 7507 7508 int map_set_for_each_callback_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7509 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 7510 struct bpf_func_state *callee) 7511 { 7512 /* bpf_for_each_map_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *callback_fn, 7513 * void *callback_ctx, u64 flags); 7514 * callback_fn(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value, 7515 * void *callback_ctx); 7516 */ 7517 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1]; 7518 7519 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].type = PTR_TO_MAP_KEY; 7520 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]); 7521 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr; 7522 7523 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 7524 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); 7525 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr; 7526 7527 /* pointer to stack or null */ 7528 callee->regs[BPF_REG_4] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_3]; 7529 7530 /* unused */ 7531 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 7532 return 0; 7533 } 7534 7535 static int set_callee_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7536 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 7537 struct bpf_func_state *callee, int insn_idx) 7538 { 7539 int i; 7540 7541 /* copy r1 - r5 args that callee can access. The copy includes parent 7542 * pointers, which connects us up to the liveness chain 7543 */ 7544 for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) 7545 callee->regs[i] = caller->regs[i]; 7546 return 0; 7547 } 7548 7549 static int check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 7550 int *insn_idx) 7551 { 7552 int subprog, target_insn; 7553 7554 target_insn = *insn_idx + insn->imm + 1; 7555 subprog = find_subprog(env, target_insn); 7556 if (subprog < 0) { 7557 verbose(env, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", 7558 target_insn); 7559 return -EFAULT; 7560 } 7561 7562 return __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx, subprog, set_callee_state); 7563 } 7564 7565 static int set_map_elem_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7566 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 7567 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 7568 int insn_idx) 7569 { 7570 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; 7571 struct bpf_map *map; 7572 int err; 7573 7574 if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(insn_aux)) { 7575 verbose(env, "tail_call abusing map_ptr\n"); 7576 return -EINVAL; 7577 } 7578 7579 map = BPF_MAP_PTR(insn_aux->map_ptr_state); 7580 if (!map->ops->map_set_for_each_callback_args || 7581 !map->ops->map_for_each_callback) { 7582 verbose(env, "callback function not allowed for map\n"); 7583 return -ENOTSUPP; 7584 } 7585 7586 err = map->ops->map_set_for_each_callback_args(env, caller, callee); 7587 if (err) 7588 return err; 7589 7590 callee->in_callback_fn = true; 7591 callee->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 1); 7592 return 0; 7593 } 7594 7595 static int set_loop_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7596 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 7597 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 7598 int insn_idx) 7599 { 7600 /* bpf_loop(u32 nr_loops, void *callback_fn, void *callback_ctx, 7601 * u64 flags); 7602 * callback_fn(u32 index, void *callback_ctx); 7603 */ 7604 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1].type = SCALAR_VALUE; 7605 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_3]; 7606 7607 /* unused */ 7608 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); 7609 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]); 7610 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 7611 7612 callee->in_callback_fn = true; 7613 callee->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 1); 7614 return 0; 7615 } 7616 7617 static int set_timer_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7618 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 7619 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 7620 int insn_idx) 7621 { 7622 struct bpf_map *map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr; 7623 7624 /* bpf_timer_set_callback(struct bpf_timer *timer, void *callback_fn); 7625 * callback_fn(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value); 7626 */ 7627 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1].type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; 7628 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_1]); 7629 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr = map_ptr; 7630 7631 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].type = PTR_TO_MAP_KEY; 7632 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]); 7633 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].map_ptr = map_ptr; 7634 7635 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 7636 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); 7637 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].map_ptr = map_ptr; 7638 7639 /* unused */ 7640 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]); 7641 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 7642 callee->in_async_callback_fn = true; 7643 callee->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 1); 7644 return 0; 7645 } 7646 7647 static int set_find_vma_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7648 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 7649 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 7650 int insn_idx) 7651 { 7652 /* bpf_find_vma(struct task_struct *task, u64 addr, 7653 * void *callback_fn, void *callback_ctx, u64 flags) 7654 * (callback_fn)(struct task_struct *task, 7655 * struct vm_area_struct *vma, void *callback_ctx); 7656 */ 7657 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1]; 7658 7659 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 7660 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]); 7661 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].btf = btf_vmlinux; 7662 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].btf_id = btf_tracing_ids[BTF_TRACING_TYPE_VMA], 7663 7664 /* pointer to stack or null */ 7665 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_4]; 7666 7667 /* unused */ 7668 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]); 7669 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 7670 callee->in_callback_fn = true; 7671 callee->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 1); 7672 return 0; 7673 } 7674 7675 static int set_user_ringbuf_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7676 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 7677 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 7678 int insn_idx) 7679 { 7680 /* bpf_user_ringbuf_drain(struct bpf_map *map, void *callback_fn, void 7681 * callback_ctx, u64 flags); 7682 * callback_fn(const struct bpf_dynptr_t* dynptr, void *callback_ctx); 7683 */ 7684 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_0]); 7685 mark_dynptr_cb_reg(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_1], BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL); 7686 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_3]; 7687 7688 /* unused */ 7689 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); 7690 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]); 7691 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 7692 7693 callee->in_callback_fn = true; 7694 callee->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 1); 7695 return 0; 7696 } 7697 7698 static int prepare_func_exit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *insn_idx) 7699 { 7700 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 7701 struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee; 7702 struct bpf_reg_state *r0; 7703 int err; 7704 7705 callee = state->frame[state->curframe]; 7706 r0 = &callee->regs[BPF_REG_0]; 7707 if (r0->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 7708 /* technically it's ok to return caller's stack pointer 7709 * (or caller's caller's pointer) back to the caller, 7710 * since these pointers are valid. Only current stack 7711 * pointer will be invalid as soon as function exits, 7712 * but let's be conservative 7713 */ 7714 verbose(env, "cannot return stack pointer to the caller\n"); 7715 return -EINVAL; 7716 } 7717 7718 caller = state->frame[state->curframe - 1]; 7719 if (callee->in_callback_fn) { 7720 /* enforce R0 return value range [0, 1]. */ 7721 struct tnum range = callee->callback_ret_range; 7722 7723 if (r0->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 7724 verbose(env, "R0 not a scalar value\n"); 7725 return -EACCES; 7726 } 7727 if (!tnum_in(range, r0->var_off)) { 7728 verbose_invalid_scalar(env, r0, &range, "callback return", "R0"); 7729 return -EINVAL; 7730 } 7731 } else { 7732 /* return to the caller whatever r0 had in the callee */ 7733 caller->regs[BPF_REG_0] = *r0; 7734 } 7735 7736 /* callback_fn frame should have released its own additions to parent's 7737 * reference state at this point, or check_reference_leak would 7738 * complain, hence it must be the same as the caller. There is no need 7739 * to copy it back. 7740 */ 7741 if (!callee->in_callback_fn) { 7742 /* Transfer references to the caller */ 7743 err = copy_reference_state(caller, callee); 7744 if (err) 7745 return err; 7746 } 7747 7748 *insn_idx = callee->callsite + 1; 7749 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 7750 verbose(env, "returning from callee:\n"); 7751 print_verifier_state(env, callee, true); 7752 verbose(env, "to caller at %d:\n", *insn_idx); 7753 print_verifier_state(env, caller, true); 7754 } 7755 /* clear everything in the callee */ 7756 free_func_state(callee); 7757 state->frame[state->curframe--] = NULL; 7758 return 0; 7759 } 7760 7761 static void do_refine_retval_range(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, int ret_type, 7762 int func_id, 7763 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 7764 { 7765 struct bpf_reg_state *ret_reg = ®s[BPF_REG_0]; 7766 7767 if (ret_type != RET_INTEGER || 7768 (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stack && 7769 func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_task_stack && 7770 func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_str && 7771 func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel_str && 7772 func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_user_str)) 7773 return; 7774 7775 ret_reg->smax_value = meta->msize_max_value; 7776 ret_reg->s32_max_value = meta->msize_max_value; 7777 ret_reg->smin_value = -MAX_ERRNO; 7778 ret_reg->s32_min_value = -MAX_ERRNO; 7779 reg_bounds_sync(ret_reg); 7780 } 7781 7782 static int 7783 record_func_map(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 7784 int func_id, int insn_idx) 7785 { 7786 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; 7787 struct bpf_map *map = meta->map_ptr; 7788 7789 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call && 7790 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 7791 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem && 7792 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem && 7793 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem && 7794 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem && 7795 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem && 7796 func_id != BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem && 7797 func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map && 7798 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem) 7799 return 0; 7800 7801 if (map == NULL) { 7802 verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n"); 7803 return -EINVAL; 7804 } 7805 7806 /* In case of read-only, some additional restrictions 7807 * need to be applied in order to prevent altering the 7808 * state of the map from program side. 7809 */ 7810 if ((map->map_flags & BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG) && 7811 (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem || 7812 func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem || 7813 func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem || 7814 func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem)) { 7815 verbose(env, "write into map forbidden\n"); 7816 return -EACCES; 7817 } 7818 7819 if (!BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state)) 7820 bpf_map_ptr_store(aux, meta->map_ptr, 7821 !meta->map_ptr->bypass_spec_v1); 7822 else if (BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state) != meta->map_ptr) 7823 bpf_map_ptr_store(aux, BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON, 7824 !meta->map_ptr->bypass_spec_v1); 7825 return 0; 7826 } 7827 7828 static int 7829 record_func_key(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 7830 int func_id, int insn_idx) 7831 { 7832 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; 7833 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg; 7834 struct bpf_map *map = meta->map_ptr; 7835 u64 val, max; 7836 int err; 7837 7838 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call) 7839 return 0; 7840 if (!map || map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY) { 7841 verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n"); 7842 return -EINVAL; 7843 } 7844 7845 reg = ®s[BPF_REG_3]; 7846 val = reg->var_off.value; 7847 max = map->max_entries; 7848 7849 if (!(register_is_const(reg) && val < max)) { 7850 bpf_map_key_store(aux, BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON); 7851 return 0; 7852 } 7853 7854 err = mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_3); 7855 if (err) 7856 return err; 7857 if (bpf_map_key_unseen(aux)) 7858 bpf_map_key_store(aux, val); 7859 else if (!bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux) && 7860 bpf_map_key_immediate(aux) != val) 7861 bpf_map_key_store(aux, BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON); 7862 return 0; 7863 } 7864 7865 static int check_reference_leak(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 7866 { 7867 struct bpf_func_state *state = cur_func(env); 7868 bool refs_lingering = false; 7869 int i; 7870 7871 if (state->frameno && !state->in_callback_fn) 7872 return 0; 7873 7874 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) { 7875 if (state->in_callback_fn && state->refs[i].callback_ref != state->frameno) 7876 continue; 7877 verbose(env, "Unreleased reference id=%d alloc_insn=%d\n", 7878 state->refs[i].id, state->refs[i].insn_idx); 7879 refs_lingering = true; 7880 } 7881 return refs_lingering ? -EINVAL : 0; 7882 } 7883 7884 static int check_bpf_snprintf_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7885 struct bpf_reg_state *regs) 7886 { 7887 struct bpf_reg_state *fmt_reg = ®s[BPF_REG_3]; 7888 struct bpf_reg_state *data_len_reg = ®s[BPF_REG_5]; 7889 struct bpf_map *fmt_map = fmt_reg->map_ptr; 7890 struct bpf_bprintf_data data = {}; 7891 int err, fmt_map_off, num_args; 7892 u64 fmt_addr; 7893 char *fmt; 7894 7895 /* data must be an array of u64 */ 7896 if (data_len_reg->var_off.value % 8) 7897 return -EINVAL; 7898 num_args = data_len_reg->var_off.value / 8; 7899 7900 /* fmt being ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR guarantees that var_off is const 7901 * and map_direct_value_addr is set. 7902 */ 7903 fmt_map_off = fmt_reg->off + fmt_reg->var_off.value; 7904 err = fmt_map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(fmt_map, &fmt_addr, 7905 fmt_map_off); 7906 if (err) { 7907 verbose(env, "verifier bug\n"); 7908 return -EFAULT; 7909 } 7910 fmt = (char *)(long)fmt_addr + fmt_map_off; 7911 7912 /* We are also guaranteed that fmt+fmt_map_off is NULL terminated, we 7913 * can focus on validating the format specifiers. 7914 */ 7915 err = bpf_bprintf_prepare(fmt, UINT_MAX, NULL, num_args, &data); 7916 if (err < 0) 7917 verbose(env, "Invalid format string\n"); 7918 7919 return err; 7920 } 7921 7922 static int check_get_func_ip(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 7923 { 7924 enum bpf_prog_type type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 7925 int func_id = BPF_FUNC_get_func_ip; 7926 7927 if (type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING) { 7928 if (!bpf_prog_has_trampoline(env->prog)) { 7929 verbose(env, "func %s#%d supported only for fentry/fexit/fmod_ret programs\n", 7930 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 7931 return -ENOTSUPP; 7932 } 7933 return 0; 7934 } else if (type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE) { 7935 return 0; 7936 } 7937 7938 verbose(env, "func %s#%d not supported for program type %d\n", 7939 func_id_name(func_id), func_id, type); 7940 return -ENOTSUPP; 7941 } 7942 7943 static struct bpf_insn_aux_data *cur_aux(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 7944 { 7945 return &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx]; 7946 } 7947 7948 static bool loop_flag_is_zero(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 7949 { 7950 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 7951 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[BPF_REG_4]; 7952 bool reg_is_null = register_is_null(reg); 7953 7954 if (reg_is_null) 7955 mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_4); 7956 7957 return reg_is_null; 7958 } 7959 7960 static void update_loop_inline_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 subprogno) 7961 { 7962 struct bpf_loop_inline_state *state = &cur_aux(env)->loop_inline_state; 7963 7964 if (!state->initialized) { 7965 state->initialized = 1; 7966 state->fit_for_inline = loop_flag_is_zero(env); 7967 state->callback_subprogno = subprogno; 7968 return; 7969 } 7970 7971 if (!state->fit_for_inline) 7972 return; 7973 7974 state->fit_for_inline = (loop_flag_is_zero(env) && 7975 state->callback_subprogno == subprogno); 7976 } 7977 7978 static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 7979 int *insn_idx_p) 7980 { 7981 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 7982 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn = NULL; 7983 enum bpf_return_type ret_type; 7984 enum bpf_type_flag ret_flag; 7985 struct bpf_reg_state *regs; 7986 struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta; 7987 int insn_idx = *insn_idx_p; 7988 bool changes_data; 7989 int i, err, func_id; 7990 7991 /* find function prototype */ 7992 func_id = insn->imm; 7993 if (func_id < 0 || func_id >= __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID) { 7994 verbose(env, "invalid func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), 7995 func_id); 7996 return -EINVAL; 7997 } 7998 7999 if (env->ops->get_func_proto) 8000 fn = env->ops->get_func_proto(func_id, env->prog); 8001 if (!fn) { 8002 verbose(env, "unknown func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), 8003 func_id); 8004 return -EINVAL; 8005 } 8006 8007 /* eBPF programs must be GPL compatible to use GPL-ed functions */ 8008 if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible && fn->gpl_only) { 8009 verbose(env, "cannot call GPL-restricted function from non-GPL compatible program\n"); 8010 return -EINVAL; 8011 } 8012 8013 if (fn->allowed && !fn->allowed(env->prog)) { 8014 verbose(env, "helper call is not allowed in probe\n"); 8015 return -EINVAL; 8016 } 8017 8018 if (!env->prog->aux->sleepable && fn->might_sleep) { 8019 verbose(env, "helper call might sleep in a non-sleepable prog\n"); 8020 return -EINVAL; 8021 } 8022 8023 /* With LD_ABS/IND some JITs save/restore skb from r1. */ 8024 changes_data = bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(fn->func); 8025 if (changes_data && fn->arg1_type != ARG_PTR_TO_CTX) { 8026 verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d: r1 != ctx\n", 8027 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 8028 return -EINVAL; 8029 } 8030 8031 memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta)); 8032 meta.pkt_access = fn->pkt_access; 8033 8034 err = check_func_proto(fn, func_id); 8035 if (err) { 8036 verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n", 8037 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 8038 return err; 8039 } 8040 8041 if (env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock) { 8042 if (fn->might_sleep) { 8043 verbose(env, "sleepable helper %s#%d in rcu_read_lock region\n", 8044 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 8045 return -EINVAL; 8046 } 8047 8048 if (env->prog->aux->sleepable && is_storage_get_function(func_id)) 8049 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].storage_get_func_atomic = true; 8050 } 8051 8052 meta.func_id = func_id; 8053 /* check args */ 8054 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS; i++) { 8055 err = check_func_arg(env, i, &meta, fn); 8056 if (err) 8057 return err; 8058 } 8059 8060 err = record_func_map(env, &meta, func_id, insn_idx); 8061 if (err) 8062 return err; 8063 8064 err = record_func_key(env, &meta, func_id, insn_idx); 8065 if (err) 8066 return err; 8067 8068 /* Mark slots with STACK_MISC in case of raw mode, stack offset 8069 * is inferred from register state. 8070 */ 8071 for (i = 0; i < meta.access_size; i++) { 8072 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, meta.regno, i, BPF_B, 8073 BPF_WRITE, -1, false); 8074 if (err) 8075 return err; 8076 } 8077 8078 regs = cur_regs(env); 8079 8080 /* This can only be set for PTR_TO_STACK, as CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR cannot 8081 * be reinitialized by any dynptr helper. Hence, mark_stack_slots_dynptr 8082 * is safe to do directly. 8083 */ 8084 if (meta.uninit_dynptr_regno) { 8085 if (regs[meta.uninit_dynptr_regno].type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) { 8086 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR cannot be initialized\n"); 8087 return -EFAULT; 8088 } 8089 /* we write BPF_DW bits (8 bytes) at a time */ 8090 for (i = 0; i < BPF_DYNPTR_SIZE; i += 8) { 8091 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, meta.uninit_dynptr_regno, 8092 i, BPF_DW, BPF_WRITE, -1, false); 8093 if (err) 8094 return err; 8095 } 8096 8097 err = mark_stack_slots_dynptr(env, ®s[meta.uninit_dynptr_regno], 8098 fn->arg_type[meta.uninit_dynptr_regno - BPF_REG_1], 8099 insn_idx); 8100 if (err) 8101 return err; 8102 } 8103 8104 if (meta.release_regno) { 8105 err = -EINVAL; 8106 /* This can only be set for PTR_TO_STACK, as CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR cannot 8107 * be released by any dynptr helper. Hence, unmark_stack_slots_dynptr 8108 * is safe to do directly. 8109 */ 8110 if (arg_type_is_dynptr(fn->arg_type[meta.release_regno - BPF_REG_1])) { 8111 if (regs[meta.release_regno].type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) { 8112 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR cannot be released\n"); 8113 return -EFAULT; 8114 } 8115 err = unmark_stack_slots_dynptr(env, ®s[meta.release_regno]); 8116 } else if (meta.ref_obj_id) { 8117 err = release_reference(env, meta.ref_obj_id); 8118 } else if (register_is_null(®s[meta.release_regno])) { 8119 /* meta.ref_obj_id can only be 0 if register that is meant to be 8120 * released is NULL, which must be > R0. 8121 */ 8122 err = 0; 8123 } 8124 if (err) { 8125 verbose(env, "func %s#%d reference has not been acquired before\n", 8126 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 8127 return err; 8128 } 8129 } 8130 8131 switch (func_id) { 8132 case BPF_FUNC_tail_call: 8133 err = check_reference_leak(env); 8134 if (err) { 8135 verbose(env, "tail_call would lead to reference leak\n"); 8136 return err; 8137 } 8138 break; 8139 case BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage: 8140 /* check that flags argument in get_local_storage(map, flags) is 0, 8141 * this is required because get_local_storage() can't return an error. 8142 */ 8143 if (!register_is_null(®s[BPF_REG_2])) { 8144 verbose(env, "get_local_storage() doesn't support non-zero flags\n"); 8145 return -EINVAL; 8146 } 8147 break; 8148 case BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem: 8149 err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno, 8150 set_map_elem_callback_state); 8151 break; 8152 case BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback: 8153 err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno, 8154 set_timer_callback_state); 8155 break; 8156 case BPF_FUNC_find_vma: 8157 err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno, 8158 set_find_vma_callback_state); 8159 break; 8160 case BPF_FUNC_snprintf: 8161 err = check_bpf_snprintf_call(env, regs); 8162 break; 8163 case BPF_FUNC_loop: 8164 update_loop_inline_state(env, meta.subprogno); 8165 err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno, 8166 set_loop_callback_state); 8167 break; 8168 case BPF_FUNC_dynptr_from_mem: 8169 if (regs[BPF_REG_1].type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 8170 verbose(env, "Unsupported reg type %s for bpf_dynptr_from_mem data\n", 8171 reg_type_str(env, regs[BPF_REG_1].type)); 8172 return -EACCES; 8173 } 8174 break; 8175 case BPF_FUNC_set_retval: 8176 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM && 8177 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_LSM_CGROUP) { 8178 if (!env->prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) { 8179 /* Make sure programs that attach to void 8180 * hooks don't try to modify return value. 8181 */ 8182 verbose(env, "BPF_LSM_CGROUP that attach to void LSM hooks can't modify return value!\n"); 8183 return -EINVAL; 8184 } 8185 } 8186 break; 8187 case BPF_FUNC_dynptr_data: 8188 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS; i++) { 8189 if (arg_type_is_dynptr(fn->arg_type[i])) { 8190 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[BPF_REG_1 + i]; 8191 int id, ref_obj_id; 8192 8193 if (meta.dynptr_id) { 8194 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: meta.dynptr_id already set\n"); 8195 return -EFAULT; 8196 } 8197 8198 if (meta.ref_obj_id) { 8199 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: meta.ref_obj_id already set\n"); 8200 return -EFAULT; 8201 } 8202 8203 id = dynptr_id(env, reg); 8204 if (id < 0) { 8205 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: failed to obtain dynptr id\n"); 8206 return id; 8207 } 8208 8209 ref_obj_id = dynptr_ref_obj_id(env, reg); 8210 if (ref_obj_id < 0) { 8211 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: failed to obtain dynptr ref_obj_id\n"); 8212 return ref_obj_id; 8213 } 8214 8215 meta.dynptr_id = id; 8216 meta.ref_obj_id = ref_obj_id; 8217 break; 8218 } 8219 } 8220 if (i == MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS) { 8221 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no dynptr in bpf_dynptr_data()\n"); 8222 return -EFAULT; 8223 } 8224 break; 8225 case BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain: 8226 err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno, 8227 set_user_ringbuf_callback_state); 8228 break; 8229 } 8230 8231 if (err) 8232 return err; 8233 8234 /* reset caller saved regs */ 8235 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { 8236 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); 8237 check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); 8238 } 8239 8240 /* helper call returns 64-bit value. */ 8241 regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 8242 8243 /* update return register (already marked as written above) */ 8244 ret_type = fn->ret_type; 8245 ret_flag = type_flag(ret_type); 8246 8247 switch (base_type(ret_type)) { 8248 case RET_INTEGER: 8249 /* sets type to SCALAR_VALUE */ 8250 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 8251 break; 8252 case RET_VOID: 8253 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = NOT_INIT; 8254 break; 8255 case RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 8256 /* There is no offset yet applied, variable or fixed */ 8257 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 8258 /* remember map_ptr, so that check_map_access() 8259 * can check 'value_size' boundary of memory access 8260 * to map element returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem() 8261 */ 8262 if (meta.map_ptr == NULL) { 8263 verbose(env, 8264 "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n"); 8265 return -EINVAL; 8266 } 8267 regs[BPF_REG_0].map_ptr = meta.map_ptr; 8268 regs[BPF_REG_0].map_uid = meta.map_uid; 8269 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE | ret_flag; 8270 if (!type_may_be_null(ret_type) && 8271 btf_record_has_field(meta.map_ptr->record, BPF_SPIN_LOCK)) { 8272 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; 8273 } 8274 break; 8275 case RET_PTR_TO_SOCKET: 8276 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 8277 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_SOCKET | ret_flag; 8278 break; 8279 case RET_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 8280 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 8281 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON | ret_flag; 8282 break; 8283 case RET_PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 8284 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 8285 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK | ret_flag; 8286 break; 8287 case RET_PTR_TO_MEM: 8288 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 8289 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM | ret_flag; 8290 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = meta.mem_size; 8291 break; 8292 case RET_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_BTF_ID: 8293 { 8294 const struct btf_type *t; 8295 8296 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 8297 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(meta.ret_btf, meta.ret_btf_id, NULL); 8298 if (!btf_type_is_struct(t)) { 8299 u32 tsize; 8300 const struct btf_type *ret; 8301 const char *tname; 8302 8303 /* resolve the type size of ksym. */ 8304 ret = btf_resolve_size(meta.ret_btf, t, &tsize); 8305 if (IS_ERR(ret)) { 8306 tname = btf_name_by_offset(meta.ret_btf, t->name_off); 8307 verbose(env, "unable to resolve the size of type '%s': %ld\n", 8308 tname, PTR_ERR(ret)); 8309 return -EINVAL; 8310 } 8311 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM | ret_flag; 8312 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = tsize; 8313 } else { 8314 /* MEM_RDONLY may be carried from ret_flag, but it 8315 * doesn't apply on PTR_TO_BTF_ID. Fold it, otherwise 8316 * it will confuse the check of PTR_TO_BTF_ID in 8317 * check_mem_access(). 8318 */ 8319 ret_flag &= ~MEM_RDONLY; 8320 8321 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | ret_flag; 8322 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = meta.ret_btf; 8323 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta.ret_btf_id; 8324 } 8325 break; 8326 } 8327 case RET_PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 8328 { 8329 struct btf *ret_btf; 8330 int ret_btf_id; 8331 8332 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 8333 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | ret_flag; 8334 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) { 8335 ret_btf = meta.kptr_field->kptr.btf; 8336 ret_btf_id = meta.kptr_field->kptr.btf_id; 8337 } else { 8338 if (fn->ret_btf_id == BPF_PTR_POISON) { 8339 verbose(env, "verifier internal error:"); 8340 verbose(env, "func %s has non-overwritten BPF_PTR_POISON return type\n", 8341 func_id_name(func_id)); 8342 return -EINVAL; 8343 } 8344 ret_btf = btf_vmlinux; 8345 ret_btf_id = *fn->ret_btf_id; 8346 } 8347 if (ret_btf_id == 0) { 8348 verbose(env, "invalid return type %u of func %s#%d\n", 8349 base_type(ret_type), func_id_name(func_id), 8350 func_id); 8351 return -EINVAL; 8352 } 8353 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = ret_btf; 8354 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ret_btf_id; 8355 break; 8356 } 8357 default: 8358 verbose(env, "unknown return type %u of func %s#%d\n", 8359 base_type(ret_type), func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 8360 return -EINVAL; 8361 } 8362 8363 if (type_may_be_null(regs[BPF_REG_0].type)) 8364 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; 8365 8366 if (helper_multiple_ref_obj_use(func_id, meta.map_ptr)) { 8367 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: func %s#%d sets ref_obj_id more than once\n", 8368 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 8369 return -EFAULT; 8370 } 8371 8372 if (is_dynptr_ref_function(func_id)) 8373 regs[BPF_REG_0].dynptr_id = meta.dynptr_id; 8374 8375 if (is_ptr_cast_function(func_id) || is_dynptr_ref_function(func_id)) { 8376 /* For release_reference() */ 8377 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = meta.ref_obj_id; 8378 } else if (is_acquire_function(func_id, meta.map_ptr)) { 8379 int id = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx); 8380 8381 if (id < 0) 8382 return id; 8383 /* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg() */ 8384 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = id; 8385 /* For release_reference() */ 8386 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = id; 8387 } 8388 8389 do_refine_retval_range(regs, fn->ret_type, func_id, &meta); 8390 8391 err = check_map_func_compatibility(env, meta.map_ptr, func_id); 8392 if (err) 8393 return err; 8394 8395 if ((func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stack || 8396 func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_task_stack) && 8397 !env->prog->has_callchain_buf) { 8398 const char *err_str; 8399 8400 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS 8401 err = get_callchain_buffers(sysctl_perf_event_max_stack); 8402 err_str = "cannot get callchain buffer for func %s#%d\n"; 8403 #else 8404 err = -ENOTSUPP; 8405 err_str = "func %s#%d not supported without CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS\n"; 8406 #endif 8407 if (err) { 8408 verbose(env, err_str, func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 8409 return err; 8410 } 8411 8412 env->prog->has_callchain_buf = true; 8413 } 8414 8415 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stackid || func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stack) 8416 env->prog->call_get_stack = true; 8417 8418 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_func_ip) { 8419 if (check_get_func_ip(env)) 8420 return -ENOTSUPP; 8421 env->prog->call_get_func_ip = true; 8422 } 8423 8424 if (changes_data) 8425 clear_all_pkt_pointers(env); 8426 return 0; 8427 } 8428 8429 /* mark_btf_func_reg_size() is used when the reg size is determined by 8430 * the BTF func_proto's return value size and argument. 8431 */ 8432 static void mark_btf_func_reg_size(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 8433 size_t reg_size) 8434 { 8435 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &cur_regs(env)[regno]; 8436 8437 if (regno == BPF_REG_0) { 8438 /* Function return value */ 8439 reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 8440 reg->subreg_def = reg_size == sizeof(u64) ? 8441 DEF_NOT_SUBREG : env->insn_idx + 1; 8442 } else { 8443 /* Function argument */ 8444 if (reg_size == sizeof(u64)) { 8445 mark_insn_zext(env, reg); 8446 mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 8447 } else { 8448 mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ32); 8449 } 8450 } 8451 } 8452 8453 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta { 8454 /* In parameters */ 8455 struct btf *btf; 8456 u32 func_id; 8457 u32 kfunc_flags; 8458 const struct btf_type *func_proto; 8459 const char *func_name; 8460 /* Out parameters */ 8461 u32 ref_obj_id; 8462 u8 release_regno; 8463 bool r0_rdonly; 8464 u32 ret_btf_id; 8465 u64 r0_size; 8466 struct { 8467 u64 value; 8468 bool found; 8469 } arg_constant; 8470 struct { 8471 struct btf *btf; 8472 u32 btf_id; 8473 } arg_obj_drop; 8474 struct { 8475 struct btf_field *field; 8476 } arg_list_head; 8477 }; 8478 8479 static bool is_kfunc_acquire(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 8480 { 8481 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_ACQUIRE; 8482 } 8483 8484 static bool is_kfunc_ret_null(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 8485 { 8486 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_RET_NULL; 8487 } 8488 8489 static bool is_kfunc_release(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 8490 { 8491 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_RELEASE; 8492 } 8493 8494 static bool is_kfunc_trusted_args(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 8495 { 8496 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_TRUSTED_ARGS; 8497 } 8498 8499 static bool is_kfunc_sleepable(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 8500 { 8501 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_SLEEPABLE; 8502 } 8503 8504 static bool is_kfunc_destructive(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 8505 { 8506 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_DESTRUCTIVE; 8507 } 8508 8509 static bool is_kfunc_rcu(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 8510 { 8511 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_RCU; 8512 } 8513 8514 static bool is_kfunc_arg_kptr_get(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, int arg) 8515 { 8516 return arg == 0 && (meta->kfunc_flags & KF_KPTR_GET); 8517 } 8518 8519 static bool __kfunc_param_match_suffix(const struct btf *btf, 8520 const struct btf_param *arg, 8521 const char *suffix) 8522 { 8523 int suffix_len = strlen(suffix), len; 8524 const char *param_name; 8525 8526 /* In the future, this can be ported to use BTF tagging */ 8527 param_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf, arg->name_off); 8528 if (str_is_empty(param_name)) 8529 return false; 8530 len = strlen(param_name); 8531 if (len < suffix_len) 8532 return false; 8533 param_name += len - suffix_len; 8534 return !strncmp(param_name, suffix, suffix_len); 8535 } 8536 8537 static bool is_kfunc_arg_mem_size(const struct btf *btf, 8538 const struct btf_param *arg, 8539 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 8540 { 8541 const struct btf_type *t; 8542 8543 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, arg->type, NULL); 8544 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(t) || reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 8545 return false; 8546 8547 return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__sz"); 8548 } 8549 8550 static bool is_kfunc_arg_constant(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 8551 { 8552 return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__k"); 8553 } 8554 8555 static bool is_kfunc_arg_ignore(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 8556 { 8557 return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__ign"); 8558 } 8559 8560 static bool is_kfunc_arg_alloc_obj(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 8561 { 8562 return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__alloc"); 8563 } 8564 8565 static bool is_kfunc_arg_scalar_with_name(const struct btf *btf, 8566 const struct btf_param *arg, 8567 const char *name) 8568 { 8569 int len, target_len = strlen(name); 8570 const char *param_name; 8571 8572 param_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf, arg->name_off); 8573 if (str_is_empty(param_name)) 8574 return false; 8575 len = strlen(param_name); 8576 if (len != target_len) 8577 return false; 8578 if (strcmp(param_name, name)) 8579 return false; 8580 8581 return true; 8582 } 8583 8584 enum { 8585 KF_ARG_DYNPTR_ID, 8586 KF_ARG_LIST_HEAD_ID, 8587 KF_ARG_LIST_NODE_ID, 8588 }; 8589 8590 BTF_ID_LIST(kf_arg_btf_ids) 8591 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_dynptr_kern) 8592 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_list_head) 8593 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_list_node) 8594 8595 static bool __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(const struct btf *btf, 8596 const struct btf_param *arg, int type) 8597 { 8598 const struct btf_type *t; 8599 u32 res_id; 8600 8601 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, arg->type, NULL); 8602 if (!t) 8603 return false; 8604 if (!btf_type_is_ptr(t)) 8605 return false; 8606 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, t->type, &res_id); 8607 if (!t) 8608 return false; 8609 return btf_types_are_same(btf, res_id, btf_vmlinux, kf_arg_btf_ids[type]); 8610 } 8611 8612 static bool is_kfunc_arg_dynptr(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 8613 { 8614 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_DYNPTR_ID); 8615 } 8616 8617 static bool is_kfunc_arg_list_head(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 8618 { 8619 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_LIST_HEAD_ID); 8620 } 8621 8622 static bool is_kfunc_arg_list_node(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 8623 { 8624 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_LIST_NODE_ID); 8625 } 8626 8627 /* Returns true if struct is composed of scalars, 4 levels of nesting allowed */ 8628 static bool __btf_type_is_scalar_struct(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8629 const struct btf *btf, 8630 const struct btf_type *t, int rec) 8631 { 8632 const struct btf_type *member_type; 8633 const struct btf_member *member; 8634 u32 i; 8635 8636 if (!btf_type_is_struct(t)) 8637 return false; 8638 8639 for_each_member(i, t, member) { 8640 const struct btf_array *array; 8641 8642 member_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, member->type, NULL); 8643 if (btf_type_is_struct(member_type)) { 8644 if (rec >= 3) { 8645 verbose(env, "max struct nesting depth exceeded\n"); 8646 return false; 8647 } 8648 if (!__btf_type_is_scalar_struct(env, btf, member_type, rec + 1)) 8649 return false; 8650 continue; 8651 } 8652 if (btf_type_is_array(member_type)) { 8653 array = btf_array(member_type); 8654 if (!array->nelems) 8655 return false; 8656 member_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, array->type, NULL); 8657 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(member_type)) 8658 return false; 8659 continue; 8660 } 8661 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(member_type)) 8662 return false; 8663 } 8664 return true; 8665 } 8666 8667 8668 static u32 *reg2btf_ids[__BPF_REG_TYPE_MAX] = { 8669 #ifdef CONFIG_NET 8670 [PTR_TO_SOCKET] = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_SOCK], 8671 [PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON] = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_SOCK_COMMON], 8672 [PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK] = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_TCP], 8673 #endif 8674 }; 8675 8676 enum kfunc_ptr_arg_type { 8677 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX, 8678 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID, /* Allocated object */ 8679 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_KPTR, /* PTR_TO_KPTR but type specific */ 8680 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, 8681 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD, 8682 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_NODE, 8683 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID, /* Also covers reg2btf_ids conversions */ 8684 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM, 8685 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE, /* Size derived from next argument, skip it */ 8686 }; 8687 8688 enum special_kfunc_type { 8689 KF_bpf_obj_new_impl, 8690 KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl, 8691 KF_bpf_list_push_front, 8692 KF_bpf_list_push_back, 8693 KF_bpf_list_pop_front, 8694 KF_bpf_list_pop_back, 8695 KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx, 8696 KF_bpf_rdonly_cast, 8697 KF_bpf_rcu_read_lock, 8698 KF_bpf_rcu_read_unlock, 8699 }; 8700 8701 BTF_SET_START(special_kfunc_set) 8702 BTF_ID(func, bpf_obj_new_impl) 8703 BTF_ID(func, bpf_obj_drop_impl) 8704 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_push_front) 8705 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_push_back) 8706 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_pop_front) 8707 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_pop_back) 8708 BTF_ID(func, bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx) 8709 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rdonly_cast) 8710 BTF_SET_END(special_kfunc_set) 8711 8712 BTF_ID_LIST(special_kfunc_list) 8713 BTF_ID(func, bpf_obj_new_impl) 8714 BTF_ID(func, bpf_obj_drop_impl) 8715 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_push_front) 8716 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_push_back) 8717 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_pop_front) 8718 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_pop_back) 8719 BTF_ID(func, bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx) 8720 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rdonly_cast) 8721 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rcu_read_lock) 8722 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rcu_read_unlock) 8723 8724 static bool is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_lock(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 8725 { 8726 return meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rcu_read_lock]; 8727 } 8728 8729 static bool is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_unlock(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 8730 { 8731 return meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rcu_read_unlock]; 8732 } 8733 8734 static enum kfunc_ptr_arg_type 8735 get_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8736 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 8737 const struct btf_type *t, const struct btf_type *ref_t, 8738 const char *ref_tname, const struct btf_param *args, 8739 int argno, int nargs) 8740 { 8741 u32 regno = argno + 1; 8742 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 8743 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; 8744 bool arg_mem_size = false; 8745 8746 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx]) 8747 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX; 8748 8749 /* In this function, we verify the kfunc's BTF as per the argument type, 8750 * leaving the rest of the verification with respect to the register 8751 * type to our caller. When a set of conditions hold in the BTF type of 8752 * arguments, we resolve it to a known kfunc_ptr_arg_type. 8753 */ 8754 if (btf_get_prog_ctx_type(&env->log, meta->btf, t, resolve_prog_type(env->prog), argno)) 8755 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX; 8756 8757 if (is_kfunc_arg_alloc_obj(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 8758 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID; 8759 8760 if (is_kfunc_arg_kptr_get(meta, argno)) { 8761 if (!btf_type_is_ptr(ref_t)) { 8762 verbose(env, "arg#0 BTF type must be a double pointer for kptr_get kfunc\n"); 8763 return -EINVAL; 8764 } 8765 ref_t = btf_type_by_id(meta->btf, ref_t->type); 8766 ref_tname = btf_name_by_offset(meta->btf, ref_t->name_off); 8767 if (!btf_type_is_struct(ref_t)) { 8768 verbose(env, "kernel function %s args#0 pointer type %s %s is not supported\n", 8769 meta->func_name, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname); 8770 return -EINVAL; 8771 } 8772 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_KPTR; 8773 } 8774 8775 if (is_kfunc_arg_dynptr(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 8776 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR; 8777 8778 if (is_kfunc_arg_list_head(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 8779 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD; 8780 8781 if (is_kfunc_arg_list_node(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 8782 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_NODE; 8783 8784 if ((base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID || reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)])) { 8785 if (!btf_type_is_struct(ref_t)) { 8786 verbose(env, "kernel function %s args#%d pointer type %s %s is not supported\n", 8787 meta->func_name, argno, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname); 8788 return -EINVAL; 8789 } 8790 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 8791 } 8792 8793 if (argno + 1 < nargs && is_kfunc_arg_mem_size(meta->btf, &args[argno + 1], ®s[regno + 1])) 8794 arg_mem_size = true; 8795 8796 /* This is the catch all argument type of register types supported by 8797 * check_helper_mem_access. However, we only allow when argument type is 8798 * pointer to scalar, or struct composed (recursively) of scalars. When 8799 * arg_mem_size is true, the pointer can be void *. 8800 */ 8801 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(ref_t) && !__btf_type_is_scalar_struct(env, meta->btf, ref_t, 0) && 8802 (arg_mem_size ? !btf_type_is_void(ref_t) : 1)) { 8803 verbose(env, "arg#%d pointer type %s %s must point to %sscalar, or struct with scalar\n", 8804 argno, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname, arg_mem_size ? "void, " : ""); 8805 return -EINVAL; 8806 } 8807 return arg_mem_size ? KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE : KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM; 8808 } 8809 8810 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8811 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 8812 const struct btf_type *ref_t, 8813 const char *ref_tname, u32 ref_id, 8814 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 8815 int argno) 8816 { 8817 const struct btf_type *reg_ref_t; 8818 bool strict_type_match = false; 8819 const struct btf *reg_btf; 8820 const char *reg_ref_tname; 8821 u32 reg_ref_id; 8822 8823 if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 8824 reg_btf = reg->btf; 8825 reg_ref_id = reg->btf_id; 8826 } else { 8827 reg_btf = btf_vmlinux; 8828 reg_ref_id = *reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)]; 8829 } 8830 8831 /* Enforce strict type matching for calls to kfuncs that are acquiring 8832 * or releasing a reference, or are no-cast aliases. We do _not_ 8833 * enforce strict matching for plain KF_TRUSTED_ARGS kfuncs by default, 8834 * as we want to enable BPF programs to pass types that are bitwise 8835 * equivalent without forcing them to explicitly cast with something 8836 * like bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx(). 8837 * 8838 * For example, say we had a type like the following: 8839 * 8840 * struct bpf_cpumask { 8841 * cpumask_t cpumask; 8842 * refcount_t usage; 8843 * }; 8844 * 8845 * Note that as specified in <linux/cpumask.h>, cpumask_t is typedef'ed 8846 * to a struct cpumask, so it would be safe to pass a struct 8847 * bpf_cpumask * to a kfunc expecting a struct cpumask *. 8848 * 8849 * The philosophy here is similar to how we allow scalars of different 8850 * types to be passed to kfuncs as long as the size is the same. The 8851 * only difference here is that we're simply allowing 8852 * btf_struct_ids_match() to walk the struct at the 0th offset, and 8853 * resolve types. 8854 */ 8855 if (is_kfunc_acquire(meta) || 8856 (is_kfunc_release(meta) && reg->ref_obj_id) || 8857 btf_type_ids_nocast_alias(&env->log, reg_btf, reg_ref_id, meta->btf, ref_id)) 8858 strict_type_match = true; 8859 8860 WARN_ON_ONCE(is_kfunc_trusted_args(meta) && reg->off); 8861 8862 reg_ref_t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(reg_btf, reg_ref_id, ®_ref_id); 8863 reg_ref_tname = btf_name_by_offset(reg_btf, reg_ref_t->name_off); 8864 if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg_btf, reg_ref_id, reg->off, meta->btf, ref_id, strict_type_match)) { 8865 verbose(env, "kernel function %s args#%d expected pointer to %s %s but R%d has a pointer to %s %s\n", 8866 meta->func_name, argno, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname, argno + 1, 8867 btf_type_str(reg_ref_t), reg_ref_tname); 8868 return -EINVAL; 8869 } 8870 return 0; 8871 } 8872 8873 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_kptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8874 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 8875 const struct btf_type *ref_t, 8876 const char *ref_tname, 8877 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 8878 int argno) 8879 { 8880 struct btf_field *kptr_field; 8881 8882 /* check_func_arg_reg_off allows var_off for 8883 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, but we need fixed offset to find 8884 * off_desc. 8885 */ 8886 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 8887 verbose(env, "arg#0 must have constant offset\n"); 8888 return -EINVAL; 8889 } 8890 8891 kptr_field = btf_record_find(reg->map_ptr->record, reg->off + reg->var_off.value, BPF_KPTR); 8892 if (!kptr_field || kptr_field->type != BPF_KPTR_REF) { 8893 verbose(env, "arg#0 no referenced kptr at map value offset=%llu\n", 8894 reg->off + reg->var_off.value); 8895 return -EINVAL; 8896 } 8897 8898 if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, meta->btf, ref_t->type, 0, kptr_field->kptr.btf, 8899 kptr_field->kptr.btf_id, true)) { 8900 verbose(env, "kernel function %s args#%d expected pointer to %s %s\n", 8901 meta->func_name, argno, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname); 8902 return -EINVAL; 8903 } 8904 return 0; 8905 } 8906 8907 static int ref_set_release_on_unlock(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 ref_obj_id) 8908 { 8909 struct bpf_func_state *state = cur_func(env); 8910 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 8911 int i; 8912 8913 /* bpf_spin_lock only allows calling list_push and list_pop, no BPF 8914 * subprogs, no global functions. This means that the references would 8915 * not be released inside the critical section but they may be added to 8916 * the reference state, and the acquired_refs are never copied out for a 8917 * different frame as BPF to BPF calls don't work in bpf_spin_lock 8918 * critical sections. 8919 */ 8920 if (!ref_obj_id) { 8921 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: ref_obj_id is zero for release_on_unlock\n"); 8922 return -EFAULT; 8923 } 8924 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) { 8925 if (state->refs[i].id == ref_obj_id) { 8926 if (state->refs[i].release_on_unlock) { 8927 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: expected false release_on_unlock"); 8928 return -EFAULT; 8929 } 8930 state->refs[i].release_on_unlock = true; 8931 /* Now mark everyone sharing same ref_obj_id as untrusted */ 8932 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, state, reg, ({ 8933 if (reg->ref_obj_id == ref_obj_id) 8934 reg->type |= PTR_UNTRUSTED; 8935 })); 8936 return 0; 8937 } 8938 } 8939 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: ref state missing for ref_obj_id\n"); 8940 return -EFAULT; 8941 } 8942 8943 /* Implementation details: 8944 * 8945 * Each register points to some region of memory, which we define as an 8946 * allocation. Each allocation may embed a bpf_spin_lock which protects any 8947 * special BPF objects (bpf_list_head, bpf_rb_root, etc.) part of the same 8948 * allocation. The lock and the data it protects are colocated in the same 8949 * memory region. 8950 * 8951 * Hence, everytime a register holds a pointer value pointing to such 8952 * allocation, the verifier preserves a unique reg->id for it. 8953 * 8954 * The verifier remembers the lock 'ptr' and the lock 'id' whenever 8955 * bpf_spin_lock is called. 8956 * 8957 * To enable this, lock state in the verifier captures two values: 8958 * active_lock.ptr = Register's type specific pointer 8959 * active_lock.id = A unique ID for each register pointer value 8960 * 8961 * Currently, PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE and PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC are the two 8962 * supported register types. 8963 * 8964 * The active_lock.ptr in case of map values is the reg->map_ptr, and in case of 8965 * allocated objects is the reg->btf pointer. 8966 * 8967 * The active_lock.id is non-unique for maps supporting direct_value_addr, as we 8968 * can establish the provenance of the map value statically for each distinct 8969 * lookup into such maps. They always contain a single map value hence unique 8970 * IDs for each pseudo load pessimizes the algorithm and rejects valid programs. 8971 * 8972 * So, in case of global variables, they use array maps with max_entries = 1, 8973 * hence their active_lock.ptr becomes map_ptr and id = 0 (since they all point 8974 * into the same map value as max_entries is 1, as described above). 8975 * 8976 * In case of inner map lookups, the inner map pointer has same map_ptr as the 8977 * outer map pointer (in verifier context), but each lookup into an inner map 8978 * assigns a fresh reg->id to the lookup, so while lookups into distinct inner 8979 * maps from the same outer map share the same map_ptr as active_lock.ptr, they 8980 * will get different reg->id assigned to each lookup, hence different 8981 * active_lock.id. 8982 * 8983 * In case of allocated objects, active_lock.ptr is the reg->btf, and the 8984 * reg->id is a unique ID preserved after the NULL pointer check on the pointer 8985 * returned from bpf_obj_new. Each allocation receives a new reg->id. 8986 */ 8987 static int check_reg_allocation_locked(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 8988 { 8989 void *ptr; 8990 u32 id; 8991 8992 switch ((int)reg->type) { 8993 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 8994 ptr = reg->map_ptr; 8995 break; 8996 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC: 8997 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_TRUSTED: 8998 ptr = reg->btf; 8999 break; 9000 default: 9001 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unknown reg type for lock check\n"); 9002 return -EFAULT; 9003 } 9004 id = reg->id; 9005 9006 if (!env->cur_state->active_lock.ptr) 9007 return -EINVAL; 9008 if (env->cur_state->active_lock.ptr != ptr || 9009 env->cur_state->active_lock.id != id) { 9010 verbose(env, "held lock and object are not in the same allocation\n"); 9011 return -EINVAL; 9012 } 9013 return 0; 9014 } 9015 9016 static bool is_bpf_list_api_kfunc(u32 btf_id) 9017 { 9018 return btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_front] || 9019 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_back] || 9020 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_pop_front] || 9021 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_pop_back]; 9022 } 9023 9024 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_head(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9025 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 9026 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 9027 { 9028 struct btf_field *field; 9029 struct btf_record *rec; 9030 u32 list_head_off; 9031 9032 if (meta->btf != btf_vmlinux || !is_bpf_list_api_kfunc(meta->func_id)) { 9033 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: bpf_list_head argument for unknown kfunc\n"); 9034 return -EFAULT; 9035 } 9036 9037 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 9038 verbose(env, 9039 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. bpf_list_head has to be at the constant offset\n", 9040 regno); 9041 return -EINVAL; 9042 } 9043 9044 rec = reg_btf_record(reg); 9045 list_head_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; 9046 field = btf_record_find(rec, list_head_off, BPF_LIST_HEAD); 9047 if (!field) { 9048 verbose(env, "bpf_list_head not found at offset=%u\n", list_head_off); 9049 return -EINVAL; 9050 } 9051 9052 /* All functions require bpf_list_head to be protected using a bpf_spin_lock */ 9053 if (check_reg_allocation_locked(env, reg)) { 9054 verbose(env, "bpf_spin_lock at off=%d must be held for bpf_list_head\n", 9055 rec->spin_lock_off); 9056 return -EINVAL; 9057 } 9058 9059 if (meta->arg_list_head.field) { 9060 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: repeating bpf_list_head arg\n"); 9061 return -EFAULT; 9062 } 9063 meta->arg_list_head.field = field; 9064 return 0; 9065 } 9066 9067 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_node(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9068 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 9069 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 9070 { 9071 const struct btf_type *et, *t; 9072 struct btf_field *field; 9073 struct btf_record *rec; 9074 u32 list_node_off; 9075 9076 if (meta->btf != btf_vmlinux || 9077 (meta->func_id != special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_front] && 9078 meta->func_id != special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_back])) { 9079 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: bpf_list_node argument for unknown kfunc\n"); 9080 return -EFAULT; 9081 } 9082 9083 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 9084 verbose(env, 9085 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. bpf_list_node has to be at the constant offset\n", 9086 regno); 9087 return -EINVAL; 9088 } 9089 9090 rec = reg_btf_record(reg); 9091 list_node_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; 9092 field = btf_record_find(rec, list_node_off, BPF_LIST_NODE); 9093 if (!field || field->offset != list_node_off) { 9094 verbose(env, "bpf_list_node not found at offset=%u\n", list_node_off); 9095 return -EINVAL; 9096 } 9097 9098 field = meta->arg_list_head.field; 9099 9100 et = btf_type_by_id(field->graph_root.btf, field->graph_root.value_btf_id); 9101 t = btf_type_by_id(reg->btf, reg->btf_id); 9102 if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg->btf, reg->btf_id, 0, field->graph_root.btf, 9103 field->graph_root.value_btf_id, true)) { 9104 verbose(env, "operation on bpf_list_head expects arg#1 bpf_list_node at offset=%d " 9105 "in struct %s, but arg is at offset=%d in struct %s\n", 9106 field->graph_root.node_offset, 9107 btf_name_by_offset(field->graph_root.btf, et->name_off), 9108 list_node_off, btf_name_by_offset(reg->btf, t->name_off)); 9109 return -EINVAL; 9110 } 9111 9112 if (list_node_off != field->graph_root.node_offset) { 9113 verbose(env, "arg#1 offset=%d, but expected bpf_list_node at offset=%d in struct %s\n", 9114 list_node_off, field->graph_root.node_offset, 9115 btf_name_by_offset(field->graph_root.btf, et->name_off)); 9116 return -EINVAL; 9117 } 9118 /* Set arg#1 for expiration after unlock */ 9119 return ref_set_release_on_unlock(env, reg->ref_obj_id); 9120 } 9121 9122 static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 9123 { 9124 const char *func_name = meta->func_name, *ref_tname; 9125 const struct btf *btf = meta->btf; 9126 const struct btf_param *args; 9127 u32 i, nargs; 9128 int ret; 9129 9130 args = (const struct btf_param *)(meta->func_proto + 1); 9131 nargs = btf_type_vlen(meta->func_proto); 9132 if (nargs > MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS) { 9133 verbose(env, "Function %s has %d > %d args\n", func_name, nargs, 9134 MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS); 9135 return -EINVAL; 9136 } 9137 9138 /* Check that BTF function arguments match actual types that the 9139 * verifier sees. 9140 */ 9141 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) { 9142 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[i + 1]; 9143 const struct btf_type *t, *ref_t, *resolve_ret; 9144 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type = ARG_DONTCARE; 9145 u32 regno = i + 1, ref_id, type_size; 9146 bool is_ret_buf_sz = false; 9147 int kf_arg_type; 9148 9149 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, args[i].type, NULL); 9150 9151 if (is_kfunc_arg_ignore(btf, &args[i])) 9152 continue; 9153 9154 if (btf_type_is_scalar(t)) { 9155 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 9156 verbose(env, "R%d is not a scalar\n", regno); 9157 return -EINVAL; 9158 } 9159 9160 if (is_kfunc_arg_constant(meta->btf, &args[i])) { 9161 if (meta->arg_constant.found) { 9162 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: only one constant argument permitted\n"); 9163 return -EFAULT; 9164 } 9165 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 9166 verbose(env, "R%d must be a known constant\n", regno); 9167 return -EINVAL; 9168 } 9169 ret = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); 9170 if (ret < 0) 9171 return ret; 9172 meta->arg_constant.found = true; 9173 meta->arg_constant.value = reg->var_off.value; 9174 } else if (is_kfunc_arg_scalar_with_name(btf, &args[i], "rdonly_buf_size")) { 9175 meta->r0_rdonly = true; 9176 is_ret_buf_sz = true; 9177 } else if (is_kfunc_arg_scalar_with_name(btf, &args[i], "rdwr_buf_size")) { 9178 is_ret_buf_sz = true; 9179 } 9180 9181 if (is_ret_buf_sz) { 9182 if (meta->r0_size) { 9183 verbose(env, "2 or more rdonly/rdwr_buf_size parameters for kfunc"); 9184 return -EINVAL; 9185 } 9186 9187 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 9188 verbose(env, "R%d is not a const\n", regno); 9189 return -EINVAL; 9190 } 9191 9192 meta->r0_size = reg->var_off.value; 9193 ret = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); 9194 if (ret) 9195 return ret; 9196 } 9197 continue; 9198 } 9199 9200 if (!btf_type_is_ptr(t)) { 9201 verbose(env, "Unrecognized arg#%d type %s\n", i, btf_type_str(t)); 9202 return -EINVAL; 9203 } 9204 9205 if (is_kfunc_trusted_args(meta) && 9206 (register_is_null(reg) || type_may_be_null(reg->type))) { 9207 verbose(env, "Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg%d\n", i); 9208 return -EACCES; 9209 } 9210 9211 if (reg->ref_obj_id) { 9212 if (is_kfunc_release(meta) && meta->ref_obj_id) { 9213 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: more than one arg with ref_obj_id R%d %u %u\n", 9214 regno, reg->ref_obj_id, 9215 meta->ref_obj_id); 9216 return -EFAULT; 9217 } 9218 meta->ref_obj_id = reg->ref_obj_id; 9219 if (is_kfunc_release(meta)) 9220 meta->release_regno = regno; 9221 } 9222 9223 ref_t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, t->type, &ref_id); 9224 ref_tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, ref_t->name_off); 9225 9226 kf_arg_type = get_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(env, meta, t, ref_t, ref_tname, args, i, nargs); 9227 if (kf_arg_type < 0) 9228 return kf_arg_type; 9229 9230 switch (kf_arg_type) { 9231 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID: 9232 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 9233 if (!is_kfunc_trusted_args(meta) && !is_kfunc_rcu(meta)) 9234 break; 9235 9236 if (!is_trusted_reg(reg)) { 9237 if (!is_kfunc_rcu(meta)) { 9238 verbose(env, "R%d must be referenced or trusted\n", regno); 9239 return -EINVAL; 9240 } 9241 if (!is_rcu_reg(reg)) { 9242 verbose(env, "R%d must be a rcu pointer\n", regno); 9243 return -EINVAL; 9244 } 9245 } 9246 9247 fallthrough; 9248 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX: 9249 /* Trusted arguments have the same offset checks as release arguments */ 9250 arg_type |= OBJ_RELEASE; 9251 break; 9252 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_KPTR: 9253 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR: 9254 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD: 9255 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_NODE: 9256 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM: 9257 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE: 9258 /* Trusted by default */ 9259 break; 9260 default: 9261 WARN_ON_ONCE(1); 9262 return -EFAULT; 9263 } 9264 9265 if (is_kfunc_release(meta) && reg->ref_obj_id) 9266 arg_type |= OBJ_RELEASE; 9267 ret = check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, regno, arg_type); 9268 if (ret < 0) 9269 return ret; 9270 9271 switch (kf_arg_type) { 9272 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX: 9273 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_CTX) { 9274 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to ctx, but got %s\n", i, btf_type_str(t)); 9275 return -EINVAL; 9276 } 9277 9278 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx]) { 9279 ret = get_kern_ctx_btf_id(&env->log, resolve_prog_type(env->prog)); 9280 if (ret < 0) 9281 return -EINVAL; 9282 meta->ret_btf_id = ret; 9283 } 9284 break; 9285 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID: 9286 if (reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) { 9287 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to allocated object\n", i); 9288 return -EINVAL; 9289 } 9290 if (!reg->ref_obj_id) { 9291 verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n"); 9292 return -EINVAL; 9293 } 9294 if (meta->btf == btf_vmlinux && 9295 meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl]) { 9296 meta->arg_obj_drop.btf = reg->btf; 9297 meta->arg_obj_drop.btf_id = reg->btf_id; 9298 } 9299 break; 9300 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_KPTR: 9301 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 9302 verbose(env, "arg#0 expected pointer to map value\n"); 9303 return -EINVAL; 9304 } 9305 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_kptr(env, reg, ref_t, ref_tname, meta, i); 9306 if (ret < 0) 9307 return ret; 9308 break; 9309 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR: 9310 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_STACK && 9311 reg->type != CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) { 9312 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to stack or dynptr_ptr\n", i); 9313 return -EINVAL; 9314 } 9315 9316 ret = process_dynptr_func(env, regno, ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR | MEM_RDONLY, NULL); 9317 if (ret < 0) 9318 return ret; 9319 break; 9320 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD: 9321 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE && 9322 reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) { 9323 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to map value or allocated object\n", i); 9324 return -EINVAL; 9325 } 9326 if (reg->type == (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC) && !reg->ref_obj_id) { 9327 verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n"); 9328 return -EINVAL; 9329 } 9330 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_head(env, reg, regno, meta); 9331 if (ret < 0) 9332 return ret; 9333 break; 9334 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_NODE: 9335 if (reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) { 9336 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to allocated object\n", i); 9337 return -EINVAL; 9338 } 9339 if (!reg->ref_obj_id) { 9340 verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n"); 9341 return -EINVAL; 9342 } 9343 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_node(env, reg, regno, meta); 9344 if (ret < 0) 9345 return ret; 9346 break; 9347 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 9348 /* Only base_type is checked, further checks are done here */ 9349 if ((base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID || 9350 (bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg->type) && !is_rcu_reg(reg))) && 9351 !reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)]) { 9352 verbose(env, "arg#%d is %s ", i, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 9353 verbose(env, "expected %s or socket\n", 9354 reg_type_str(env, base_type(reg->type) | 9355 (type_flag(reg->type) & BPF_REG_TRUSTED_MODIFIERS))); 9356 return -EINVAL; 9357 } 9358 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_btf_id(env, reg, ref_t, ref_tname, ref_id, meta, i); 9359 if (ret < 0) 9360 return ret; 9361 break; 9362 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM: 9363 resolve_ret = btf_resolve_size(btf, ref_t, &type_size); 9364 if (IS_ERR(resolve_ret)) { 9365 verbose(env, "arg#%d reference type('%s %s') size cannot be determined: %ld\n", 9366 i, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname, PTR_ERR(resolve_ret)); 9367 return -EINVAL; 9368 } 9369 ret = check_mem_reg(env, reg, regno, type_size); 9370 if (ret < 0) 9371 return ret; 9372 break; 9373 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE: 9374 ret = check_kfunc_mem_size_reg(env, ®s[regno + 1], regno + 1); 9375 if (ret < 0) { 9376 verbose(env, "arg#%d arg#%d memory, len pair leads to invalid memory access\n", i, i + 1); 9377 return ret; 9378 } 9379 /* Skip next '__sz' argument */ 9380 i++; 9381 break; 9382 } 9383 } 9384 9385 if (is_kfunc_release(meta) && !meta->release_regno) { 9386 verbose(env, "release kernel function %s expects refcounted PTR_TO_BTF_ID\n", 9387 func_name); 9388 return -EINVAL; 9389 } 9390 9391 return 0; 9392 } 9393 9394 static int check_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 9395 int *insn_idx_p) 9396 { 9397 const struct btf_type *t, *func, *func_proto, *ptr_type; 9398 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 9399 const char *func_name, *ptr_type_name; 9400 bool sleepable, rcu_lock, rcu_unlock; 9401 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta meta; 9402 u32 i, nargs, func_id, ptr_type_id; 9403 int err, insn_idx = *insn_idx_p; 9404 const struct btf_param *args; 9405 const struct btf_type *ret_t; 9406 struct btf *desc_btf; 9407 u32 *kfunc_flags; 9408 9409 /* skip for now, but return error when we find this in fixup_kfunc_call */ 9410 if (!insn->imm) 9411 return 0; 9412 9413 desc_btf = find_kfunc_desc_btf(env, insn->off); 9414 if (IS_ERR(desc_btf)) 9415 return PTR_ERR(desc_btf); 9416 9417 func_id = insn->imm; 9418 func = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, func_id); 9419 func_name = btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf, func->name_off); 9420 func_proto = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, func->type); 9421 9422 kfunc_flags = btf_kfunc_id_set_contains(desc_btf, resolve_prog_type(env->prog), func_id); 9423 if (!kfunc_flags) { 9424 verbose(env, "calling kernel function %s is not allowed\n", 9425 func_name); 9426 return -EACCES; 9427 } 9428 9429 /* Prepare kfunc call metadata */ 9430 memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta)); 9431 meta.btf = desc_btf; 9432 meta.func_id = func_id; 9433 meta.kfunc_flags = *kfunc_flags; 9434 meta.func_proto = func_proto; 9435 meta.func_name = func_name; 9436 9437 if (is_kfunc_destructive(&meta) && !capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT)) { 9438 verbose(env, "destructive kfunc calls require CAP_SYS_BOOT capability\n"); 9439 return -EACCES; 9440 } 9441 9442 sleepable = is_kfunc_sleepable(&meta); 9443 if (sleepable && !env->prog->aux->sleepable) { 9444 verbose(env, "program must be sleepable to call sleepable kfunc %s\n", func_name); 9445 return -EACCES; 9446 } 9447 9448 rcu_lock = is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_lock(&meta); 9449 rcu_unlock = is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_unlock(&meta); 9450 if ((rcu_lock || rcu_unlock) && !env->rcu_tag_supported) { 9451 verbose(env, "no vmlinux btf rcu tag support for kfunc %s\n", func_name); 9452 return -EACCES; 9453 } 9454 9455 if (env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock) { 9456 struct bpf_func_state *state; 9457 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 9458 9459 if (rcu_lock) { 9460 verbose(env, "nested rcu read lock (kernel function %s)\n", func_name); 9461 return -EINVAL; 9462 } else if (rcu_unlock) { 9463 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, state, reg, ({ 9464 if (reg->type & MEM_RCU) { 9465 reg->type &= ~(MEM_RCU | PTR_MAYBE_NULL); 9466 reg->type |= PTR_UNTRUSTED; 9467 } 9468 })); 9469 env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock = false; 9470 } else if (sleepable) { 9471 verbose(env, "kernel func %s is sleepable within rcu_read_lock region\n", func_name); 9472 return -EACCES; 9473 } 9474 } else if (rcu_lock) { 9475 env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock = true; 9476 } else if (rcu_unlock) { 9477 verbose(env, "unmatched rcu read unlock (kernel function %s)\n", func_name); 9478 return -EINVAL; 9479 } 9480 9481 /* Check the arguments */ 9482 err = check_kfunc_args(env, &meta); 9483 if (err < 0) 9484 return err; 9485 /* In case of release function, we get register number of refcounted 9486 * PTR_TO_BTF_ID in bpf_kfunc_arg_meta, do the release now. 9487 */ 9488 if (meta.release_regno) { 9489 err = release_reference(env, regs[meta.release_regno].ref_obj_id); 9490 if (err) { 9491 verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d reference has not been acquired before\n", 9492 func_name, func_id); 9493 return err; 9494 } 9495 } 9496 9497 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) 9498 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); 9499 9500 /* Check return type */ 9501 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(desc_btf, func_proto->type, NULL); 9502 9503 if (is_kfunc_acquire(&meta) && !btf_type_is_struct_ptr(meta.btf, t)) { 9504 /* Only exception is bpf_obj_new_impl */ 9505 if (meta.btf != btf_vmlinux || meta.func_id != special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_new_impl]) { 9506 verbose(env, "acquire kernel function does not return PTR_TO_BTF_ID\n"); 9507 return -EINVAL; 9508 } 9509 } 9510 9511 if (btf_type_is_scalar(t)) { 9512 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 9513 mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, BPF_REG_0, t->size); 9514 } else if (btf_type_is_ptr(t)) { 9515 ptr_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(desc_btf, t->type, &ptr_type_id); 9516 9517 if (meta.btf == btf_vmlinux && btf_id_set_contains(&special_kfunc_set, meta.func_id)) { 9518 if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_new_impl]) { 9519 struct btf *ret_btf; 9520 u32 ret_btf_id; 9521 9522 if (unlikely(!bpf_global_ma_set)) 9523 return -ENOMEM; 9524 9525 if (((u64)(u32)meta.arg_constant.value) != meta.arg_constant.value) { 9526 verbose(env, "local type ID argument must be in range [0, U32_MAX]\n"); 9527 return -EINVAL; 9528 } 9529 9530 ret_btf = env->prog->aux->btf; 9531 ret_btf_id = meta.arg_constant.value; 9532 9533 /* This may be NULL due to user not supplying a BTF */ 9534 if (!ret_btf) { 9535 verbose(env, "bpf_obj_new requires prog BTF\n"); 9536 return -EINVAL; 9537 } 9538 9539 ret_t = btf_type_by_id(ret_btf, ret_btf_id); 9540 if (!ret_t || !__btf_type_is_struct(ret_t)) { 9541 verbose(env, "bpf_obj_new type ID argument must be of a struct\n"); 9542 return -EINVAL; 9543 } 9544 9545 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 9546 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC; 9547 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = ret_btf; 9548 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ret_btf_id; 9549 9550 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].obj_new_size = ret_t->size; 9551 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].kptr_struct_meta = 9552 btf_find_struct_meta(ret_btf, ret_btf_id); 9553 } else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl]) { 9554 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].kptr_struct_meta = 9555 btf_find_struct_meta(meta.arg_obj_drop.btf, 9556 meta.arg_obj_drop.btf_id); 9557 } else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_pop_front] || 9558 meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_pop_back]) { 9559 struct btf_field *field = meta.arg_list_head.field; 9560 9561 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 9562 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC; 9563 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = field->graph_root.btf; 9564 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = field->graph_root.value_btf_id; 9565 regs[BPF_REG_0].off = field->graph_root.node_offset; 9566 } else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx]) { 9567 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 9568 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED; 9569 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = desc_btf; 9570 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta.ret_btf_id; 9571 } else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rdonly_cast]) { 9572 ret_t = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, meta.arg_constant.value); 9573 if (!ret_t || !btf_type_is_struct(ret_t)) { 9574 verbose(env, 9575 "kfunc bpf_rdonly_cast type ID argument must be of a struct\n"); 9576 return -EINVAL; 9577 } 9578 9579 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 9580 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED; 9581 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = desc_btf; 9582 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta.arg_constant.value; 9583 } else { 9584 verbose(env, "kernel function %s unhandled dynamic return type\n", 9585 meta.func_name); 9586 return -EFAULT; 9587 } 9588 } else if (!__btf_type_is_struct(ptr_type)) { 9589 if (!meta.r0_size) { 9590 ptr_type_name = btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf, 9591 ptr_type->name_off); 9592 verbose(env, 9593 "kernel function %s returns pointer type %s %s is not supported\n", 9594 func_name, 9595 btf_type_str(ptr_type), 9596 ptr_type_name); 9597 return -EINVAL; 9598 } 9599 9600 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 9601 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM; 9602 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = meta.r0_size; 9603 9604 if (meta.r0_rdonly) 9605 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_RDONLY; 9606 9607 /* Ensures we don't access the memory after a release_reference() */ 9608 if (meta.ref_obj_id) 9609 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = meta.ref_obj_id; 9610 } else { 9611 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 9612 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = desc_btf; 9613 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 9614 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ptr_type_id; 9615 } 9616 9617 if (is_kfunc_ret_null(&meta)) { 9618 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 9619 /* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg, see 93c230e3f5bd6 */ 9620 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; 9621 } 9622 mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, BPF_REG_0, sizeof(void *)); 9623 if (is_kfunc_acquire(&meta)) { 9624 int id = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx); 9625 9626 if (id < 0) 9627 return id; 9628 if (is_kfunc_ret_null(&meta)) 9629 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = id; 9630 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = id; 9631 } 9632 if (reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(®s[BPF_REG_0]) && !regs[BPF_REG_0].id) 9633 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; 9634 } /* else { add_kfunc_call() ensures it is btf_type_is_void(t) } */ 9635 9636 nargs = btf_type_vlen(func_proto); 9637 args = (const struct btf_param *)(func_proto + 1); 9638 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) { 9639 u32 regno = i + 1; 9640 9641 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(desc_btf, args[i].type, NULL); 9642 if (btf_type_is_ptr(t)) 9643 mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, regno, sizeof(void *)); 9644 else 9645 /* scalar. ensured by btf_check_kfunc_arg_match() */ 9646 mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, regno, t->size); 9647 } 9648 9649 return 0; 9650 } 9651 9652 static bool signed_add_overflows(s64 a, s64 b) 9653 { 9654 /* Do the add in u64, where overflow is well-defined */ 9655 s64 res = (s64)((u64)a + (u64)b); 9656 9657 if (b < 0) 9658 return res > a; 9659 return res < a; 9660 } 9661 9662 static bool signed_add32_overflows(s32 a, s32 b) 9663 { 9664 /* Do the add in u32, where overflow is well-defined */ 9665 s32 res = (s32)((u32)a + (u32)b); 9666 9667 if (b < 0) 9668 return res > a; 9669 return res < a; 9670 } 9671 9672 static bool signed_sub_overflows(s64 a, s64 b) 9673 { 9674 /* Do the sub in u64, where overflow is well-defined */ 9675 s64 res = (s64)((u64)a - (u64)b); 9676 9677 if (b < 0) 9678 return res < a; 9679 return res > a; 9680 } 9681 9682 static bool signed_sub32_overflows(s32 a, s32 b) 9683 { 9684 /* Do the sub in u32, where overflow is well-defined */ 9685 s32 res = (s32)((u32)a - (u32)b); 9686 9687 if (b < 0) 9688 return res < a; 9689 return res > a; 9690 } 9691 9692 static bool check_reg_sane_offset(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9693 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 9694 enum bpf_reg_type type) 9695 { 9696 bool known = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 9697 s64 val = reg->var_off.value; 9698 s64 smin = reg->smin_value; 9699 9700 if (known && (val >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || val <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF)) { 9701 verbose(env, "math between %s pointer and %lld is not allowed\n", 9702 reg_type_str(env, type), val); 9703 return false; 9704 } 9705 9706 if (reg->off >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || reg->off <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 9707 verbose(env, "%s pointer offset %d is not allowed\n", 9708 reg_type_str(env, type), reg->off); 9709 return false; 9710 } 9711 9712 if (smin == S64_MIN) { 9713 verbose(env, "math between %s pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed\n", 9714 reg_type_str(env, type)); 9715 return false; 9716 } 9717 9718 if (smin >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || smin <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 9719 verbose(env, "value %lld makes %s pointer be out of bounds\n", 9720 smin, reg_type_str(env, type)); 9721 return false; 9722 } 9723 9724 return true; 9725 } 9726 9727 enum { 9728 REASON_BOUNDS = -1, 9729 REASON_TYPE = -2, 9730 REASON_PATHS = -3, 9731 REASON_LIMIT = -4, 9732 REASON_STACK = -5, 9733 }; 9734 9735 static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, 9736 u32 *alu_limit, bool mask_to_left) 9737 { 9738 u32 max = 0, ptr_limit = 0; 9739 9740 switch (ptr_reg->type) { 9741 case PTR_TO_STACK: 9742 /* Offset 0 is out-of-bounds, but acceptable start for the 9743 * left direction, see BPF_REG_FP. Also, unknown scalar 9744 * offset where we would need to deal with min/max bounds is 9745 * currently prohibited for unprivileged. 9746 */ 9747 max = MAX_BPF_STACK + mask_to_left; 9748 ptr_limit = -(ptr_reg->var_off.value + ptr_reg->off); 9749 break; 9750 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 9751 max = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size; 9752 ptr_limit = (mask_to_left ? 9753 ptr_reg->smin_value : 9754 ptr_reg->umax_value) + ptr_reg->off; 9755 break; 9756 default: 9757 return REASON_TYPE; 9758 } 9759 9760 if (ptr_limit >= max) 9761 return REASON_LIMIT; 9762 *alu_limit = ptr_limit; 9763 return 0; 9764 } 9765 9766 static bool can_skip_alu_sanitation(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9767 const struct bpf_insn *insn) 9768 { 9769 return env->bypass_spec_v1 || BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K; 9770 } 9771 9772 static int update_alu_sanitation_state(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, 9773 u32 alu_state, u32 alu_limit) 9774 { 9775 /* If we arrived here from different branches with different 9776 * state or limits to sanitize, then this won't work. 9777 */ 9778 if (aux->alu_state && 9779 (aux->alu_state != alu_state || 9780 aux->alu_limit != alu_limit)) 9781 return REASON_PATHS; 9782 9783 /* Corresponding fixup done in do_misc_fixups(). */ 9784 aux->alu_state = alu_state; 9785 aux->alu_limit = alu_limit; 9786 return 0; 9787 } 9788 9789 static int sanitize_val_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9790 struct bpf_insn *insn) 9791 { 9792 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env); 9793 9794 if (can_skip_alu_sanitation(env, insn)) 9795 return 0; 9796 9797 return update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER, 0); 9798 } 9799 9800 static bool sanitize_needed(u8 opcode) 9801 { 9802 return opcode == BPF_ADD || opcode == BPF_SUB; 9803 } 9804 9805 struct bpf_sanitize_info { 9806 struct bpf_insn_aux_data aux; 9807 bool mask_to_left; 9808 }; 9809 9810 static struct bpf_verifier_state * 9811 sanitize_speculative_path(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9812 const struct bpf_insn *insn, 9813 u32 next_idx, u32 curr_idx) 9814 { 9815 struct bpf_verifier_state *branch; 9816 struct bpf_reg_state *regs; 9817 9818 branch = push_stack(env, next_idx, curr_idx, true); 9819 if (branch && insn) { 9820 regs = branch->frame[branch->curframe]->regs; 9821 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) { 9822 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 9823 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 9824 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 9825 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->src_reg); 9826 } 9827 } 9828 return branch; 9829 } 9830 9831 static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9832 struct bpf_insn *insn, 9833 const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, 9834 const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg, 9835 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 9836 struct bpf_sanitize_info *info, 9837 const bool commit_window) 9838 { 9839 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = commit_window ? cur_aux(env) : &info->aux; 9840 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 9841 bool off_is_imm = tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off); 9842 bool off_is_neg = off_reg->smin_value < 0; 9843 bool ptr_is_dst_reg = ptr_reg == dst_reg; 9844 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 9845 u32 alu_state, alu_limit; 9846 struct bpf_reg_state tmp; 9847 bool ret; 9848 int err; 9849 9850 if (can_skip_alu_sanitation(env, insn)) 9851 return 0; 9852 9853 /* We already marked aux for masking from non-speculative 9854 * paths, thus we got here in the first place. We only care 9855 * to explore bad access from here. 9856 */ 9857 if (vstate->speculative) 9858 goto do_sim; 9859 9860 if (!commit_window) { 9861 if (!tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off) && 9862 (off_reg->smin_value < 0) != (off_reg->smax_value < 0)) 9863 return REASON_BOUNDS; 9864 9865 info->mask_to_left = (opcode == BPF_ADD && off_is_neg) || 9866 (opcode == BPF_SUB && !off_is_neg); 9867 } 9868 9869 err = retrieve_ptr_limit(ptr_reg, &alu_limit, info->mask_to_left); 9870 if (err < 0) 9871 return err; 9872 9873 if (commit_window) { 9874 /* In commit phase we narrow the masking window based on 9875 * the observed pointer move after the simulated operation. 9876 */ 9877 alu_state = info->aux.alu_state; 9878 alu_limit = abs(info->aux.alu_limit - alu_limit); 9879 } else { 9880 alu_state = off_is_neg ? BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE : 0; 9881 alu_state |= off_is_imm ? BPF_ALU_IMMEDIATE : 0; 9882 alu_state |= ptr_is_dst_reg ? 9883 BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC : BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST; 9884 9885 /* Limit pruning on unknown scalars to enable deep search for 9886 * potential masking differences from other program paths. 9887 */ 9888 if (!off_is_imm) 9889 env->explore_alu_limits = true; 9890 } 9891 9892 err = update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, alu_state, alu_limit); 9893 if (err < 0) 9894 return err; 9895 do_sim: 9896 /* If we're in commit phase, we're done here given we already 9897 * pushed the truncated dst_reg into the speculative verification 9898 * stack. 9899 * 9900 * Also, when register is a known constant, we rewrite register-based 9901 * operation to immediate-based, and thus do not need masking (and as 9902 * a consequence, do not need to simulate the zero-truncation either). 9903 */ 9904 if (commit_window || off_is_imm) 9905 return 0; 9906 9907 /* Simulate and find potential out-of-bounds access under 9908 * speculative execution from truncation as a result of 9909 * masking when off was not within expected range. If off 9910 * sits in dst, then we temporarily need to move ptr there 9911 * to simulate dst (== 0) +/-= ptr. Needed, for example, 9912 * for cases where we use K-based arithmetic in one direction 9913 * and truncated reg-based in the other in order to explore 9914 * bad access. 9915 */ 9916 if (!ptr_is_dst_reg) { 9917 tmp = *dst_reg; 9918 *dst_reg = *ptr_reg; 9919 } 9920 ret = sanitize_speculative_path(env, NULL, env->insn_idx + 1, 9921 env->insn_idx); 9922 if (!ptr_is_dst_reg && ret) 9923 *dst_reg = tmp; 9924 return !ret ? REASON_STACK : 0; 9925 } 9926 9927 static void sanitize_mark_insn_seen(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 9928 { 9929 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 9930 9931 /* If we simulate paths under speculation, we don't update the 9932 * insn as 'seen' such that when we verify unreachable paths in 9933 * the non-speculative domain, sanitize_dead_code() can still 9934 * rewrite/sanitize them. 9935 */ 9936 if (!vstate->speculative) 9937 env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = env->pass_cnt; 9938 } 9939 9940 static int sanitize_err(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9941 const struct bpf_insn *insn, int reason, 9942 const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg, 9943 const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg) 9944 { 9945 static const char *err = "pointer arithmetic with it prohibited for !root"; 9946 const char *op = BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_ADD ? "add" : "sub"; 9947 u32 dst = insn->dst_reg, src = insn->src_reg; 9948 9949 switch (reason) { 9950 case REASON_BOUNDS: 9951 verbose(env, "R%d has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds, %s\n", 9952 off_reg == dst_reg ? dst : src, err); 9953 break; 9954 case REASON_TYPE: 9955 verbose(env, "R%d has pointer with unsupported alu operation, %s\n", 9956 off_reg == dst_reg ? src : dst, err); 9957 break; 9958 case REASON_PATHS: 9959 verbose(env, "R%d tried to %s from different maps, paths or scalars, %s\n", 9960 dst, op, err); 9961 break; 9962 case REASON_LIMIT: 9963 verbose(env, "R%d tried to %s beyond pointer bounds, %s\n", 9964 dst, op, err); 9965 break; 9966 case REASON_STACK: 9967 verbose(env, "R%d could not be pushed for speculative verification, %s\n", 9968 dst, err); 9969 break; 9970 default: 9971 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unknown reason (%d)\n", 9972 reason); 9973 break; 9974 } 9975 9976 return -EACCES; 9977 } 9978 9979 /* check that stack access falls within stack limits and that 'reg' doesn't 9980 * have a variable offset. 9981 * 9982 * Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for simplicity since it 9983 * requires corresponding support in Spectre masking for stack ALU. See also 9984 * retrieve_ptr_limit(). 9985 * 9986 * 9987 * 'off' includes 'reg->off'. 9988 */ 9989 static int check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic( 9990 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9991 int regno, 9992 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 9993 int off) 9994 { 9995 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 9996 char tn_buf[48]; 9997 9998 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 9999 verbose(env, "R%d variable stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s off=%d\n", 10000 regno, tn_buf, off); 10001 return -EACCES; 10002 } 10003 10004 if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK) { 10005 verbose(env, "R%d stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, " 10006 "prohibited for !root; off=%d\n", regno, off); 10007 return -EACCES; 10008 } 10009 10010 return 0; 10011 } 10012 10013 static int sanitize_check_bounds(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10014 const struct bpf_insn *insn, 10015 const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg) 10016 { 10017 u32 dst = insn->dst_reg; 10018 10019 /* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds 10020 * in order to be able to sanitize access later on. 10021 */ 10022 if (env->bypass_spec_v1) 10023 return 0; 10024 10025 switch (dst_reg->type) { 10026 case PTR_TO_STACK: 10027 if (check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic(env, dst, dst_reg, 10028 dst_reg->off + dst_reg->var_off.value)) 10029 return -EACCES; 10030 break; 10031 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 10032 if (check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1, false, ACCESS_HELPER)) { 10033 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, " 10034 "prohibited for !root\n", dst); 10035 return -EACCES; 10036 } 10037 break; 10038 default: 10039 break; 10040 } 10041 10042 return 0; 10043 } 10044 10045 /* Handles arithmetic on a pointer and a scalar: computes new min/max and var_off. 10046 * Caller should also handle BPF_MOV case separately. 10047 * If we return -EACCES, caller may want to try again treating pointer as a 10048 * scalar. So we only emit a diagnostic if !env->allow_ptr_leaks. 10049 */ 10050 static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10051 struct bpf_insn *insn, 10052 const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, 10053 const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg) 10054 { 10055 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 10056 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 10057 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *dst_reg; 10058 bool known = tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off); 10059 s64 smin_val = off_reg->smin_value, smax_val = off_reg->smax_value, 10060 smin_ptr = ptr_reg->smin_value, smax_ptr = ptr_reg->smax_value; 10061 u64 umin_val = off_reg->umin_value, umax_val = off_reg->umax_value, 10062 umin_ptr = ptr_reg->umin_value, umax_ptr = ptr_reg->umax_value; 10063 struct bpf_sanitize_info info = {}; 10064 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 10065 u32 dst = insn->dst_reg; 10066 int ret; 10067 10068 dst_reg = ®s[dst]; 10069 10070 if ((known && (smin_val != smax_val || umin_val != umax_val)) || 10071 smin_val > smax_val || umin_val > umax_val) { 10072 /* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds derived from 10073 * e.g. dead branches. 10074 */ 10075 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 10076 return 0; 10077 } 10078 10079 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) { 10080 /* 32-bit ALU ops on pointers produce (meaningless) scalars */ 10081 if (opcode == BPF_SUB && env->allow_ptr_leaks) { 10082 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 10083 return 0; 10084 } 10085 10086 verbose(env, 10087 "R%d 32-bit pointer arithmetic prohibited\n", 10088 dst); 10089 return -EACCES; 10090 } 10091 10092 if (ptr_reg->type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL) { 10093 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited, null-check it first\n", 10094 dst, reg_type_str(env, ptr_reg->type)); 10095 return -EACCES; 10096 } 10097 10098 switch (base_type(ptr_reg->type)) { 10099 case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP: 10100 /* smin_val represents the known value */ 10101 if (known && smin_val == 0 && opcode == BPF_ADD) 10102 break; 10103 fallthrough; 10104 case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: 10105 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 10106 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 10107 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 10108 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 10109 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited\n", 10110 dst, reg_type_str(env, ptr_reg->type)); 10111 return -EACCES; 10112 default: 10113 break; 10114 } 10115 10116 /* In case of 'scalar += pointer', dst_reg inherits pointer type and id. 10117 * The id may be overwritten later if we create a new variable offset. 10118 */ 10119 dst_reg->type = ptr_reg->type; 10120 dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id; 10121 10122 if (!check_reg_sane_offset(env, off_reg, ptr_reg->type) || 10123 !check_reg_sane_offset(env, ptr_reg, ptr_reg->type)) 10124 return -EINVAL; 10125 10126 /* pointer types do not carry 32-bit bounds at the moment. */ 10127 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 10128 10129 if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) { 10130 ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg, 10131 &info, false); 10132 if (ret < 0) 10133 return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg); 10134 } 10135 10136 switch (opcode) { 10137 case BPF_ADD: 10138 /* We can take a fixed offset as long as it doesn't overflow 10139 * the s32 'off' field 10140 */ 10141 if (known && (ptr_reg->off + smin_val == 10142 (s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off + smin_val))) { 10143 /* pointer += K. Accumulate it into fixed offset */ 10144 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr; 10145 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr; 10146 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr; 10147 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr; 10148 dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off; 10149 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off + smin_val; 10150 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; 10151 break; 10152 } 10153 /* A new variable offset is created. Note that off_reg->off 10154 * == 0, since it's a scalar. 10155 * dst_reg gets the pointer type and since some positive 10156 * integer value was added to the pointer, give it a new 'id' 10157 * if it's a PTR_TO_PACKET. 10158 * this creates a new 'base' pointer, off_reg (variable) gets 10159 * added into the variable offset, and we copy the fixed offset 10160 * from ptr_reg. 10161 */ 10162 if (signed_add_overflows(smin_ptr, smin_val) || 10163 signed_add_overflows(smax_ptr, smax_val)) { 10164 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 10165 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 10166 } else { 10167 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr + smin_val; 10168 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr + smax_val; 10169 } 10170 if (umin_ptr + umin_val < umin_ptr || 10171 umax_ptr + umax_val < umax_ptr) { 10172 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 10173 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 10174 } else { 10175 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr + umin_val; 10176 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr + umax_val; 10177 } 10178 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off); 10179 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off; 10180 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; 10181 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) { 10182 dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 10183 /* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */ 10184 memset(&dst_reg->raw, 0, sizeof(dst_reg->raw)); 10185 } 10186 break; 10187 case BPF_SUB: 10188 if (dst_reg == off_reg) { 10189 /* scalar -= pointer. Creates an unknown scalar */ 10190 verbose(env, "R%d tried to subtract pointer from scalar\n", 10191 dst); 10192 return -EACCES; 10193 } 10194 /* We don't allow subtraction from FP, because (according to 10195 * test_verifier.c test "invalid fp arithmetic", JITs might not 10196 * be able to deal with it. 10197 */ 10198 if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 10199 verbose(env, "R%d subtraction from stack pointer prohibited\n", 10200 dst); 10201 return -EACCES; 10202 } 10203 if (known && (ptr_reg->off - smin_val == 10204 (s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off - smin_val))) { 10205 /* pointer -= K. Subtract it from fixed offset */ 10206 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr; 10207 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr; 10208 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr; 10209 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr; 10210 dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off; 10211 dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id; 10212 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off - smin_val; 10213 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; 10214 break; 10215 } 10216 /* A new variable offset is created. If the subtrahend is known 10217 * nonnegative, then any reg->range we had before is still good. 10218 */ 10219 if (signed_sub_overflows(smin_ptr, smax_val) || 10220 signed_sub_overflows(smax_ptr, smin_val)) { 10221 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 10222 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 10223 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 10224 } else { 10225 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr - smax_val; 10226 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr - smin_val; 10227 } 10228 if (umin_ptr < umax_val) { 10229 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 10230 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 10231 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 10232 } else { 10233 /* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */ 10234 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr - umax_val; 10235 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr - umin_val; 10236 } 10237 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off); 10238 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off; 10239 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; 10240 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) { 10241 dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 10242 /* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */ 10243 if (smin_val < 0) 10244 memset(&dst_reg->raw, 0, sizeof(dst_reg->raw)); 10245 } 10246 break; 10247 case BPF_AND: 10248 case BPF_OR: 10249 case BPF_XOR: 10250 /* bitwise ops on pointers are troublesome, prohibit. */ 10251 verbose(env, "R%d bitwise operator %s on pointer prohibited\n", 10252 dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); 10253 return -EACCES; 10254 default: 10255 /* other operators (e.g. MUL,LSH) produce non-pointer results */ 10256 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic with %s operator prohibited\n", 10257 dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); 10258 return -EACCES; 10259 } 10260 10261 if (!check_reg_sane_offset(env, dst_reg, ptr_reg->type)) 10262 return -EINVAL; 10263 reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg); 10264 if (sanitize_check_bounds(env, insn, dst_reg) < 0) 10265 return -EACCES; 10266 if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) { 10267 ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, dst_reg, off_reg, dst_reg, 10268 &info, true); 10269 if (ret < 0) 10270 return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg); 10271 } 10272 10273 return 0; 10274 } 10275 10276 static void scalar32_min_max_add(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10277 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 10278 { 10279 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 10280 s32 smax_val = src_reg->s32_max_value; 10281 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 10282 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 10283 10284 if (signed_add32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_min_value, smin_val) || 10285 signed_add32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_max_value, smax_val)) { 10286 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 10287 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 10288 } else { 10289 dst_reg->s32_min_value += smin_val; 10290 dst_reg->s32_max_value += smax_val; 10291 } 10292 if (dst_reg->u32_min_value + umin_val < umin_val || 10293 dst_reg->u32_max_value + umax_val < umax_val) { 10294 dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0; 10295 dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 10296 } else { 10297 dst_reg->u32_min_value += umin_val; 10298 dst_reg->u32_max_value += umax_val; 10299 } 10300 } 10301 10302 static void scalar_min_max_add(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10303 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 10304 { 10305 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 10306 s64 smax_val = src_reg->smax_value; 10307 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 10308 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 10309 10310 if (signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smin_val) || 10311 signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smax_val)) { 10312 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 10313 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 10314 } else { 10315 dst_reg->smin_value += smin_val; 10316 dst_reg->smax_value += smax_val; 10317 } 10318 if (dst_reg->umin_value + umin_val < umin_val || 10319 dst_reg->umax_value + umax_val < umax_val) { 10320 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 10321 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 10322 } else { 10323 dst_reg->umin_value += umin_val; 10324 dst_reg->umax_value += umax_val; 10325 } 10326 } 10327 10328 static void scalar32_min_max_sub(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10329 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 10330 { 10331 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 10332 s32 smax_val = src_reg->s32_max_value; 10333 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 10334 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 10335 10336 if (signed_sub32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_min_value, smax_val) || 10337 signed_sub32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_max_value, smin_val)) { 10338 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 10339 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 10340 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 10341 } else { 10342 dst_reg->s32_min_value -= smax_val; 10343 dst_reg->s32_max_value -= smin_val; 10344 } 10345 if (dst_reg->u32_min_value < umax_val) { 10346 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 10347 dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0; 10348 dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 10349 } else { 10350 /* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */ 10351 dst_reg->u32_min_value -= umax_val; 10352 dst_reg->u32_max_value -= umin_val; 10353 } 10354 } 10355 10356 static void scalar_min_max_sub(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10357 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 10358 { 10359 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 10360 s64 smax_val = src_reg->smax_value; 10361 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 10362 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 10363 10364 if (signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smax_val) || 10365 signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smin_val)) { 10366 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 10367 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 10368 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 10369 } else { 10370 dst_reg->smin_value -= smax_val; 10371 dst_reg->smax_value -= smin_val; 10372 } 10373 if (dst_reg->umin_value < umax_val) { 10374 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 10375 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 10376 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 10377 } else { 10378 /* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */ 10379 dst_reg->umin_value -= umax_val; 10380 dst_reg->umax_value -= umin_val; 10381 } 10382 } 10383 10384 static void scalar32_min_max_mul(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10385 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 10386 { 10387 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 10388 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 10389 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 10390 10391 if (smin_val < 0 || dst_reg->s32_min_value < 0) { 10392 /* Ain't nobody got time to multiply that sign */ 10393 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 10394 return; 10395 } 10396 /* Both values are positive, so we can work with unsigned and 10397 * copy the result to signed (unless it exceeds S32_MAX). 10398 */ 10399 if (umax_val > U16_MAX || dst_reg->u32_max_value > U16_MAX) { 10400 /* Potential overflow, we know nothing */ 10401 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 10402 return; 10403 } 10404 dst_reg->u32_min_value *= umin_val; 10405 dst_reg->u32_max_value *= umax_val; 10406 if (dst_reg->u32_max_value > S32_MAX) { 10407 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 10408 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 10409 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 10410 } else { 10411 dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; 10412 dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; 10413 } 10414 } 10415 10416 static void scalar_min_max_mul(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10417 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 10418 { 10419 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 10420 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 10421 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 10422 10423 if (smin_val < 0 || dst_reg->smin_value < 0) { 10424 /* Ain't nobody got time to multiply that sign */ 10425 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 10426 return; 10427 } 10428 /* Both values are positive, so we can work with unsigned and 10429 * copy the result to signed (unless it exceeds S64_MAX). 10430 */ 10431 if (umax_val > U32_MAX || dst_reg->umax_value > U32_MAX) { 10432 /* Potential overflow, we know nothing */ 10433 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 10434 return; 10435 } 10436 dst_reg->umin_value *= umin_val; 10437 dst_reg->umax_value *= umax_val; 10438 if (dst_reg->umax_value > S64_MAX) { 10439 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 10440 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 10441 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 10442 } else { 10443 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; 10444 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; 10445 } 10446 } 10447 10448 static void scalar32_min_max_and(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10449 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 10450 { 10451 bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 10452 bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 10453 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 10454 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 10455 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 10456 10457 if (src_known && dst_known) { 10458 __mark_reg32_known(dst_reg, var32_off.value); 10459 return; 10460 } 10461 10462 /* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently 10463 * bitwise. Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima. 10464 */ 10465 dst_reg->u32_min_value = var32_off.value; 10466 dst_reg->u32_max_value = min(dst_reg->u32_max_value, umax_val); 10467 if (dst_reg->s32_min_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) { 10468 /* Lose signed bounds when ANDing negative numbers, 10469 * ain't nobody got time for that. 10470 */ 10471 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 10472 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 10473 } else { 10474 /* ANDing two positives gives a positive, so safe to 10475 * cast result into s64. 10476 */ 10477 dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; 10478 dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; 10479 } 10480 } 10481 10482 static void scalar_min_max_and(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10483 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 10484 { 10485 bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 10486 bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 10487 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 10488 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 10489 10490 if (src_known && dst_known) { 10491 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value); 10492 return; 10493 } 10494 10495 /* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently 10496 * bitwise. Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima. 10497 */ 10498 dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value; 10499 dst_reg->umax_value = min(dst_reg->umax_value, umax_val); 10500 if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) { 10501 /* Lose signed bounds when ANDing negative numbers, 10502 * ain't nobody got time for that. 10503 */ 10504 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 10505 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 10506 } else { 10507 /* ANDing two positives gives a positive, so safe to 10508 * cast result into s64. 10509 */ 10510 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; 10511 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; 10512 } 10513 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */ 10514 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 10515 } 10516 10517 static void scalar32_min_max_or(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10518 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 10519 { 10520 bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 10521 bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 10522 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 10523 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 10524 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 10525 10526 if (src_known && dst_known) { 10527 __mark_reg32_known(dst_reg, var32_off.value); 10528 return; 10529 } 10530 10531 /* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the 10532 * maximum of the operands' minima 10533 */ 10534 dst_reg->u32_min_value = max(dst_reg->u32_min_value, umin_val); 10535 dst_reg->u32_max_value = var32_off.value | var32_off.mask; 10536 if (dst_reg->s32_min_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) { 10537 /* Lose signed bounds when ORing negative numbers, 10538 * ain't nobody got time for that. 10539 */ 10540 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 10541 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 10542 } else { 10543 /* ORing two positives gives a positive, so safe to 10544 * cast result into s64. 10545 */ 10546 dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; 10547 dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; 10548 } 10549 } 10550 10551 static void scalar_min_max_or(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10552 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 10553 { 10554 bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 10555 bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 10556 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 10557 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 10558 10559 if (src_known && dst_known) { 10560 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value); 10561 return; 10562 } 10563 10564 /* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the 10565 * maximum of the operands' minima 10566 */ 10567 dst_reg->umin_value = max(dst_reg->umin_value, umin_val); 10568 dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value | dst_reg->var_off.mask; 10569 if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) { 10570 /* Lose signed bounds when ORing negative numbers, 10571 * ain't nobody got time for that. 10572 */ 10573 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 10574 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 10575 } else { 10576 /* ORing two positives gives a positive, so safe to 10577 * cast result into s64. 10578 */ 10579 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; 10580 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; 10581 } 10582 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */ 10583 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 10584 } 10585 10586 static void scalar32_min_max_xor(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10587 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 10588 { 10589 bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 10590 bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 10591 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 10592 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 10593 10594 if (src_known && dst_known) { 10595 __mark_reg32_known(dst_reg, var32_off.value); 10596 return; 10597 } 10598 10599 /* We get both minimum and maximum from the var32_off. */ 10600 dst_reg->u32_min_value = var32_off.value; 10601 dst_reg->u32_max_value = var32_off.value | var32_off.mask; 10602 10603 if (dst_reg->s32_min_value >= 0 && smin_val >= 0) { 10604 /* XORing two positive sign numbers gives a positive, 10605 * so safe to cast u32 result into s32. 10606 */ 10607 dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; 10608 dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; 10609 } else { 10610 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 10611 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 10612 } 10613 } 10614 10615 static void scalar_min_max_xor(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10616 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 10617 { 10618 bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 10619 bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 10620 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 10621 10622 if (src_known && dst_known) { 10623 /* dst_reg->var_off.value has been updated earlier */ 10624 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value); 10625 return; 10626 } 10627 10628 /* We get both minimum and maximum from the var_off. */ 10629 dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value; 10630 dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value | dst_reg->var_off.mask; 10631 10632 if (dst_reg->smin_value >= 0 && smin_val >= 0) { 10633 /* XORing two positive sign numbers gives a positive, 10634 * so safe to cast u64 result into s64. 10635 */ 10636 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; 10637 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; 10638 } else { 10639 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 10640 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 10641 } 10642 10643 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 10644 } 10645 10646 static void __scalar32_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10647 u64 umin_val, u64 umax_val) 10648 { 10649 /* We lose all sign bit information (except what we can pick 10650 * up from var_off) 10651 */ 10652 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 10653 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 10654 /* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */ 10655 if (umax_val > 31 || dst_reg->u32_max_value > 1ULL << (31 - umax_val)) { 10656 dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0; 10657 dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 10658 } else { 10659 dst_reg->u32_min_value <<= umin_val; 10660 dst_reg->u32_max_value <<= umax_val; 10661 } 10662 } 10663 10664 static void scalar32_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10665 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 10666 { 10667 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 10668 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 10669 /* u32 alu operation will zext upper bits */ 10670 struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 10671 10672 __scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val); 10673 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(tnum_lshift(subreg, umin_val)); 10674 /* Not required but being careful mark reg64 bounds as unknown so 10675 * that we are forced to pick them up from tnum and zext later and 10676 * if some path skips this step we are still safe. 10677 */ 10678 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 10679 __update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg); 10680 } 10681 10682 static void __scalar64_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10683 u64 umin_val, u64 umax_val) 10684 { 10685 /* Special case <<32 because it is a common compiler pattern to sign 10686 * extend subreg by doing <<32 s>>32. In this case if 32bit bounds are 10687 * positive we know this shift will also be positive so we can track 10688 * bounds correctly. Otherwise we lose all sign bit information except 10689 * what we can pick up from var_off. Perhaps we can generalize this 10690 * later to shifts of any length. 10691 */ 10692 if (umin_val == 32 && umax_val == 32 && dst_reg->s32_max_value >= 0) 10693 dst_reg->smax_value = (s64)dst_reg->s32_max_value << 32; 10694 else 10695 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 10696 10697 if (umin_val == 32 && umax_val == 32 && dst_reg->s32_min_value >= 0) 10698 dst_reg->smin_value = (s64)dst_reg->s32_min_value << 32; 10699 else 10700 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 10701 10702 /* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */ 10703 if (dst_reg->umax_value > 1ULL << (63 - umax_val)) { 10704 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 10705 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 10706 } else { 10707 dst_reg->umin_value <<= umin_val; 10708 dst_reg->umax_value <<= umax_val; 10709 } 10710 } 10711 10712 static void scalar_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10713 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 10714 { 10715 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 10716 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 10717 10718 /* scalar64 calc uses 32bit unshifted bounds so must be called first */ 10719 __scalar64_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val); 10720 __scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val); 10721 10722 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_lshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val); 10723 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */ 10724 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 10725 } 10726 10727 static void scalar32_min_max_rsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10728 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 10729 { 10730 struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 10731 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 10732 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 10733 10734 /* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift. If the value in dst_reg might 10735 * be negative, then either: 10736 * 1) src_reg might be zero, so the sign bit of the result is 10737 * unknown, so we lose our signed bounds 10738 * 2) it's known negative, thus the unsigned bounds capture the 10739 * signed bounds 10740 * 3) the signed bounds cross zero, so they tell us nothing 10741 * about the result 10742 * If the value in dst_reg is known nonnegative, then again the 10743 * unsigned bounds capture the signed bounds. 10744 * Thus, in all cases it suffices to blow away our signed bounds 10745 * and rely on inferring new ones from the unsigned bounds and 10746 * var_off of the result. 10747 */ 10748 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 10749 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 10750 10751 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(subreg, umin_val); 10752 dst_reg->u32_min_value >>= umax_val; 10753 dst_reg->u32_max_value >>= umin_val; 10754 10755 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 10756 __update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg); 10757 } 10758 10759 static void scalar_min_max_rsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10760 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 10761 { 10762 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 10763 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 10764 10765 /* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift. If the value in dst_reg might 10766 * be negative, then either: 10767 * 1) src_reg might be zero, so the sign bit of the result is 10768 * unknown, so we lose our signed bounds 10769 * 2) it's known negative, thus the unsigned bounds capture the 10770 * signed bounds 10771 * 3) the signed bounds cross zero, so they tell us nothing 10772 * about the result 10773 * If the value in dst_reg is known nonnegative, then again the 10774 * unsigned bounds capture the signed bounds. 10775 * Thus, in all cases it suffices to blow away our signed bounds 10776 * and rely on inferring new ones from the unsigned bounds and 10777 * var_off of the result. 10778 */ 10779 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 10780 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 10781 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val); 10782 dst_reg->umin_value >>= umax_val; 10783 dst_reg->umax_value >>= umin_val; 10784 10785 /* Its not easy to operate on alu32 bounds here because it depends 10786 * on bits being shifted in. Take easy way out and mark unbounded 10787 * so we can recalculate later from tnum. 10788 */ 10789 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 10790 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 10791 } 10792 10793 static void scalar32_min_max_arsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10794 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 10795 { 10796 u64 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 10797 10798 /* Upon reaching here, src_known is true and 10799 * umax_val is equal to umin_val. 10800 */ 10801 dst_reg->s32_min_value = (u32)(((s32)dst_reg->s32_min_value) >> umin_val); 10802 dst_reg->s32_max_value = (u32)(((s32)dst_reg->s32_max_value) >> umin_val); 10803 10804 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_arshift(tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off), umin_val, 32); 10805 10806 /* blow away the dst_reg umin_value/umax_value and rely on 10807 * dst_reg var_off to refine the result. 10808 */ 10809 dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0; 10810 dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 10811 10812 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 10813 __update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg); 10814 } 10815 10816 static void scalar_min_max_arsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10817 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 10818 { 10819 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 10820 10821 /* Upon reaching here, src_known is true and umax_val is equal 10822 * to umin_val. 10823 */ 10824 dst_reg->smin_value >>= umin_val; 10825 dst_reg->smax_value >>= umin_val; 10826 10827 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_arshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val, 64); 10828 10829 /* blow away the dst_reg umin_value/umax_value and rely on 10830 * dst_reg var_off to refine the result. 10831 */ 10832 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 10833 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 10834 10835 /* Its not easy to operate on alu32 bounds here because it depends 10836 * on bits being shifted in from upper 32-bits. Take easy way out 10837 * and mark unbounded so we can recalculate later from tnum. 10838 */ 10839 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 10840 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 10841 } 10842 10843 /* WARNING: This function does calculations on 64-bit values, but the actual 10844 * execution may occur on 32-bit values. Therefore, things like bitshifts 10845 * need extra checks in the 32-bit case. 10846 */ 10847 static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10848 struct bpf_insn *insn, 10849 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10850 struct bpf_reg_state src_reg) 10851 { 10852 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 10853 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 10854 bool src_known; 10855 s64 smin_val, smax_val; 10856 u64 umin_val, umax_val; 10857 s32 s32_min_val, s32_max_val; 10858 u32 u32_min_val, u32_max_val; 10859 u64 insn_bitness = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) ? 64 : 32; 10860 bool alu32 = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64); 10861 int ret; 10862 10863 smin_val = src_reg.smin_value; 10864 smax_val = src_reg.smax_value; 10865 umin_val = src_reg.umin_value; 10866 umax_val = src_reg.umax_value; 10867 10868 s32_min_val = src_reg.s32_min_value; 10869 s32_max_val = src_reg.s32_max_value; 10870 u32_min_val = src_reg.u32_min_value; 10871 u32_max_val = src_reg.u32_max_value; 10872 10873 if (alu32) { 10874 src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg.var_off); 10875 if ((src_known && 10876 (s32_min_val != s32_max_val || u32_min_val != u32_max_val)) || 10877 s32_min_val > s32_max_val || u32_min_val > u32_max_val) { 10878 /* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds 10879 * derived from e.g. dead branches. 10880 */ 10881 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 10882 return 0; 10883 } 10884 } else { 10885 src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg.var_off); 10886 if ((src_known && 10887 (smin_val != smax_val || umin_val != umax_val)) || 10888 smin_val > smax_val || umin_val > umax_val) { 10889 /* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds 10890 * derived from e.g. dead branches. 10891 */ 10892 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 10893 return 0; 10894 } 10895 } 10896 10897 if (!src_known && 10898 opcode != BPF_ADD && opcode != BPF_SUB && opcode != BPF_AND) { 10899 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 10900 return 0; 10901 } 10902 10903 if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) { 10904 ret = sanitize_val_alu(env, insn); 10905 if (ret < 0) 10906 return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, NULL, NULL); 10907 } 10908 10909 /* Calculate sign/unsigned bounds and tnum for alu32 and alu64 bit ops. 10910 * There are two classes of instructions: The first class we track both 10911 * alu32 and alu64 sign/unsigned bounds independently this provides the 10912 * greatest amount of precision when alu operations are mixed with jmp32 10913 * operations. These operations are BPF_ADD, BPF_SUB, BPF_MUL, BPF_ADD, 10914 * and BPF_OR. This is possible because these ops have fairly easy to 10915 * understand and calculate behavior in both 32-bit and 64-bit alu ops. 10916 * See alu32 verifier tests for examples. The second class of 10917 * operations, BPF_LSH, BPF_RSH, and BPF_ARSH, however are not so easy 10918 * with regards to tracking sign/unsigned bounds because the bits may 10919 * cross subreg boundaries in the alu64 case. When this happens we mark 10920 * the reg unbounded in the subreg bound space and use the resulting 10921 * tnum to calculate an approximation of the sign/unsigned bounds. 10922 */ 10923 switch (opcode) { 10924 case BPF_ADD: 10925 scalar32_min_max_add(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10926 scalar_min_max_add(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10927 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 10928 break; 10929 case BPF_SUB: 10930 scalar32_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10931 scalar_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10932 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 10933 break; 10934 case BPF_MUL: 10935 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_mul(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 10936 scalar32_min_max_mul(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10937 scalar_min_max_mul(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10938 break; 10939 case BPF_AND: 10940 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_and(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 10941 scalar32_min_max_and(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10942 scalar_min_max_and(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10943 break; 10944 case BPF_OR: 10945 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_or(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 10946 scalar32_min_max_or(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10947 scalar_min_max_or(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10948 break; 10949 case BPF_XOR: 10950 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_xor(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 10951 scalar32_min_max_xor(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10952 scalar_min_max_xor(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10953 break; 10954 case BPF_LSH: 10955 if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) { 10956 /* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined. 10957 * This includes shifts by a negative number. 10958 */ 10959 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 10960 break; 10961 } 10962 if (alu32) 10963 scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10964 else 10965 scalar_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10966 break; 10967 case BPF_RSH: 10968 if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) { 10969 /* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined. 10970 * This includes shifts by a negative number. 10971 */ 10972 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 10973 break; 10974 } 10975 if (alu32) 10976 scalar32_min_max_rsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10977 else 10978 scalar_min_max_rsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10979 break; 10980 case BPF_ARSH: 10981 if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) { 10982 /* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined. 10983 * This includes shifts by a negative number. 10984 */ 10985 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 10986 break; 10987 } 10988 if (alu32) 10989 scalar32_min_max_arsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10990 else 10991 scalar_min_max_arsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10992 break; 10993 default: 10994 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 10995 break; 10996 } 10997 10998 /* ALU32 ops are zero extended into 64bit register */ 10999 if (alu32) 11000 zext_32_to_64(dst_reg); 11001 reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg); 11002 return 0; 11003 } 11004 11005 /* Handles ALU ops other than BPF_END, BPF_NEG and BPF_MOV: computes new min/max 11006 * and var_off. 11007 */ 11008 static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11009 struct bpf_insn *insn) 11010 { 11011 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 11012 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 11013 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *dst_reg, *src_reg; 11014 struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, off_reg = {0}; 11015 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 11016 int err; 11017 11018 dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg]; 11019 src_reg = NULL; 11020 if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 11021 ptr_reg = dst_reg; 11022 else 11023 /* Make sure ID is cleared otherwise dst_reg min/max could be 11024 * incorrectly propagated into other registers by find_equal_scalars() 11025 */ 11026 dst_reg->id = 0; 11027 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 11028 src_reg = ®s[insn->src_reg]; 11029 if (src_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 11030 if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 11031 /* Combining two pointers by any ALU op yields 11032 * an arbitrary scalar. Disallow all math except 11033 * pointer subtraction 11034 */ 11035 if (opcode == BPF_SUB && env->allow_ptr_leaks) { 11036 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 11037 return 0; 11038 } 11039 verbose(env, "R%d pointer %s pointer prohibited\n", 11040 insn->dst_reg, 11041 bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); 11042 return -EACCES; 11043 } else { 11044 /* scalar += pointer 11045 * This is legal, but we have to reverse our 11046 * src/dest handling in computing the range 11047 */ 11048 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->dst_reg); 11049 if (err) 11050 return err; 11051 return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, 11052 src_reg, dst_reg); 11053 } 11054 } else if (ptr_reg) { 11055 /* pointer += scalar */ 11056 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg); 11057 if (err) 11058 return err; 11059 return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, 11060 dst_reg, src_reg); 11061 } else if (dst_reg->precise) { 11062 /* if dst_reg is precise, src_reg should be precise as well */ 11063 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg); 11064 if (err) 11065 return err; 11066 } 11067 } else { 11068 /* Pretend the src is a reg with a known value, since we only 11069 * need to be able to read from this state. 11070 */ 11071 off_reg.type = SCALAR_VALUE; 11072 __mark_reg_known(&off_reg, insn->imm); 11073 src_reg = &off_reg; 11074 if (ptr_reg) /* pointer += K */ 11075 return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, 11076 ptr_reg, src_reg); 11077 } 11078 11079 /* Got here implies adding two SCALAR_VALUEs */ 11080 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ptr_reg)) { 11081 print_verifier_state(env, state, true); 11082 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected ptr_reg\n"); 11083 return -EINVAL; 11084 } 11085 if (WARN_ON(!src_reg)) { 11086 print_verifier_state(env, state, true); 11087 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no src_reg\n"); 11088 return -EINVAL; 11089 } 11090 return adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(env, insn, dst_reg, *src_reg); 11091 } 11092 11093 /* check validity of 32-bit and 64-bit arithmetic operations */ 11094 static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 11095 { 11096 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 11097 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 11098 int err; 11099 11100 if (opcode == BPF_END || opcode == BPF_NEG) { 11101 if (opcode == BPF_NEG) { 11102 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || 11103 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 11104 insn->off != 0 || insn->imm != 0) { 11105 verbose(env, "BPF_NEG uses reserved fields\n"); 11106 return -EINVAL; 11107 } 11108 } else { 11109 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 || 11110 (insn->imm != 16 && insn->imm != 32 && insn->imm != 64) || 11111 BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) { 11112 verbose(env, "BPF_END uses reserved fields\n"); 11113 return -EINVAL; 11114 } 11115 } 11116 11117 /* check src operand */ 11118 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 11119 if (err) 11120 return err; 11121 11122 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) { 11123 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n", 11124 insn->dst_reg); 11125 return -EACCES; 11126 } 11127 11128 /* check dest operand */ 11129 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP); 11130 if (err) 11131 return err; 11132 11133 } else if (opcode == BPF_MOV) { 11134 11135 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 11136 if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) { 11137 verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n"); 11138 return -EINVAL; 11139 } 11140 11141 /* check src operand */ 11142 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 11143 if (err) 11144 return err; 11145 } else { 11146 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) { 11147 verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n"); 11148 return -EINVAL; 11149 } 11150 } 11151 11152 /* check dest operand, mark as required later */ 11153 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK); 11154 if (err) 11155 return err; 11156 11157 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 11158 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg = regs + insn->src_reg; 11159 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg = regs + insn->dst_reg; 11160 11161 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) { 11162 /* case: R1 = R2 11163 * copy register state to dest reg 11164 */ 11165 if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && !src_reg->id) 11166 /* Assign src and dst registers the same ID 11167 * that will be used by find_equal_scalars() 11168 * to propagate min/max range. 11169 */ 11170 src_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 11171 *dst_reg = *src_reg; 11172 dst_reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 11173 dst_reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 11174 } else { 11175 /* R1 = (u32) R2 */ 11176 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { 11177 verbose(env, 11178 "R%d partial copy of pointer\n", 11179 insn->src_reg); 11180 return -EACCES; 11181 } else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 11182 *dst_reg = *src_reg; 11183 /* Make sure ID is cleared otherwise 11184 * dst_reg min/max could be incorrectly 11185 * propagated into src_reg by find_equal_scalars() 11186 */ 11187 dst_reg->id = 0; 11188 dst_reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 11189 dst_reg->subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1; 11190 } else { 11191 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, 11192 insn->dst_reg); 11193 } 11194 zext_32_to_64(dst_reg); 11195 reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg); 11196 } 11197 } else { 11198 /* case: R = imm 11199 * remember the value we stored into this reg 11200 */ 11201 /* clear any state __mark_reg_known doesn't set */ 11202 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 11203 regs[insn->dst_reg].type = SCALAR_VALUE; 11204 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) { 11205 __mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg, 11206 insn->imm); 11207 } else { 11208 __mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg, 11209 (u32)insn->imm); 11210 } 11211 } 11212 11213 } else if (opcode > BPF_END) { 11214 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_ALU opcode %x\n", opcode); 11215 return -EINVAL; 11216 11217 } else { /* all other ALU ops: and, sub, xor, add, ... */ 11218 11219 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 11220 if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) { 11221 verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n"); 11222 return -EINVAL; 11223 } 11224 /* check src1 operand */ 11225 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 11226 if (err) 11227 return err; 11228 } else { 11229 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) { 11230 verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n"); 11231 return -EINVAL; 11232 } 11233 } 11234 11235 /* check src2 operand */ 11236 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 11237 if (err) 11238 return err; 11239 11240 if ((opcode == BPF_MOD || opcode == BPF_DIV) && 11241 BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && insn->imm == 0) { 11242 verbose(env, "div by zero\n"); 11243 return -EINVAL; 11244 } 11245 11246 if ((opcode == BPF_LSH || opcode == BPF_RSH || 11247 opcode == BPF_ARSH) && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) { 11248 int size = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 ? 64 : 32; 11249 11250 if (insn->imm < 0 || insn->imm >= size) { 11251 verbose(env, "invalid shift %d\n", insn->imm); 11252 return -EINVAL; 11253 } 11254 } 11255 11256 /* check dest operand */ 11257 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK); 11258 if (err) 11259 return err; 11260 11261 return adjust_reg_min_max_vals(env, insn); 11262 } 11263 11264 return 0; 11265 } 11266 11267 static void find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, 11268 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 11269 enum bpf_reg_type type, 11270 bool range_right_open) 11271 { 11272 struct bpf_func_state *state; 11273 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 11274 int new_range; 11275 11276 if (dst_reg->off < 0 || 11277 (dst_reg->off == 0 && range_right_open)) 11278 /* This doesn't give us any range */ 11279 return; 11280 11281 if (dst_reg->umax_value > MAX_PACKET_OFF || 11282 dst_reg->umax_value + dst_reg->off > MAX_PACKET_OFF) 11283 /* Risk of overflow. For instance, ptr + (1<<63) may be less 11284 * than pkt_end, but that's because it's also less than pkt. 11285 */ 11286 return; 11287 11288 new_range = dst_reg->off; 11289 if (range_right_open) 11290 new_range++; 11291 11292 /* Examples for register markings: 11293 * 11294 * pkt_data in dst register: 11295 * 11296 * r2 = r3; 11297 * r2 += 8; 11298 * if (r2 > pkt_end) goto <handle exception> 11299 * <access okay> 11300 * 11301 * r2 = r3; 11302 * r2 += 8; 11303 * if (r2 < pkt_end) goto <access okay> 11304 * <handle exception> 11305 * 11306 * Where: 11307 * r2 == dst_reg, pkt_end == src_reg 11308 * r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0) 11309 * r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0) 11310 * 11311 * pkt_data in src register: 11312 * 11313 * r2 = r3; 11314 * r2 += 8; 11315 * if (pkt_end >= r2) goto <access okay> 11316 * <handle exception> 11317 * 11318 * r2 = r3; 11319 * r2 += 8; 11320 * if (pkt_end <= r2) goto <handle exception> 11321 * <access okay> 11322 * 11323 * Where: 11324 * pkt_end == dst_reg, r2 == src_reg 11325 * r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0) 11326 * r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0) 11327 * 11328 * Find register r3 and mark its range as r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8) 11329 * or r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8-1), so that range of bytes [r3, r3 + 8) 11330 * and [r3, r3 + 8-1) respectively is safe to access depending on 11331 * the check. 11332 */ 11333 11334 /* If our ids match, then we must have the same max_value. And we 11335 * don't care about the other reg's fixed offset, since if it's too big 11336 * the range won't allow anything. 11337 * dst_reg->off is known < MAX_PACKET_OFF, therefore it fits in a u16. 11338 */ 11339 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(vstate, state, reg, ({ 11340 if (reg->type == type && reg->id == dst_reg->id) 11341 /* keep the maximum range already checked */ 11342 reg->range = max(reg->range, new_range); 11343 })); 11344 } 11345 11346 static int is_branch32_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 val, u8 opcode) 11347 { 11348 struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off); 11349 s32 sval = (s32)val; 11350 11351 switch (opcode) { 11352 case BPF_JEQ: 11353 if (tnum_is_const(subreg)) 11354 return !!tnum_equals_const(subreg, val); 11355 break; 11356 case BPF_JNE: 11357 if (tnum_is_const(subreg)) 11358 return !tnum_equals_const(subreg, val); 11359 break; 11360 case BPF_JSET: 11361 if ((~subreg.mask & subreg.value) & val) 11362 return 1; 11363 if (!((subreg.mask | subreg.value) & val)) 11364 return 0; 11365 break; 11366 case BPF_JGT: 11367 if (reg->u32_min_value > val) 11368 return 1; 11369 else if (reg->u32_max_value <= val) 11370 return 0; 11371 break; 11372 case BPF_JSGT: 11373 if (reg->s32_min_value > sval) 11374 return 1; 11375 else if (reg->s32_max_value <= sval) 11376 return 0; 11377 break; 11378 case BPF_JLT: 11379 if (reg->u32_max_value < val) 11380 return 1; 11381 else if (reg->u32_min_value >= val) 11382 return 0; 11383 break; 11384 case BPF_JSLT: 11385 if (reg->s32_max_value < sval) 11386 return 1; 11387 else if (reg->s32_min_value >= sval) 11388 return 0; 11389 break; 11390 case BPF_JGE: 11391 if (reg->u32_min_value >= val) 11392 return 1; 11393 else if (reg->u32_max_value < val) 11394 return 0; 11395 break; 11396 case BPF_JSGE: 11397 if (reg->s32_min_value >= sval) 11398 return 1; 11399 else if (reg->s32_max_value < sval) 11400 return 0; 11401 break; 11402 case BPF_JLE: 11403 if (reg->u32_max_value <= val) 11404 return 1; 11405 else if (reg->u32_min_value > val) 11406 return 0; 11407 break; 11408 case BPF_JSLE: 11409 if (reg->s32_max_value <= sval) 11410 return 1; 11411 else if (reg->s32_min_value > sval) 11412 return 0; 11413 break; 11414 } 11415 11416 return -1; 11417 } 11418 11419 11420 static int is_branch64_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 val, u8 opcode) 11421 { 11422 s64 sval = (s64)val; 11423 11424 switch (opcode) { 11425 case BPF_JEQ: 11426 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 11427 return !!tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, val); 11428 break; 11429 case BPF_JNE: 11430 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 11431 return !tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, val); 11432 break; 11433 case BPF_JSET: 11434 if ((~reg->var_off.mask & reg->var_off.value) & val) 11435 return 1; 11436 if (!((reg->var_off.mask | reg->var_off.value) & val)) 11437 return 0; 11438 break; 11439 case BPF_JGT: 11440 if (reg->umin_value > val) 11441 return 1; 11442 else if (reg->umax_value <= val) 11443 return 0; 11444 break; 11445 case BPF_JSGT: 11446 if (reg->smin_value > sval) 11447 return 1; 11448 else if (reg->smax_value <= sval) 11449 return 0; 11450 break; 11451 case BPF_JLT: 11452 if (reg->umax_value < val) 11453 return 1; 11454 else if (reg->umin_value >= val) 11455 return 0; 11456 break; 11457 case BPF_JSLT: 11458 if (reg->smax_value < sval) 11459 return 1; 11460 else if (reg->smin_value >= sval) 11461 return 0; 11462 break; 11463 case BPF_JGE: 11464 if (reg->umin_value >= val) 11465 return 1; 11466 else if (reg->umax_value < val) 11467 return 0; 11468 break; 11469 case BPF_JSGE: 11470 if (reg->smin_value >= sval) 11471 return 1; 11472 else if (reg->smax_value < sval) 11473 return 0; 11474 break; 11475 case BPF_JLE: 11476 if (reg->umax_value <= val) 11477 return 1; 11478 else if (reg->umin_value > val) 11479 return 0; 11480 break; 11481 case BPF_JSLE: 11482 if (reg->smax_value <= sval) 11483 return 1; 11484 else if (reg->smin_value > sval) 11485 return 0; 11486 break; 11487 } 11488 11489 return -1; 11490 } 11491 11492 /* compute branch direction of the expression "if (reg opcode val) goto target;" 11493 * and return: 11494 * 1 - branch will be taken and "goto target" will be executed 11495 * 0 - branch will not be taken and fall-through to next insn 11496 * -1 - unknown. Example: "if (reg < 5)" is unknown when register value 11497 * range [0,10] 11498 */ 11499 static int is_branch_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 val, u8 opcode, 11500 bool is_jmp32) 11501 { 11502 if (__is_pointer_value(false, reg)) { 11503 if (!reg_type_not_null(reg->type)) 11504 return -1; 11505 11506 /* If pointer is valid tests against zero will fail so we can 11507 * use this to direct branch taken. 11508 */ 11509 if (val != 0) 11510 return -1; 11511 11512 switch (opcode) { 11513 case BPF_JEQ: 11514 return 0; 11515 case BPF_JNE: 11516 return 1; 11517 default: 11518 return -1; 11519 } 11520 } 11521 11522 if (is_jmp32) 11523 return is_branch32_taken(reg, val, opcode); 11524 return is_branch64_taken(reg, val, opcode); 11525 } 11526 11527 static int flip_opcode(u32 opcode) 11528 { 11529 /* How can we transform "a <op> b" into "b <op> a"? */ 11530 static const u8 opcode_flip[16] = { 11531 /* these stay the same */ 11532 [BPF_JEQ >> 4] = BPF_JEQ, 11533 [BPF_JNE >> 4] = BPF_JNE, 11534 [BPF_JSET >> 4] = BPF_JSET, 11535 /* these swap "lesser" and "greater" (L and G in the opcodes) */ 11536 [BPF_JGE >> 4] = BPF_JLE, 11537 [BPF_JGT >> 4] = BPF_JLT, 11538 [BPF_JLE >> 4] = BPF_JGE, 11539 [BPF_JLT >> 4] = BPF_JGT, 11540 [BPF_JSGE >> 4] = BPF_JSLE, 11541 [BPF_JSGT >> 4] = BPF_JSLT, 11542 [BPF_JSLE >> 4] = BPF_JSGE, 11543 [BPF_JSLT >> 4] = BPF_JSGT 11544 }; 11545 return opcode_flip[opcode >> 4]; 11546 } 11547 11548 static int is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 11549 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg, 11550 u8 opcode) 11551 { 11552 struct bpf_reg_state *pkt; 11553 11554 if (src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) { 11555 pkt = dst_reg; 11556 } else if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) { 11557 pkt = src_reg; 11558 opcode = flip_opcode(opcode); 11559 } else { 11560 return -1; 11561 } 11562 11563 if (pkt->range >= 0) 11564 return -1; 11565 11566 switch (opcode) { 11567 case BPF_JLE: 11568 /* pkt <= pkt_end */ 11569 fallthrough; 11570 case BPF_JGT: 11571 /* pkt > pkt_end */ 11572 if (pkt->range == BEYOND_PKT_END) 11573 /* pkt has at last one extra byte beyond pkt_end */ 11574 return opcode == BPF_JGT; 11575 break; 11576 case BPF_JLT: 11577 /* pkt < pkt_end */ 11578 fallthrough; 11579 case BPF_JGE: 11580 /* pkt >= pkt_end */ 11581 if (pkt->range == BEYOND_PKT_END || pkt->range == AT_PKT_END) 11582 return opcode == BPF_JGE; 11583 break; 11584 } 11585 return -1; 11586 } 11587 11588 /* Adjusts the register min/max values in the case that the dst_reg is the 11589 * variable register that we are working on, and src_reg is a constant or we're 11590 * simply doing a BPF_K check. 11591 * In JEQ/JNE cases we also adjust the var_off values. 11592 */ 11593 static void reg_set_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg, 11594 struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg, 11595 u64 val, u32 val32, 11596 u8 opcode, bool is_jmp32) 11597 { 11598 struct tnum false_32off = tnum_subreg(false_reg->var_off); 11599 struct tnum false_64off = false_reg->var_off; 11600 struct tnum true_32off = tnum_subreg(true_reg->var_off); 11601 struct tnum true_64off = true_reg->var_off; 11602 s64 sval = (s64)val; 11603 s32 sval32 = (s32)val32; 11604 11605 /* If the dst_reg is a pointer, we can't learn anything about its 11606 * variable offset from the compare (unless src_reg were a pointer into 11607 * the same object, but we don't bother with that. 11608 * Since false_reg and true_reg have the same type by construction, we 11609 * only need to check one of them for pointerness. 11610 */ 11611 if (__is_pointer_value(false, false_reg)) 11612 return; 11613 11614 switch (opcode) { 11615 /* JEQ/JNE comparison doesn't change the register equivalence. 11616 * 11617 * r1 = r2; 11618 * if (r1 == 42) goto label; 11619 * ... 11620 * label: // here both r1 and r2 are known to be 42. 11621 * 11622 * Hence when marking register as known preserve it's ID. 11623 */ 11624 case BPF_JEQ: 11625 if (is_jmp32) { 11626 __mark_reg32_known(true_reg, val32); 11627 true_32off = tnum_subreg(true_reg->var_off); 11628 } else { 11629 ___mark_reg_known(true_reg, val); 11630 true_64off = true_reg->var_off; 11631 } 11632 break; 11633 case BPF_JNE: 11634 if (is_jmp32) { 11635 __mark_reg32_known(false_reg, val32); 11636 false_32off = tnum_subreg(false_reg->var_off); 11637 } else { 11638 ___mark_reg_known(false_reg, val); 11639 false_64off = false_reg->var_off; 11640 } 11641 break; 11642 case BPF_JSET: 11643 if (is_jmp32) { 11644 false_32off = tnum_and(false_32off, tnum_const(~val32)); 11645 if (is_power_of_2(val32)) 11646 true_32off = tnum_or(true_32off, 11647 tnum_const(val32)); 11648 } else { 11649 false_64off = tnum_and(false_64off, tnum_const(~val)); 11650 if (is_power_of_2(val)) 11651 true_64off = tnum_or(true_64off, 11652 tnum_const(val)); 11653 } 11654 break; 11655 case BPF_JGE: 11656 case BPF_JGT: 11657 { 11658 if (is_jmp32) { 11659 u32 false_umax = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val32 : val32 - 1; 11660 u32 true_umin = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val32 + 1 : val32; 11661 11662 false_reg->u32_max_value = min(false_reg->u32_max_value, 11663 false_umax); 11664 true_reg->u32_min_value = max(true_reg->u32_min_value, 11665 true_umin); 11666 } else { 11667 u64 false_umax = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val : val - 1; 11668 u64 true_umin = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val + 1 : val; 11669 11670 false_reg->umax_value = min(false_reg->umax_value, false_umax); 11671 true_reg->umin_value = max(true_reg->umin_value, true_umin); 11672 } 11673 break; 11674 } 11675 case BPF_JSGE: 11676 case BPF_JSGT: 11677 { 11678 if (is_jmp32) { 11679 s32 false_smax = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval32 : sval32 - 1; 11680 s32 true_smin = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval32 + 1 : sval32; 11681 11682 false_reg->s32_max_value = min(false_reg->s32_max_value, false_smax); 11683 true_reg->s32_min_value = max(true_reg->s32_min_value, true_smin); 11684 } else { 11685 s64 false_smax = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval : sval - 1; 11686 s64 true_smin = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval + 1 : sval; 11687 11688 false_reg->smax_value = min(false_reg->smax_value, false_smax); 11689 true_reg->smin_value = max(true_reg->smin_value, true_smin); 11690 } 11691 break; 11692 } 11693 case BPF_JLE: 11694 case BPF_JLT: 11695 { 11696 if (is_jmp32) { 11697 u32 false_umin = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val32 : val32 + 1; 11698 u32 true_umax = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val32 - 1 : val32; 11699 11700 false_reg->u32_min_value = max(false_reg->u32_min_value, 11701 false_umin); 11702 true_reg->u32_max_value = min(true_reg->u32_max_value, 11703 true_umax); 11704 } else { 11705 u64 false_umin = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val : val + 1; 11706 u64 true_umax = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val - 1 : val; 11707 11708 false_reg->umin_value = max(false_reg->umin_value, false_umin); 11709 true_reg->umax_value = min(true_reg->umax_value, true_umax); 11710 } 11711 break; 11712 } 11713 case BPF_JSLE: 11714 case BPF_JSLT: 11715 { 11716 if (is_jmp32) { 11717 s32 false_smin = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval32 : sval32 + 1; 11718 s32 true_smax = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval32 - 1 : sval32; 11719 11720 false_reg->s32_min_value = max(false_reg->s32_min_value, false_smin); 11721 true_reg->s32_max_value = min(true_reg->s32_max_value, true_smax); 11722 } else { 11723 s64 false_smin = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval : sval + 1; 11724 s64 true_smax = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval - 1 : sval; 11725 11726 false_reg->smin_value = max(false_reg->smin_value, false_smin); 11727 true_reg->smax_value = min(true_reg->smax_value, true_smax); 11728 } 11729 break; 11730 } 11731 default: 11732 return; 11733 } 11734 11735 if (is_jmp32) { 11736 false_reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(false_64off), 11737 tnum_subreg(false_32off)); 11738 true_reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(true_64off), 11739 tnum_subreg(true_32off)); 11740 __reg_combine_32_into_64(false_reg); 11741 __reg_combine_32_into_64(true_reg); 11742 } else { 11743 false_reg->var_off = false_64off; 11744 true_reg->var_off = true_64off; 11745 __reg_combine_64_into_32(false_reg); 11746 __reg_combine_64_into_32(true_reg); 11747 } 11748 } 11749 11750 /* Same as above, but for the case that dst_reg holds a constant and src_reg is 11751 * the variable reg. 11752 */ 11753 static void reg_set_min_max_inv(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg, 11754 struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg, 11755 u64 val, u32 val32, 11756 u8 opcode, bool is_jmp32) 11757 { 11758 opcode = flip_opcode(opcode); 11759 /* This uses zero as "not present in table"; luckily the zero opcode, 11760 * BPF_JA, can't get here. 11761 */ 11762 if (opcode) 11763 reg_set_min_max(true_reg, false_reg, val, val32, opcode, is_jmp32); 11764 } 11765 11766 /* Regs are known to be equal, so intersect their min/max/var_off */ 11767 static void __reg_combine_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg, 11768 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg) 11769 { 11770 src_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->umin_value = max(src_reg->umin_value, 11771 dst_reg->umin_value); 11772 src_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->umax_value = min(src_reg->umax_value, 11773 dst_reg->umax_value); 11774 src_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->smin_value = max(src_reg->smin_value, 11775 dst_reg->smin_value); 11776 src_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->smax_value = min(src_reg->smax_value, 11777 dst_reg->smax_value); 11778 src_reg->var_off = dst_reg->var_off = tnum_intersect(src_reg->var_off, 11779 dst_reg->var_off); 11780 reg_bounds_sync(src_reg); 11781 reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg); 11782 } 11783 11784 static void reg_combine_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *true_src, 11785 struct bpf_reg_state *true_dst, 11786 struct bpf_reg_state *false_src, 11787 struct bpf_reg_state *false_dst, 11788 u8 opcode) 11789 { 11790 switch (opcode) { 11791 case BPF_JEQ: 11792 __reg_combine_min_max(true_src, true_dst); 11793 break; 11794 case BPF_JNE: 11795 __reg_combine_min_max(false_src, false_dst); 11796 break; 11797 } 11798 } 11799 11800 static void mark_ptr_or_null_reg(struct bpf_func_state *state, 11801 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 id, 11802 bool is_null) 11803 { 11804 if (type_may_be_null(reg->type) && reg->id == id && 11805 (is_rcu_reg(reg) || !WARN_ON_ONCE(!reg->id))) { 11806 /* Old offset (both fixed and variable parts) should have been 11807 * known-zero, because we don't allow pointer arithmetic on 11808 * pointers that might be NULL. If we see this happening, don't 11809 * convert the register. 11810 * 11811 * But in some cases, some helpers that return local kptrs 11812 * advance offset for the returned pointer. In those cases, it 11813 * is fine to expect to see reg->off. 11814 */ 11815 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(reg->smin_value || reg->smax_value || !tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0))) 11816 return; 11817 if (reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_MAYBE_NULL) && WARN_ON_ONCE(reg->off)) 11818 return; 11819 if (is_null) { 11820 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 11821 /* We don't need id and ref_obj_id from this point 11822 * onwards anymore, thus we should better reset it, 11823 * so that state pruning has chances to take effect. 11824 */ 11825 reg->id = 0; 11826 reg->ref_obj_id = 0; 11827 11828 return; 11829 } 11830 11831 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(reg); 11832 11833 if (!reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(reg)) { 11834 /* For not-NULL ptr, reg->ref_obj_id will be reset 11835 * in release_reference(). 11836 * 11837 * reg->id is still used by spin_lock ptr. Other 11838 * than spin_lock ptr type, reg->id can be reset. 11839 */ 11840 reg->id = 0; 11841 } 11842 } 11843 } 11844 11845 /* The logic is similar to find_good_pkt_pointers(), both could eventually 11846 * be folded together at some point. 11847 */ 11848 static void mark_ptr_or_null_regs(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, u32 regno, 11849 bool is_null) 11850 { 11851 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 11852 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg; 11853 u32 ref_obj_id = regs[regno].ref_obj_id; 11854 u32 id = regs[regno].id; 11855 11856 if (ref_obj_id && ref_obj_id == id && is_null) 11857 /* regs[regno] is in the " == NULL" branch. 11858 * No one could have freed the reference state before 11859 * doing the NULL check. 11860 */ 11861 WARN_ON_ONCE(release_reference_state(state, id)); 11862 11863 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(vstate, state, reg, ({ 11864 mark_ptr_or_null_reg(state, reg, id, is_null); 11865 })); 11866 } 11867 11868 static bool try_match_pkt_pointers(const struct bpf_insn *insn, 11869 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 11870 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg, 11871 struct bpf_verifier_state *this_branch, 11872 struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch) 11873 { 11874 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_X) 11875 return false; 11876 11877 /* Pointers are always 64-bit. */ 11878 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP32) 11879 return false; 11880 11881 switch (BPF_OP(insn->code)) { 11882 case BPF_JGT: 11883 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 11884 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || 11885 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 11886 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { 11887 /* pkt_data' > pkt_end, pkt_meta' > pkt_data */ 11888 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg, 11889 dst_reg->type, false); 11890 mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, true); 11891 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 11892 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || 11893 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 11894 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { 11895 /* pkt_end > pkt_data', pkt_data > pkt_meta' */ 11896 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, src_reg, 11897 src_reg->type, true); 11898 mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->src_reg, false); 11899 } else { 11900 return false; 11901 } 11902 break; 11903 case BPF_JLT: 11904 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 11905 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || 11906 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 11907 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { 11908 /* pkt_data' < pkt_end, pkt_meta' < pkt_data */ 11909 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg, 11910 dst_reg->type, true); 11911 mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, false); 11912 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 11913 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || 11914 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 11915 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { 11916 /* pkt_end < pkt_data', pkt_data > pkt_meta' */ 11917 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, src_reg, 11918 src_reg->type, false); 11919 mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->src_reg, true); 11920 } else { 11921 return false; 11922 } 11923 break; 11924 case BPF_JGE: 11925 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 11926 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || 11927 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 11928 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { 11929 /* pkt_data' >= pkt_end, pkt_meta' >= pkt_data */ 11930 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg, 11931 dst_reg->type, true); 11932 mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, false); 11933 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 11934 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || 11935 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 11936 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { 11937 /* pkt_end >= pkt_data', pkt_data >= pkt_meta' */ 11938 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, src_reg, 11939 src_reg->type, false); 11940 mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->src_reg, true); 11941 } else { 11942 return false; 11943 } 11944 break; 11945 case BPF_JLE: 11946 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 11947 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || 11948 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 11949 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { 11950 /* pkt_data' <= pkt_end, pkt_meta' <= pkt_data */ 11951 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg, 11952 dst_reg->type, false); 11953 mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, true); 11954 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 11955 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || 11956 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 11957 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { 11958 /* pkt_end <= pkt_data', pkt_data <= pkt_meta' */ 11959 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, src_reg, 11960 src_reg->type, true); 11961 mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->src_reg, false); 11962 } else { 11963 return false; 11964 } 11965 break; 11966 default: 11967 return false; 11968 } 11969 11970 return true; 11971 } 11972 11973 static void find_equal_scalars(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, 11974 struct bpf_reg_state *known_reg) 11975 { 11976 struct bpf_func_state *state; 11977 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 11978 11979 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(vstate, state, reg, ({ 11980 if (reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->id == known_reg->id) 11981 *reg = *known_reg; 11982 })); 11983 } 11984 11985 static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11986 struct bpf_insn *insn, int *insn_idx) 11987 { 11988 struct bpf_verifier_state *this_branch = env->cur_state; 11989 struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch; 11990 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]->regs; 11991 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, *other_branch_regs, *src_reg = NULL; 11992 struct bpf_reg_state *eq_branch_regs; 11993 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 11994 bool is_jmp32; 11995 int pred = -1; 11996 int err; 11997 11998 /* Only conditional jumps are expected to reach here. */ 11999 if (opcode == BPF_JA || opcode > BPF_JSLE) { 12000 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_JMP/JMP32 opcode %x\n", opcode); 12001 return -EINVAL; 12002 } 12003 12004 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 12005 if (insn->imm != 0) { 12006 verbose(env, "BPF_JMP/JMP32 uses reserved fields\n"); 12007 return -EINVAL; 12008 } 12009 12010 /* check src1 operand */ 12011 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 12012 if (err) 12013 return err; 12014 12015 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { 12016 verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n", 12017 insn->src_reg); 12018 return -EACCES; 12019 } 12020 src_reg = ®s[insn->src_reg]; 12021 } else { 12022 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) { 12023 verbose(env, "BPF_JMP/JMP32 uses reserved fields\n"); 12024 return -EINVAL; 12025 } 12026 } 12027 12028 /* check src2 operand */ 12029 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 12030 if (err) 12031 return err; 12032 12033 dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg]; 12034 is_jmp32 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP32; 12035 12036 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) { 12037 pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, insn->imm, opcode, is_jmp32); 12038 } else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && 12039 is_jmp32 && tnum_is_const(tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off))) { 12040 pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, 12041 tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off).value, 12042 opcode, 12043 is_jmp32); 12044 } else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && 12045 !is_jmp32 && tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off)) { 12046 pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, 12047 src_reg->var_off.value, 12048 opcode, 12049 is_jmp32); 12050 } else if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(dst_reg) && 12051 reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(src_reg) && 12052 !is_jmp32) { 12053 pred = is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken(dst_reg, src_reg, opcode); 12054 } 12055 12056 if (pred >= 0) { 12057 /* If we get here with a dst_reg pointer type it is because 12058 * above is_branch_taken() special cased the 0 comparison. 12059 */ 12060 if (!__is_pointer_value(false, dst_reg)) 12061 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->dst_reg); 12062 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && !err && 12063 !__is_pointer_value(false, src_reg)) 12064 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg); 12065 if (err) 12066 return err; 12067 } 12068 12069 if (pred == 1) { 12070 /* Only follow the goto, ignore fall-through. If needed, push 12071 * the fall-through branch for simulation under speculative 12072 * execution. 12073 */ 12074 if (!env->bypass_spec_v1 && 12075 !sanitize_speculative_path(env, insn, *insn_idx + 1, 12076 *insn_idx)) 12077 return -EFAULT; 12078 *insn_idx += insn->off; 12079 return 0; 12080 } else if (pred == 0) { 12081 /* Only follow the fall-through branch, since that's where the 12082 * program will go. If needed, push the goto branch for 12083 * simulation under speculative execution. 12084 */ 12085 if (!env->bypass_spec_v1 && 12086 !sanitize_speculative_path(env, insn, 12087 *insn_idx + insn->off + 1, 12088 *insn_idx)) 12089 return -EFAULT; 12090 return 0; 12091 } 12092 12093 other_branch = push_stack(env, *insn_idx + insn->off + 1, *insn_idx, 12094 false); 12095 if (!other_branch) 12096 return -EFAULT; 12097 other_branch_regs = other_branch->frame[other_branch->curframe]->regs; 12098 12099 /* detect if we are comparing against a constant value so we can adjust 12100 * our min/max values for our dst register. 12101 * this is only legit if both are scalars (or pointers to the same 12102 * object, I suppose, see the PTR_MAYBE_NULL related if block below), 12103 * because otherwise the different base pointers mean the offsets aren't 12104 * comparable. 12105 */ 12106 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 12107 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg = ®s[insn->src_reg]; 12108 12109 if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && 12110 src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 12111 if (tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off) || 12112 (is_jmp32 && 12113 tnum_is_const(tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off)))) 12114 reg_set_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg], 12115 dst_reg, 12116 src_reg->var_off.value, 12117 tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off).value, 12118 opcode, is_jmp32); 12119 else if (tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off) || 12120 (is_jmp32 && 12121 tnum_is_const(tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off)))) 12122 reg_set_min_max_inv(&other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg], 12123 src_reg, 12124 dst_reg->var_off.value, 12125 tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off).value, 12126 opcode, is_jmp32); 12127 else if (!is_jmp32 && 12128 (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE)) 12129 /* Comparing for equality, we can combine knowledge */ 12130 reg_combine_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg], 12131 &other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg], 12132 src_reg, dst_reg, opcode); 12133 if (src_reg->id && 12134 !WARN_ON_ONCE(src_reg->id != other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg].id)) { 12135 find_equal_scalars(this_branch, src_reg); 12136 find_equal_scalars(other_branch, &other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg]); 12137 } 12138 12139 } 12140 } else if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 12141 reg_set_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg], 12142 dst_reg, insn->imm, (u32)insn->imm, 12143 opcode, is_jmp32); 12144 } 12145 12146 if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && dst_reg->id && 12147 !WARN_ON_ONCE(dst_reg->id != other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg].id)) { 12148 find_equal_scalars(this_branch, dst_reg); 12149 find_equal_scalars(other_branch, &other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg]); 12150 } 12151 12152 /* if one pointer register is compared to another pointer 12153 * register check if PTR_MAYBE_NULL could be lifted. 12154 * E.g. register A - maybe null 12155 * register B - not null 12156 * for JNE A, B, ... - A is not null in the false branch; 12157 * for JEQ A, B, ... - A is not null in the true branch. 12158 * 12159 * Since PTR_TO_BTF_ID points to a kernel struct that does 12160 * not need to be null checked by the BPF program, i.e., 12161 * could be null even without PTR_MAYBE_NULL marking, so 12162 * only propagate nullness when neither reg is that type. 12163 */ 12164 if (!is_jmp32 && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && 12165 __is_pointer_value(false, src_reg) && __is_pointer_value(false, dst_reg) && 12166 type_may_be_null(src_reg->type) != type_may_be_null(dst_reg->type) && 12167 base_type(src_reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID && 12168 base_type(dst_reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 12169 eq_branch_regs = NULL; 12170 switch (opcode) { 12171 case BPF_JEQ: 12172 eq_branch_regs = other_branch_regs; 12173 break; 12174 case BPF_JNE: 12175 eq_branch_regs = regs; 12176 break; 12177 default: 12178 /* do nothing */ 12179 break; 12180 } 12181 if (eq_branch_regs) { 12182 if (type_may_be_null(src_reg->type)) 12183 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(&eq_branch_regs[insn->src_reg]); 12184 else 12185 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(&eq_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg]); 12186 } 12187 } 12188 12189 /* detect if R == 0 where R is returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem(). 12190 * NOTE: these optimizations below are related with pointer comparison 12191 * which will never be JMP32. 12192 */ 12193 if (!is_jmp32 && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && 12194 insn->imm == 0 && (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE) && 12195 type_may_be_null(dst_reg->type)) { 12196 /* Mark all identical registers in each branch as either 12197 * safe or unknown depending R == 0 or R != 0 conditional. 12198 */ 12199 mark_ptr_or_null_regs(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, 12200 opcode == BPF_JNE); 12201 mark_ptr_or_null_regs(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, 12202 opcode == BPF_JEQ); 12203 } else if (!try_match_pkt_pointers(insn, dst_reg, ®s[insn->src_reg], 12204 this_branch, other_branch) && 12205 is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) { 12206 verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n", 12207 insn->dst_reg); 12208 return -EACCES; 12209 } 12210 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) 12211 print_insn_state(env, this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]); 12212 return 0; 12213 } 12214 12215 /* verify BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */ 12216 static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 12217 { 12218 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env); 12219 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 12220 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg; 12221 struct bpf_map *map; 12222 int err; 12223 12224 if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) { 12225 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD_IMM insn\n"); 12226 return -EINVAL; 12227 } 12228 if (insn->off != 0) { 12229 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_IMM64 uses reserved fields\n"); 12230 return -EINVAL; 12231 } 12232 12233 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP); 12234 if (err) 12235 return err; 12236 12237 dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg]; 12238 if (insn->src_reg == 0) { 12239 u64 imm = ((u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32) | (u32)insn->imm; 12240 12241 dst_reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 12242 __mark_reg_known(®s[insn->dst_reg], imm); 12243 return 0; 12244 } 12245 12246 /* All special src_reg cases are listed below. From this point onwards 12247 * we either succeed and assign a corresponding dst_reg->type after 12248 * zeroing the offset, or fail and reject the program. 12249 */ 12250 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 12251 12252 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_BTF_ID) { 12253 dst_reg->type = aux->btf_var.reg_type; 12254 switch (base_type(dst_reg->type)) { 12255 case PTR_TO_MEM: 12256 dst_reg->mem_size = aux->btf_var.mem_size; 12257 break; 12258 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 12259 dst_reg->btf = aux->btf_var.btf; 12260 dst_reg->btf_id = aux->btf_var.btf_id; 12261 break; 12262 default: 12263 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 12264 return -EFAULT; 12265 } 12266 return 0; 12267 } 12268 12269 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) { 12270 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 12271 u32 subprogno = find_subprog(env, 12272 env->insn_idx + insn->imm + 1); 12273 12274 if (!aux->func_info) { 12275 verbose(env, "missing btf func_info\n"); 12276 return -EINVAL; 12277 } 12278 if (aux->func_info_aux[subprogno].linkage != BTF_FUNC_STATIC) { 12279 verbose(env, "callback function not static\n"); 12280 return -EINVAL; 12281 } 12282 12283 dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_FUNC; 12284 dst_reg->subprogno = subprogno; 12285 return 0; 12286 } 12287 12288 map = env->used_maps[aux->map_index]; 12289 dst_reg->map_ptr = map; 12290 12291 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE || 12292 insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE) { 12293 dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 12294 dst_reg->off = aux->map_off; 12295 WARN_ON_ONCE(map->max_entries != 1); 12296 /* We want reg->id to be same (0) as map_value is not distinct */ 12297 } else if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD || 12298 insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX) { 12299 dst_reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; 12300 } else { 12301 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 12302 return -EINVAL; 12303 } 12304 12305 return 0; 12306 } 12307 12308 static bool may_access_skb(enum bpf_prog_type type) 12309 { 12310 switch (type) { 12311 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER: 12312 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: 12313 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT: 12314 return true; 12315 default: 12316 return false; 12317 } 12318 } 12319 12320 /* verify safety of LD_ABS|LD_IND instructions: 12321 * - they can only appear in the programs where ctx == skb 12322 * - since they are wrappers of function calls, they scratch R1-R5 registers, 12323 * preserve R6-R9, and store return value into R0 12324 * 12325 * Implicit input: 12326 * ctx == skb == R6 == CTX 12327 * 12328 * Explicit input: 12329 * SRC == any register 12330 * IMM == 32-bit immediate 12331 * 12332 * Output: 12333 * R0 - 8/16/32-bit skb data converted to cpu endianness 12334 */ 12335 static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 12336 { 12337 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 12338 static const int ctx_reg = BPF_REG_6; 12339 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); 12340 int i, err; 12341 12342 if (!may_access_skb(resolve_prog_type(env->prog))) { 12343 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] instructions not allowed for this program type\n"); 12344 return -EINVAL; 12345 } 12346 12347 if (!env->ops->gen_ld_abs) { 12348 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 12349 return -EINVAL; 12350 } 12351 12352 if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 || 12353 BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW || 12354 (mode == BPF_ABS && insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0)) { 12355 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] uses reserved fields\n"); 12356 return -EINVAL; 12357 } 12358 12359 /* check whether implicit source operand (register R6) is readable */ 12360 err = check_reg_arg(env, ctx_reg, SRC_OP); 12361 if (err) 12362 return err; 12363 12364 /* Disallow usage of BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] with reference tracking, as 12365 * gen_ld_abs() may terminate the program at runtime, leading to 12366 * reference leak. 12367 */ 12368 err = check_reference_leak(env); 12369 if (err) { 12370 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] cannot be mixed with socket references\n"); 12371 return err; 12372 } 12373 12374 if (env->cur_state->active_lock.ptr) { 12375 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] cannot be used inside bpf_spin_lock-ed region\n"); 12376 return -EINVAL; 12377 } 12378 12379 if (env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock) { 12380 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] cannot be used inside bpf_rcu_read_lock-ed region\n"); 12381 return -EINVAL; 12382 } 12383 12384 if (regs[ctx_reg].type != PTR_TO_CTX) { 12385 verbose(env, 12386 "at the time of BPF_LD_ABS|IND R6 != pointer to skb\n"); 12387 return -EINVAL; 12388 } 12389 12390 if (mode == BPF_IND) { 12391 /* check explicit source operand */ 12392 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 12393 if (err) 12394 return err; 12395 } 12396 12397 err = check_ptr_off_reg(env, ®s[ctx_reg], ctx_reg); 12398 if (err < 0) 12399 return err; 12400 12401 /* reset caller saved regs to unreadable */ 12402 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { 12403 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); 12404 check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); 12405 } 12406 12407 /* mark destination R0 register as readable, since it contains 12408 * the value fetched from the packet. 12409 * Already marked as written above. 12410 */ 12411 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 12412 /* ld_abs load up to 32-bit skb data. */ 12413 regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1; 12414 return 0; 12415 } 12416 12417 static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 12418 { 12419 struct tnum enforce_attach_type_range = tnum_unknown; 12420 const struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 12421 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 12422 struct tnum range = tnum_range(0, 1); 12423 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 12424 int err; 12425 struct bpf_func_state *frame = env->cur_state->frame[0]; 12426 const bool is_subprog = frame->subprogno; 12427 12428 /* LSM and struct_ops func-ptr's return type could be "void" */ 12429 if (!is_subprog) { 12430 switch (prog_type) { 12431 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: 12432 if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_LSM_CGROUP) 12433 /* See below, can be 0 or 0-1 depending on hook. */ 12434 break; 12435 fallthrough; 12436 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS: 12437 if (!prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) 12438 return 0; 12439 break; 12440 default: 12441 break; 12442 } 12443 } 12444 12445 /* eBPF calling convention is such that R0 is used 12446 * to return the value from eBPF program. 12447 * Make sure that it's readable at this time 12448 * of bpf_exit, which means that program wrote 12449 * something into it earlier 12450 */ 12451 err = check_reg_arg(env, BPF_REG_0, SRC_OP); 12452 if (err) 12453 return err; 12454 12455 if (is_pointer_value(env, BPF_REG_0)) { 12456 verbose(env, "R0 leaks addr as return value\n"); 12457 return -EACCES; 12458 } 12459 12460 reg = cur_regs(env) + BPF_REG_0; 12461 12462 if (frame->in_async_callback_fn) { 12463 /* enforce return zero from async callbacks like timer */ 12464 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 12465 verbose(env, "In async callback the register R0 is not a known value (%s)\n", 12466 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 12467 return -EINVAL; 12468 } 12469 12470 if (!tnum_in(tnum_const(0), reg->var_off)) { 12471 verbose_invalid_scalar(env, reg, &range, "async callback", "R0"); 12472 return -EINVAL; 12473 } 12474 return 0; 12475 } 12476 12477 if (is_subprog) { 12478 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 12479 verbose(env, "At subprogram exit the register R0 is not a scalar value (%s)\n", 12480 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 12481 return -EINVAL; 12482 } 12483 return 0; 12484 } 12485 12486 switch (prog_type) { 12487 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR: 12488 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UDP4_RECVMSG || 12489 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UDP6_RECVMSG || 12490 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETPEERNAME || 12491 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETPEERNAME || 12492 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETSOCKNAME || 12493 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETSOCKNAME) 12494 range = tnum_range(1, 1); 12495 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_BIND || 12496 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_BIND) 12497 range = tnum_range(0, 3); 12498 break; 12499 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB: 12500 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET_EGRESS) { 12501 range = tnum_range(0, 3); 12502 enforce_attach_type_range = tnum_range(2, 3); 12503 } 12504 break; 12505 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK: 12506 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS: 12507 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_DEVICE: 12508 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SYSCTL: 12509 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT: 12510 break; 12511 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT: 12512 if (!env->prog->aux->attach_btf_id) 12513 return 0; 12514 range = tnum_const(0); 12515 break; 12516 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: 12517 switch (env->prog->expected_attach_type) { 12518 case BPF_TRACE_FENTRY: 12519 case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT: 12520 range = tnum_const(0); 12521 break; 12522 case BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP: 12523 case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN: 12524 return 0; 12525 case BPF_TRACE_ITER: 12526 break; 12527 default: 12528 return -ENOTSUPP; 12529 } 12530 break; 12531 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP: 12532 range = tnum_range(SK_DROP, SK_PASS); 12533 break; 12534 12535 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: 12536 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type != BPF_LSM_CGROUP) { 12537 /* Regular BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM programs can return 12538 * any value. 12539 */ 12540 return 0; 12541 } 12542 if (!env->prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) { 12543 /* Make sure programs that attach to void 12544 * hooks don't try to modify return value. 12545 */ 12546 range = tnum_range(1, 1); 12547 } 12548 break; 12549 12550 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT: 12551 /* freplace program can return anything as its return value 12552 * depends on the to-be-replaced kernel func or bpf program. 12553 */ 12554 default: 12555 return 0; 12556 } 12557 12558 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 12559 verbose(env, "At program exit the register R0 is not a known value (%s)\n", 12560 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 12561 return -EINVAL; 12562 } 12563 12564 if (!tnum_in(range, reg->var_off)) { 12565 verbose_invalid_scalar(env, reg, &range, "program exit", "R0"); 12566 if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_LSM_CGROUP && 12567 prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM && 12568 !prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) 12569 verbose(env, "Note, BPF_LSM_CGROUP that attach to void LSM hooks can't modify return value!\n"); 12570 return -EINVAL; 12571 } 12572 12573 if (!tnum_is_unknown(enforce_attach_type_range) && 12574 tnum_in(enforce_attach_type_range, reg->var_off)) 12575 env->prog->enforce_expected_attach_type = 1; 12576 return 0; 12577 } 12578 12579 /* non-recursive DFS pseudo code 12580 * 1 procedure DFS-iterative(G,v): 12581 * 2 label v as discovered 12582 * 3 let S be a stack 12583 * 4 S.push(v) 12584 * 5 while S is not empty 12585 * 6 t <- S.peek() 12586 * 7 if t is what we're looking for: 12587 * 8 return t 12588 * 9 for all edges e in G.adjacentEdges(t) do 12589 * 10 if edge e is already labelled 12590 * 11 continue with the next edge 12591 * 12 w <- G.adjacentVertex(t,e) 12592 * 13 if vertex w is not discovered and not explored 12593 * 14 label e as tree-edge 12594 * 15 label w as discovered 12595 * 16 S.push(w) 12596 * 17 continue at 5 12597 * 18 else if vertex w is discovered 12598 * 19 label e as back-edge 12599 * 20 else 12600 * 21 // vertex w is explored 12601 * 22 label e as forward- or cross-edge 12602 * 23 label t as explored 12603 * 24 S.pop() 12604 * 12605 * convention: 12606 * 0x10 - discovered 12607 * 0x11 - discovered and fall-through edge labelled 12608 * 0x12 - discovered and fall-through and branch edges labelled 12609 * 0x20 - explored 12610 */ 12611 12612 enum { 12613 DISCOVERED = 0x10, 12614 EXPLORED = 0x20, 12615 FALLTHROUGH = 1, 12616 BRANCH = 2, 12617 }; 12618 12619 static u32 state_htab_size(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 12620 { 12621 return env->prog->len; 12622 } 12623 12624 static struct bpf_verifier_state_list **explored_state( 12625 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12626 int idx) 12627 { 12628 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 12629 struct bpf_func_state *state = cur->frame[cur->curframe]; 12630 12631 return &env->explored_states[(idx ^ state->callsite) % state_htab_size(env)]; 12632 } 12633 12634 static void mark_prune_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx) 12635 { 12636 env->insn_aux_data[idx].prune_point = true; 12637 } 12638 12639 static bool is_prune_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 12640 { 12641 return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].prune_point; 12642 } 12643 12644 enum { 12645 DONE_EXPLORING = 0, 12646 KEEP_EXPLORING = 1, 12647 }; 12648 12649 /* t, w, e - match pseudo-code above: 12650 * t - index of current instruction 12651 * w - next instruction 12652 * e - edge 12653 */ 12654 static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12655 bool loop_ok) 12656 { 12657 int *insn_stack = env->cfg.insn_stack; 12658 int *insn_state = env->cfg.insn_state; 12659 12660 if (e == FALLTHROUGH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | FALLTHROUGH)) 12661 return DONE_EXPLORING; 12662 12663 if (e == BRANCH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | BRANCH)) 12664 return DONE_EXPLORING; 12665 12666 if (w < 0 || w >= env->prog->len) { 12667 verbose_linfo(env, t, "%d: ", t); 12668 verbose(env, "jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", t, w); 12669 return -EINVAL; 12670 } 12671 12672 if (e == BRANCH) { 12673 /* mark branch target for state pruning */ 12674 mark_prune_point(env, w); 12675 mark_jmp_point(env, w); 12676 } 12677 12678 if (insn_state[w] == 0) { 12679 /* tree-edge */ 12680 insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e; 12681 insn_state[w] = DISCOVERED; 12682 if (env->cfg.cur_stack >= env->prog->len) 12683 return -E2BIG; 12684 insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack++] = w; 12685 return KEEP_EXPLORING; 12686 } else if ((insn_state[w] & 0xF0) == DISCOVERED) { 12687 if (loop_ok && env->bpf_capable) 12688 return DONE_EXPLORING; 12689 verbose_linfo(env, t, "%d: ", t); 12690 verbose_linfo(env, w, "%d: ", w); 12691 verbose(env, "back-edge from insn %d to %d\n", t, w); 12692 return -EINVAL; 12693 } else if (insn_state[w] == EXPLORED) { 12694 /* forward- or cross-edge */ 12695 insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e; 12696 } else { 12697 verbose(env, "insn state internal bug\n"); 12698 return -EFAULT; 12699 } 12700 return DONE_EXPLORING; 12701 } 12702 12703 static int visit_func_call_insn(int t, struct bpf_insn *insns, 12704 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12705 bool visit_callee) 12706 { 12707 int ret; 12708 12709 ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, false); 12710 if (ret) 12711 return ret; 12712 12713 mark_prune_point(env, t + 1); 12714 /* when we exit from subprog, we need to record non-linear history */ 12715 mark_jmp_point(env, t + 1); 12716 12717 if (visit_callee) { 12718 mark_prune_point(env, t); 12719 ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].imm + 1, BRANCH, env, 12720 /* It's ok to allow recursion from CFG point of 12721 * view. __check_func_call() will do the actual 12722 * check. 12723 */ 12724 bpf_pseudo_func(insns + t)); 12725 } 12726 return ret; 12727 } 12728 12729 /* Visits the instruction at index t and returns one of the following: 12730 * < 0 - an error occurred 12731 * DONE_EXPLORING - the instruction was fully explored 12732 * KEEP_EXPLORING - there is still work to be done before it is fully explored 12733 */ 12734 static int visit_insn(int t, struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 12735 { 12736 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; 12737 int ret; 12738 12739 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insns + t)) 12740 return visit_func_call_insn(t, insns, env, true); 12741 12742 /* All non-branch instructions have a single fall-through edge. */ 12743 if (BPF_CLASS(insns[t].code) != BPF_JMP && 12744 BPF_CLASS(insns[t].code) != BPF_JMP32) 12745 return push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, false); 12746 12747 switch (BPF_OP(insns[t].code)) { 12748 case BPF_EXIT: 12749 return DONE_EXPLORING; 12750 12751 case BPF_CALL: 12752 if (insns[t].imm == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback) 12753 /* Mark this call insn as a prune point to trigger 12754 * is_state_visited() check before call itself is 12755 * processed by __check_func_call(). Otherwise new 12756 * async state will be pushed for further exploration. 12757 */ 12758 mark_prune_point(env, t); 12759 return visit_func_call_insn(t, insns, env, 12760 insns[t].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL); 12761 12762 case BPF_JA: 12763 if (BPF_SRC(insns[t].code) != BPF_K) 12764 return -EINVAL; 12765 12766 /* unconditional jump with single edge */ 12767 ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, 12768 true); 12769 if (ret) 12770 return ret; 12771 12772 mark_prune_point(env, t + insns[t].off + 1); 12773 mark_jmp_point(env, t + insns[t].off + 1); 12774 12775 return ret; 12776 12777 default: 12778 /* conditional jump with two edges */ 12779 mark_prune_point(env, t); 12780 12781 ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, true); 12782 if (ret) 12783 return ret; 12784 12785 return push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1, BRANCH, env, true); 12786 } 12787 } 12788 12789 /* non-recursive depth-first-search to detect loops in BPF program 12790 * loop == back-edge in directed graph 12791 */ 12792 static int check_cfg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 12793 { 12794 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 12795 int *insn_stack, *insn_state; 12796 int ret = 0; 12797 int i; 12798 12799 insn_state = env->cfg.insn_state = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL); 12800 if (!insn_state) 12801 return -ENOMEM; 12802 12803 insn_stack = env->cfg.insn_stack = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL); 12804 if (!insn_stack) { 12805 kvfree(insn_state); 12806 return -ENOMEM; 12807 } 12808 12809 insn_state[0] = DISCOVERED; /* mark 1st insn as discovered */ 12810 insn_stack[0] = 0; /* 0 is the first instruction */ 12811 env->cfg.cur_stack = 1; 12812 12813 while (env->cfg.cur_stack > 0) { 12814 int t = insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack - 1]; 12815 12816 ret = visit_insn(t, env); 12817 switch (ret) { 12818 case DONE_EXPLORING: 12819 insn_state[t] = EXPLORED; 12820 env->cfg.cur_stack--; 12821 break; 12822 case KEEP_EXPLORING: 12823 break; 12824 default: 12825 if (ret > 0) { 12826 verbose(env, "visit_insn internal bug\n"); 12827 ret = -EFAULT; 12828 } 12829 goto err_free; 12830 } 12831 } 12832 12833 if (env->cfg.cur_stack < 0) { 12834 verbose(env, "pop stack internal bug\n"); 12835 ret = -EFAULT; 12836 goto err_free; 12837 } 12838 12839 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 12840 if (insn_state[i] != EXPLORED) { 12841 verbose(env, "unreachable insn %d\n", i); 12842 ret = -EINVAL; 12843 goto err_free; 12844 } 12845 } 12846 ret = 0; /* cfg looks good */ 12847 12848 err_free: 12849 kvfree(insn_state); 12850 kvfree(insn_stack); 12851 env->cfg.insn_state = env->cfg.insn_stack = NULL; 12852 return ret; 12853 } 12854 12855 static int check_abnormal_return(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 12856 { 12857 int i; 12858 12859 for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 12860 if (env->subprog_info[i].has_ld_abs) { 12861 verbose(env, "LD_ABS is not allowed in subprogs without BTF\n"); 12862 return -EINVAL; 12863 } 12864 if (env->subprog_info[i].has_tail_call) { 12865 verbose(env, "tail_call is not allowed in subprogs without BTF\n"); 12866 return -EINVAL; 12867 } 12868 } 12869 return 0; 12870 } 12871 12872 /* The minimum supported BTF func info size */ 12873 #define MIN_BPF_FUNCINFO_SIZE 8 12874 #define MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE 252 12875 12876 static int check_btf_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12877 const union bpf_attr *attr, 12878 bpfptr_t uattr) 12879 { 12880 const struct btf_type *type, *func_proto, *ret_type; 12881 u32 i, nfuncs, urec_size, min_size; 12882 u32 krec_size = sizeof(struct bpf_func_info); 12883 struct bpf_func_info *krecord; 12884 struct bpf_func_info_aux *info_aux = NULL; 12885 struct bpf_prog *prog; 12886 const struct btf *btf; 12887 bpfptr_t urecord; 12888 u32 prev_offset = 0; 12889 bool scalar_return; 12890 int ret = -ENOMEM; 12891 12892 nfuncs = attr->func_info_cnt; 12893 if (!nfuncs) { 12894 if (check_abnormal_return(env)) 12895 return -EINVAL; 12896 return 0; 12897 } 12898 12899 if (nfuncs != env->subprog_cnt) { 12900 verbose(env, "number of funcs in func_info doesn't match number of subprogs\n"); 12901 return -EINVAL; 12902 } 12903 12904 urec_size = attr->func_info_rec_size; 12905 if (urec_size < MIN_BPF_FUNCINFO_SIZE || 12906 urec_size > MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE || 12907 urec_size % sizeof(u32)) { 12908 verbose(env, "invalid func info rec size %u\n", urec_size); 12909 return -EINVAL; 12910 } 12911 12912 prog = env->prog; 12913 btf = prog->aux->btf; 12914 12915 urecord = make_bpfptr(attr->func_info, uattr.is_kernel); 12916 min_size = min_t(u32, krec_size, urec_size); 12917 12918 krecord = kvcalloc(nfuncs, krec_size, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); 12919 if (!krecord) 12920 return -ENOMEM; 12921 info_aux = kcalloc(nfuncs, sizeof(*info_aux), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); 12922 if (!info_aux) 12923 goto err_free; 12924 12925 for (i = 0; i < nfuncs; i++) { 12926 ret = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(urecord, krec_size, urec_size); 12927 if (ret) { 12928 if (ret == -E2BIG) { 12929 verbose(env, "nonzero tailing record in func info"); 12930 /* set the size kernel expects so loader can zero 12931 * out the rest of the record. 12932 */ 12933 if (copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr, 12934 offsetof(union bpf_attr, func_info_rec_size), 12935 &min_size, sizeof(min_size))) 12936 ret = -EFAULT; 12937 } 12938 goto err_free; 12939 } 12940 12941 if (copy_from_bpfptr(&krecord[i], urecord, min_size)) { 12942 ret = -EFAULT; 12943 goto err_free; 12944 } 12945 12946 /* check insn_off */ 12947 ret = -EINVAL; 12948 if (i == 0) { 12949 if (krecord[i].insn_off) { 12950 verbose(env, 12951 "nonzero insn_off %u for the first func info record", 12952 krecord[i].insn_off); 12953 goto err_free; 12954 } 12955 } else if (krecord[i].insn_off <= prev_offset) { 12956 verbose(env, 12957 "same or smaller insn offset (%u) than previous func info record (%u)", 12958 krecord[i].insn_off, prev_offset); 12959 goto err_free; 12960 } 12961 12962 if (env->subprog_info[i].start != krecord[i].insn_off) { 12963 verbose(env, "func_info BTF section doesn't match subprog layout in BPF program\n"); 12964 goto err_free; 12965 } 12966 12967 /* check type_id */ 12968 type = btf_type_by_id(btf, krecord[i].type_id); 12969 if (!type || !btf_type_is_func(type)) { 12970 verbose(env, "invalid type id %d in func info", 12971 krecord[i].type_id); 12972 goto err_free; 12973 } 12974 info_aux[i].linkage = BTF_INFO_VLEN(type->info); 12975 12976 func_proto = btf_type_by_id(btf, type->type); 12977 if (unlikely(!func_proto || !btf_type_is_func_proto(func_proto))) 12978 /* btf_func_check() already verified it during BTF load */ 12979 goto err_free; 12980 ret_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, func_proto->type, NULL); 12981 scalar_return = 12982 btf_type_is_small_int(ret_type) || btf_is_any_enum(ret_type); 12983 if (i && !scalar_return && env->subprog_info[i].has_ld_abs) { 12984 verbose(env, "LD_ABS is only allowed in functions that return 'int'.\n"); 12985 goto err_free; 12986 } 12987 if (i && !scalar_return && env->subprog_info[i].has_tail_call) { 12988 verbose(env, "tail_call is only allowed in functions that return 'int'.\n"); 12989 goto err_free; 12990 } 12991 12992 prev_offset = krecord[i].insn_off; 12993 bpfptr_add(&urecord, urec_size); 12994 } 12995 12996 prog->aux->func_info = krecord; 12997 prog->aux->func_info_cnt = nfuncs; 12998 prog->aux->func_info_aux = info_aux; 12999 return 0; 13000 13001 err_free: 13002 kvfree(krecord); 13003 kfree(info_aux); 13004 return ret; 13005 } 13006 13007 static void adjust_btf_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 13008 { 13009 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 13010 int i; 13011 13012 if (!aux->func_info) 13013 return; 13014 13015 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) 13016 aux->func_info[i].insn_off = env->subprog_info[i].start; 13017 } 13018 13019 #define MIN_BPF_LINEINFO_SIZE offsetofend(struct bpf_line_info, line_col) 13020 #define MAX_LINEINFO_REC_SIZE MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE 13021 13022 static int check_btf_line(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 13023 const union bpf_attr *attr, 13024 bpfptr_t uattr) 13025 { 13026 u32 i, s, nr_linfo, ncopy, expected_size, rec_size, prev_offset = 0; 13027 struct bpf_subprog_info *sub; 13028 struct bpf_line_info *linfo; 13029 struct bpf_prog *prog; 13030 const struct btf *btf; 13031 bpfptr_t ulinfo; 13032 int err; 13033 13034 nr_linfo = attr->line_info_cnt; 13035 if (!nr_linfo) 13036 return 0; 13037 if (nr_linfo > INT_MAX / sizeof(struct bpf_line_info)) 13038 return -EINVAL; 13039 13040 rec_size = attr->line_info_rec_size; 13041 if (rec_size < MIN_BPF_LINEINFO_SIZE || 13042 rec_size > MAX_LINEINFO_REC_SIZE || 13043 rec_size & (sizeof(u32) - 1)) 13044 return -EINVAL; 13045 13046 /* Need to zero it in case the userspace may 13047 * pass in a smaller bpf_line_info object. 13048 */ 13049 linfo = kvcalloc(nr_linfo, sizeof(struct bpf_line_info), 13050 GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); 13051 if (!linfo) 13052 return -ENOMEM; 13053 13054 prog = env->prog; 13055 btf = prog->aux->btf; 13056 13057 s = 0; 13058 sub = env->subprog_info; 13059 ulinfo = make_bpfptr(attr->line_info, uattr.is_kernel); 13060 expected_size = sizeof(struct bpf_line_info); 13061 ncopy = min_t(u32, expected_size, rec_size); 13062 for (i = 0; i < nr_linfo; i++) { 13063 err = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(ulinfo, expected_size, rec_size); 13064 if (err) { 13065 if (err == -E2BIG) { 13066 verbose(env, "nonzero tailing record in line_info"); 13067 if (copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr, 13068 offsetof(union bpf_attr, line_info_rec_size), 13069 &expected_size, sizeof(expected_size))) 13070 err = -EFAULT; 13071 } 13072 goto err_free; 13073 } 13074 13075 if (copy_from_bpfptr(&linfo[i], ulinfo, ncopy)) { 13076 err = -EFAULT; 13077 goto err_free; 13078 } 13079 13080 /* 13081 * Check insn_off to ensure 13082 * 1) strictly increasing AND 13083 * 2) bounded by prog->len 13084 * 13085 * The linfo[0].insn_off == 0 check logically falls into 13086 * the later "missing bpf_line_info for func..." case 13087 * because the first linfo[0].insn_off must be the 13088 * first sub also and the first sub must have 13089 * subprog_info[0].start == 0. 13090 */ 13091 if ((i && linfo[i].insn_off <= prev_offset) || 13092 linfo[i].insn_off >= prog->len) { 13093 verbose(env, "Invalid line_info[%u].insn_off:%u (prev_offset:%u prog->len:%u)\n", 13094 i, linfo[i].insn_off, prev_offset, 13095 prog->len); 13096 err = -EINVAL; 13097 goto err_free; 13098 } 13099 13100 if (!prog->insnsi[linfo[i].insn_off].code) { 13101 verbose(env, 13102 "Invalid insn code at line_info[%u].insn_off\n", 13103 i); 13104 err = -EINVAL; 13105 goto err_free; 13106 } 13107 13108 if (!btf_name_by_offset(btf, linfo[i].line_off) || 13109 !btf_name_by_offset(btf, linfo[i].file_name_off)) { 13110 verbose(env, "Invalid line_info[%u].line_off or .file_name_off\n", i); 13111 err = -EINVAL; 13112 goto err_free; 13113 } 13114 13115 if (s != env->subprog_cnt) { 13116 if (linfo[i].insn_off == sub[s].start) { 13117 sub[s].linfo_idx = i; 13118 s++; 13119 } else if (sub[s].start < linfo[i].insn_off) { 13120 verbose(env, "missing bpf_line_info for func#%u\n", s); 13121 err = -EINVAL; 13122 goto err_free; 13123 } 13124 } 13125 13126 prev_offset = linfo[i].insn_off; 13127 bpfptr_add(&ulinfo, rec_size); 13128 } 13129 13130 if (s != env->subprog_cnt) { 13131 verbose(env, "missing bpf_line_info for %u funcs starting from func#%u\n", 13132 env->subprog_cnt - s, s); 13133 err = -EINVAL; 13134 goto err_free; 13135 } 13136 13137 prog->aux->linfo = linfo; 13138 prog->aux->nr_linfo = nr_linfo; 13139 13140 return 0; 13141 13142 err_free: 13143 kvfree(linfo); 13144 return err; 13145 } 13146 13147 #define MIN_CORE_RELO_SIZE sizeof(struct bpf_core_relo) 13148 #define MAX_CORE_RELO_SIZE MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE 13149 13150 static int check_core_relo(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 13151 const union bpf_attr *attr, 13152 bpfptr_t uattr) 13153 { 13154 u32 i, nr_core_relo, ncopy, expected_size, rec_size; 13155 struct bpf_core_relo core_relo = {}; 13156 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 13157 const struct btf *btf = prog->aux->btf; 13158 struct bpf_core_ctx ctx = { 13159 .log = &env->log, 13160 .btf = btf, 13161 }; 13162 bpfptr_t u_core_relo; 13163 int err; 13164 13165 nr_core_relo = attr->core_relo_cnt; 13166 if (!nr_core_relo) 13167 return 0; 13168 if (nr_core_relo > INT_MAX / sizeof(struct bpf_core_relo)) 13169 return -EINVAL; 13170 13171 rec_size = attr->core_relo_rec_size; 13172 if (rec_size < MIN_CORE_RELO_SIZE || 13173 rec_size > MAX_CORE_RELO_SIZE || 13174 rec_size % sizeof(u32)) 13175 return -EINVAL; 13176 13177 u_core_relo = make_bpfptr(attr->core_relos, uattr.is_kernel); 13178 expected_size = sizeof(struct bpf_core_relo); 13179 ncopy = min_t(u32, expected_size, rec_size); 13180 13181 /* Unlike func_info and line_info, copy and apply each CO-RE 13182 * relocation record one at a time. 13183 */ 13184 for (i = 0; i < nr_core_relo; i++) { 13185 /* future proofing when sizeof(bpf_core_relo) changes */ 13186 err = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(u_core_relo, expected_size, rec_size); 13187 if (err) { 13188 if (err == -E2BIG) { 13189 verbose(env, "nonzero tailing record in core_relo"); 13190 if (copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr, 13191 offsetof(union bpf_attr, core_relo_rec_size), 13192 &expected_size, sizeof(expected_size))) 13193 err = -EFAULT; 13194 } 13195 break; 13196 } 13197 13198 if (copy_from_bpfptr(&core_relo, u_core_relo, ncopy)) { 13199 err = -EFAULT; 13200 break; 13201 } 13202 13203 if (core_relo.insn_off % 8 || core_relo.insn_off / 8 >= prog->len) { 13204 verbose(env, "Invalid core_relo[%u].insn_off:%u prog->len:%u\n", 13205 i, core_relo.insn_off, prog->len); 13206 err = -EINVAL; 13207 break; 13208 } 13209 13210 err = bpf_core_apply(&ctx, &core_relo, i, 13211 &prog->insnsi[core_relo.insn_off / 8]); 13212 if (err) 13213 break; 13214 bpfptr_add(&u_core_relo, rec_size); 13215 } 13216 return err; 13217 } 13218 13219 static int check_btf_info(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 13220 const union bpf_attr *attr, 13221 bpfptr_t uattr) 13222 { 13223 struct btf *btf; 13224 int err; 13225 13226 if (!attr->func_info_cnt && !attr->line_info_cnt) { 13227 if (check_abnormal_return(env)) 13228 return -EINVAL; 13229 return 0; 13230 } 13231 13232 btf = btf_get_by_fd(attr->prog_btf_fd); 13233 if (IS_ERR(btf)) 13234 return PTR_ERR(btf); 13235 if (btf_is_kernel(btf)) { 13236 btf_put(btf); 13237 return -EACCES; 13238 } 13239 env->prog->aux->btf = btf; 13240 13241 err = check_btf_func(env, attr, uattr); 13242 if (err) 13243 return err; 13244 13245 err = check_btf_line(env, attr, uattr); 13246 if (err) 13247 return err; 13248 13249 err = check_core_relo(env, attr, uattr); 13250 if (err) 13251 return err; 13252 13253 return 0; 13254 } 13255 13256 /* check %cur's range satisfies %old's */ 13257 static bool range_within(struct bpf_reg_state *old, 13258 struct bpf_reg_state *cur) 13259 { 13260 return old->umin_value <= cur->umin_value && 13261 old->umax_value >= cur->umax_value && 13262 old->smin_value <= cur->smin_value && 13263 old->smax_value >= cur->smax_value && 13264 old->u32_min_value <= cur->u32_min_value && 13265 old->u32_max_value >= cur->u32_max_value && 13266 old->s32_min_value <= cur->s32_min_value && 13267 old->s32_max_value >= cur->s32_max_value; 13268 } 13269 13270 /* If in the old state two registers had the same id, then they need to have 13271 * the same id in the new state as well. But that id could be different from 13272 * the old state, so we need to track the mapping from old to new ids. 13273 * Once we have seen that, say, a reg with old id 5 had new id 9, any subsequent 13274 * regs with old id 5 must also have new id 9 for the new state to be safe. But 13275 * regs with a different old id could still have new id 9, we don't care about 13276 * that. 13277 * So we look through our idmap to see if this old id has been seen before. If 13278 * so, we require the new id to match; otherwise, we add the id pair to the map. 13279 */ 13280 static bool check_ids(u32 old_id, u32 cur_id, struct bpf_id_pair *idmap) 13281 { 13282 unsigned int i; 13283 13284 /* either both IDs should be set or both should be zero */ 13285 if (!!old_id != !!cur_id) 13286 return false; 13287 13288 if (old_id == 0) /* cur_id == 0 as well */ 13289 return true; 13290 13291 for (i = 0; i < BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE; i++) { 13292 if (!idmap[i].old) { 13293 /* Reached an empty slot; haven't seen this id before */ 13294 idmap[i].old = old_id; 13295 idmap[i].cur = cur_id; 13296 return true; 13297 } 13298 if (idmap[i].old == old_id) 13299 return idmap[i].cur == cur_id; 13300 } 13301 /* We ran out of idmap slots, which should be impossible */ 13302 WARN_ON_ONCE(1); 13303 return false; 13304 } 13305 13306 static void clean_func_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 13307 struct bpf_func_state *st) 13308 { 13309 enum bpf_reg_liveness live; 13310 int i, j; 13311 13312 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) { 13313 live = st->regs[i].live; 13314 /* liveness must not touch this register anymore */ 13315 st->regs[i].live |= REG_LIVE_DONE; 13316 if (!(live & REG_LIVE_READ)) 13317 /* since the register is unused, clear its state 13318 * to make further comparison simpler 13319 */ 13320 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &st->regs[i]); 13321 } 13322 13323 for (i = 0; i < st->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 13324 live = st->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live; 13325 /* liveness must not touch this stack slot anymore */ 13326 st->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_DONE; 13327 if (!(live & REG_LIVE_READ)) { 13328 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &st->stack[i].spilled_ptr); 13329 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 13330 st->stack[i].slot_type[j] = STACK_INVALID; 13331 } 13332 } 13333 } 13334 13335 static void clean_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 13336 struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 13337 { 13338 int i; 13339 13340 if (st->frame[0]->regs[0].live & REG_LIVE_DONE) 13341 /* all regs in this state in all frames were already marked */ 13342 return; 13343 13344 for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) 13345 clean_func_state(env, st->frame[i]); 13346 } 13347 13348 /* the parentage chains form a tree. 13349 * the verifier states are added to state lists at given insn and 13350 * pushed into state stack for future exploration. 13351 * when the verifier reaches bpf_exit insn some of the verifer states 13352 * stored in the state lists have their final liveness state already, 13353 * but a lot of states will get revised from liveness point of view when 13354 * the verifier explores other branches. 13355 * Example: 13356 * 1: r0 = 1 13357 * 2: if r1 == 100 goto pc+1 13358 * 3: r0 = 2 13359 * 4: exit 13360 * when the verifier reaches exit insn the register r0 in the state list of 13361 * insn 2 will be seen as !REG_LIVE_READ. Then the verifier pops the other_branch 13362 * of insn 2 and goes exploring further. At the insn 4 it will walk the 13363 * parentage chain from insn 4 into insn 2 and will mark r0 as REG_LIVE_READ. 13364 * 13365 * Since the verifier pushes the branch states as it sees them while exploring 13366 * the program the condition of walking the branch instruction for the second 13367 * time means that all states below this branch were already explored and 13368 * their final liveness marks are already propagated. 13369 * Hence when the verifier completes the search of state list in is_state_visited() 13370 * we can call this clean_live_states() function to mark all liveness states 13371 * as REG_LIVE_DONE to indicate that 'parent' pointers of 'struct bpf_reg_state' 13372 * will not be used. 13373 * This function also clears the registers and stack for states that !READ 13374 * to simplify state merging. 13375 * 13376 * Important note here that walking the same branch instruction in the callee 13377 * doesn't meant that the states are DONE. The verifier has to compare 13378 * the callsites 13379 */ 13380 static void clean_live_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn, 13381 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 13382 { 13383 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl; 13384 int i; 13385 13386 sl = *explored_state(env, insn); 13387 while (sl) { 13388 if (sl->state.branches) 13389 goto next; 13390 if (sl->state.insn_idx != insn || 13391 sl->state.curframe != cur->curframe) 13392 goto next; 13393 for (i = 0; i <= cur->curframe; i++) 13394 if (sl->state.frame[i]->callsite != cur->frame[i]->callsite) 13395 goto next; 13396 clean_verifier_state(env, &sl->state); 13397 next: 13398 sl = sl->next; 13399 } 13400 } 13401 13402 static bool regs_exact(const struct bpf_reg_state *rold, 13403 const struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, 13404 struct bpf_id_pair *idmap) 13405 { 13406 return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0 && 13407 check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap) && 13408 check_ids(rold->ref_obj_id, rcur->ref_obj_id, idmap); 13409 } 13410 13411 /* Returns true if (rold safe implies rcur safe) */ 13412 static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold, 13413 struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, struct bpf_id_pair *idmap) 13414 { 13415 if (!(rold->live & REG_LIVE_READ)) 13416 /* explored state didn't use this */ 13417 return true; 13418 if (rold->type == NOT_INIT) 13419 /* explored state can't have used this */ 13420 return true; 13421 if (rcur->type == NOT_INIT) 13422 return false; 13423 13424 /* Enforce that register types have to match exactly, including their 13425 * modifiers (like PTR_MAYBE_NULL, MEM_RDONLY, etc), as a general 13426 * rule. 13427 * 13428 * One can make a point that using a pointer register as unbounded 13429 * SCALAR would be technically acceptable, but this could lead to 13430 * pointer leaks because scalars are allowed to leak while pointers 13431 * are not. We could make this safe in special cases if root is 13432 * calling us, but it's probably not worth the hassle. 13433 * 13434 * Also, register types that are *not* MAYBE_NULL could technically be 13435 * safe to use as their MAYBE_NULL variants (e.g., PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE 13436 * is safe to be used as PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, provided both point 13437 * to the same map). 13438 * However, if the old MAYBE_NULL register then got NULL checked, 13439 * doing so could have affected others with the same id, and we can't 13440 * check for that because we lost the id when we converted to 13441 * a non-MAYBE_NULL variant. 13442 * So, as a general rule we don't allow mixing MAYBE_NULL and 13443 * non-MAYBE_NULL registers as well. 13444 */ 13445 if (rold->type != rcur->type) 13446 return false; 13447 13448 switch (base_type(rold->type)) { 13449 case SCALAR_VALUE: 13450 if (regs_exact(rold, rcur, idmap)) 13451 return true; 13452 if (env->explore_alu_limits) 13453 return false; 13454 if (!rold->precise) 13455 return true; 13456 /* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */ 13457 return range_within(rold, rcur) && 13458 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off); 13459 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 13460 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 13461 /* If the new min/max/var_off satisfy the old ones and 13462 * everything else matches, we are OK. 13463 */ 13464 return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off)) == 0 && 13465 range_within(rold, rcur) && 13466 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off) && 13467 check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap); 13468 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 13469 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 13470 /* We must have at least as much range as the old ptr 13471 * did, so that any accesses which were safe before are 13472 * still safe. This is true even if old range < old off, 13473 * since someone could have accessed through (ptr - k), or 13474 * even done ptr -= k in a register, to get a safe access. 13475 */ 13476 if (rold->range > rcur->range) 13477 return false; 13478 /* If the offsets don't match, we can't trust our alignment; 13479 * nor can we be sure that we won't fall out of range. 13480 */ 13481 if (rold->off != rcur->off) 13482 return false; 13483 /* id relations must be preserved */ 13484 if (!check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap)) 13485 return false; 13486 /* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */ 13487 return range_within(rold, rcur) && 13488 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off); 13489 case PTR_TO_STACK: 13490 /* two stack pointers are equal only if they're pointing to 13491 * the same stack frame, since fp-8 in foo != fp-8 in bar 13492 */ 13493 return regs_exact(rold, rcur, idmap) && rold->frameno == rcur->frameno; 13494 default: 13495 return regs_exact(rold, rcur, idmap); 13496 } 13497 } 13498 13499 static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old, 13500 struct bpf_func_state *cur, struct bpf_id_pair *idmap) 13501 { 13502 int i, spi; 13503 13504 /* walk slots of the explored stack and ignore any additional 13505 * slots in the current stack, since explored(safe) state 13506 * didn't use them 13507 */ 13508 for (i = 0; i < old->allocated_stack; i++) { 13509 spi = i / BPF_REG_SIZE; 13510 13511 if (!(old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live & REG_LIVE_READ)) { 13512 i += BPF_REG_SIZE - 1; 13513 /* explored state didn't use this */ 13514 continue; 13515 } 13516 13517 if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_INVALID) 13518 continue; 13519 13520 /* explored stack has more populated slots than current stack 13521 * and these slots were used 13522 */ 13523 if (i >= cur->allocated_stack) 13524 return false; 13525 13526 /* if old state was safe with misc data in the stack 13527 * it will be safe with zero-initialized stack. 13528 * The opposite is not true 13529 */ 13530 if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_MISC && 13531 cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_ZERO) 13532 continue; 13533 if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] != 13534 cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE]) 13535 /* Ex: old explored (safe) state has STACK_SPILL in 13536 * this stack slot, but current has STACK_MISC -> 13537 * this verifier states are not equivalent, 13538 * return false to continue verification of this path 13539 */ 13540 return false; 13541 if (i % BPF_REG_SIZE != BPF_REG_SIZE - 1) 13542 continue; 13543 /* Both old and cur are having same slot_type */ 13544 switch (old->stack[spi].slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE - 1]) { 13545 case STACK_SPILL: 13546 /* when explored and current stack slot are both storing 13547 * spilled registers, check that stored pointers types 13548 * are the same as well. 13549 * Ex: explored safe path could have stored 13550 * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -8} 13551 * but current path has stored: 13552 * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -16} 13553 * such verifier states are not equivalent. 13554 * return false to continue verification of this path 13555 */ 13556 if (!regsafe(env, &old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, 13557 &cur->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, idmap)) 13558 return false; 13559 break; 13560 case STACK_DYNPTR: 13561 { 13562 const struct bpf_reg_state *old_reg, *cur_reg; 13563 13564 old_reg = &old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 13565 cur_reg = &cur->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 13566 if (old_reg->dynptr.type != cur_reg->dynptr.type || 13567 old_reg->dynptr.first_slot != cur_reg->dynptr.first_slot || 13568 !check_ids(old_reg->ref_obj_id, cur_reg->ref_obj_id, idmap)) 13569 return false; 13570 break; 13571 } 13572 case STACK_MISC: 13573 case STACK_ZERO: 13574 case STACK_INVALID: 13575 continue; 13576 /* Ensure that new unhandled slot types return false by default */ 13577 default: 13578 return false; 13579 } 13580 } 13581 return true; 13582 } 13583 13584 static bool refsafe(struct bpf_func_state *old, struct bpf_func_state *cur, 13585 struct bpf_id_pair *idmap) 13586 { 13587 int i; 13588 13589 if (old->acquired_refs != cur->acquired_refs) 13590 return false; 13591 13592 for (i = 0; i < old->acquired_refs; i++) { 13593 if (!check_ids(old->refs[i].id, cur->refs[i].id, idmap)) 13594 return false; 13595 } 13596 13597 return true; 13598 } 13599 13600 /* compare two verifier states 13601 * 13602 * all states stored in state_list are known to be valid, since 13603 * verifier reached 'bpf_exit' instruction through them 13604 * 13605 * this function is called when verifier exploring different branches of 13606 * execution popped from the state stack. If it sees an old state that has 13607 * more strict register state and more strict stack state then this execution 13608 * branch doesn't need to be explored further, since verifier already 13609 * concluded that more strict state leads to valid finish. 13610 * 13611 * Therefore two states are equivalent if register state is more conservative 13612 * and explored stack state is more conservative than the current one. 13613 * Example: 13614 * explored current 13615 * (slot1=INV slot2=MISC) == (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC) 13616 * (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC) != (slot1=INV slot2=MISC) 13617 * 13618 * In other words if current stack state (one being explored) has more 13619 * valid slots than old one that already passed validation, it means 13620 * the verifier can stop exploring and conclude that current state is valid too 13621 * 13622 * Similarly with registers. If explored state has register type as invalid 13623 * whereas register type in current state is meaningful, it means that 13624 * the current state will reach 'bpf_exit' instruction safely 13625 */ 13626 static bool func_states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old, 13627 struct bpf_func_state *cur) 13628 { 13629 int i; 13630 13631 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) 13632 if (!regsafe(env, &old->regs[i], &cur->regs[i], 13633 env->idmap_scratch)) 13634 return false; 13635 13636 if (!stacksafe(env, old, cur, env->idmap_scratch)) 13637 return false; 13638 13639 if (!refsafe(old, cur, env->idmap_scratch)) 13640 return false; 13641 13642 return true; 13643 } 13644 13645 static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 13646 struct bpf_verifier_state *old, 13647 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 13648 { 13649 int i; 13650 13651 if (old->curframe != cur->curframe) 13652 return false; 13653 13654 memset(env->idmap_scratch, 0, sizeof(env->idmap_scratch)); 13655 13656 /* Verification state from speculative execution simulation 13657 * must never prune a non-speculative execution one. 13658 */ 13659 if (old->speculative && !cur->speculative) 13660 return false; 13661 13662 if (old->active_lock.ptr != cur->active_lock.ptr) 13663 return false; 13664 13665 /* Old and cur active_lock's have to be either both present 13666 * or both absent. 13667 */ 13668 if (!!old->active_lock.id != !!cur->active_lock.id) 13669 return false; 13670 13671 if (old->active_lock.id && 13672 !check_ids(old->active_lock.id, cur->active_lock.id, env->idmap_scratch)) 13673 return false; 13674 13675 if (old->active_rcu_lock != cur->active_rcu_lock) 13676 return false; 13677 13678 /* for states to be equal callsites have to be the same 13679 * and all frame states need to be equivalent 13680 */ 13681 for (i = 0; i <= old->curframe; i++) { 13682 if (old->frame[i]->callsite != cur->frame[i]->callsite) 13683 return false; 13684 if (!func_states_equal(env, old->frame[i], cur->frame[i])) 13685 return false; 13686 } 13687 return true; 13688 } 13689 13690 /* Return 0 if no propagation happened. Return negative error code if error 13691 * happened. Otherwise, return the propagated bit. 13692 */ 13693 static int propagate_liveness_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 13694 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 13695 struct bpf_reg_state *parent_reg) 13696 { 13697 u8 parent_flag = parent_reg->live & REG_LIVE_READ; 13698 u8 flag = reg->live & REG_LIVE_READ; 13699 int err; 13700 13701 /* When comes here, read flags of PARENT_REG or REG could be any of 13702 * REG_LIVE_READ64, REG_LIVE_READ32, REG_LIVE_NONE. There is no need 13703 * of propagation if PARENT_REG has strongest REG_LIVE_READ64. 13704 */ 13705 if (parent_flag == REG_LIVE_READ64 || 13706 /* Or if there is no read flag from REG. */ 13707 !flag || 13708 /* Or if the read flag from REG is the same as PARENT_REG. */ 13709 parent_flag == flag) 13710 return 0; 13711 13712 err = mark_reg_read(env, reg, parent_reg, flag); 13713 if (err) 13714 return err; 13715 13716 return flag; 13717 } 13718 13719 /* A write screens off any subsequent reads; but write marks come from the 13720 * straight-line code between a state and its parent. When we arrive at an 13721 * equivalent state (jump target or such) we didn't arrive by the straight-line 13722 * code, so read marks in the state must propagate to the parent regardless 13723 * of the state's write marks. That's what 'parent == state->parent' comparison 13724 * in mark_reg_read() is for. 13725 */ 13726 static int propagate_liveness(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 13727 const struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, 13728 struct bpf_verifier_state *vparent) 13729 { 13730 struct bpf_reg_state *state_reg, *parent_reg; 13731 struct bpf_func_state *state, *parent; 13732 int i, frame, err = 0; 13733 13734 if (vparent->curframe != vstate->curframe) { 13735 WARN(1, "propagate_live: parent frame %d current frame %d\n", 13736 vparent->curframe, vstate->curframe); 13737 return -EFAULT; 13738 } 13739 /* Propagate read liveness of registers... */ 13740 BUILD_BUG_ON(BPF_REG_FP + 1 != MAX_BPF_REG); 13741 for (frame = 0; frame <= vstate->curframe; frame++) { 13742 parent = vparent->frame[frame]; 13743 state = vstate->frame[frame]; 13744 parent_reg = parent->regs; 13745 state_reg = state->regs; 13746 /* We don't need to worry about FP liveness, it's read-only */ 13747 for (i = frame < vstate->curframe ? BPF_REG_6 : 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) { 13748 err = propagate_liveness_reg(env, &state_reg[i], 13749 &parent_reg[i]); 13750 if (err < 0) 13751 return err; 13752 if (err == REG_LIVE_READ64) 13753 mark_insn_zext(env, &parent_reg[i]); 13754 } 13755 13756 /* Propagate stack slots. */ 13757 for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE && 13758 i < parent->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 13759 parent_reg = &parent->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 13760 state_reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 13761 err = propagate_liveness_reg(env, state_reg, 13762 parent_reg); 13763 if (err < 0) 13764 return err; 13765 } 13766 } 13767 return 0; 13768 } 13769 13770 /* find precise scalars in the previous equivalent state and 13771 * propagate them into the current state 13772 */ 13773 static int propagate_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 13774 const struct bpf_verifier_state *old) 13775 { 13776 struct bpf_reg_state *state_reg; 13777 struct bpf_func_state *state; 13778 int i, err = 0, fr; 13779 13780 for (fr = old->curframe; fr >= 0; fr--) { 13781 state = old->frame[fr]; 13782 state_reg = state->regs; 13783 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++, state_reg++) { 13784 if (state_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || 13785 !state_reg->precise) 13786 continue; 13787 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) 13788 verbose(env, "frame %d: propagating r%d\n", i, fr); 13789 err = mark_chain_precision_frame(env, fr, i); 13790 if (err < 0) 13791 return err; 13792 } 13793 13794 for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 13795 if (!is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[i])) 13796 continue; 13797 state_reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 13798 if (state_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || 13799 !state_reg->precise) 13800 continue; 13801 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) 13802 verbose(env, "frame %d: propagating fp%d\n", 13803 (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE, fr); 13804 err = mark_chain_precision_stack_frame(env, fr, i); 13805 if (err < 0) 13806 return err; 13807 } 13808 } 13809 return 0; 13810 } 13811 13812 static bool states_maybe_looping(struct bpf_verifier_state *old, 13813 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 13814 { 13815 struct bpf_func_state *fold, *fcur; 13816 int i, fr = cur->curframe; 13817 13818 if (old->curframe != fr) 13819 return false; 13820 13821 fold = old->frame[fr]; 13822 fcur = cur->frame[fr]; 13823 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) 13824 if (memcmp(&fold->regs[i], &fcur->regs[i], 13825 offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, parent))) 13826 return false; 13827 return true; 13828 } 13829 13830 13831 static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 13832 { 13833 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *new_sl; 13834 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl, **pprev; 13835 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state, *new; 13836 int i, j, err, states_cnt = 0; 13837 bool add_new_state = env->test_state_freq ? true : false; 13838 13839 /* bpf progs typically have pruning point every 4 instructions 13840 * http://vger.kernel.org/bpfconf2019.html#session-1 13841 * Do not add new state for future pruning if the verifier hasn't seen 13842 * at least 2 jumps and at least 8 instructions. 13843 * This heuristics helps decrease 'total_states' and 'peak_states' metric. 13844 * In tests that amounts to up to 50% reduction into total verifier 13845 * memory consumption and 20% verifier time speedup. 13846 */ 13847 if (env->jmps_processed - env->prev_jmps_processed >= 2 && 13848 env->insn_processed - env->prev_insn_processed >= 8) 13849 add_new_state = true; 13850 13851 pprev = explored_state(env, insn_idx); 13852 sl = *pprev; 13853 13854 clean_live_states(env, insn_idx, cur); 13855 13856 while (sl) { 13857 states_cnt++; 13858 if (sl->state.insn_idx != insn_idx) 13859 goto next; 13860 13861 if (sl->state.branches) { 13862 struct bpf_func_state *frame = sl->state.frame[sl->state.curframe]; 13863 13864 if (frame->in_async_callback_fn && 13865 frame->async_entry_cnt != cur->frame[cur->curframe]->async_entry_cnt) { 13866 /* Different async_entry_cnt means that the verifier is 13867 * processing another entry into async callback. 13868 * Seeing the same state is not an indication of infinite 13869 * loop or infinite recursion. 13870 * But finding the same state doesn't mean that it's safe 13871 * to stop processing the current state. The previous state 13872 * hasn't yet reached bpf_exit, since state.branches > 0. 13873 * Checking in_async_callback_fn alone is not enough either. 13874 * Since the verifier still needs to catch infinite loops 13875 * inside async callbacks. 13876 */ 13877 } else if (states_maybe_looping(&sl->state, cur) && 13878 states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur)) { 13879 verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; "); 13880 verbose(env, "infinite loop detected at insn %d\n", insn_idx); 13881 return -EINVAL; 13882 } 13883 /* if the verifier is processing a loop, avoid adding new state 13884 * too often, since different loop iterations have distinct 13885 * states and may not help future pruning. 13886 * This threshold shouldn't be too low to make sure that 13887 * a loop with large bound will be rejected quickly. 13888 * The most abusive loop will be: 13889 * r1 += 1 13890 * if r1 < 1000000 goto pc-2 13891 * 1M insn_procssed limit / 100 == 10k peak states. 13892 * This threshold shouldn't be too high either, since states 13893 * at the end of the loop are likely to be useful in pruning. 13894 */ 13895 if (env->jmps_processed - env->prev_jmps_processed < 20 && 13896 env->insn_processed - env->prev_insn_processed < 100) 13897 add_new_state = false; 13898 goto miss; 13899 } 13900 if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur)) { 13901 sl->hit_cnt++; 13902 /* reached equivalent register/stack state, 13903 * prune the search. 13904 * Registers read by the continuation are read by us. 13905 * If we have any write marks in env->cur_state, they 13906 * will prevent corresponding reads in the continuation 13907 * from reaching our parent (an explored_state). Our 13908 * own state will get the read marks recorded, but 13909 * they'll be immediately forgotten as we're pruning 13910 * this state and will pop a new one. 13911 */ 13912 err = propagate_liveness(env, &sl->state, cur); 13913 13914 /* if previous state reached the exit with precision and 13915 * current state is equivalent to it (except precsion marks) 13916 * the precision needs to be propagated back in 13917 * the current state. 13918 */ 13919 err = err ? : push_jmp_history(env, cur); 13920 err = err ? : propagate_precision(env, &sl->state); 13921 if (err) 13922 return err; 13923 return 1; 13924 } 13925 miss: 13926 /* when new state is not going to be added do not increase miss count. 13927 * Otherwise several loop iterations will remove the state 13928 * recorded earlier. The goal of these heuristics is to have 13929 * states from some iterations of the loop (some in the beginning 13930 * and some at the end) to help pruning. 13931 */ 13932 if (add_new_state) 13933 sl->miss_cnt++; 13934 /* heuristic to determine whether this state is beneficial 13935 * to keep checking from state equivalence point of view. 13936 * Higher numbers increase max_states_per_insn and verification time, 13937 * but do not meaningfully decrease insn_processed. 13938 */ 13939 if (sl->miss_cnt > sl->hit_cnt * 3 + 3) { 13940 /* the state is unlikely to be useful. Remove it to 13941 * speed up verification 13942 */ 13943 *pprev = sl->next; 13944 if (sl->state.frame[0]->regs[0].live & REG_LIVE_DONE) { 13945 u32 br = sl->state.branches; 13946 13947 WARN_ONCE(br, 13948 "BUG live_done but branches_to_explore %d\n", 13949 br); 13950 free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false); 13951 kfree(sl); 13952 env->peak_states--; 13953 } else { 13954 /* cannot free this state, since parentage chain may 13955 * walk it later. Add it for free_list instead to 13956 * be freed at the end of verification 13957 */ 13958 sl->next = env->free_list; 13959 env->free_list = sl; 13960 } 13961 sl = *pprev; 13962 continue; 13963 } 13964 next: 13965 pprev = &sl->next; 13966 sl = *pprev; 13967 } 13968 13969 if (env->max_states_per_insn < states_cnt) 13970 env->max_states_per_insn = states_cnt; 13971 13972 if (!env->bpf_capable && states_cnt > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES) 13973 return 0; 13974 13975 if (!add_new_state) 13976 return 0; 13977 13978 /* There were no equivalent states, remember the current one. 13979 * Technically the current state is not proven to be safe yet, 13980 * but it will either reach outer most bpf_exit (which means it's safe) 13981 * or it will be rejected. When there are no loops the verifier won't be 13982 * seeing this tuple (frame[0].callsite, frame[1].callsite, .. insn_idx) 13983 * again on the way to bpf_exit. 13984 * When looping the sl->state.branches will be > 0 and this state 13985 * will not be considered for equivalence until branches == 0. 13986 */ 13987 new_sl = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list), GFP_KERNEL); 13988 if (!new_sl) 13989 return -ENOMEM; 13990 env->total_states++; 13991 env->peak_states++; 13992 env->prev_jmps_processed = env->jmps_processed; 13993 env->prev_insn_processed = env->insn_processed; 13994 13995 /* forget precise markings we inherited, see __mark_chain_precision */ 13996 if (env->bpf_capable) 13997 mark_all_scalars_imprecise(env, cur); 13998 13999 /* add new state to the head of linked list */ 14000 new = &new_sl->state; 14001 err = copy_verifier_state(new, cur); 14002 if (err) { 14003 free_verifier_state(new, false); 14004 kfree(new_sl); 14005 return err; 14006 } 14007 new->insn_idx = insn_idx; 14008 WARN_ONCE(new->branches != 1, 14009 "BUG is_state_visited:branches_to_explore=%d insn %d\n", new->branches, insn_idx); 14010 14011 cur->parent = new; 14012 cur->first_insn_idx = insn_idx; 14013 clear_jmp_history(cur); 14014 new_sl->next = *explored_state(env, insn_idx); 14015 *explored_state(env, insn_idx) = new_sl; 14016 /* connect new state to parentage chain. Current frame needs all 14017 * registers connected. Only r6 - r9 of the callers are alive (pushed 14018 * to the stack implicitly by JITs) so in callers' frames connect just 14019 * r6 - r9 as an optimization. Callers will have r1 - r5 connected to 14020 * the state of the call instruction (with WRITTEN set), and r0 comes 14021 * from callee with its full parentage chain, anyway. 14022 */ 14023 /* clear write marks in current state: the writes we did are not writes 14024 * our child did, so they don't screen off its reads from us. 14025 * (There are no read marks in current state, because reads always mark 14026 * their parent and current state never has children yet. Only 14027 * explored_states can get read marks.) 14028 */ 14029 for (j = 0; j <= cur->curframe; j++) { 14030 for (i = j < cur->curframe ? BPF_REG_6 : 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) 14031 cur->frame[j]->regs[i].parent = &new->frame[j]->regs[i]; 14032 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) 14033 cur->frame[j]->regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE; 14034 } 14035 14036 /* all stack frames are accessible from callee, clear them all */ 14037 for (j = 0; j <= cur->curframe; j++) { 14038 struct bpf_func_state *frame = cur->frame[j]; 14039 struct bpf_func_state *newframe = new->frame[j]; 14040 14041 for (i = 0; i < frame->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 14042 frame->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live = REG_LIVE_NONE; 14043 frame->stack[i].spilled_ptr.parent = 14044 &newframe->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 14045 } 14046 } 14047 return 0; 14048 } 14049 14050 /* Return true if it's OK to have the same insn return a different type. */ 14051 static bool reg_type_mismatch_ok(enum bpf_reg_type type) 14052 { 14053 switch (base_type(type)) { 14054 case PTR_TO_CTX: 14055 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 14056 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 14057 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 14058 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 14059 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 14060 return false; 14061 default: 14062 return true; 14063 } 14064 } 14065 14066 /* If an instruction was previously used with particular pointer types, then we 14067 * need to be careful to avoid cases such as the below, where it may be ok 14068 * for one branch accessing the pointer, but not ok for the other branch: 14069 * 14070 * R1 = sock_ptr 14071 * goto X; 14072 * ... 14073 * R1 = some_other_valid_ptr; 14074 * goto X; 14075 * ... 14076 * R2 = *(u32 *)(R1 + 0); 14077 */ 14078 static bool reg_type_mismatch(enum bpf_reg_type src, enum bpf_reg_type prev) 14079 { 14080 return src != prev && (!reg_type_mismatch_ok(src) || 14081 !reg_type_mismatch_ok(prev)); 14082 } 14083 14084 static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 14085 { 14086 bool pop_log = !(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2); 14087 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 14088 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; 14089 struct bpf_reg_state *regs; 14090 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 14091 bool do_print_state = false; 14092 int prev_insn_idx = -1; 14093 14094 for (;;) { 14095 struct bpf_insn *insn; 14096 u8 class; 14097 int err; 14098 14099 env->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx; 14100 if (env->insn_idx >= insn_cnt) { 14101 verbose(env, "invalid insn idx %d insn_cnt %d\n", 14102 env->insn_idx, insn_cnt); 14103 return -EFAULT; 14104 } 14105 14106 insn = &insns[env->insn_idx]; 14107 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); 14108 14109 if (++env->insn_processed > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS) { 14110 verbose(env, 14111 "BPF program is too large. Processed %d insn\n", 14112 env->insn_processed); 14113 return -E2BIG; 14114 } 14115 14116 state->last_insn_idx = env->prev_insn_idx; 14117 14118 if (is_prune_point(env, env->insn_idx)) { 14119 err = is_state_visited(env, env->insn_idx); 14120 if (err < 0) 14121 return err; 14122 if (err == 1) { 14123 /* found equivalent state, can prune the search */ 14124 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 14125 if (do_print_state) 14126 verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d%s: safe\n", 14127 env->prev_insn_idx, env->insn_idx, 14128 env->cur_state->speculative ? 14129 " (speculative execution)" : ""); 14130 else 14131 verbose(env, "%d: safe\n", env->insn_idx); 14132 } 14133 goto process_bpf_exit; 14134 } 14135 } 14136 14137 if (is_jmp_point(env, env->insn_idx)) { 14138 err = push_jmp_history(env, state); 14139 if (err) 14140 return err; 14141 } 14142 14143 if (signal_pending(current)) 14144 return -EAGAIN; 14145 14146 if (need_resched()) 14147 cond_resched(); 14148 14149 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2 && do_print_state) { 14150 verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d%s:", 14151 env->prev_insn_idx, env->insn_idx, 14152 env->cur_state->speculative ? 14153 " (speculative execution)" : ""); 14154 print_verifier_state(env, state->frame[state->curframe], true); 14155 do_print_state = false; 14156 } 14157 14158 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 14159 const struct bpf_insn_cbs cbs = { 14160 .cb_call = disasm_kfunc_name, 14161 .cb_print = verbose, 14162 .private_data = env, 14163 }; 14164 14165 if (verifier_state_scratched(env)) 14166 print_insn_state(env, state->frame[state->curframe]); 14167 14168 verbose_linfo(env, env->insn_idx, "; "); 14169 env->prev_log_len = env->log.len_used; 14170 verbose(env, "%d: ", env->insn_idx); 14171 print_bpf_insn(&cbs, insn, env->allow_ptr_leaks); 14172 env->prev_insn_print_len = env->log.len_used - env->prev_log_len; 14173 env->prev_log_len = env->log.len_used; 14174 } 14175 14176 if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) { 14177 err = bpf_prog_offload_verify_insn(env, env->insn_idx, 14178 env->prev_insn_idx); 14179 if (err) 14180 return err; 14181 } 14182 14183 regs = cur_regs(env); 14184 sanitize_mark_insn_seen(env); 14185 prev_insn_idx = env->insn_idx; 14186 14187 if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) { 14188 err = check_alu_op(env, insn); 14189 if (err) 14190 return err; 14191 14192 } else if (class == BPF_LDX) { 14193 enum bpf_reg_type *prev_src_type, src_reg_type; 14194 14195 /* check for reserved fields is already done */ 14196 14197 /* check src operand */ 14198 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 14199 if (err) 14200 return err; 14201 14202 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK); 14203 if (err) 14204 return err; 14205 14206 src_reg_type = regs[insn->src_reg].type; 14207 14208 /* check that memory (src_reg + off) is readable, 14209 * the state of dst_reg will be updated by this func 14210 */ 14211 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->src_reg, 14212 insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), 14213 BPF_READ, insn->dst_reg, false); 14214 if (err) 14215 return err; 14216 14217 prev_src_type = &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].ptr_type; 14218 14219 if (*prev_src_type == NOT_INIT) { 14220 /* saw a valid insn 14221 * dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + off) 14222 * save type to validate intersecting paths 14223 */ 14224 *prev_src_type = src_reg_type; 14225 14226 } else if (reg_type_mismatch(src_reg_type, *prev_src_type)) { 14227 /* ABuser program is trying to use the same insn 14228 * dst_reg = *(u32*) (src_reg + off) 14229 * with different pointer types: 14230 * src_reg == ctx in one branch and 14231 * src_reg == stack|map in some other branch. 14232 * Reject it. 14233 */ 14234 verbose(env, "same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n"); 14235 return -EINVAL; 14236 } 14237 14238 } else if (class == BPF_STX) { 14239 enum bpf_reg_type *prev_dst_type, dst_reg_type; 14240 14241 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC) { 14242 err = check_atomic(env, env->insn_idx, insn); 14243 if (err) 14244 return err; 14245 env->insn_idx++; 14246 continue; 14247 } 14248 14249 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0) { 14250 verbose(env, "BPF_STX uses reserved fields\n"); 14251 return -EINVAL; 14252 } 14253 14254 /* check src1 operand */ 14255 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 14256 if (err) 14257 return err; 14258 /* check src2 operand */ 14259 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 14260 if (err) 14261 return err; 14262 14263 dst_reg_type = regs[insn->dst_reg].type; 14264 14265 /* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */ 14266 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, 14267 insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), 14268 BPF_WRITE, insn->src_reg, false); 14269 if (err) 14270 return err; 14271 14272 prev_dst_type = &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].ptr_type; 14273 14274 if (*prev_dst_type == NOT_INIT) { 14275 *prev_dst_type = dst_reg_type; 14276 } else if (reg_type_mismatch(dst_reg_type, *prev_dst_type)) { 14277 verbose(env, "same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n"); 14278 return -EINVAL; 14279 } 14280 14281 } else if (class == BPF_ST) { 14282 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || 14283 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) { 14284 verbose(env, "BPF_ST uses reserved fields\n"); 14285 return -EINVAL; 14286 } 14287 /* check src operand */ 14288 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 14289 if (err) 14290 return err; 14291 14292 if (is_ctx_reg(env, insn->dst_reg)) { 14293 verbose(env, "BPF_ST stores into R%d %s is not allowed\n", 14294 insn->dst_reg, 14295 reg_type_str(env, reg_state(env, insn->dst_reg)->type)); 14296 return -EACCES; 14297 } 14298 14299 /* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */ 14300 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, 14301 insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), 14302 BPF_WRITE, -1, false); 14303 if (err) 14304 return err; 14305 14306 } else if (class == BPF_JMP || class == BPF_JMP32) { 14307 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 14308 14309 env->jmps_processed++; 14310 if (opcode == BPF_CALL) { 14311 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || 14312 (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL 14313 && insn->off != 0) || 14314 (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 && 14315 insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL && 14316 insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) || 14317 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 14318 class == BPF_JMP32) { 14319 verbose(env, "BPF_CALL uses reserved fields\n"); 14320 return -EINVAL; 14321 } 14322 14323 if (env->cur_state->active_lock.ptr) { 14324 if ((insn->src_reg == BPF_REG_0 && insn->imm != BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock) || 14325 (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) || 14326 (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL && 14327 (insn->off != 0 || !is_bpf_list_api_kfunc(insn->imm)))) { 14328 verbose(env, "function calls are not allowed while holding a lock\n"); 14329 return -EINVAL; 14330 } 14331 } 14332 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 14333 err = check_func_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); 14334 else if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) 14335 err = check_kfunc_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); 14336 else 14337 err = check_helper_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); 14338 if (err) 14339 return err; 14340 } else if (opcode == BPF_JA) { 14341 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || 14342 insn->imm != 0 || 14343 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 14344 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 14345 class == BPF_JMP32) { 14346 verbose(env, "BPF_JA uses reserved fields\n"); 14347 return -EINVAL; 14348 } 14349 14350 env->insn_idx += insn->off + 1; 14351 continue; 14352 14353 } else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) { 14354 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || 14355 insn->imm != 0 || 14356 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 14357 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 14358 class == BPF_JMP32) { 14359 verbose(env, "BPF_EXIT uses reserved fields\n"); 14360 return -EINVAL; 14361 } 14362 14363 if (env->cur_state->active_lock.ptr) { 14364 verbose(env, "bpf_spin_unlock is missing\n"); 14365 return -EINVAL; 14366 } 14367 14368 if (env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock) { 14369 verbose(env, "bpf_rcu_read_unlock is missing\n"); 14370 return -EINVAL; 14371 } 14372 14373 /* We must do check_reference_leak here before 14374 * prepare_func_exit to handle the case when 14375 * state->curframe > 0, it may be a callback 14376 * function, for which reference_state must 14377 * match caller reference state when it exits. 14378 */ 14379 err = check_reference_leak(env); 14380 if (err) 14381 return err; 14382 14383 if (state->curframe) { 14384 /* exit from nested function */ 14385 err = prepare_func_exit(env, &env->insn_idx); 14386 if (err) 14387 return err; 14388 do_print_state = true; 14389 continue; 14390 } 14391 14392 err = check_return_code(env); 14393 if (err) 14394 return err; 14395 process_bpf_exit: 14396 mark_verifier_state_scratched(env); 14397 update_branch_counts(env, env->cur_state); 14398 err = pop_stack(env, &prev_insn_idx, 14399 &env->insn_idx, pop_log); 14400 if (err < 0) { 14401 if (err != -ENOENT) 14402 return err; 14403 break; 14404 } else { 14405 do_print_state = true; 14406 continue; 14407 } 14408 } else { 14409 err = check_cond_jmp_op(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); 14410 if (err) 14411 return err; 14412 } 14413 } else if (class == BPF_LD) { 14414 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); 14415 14416 if (mode == BPF_ABS || mode == BPF_IND) { 14417 err = check_ld_abs(env, insn); 14418 if (err) 14419 return err; 14420 14421 } else if (mode == BPF_IMM) { 14422 err = check_ld_imm(env, insn); 14423 if (err) 14424 return err; 14425 14426 env->insn_idx++; 14427 sanitize_mark_insn_seen(env); 14428 } else { 14429 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD mode\n"); 14430 return -EINVAL; 14431 } 14432 } else { 14433 verbose(env, "unknown insn class %d\n", class); 14434 return -EINVAL; 14435 } 14436 14437 env->insn_idx++; 14438 } 14439 14440 return 0; 14441 } 14442 14443 static int find_btf_percpu_datasec(struct btf *btf) 14444 { 14445 const struct btf_type *t; 14446 const char *tname; 14447 int i, n; 14448 14449 /* 14450 * Both vmlinux and module each have their own ".data..percpu" 14451 * DATASECs in BTF. So for module's case, we need to skip vmlinux BTF 14452 * types to look at only module's own BTF types. 14453 */ 14454 n = btf_nr_types(btf); 14455 if (btf_is_module(btf)) 14456 i = btf_nr_types(btf_vmlinux); 14457 else 14458 i = 1; 14459 14460 for(; i < n; i++) { 14461 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, i); 14462 if (BTF_INFO_KIND(t->info) != BTF_KIND_DATASEC) 14463 continue; 14464 14465 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off); 14466 if (!strcmp(tname, ".data..percpu")) 14467 return i; 14468 } 14469 14470 return -ENOENT; 14471 } 14472 14473 /* replace pseudo btf_id with kernel symbol address */ 14474 static int check_pseudo_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 14475 struct bpf_insn *insn, 14476 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 14477 { 14478 const struct btf_var_secinfo *vsi; 14479 const struct btf_type *datasec; 14480 struct btf_mod_pair *btf_mod; 14481 const struct btf_type *t; 14482 const char *sym_name; 14483 bool percpu = false; 14484 u32 type, id = insn->imm; 14485 struct btf *btf; 14486 s32 datasec_id; 14487 u64 addr; 14488 int i, btf_fd, err; 14489 14490 btf_fd = insn[1].imm; 14491 if (btf_fd) { 14492 btf = btf_get_by_fd(btf_fd); 14493 if (IS_ERR(btf)) { 14494 verbose(env, "invalid module BTF object FD specified.\n"); 14495 return -EINVAL; 14496 } 14497 } else { 14498 if (!btf_vmlinux) { 14499 verbose(env, "kernel is missing BTF, make sure CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF=y is specified in Kconfig.\n"); 14500 return -EINVAL; 14501 } 14502 btf = btf_vmlinux; 14503 btf_get(btf); 14504 } 14505 14506 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, id); 14507 if (!t) { 14508 verbose(env, "ldimm64 insn specifies invalid btf_id %d.\n", id); 14509 err = -ENOENT; 14510 goto err_put; 14511 } 14512 14513 if (!btf_type_is_var(t)) { 14514 verbose(env, "pseudo btf_id %d in ldimm64 isn't KIND_VAR.\n", id); 14515 err = -EINVAL; 14516 goto err_put; 14517 } 14518 14519 sym_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off); 14520 addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(sym_name); 14521 if (!addr) { 14522 verbose(env, "ldimm64 failed to find the address for kernel symbol '%s'.\n", 14523 sym_name); 14524 err = -ENOENT; 14525 goto err_put; 14526 } 14527 14528 datasec_id = find_btf_percpu_datasec(btf); 14529 if (datasec_id > 0) { 14530 datasec = btf_type_by_id(btf, datasec_id); 14531 for_each_vsi(i, datasec, vsi) { 14532 if (vsi->type == id) { 14533 percpu = true; 14534 break; 14535 } 14536 } 14537 } 14538 14539 insn[0].imm = (u32)addr; 14540 insn[1].imm = addr >> 32; 14541 14542 type = t->type; 14543 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, type, NULL); 14544 if (percpu) { 14545 aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU; 14546 aux->btf_var.btf = btf; 14547 aux->btf_var.btf_id = type; 14548 } else if (!btf_type_is_struct(t)) { 14549 const struct btf_type *ret; 14550 const char *tname; 14551 u32 tsize; 14552 14553 /* resolve the type size of ksym. */ 14554 ret = btf_resolve_size(btf, t, &tsize); 14555 if (IS_ERR(ret)) { 14556 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off); 14557 verbose(env, "ldimm64 unable to resolve the size of type '%s': %ld\n", 14558 tname, PTR_ERR(ret)); 14559 err = -EINVAL; 14560 goto err_put; 14561 } 14562 aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY; 14563 aux->btf_var.mem_size = tsize; 14564 } else { 14565 aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 14566 aux->btf_var.btf = btf; 14567 aux->btf_var.btf_id = type; 14568 } 14569 14570 /* check whether we recorded this BTF (and maybe module) already */ 14571 for (i = 0; i < env->used_btf_cnt; i++) { 14572 if (env->used_btfs[i].btf == btf) { 14573 btf_put(btf); 14574 return 0; 14575 } 14576 } 14577 14578 if (env->used_btf_cnt >= MAX_USED_BTFS) { 14579 err = -E2BIG; 14580 goto err_put; 14581 } 14582 14583 btf_mod = &env->used_btfs[env->used_btf_cnt]; 14584 btf_mod->btf = btf; 14585 btf_mod->module = NULL; 14586 14587 /* if we reference variables from kernel module, bump its refcount */ 14588 if (btf_is_module(btf)) { 14589 btf_mod->module = btf_try_get_module(btf); 14590 if (!btf_mod->module) { 14591 err = -ENXIO; 14592 goto err_put; 14593 } 14594 } 14595 14596 env->used_btf_cnt++; 14597 14598 return 0; 14599 err_put: 14600 btf_put(btf); 14601 return err; 14602 } 14603 14604 static bool is_tracing_prog_type(enum bpf_prog_type type) 14605 { 14606 switch (type) { 14607 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE: 14608 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT: 14609 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT: 14610 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT: 14611 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT_WRITABLE: 14612 return true; 14613 default: 14614 return false; 14615 } 14616 } 14617 14618 static int check_map_prog_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 14619 struct bpf_map *map, 14620 struct bpf_prog *prog) 14621 14622 { 14623 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(prog); 14624 14625 if (btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_LIST_HEAD)) { 14626 if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type)) { 14627 verbose(env, "tracing progs cannot use bpf_list_head yet\n"); 14628 return -EINVAL; 14629 } 14630 } 14631 14632 if (btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_SPIN_LOCK)) { 14633 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) { 14634 verbose(env, "socket filter progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n"); 14635 return -EINVAL; 14636 } 14637 14638 if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type)) { 14639 verbose(env, "tracing progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n"); 14640 return -EINVAL; 14641 } 14642 14643 if (prog->aux->sleepable) { 14644 verbose(env, "sleepable progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n"); 14645 return -EINVAL; 14646 } 14647 } 14648 14649 if (btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_TIMER)) { 14650 if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type)) { 14651 verbose(env, "tracing progs cannot use bpf_timer yet\n"); 14652 return -EINVAL; 14653 } 14654 } 14655 14656 if ((bpf_prog_is_offloaded(prog->aux) || bpf_map_is_offloaded(map)) && 14657 !bpf_offload_prog_map_match(prog, map)) { 14658 verbose(env, "offload device mismatch between prog and map\n"); 14659 return -EINVAL; 14660 } 14661 14662 if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) { 14663 verbose(env, "bpf_struct_ops map cannot be used in prog\n"); 14664 return -EINVAL; 14665 } 14666 14667 if (prog->aux->sleepable) 14668 switch (map->map_type) { 14669 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH: 14670 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_HASH: 14671 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY: 14672 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH: 14673 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY: 14674 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_PERCPU_HASH: 14675 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS: 14676 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS: 14677 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF: 14678 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF: 14679 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE: 14680 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE: 14681 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE: 14682 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE: 14683 break; 14684 default: 14685 verbose(env, 14686 "Sleepable programs can only use array, hash, ringbuf and local storage maps\n"); 14687 return -EINVAL; 14688 } 14689 14690 return 0; 14691 } 14692 14693 static bool bpf_map_is_cgroup_storage(struct bpf_map *map) 14694 { 14695 return (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE || 14696 map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE); 14697 } 14698 14699 /* find and rewrite pseudo imm in ld_imm64 instructions: 14700 * 14701 * 1. if it accesses map FD, replace it with actual map pointer. 14702 * 2. if it accesses btf_id of a VAR, replace it with pointer to the var. 14703 * 14704 * NOTE: btf_vmlinux is required for converting pseudo btf_id. 14705 */ 14706 static int resolve_pseudo_ldimm64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 14707 { 14708 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 14709 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 14710 int i, j, err; 14711 14712 err = bpf_prog_calc_tag(env->prog); 14713 if (err) 14714 return err; 14715 14716 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 14717 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX && 14718 (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0)) { 14719 verbose(env, "BPF_LDX uses reserved fields\n"); 14720 return -EINVAL; 14721 } 14722 14723 if (insn[0].code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) { 14724 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux; 14725 struct bpf_map *map; 14726 struct fd f; 14727 u64 addr; 14728 u32 fd; 14729 14730 if (i == insn_cnt - 1 || insn[1].code != 0 || 14731 insn[1].dst_reg != 0 || insn[1].src_reg != 0 || 14732 insn[1].off != 0) { 14733 verbose(env, "invalid bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n"); 14734 return -EINVAL; 14735 } 14736 14737 if (insn[0].src_reg == 0) 14738 /* valid generic load 64-bit imm */ 14739 goto next_insn; 14740 14741 if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_BTF_ID) { 14742 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i]; 14743 err = check_pseudo_btf_id(env, insn, aux); 14744 if (err) 14745 return err; 14746 goto next_insn; 14747 } 14748 14749 if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) { 14750 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i]; 14751 aux->ptr_type = PTR_TO_FUNC; 14752 goto next_insn; 14753 } 14754 14755 /* In final convert_pseudo_ld_imm64() step, this is 14756 * converted into regular 64-bit imm load insn. 14757 */ 14758 switch (insn[0].src_reg) { 14759 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE: 14760 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE: 14761 break; 14762 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD: 14763 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX: 14764 if (insn[1].imm == 0) 14765 break; 14766 fallthrough; 14767 default: 14768 verbose(env, "unrecognized bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n"); 14769 return -EINVAL; 14770 } 14771 14772 switch (insn[0].src_reg) { 14773 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE: 14774 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX: 14775 if (bpfptr_is_null(env->fd_array)) { 14776 verbose(env, "fd_idx without fd_array is invalid\n"); 14777 return -EPROTO; 14778 } 14779 if (copy_from_bpfptr_offset(&fd, env->fd_array, 14780 insn[0].imm * sizeof(fd), 14781 sizeof(fd))) 14782 return -EFAULT; 14783 break; 14784 default: 14785 fd = insn[0].imm; 14786 break; 14787 } 14788 14789 f = fdget(fd); 14790 map = __bpf_map_get(f); 14791 if (IS_ERR(map)) { 14792 verbose(env, "fd %d is not pointing to valid bpf_map\n", 14793 insn[0].imm); 14794 return PTR_ERR(map); 14795 } 14796 14797 err = check_map_prog_compatibility(env, map, env->prog); 14798 if (err) { 14799 fdput(f); 14800 return err; 14801 } 14802 14803 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i]; 14804 if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD || 14805 insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX) { 14806 addr = (unsigned long)map; 14807 } else { 14808 u32 off = insn[1].imm; 14809 14810 if (off >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 14811 verbose(env, "direct value offset of %u is not allowed\n", off); 14812 fdput(f); 14813 return -EINVAL; 14814 } 14815 14816 if (!map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) { 14817 verbose(env, "no direct value access support for this map type\n"); 14818 fdput(f); 14819 return -EINVAL; 14820 } 14821 14822 err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &addr, off); 14823 if (err) { 14824 verbose(env, "invalid access to map value pointer, value_size=%u off=%u\n", 14825 map->value_size, off); 14826 fdput(f); 14827 return err; 14828 } 14829 14830 aux->map_off = off; 14831 addr += off; 14832 } 14833 14834 insn[0].imm = (u32)addr; 14835 insn[1].imm = addr >> 32; 14836 14837 /* check whether we recorded this map already */ 14838 for (j = 0; j < env->used_map_cnt; j++) { 14839 if (env->used_maps[j] == map) { 14840 aux->map_index = j; 14841 fdput(f); 14842 goto next_insn; 14843 } 14844 } 14845 14846 if (env->used_map_cnt >= MAX_USED_MAPS) { 14847 fdput(f); 14848 return -E2BIG; 14849 } 14850 14851 /* hold the map. If the program is rejected by verifier, 14852 * the map will be released by release_maps() or it 14853 * will be used by the valid program until it's unloaded 14854 * and all maps are released in free_used_maps() 14855 */ 14856 bpf_map_inc(map); 14857 14858 aux->map_index = env->used_map_cnt; 14859 env->used_maps[env->used_map_cnt++] = map; 14860 14861 if (bpf_map_is_cgroup_storage(map) && 14862 bpf_cgroup_storage_assign(env->prog->aux, map)) { 14863 verbose(env, "only one cgroup storage of each type is allowed\n"); 14864 fdput(f); 14865 return -EBUSY; 14866 } 14867 14868 fdput(f); 14869 next_insn: 14870 insn++; 14871 i++; 14872 continue; 14873 } 14874 14875 /* Basic sanity check before we invest more work here. */ 14876 if (!bpf_opcode_in_insntable(insn->code)) { 14877 verbose(env, "unknown opcode %02x\n", insn->code); 14878 return -EINVAL; 14879 } 14880 } 14881 14882 /* now all pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions load valid 14883 * 'struct bpf_map *' into a register instead of user map_fd. 14884 * These pointers will be used later by verifier to validate map access. 14885 */ 14886 return 0; 14887 } 14888 14889 /* drop refcnt of maps used by the rejected program */ 14890 static void release_maps(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 14891 { 14892 __bpf_free_used_maps(env->prog->aux, env->used_maps, 14893 env->used_map_cnt); 14894 } 14895 14896 /* drop refcnt of maps used by the rejected program */ 14897 static void release_btfs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 14898 { 14899 __bpf_free_used_btfs(env->prog->aux, env->used_btfs, 14900 env->used_btf_cnt); 14901 } 14902 14903 /* convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic BPF_LD_IMM64 */ 14904 static void convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 14905 { 14906 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 14907 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 14908 int i; 14909 14910 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 14911 if (insn->code != (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) 14912 continue; 14913 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) 14914 continue; 14915 insn->src_reg = 0; 14916 } 14917 } 14918 14919 /* single env->prog->insni[off] instruction was replaced with the range 14920 * insni[off, off + cnt). Adjust corresponding insn_aux_data by copying 14921 * [0, off) and [off, end) to new locations, so the patched range stays zero 14922 */ 14923 static void adjust_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 14924 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *new_data, 14925 struct bpf_prog *new_prog, u32 off, u32 cnt) 14926 { 14927 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *old_data = env->insn_aux_data; 14928 struct bpf_insn *insn = new_prog->insnsi; 14929 u32 old_seen = old_data[off].seen; 14930 u32 prog_len; 14931 int i; 14932 14933 /* aux info at OFF always needs adjustment, no matter fast path 14934 * (cnt == 1) is taken or not. There is no guarantee INSN at OFF is the 14935 * original insn at old prog. 14936 */ 14937 old_data[off].zext_dst = insn_has_def32(env, insn + off + cnt - 1); 14938 14939 if (cnt == 1) 14940 return; 14941 prog_len = new_prog->len; 14942 14943 memcpy(new_data, old_data, sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * off); 14944 memcpy(new_data + off + cnt - 1, old_data + off, 14945 sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * (prog_len - off - cnt + 1)); 14946 for (i = off; i < off + cnt - 1; i++) { 14947 /* Expand insni[off]'s seen count to the patched range. */ 14948 new_data[i].seen = old_seen; 14949 new_data[i].zext_dst = insn_has_def32(env, insn + i); 14950 } 14951 env->insn_aux_data = new_data; 14952 vfree(old_data); 14953 } 14954 14955 static void adjust_subprog_starts(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 len) 14956 { 14957 int i; 14958 14959 if (len == 1) 14960 return; 14961 /* NOTE: fake 'exit' subprog should be updated as well. */ 14962 for (i = 0; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 14963 if (env->subprog_info[i].start <= off) 14964 continue; 14965 env->subprog_info[i].start += len - 1; 14966 } 14967 } 14968 14969 static void adjust_poke_descs(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 off, u32 len) 14970 { 14971 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *tab = prog->aux->poke_tab; 14972 int i, sz = prog->aux->size_poke_tab; 14973 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *desc; 14974 14975 for (i = 0; i < sz; i++) { 14976 desc = &tab[i]; 14977 if (desc->insn_idx <= off) 14978 continue; 14979 desc->insn_idx += len - 1; 14980 } 14981 } 14982 14983 static struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, 14984 const struct bpf_insn *patch, u32 len) 14985 { 14986 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 14987 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *new_data = NULL; 14988 14989 if (len > 1) { 14990 new_data = vzalloc(array_size(env->prog->len + len - 1, 14991 sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data))); 14992 if (!new_data) 14993 return NULL; 14994 } 14995 14996 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_single(env->prog, off, patch, len); 14997 if (IS_ERR(new_prog)) { 14998 if (PTR_ERR(new_prog) == -ERANGE) 14999 verbose(env, 15000 "insn %d cannot be patched due to 16-bit range\n", 15001 env->insn_aux_data[off].orig_idx); 15002 vfree(new_data); 15003 return NULL; 15004 } 15005 adjust_insn_aux_data(env, new_data, new_prog, off, len); 15006 adjust_subprog_starts(env, off, len); 15007 adjust_poke_descs(new_prog, off, len); 15008 return new_prog; 15009 } 15010 15011 static int adjust_subprog_starts_after_remove(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 15012 u32 off, u32 cnt) 15013 { 15014 int i, j; 15015 15016 /* find first prog starting at or after off (first to remove) */ 15017 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) 15018 if (env->subprog_info[i].start >= off) 15019 break; 15020 /* find first prog starting at or after off + cnt (first to stay) */ 15021 for (j = i; j < env->subprog_cnt; j++) 15022 if (env->subprog_info[j].start >= off + cnt) 15023 break; 15024 /* if j doesn't start exactly at off + cnt, we are just removing 15025 * the front of previous prog 15026 */ 15027 if (env->subprog_info[j].start != off + cnt) 15028 j--; 15029 15030 if (j > i) { 15031 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 15032 int move; 15033 15034 /* move fake 'exit' subprog as well */ 15035 move = env->subprog_cnt + 1 - j; 15036 15037 memmove(env->subprog_info + i, 15038 env->subprog_info + j, 15039 sizeof(*env->subprog_info) * move); 15040 env->subprog_cnt -= j - i; 15041 15042 /* remove func_info */ 15043 if (aux->func_info) { 15044 move = aux->func_info_cnt - j; 15045 15046 memmove(aux->func_info + i, 15047 aux->func_info + j, 15048 sizeof(*aux->func_info) * move); 15049 aux->func_info_cnt -= j - i; 15050 /* func_info->insn_off is set after all code rewrites, 15051 * in adjust_btf_func() - no need to adjust 15052 */ 15053 } 15054 } else { 15055 /* convert i from "first prog to remove" to "first to adjust" */ 15056 if (env->subprog_info[i].start == off) 15057 i++; 15058 } 15059 15060 /* update fake 'exit' subprog as well */ 15061 for (; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++) 15062 env->subprog_info[i].start -= cnt; 15063 15064 return 0; 15065 } 15066 15067 static int bpf_adj_linfo_after_remove(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, 15068 u32 cnt) 15069 { 15070 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 15071 u32 i, l_off, l_cnt, nr_linfo; 15072 struct bpf_line_info *linfo; 15073 15074 nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; 15075 if (!nr_linfo) 15076 return 0; 15077 15078 linfo = prog->aux->linfo; 15079 15080 /* find first line info to remove, count lines to be removed */ 15081 for (i = 0; i < nr_linfo; i++) 15082 if (linfo[i].insn_off >= off) 15083 break; 15084 15085 l_off = i; 15086 l_cnt = 0; 15087 for (; i < nr_linfo; i++) 15088 if (linfo[i].insn_off < off + cnt) 15089 l_cnt++; 15090 else 15091 break; 15092 15093 /* First live insn doesn't match first live linfo, it needs to "inherit" 15094 * last removed linfo. prog is already modified, so prog->len == off 15095 * means no live instructions after (tail of the program was removed). 15096 */ 15097 if (prog->len != off && l_cnt && 15098 (i == nr_linfo || linfo[i].insn_off != off + cnt)) { 15099 l_cnt--; 15100 linfo[--i].insn_off = off + cnt; 15101 } 15102 15103 /* remove the line info which refer to the removed instructions */ 15104 if (l_cnt) { 15105 memmove(linfo + l_off, linfo + i, 15106 sizeof(*linfo) * (nr_linfo - i)); 15107 15108 prog->aux->nr_linfo -= l_cnt; 15109 nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; 15110 } 15111 15112 /* pull all linfo[i].insn_off >= off + cnt in by cnt */ 15113 for (i = l_off; i < nr_linfo; i++) 15114 linfo[i].insn_off -= cnt; 15115 15116 /* fix up all subprogs (incl. 'exit') which start >= off */ 15117 for (i = 0; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++) 15118 if (env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx > l_off) { 15119 /* program may have started in the removed region but 15120 * may not be fully removed 15121 */ 15122 if (env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx >= l_off + l_cnt) 15123 env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx -= l_cnt; 15124 else 15125 env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx = l_off; 15126 } 15127 15128 return 0; 15129 } 15130 15131 static int verifier_remove_insns(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 cnt) 15132 { 15133 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 15134 unsigned int orig_prog_len = env->prog->len; 15135 int err; 15136 15137 if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) 15138 bpf_prog_offload_remove_insns(env, off, cnt); 15139 15140 err = bpf_remove_insns(env->prog, off, cnt); 15141 if (err) 15142 return err; 15143 15144 err = adjust_subprog_starts_after_remove(env, off, cnt); 15145 if (err) 15146 return err; 15147 15148 err = bpf_adj_linfo_after_remove(env, off, cnt); 15149 if (err) 15150 return err; 15151 15152 memmove(aux_data + off, aux_data + off + cnt, 15153 sizeof(*aux_data) * (orig_prog_len - off - cnt)); 15154 15155 return 0; 15156 } 15157 15158 /* The verifier does more data flow analysis than llvm and will not 15159 * explore branches that are dead at run time. Malicious programs can 15160 * have dead code too. Therefore replace all dead at-run-time code 15161 * with 'ja -1'. 15162 * 15163 * Just nops are not optimal, e.g. if they would sit at the end of the 15164 * program and through another bug we would manage to jump there, then 15165 * we'd execute beyond program memory otherwise. Returning exception 15166 * code also wouldn't work since we can have subprogs where the dead 15167 * code could be located. 15168 */ 15169 static void sanitize_dead_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 15170 { 15171 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 15172 struct bpf_insn trap = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, -1); 15173 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 15174 const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 15175 int i; 15176 15177 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 15178 if (aux_data[i].seen) 15179 continue; 15180 memcpy(insn + i, &trap, sizeof(trap)); 15181 aux_data[i].zext_dst = false; 15182 } 15183 } 15184 15185 static bool insn_is_cond_jump(u8 code) 15186 { 15187 u8 op; 15188 15189 if (BPF_CLASS(code) == BPF_JMP32) 15190 return true; 15191 15192 if (BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP) 15193 return false; 15194 15195 op = BPF_OP(code); 15196 return op != BPF_JA && op != BPF_EXIT && op != BPF_CALL; 15197 } 15198 15199 static void opt_hard_wire_dead_code_branches(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 15200 { 15201 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 15202 struct bpf_insn ja = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0); 15203 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 15204 const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 15205 int i; 15206 15207 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 15208 if (!insn_is_cond_jump(insn->code)) 15209 continue; 15210 15211 if (!aux_data[i + 1].seen) 15212 ja.off = insn->off; 15213 else if (!aux_data[i + 1 + insn->off].seen) 15214 ja.off = 0; 15215 else 15216 continue; 15217 15218 if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) 15219 bpf_prog_offload_replace_insn(env, i, &ja); 15220 15221 memcpy(insn, &ja, sizeof(ja)); 15222 } 15223 } 15224 15225 static int opt_remove_dead_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 15226 { 15227 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 15228 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 15229 int i, err; 15230 15231 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 15232 int j; 15233 15234 j = 0; 15235 while (i + j < insn_cnt && !aux_data[i + j].seen) 15236 j++; 15237 if (!j) 15238 continue; 15239 15240 err = verifier_remove_insns(env, i, j); 15241 if (err) 15242 return err; 15243 insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 15244 } 15245 15246 return 0; 15247 } 15248 15249 static int opt_remove_nops(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 15250 { 15251 const struct bpf_insn ja = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0); 15252 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 15253 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 15254 int i, err; 15255 15256 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 15257 if (memcmp(&insn[i], &ja, sizeof(ja))) 15258 continue; 15259 15260 err = verifier_remove_insns(env, i, 1); 15261 if (err) 15262 return err; 15263 insn_cnt--; 15264 i--; 15265 } 15266 15267 return 0; 15268 } 15269 15270 static int opt_subreg_zext_lo32_rnd_hi32(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 15271 const union bpf_attr *attr) 15272 { 15273 struct bpf_insn *patch, zext_patch[2], rnd_hi32_patch[4]; 15274 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = env->insn_aux_data; 15275 int i, patch_len, delta = 0, len = env->prog->len; 15276 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; 15277 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 15278 bool rnd_hi32; 15279 15280 rnd_hi32 = attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_TEST_RND_HI32; 15281 zext_patch[1] = BPF_ZEXT_REG(0); 15282 rnd_hi32_patch[1] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_AX, 0); 15283 rnd_hi32_patch[2] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_AX, 32); 15284 rnd_hi32_patch[3] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, 0, BPF_REG_AX); 15285 for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { 15286 int adj_idx = i + delta; 15287 struct bpf_insn insn; 15288 int load_reg; 15289 15290 insn = insns[adj_idx]; 15291 load_reg = insn_def_regno(&insn); 15292 if (!aux[adj_idx].zext_dst) { 15293 u8 code, class; 15294 u32 imm_rnd; 15295 15296 if (!rnd_hi32) 15297 continue; 15298 15299 code = insn.code; 15300 class = BPF_CLASS(code); 15301 if (load_reg == -1) 15302 continue; 15303 15304 /* NOTE: arg "reg" (the fourth one) is only used for 15305 * BPF_STX + SRC_OP, so it is safe to pass NULL 15306 * here. 15307 */ 15308 if (is_reg64(env, &insn, load_reg, NULL, DST_OP)) { 15309 if (class == BPF_LD && 15310 BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_IMM) 15311 i++; 15312 continue; 15313 } 15314 15315 /* ctx load could be transformed into wider load. */ 15316 if (class == BPF_LDX && 15317 aux[adj_idx].ptr_type == PTR_TO_CTX) 15318 continue; 15319 15320 imm_rnd = get_random_u32(); 15321 rnd_hi32_patch[0] = insn; 15322 rnd_hi32_patch[1].imm = imm_rnd; 15323 rnd_hi32_patch[3].dst_reg = load_reg; 15324 patch = rnd_hi32_patch; 15325 patch_len = 4; 15326 goto apply_patch_buffer; 15327 } 15328 15329 /* Add in an zero-extend instruction if a) the JIT has requested 15330 * it or b) it's a CMPXCHG. 15331 * 15332 * The latter is because: BPF_CMPXCHG always loads a value into 15333 * R0, therefore always zero-extends. However some archs' 15334 * equivalent instruction only does this load when the 15335 * comparison is successful. This detail of CMPXCHG is 15336 * orthogonal to the general zero-extension behaviour of the 15337 * CPU, so it's treated independently of bpf_jit_needs_zext. 15338 */ 15339 if (!bpf_jit_needs_zext() && !is_cmpxchg_insn(&insn)) 15340 continue; 15341 15342 /* Zero-extension is done by the caller. */ 15343 if (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(&insn)) 15344 continue; 15345 15346 if (WARN_ON(load_reg == -1)) { 15347 verbose(env, "verifier bug. zext_dst is set, but no reg is defined\n"); 15348 return -EFAULT; 15349 } 15350 15351 zext_patch[0] = insn; 15352 zext_patch[1].dst_reg = load_reg; 15353 zext_patch[1].src_reg = load_reg; 15354 patch = zext_patch; 15355 patch_len = 2; 15356 apply_patch_buffer: 15357 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, adj_idx, patch, patch_len); 15358 if (!new_prog) 15359 return -ENOMEM; 15360 env->prog = new_prog; 15361 insns = new_prog->insnsi; 15362 aux = env->insn_aux_data; 15363 delta += patch_len - 1; 15364 } 15365 15366 return 0; 15367 } 15368 15369 /* convert load instructions that access fields of a context type into a 15370 * sequence of instructions that access fields of the underlying structure: 15371 * struct __sk_buff -> struct sk_buff 15372 * struct bpf_sock_ops -> struct sock 15373 */ 15374 static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 15375 { 15376 const struct bpf_verifier_ops *ops = env->ops; 15377 int i, cnt, size, ctx_field_size, delta = 0; 15378 const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 15379 struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16], *insn; 15380 u32 target_size, size_default, off; 15381 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 15382 enum bpf_access_type type; 15383 bool is_narrower_load; 15384 15385 if (ops->gen_prologue || env->seen_direct_write) { 15386 if (!ops->gen_prologue) { 15387 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 15388 return -EINVAL; 15389 } 15390 cnt = ops->gen_prologue(insn_buf, env->seen_direct_write, 15391 env->prog); 15392 if (cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) { 15393 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 15394 return -EINVAL; 15395 } else if (cnt) { 15396 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, 0, insn_buf, cnt); 15397 if (!new_prog) 15398 return -ENOMEM; 15399 15400 env->prog = new_prog; 15401 delta += cnt - 1; 15402 } 15403 } 15404 15405 if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) 15406 return 0; 15407 15408 insn = env->prog->insnsi + delta; 15409 15410 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 15411 bpf_convert_ctx_access_t convert_ctx_access; 15412 bool ctx_access; 15413 15414 if (insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || 15415 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || 15416 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || 15417 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW)) { 15418 type = BPF_READ; 15419 ctx_access = true; 15420 } else if (insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || 15421 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || 15422 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || 15423 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW) || 15424 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || 15425 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || 15426 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || 15427 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW)) { 15428 type = BPF_WRITE; 15429 ctx_access = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX; 15430 } else { 15431 continue; 15432 } 15433 15434 if (type == BPF_WRITE && 15435 env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].sanitize_stack_spill) { 15436 struct bpf_insn patch[] = { 15437 *insn, 15438 BPF_ST_NOSPEC(), 15439 }; 15440 15441 cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(patch); 15442 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, patch, cnt); 15443 if (!new_prog) 15444 return -ENOMEM; 15445 15446 delta += cnt - 1; 15447 env->prog = new_prog; 15448 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 15449 continue; 15450 } 15451 15452 if (!ctx_access) 15453 continue; 15454 15455 switch ((int)env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ptr_type) { 15456 case PTR_TO_CTX: 15457 if (!ops->convert_ctx_access) 15458 continue; 15459 convert_ctx_access = ops->convert_ctx_access; 15460 break; 15461 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 15462 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 15463 convert_ctx_access = bpf_sock_convert_ctx_access; 15464 break; 15465 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 15466 convert_ctx_access = bpf_tcp_sock_convert_ctx_access; 15467 break; 15468 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 15469 convert_ctx_access = bpf_xdp_sock_convert_ctx_access; 15470 break; 15471 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 15472 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED: 15473 /* PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC always has a valid lifetime, unlike 15474 * PTR_TO_BTF_ID, and an active ref_obj_id, but the same cannot 15475 * be said once it is marked PTR_UNTRUSTED, hence we must handle 15476 * any faults for loads into such types. BPF_WRITE is disallowed 15477 * for this case. 15478 */ 15479 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_UNTRUSTED: 15480 if (type == BPF_READ) { 15481 insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEM | 15482 BPF_SIZE((insn)->code); 15483 env->prog->aux->num_exentries++; 15484 } 15485 continue; 15486 default: 15487 continue; 15488 } 15489 15490 ctx_field_size = env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ctx_field_size; 15491 size = BPF_LDST_BYTES(insn); 15492 15493 /* If the read access is a narrower load of the field, 15494 * convert to a 4/8-byte load, to minimum program type specific 15495 * convert_ctx_access changes. If conversion is successful, 15496 * we will apply proper mask to the result. 15497 */ 15498 is_narrower_load = size < ctx_field_size; 15499 size_default = bpf_ctx_off_adjust_machine(ctx_field_size); 15500 off = insn->off; 15501 if (is_narrower_load) { 15502 u8 size_code; 15503 15504 if (type == BPF_WRITE) { 15505 verbose(env, "bpf verifier narrow ctx access misconfigured\n"); 15506 return -EINVAL; 15507 } 15508 15509 size_code = BPF_H; 15510 if (ctx_field_size == 4) 15511 size_code = BPF_W; 15512 else if (ctx_field_size == 8) 15513 size_code = BPF_DW; 15514 15515 insn->off = off & ~(size_default - 1); 15516 insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | size_code; 15517 } 15518 15519 target_size = 0; 15520 cnt = convert_ctx_access(type, insn, insn_buf, env->prog, 15521 &target_size); 15522 if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf) || 15523 (ctx_field_size && !target_size)) { 15524 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 15525 return -EINVAL; 15526 } 15527 15528 if (is_narrower_load && size < target_size) { 15529 u8 shift = bpf_ctx_narrow_access_offset( 15530 off, size, size_default) * 8; 15531 if (shift && cnt + 1 >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) { 15532 verbose(env, "bpf verifier narrow ctx load misconfigured\n"); 15533 return -EINVAL; 15534 } 15535 if (ctx_field_size <= 4) { 15536 if (shift) 15537 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_RSH, 15538 insn->dst_reg, 15539 shift); 15540 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg, 15541 (1 << size * 8) - 1); 15542 } else { 15543 if (shift) 15544 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH, 15545 insn->dst_reg, 15546 shift); 15547 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg, 15548 (1ULL << size * 8) - 1); 15549 } 15550 } 15551 15552 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 15553 if (!new_prog) 15554 return -ENOMEM; 15555 15556 delta += cnt - 1; 15557 15558 /* keep walking new program and skip insns we just inserted */ 15559 env->prog = new_prog; 15560 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 15561 } 15562 15563 return 0; 15564 } 15565 15566 static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 15567 { 15568 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog, **func, *tmp; 15569 int i, j, subprog_start, subprog_end = 0, len, subprog; 15570 struct bpf_map *map_ptr; 15571 struct bpf_insn *insn; 15572 void *old_bpf_func; 15573 int err, num_exentries; 15574 15575 if (env->subprog_cnt <= 1) 15576 return 0; 15577 15578 for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { 15579 if (!bpf_pseudo_func(insn) && !bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 15580 continue; 15581 15582 /* Upon error here we cannot fall back to interpreter but 15583 * need a hard reject of the program. Thus -EFAULT is 15584 * propagated in any case. 15585 */ 15586 subprog = find_subprog(env, i + insn->imm + 1); 15587 if (subprog < 0) { 15588 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", 15589 i + insn->imm + 1); 15590 return -EFAULT; 15591 } 15592 /* temporarily remember subprog id inside insn instead of 15593 * aux_data, since next loop will split up all insns into funcs 15594 */ 15595 insn->off = subprog; 15596 /* remember original imm in case JIT fails and fallback 15597 * to interpreter will be needed 15598 */ 15599 env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm = insn->imm; 15600 /* point imm to __bpf_call_base+1 from JITs point of view */ 15601 insn->imm = 1; 15602 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) 15603 /* jit (e.g. x86_64) may emit fewer instructions 15604 * if it learns a u32 imm is the same as a u64 imm. 15605 * Force a non zero here. 15606 */ 15607 insn[1].imm = 1; 15608 } 15609 15610 err = bpf_prog_alloc_jited_linfo(prog); 15611 if (err) 15612 goto out_undo_insn; 15613 15614 err = -ENOMEM; 15615 func = kcalloc(env->subprog_cnt, sizeof(prog), GFP_KERNEL); 15616 if (!func) 15617 goto out_undo_insn; 15618 15619 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 15620 subprog_start = subprog_end; 15621 subprog_end = env->subprog_info[i + 1].start; 15622 15623 len = subprog_end - subprog_start; 15624 /* bpf_prog_run() doesn't call subprogs directly, 15625 * hence main prog stats include the runtime of subprogs. 15626 * subprogs don't have IDs and not reachable via prog_get_next_id 15627 * func[i]->stats will never be accessed and stays NULL 15628 */ 15629 func[i] = bpf_prog_alloc_no_stats(bpf_prog_size(len), GFP_USER); 15630 if (!func[i]) 15631 goto out_free; 15632 memcpy(func[i]->insnsi, &prog->insnsi[subprog_start], 15633 len * sizeof(struct bpf_insn)); 15634 func[i]->type = prog->type; 15635 func[i]->len = len; 15636 if (bpf_prog_calc_tag(func[i])) 15637 goto out_free; 15638 func[i]->is_func = 1; 15639 func[i]->aux->func_idx = i; 15640 /* Below members will be freed only at prog->aux */ 15641 func[i]->aux->btf = prog->aux->btf; 15642 func[i]->aux->func_info = prog->aux->func_info; 15643 func[i]->aux->func_info_cnt = prog->aux->func_info_cnt; 15644 func[i]->aux->poke_tab = prog->aux->poke_tab; 15645 func[i]->aux->size_poke_tab = prog->aux->size_poke_tab; 15646 15647 for (j = 0; j < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; j++) { 15648 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *poke; 15649 15650 poke = &prog->aux->poke_tab[j]; 15651 if (poke->insn_idx < subprog_end && 15652 poke->insn_idx >= subprog_start) 15653 poke->aux = func[i]->aux; 15654 } 15655 15656 func[i]->aux->name[0] = 'F'; 15657 func[i]->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth; 15658 func[i]->jit_requested = 1; 15659 func[i]->blinding_requested = prog->blinding_requested; 15660 func[i]->aux->kfunc_tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 15661 func[i]->aux->kfunc_btf_tab = prog->aux->kfunc_btf_tab; 15662 func[i]->aux->linfo = prog->aux->linfo; 15663 func[i]->aux->nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; 15664 func[i]->aux->jited_linfo = prog->aux->jited_linfo; 15665 func[i]->aux->linfo_idx = env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx; 15666 num_exentries = 0; 15667 insn = func[i]->insnsi; 15668 for (j = 0; j < func[i]->len; j++, insn++) { 15669 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX && 15670 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEM) 15671 num_exentries++; 15672 } 15673 func[i]->aux->num_exentries = num_exentries; 15674 func[i]->aux->tail_call_reachable = env->subprog_info[i].tail_call_reachable; 15675 func[i] = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]); 15676 if (!func[i]->jited) { 15677 err = -ENOTSUPP; 15678 goto out_free; 15679 } 15680 cond_resched(); 15681 } 15682 15683 /* at this point all bpf functions were successfully JITed 15684 * now populate all bpf_calls with correct addresses and 15685 * run last pass of JIT 15686 */ 15687 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 15688 insn = func[i]->insnsi; 15689 for (j = 0; j < func[i]->len; j++, insn++) { 15690 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { 15691 subprog = insn->off; 15692 insn[0].imm = (u32)(long)func[subprog]->bpf_func; 15693 insn[1].imm = ((u64)(long)func[subprog]->bpf_func) >> 32; 15694 continue; 15695 } 15696 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 15697 continue; 15698 subprog = insn->off; 15699 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(func[subprog]->bpf_func); 15700 } 15701 15702 /* we use the aux data to keep a list of the start addresses 15703 * of the JITed images for each function in the program 15704 * 15705 * for some architectures, such as powerpc64, the imm field 15706 * might not be large enough to hold the offset of the start 15707 * address of the callee's JITed image from __bpf_call_base 15708 * 15709 * in such cases, we can lookup the start address of a callee 15710 * by using its subprog id, available from the off field of 15711 * the call instruction, as an index for this list 15712 */ 15713 func[i]->aux->func = func; 15714 func[i]->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt; 15715 } 15716 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 15717 old_bpf_func = func[i]->bpf_func; 15718 tmp = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]); 15719 if (tmp != func[i] || func[i]->bpf_func != old_bpf_func) { 15720 verbose(env, "JIT doesn't support bpf-to-bpf calls\n"); 15721 err = -ENOTSUPP; 15722 goto out_free; 15723 } 15724 cond_resched(); 15725 } 15726 15727 /* finally lock prog and jit images for all functions and 15728 * populate kallsysm 15729 */ 15730 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 15731 bpf_prog_lock_ro(func[i]); 15732 bpf_prog_kallsyms_add(func[i]); 15733 } 15734 15735 /* Last step: make now unused interpreter insns from main 15736 * prog consistent for later dump requests, so they can 15737 * later look the same as if they were interpreted only. 15738 */ 15739 for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { 15740 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { 15741 insn[0].imm = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm; 15742 insn[1].imm = insn->off; 15743 insn->off = 0; 15744 continue; 15745 } 15746 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 15747 continue; 15748 insn->off = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm; 15749 subprog = find_subprog(env, i + insn->off + 1); 15750 insn->imm = subprog; 15751 } 15752 15753 prog->jited = 1; 15754 prog->bpf_func = func[0]->bpf_func; 15755 prog->jited_len = func[0]->jited_len; 15756 prog->aux->func = func; 15757 prog->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt; 15758 bpf_prog_jit_attempt_done(prog); 15759 return 0; 15760 out_free: 15761 /* We failed JIT'ing, so at this point we need to unregister poke 15762 * descriptors from subprogs, so that kernel is not attempting to 15763 * patch it anymore as we're freeing the subprog JIT memory. 15764 */ 15765 for (i = 0; i < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; i++) { 15766 map_ptr = prog->aux->poke_tab[i].tail_call.map; 15767 map_ptr->ops->map_poke_untrack(map_ptr, prog->aux); 15768 } 15769 /* At this point we're guaranteed that poke descriptors are not 15770 * live anymore. We can just unlink its descriptor table as it's 15771 * released with the main prog. 15772 */ 15773 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 15774 if (!func[i]) 15775 continue; 15776 func[i]->aux->poke_tab = NULL; 15777 bpf_jit_free(func[i]); 15778 } 15779 kfree(func); 15780 out_undo_insn: 15781 /* cleanup main prog to be interpreted */ 15782 prog->jit_requested = 0; 15783 prog->blinding_requested = 0; 15784 for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { 15785 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 15786 continue; 15787 insn->off = 0; 15788 insn->imm = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm; 15789 } 15790 bpf_prog_jit_attempt_done(prog); 15791 return err; 15792 } 15793 15794 static int fixup_call_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 15795 { 15796 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON 15797 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 15798 struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi; 15799 bool has_kfunc_call = bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call(prog); 15800 int i, depth; 15801 #endif 15802 int err = 0; 15803 15804 if (env->prog->jit_requested && 15805 !bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) { 15806 err = jit_subprogs(env); 15807 if (err == 0) 15808 return 0; 15809 if (err == -EFAULT) 15810 return err; 15811 } 15812 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON 15813 if (has_kfunc_call) { 15814 verbose(env, "calling kernel functions are not allowed in non-JITed programs\n"); 15815 return -EINVAL; 15816 } 15817 if (env->subprog_cnt > 1 && env->prog->aux->tail_call_reachable) { 15818 /* When JIT fails the progs with bpf2bpf calls and tail_calls 15819 * have to be rejected, since interpreter doesn't support them yet. 15820 */ 15821 verbose(env, "tail_calls are not allowed in non-JITed programs with bpf-to-bpf calls\n"); 15822 return -EINVAL; 15823 } 15824 for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { 15825 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { 15826 /* When JIT fails the progs with callback calls 15827 * have to be rejected, since interpreter doesn't support them yet. 15828 */ 15829 verbose(env, "callbacks are not allowed in non-JITed programs\n"); 15830 return -EINVAL; 15831 } 15832 15833 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 15834 continue; 15835 depth = get_callee_stack_depth(env, insn, i); 15836 if (depth < 0) 15837 return depth; 15838 bpf_patch_call_args(insn, depth); 15839 } 15840 err = 0; 15841 #endif 15842 return err; 15843 } 15844 15845 static int fixup_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 15846 struct bpf_insn *insn_buf, int insn_idx, int *cnt) 15847 { 15848 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc; 15849 void *xdp_kfunc; 15850 15851 if (!insn->imm) { 15852 verbose(env, "invalid kernel function call not eliminated in verifier pass\n"); 15853 return -EINVAL; 15854 } 15855 15856 *cnt = 0; 15857 15858 if (bpf_dev_bound_kfunc_id(insn->imm)) { 15859 xdp_kfunc = bpf_dev_bound_resolve_kfunc(env->prog, insn->imm); 15860 if (xdp_kfunc) { 15861 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(xdp_kfunc); 15862 return 0; 15863 } 15864 15865 /* fallback to default kfunc when not supported by netdev */ 15866 } 15867 15868 /* insn->imm has the btf func_id. Replace it with 15869 * an address (relative to __bpf_call_base). 15870 */ 15871 desc = find_kfunc_desc(env->prog, insn->imm, insn->off); 15872 if (!desc) { 15873 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: kernel function descriptor not found for func_id %u\n", 15874 insn->imm); 15875 return -EFAULT; 15876 } 15877 15878 insn->imm = desc->imm; 15879 if (insn->off) 15880 return 0; 15881 if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_new_impl]) { 15882 struct btf_struct_meta *kptr_struct_meta = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].kptr_struct_meta; 15883 struct bpf_insn addr[2] = { BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_2, (long)kptr_struct_meta) }; 15884 u64 obj_new_size = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].obj_new_size; 15885 15886 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_1, obj_new_size); 15887 insn_buf[1] = addr[0]; 15888 insn_buf[2] = addr[1]; 15889 insn_buf[3] = *insn; 15890 *cnt = 4; 15891 } else if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl]) { 15892 struct btf_struct_meta *kptr_struct_meta = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].kptr_struct_meta; 15893 struct bpf_insn addr[2] = { BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_2, (long)kptr_struct_meta) }; 15894 15895 insn_buf[0] = addr[0]; 15896 insn_buf[1] = addr[1]; 15897 insn_buf[2] = *insn; 15898 *cnt = 3; 15899 } else if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx] || 15900 desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rdonly_cast]) { 15901 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1); 15902 *cnt = 1; 15903 } 15904 return 0; 15905 } 15906 15907 /* Do various post-verification rewrites in a single program pass. 15908 * These rewrites simplify JIT and interpreter implementations. 15909 */ 15910 static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 15911 { 15912 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 15913 enum bpf_attach_type eatype = prog->expected_attach_type; 15914 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(prog); 15915 struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi; 15916 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn; 15917 const int insn_cnt = prog->len; 15918 const struct bpf_map_ops *ops; 15919 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux; 15920 struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16]; 15921 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 15922 struct bpf_map *map_ptr; 15923 int i, ret, cnt, delta = 0; 15924 15925 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 15926 /* Make divide-by-zero exceptions impossible. */ 15927 if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOD | BPF_X) || 15928 insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_DIV | BPF_X) || 15929 insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_MOD | BPF_X) || 15930 insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_DIV | BPF_X)) { 15931 bool is64 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64; 15932 bool isdiv = BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_DIV; 15933 struct bpf_insn *patchlet; 15934 struct bpf_insn chk_and_div[] = { 15935 /* [R,W]x div 0 -> 0 */ 15936 BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) | 15937 BPF_JNE | BPF_K, insn->src_reg, 15938 0, 2, 0), 15939 BPF_ALU32_REG(BPF_XOR, insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg), 15940 BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1), 15941 *insn, 15942 }; 15943 struct bpf_insn chk_and_mod[] = { 15944 /* [R,W]x mod 0 -> [R,W]x */ 15945 BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) | 15946 BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, insn->src_reg, 15947 0, 1 + (is64 ? 0 : 1), 0), 15948 *insn, 15949 BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1), 15950 BPF_MOV32_REG(insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg), 15951 }; 15952 15953 patchlet = isdiv ? chk_and_div : chk_and_mod; 15954 cnt = isdiv ? ARRAY_SIZE(chk_and_div) : 15955 ARRAY_SIZE(chk_and_mod) - (is64 ? 2 : 0); 15956 15957 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, patchlet, cnt); 15958 if (!new_prog) 15959 return -ENOMEM; 15960 15961 delta += cnt - 1; 15962 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 15963 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 15964 continue; 15965 } 15966 15967 /* Implement LD_ABS and LD_IND with a rewrite, if supported by the program type. */ 15968 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LD && 15969 (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS || 15970 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND)) { 15971 cnt = env->ops->gen_ld_abs(insn, insn_buf); 15972 if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) { 15973 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 15974 return -EINVAL; 15975 } 15976 15977 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 15978 if (!new_prog) 15979 return -ENOMEM; 15980 15981 delta += cnt - 1; 15982 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 15983 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 15984 continue; 15985 } 15986 15987 /* Rewrite pointer arithmetic to mitigate speculation attacks. */ 15988 if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ADD | BPF_X) || 15989 insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_SUB | BPF_X)) { 15990 const u8 code_add = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ADD | BPF_X; 15991 const u8 code_sub = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_SUB | BPF_X; 15992 struct bpf_insn *patch = &insn_buf[0]; 15993 bool issrc, isneg, isimm; 15994 u32 off_reg; 15995 15996 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta]; 15997 if (!aux->alu_state || 15998 aux->alu_state == BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER) 15999 continue; 16000 16001 isneg = aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE; 16002 issrc = (aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_SANITIZE) == 16003 BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC; 16004 isimm = aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_IMMEDIATE; 16005 16006 off_reg = issrc ? insn->src_reg : insn->dst_reg; 16007 if (isimm) { 16008 *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, aux->alu_limit); 16009 } else { 16010 if (isneg) 16011 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1); 16012 *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, aux->alu_limit); 16013 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg); 16014 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg); 16015 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_NEG, BPF_REG_AX, 0); 16016 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ARSH, BPF_REG_AX, 63); 16017 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg); 16018 } 16019 if (!issrc) 16020 *patch++ = BPF_MOV64_REG(insn->dst_reg, insn->src_reg); 16021 insn->src_reg = BPF_REG_AX; 16022 if (isneg) 16023 insn->code = insn->code == code_add ? 16024 code_sub : code_add; 16025 *patch++ = *insn; 16026 if (issrc && isneg && !isimm) 16027 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1); 16028 cnt = patch - insn_buf; 16029 16030 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 16031 if (!new_prog) 16032 return -ENOMEM; 16033 16034 delta += cnt - 1; 16035 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 16036 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 16037 continue; 16038 } 16039 16040 if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL)) 16041 continue; 16042 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 16043 continue; 16044 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) { 16045 ret = fixup_kfunc_call(env, insn, insn_buf, i + delta, &cnt); 16046 if (ret) 16047 return ret; 16048 if (cnt == 0) 16049 continue; 16050 16051 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 16052 if (!new_prog) 16053 return -ENOMEM; 16054 16055 delta += cnt - 1; 16056 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 16057 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 16058 continue; 16059 } 16060 16061 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm) 16062 prog->dst_needed = 1; 16063 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32) 16064 bpf_user_rnd_init_once(); 16065 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_override_return) 16066 prog->kprobe_override = 1; 16067 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) { 16068 /* If we tail call into other programs, we 16069 * cannot make any assumptions since they can 16070 * be replaced dynamically during runtime in 16071 * the program array. 16072 */ 16073 prog->cb_access = 1; 16074 if (!allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(env)) 16075 prog->aux->stack_depth = MAX_BPF_STACK; 16076 prog->aux->max_pkt_offset = MAX_PACKET_OFF; 16077 16078 /* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode to avoid 16079 * conditional branch in the interpreter for every normal 16080 * call and to prevent accidental JITing by JIT compiler 16081 * that doesn't support bpf_tail_call yet 16082 */ 16083 insn->imm = 0; 16084 insn->code = BPF_JMP | BPF_TAIL_CALL; 16085 16086 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta]; 16087 if (env->bpf_capable && !prog->blinding_requested && 16088 prog->jit_requested && 16089 !bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux) && 16090 !bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux) && 16091 !bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux)) { 16092 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor desc = { 16093 .reason = BPF_POKE_REASON_TAIL_CALL, 16094 .tail_call.map = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state), 16095 .tail_call.key = bpf_map_key_immediate(aux), 16096 .insn_idx = i + delta, 16097 }; 16098 16099 ret = bpf_jit_add_poke_descriptor(prog, &desc); 16100 if (ret < 0) { 16101 verbose(env, "adding tail call poke descriptor failed\n"); 16102 return ret; 16103 } 16104 16105 insn->imm = ret + 1; 16106 continue; 16107 } 16108 16109 if (!bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux)) 16110 continue; 16111 16112 /* instead of changing every JIT dealing with tail_call 16113 * emit two extra insns: 16114 * if (index >= max_entries) goto out; 16115 * index &= array->index_mask; 16116 * to avoid out-of-bounds cpu speculation 16117 */ 16118 if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux)) { 16119 verbose(env, "tail_call abusing map_ptr\n"); 16120 return -EINVAL; 16121 } 16122 16123 map_ptr = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state); 16124 insn_buf[0] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_3, 16125 map_ptr->max_entries, 2); 16126 insn_buf[1] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_3, 16127 container_of(map_ptr, 16128 struct bpf_array, 16129 map)->index_mask); 16130 insn_buf[2] = *insn; 16131 cnt = 3; 16132 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 16133 if (!new_prog) 16134 return -ENOMEM; 16135 16136 delta += cnt - 1; 16137 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 16138 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 16139 continue; 16140 } 16141 16142 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback) { 16143 /* The verifier will process callback_fn as many times as necessary 16144 * with different maps and the register states prepared by 16145 * set_timer_callback_state will be accurate. 16146 * 16147 * The following use case is valid: 16148 * map1 is shared by prog1, prog2, prog3. 16149 * prog1 calls bpf_timer_init for some map1 elements 16150 * prog2 calls bpf_timer_set_callback for some map1 elements. 16151 * Those that were not bpf_timer_init-ed will return -EINVAL. 16152 * prog3 calls bpf_timer_start for some map1 elements. 16153 * Those that were not both bpf_timer_init-ed and 16154 * bpf_timer_set_callback-ed will return -EINVAL. 16155 */ 16156 struct bpf_insn ld_addrs[2] = { 16157 BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_3, (long)prog->aux), 16158 }; 16159 16160 insn_buf[0] = ld_addrs[0]; 16161 insn_buf[1] = ld_addrs[1]; 16162 insn_buf[2] = *insn; 16163 cnt = 3; 16164 16165 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 16166 if (!new_prog) 16167 return -ENOMEM; 16168 16169 delta += cnt - 1; 16170 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 16171 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 16172 goto patch_call_imm; 16173 } 16174 16175 if (is_storage_get_function(insn->imm)) { 16176 if (!env->prog->aux->sleepable || 16177 env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].storage_get_func_atomic) 16178 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_5, (__force __s32)GFP_ATOMIC); 16179 else 16180 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_5, (__force __s32)GFP_KERNEL); 16181 insn_buf[1] = *insn; 16182 cnt = 2; 16183 16184 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 16185 if (!new_prog) 16186 return -ENOMEM; 16187 16188 delta += cnt - 1; 16189 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 16190 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 16191 goto patch_call_imm; 16192 } 16193 16194 /* BPF_EMIT_CALL() assumptions in some of the map_gen_lookup 16195 * and other inlining handlers are currently limited to 64 bit 16196 * only. 16197 */ 16198 if (prog->jit_requested && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 && 16199 (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem || 16200 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem || 16201 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem || 16202 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem || 16203 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem || 16204 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem || 16205 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_redirect_map || 16206 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem || 16207 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem)) { 16208 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta]; 16209 if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux)) 16210 goto patch_call_imm; 16211 16212 map_ptr = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state); 16213 ops = map_ptr->ops; 16214 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 16215 ops->map_gen_lookup) { 16216 cnt = ops->map_gen_lookup(map_ptr, insn_buf); 16217 if (cnt == -EOPNOTSUPP) 16218 goto patch_map_ops_generic; 16219 if (cnt <= 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) { 16220 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 16221 return -EINVAL; 16222 } 16223 16224 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, 16225 insn_buf, cnt); 16226 if (!new_prog) 16227 return -ENOMEM; 16228 16229 delta += cnt - 1; 16230 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 16231 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 16232 continue; 16233 } 16234 16235 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_lookup_elem, 16236 (void *(*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key))NULL)); 16237 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_delete_elem, 16238 (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key))NULL)); 16239 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_update_elem, 16240 (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value, 16241 u64 flags))NULL)); 16242 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_push_elem, 16243 (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value, 16244 u64 flags))NULL)); 16245 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_pop_elem, 16246 (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value))NULL)); 16247 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_peek_elem, 16248 (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value))NULL)); 16249 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_redirect, 16250 (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, u64 index, u64 flags))NULL)); 16251 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_for_each_callback, 16252 (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, 16253 bpf_callback_t callback_fn, 16254 void *callback_ctx, 16255 u64 flags))NULL)); 16256 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_lookup_percpu_elem, 16257 (void *(*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, u32 cpu))NULL)); 16258 16259 patch_map_ops_generic: 16260 switch (insn->imm) { 16261 case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem: 16262 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_lookup_elem); 16263 continue; 16264 case BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem: 16265 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_update_elem); 16266 continue; 16267 case BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem: 16268 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_delete_elem); 16269 continue; 16270 case BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem: 16271 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_push_elem); 16272 continue; 16273 case BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem: 16274 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_pop_elem); 16275 continue; 16276 case BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem: 16277 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_peek_elem); 16278 continue; 16279 case BPF_FUNC_redirect_map: 16280 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_redirect); 16281 continue; 16282 case BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem: 16283 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_for_each_callback); 16284 continue; 16285 case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem: 16286 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_lookup_percpu_elem); 16287 continue; 16288 } 16289 16290 goto patch_call_imm; 16291 } 16292 16293 /* Implement bpf_jiffies64 inline. */ 16294 if (prog->jit_requested && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 && 16295 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_jiffies64) { 16296 struct bpf_insn ld_jiffies_addr[2] = { 16297 BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_0, 16298 (unsigned long)&jiffies), 16299 }; 16300 16301 insn_buf[0] = ld_jiffies_addr[0]; 16302 insn_buf[1] = ld_jiffies_addr[1]; 16303 insn_buf[2] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 16304 BPF_REG_0, 0); 16305 cnt = 3; 16306 16307 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, 16308 cnt); 16309 if (!new_prog) 16310 return -ENOMEM; 16311 16312 delta += cnt - 1; 16313 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 16314 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 16315 continue; 16316 } 16317 16318 /* Implement bpf_get_func_arg inline. */ 16319 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 16320 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_arg) { 16321 /* Load nr_args from ctx - 8 */ 16322 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -8); 16323 insn_buf[1] = BPF_JMP32_REG(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_0, 6); 16324 insn_buf[2] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_2, 3); 16325 insn_buf[3] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1); 16326 insn_buf[4] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2, 0); 16327 insn_buf[5] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, 0); 16328 insn_buf[6] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0); 16329 insn_buf[7] = BPF_JMP_A(1); 16330 insn_buf[8] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, -EINVAL); 16331 cnt = 9; 16332 16333 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 16334 if (!new_prog) 16335 return -ENOMEM; 16336 16337 delta += cnt - 1; 16338 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 16339 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 16340 continue; 16341 } 16342 16343 /* Implement bpf_get_func_ret inline. */ 16344 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 16345 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_ret) { 16346 if (eatype == BPF_TRACE_FEXIT || 16347 eatype == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) { 16348 /* Load nr_args from ctx - 8 */ 16349 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -8); 16350 insn_buf[1] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_0, 3); 16351 insn_buf[2] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1); 16352 insn_buf[3] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, 0); 16353 insn_buf[4] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, 0); 16354 insn_buf[5] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0); 16355 cnt = 6; 16356 } else { 16357 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, -EOPNOTSUPP); 16358 cnt = 1; 16359 } 16360 16361 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 16362 if (!new_prog) 16363 return -ENOMEM; 16364 16365 delta += cnt - 1; 16366 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 16367 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 16368 continue; 16369 } 16370 16371 /* Implement get_func_arg_cnt inline. */ 16372 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 16373 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_arg_cnt) { 16374 /* Load nr_args from ctx - 8 */ 16375 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -8); 16376 16377 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, 1); 16378 if (!new_prog) 16379 return -ENOMEM; 16380 16381 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 16382 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 16383 continue; 16384 } 16385 16386 /* Implement bpf_get_func_ip inline. */ 16387 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 16388 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_ip) { 16389 /* Load IP address from ctx - 16 */ 16390 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -16); 16391 16392 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, 1); 16393 if (!new_prog) 16394 return -ENOMEM; 16395 16396 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 16397 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 16398 continue; 16399 } 16400 16401 patch_call_imm: 16402 fn = env->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm, env->prog); 16403 /* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed 16404 * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions 16405 */ 16406 if (!fn->func) { 16407 verbose(env, 16408 "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n", 16409 func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm); 16410 return -EFAULT; 16411 } 16412 insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base; 16413 } 16414 16415 /* Since poke tab is now finalized, publish aux to tracker. */ 16416 for (i = 0; i < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; i++) { 16417 map_ptr = prog->aux->poke_tab[i].tail_call.map; 16418 if (!map_ptr->ops->map_poke_track || 16419 !map_ptr->ops->map_poke_untrack || 16420 !map_ptr->ops->map_poke_run) { 16421 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 16422 return -EINVAL; 16423 } 16424 16425 ret = map_ptr->ops->map_poke_track(map_ptr, prog->aux); 16426 if (ret < 0) { 16427 verbose(env, "tracking tail call prog failed\n"); 16428 return ret; 16429 } 16430 } 16431 16432 sort_kfunc_descs_by_imm(env->prog); 16433 16434 return 0; 16435 } 16436 16437 static struct bpf_prog *inline_bpf_loop(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 16438 int position, 16439 s32 stack_base, 16440 u32 callback_subprogno, 16441 u32 *cnt) 16442 { 16443 s32 r6_offset = stack_base + 0 * BPF_REG_SIZE; 16444 s32 r7_offset = stack_base + 1 * BPF_REG_SIZE; 16445 s32 r8_offset = stack_base + 2 * BPF_REG_SIZE; 16446 int reg_loop_max = BPF_REG_6; 16447 int reg_loop_cnt = BPF_REG_7; 16448 int reg_loop_ctx = BPF_REG_8; 16449 16450 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 16451 u32 callback_start; 16452 u32 call_insn_offset; 16453 s32 callback_offset; 16454 16455 /* This represents an inlined version of bpf_iter.c:bpf_loop, 16456 * be careful to modify this code in sync. 16457 */ 16458 struct bpf_insn insn_buf[] = { 16459 /* Return error and jump to the end of the patch if 16460 * expected number of iterations is too big. 16461 */ 16462 BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JLE, BPF_REG_1, BPF_MAX_LOOPS, 2), 16463 BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_0, -E2BIG), 16464 BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 16), 16465 /* spill R6, R7, R8 to use these as loop vars */ 16466 BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_6, r6_offset), 16467 BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_7, r7_offset), 16468 BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_8, r8_offset), 16469 /* initialize loop vars */ 16470 BPF_MOV64_REG(reg_loop_max, BPF_REG_1), 16471 BPF_MOV32_IMM(reg_loop_cnt, 0), 16472 BPF_MOV64_REG(reg_loop_ctx, BPF_REG_3), 16473 /* loop header, 16474 * if reg_loop_cnt >= reg_loop_max skip the loop body 16475 */ 16476 BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGE, reg_loop_cnt, reg_loop_max, 5), 16477 /* callback call, 16478 * correct callback offset would be set after patching 16479 */ 16480 BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, reg_loop_cnt), 16481 BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, reg_loop_ctx), 16482 BPF_CALL_REL(0), 16483 /* increment loop counter */ 16484 BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, reg_loop_cnt, 1), 16485 /* jump to loop header if callback returned 0 */ 16486 BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, -6), 16487 /* return value of bpf_loop, 16488 * set R0 to the number of iterations 16489 */ 16490 BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, reg_loop_cnt), 16491 /* restore original values of R6, R7, R8 */ 16492 BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_10, r6_offset), 16493 BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_10, r7_offset), 16494 BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_10, r8_offset), 16495 }; 16496 16497 *cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf); 16498 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, position, insn_buf, *cnt); 16499 if (!new_prog) 16500 return new_prog; 16501 16502 /* callback start is known only after patching */ 16503 callback_start = env->subprog_info[callback_subprogno].start; 16504 /* Note: insn_buf[12] is an offset of BPF_CALL_REL instruction */ 16505 call_insn_offset = position + 12; 16506 callback_offset = callback_start - call_insn_offset - 1; 16507 new_prog->insnsi[call_insn_offset].imm = callback_offset; 16508 16509 return new_prog; 16510 } 16511 16512 static bool is_bpf_loop_call(struct bpf_insn *insn) 16513 { 16514 return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 16515 insn->src_reg == 0 && 16516 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_loop; 16517 } 16518 16519 /* For all sub-programs in the program (including main) check 16520 * insn_aux_data to see if there are bpf_loop calls that require 16521 * inlining. If such calls are found the calls are replaced with a 16522 * sequence of instructions produced by `inline_bpf_loop` function and 16523 * subprog stack_depth is increased by the size of 3 registers. 16524 * This stack space is used to spill values of the R6, R7, R8. These 16525 * registers are used to store the loop bound, counter and context 16526 * variables. 16527 */ 16528 static int optimize_bpf_loop(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 16529 { 16530 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprogs = env->subprog_info; 16531 int i, cur_subprog = 0, cnt, delta = 0; 16532 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 16533 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 16534 u16 stack_depth = subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth; 16535 u16 stack_depth_roundup = round_up(stack_depth, 8) - stack_depth; 16536 u16 stack_depth_extra = 0; 16537 16538 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 16539 struct bpf_loop_inline_state *inline_state = 16540 &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].loop_inline_state; 16541 16542 if (is_bpf_loop_call(insn) && inline_state->fit_for_inline) { 16543 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 16544 16545 stack_depth_extra = BPF_REG_SIZE * 3 + stack_depth_roundup; 16546 new_prog = inline_bpf_loop(env, 16547 i + delta, 16548 -(stack_depth + stack_depth_extra), 16549 inline_state->callback_subprogno, 16550 &cnt); 16551 if (!new_prog) 16552 return -ENOMEM; 16553 16554 delta += cnt - 1; 16555 env->prog = new_prog; 16556 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 16557 } 16558 16559 if (subprogs[cur_subprog + 1].start == i + delta + 1) { 16560 subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth += stack_depth_extra; 16561 cur_subprog++; 16562 stack_depth = subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth; 16563 stack_depth_roundup = round_up(stack_depth, 8) - stack_depth; 16564 stack_depth_extra = 0; 16565 } 16566 } 16567 16568 env->prog->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[0].stack_depth; 16569 16570 return 0; 16571 } 16572 16573 static void free_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 16574 { 16575 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl, *sln; 16576 int i; 16577 16578 sl = env->free_list; 16579 while (sl) { 16580 sln = sl->next; 16581 free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false); 16582 kfree(sl); 16583 sl = sln; 16584 } 16585 env->free_list = NULL; 16586 16587 if (!env->explored_states) 16588 return; 16589 16590 for (i = 0; i < state_htab_size(env); i++) { 16591 sl = env->explored_states[i]; 16592 16593 while (sl) { 16594 sln = sl->next; 16595 free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false); 16596 kfree(sl); 16597 sl = sln; 16598 } 16599 env->explored_states[i] = NULL; 16600 } 16601 } 16602 16603 static int do_check_common(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog) 16604 { 16605 bool pop_log = !(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2); 16606 struct bpf_verifier_state *state; 16607 struct bpf_reg_state *regs; 16608 int ret, i; 16609 16610 env->prev_linfo = NULL; 16611 env->pass_cnt++; 16612 16613 state = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state), GFP_KERNEL); 16614 if (!state) 16615 return -ENOMEM; 16616 state->curframe = 0; 16617 state->speculative = false; 16618 state->branches = 1; 16619 state->frame[0] = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_func_state), GFP_KERNEL); 16620 if (!state->frame[0]) { 16621 kfree(state); 16622 return -ENOMEM; 16623 } 16624 env->cur_state = state; 16625 init_func_state(env, state->frame[0], 16626 BPF_MAIN_FUNC /* callsite */, 16627 0 /* frameno */, 16628 subprog); 16629 state->first_insn_idx = env->subprog_info[subprog].start; 16630 state->last_insn_idx = -1; 16631 16632 regs = state->frame[state->curframe]->regs; 16633 if (subprog || env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) { 16634 ret = btf_prepare_func_args(env, subprog, regs); 16635 if (ret) 16636 goto out; 16637 for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) { 16638 if (regs[i].type == PTR_TO_CTX) 16639 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, i); 16640 else if (regs[i].type == SCALAR_VALUE) 16641 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, i); 16642 else if (base_type(regs[i].type) == PTR_TO_MEM) { 16643 const u32 mem_size = regs[i].mem_size; 16644 16645 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, i); 16646 regs[i].mem_size = mem_size; 16647 regs[i].id = ++env->id_gen; 16648 } 16649 } 16650 } else { 16651 /* 1st arg to a function */ 16652 regs[BPF_REG_1].type = PTR_TO_CTX; 16653 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_1); 16654 ret = btf_check_subprog_arg_match(env, subprog, regs); 16655 if (ret == -EFAULT) 16656 /* unlikely verifier bug. abort. 16657 * ret == 0 and ret < 0 are sadly acceptable for 16658 * main() function due to backward compatibility. 16659 * Like socket filter program may be written as: 16660 * int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) 16661 * and never dereference that ctx in the program. 16662 * 'struct pt_regs' is a type mismatch for socket 16663 * filter that should be using 'struct __sk_buff'. 16664 */ 16665 goto out; 16666 } 16667 16668 ret = do_check(env); 16669 out: 16670 /* check for NULL is necessary, since cur_state can be freed inside 16671 * do_check() under memory pressure. 16672 */ 16673 if (env->cur_state) { 16674 free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true); 16675 env->cur_state = NULL; 16676 } 16677 while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false)); 16678 if (!ret && pop_log) 16679 bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, 0); 16680 free_states(env); 16681 return ret; 16682 } 16683 16684 /* Verify all global functions in a BPF program one by one based on their BTF. 16685 * All global functions must pass verification. Otherwise the whole program is rejected. 16686 * Consider: 16687 * int bar(int); 16688 * int foo(int f) 16689 * { 16690 * return bar(f); 16691 * } 16692 * int bar(int b) 16693 * { 16694 * ... 16695 * } 16696 * foo() will be verified first for R1=any_scalar_value. During verification it 16697 * will be assumed that bar() already verified successfully and call to bar() 16698 * from foo() will be checked for type match only. Later bar() will be verified 16699 * independently to check that it's safe for R1=any_scalar_value. 16700 */ 16701 static int do_check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 16702 { 16703 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 16704 int i, ret; 16705 16706 if (!aux->func_info) 16707 return 0; 16708 16709 for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 16710 if (aux->func_info_aux[i].linkage != BTF_FUNC_GLOBAL) 16711 continue; 16712 env->insn_idx = env->subprog_info[i].start; 16713 WARN_ON_ONCE(env->insn_idx == 0); 16714 ret = do_check_common(env, i); 16715 if (ret) { 16716 return ret; 16717 } else if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 16718 verbose(env, 16719 "Func#%d is safe for any args that match its prototype\n", 16720 i); 16721 } 16722 } 16723 return 0; 16724 } 16725 16726 static int do_check_main(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 16727 { 16728 int ret; 16729 16730 env->insn_idx = 0; 16731 ret = do_check_common(env, 0); 16732 if (!ret) 16733 env->prog->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[0].stack_depth; 16734 return ret; 16735 } 16736 16737 16738 static void print_verification_stats(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 16739 { 16740 int i; 16741 16742 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_STATS) { 16743 verbose(env, "verification time %lld usec\n", 16744 div_u64(env->verification_time, 1000)); 16745 verbose(env, "stack depth "); 16746 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 16747 u32 depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth; 16748 16749 verbose(env, "%d", depth); 16750 if (i + 1 < env->subprog_cnt) 16751 verbose(env, "+"); 16752 } 16753 verbose(env, "\n"); 16754 } 16755 verbose(env, "processed %d insns (limit %d) max_states_per_insn %d " 16756 "total_states %d peak_states %d mark_read %d\n", 16757 env->insn_processed, BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS, 16758 env->max_states_per_insn, env->total_states, 16759 env->peak_states, env->longest_mark_read_walk); 16760 } 16761 16762 static int check_struct_ops_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 16763 { 16764 const struct btf_type *t, *func_proto; 16765 const struct bpf_struct_ops *st_ops; 16766 const struct btf_member *member; 16767 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 16768 u32 btf_id, member_idx; 16769 const char *mname; 16770 16771 if (!prog->gpl_compatible) { 16772 verbose(env, "struct ops programs must have a GPL compatible license\n"); 16773 return -EINVAL; 16774 } 16775 16776 btf_id = prog->aux->attach_btf_id; 16777 st_ops = bpf_struct_ops_find(btf_id); 16778 if (!st_ops) { 16779 verbose(env, "attach_btf_id %u is not a supported struct\n", 16780 btf_id); 16781 return -ENOTSUPP; 16782 } 16783 16784 t = st_ops->type; 16785 member_idx = prog->expected_attach_type; 16786 if (member_idx >= btf_type_vlen(t)) { 16787 verbose(env, "attach to invalid member idx %u of struct %s\n", 16788 member_idx, st_ops->name); 16789 return -EINVAL; 16790 } 16791 16792 member = &btf_type_member(t)[member_idx]; 16793 mname = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, member->name_off); 16794 func_proto = btf_type_resolve_func_ptr(btf_vmlinux, member->type, 16795 NULL); 16796 if (!func_proto) { 16797 verbose(env, "attach to invalid member %s(@idx %u) of struct %s\n", 16798 mname, member_idx, st_ops->name); 16799 return -EINVAL; 16800 } 16801 16802 if (st_ops->check_member) { 16803 int err = st_ops->check_member(t, member, prog); 16804 16805 if (err) { 16806 verbose(env, "attach to unsupported member %s of struct %s\n", 16807 mname, st_ops->name); 16808 return err; 16809 } 16810 } 16811 16812 prog->aux->attach_func_proto = func_proto; 16813 prog->aux->attach_func_name = mname; 16814 env->ops = st_ops->verifier_ops; 16815 16816 return 0; 16817 } 16818 #define SECURITY_PREFIX "security_" 16819 16820 static int check_attach_modify_return(unsigned long addr, const char *func_name) 16821 { 16822 if (within_error_injection_list(addr) || 16823 !strncmp(SECURITY_PREFIX, func_name, sizeof(SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1)) 16824 return 0; 16825 16826 return -EINVAL; 16827 } 16828 16829 /* list of non-sleepable functions that are otherwise on 16830 * ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION list 16831 */ 16832 BTF_SET_START(btf_non_sleepable_error_inject) 16833 /* Three functions below can be called from sleepable and non-sleepable context. 16834 * Assume non-sleepable from bpf safety point of view. 16835 */ 16836 BTF_ID(func, __filemap_add_folio) 16837 BTF_ID(func, should_fail_alloc_page) 16838 BTF_ID(func, should_failslab) 16839 BTF_SET_END(btf_non_sleepable_error_inject) 16840 16841 static int check_non_sleepable_error_inject(u32 btf_id) 16842 { 16843 return btf_id_set_contains(&btf_non_sleepable_error_inject, btf_id); 16844 } 16845 16846 int bpf_check_attach_target(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, 16847 const struct bpf_prog *prog, 16848 const struct bpf_prog *tgt_prog, 16849 u32 btf_id, 16850 struct bpf_attach_target_info *tgt_info) 16851 { 16852 bool prog_extension = prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT; 16853 const char prefix[] = "btf_trace_"; 16854 int ret = 0, subprog = -1, i; 16855 const struct btf_type *t; 16856 bool conservative = true; 16857 const char *tname; 16858 struct btf *btf; 16859 long addr = 0; 16860 16861 if (!btf_id) { 16862 bpf_log(log, "Tracing programs must provide btf_id\n"); 16863 return -EINVAL; 16864 } 16865 btf = tgt_prog ? tgt_prog->aux->btf : prog->aux->attach_btf; 16866 if (!btf) { 16867 bpf_log(log, 16868 "FENTRY/FEXIT program can only be attached to another program annotated with BTF\n"); 16869 return -EINVAL; 16870 } 16871 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, btf_id); 16872 if (!t) { 16873 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is invalid\n", btf_id); 16874 return -EINVAL; 16875 } 16876 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off); 16877 if (!tname) { 16878 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u doesn't have a name\n", btf_id); 16879 return -EINVAL; 16880 } 16881 if (tgt_prog) { 16882 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = tgt_prog->aux; 16883 16884 if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(prog->aux) && 16885 !bpf_prog_dev_bound_match(prog, tgt_prog)) { 16886 bpf_log(log, "Target program bound device mismatch"); 16887 return -EINVAL; 16888 } 16889 16890 for (i = 0; i < aux->func_info_cnt; i++) 16891 if (aux->func_info[i].type_id == btf_id) { 16892 subprog = i; 16893 break; 16894 } 16895 if (subprog == -1) { 16896 bpf_log(log, "Subprog %s doesn't exist\n", tname); 16897 return -EINVAL; 16898 } 16899 conservative = aux->func_info_aux[subprog].unreliable; 16900 if (prog_extension) { 16901 if (conservative) { 16902 bpf_log(log, 16903 "Cannot replace static functions\n"); 16904 return -EINVAL; 16905 } 16906 if (!prog->jit_requested) { 16907 bpf_log(log, 16908 "Extension programs should be JITed\n"); 16909 return -EINVAL; 16910 } 16911 } 16912 if (!tgt_prog->jited) { 16913 bpf_log(log, "Can attach to only JITed progs\n"); 16914 return -EINVAL; 16915 } 16916 if (tgt_prog->type == prog->type) { 16917 /* Cannot fentry/fexit another fentry/fexit program. 16918 * Cannot attach program extension to another extension. 16919 * It's ok to attach fentry/fexit to extension program. 16920 */ 16921 bpf_log(log, "Cannot recursively attach\n"); 16922 return -EINVAL; 16923 } 16924 if (tgt_prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 16925 prog_extension && 16926 (tgt_prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FENTRY || 16927 tgt_prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FEXIT)) { 16928 /* Program extensions can extend all program types 16929 * except fentry/fexit. The reason is the following. 16930 * The fentry/fexit programs are used for performance 16931 * analysis, stats and can be attached to any program 16932 * type except themselves. When extension program is 16933 * replacing XDP function it is necessary to allow 16934 * performance analysis of all functions. Both original 16935 * XDP program and its program extension. Hence 16936 * attaching fentry/fexit to BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT is 16937 * allowed. If extending of fentry/fexit was allowed it 16938 * would be possible to create long call chain 16939 * fentry->extension->fentry->extension beyond 16940 * reasonable stack size. Hence extending fentry is not 16941 * allowed. 16942 */ 16943 bpf_log(log, "Cannot extend fentry/fexit\n"); 16944 return -EINVAL; 16945 } 16946 } else { 16947 if (prog_extension) { 16948 bpf_log(log, "Cannot replace kernel functions\n"); 16949 return -EINVAL; 16950 } 16951 } 16952 16953 switch (prog->expected_attach_type) { 16954 case BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP: 16955 if (tgt_prog) { 16956 bpf_log(log, 16957 "Only FENTRY/FEXIT progs are attachable to another BPF prog\n"); 16958 return -EINVAL; 16959 } 16960 if (!btf_type_is_typedef(t)) { 16961 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a typedef\n", 16962 btf_id); 16963 return -EINVAL; 16964 } 16965 if (strncmp(prefix, tname, sizeof(prefix) - 1)) { 16966 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u points to wrong type name %s\n", 16967 btf_id, tname); 16968 return -EINVAL; 16969 } 16970 tname += sizeof(prefix) - 1; 16971 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); 16972 if (!btf_type_is_ptr(t)) 16973 /* should never happen in valid vmlinux build */ 16974 return -EINVAL; 16975 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); 16976 if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t)) 16977 /* should never happen in valid vmlinux build */ 16978 return -EINVAL; 16979 16980 break; 16981 case BPF_TRACE_ITER: 16982 if (!btf_type_is_func(t)) { 16983 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a function\n", 16984 btf_id); 16985 return -EINVAL; 16986 } 16987 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); 16988 if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t)) 16989 return -EINVAL; 16990 ret = btf_distill_func_proto(log, btf, t, tname, &tgt_info->fmodel); 16991 if (ret) 16992 return ret; 16993 break; 16994 default: 16995 if (!prog_extension) 16996 return -EINVAL; 16997 fallthrough; 16998 case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN: 16999 case BPF_LSM_MAC: 17000 case BPF_LSM_CGROUP: 17001 case BPF_TRACE_FENTRY: 17002 case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT: 17003 if (!btf_type_is_func(t)) { 17004 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a function\n", 17005 btf_id); 17006 return -EINVAL; 17007 } 17008 if (prog_extension && 17009 btf_check_type_match(log, prog, btf, t)) 17010 return -EINVAL; 17011 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); 17012 if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t)) 17013 return -EINVAL; 17014 17015 if ((prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type || prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type) && 17016 (!tgt_prog || prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type != tgt_prog->type || 17017 prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type != tgt_prog->expected_attach_type)) 17018 return -EINVAL; 17019 17020 if (tgt_prog && conservative) 17021 t = NULL; 17022 17023 ret = btf_distill_func_proto(log, btf, t, tname, &tgt_info->fmodel); 17024 if (ret < 0) 17025 return ret; 17026 17027 if (tgt_prog) { 17028 if (subprog == 0) 17029 addr = (long) tgt_prog->bpf_func; 17030 else 17031 addr = (long) tgt_prog->aux->func[subprog]->bpf_func; 17032 } else { 17033 addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(tname); 17034 if (!addr) { 17035 bpf_log(log, 17036 "The address of function %s cannot be found\n", 17037 tname); 17038 return -ENOENT; 17039 } 17040 } 17041 17042 if (prog->aux->sleepable) { 17043 ret = -EINVAL; 17044 switch (prog->type) { 17045 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: 17046 17047 /* fentry/fexit/fmod_ret progs can be sleepable if they are 17048 * attached to ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION and are not in denylist. 17049 */ 17050 if (!check_non_sleepable_error_inject(btf_id) && 17051 within_error_injection_list(addr)) 17052 ret = 0; 17053 /* fentry/fexit/fmod_ret progs can also be sleepable if they are 17054 * in the fmodret id set with the KF_SLEEPABLE flag. 17055 */ 17056 else { 17057 u32 *flags = btf_kfunc_is_modify_return(btf, btf_id); 17058 17059 if (flags && (*flags & KF_SLEEPABLE)) 17060 ret = 0; 17061 } 17062 break; 17063 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: 17064 /* LSM progs check that they are attached to bpf_lsm_*() funcs. 17065 * Only some of them are sleepable. 17066 */ 17067 if (bpf_lsm_is_sleepable_hook(btf_id)) 17068 ret = 0; 17069 break; 17070 default: 17071 break; 17072 } 17073 if (ret) { 17074 bpf_log(log, "%s is not sleepable\n", tname); 17075 return ret; 17076 } 17077 } else if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) { 17078 if (tgt_prog) { 17079 bpf_log(log, "can't modify return codes of BPF programs\n"); 17080 return -EINVAL; 17081 } 17082 ret = -EINVAL; 17083 if (btf_kfunc_is_modify_return(btf, btf_id) || 17084 !check_attach_modify_return(addr, tname)) 17085 ret = 0; 17086 if (ret) { 17087 bpf_log(log, "%s() is not modifiable\n", tname); 17088 return ret; 17089 } 17090 } 17091 17092 break; 17093 } 17094 tgt_info->tgt_addr = addr; 17095 tgt_info->tgt_name = tname; 17096 tgt_info->tgt_type = t; 17097 return 0; 17098 } 17099 17100 BTF_SET_START(btf_id_deny) 17101 BTF_ID_UNUSED 17102 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP 17103 BTF_ID(func, migrate_disable) 17104 BTF_ID(func, migrate_enable) 17105 #endif 17106 #if !defined CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU && !defined CONFIG_TINY_RCU 17107 BTF_ID(func, rcu_read_unlock_strict) 17108 #endif 17109 BTF_SET_END(btf_id_deny) 17110 17111 static bool can_be_sleepable(struct bpf_prog *prog) 17112 { 17113 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING) { 17114 switch (prog->expected_attach_type) { 17115 case BPF_TRACE_FENTRY: 17116 case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT: 17117 case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN: 17118 case BPF_TRACE_ITER: 17119 return true; 17120 default: 17121 return false; 17122 } 17123 } 17124 return prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM || 17125 prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE /* only for uprobes */ || 17126 prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS; 17127 } 17128 17129 static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 17130 { 17131 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 17132 struct bpf_prog *tgt_prog = prog->aux->dst_prog; 17133 struct bpf_attach_target_info tgt_info = {}; 17134 u32 btf_id = prog->aux->attach_btf_id; 17135 struct bpf_trampoline *tr; 17136 int ret; 17137 u64 key; 17138 17139 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_SYSCALL) { 17140 if (prog->aux->sleepable) 17141 /* attach_btf_id checked to be zero already */ 17142 return 0; 17143 verbose(env, "Syscall programs can only be sleepable\n"); 17144 return -EINVAL; 17145 } 17146 17147 if (prog->aux->sleepable && !can_be_sleepable(prog)) { 17148 verbose(env, "Only fentry/fexit/fmod_ret, lsm, iter, uprobe, and struct_ops programs can be sleepable\n"); 17149 return -EINVAL; 17150 } 17151 17152 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) 17153 return check_struct_ops_btf_id(env); 17154 17155 if (prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 17156 prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM && 17157 prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) 17158 return 0; 17159 17160 ret = bpf_check_attach_target(&env->log, prog, tgt_prog, btf_id, &tgt_info); 17161 if (ret) 17162 return ret; 17163 17164 if (tgt_prog && prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) { 17165 /* to make freplace equivalent to their targets, they need to 17166 * inherit env->ops and expected_attach_type for the rest of the 17167 * verification 17168 */ 17169 env->ops = bpf_verifier_ops[tgt_prog->type]; 17170 prog->expected_attach_type = tgt_prog->expected_attach_type; 17171 } 17172 17173 /* store info about the attachment target that will be used later */ 17174 prog->aux->attach_func_proto = tgt_info.tgt_type; 17175 prog->aux->attach_func_name = tgt_info.tgt_name; 17176 17177 if (tgt_prog) { 17178 prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type = tgt_prog->type; 17179 prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type = tgt_prog->expected_attach_type; 17180 } 17181 17182 if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP) { 17183 prog->aux->attach_btf_trace = true; 17184 return 0; 17185 } else if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_ITER) { 17186 if (!bpf_iter_prog_supported(prog)) 17187 return -EINVAL; 17188 return 0; 17189 } 17190 17191 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) { 17192 ret = bpf_lsm_verify_prog(&env->log, prog); 17193 if (ret < 0) 17194 return ret; 17195 } else if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 17196 btf_id_set_contains(&btf_id_deny, btf_id)) { 17197 return -EINVAL; 17198 } 17199 17200 key = bpf_trampoline_compute_key(tgt_prog, prog->aux->attach_btf, btf_id); 17201 tr = bpf_trampoline_get(key, &tgt_info); 17202 if (!tr) 17203 return -ENOMEM; 17204 17205 prog->aux->dst_trampoline = tr; 17206 return 0; 17207 } 17208 17209 struct btf *bpf_get_btf_vmlinux(void) 17210 { 17211 if (!btf_vmlinux && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF)) { 17212 mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 17213 if (!btf_vmlinux) 17214 btf_vmlinux = btf_parse_vmlinux(); 17215 mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 17216 } 17217 return btf_vmlinux; 17218 } 17219 17220 int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr) 17221 { 17222 u64 start_time = ktime_get_ns(); 17223 struct bpf_verifier_env *env; 17224 struct bpf_verifier_log *log; 17225 int i, len, ret = -EINVAL; 17226 bool is_priv; 17227 17228 /* no program is valid */ 17229 if (ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_verifier_ops) == 0) 17230 return -EINVAL; 17231 17232 /* 'struct bpf_verifier_env' can be global, but since it's not small, 17233 * allocate/free it every time bpf_check() is called 17234 */ 17235 env = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_env), GFP_KERNEL); 17236 if (!env) 17237 return -ENOMEM; 17238 log = &env->log; 17239 17240 len = (*prog)->len; 17241 env->insn_aux_data = 17242 vzalloc(array_size(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data), len)); 17243 ret = -ENOMEM; 17244 if (!env->insn_aux_data) 17245 goto err_free_env; 17246 for (i = 0; i < len; i++) 17247 env->insn_aux_data[i].orig_idx = i; 17248 env->prog = *prog; 17249 env->ops = bpf_verifier_ops[env->prog->type]; 17250 env->fd_array = make_bpfptr(attr->fd_array, uattr.is_kernel); 17251 is_priv = bpf_capable(); 17252 17253 bpf_get_btf_vmlinux(); 17254 17255 /* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */ 17256 if (!is_priv) 17257 mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 17258 17259 if (attr->log_level || attr->log_buf || attr->log_size) { 17260 /* user requested verbose verifier output 17261 * and supplied buffer to store the verification trace 17262 */ 17263 log->level = attr->log_level; 17264 log->ubuf = (char __user *) (unsigned long) attr->log_buf; 17265 log->len_total = attr->log_size; 17266 17267 /* log attributes have to be sane */ 17268 if (!bpf_verifier_log_attr_valid(log)) { 17269 ret = -EINVAL; 17270 goto err_unlock; 17271 } 17272 } 17273 17274 mark_verifier_state_clean(env); 17275 17276 if (IS_ERR(btf_vmlinux)) { 17277 /* Either gcc or pahole or kernel are broken. */ 17278 verbose(env, "in-kernel BTF is malformed\n"); 17279 ret = PTR_ERR(btf_vmlinux); 17280 goto skip_full_check; 17281 } 17282 17283 env->strict_alignment = !!(attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT); 17284 if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS)) 17285 env->strict_alignment = true; 17286 if (attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_ANY_ALIGNMENT) 17287 env->strict_alignment = false; 17288 17289 env->allow_ptr_leaks = bpf_allow_ptr_leaks(); 17290 env->allow_uninit_stack = bpf_allow_uninit_stack(); 17291 env->bypass_spec_v1 = bpf_bypass_spec_v1(); 17292 env->bypass_spec_v4 = bpf_bypass_spec_v4(); 17293 env->bpf_capable = bpf_capable(); 17294 env->rcu_tag_supported = btf_vmlinux && 17295 btf_find_by_name_kind(btf_vmlinux, "rcu", BTF_KIND_TYPE_TAG) > 0; 17296 17297 if (is_priv) 17298 env->test_state_freq = attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ; 17299 17300 env->explored_states = kvcalloc(state_htab_size(env), 17301 sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list *), 17302 GFP_USER); 17303 ret = -ENOMEM; 17304 if (!env->explored_states) 17305 goto skip_full_check; 17306 17307 ret = add_subprog_and_kfunc(env); 17308 if (ret < 0) 17309 goto skip_full_check; 17310 17311 ret = check_subprogs(env); 17312 if (ret < 0) 17313 goto skip_full_check; 17314 17315 ret = check_btf_info(env, attr, uattr); 17316 if (ret < 0) 17317 goto skip_full_check; 17318 17319 ret = check_attach_btf_id(env); 17320 if (ret) 17321 goto skip_full_check; 17322 17323 ret = resolve_pseudo_ldimm64(env); 17324 if (ret < 0) 17325 goto skip_full_check; 17326 17327 if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) { 17328 ret = bpf_prog_offload_verifier_prep(env->prog); 17329 if (ret) 17330 goto skip_full_check; 17331 } 17332 17333 ret = check_cfg(env); 17334 if (ret < 0) 17335 goto skip_full_check; 17336 17337 ret = do_check_subprogs(env); 17338 ret = ret ?: do_check_main(env); 17339 17340 if (ret == 0 && bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) 17341 ret = bpf_prog_offload_finalize(env); 17342 17343 skip_full_check: 17344 kvfree(env->explored_states); 17345 17346 if (ret == 0) 17347 ret = check_max_stack_depth(env); 17348 17349 /* instruction rewrites happen after this point */ 17350 if (ret == 0) 17351 ret = optimize_bpf_loop(env); 17352 17353 if (is_priv) { 17354 if (ret == 0) 17355 opt_hard_wire_dead_code_branches(env); 17356 if (ret == 0) 17357 ret = opt_remove_dead_code(env); 17358 if (ret == 0) 17359 ret = opt_remove_nops(env); 17360 } else { 17361 if (ret == 0) 17362 sanitize_dead_code(env); 17363 } 17364 17365 if (ret == 0) 17366 /* program is valid, convert *(u32*)(ctx + off) accesses */ 17367 ret = convert_ctx_accesses(env); 17368 17369 if (ret == 0) 17370 ret = do_misc_fixups(env); 17371 17372 /* do 32-bit optimization after insn patching has done so those patched 17373 * insns could be handled correctly. 17374 */ 17375 if (ret == 0 && !bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) { 17376 ret = opt_subreg_zext_lo32_rnd_hi32(env, attr); 17377 env->prog->aux->verifier_zext = bpf_jit_needs_zext() ? !ret 17378 : false; 17379 } 17380 17381 if (ret == 0) 17382 ret = fixup_call_args(env); 17383 17384 env->verification_time = ktime_get_ns() - start_time; 17385 print_verification_stats(env); 17386 env->prog->aux->verified_insns = env->insn_processed; 17387 17388 if (log->level && bpf_verifier_log_full(log)) 17389 ret = -ENOSPC; 17390 if (log->level && !log->ubuf) { 17391 ret = -EFAULT; 17392 goto err_release_maps; 17393 } 17394 17395 if (ret) 17396 goto err_release_maps; 17397 17398 if (env->used_map_cnt) { 17399 /* if program passed verifier, update used_maps in bpf_prog_info */ 17400 env->prog->aux->used_maps = kmalloc_array(env->used_map_cnt, 17401 sizeof(env->used_maps[0]), 17402 GFP_KERNEL); 17403 17404 if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps) { 17405 ret = -ENOMEM; 17406 goto err_release_maps; 17407 } 17408 17409 memcpy(env->prog->aux->used_maps, env->used_maps, 17410 sizeof(env->used_maps[0]) * env->used_map_cnt); 17411 env->prog->aux->used_map_cnt = env->used_map_cnt; 17412 } 17413 if (env->used_btf_cnt) { 17414 /* if program passed verifier, update used_btfs in bpf_prog_aux */ 17415 env->prog->aux->used_btfs = kmalloc_array(env->used_btf_cnt, 17416 sizeof(env->used_btfs[0]), 17417 GFP_KERNEL); 17418 if (!env->prog->aux->used_btfs) { 17419 ret = -ENOMEM; 17420 goto err_release_maps; 17421 } 17422 17423 memcpy(env->prog->aux->used_btfs, env->used_btfs, 17424 sizeof(env->used_btfs[0]) * env->used_btf_cnt); 17425 env->prog->aux->used_btf_cnt = env->used_btf_cnt; 17426 } 17427 if (env->used_map_cnt || env->used_btf_cnt) { 17428 /* program is valid. Convert pseudo bpf_ld_imm64 into generic 17429 * bpf_ld_imm64 instructions 17430 */ 17431 convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(env); 17432 } 17433 17434 adjust_btf_func(env); 17435 17436 err_release_maps: 17437 if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps) 17438 /* if we didn't copy map pointers into bpf_prog_info, release 17439 * them now. Otherwise free_used_maps() will release them. 17440 */ 17441 release_maps(env); 17442 if (!env->prog->aux->used_btfs) 17443 release_btfs(env); 17444 17445 /* extension progs temporarily inherit the attach_type of their targets 17446 for verification purposes, so set it back to zero before returning 17447 */ 17448 if (env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) 17449 env->prog->expected_attach_type = 0; 17450 17451 *prog = env->prog; 17452 err_unlock: 17453 if (!is_priv) 17454 mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 17455 vfree(env->insn_aux_data); 17456 err_free_env: 17457 kfree(env); 17458 return ret; 17459 } 17460