xref: /linux-6.15/kernel/bpf/verifier.c (revision 27b3f705)
1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
2 /* Copyright (c) 2011-2014 PLUMgrid, http://plumgrid.com
3  * Copyright (c) 2016 Facebook
4  * Copyright (c) 2018 Covalent IO, Inc. http://covalent.io
5  */
6 #include <uapi/linux/btf.h>
7 #include <linux/bpf-cgroup.h>
8 #include <linux/kernel.h>
9 #include <linux/types.h>
10 #include <linux/slab.h>
11 #include <linux/bpf.h>
12 #include <linux/btf.h>
13 #include <linux/bpf_verifier.h>
14 #include <linux/filter.h>
15 #include <net/netlink.h>
16 #include <linux/file.h>
17 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
18 #include <linux/stringify.h>
19 #include <linux/bsearch.h>
20 #include <linux/sort.h>
21 #include <linux/perf_event.h>
22 #include <linux/ctype.h>
23 #include <linux/error-injection.h>
24 #include <linux/bpf_lsm.h>
25 #include <linux/btf_ids.h>
26 
27 #include "disasm.h"
28 
29 static const struct bpf_verifier_ops * const bpf_verifier_ops[] = {
30 #define BPF_PROG_TYPE(_id, _name, prog_ctx_type, kern_ctx_type) \
31 	[_id] = & _name ## _verifier_ops,
32 #define BPF_MAP_TYPE(_id, _ops)
33 #define BPF_LINK_TYPE(_id, _name)
34 #include <linux/bpf_types.h>
35 #undef BPF_PROG_TYPE
36 #undef BPF_MAP_TYPE
37 #undef BPF_LINK_TYPE
38 };
39 
40 /* bpf_check() is a static code analyzer that walks eBPF program
41  * instruction by instruction and updates register/stack state.
42  * All paths of conditional branches are analyzed until 'bpf_exit' insn.
43  *
44  * The first pass is depth-first-search to check that the program is a DAG.
45  * It rejects the following programs:
46  * - larger than BPF_MAXINSNS insns
47  * - if loop is present (detected via back-edge)
48  * - unreachable insns exist (shouldn't be a forest. program = one function)
49  * - out of bounds or malformed jumps
50  * The second pass is all possible path descent from the 1st insn.
51  * Since it's analyzing all paths through the program, the length of the
52  * analysis is limited to 64k insn, which may be hit even if total number of
53  * insn is less then 4K, but there are too many branches that change stack/regs.
54  * Number of 'branches to be analyzed' is limited to 1k
55  *
56  * On entry to each instruction, each register has a type, and the instruction
57  * changes the types of the registers depending on instruction semantics.
58  * If instruction is BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_5), then type of R5 is
59  * copied to R1.
60  *
61  * All registers are 64-bit.
62  * R0 - return register
63  * R1-R5 argument passing registers
64  * R6-R9 callee saved registers
65  * R10 - frame pointer read-only
66  *
67  * At the start of BPF program the register R1 contains a pointer to bpf_context
68  * and has type PTR_TO_CTX.
69  *
70  * Verifier tracks arithmetic operations on pointers in case:
71  *    BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10),
72  *    BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -20),
73  * 1st insn copies R10 (which has FRAME_PTR) type into R1
74  * and 2nd arithmetic instruction is pattern matched to recognize
75  * that it wants to construct a pointer to some element within stack.
76  * So after 2nd insn, the register R1 has type PTR_TO_STACK
77  * (and -20 constant is saved for further stack bounds checking).
78  * Meaning that this reg is a pointer to stack plus known immediate constant.
79  *
80  * Most of the time the registers have SCALAR_VALUE type, which
81  * means the register has some value, but it's not a valid pointer.
82  * (like pointer plus pointer becomes SCALAR_VALUE type)
83  *
84  * When verifier sees load or store instructions the type of base register
85  * can be: PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_CTX, PTR_TO_STACK, PTR_TO_SOCKET. These are
86  * four pointer types recognized by check_mem_access() function.
87  *
88  * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE means that this register is pointing to 'map element value'
89  * and the range of [ptr, ptr + map's value_size) is accessible.
90  *
91  * registers used to pass values to function calls are checked against
92  * function argument constraints.
93  *
94  * ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY is one of such argument constraints.
95  * It means that the register type passed to this function must be
96  * PTR_TO_STACK and it will be used inside the function as
97  * 'pointer to map element key'
98  *
99  * For example the argument constraints for bpf_map_lookup_elem():
100  *   .ret_type = RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL,
101  *   .arg1_type = ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR,
102  *   .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY,
103  *
104  * ret_type says that this function returns 'pointer to map elem value or null'
105  * function expects 1st argument to be a const pointer to 'struct bpf_map' and
106  * 2nd argument should be a pointer to stack, which will be used inside
107  * the helper function as a pointer to map element key.
108  *
109  * On the kernel side the helper function looks like:
110  * u64 bpf_map_lookup_elem(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5)
111  * {
112  *    struct bpf_map *map = (struct bpf_map *) (unsigned long) r1;
113  *    void *key = (void *) (unsigned long) r2;
114  *    void *value;
115  *
116  *    here kernel can access 'key' and 'map' pointers safely, knowing that
117  *    [key, key + map->key_size) bytes are valid and were initialized on
118  *    the stack of eBPF program.
119  * }
120  *
121  * Corresponding eBPF program may look like:
122  *    BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),  // after this insn R2 type is FRAME_PTR
123  *    BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -4), // after this insn R2 type is PTR_TO_STACK
124  *    BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, map_fd),      // after this insn R1 type is CONST_PTR_TO_MAP
125  *    BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
126  * here verifier looks at prototype of map_lookup_elem() and sees:
127  * .arg1_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR and R1->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP, which is ok,
128  * Now verifier knows that this map has key of R1->map_ptr->key_size bytes
129  *
130  * Then .arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY and R2->type == PTR_TO_STACK, ok so far,
131  * Now verifier checks that [R2, R2 + map's key_size) are within stack limits
132  * and were initialized prior to this call.
133  * If it's ok, then verifier allows this BPF_CALL insn and looks at
134  * .ret_type which is RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, so it sets
135  * R0->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL which means bpf_map_lookup_elem() function
136  * returns either pointer to map value or NULL.
137  *
138  * When type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL passes through 'if (reg != 0) goto +off'
139  * insn, the register holding that pointer in the true branch changes state to
140  * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE and the same register changes state to CONST_IMM in the false
141  * branch. See check_cond_jmp_op().
142  *
143  * After the call R0 is set to return type of the function and registers R1-R5
144  * are set to NOT_INIT to indicate that they are no longer readable.
145  *
146  * The following reference types represent a potential reference to a kernel
147  * resource which, after first being allocated, must be checked and freed by
148  * the BPF program:
149  * - PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL, PTR_TO_SOCKET
150  *
151  * When the verifier sees a helper call return a reference type, it allocates a
152  * pointer id for the reference and stores it in the current function state.
153  * Similar to the way that PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL is converted into
154  * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL becomes PTR_TO_SOCKET when the type
155  * passes through a NULL-check conditional. For the branch wherein the state is
156  * changed to CONST_IMM, the verifier releases the reference.
157  *
158  * For each helper function that allocates a reference, such as
159  * bpf_sk_lookup_tcp(), there is a corresponding release function, such as
160  * bpf_sk_release(). When a reference type passes into the release function,
161  * the verifier also releases the reference. If any unchecked or unreleased
162  * reference remains at the end of the program, the verifier rejects it.
163  */
164 
165 /* verifier_state + insn_idx are pushed to stack when branch is encountered */
166 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem {
167 	/* verifer state is 'st'
168 	 * before processing instruction 'insn_idx'
169 	 * and after processing instruction 'prev_insn_idx'
170 	 */
171 	struct bpf_verifier_state st;
172 	int insn_idx;
173 	int prev_insn_idx;
174 	struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *next;
175 	/* length of verifier log at the time this state was pushed on stack */
176 	u32 log_pos;
177 };
178 
179 #define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ	8192
180 #define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES	64
181 
182 #define BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON	(1ULL << 63)
183 #define BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN	(1ULL << 62)
184 
185 #define BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV	1UL
186 #define BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON	((void *)((0xeB9FUL << 1) +	\
187 					  POISON_POINTER_DELTA))
188 #define BPF_MAP_PTR(X)		((struct bpf_map *)((X) & ~BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV))
189 
190 static int acquire_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx);
191 static int release_reference(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int ref_obj_id);
192 
193 static bool bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux)
194 {
195 	return BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state) == BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON;
196 }
197 
198 static bool bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux)
199 {
200 	return aux->map_ptr_state & BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV;
201 }
202 
203 static void bpf_map_ptr_store(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux,
204 			      const struct bpf_map *map, bool unpriv)
205 {
206 	BUILD_BUG_ON((unsigned long)BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON & BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV);
207 	unpriv |= bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux);
208 	aux->map_ptr_state = (unsigned long)map |
209 			     (unpriv ? BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV : 0UL);
210 }
211 
212 static bool bpf_map_key_poisoned(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux)
213 {
214 	return aux->map_key_state & BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON;
215 }
216 
217 static bool bpf_map_key_unseen(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux)
218 {
219 	return !(aux->map_key_state & BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN);
220 }
221 
222 static u64 bpf_map_key_immediate(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux)
223 {
224 	return aux->map_key_state & ~(BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN | BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON);
225 }
226 
227 static void bpf_map_key_store(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, u64 state)
228 {
229 	bool poisoned = bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux);
230 
231 	aux->map_key_state = state | BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN |
232 			     (poisoned ? BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON : 0ULL);
233 }
234 
235 static bool bpf_pseudo_call(const struct bpf_insn *insn)
236 {
237 	return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) &&
238 	       insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL;
239 }
240 
241 static bool bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(const struct bpf_insn *insn)
242 {
243 	return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) &&
244 	       insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL;
245 }
246 
247 struct bpf_call_arg_meta {
248 	struct bpf_map *map_ptr;
249 	bool raw_mode;
250 	bool pkt_access;
251 	u8 release_regno;
252 	int regno;
253 	int access_size;
254 	int mem_size;
255 	u64 msize_max_value;
256 	int ref_obj_id;
257 	int map_uid;
258 	int func_id;
259 	struct btf *btf;
260 	u32 btf_id;
261 	struct btf *ret_btf;
262 	u32 ret_btf_id;
263 	u32 subprogno;
264 	struct bpf_map_value_off_desc *kptr_off_desc;
265 	u8 uninit_dynptr_regno;
266 };
267 
268 struct btf *btf_vmlinux;
269 
270 static DEFINE_MUTEX(bpf_verifier_lock);
271 
272 static const struct bpf_line_info *
273 find_linfo(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 insn_off)
274 {
275 	const struct bpf_line_info *linfo;
276 	const struct bpf_prog *prog;
277 	u32 i, nr_linfo;
278 
279 	prog = env->prog;
280 	nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo;
281 
282 	if (!nr_linfo || insn_off >= prog->len)
283 		return NULL;
284 
285 	linfo = prog->aux->linfo;
286 	for (i = 1; i < nr_linfo; i++)
287 		if (insn_off < linfo[i].insn_off)
288 			break;
289 
290 	return &linfo[i - 1];
291 }
292 
293 void bpf_verifier_vlog(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, const char *fmt,
294 		       va_list args)
295 {
296 	unsigned int n;
297 
298 	n = vscnprintf(log->kbuf, BPF_VERIFIER_TMP_LOG_SIZE, fmt, args);
299 
300 	WARN_ONCE(n >= BPF_VERIFIER_TMP_LOG_SIZE - 1,
301 		  "verifier log line truncated - local buffer too short\n");
302 
303 	if (log->level == BPF_LOG_KERNEL) {
304 		bool newline = n > 0 && log->kbuf[n - 1] == '\n';
305 
306 		pr_err("BPF: %s%s", log->kbuf, newline ? "" : "\n");
307 		return;
308 	}
309 
310 	n = min(log->len_total - log->len_used - 1, n);
311 	log->kbuf[n] = '\0';
312 	if (!copy_to_user(log->ubuf + log->len_used, log->kbuf, n + 1))
313 		log->len_used += n;
314 	else
315 		log->ubuf = NULL;
316 }
317 
318 static void bpf_vlog_reset(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, u32 new_pos)
319 {
320 	char zero = 0;
321 
322 	if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(log))
323 		return;
324 
325 	log->len_used = new_pos;
326 	if (put_user(zero, log->ubuf + new_pos))
327 		log->ubuf = NULL;
328 }
329 
330 /* log_level controls verbosity level of eBPF verifier.
331  * bpf_verifier_log_write() is used to dump the verification trace to the log,
332  * so the user can figure out what's wrong with the program
333  */
334 __printf(2, 3) void bpf_verifier_log_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
335 					   const char *fmt, ...)
336 {
337 	va_list args;
338 
339 	if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(&env->log))
340 		return;
341 
342 	va_start(args, fmt);
343 	bpf_verifier_vlog(&env->log, fmt, args);
344 	va_end(args);
345 }
346 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_verifier_log_write);
347 
348 __printf(2, 3) static void verbose(void *private_data, const char *fmt, ...)
349 {
350 	struct bpf_verifier_env *env = private_data;
351 	va_list args;
352 
353 	if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(&env->log))
354 		return;
355 
356 	va_start(args, fmt);
357 	bpf_verifier_vlog(&env->log, fmt, args);
358 	va_end(args);
359 }
360 
361 __printf(2, 3) void bpf_log(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
362 			    const char *fmt, ...)
363 {
364 	va_list args;
365 
366 	if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(log))
367 		return;
368 
369 	va_start(args, fmt);
370 	bpf_verifier_vlog(log, fmt, args);
371 	va_end(args);
372 }
373 
374 static const char *ltrim(const char *s)
375 {
376 	while (isspace(*s))
377 		s++;
378 
379 	return s;
380 }
381 
382 __printf(3, 4) static void verbose_linfo(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
383 					 u32 insn_off,
384 					 const char *prefix_fmt, ...)
385 {
386 	const struct bpf_line_info *linfo;
387 
388 	if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(&env->log))
389 		return;
390 
391 	linfo = find_linfo(env, insn_off);
392 	if (!linfo || linfo == env->prev_linfo)
393 		return;
394 
395 	if (prefix_fmt) {
396 		va_list args;
397 
398 		va_start(args, prefix_fmt);
399 		bpf_verifier_vlog(&env->log, prefix_fmt, args);
400 		va_end(args);
401 	}
402 
403 	verbose(env, "%s\n",
404 		ltrim(btf_name_by_offset(env->prog->aux->btf,
405 					 linfo->line_off)));
406 
407 	env->prev_linfo = linfo;
408 }
409 
410 static void verbose_invalid_scalar(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
411 				   struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
412 				   struct tnum *range, const char *ctx,
413 				   const char *reg_name)
414 {
415 	char tn_buf[48];
416 
417 	verbose(env, "At %s the register %s ", ctx, reg_name);
418 	if (!tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off)) {
419 		tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
420 		verbose(env, "has value %s", tn_buf);
421 	} else {
422 		verbose(env, "has unknown scalar value");
423 	}
424 	tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), *range);
425 	verbose(env, " should have been in %s\n", tn_buf);
426 }
427 
428 static bool type_is_pkt_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type)
429 {
430 	return type == PTR_TO_PACKET ||
431 	       type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META;
432 }
433 
434 static bool type_is_sk_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type)
435 {
436 	return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET ||
437 		type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON ||
438 		type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK ||
439 		type == PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK;
440 }
441 
442 static bool reg_type_not_null(enum bpf_reg_type type)
443 {
444 	return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET ||
445 		type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK ||
446 		type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE ||
447 		type == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY ||
448 		type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON;
449 }
450 
451 static bool reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
452 {
453 	return reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE &&
454 		map_value_has_spin_lock(reg->map_ptr);
455 }
456 
457 static bool reg_type_may_be_refcounted_or_null(enum bpf_reg_type type)
458 {
459 	return base_type(type) == PTR_TO_SOCKET ||
460 		base_type(type) == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK ||
461 		base_type(type) == PTR_TO_MEM ||
462 		base_type(type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID;
463 }
464 
465 static bool type_is_rdonly_mem(u32 type)
466 {
467 	return type & MEM_RDONLY;
468 }
469 
470 static bool arg_type_may_be_refcounted(enum bpf_arg_type type)
471 {
472 	return type == ARG_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON;
473 }
474 
475 static bool type_may_be_null(u32 type)
476 {
477 	return type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL;
478 }
479 
480 static bool may_be_acquire_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id)
481 {
482 	return func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_tcp ||
483 		func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_udp ||
484 		func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_lookup_tcp ||
485 		func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem ||
486 	        func_id == BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve;
487 }
488 
489 static bool is_acquire_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id,
490 				const struct bpf_map *map)
491 {
492 	enum bpf_map_type map_type = map ? map->map_type : BPF_MAP_TYPE_UNSPEC;
493 
494 	if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_tcp ||
495 	    func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_udp ||
496 	    func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_lookup_tcp ||
497 	    func_id == BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve ||
498 	    func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg)
499 		return true;
500 
501 	if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem &&
502 	    (map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP ||
503 	     map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH))
504 		return true;
505 
506 	return false;
507 }
508 
509 static bool is_ptr_cast_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id)
510 {
511 	return func_id == BPF_FUNC_tcp_sock ||
512 		func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_fullsock ||
513 		func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_sock ||
514 		func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp6_sock ||
515 		func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_udp6_sock ||
516 		func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_mptcp_sock ||
517 		func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_timewait_sock ||
518 		func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_request_sock;
519 }
520 
521 static bool is_cmpxchg_insn(const struct bpf_insn *insn)
522 {
523 	return BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX &&
524 	       BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC &&
525 	       insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG;
526 }
527 
528 /* string representation of 'enum bpf_reg_type'
529  *
530  * Note that reg_type_str() can not appear more than once in a single verbose()
531  * statement.
532  */
533 static const char *reg_type_str(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
534 				enum bpf_reg_type type)
535 {
536 	char postfix[16] = {0}, prefix[32] = {0};
537 	static const char * const str[] = {
538 		[NOT_INIT]		= "?",
539 		[SCALAR_VALUE]		= "scalar",
540 		[PTR_TO_CTX]		= "ctx",
541 		[CONST_PTR_TO_MAP]	= "map_ptr",
542 		[PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE]	= "map_value",
543 		[PTR_TO_STACK]		= "fp",
544 		[PTR_TO_PACKET]		= "pkt",
545 		[PTR_TO_PACKET_META]	= "pkt_meta",
546 		[PTR_TO_PACKET_END]	= "pkt_end",
547 		[PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS]	= "flow_keys",
548 		[PTR_TO_SOCKET]		= "sock",
549 		[PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON]	= "sock_common",
550 		[PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK]	= "tcp_sock",
551 		[PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER]	= "tp_buffer",
552 		[PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK]	= "xdp_sock",
553 		[PTR_TO_BTF_ID]		= "ptr_",
554 		[PTR_TO_MEM]		= "mem",
555 		[PTR_TO_BUF]		= "buf",
556 		[PTR_TO_FUNC]		= "func",
557 		[PTR_TO_MAP_KEY]	= "map_key",
558 	};
559 
560 	if (type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL) {
561 		if (base_type(type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID)
562 			strncpy(postfix, "or_null_", 16);
563 		else
564 			strncpy(postfix, "_or_null", 16);
565 	}
566 
567 	if (type & MEM_RDONLY)
568 		strncpy(prefix, "rdonly_", 32);
569 	if (type & MEM_ALLOC)
570 		strncpy(prefix, "alloc_", 32);
571 	if (type & MEM_USER)
572 		strncpy(prefix, "user_", 32);
573 	if (type & MEM_PERCPU)
574 		strncpy(prefix, "percpu_", 32);
575 	if (type & PTR_UNTRUSTED)
576 		strncpy(prefix, "untrusted_", 32);
577 
578 	snprintf(env->type_str_buf, TYPE_STR_BUF_LEN, "%s%s%s",
579 		 prefix, str[base_type(type)], postfix);
580 	return env->type_str_buf;
581 }
582 
583 static char slot_type_char[] = {
584 	[STACK_INVALID]	= '?',
585 	[STACK_SPILL]	= 'r',
586 	[STACK_MISC]	= 'm',
587 	[STACK_ZERO]	= '0',
588 	[STACK_DYNPTR]	= 'd',
589 };
590 
591 static void print_liveness(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
592 			   enum bpf_reg_liveness live)
593 {
594 	if (live & (REG_LIVE_READ | REG_LIVE_WRITTEN | REG_LIVE_DONE))
595 	    verbose(env, "_");
596 	if (live & REG_LIVE_READ)
597 		verbose(env, "r");
598 	if (live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN)
599 		verbose(env, "w");
600 	if (live & REG_LIVE_DONE)
601 		verbose(env, "D");
602 }
603 
604 static int get_spi(s32 off)
605 {
606 	return (-off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE;
607 }
608 
609 static bool is_spi_bounds_valid(struct bpf_func_state *state, int spi, int nr_slots)
610 {
611 	int allocated_slots = state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE;
612 
613 	/* We need to check that slots between [spi - nr_slots + 1, spi] are
614 	 * within [0, allocated_stack).
615 	 *
616 	 * Please note that the spi grows downwards. For example, a dynptr
617 	 * takes the size of two stack slots; the first slot will be at
618 	 * spi and the second slot will be at spi - 1.
619 	 */
620 	return spi - nr_slots + 1 >= 0 && spi < allocated_slots;
621 }
622 
623 static struct bpf_func_state *func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
624 				   const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
625 {
626 	struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state;
627 
628 	return cur->frame[reg->frameno];
629 }
630 
631 static const char *kernel_type_name(const struct btf* btf, u32 id)
632 {
633 	return btf_name_by_offset(btf, btf_type_by_id(btf, id)->name_off);
634 }
635 
636 static void mark_reg_scratched(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno)
637 {
638 	env->scratched_regs |= 1U << regno;
639 }
640 
641 static void mark_stack_slot_scratched(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 spi)
642 {
643 	env->scratched_stack_slots |= 1ULL << spi;
644 }
645 
646 static bool reg_scratched(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno)
647 {
648 	return (env->scratched_regs >> regno) & 1;
649 }
650 
651 static bool stack_slot_scratched(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u64 regno)
652 {
653 	return (env->scratched_stack_slots >> regno) & 1;
654 }
655 
656 static bool verifier_state_scratched(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
657 {
658 	return env->scratched_regs || env->scratched_stack_slots;
659 }
660 
661 static void mark_verifier_state_clean(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
662 {
663 	env->scratched_regs = 0U;
664 	env->scratched_stack_slots = 0ULL;
665 }
666 
667 /* Used for printing the entire verifier state. */
668 static void mark_verifier_state_scratched(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
669 {
670 	env->scratched_regs = ~0U;
671 	env->scratched_stack_slots = ~0ULL;
672 }
673 
674 static enum bpf_dynptr_type arg_to_dynptr_type(enum bpf_arg_type arg_type)
675 {
676 	switch (arg_type & DYNPTR_TYPE_FLAG_MASK) {
677 	case DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL:
678 		return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL;
679 	case DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF:
680 		return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF;
681 	default:
682 		return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID;
683 	}
684 }
685 
686 static bool dynptr_type_refcounted(enum bpf_dynptr_type type)
687 {
688 	return type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF;
689 }
690 
691 static int mark_stack_slots_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
692 				   enum bpf_arg_type arg_type, int insn_idx)
693 {
694 	struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
695 	enum bpf_dynptr_type type;
696 	int spi, i, id;
697 
698 	spi = get_spi(reg->off);
699 
700 	if (!is_spi_bounds_valid(state, spi, BPF_DYNPTR_NR_SLOTS))
701 		return -EINVAL;
702 
703 	for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
704 		state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_DYNPTR;
705 		state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] = STACK_DYNPTR;
706 	}
707 
708 	type = arg_to_dynptr_type(arg_type);
709 	if (type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID)
710 		return -EINVAL;
711 
712 	state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.first_slot = true;
713 	state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type = type;
714 	state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type = type;
715 
716 	if (dynptr_type_refcounted(type)) {
717 		/* The id is used to track proper releasing */
718 		id = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx);
719 		if (id < 0)
720 			return id;
721 
722 		state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.id = id;
723 		state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.id = id;
724 	}
725 
726 	return 0;
727 }
728 
729 static int unmark_stack_slots_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
730 {
731 	struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
732 	int spi, i;
733 
734 	spi = get_spi(reg->off);
735 
736 	if (!is_spi_bounds_valid(state, spi, BPF_DYNPTR_NR_SLOTS))
737 		return -EINVAL;
738 
739 	for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
740 		state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID;
741 		state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID;
742 	}
743 
744 	/* Invalidate any slices associated with this dynptr */
745 	if (dynptr_type_refcounted(state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type)) {
746 		release_reference(env, state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.id);
747 		state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.id = 0;
748 		state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.id = 0;
749 	}
750 
751 	state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.first_slot = false;
752 	state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type = 0;
753 	state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type = 0;
754 
755 	return 0;
756 }
757 
758 static bool is_dynptr_reg_valid_uninit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
759 {
760 	struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
761 	int spi = get_spi(reg->off);
762 	int i;
763 
764 	if (!is_spi_bounds_valid(state, spi, BPF_DYNPTR_NR_SLOTS))
765 		return true;
766 
767 	for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
768 		if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] == STACK_DYNPTR ||
769 		    state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] == STACK_DYNPTR)
770 			return false;
771 	}
772 
773 	return true;
774 }
775 
776 static bool is_dynptr_reg_valid_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
777 				     enum bpf_arg_type arg_type)
778 {
779 	struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
780 	int spi = get_spi(reg->off);
781 	int i;
782 
783 	if (!is_spi_bounds_valid(state, spi, BPF_DYNPTR_NR_SLOTS) ||
784 	    !state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.first_slot)
785 		return false;
786 
787 	for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
788 		if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] != STACK_DYNPTR ||
789 		    state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] != STACK_DYNPTR)
790 			return false;
791 	}
792 
793 	/* ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR takes any type of dynptr */
794 	if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR)
795 		return true;
796 
797 	return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type == arg_to_dynptr_type(arg_type);
798 }
799 
800 /* The reg state of a pointer or a bounded scalar was saved when
801  * it was spilled to the stack.
802  */
803 static bool is_spilled_reg(const struct bpf_stack_state *stack)
804 {
805 	return stack->slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE - 1] == STACK_SPILL;
806 }
807 
808 static void scrub_spilled_slot(u8 *stype)
809 {
810 	if (*stype != STACK_INVALID)
811 		*stype = STACK_MISC;
812 }
813 
814 static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
815 				 const struct bpf_func_state *state,
816 				 bool print_all)
817 {
818 	const struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
819 	enum bpf_reg_type t;
820 	int i;
821 
822 	if (state->frameno)
823 		verbose(env, " frame%d:", state->frameno);
824 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) {
825 		reg = &state->regs[i];
826 		t = reg->type;
827 		if (t == NOT_INIT)
828 			continue;
829 		if (!print_all && !reg_scratched(env, i))
830 			continue;
831 		verbose(env, " R%d", i);
832 		print_liveness(env, reg->live);
833 		verbose(env, "=");
834 		if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->precise)
835 			verbose(env, "P");
836 		if ((t == SCALAR_VALUE || t == PTR_TO_STACK) &&
837 		    tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
838 			/* reg->off should be 0 for SCALAR_VALUE */
839 			verbose(env, "%s", t == SCALAR_VALUE ? "" : reg_type_str(env, t));
840 			verbose(env, "%lld", reg->var_off.value + reg->off);
841 		} else {
842 			const char *sep = "";
843 
844 			verbose(env, "%s", reg_type_str(env, t));
845 			if (base_type(t) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID)
846 				verbose(env, "%s", kernel_type_name(reg->btf, reg->btf_id));
847 			verbose(env, "(");
848 /*
849  * _a stands for append, was shortened to avoid multiline statements below.
850  * This macro is used to output a comma separated list of attributes.
851  */
852 #define verbose_a(fmt, ...) ({ verbose(env, "%s" fmt, sep, __VA_ARGS__); sep = ","; })
853 
854 			if (reg->id)
855 				verbose_a("id=%d", reg->id);
856 			if (reg_type_may_be_refcounted_or_null(t) && reg->ref_obj_id)
857 				verbose_a("ref_obj_id=%d", reg->ref_obj_id);
858 			if (t != SCALAR_VALUE)
859 				verbose_a("off=%d", reg->off);
860 			if (type_is_pkt_pointer(t))
861 				verbose_a("r=%d", reg->range);
862 			else if (base_type(t) == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP ||
863 				 base_type(t) == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY ||
864 				 base_type(t) == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE)
865 				verbose_a("ks=%d,vs=%d",
866 					  reg->map_ptr->key_size,
867 					  reg->map_ptr->value_size);
868 			if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
869 				/* Typically an immediate SCALAR_VALUE, but
870 				 * could be a pointer whose offset is too big
871 				 * for reg->off
872 				 */
873 				verbose_a("imm=%llx", reg->var_off.value);
874 			} else {
875 				if (reg->smin_value != reg->umin_value &&
876 				    reg->smin_value != S64_MIN)
877 					verbose_a("smin=%lld", (long long)reg->smin_value);
878 				if (reg->smax_value != reg->umax_value &&
879 				    reg->smax_value != S64_MAX)
880 					verbose_a("smax=%lld", (long long)reg->smax_value);
881 				if (reg->umin_value != 0)
882 					verbose_a("umin=%llu", (unsigned long long)reg->umin_value);
883 				if (reg->umax_value != U64_MAX)
884 					verbose_a("umax=%llu", (unsigned long long)reg->umax_value);
885 				if (!tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off)) {
886 					char tn_buf[48];
887 
888 					tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
889 					verbose_a("var_off=%s", tn_buf);
890 				}
891 				if (reg->s32_min_value != reg->smin_value &&
892 				    reg->s32_min_value != S32_MIN)
893 					verbose_a("s32_min=%d", (int)(reg->s32_min_value));
894 				if (reg->s32_max_value != reg->smax_value &&
895 				    reg->s32_max_value != S32_MAX)
896 					verbose_a("s32_max=%d", (int)(reg->s32_max_value));
897 				if (reg->u32_min_value != reg->umin_value &&
898 				    reg->u32_min_value != U32_MIN)
899 					verbose_a("u32_min=%d", (int)(reg->u32_min_value));
900 				if (reg->u32_max_value != reg->umax_value &&
901 				    reg->u32_max_value != U32_MAX)
902 					verbose_a("u32_max=%d", (int)(reg->u32_max_value));
903 			}
904 #undef verbose_a
905 
906 			verbose(env, ")");
907 		}
908 	}
909 	for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
910 		char types_buf[BPF_REG_SIZE + 1];
911 		bool valid = false;
912 		int j;
913 
914 		for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) {
915 			if (state->stack[i].slot_type[j] != STACK_INVALID)
916 				valid = true;
917 			types_buf[j] = slot_type_char[
918 					state->stack[i].slot_type[j]];
919 		}
920 		types_buf[BPF_REG_SIZE] = 0;
921 		if (!valid)
922 			continue;
923 		if (!print_all && !stack_slot_scratched(env, i))
924 			continue;
925 		verbose(env, " fp%d", (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE);
926 		print_liveness(env, state->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live);
927 		if (is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[i])) {
928 			reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr;
929 			t = reg->type;
930 			verbose(env, "=%s", t == SCALAR_VALUE ? "" : reg_type_str(env, t));
931 			if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->precise)
932 				verbose(env, "P");
933 			if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_is_const(reg->var_off))
934 				verbose(env, "%lld", reg->var_off.value + reg->off);
935 		} else {
936 			verbose(env, "=%s", types_buf);
937 		}
938 	}
939 	if (state->acquired_refs && state->refs[0].id) {
940 		verbose(env, " refs=%d", state->refs[0].id);
941 		for (i = 1; i < state->acquired_refs; i++)
942 			if (state->refs[i].id)
943 				verbose(env, ",%d", state->refs[i].id);
944 	}
945 	if (state->in_callback_fn)
946 		verbose(env, " cb");
947 	if (state->in_async_callback_fn)
948 		verbose(env, " async_cb");
949 	verbose(env, "\n");
950 	mark_verifier_state_clean(env);
951 }
952 
953 static inline u32 vlog_alignment(u32 pos)
954 {
955 	return round_up(max(pos + BPF_LOG_MIN_ALIGNMENT / 2, BPF_LOG_ALIGNMENT),
956 			BPF_LOG_MIN_ALIGNMENT) - pos - 1;
957 }
958 
959 static void print_insn_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
960 			     const struct bpf_func_state *state)
961 {
962 	if (env->prev_log_len && env->prev_log_len == env->log.len_used) {
963 		/* remove new line character */
964 		bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, env->prev_log_len - 1);
965 		verbose(env, "%*c;", vlog_alignment(env->prev_insn_print_len), ' ');
966 	} else {
967 		verbose(env, "%d:", env->insn_idx);
968 	}
969 	print_verifier_state(env, state, false);
970 }
971 
972 /* copy array src of length n * size bytes to dst. dst is reallocated if it's too
973  * small to hold src. This is different from krealloc since we don't want to preserve
974  * the contents of dst.
975  *
976  * Leaves dst untouched if src is NULL or length is zero. Returns NULL if memory could
977  * not be allocated.
978  */
979 static void *copy_array(void *dst, const void *src, size_t n, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
980 {
981 	size_t bytes;
982 
983 	if (ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(src))
984 		goto out;
985 
986 	if (unlikely(check_mul_overflow(n, size, &bytes)))
987 		return NULL;
988 
989 	if (ksize(dst) < bytes) {
990 		kfree(dst);
991 		dst = kmalloc_track_caller(bytes, flags);
992 		if (!dst)
993 			return NULL;
994 	}
995 
996 	memcpy(dst, src, bytes);
997 out:
998 	return dst ? dst : ZERO_SIZE_PTR;
999 }
1000 
1001 /* resize an array from old_n items to new_n items. the array is reallocated if it's too
1002  * small to hold new_n items. new items are zeroed out if the array grows.
1003  *
1004  * Contrary to krealloc_array, does not free arr if new_n is zero.
1005  */
1006 static void *realloc_array(void *arr, size_t old_n, size_t new_n, size_t size)
1007 {
1008 	if (!new_n || old_n == new_n)
1009 		goto out;
1010 
1011 	arr = krealloc_array(arr, new_n, size, GFP_KERNEL);
1012 	if (!arr)
1013 		return NULL;
1014 
1015 	if (new_n > old_n)
1016 		memset(arr + old_n * size, 0, (new_n - old_n) * size);
1017 
1018 out:
1019 	return arr ? arr : ZERO_SIZE_PTR;
1020 }
1021 
1022 static int copy_reference_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, const struct bpf_func_state *src)
1023 {
1024 	dst->refs = copy_array(dst->refs, src->refs, src->acquired_refs,
1025 			       sizeof(struct bpf_reference_state), GFP_KERNEL);
1026 	if (!dst->refs)
1027 		return -ENOMEM;
1028 
1029 	dst->acquired_refs = src->acquired_refs;
1030 	return 0;
1031 }
1032 
1033 static int copy_stack_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, const struct bpf_func_state *src)
1034 {
1035 	size_t n = src->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE;
1036 
1037 	dst->stack = copy_array(dst->stack, src->stack, n, sizeof(struct bpf_stack_state),
1038 				GFP_KERNEL);
1039 	if (!dst->stack)
1040 		return -ENOMEM;
1041 
1042 	dst->allocated_stack = src->allocated_stack;
1043 	return 0;
1044 }
1045 
1046 static int resize_reference_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, size_t n)
1047 {
1048 	state->refs = realloc_array(state->refs, state->acquired_refs, n,
1049 				    sizeof(struct bpf_reference_state));
1050 	if (!state->refs)
1051 		return -ENOMEM;
1052 
1053 	state->acquired_refs = n;
1054 	return 0;
1055 }
1056 
1057 static int grow_stack_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, int size)
1058 {
1059 	size_t old_n = state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE, n = size / BPF_REG_SIZE;
1060 
1061 	if (old_n >= n)
1062 		return 0;
1063 
1064 	state->stack = realloc_array(state->stack, old_n, n, sizeof(struct bpf_stack_state));
1065 	if (!state->stack)
1066 		return -ENOMEM;
1067 
1068 	state->allocated_stack = size;
1069 	return 0;
1070 }
1071 
1072 /* Acquire a pointer id from the env and update the state->refs to include
1073  * this new pointer reference.
1074  * On success, returns a valid pointer id to associate with the register
1075  * On failure, returns a negative errno.
1076  */
1077 static int acquire_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
1078 {
1079 	struct bpf_func_state *state = cur_func(env);
1080 	int new_ofs = state->acquired_refs;
1081 	int id, err;
1082 
1083 	err = resize_reference_state(state, state->acquired_refs + 1);
1084 	if (err)
1085 		return err;
1086 	id = ++env->id_gen;
1087 	state->refs[new_ofs].id = id;
1088 	state->refs[new_ofs].insn_idx = insn_idx;
1089 
1090 	return id;
1091 }
1092 
1093 /* release function corresponding to acquire_reference_state(). Idempotent. */
1094 static int release_reference_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, int ptr_id)
1095 {
1096 	int i, last_idx;
1097 
1098 	last_idx = state->acquired_refs - 1;
1099 	for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) {
1100 		if (state->refs[i].id == ptr_id) {
1101 			if (last_idx && i != last_idx)
1102 				memcpy(&state->refs[i], &state->refs[last_idx],
1103 				       sizeof(*state->refs));
1104 			memset(&state->refs[last_idx], 0, sizeof(*state->refs));
1105 			state->acquired_refs--;
1106 			return 0;
1107 		}
1108 	}
1109 	return -EINVAL;
1110 }
1111 
1112 static void free_func_state(struct bpf_func_state *state)
1113 {
1114 	if (!state)
1115 		return;
1116 	kfree(state->refs);
1117 	kfree(state->stack);
1118 	kfree(state);
1119 }
1120 
1121 static void clear_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_state *state)
1122 {
1123 	kfree(state->jmp_history);
1124 	state->jmp_history = NULL;
1125 	state->jmp_history_cnt = 0;
1126 }
1127 
1128 static void free_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state,
1129 				bool free_self)
1130 {
1131 	int i;
1132 
1133 	for (i = 0; i <= state->curframe; i++) {
1134 		free_func_state(state->frame[i]);
1135 		state->frame[i] = NULL;
1136 	}
1137 	clear_jmp_history(state);
1138 	if (free_self)
1139 		kfree(state);
1140 }
1141 
1142 /* copy verifier state from src to dst growing dst stack space
1143  * when necessary to accommodate larger src stack
1144  */
1145 static int copy_func_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst,
1146 			   const struct bpf_func_state *src)
1147 {
1148 	int err;
1149 
1150 	memcpy(dst, src, offsetof(struct bpf_func_state, acquired_refs));
1151 	err = copy_reference_state(dst, src);
1152 	if (err)
1153 		return err;
1154 	return copy_stack_state(dst, src);
1155 }
1156 
1157 static int copy_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *dst_state,
1158 			       const struct bpf_verifier_state *src)
1159 {
1160 	struct bpf_func_state *dst;
1161 	int i, err;
1162 
1163 	dst_state->jmp_history = copy_array(dst_state->jmp_history, src->jmp_history,
1164 					    src->jmp_history_cnt, sizeof(struct bpf_idx_pair),
1165 					    GFP_USER);
1166 	if (!dst_state->jmp_history)
1167 		return -ENOMEM;
1168 	dst_state->jmp_history_cnt = src->jmp_history_cnt;
1169 
1170 	/* if dst has more stack frames then src frame, free them */
1171 	for (i = src->curframe + 1; i <= dst_state->curframe; i++) {
1172 		free_func_state(dst_state->frame[i]);
1173 		dst_state->frame[i] = NULL;
1174 	}
1175 	dst_state->speculative = src->speculative;
1176 	dst_state->curframe = src->curframe;
1177 	dst_state->active_spin_lock = src->active_spin_lock;
1178 	dst_state->branches = src->branches;
1179 	dst_state->parent = src->parent;
1180 	dst_state->first_insn_idx = src->first_insn_idx;
1181 	dst_state->last_insn_idx = src->last_insn_idx;
1182 	for (i = 0; i <= src->curframe; i++) {
1183 		dst = dst_state->frame[i];
1184 		if (!dst) {
1185 			dst = kzalloc(sizeof(*dst), GFP_KERNEL);
1186 			if (!dst)
1187 				return -ENOMEM;
1188 			dst_state->frame[i] = dst;
1189 		}
1190 		err = copy_func_state(dst, src->frame[i]);
1191 		if (err)
1192 			return err;
1193 	}
1194 	return 0;
1195 }
1196 
1197 static void update_branch_counts(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st)
1198 {
1199 	while (st) {
1200 		u32 br = --st->branches;
1201 
1202 		/* WARN_ON(br > 1) technically makes sense here,
1203 		 * but see comment in push_stack(), hence:
1204 		 */
1205 		WARN_ONCE((int)br < 0,
1206 			  "BUG update_branch_counts:branches_to_explore=%d\n",
1207 			  br);
1208 		if (br)
1209 			break;
1210 		st = st->parent;
1211 	}
1212 }
1213 
1214 static int pop_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *prev_insn_idx,
1215 		     int *insn_idx, bool pop_log)
1216 {
1217 	struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state;
1218 	struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem, *head = env->head;
1219 	int err;
1220 
1221 	if (env->head == NULL)
1222 		return -ENOENT;
1223 
1224 	if (cur) {
1225 		err = copy_verifier_state(cur, &head->st);
1226 		if (err)
1227 			return err;
1228 	}
1229 	if (pop_log)
1230 		bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, head->log_pos);
1231 	if (insn_idx)
1232 		*insn_idx = head->insn_idx;
1233 	if (prev_insn_idx)
1234 		*prev_insn_idx = head->prev_insn_idx;
1235 	elem = head->next;
1236 	free_verifier_state(&head->st, false);
1237 	kfree(head);
1238 	env->head = elem;
1239 	env->stack_size--;
1240 	return 0;
1241 }
1242 
1243 static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1244 					     int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx,
1245 					     bool speculative)
1246 {
1247 	struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state;
1248 	struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem;
1249 	int err;
1250 
1251 	elem = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem), GFP_KERNEL);
1252 	if (!elem)
1253 		goto err;
1254 
1255 	elem->insn_idx = insn_idx;
1256 	elem->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx;
1257 	elem->next = env->head;
1258 	elem->log_pos = env->log.len_used;
1259 	env->head = elem;
1260 	env->stack_size++;
1261 	err = copy_verifier_state(&elem->st, cur);
1262 	if (err)
1263 		goto err;
1264 	elem->st.speculative |= speculative;
1265 	if (env->stack_size > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ) {
1266 		verbose(env, "The sequence of %d jumps is too complex.\n",
1267 			env->stack_size);
1268 		goto err;
1269 	}
1270 	if (elem->st.parent) {
1271 		++elem->st.parent->branches;
1272 		/* WARN_ON(branches > 2) technically makes sense here,
1273 		 * but
1274 		 * 1. speculative states will bump 'branches' for non-branch
1275 		 * instructions
1276 		 * 2. is_state_visited() heuristics may decide not to create
1277 		 * a new state for a sequence of branches and all such current
1278 		 * and cloned states will be pointing to a single parent state
1279 		 * which might have large 'branches' count.
1280 		 */
1281 	}
1282 	return &elem->st;
1283 err:
1284 	free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true);
1285 	env->cur_state = NULL;
1286 	/* pop all elements and return */
1287 	while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false));
1288 	return NULL;
1289 }
1290 
1291 #define CALLER_SAVED_REGS 6
1292 static const int caller_saved[CALLER_SAVED_REGS] = {
1293 	BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_5
1294 };
1295 
1296 static void __mark_reg_not_init(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1297 				struct bpf_reg_state *reg);
1298 
1299 /* This helper doesn't clear reg->id */
1300 static void ___mark_reg_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm)
1301 {
1302 	reg->var_off = tnum_const(imm);
1303 	reg->smin_value = (s64)imm;
1304 	reg->smax_value = (s64)imm;
1305 	reg->umin_value = imm;
1306 	reg->umax_value = imm;
1307 
1308 	reg->s32_min_value = (s32)imm;
1309 	reg->s32_max_value = (s32)imm;
1310 	reg->u32_min_value = (u32)imm;
1311 	reg->u32_max_value = (u32)imm;
1312 }
1313 
1314 /* Mark the unknown part of a register (variable offset or scalar value) as
1315  * known to have the value @imm.
1316  */
1317 static void __mark_reg_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm)
1318 {
1319 	/* Clear id, off, and union(map_ptr, range) */
1320 	memset(((u8 *)reg) + sizeof(reg->type), 0,
1321 	       offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off) - sizeof(reg->type));
1322 	___mark_reg_known(reg, imm);
1323 }
1324 
1325 static void __mark_reg32_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm)
1326 {
1327 	reg->var_off = tnum_const_subreg(reg->var_off, imm);
1328 	reg->s32_min_value = (s32)imm;
1329 	reg->s32_max_value = (s32)imm;
1330 	reg->u32_min_value = (u32)imm;
1331 	reg->u32_max_value = (u32)imm;
1332 }
1333 
1334 /* Mark the 'variable offset' part of a register as zero.  This should be
1335  * used only on registers holding a pointer type.
1336  */
1337 static void __mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1338 {
1339 	__mark_reg_known(reg, 0);
1340 }
1341 
1342 static void __mark_reg_const_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1343 {
1344 	__mark_reg_known(reg, 0);
1345 	reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE;
1346 }
1347 
1348 static void mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1349 				struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
1350 {
1351 	if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) {
1352 		verbose(env, "mark_reg_known_zero(regs, %u)\n", regno);
1353 		/* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs */
1354 		for (regno = 0; regno < MAX_BPF_REG; regno++)
1355 			__mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno);
1356 		return;
1357 	}
1358 	__mark_reg_known_zero(regs + regno);
1359 }
1360 
1361 static void mark_ptr_not_null_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1362 {
1363 	if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
1364 		const struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr;
1365 
1366 		if (map->inner_map_meta) {
1367 			reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
1368 			reg->map_ptr = map->inner_map_meta;
1369 			/* transfer reg's id which is unique for every map_lookup_elem
1370 			 * as UID of the inner map.
1371 			 */
1372 			if (map_value_has_timer(map->inner_map_meta))
1373 				reg->map_uid = reg->id;
1374 		} else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP) {
1375 			reg->type = PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK;
1376 		} else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP ||
1377 			   map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH) {
1378 			reg->type = PTR_TO_SOCKET;
1379 		} else {
1380 			reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE;
1381 		}
1382 		return;
1383 	}
1384 
1385 	reg->type &= ~PTR_MAYBE_NULL;
1386 }
1387 
1388 static bool reg_is_pkt_pointer(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1389 {
1390 	return type_is_pkt_pointer(reg->type);
1391 }
1392 
1393 static bool reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1394 {
1395 	return reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg) ||
1396 	       reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END;
1397 }
1398 
1399 /* Unmodified PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END] register from ctx access. */
1400 static bool reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
1401 				    enum bpf_reg_type which)
1402 {
1403 	/* The register can already have a range from prior markings.
1404 	 * This is fine as long as it hasn't been advanced from its
1405 	 * origin.
1406 	 */
1407 	return reg->type == which &&
1408 	       reg->id == 0 &&
1409 	       reg->off == 0 &&
1410 	       tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0);
1411 }
1412 
1413 /* Reset the min/max bounds of a register */
1414 static void __mark_reg_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1415 {
1416 	reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
1417 	reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
1418 	reg->umin_value = 0;
1419 	reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
1420 
1421 	reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
1422 	reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
1423 	reg->u32_min_value = 0;
1424 	reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX;
1425 }
1426 
1427 static void __mark_reg64_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1428 {
1429 	reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
1430 	reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
1431 	reg->umin_value = 0;
1432 	reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
1433 }
1434 
1435 static void __mark_reg32_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1436 {
1437 	reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
1438 	reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
1439 	reg->u32_min_value = 0;
1440 	reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX;
1441 }
1442 
1443 static void __update_reg32_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1444 {
1445 	struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off);
1446 
1447 	/* min signed is max(sign bit) | min(other bits) */
1448 	reg->s32_min_value = max_t(s32, reg->s32_min_value,
1449 			var32_off.value | (var32_off.mask & S32_MIN));
1450 	/* max signed is min(sign bit) | max(other bits) */
1451 	reg->s32_max_value = min_t(s32, reg->s32_max_value,
1452 			var32_off.value | (var32_off.mask & S32_MAX));
1453 	reg->u32_min_value = max_t(u32, reg->u32_min_value, (u32)var32_off.value);
1454 	reg->u32_max_value = min(reg->u32_max_value,
1455 				 (u32)(var32_off.value | var32_off.mask));
1456 }
1457 
1458 static void __update_reg64_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1459 {
1460 	/* min signed is max(sign bit) | min(other bits) */
1461 	reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, reg->smin_value,
1462 				reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask & S64_MIN));
1463 	/* max signed is min(sign bit) | max(other bits) */
1464 	reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, reg->smax_value,
1465 				reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask & S64_MAX));
1466 	reg->umin_value = max(reg->umin_value, reg->var_off.value);
1467 	reg->umax_value = min(reg->umax_value,
1468 			      reg->var_off.value | reg->var_off.mask);
1469 }
1470 
1471 static void __update_reg_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1472 {
1473 	__update_reg32_bounds(reg);
1474 	__update_reg64_bounds(reg);
1475 }
1476 
1477 /* Uses signed min/max values to inform unsigned, and vice-versa */
1478 static void __reg32_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1479 {
1480 	/* Learn sign from signed bounds.
1481 	 * If we cannot cross the sign boundary, then signed and unsigned bounds
1482 	 * are the same, so combine.  This works even in the negative case, e.g.
1483 	 * -3 s<= x s<= -1 implies 0xf...fd u<= x u<= 0xf...ff.
1484 	 */
1485 	if (reg->s32_min_value >= 0 || reg->s32_max_value < 0) {
1486 		reg->s32_min_value = reg->u32_min_value =
1487 			max_t(u32, reg->s32_min_value, reg->u32_min_value);
1488 		reg->s32_max_value = reg->u32_max_value =
1489 			min_t(u32, reg->s32_max_value, reg->u32_max_value);
1490 		return;
1491 	}
1492 	/* Learn sign from unsigned bounds.  Signed bounds cross the sign
1493 	 * boundary, so we must be careful.
1494 	 */
1495 	if ((s32)reg->u32_max_value >= 0) {
1496 		/* Positive.  We can't learn anything from the smin, but smax
1497 		 * is positive, hence safe.
1498 		 */
1499 		reg->s32_min_value = reg->u32_min_value;
1500 		reg->s32_max_value = reg->u32_max_value =
1501 			min_t(u32, reg->s32_max_value, reg->u32_max_value);
1502 	} else if ((s32)reg->u32_min_value < 0) {
1503 		/* Negative.  We can't learn anything from the smax, but smin
1504 		 * is negative, hence safe.
1505 		 */
1506 		reg->s32_min_value = reg->u32_min_value =
1507 			max_t(u32, reg->s32_min_value, reg->u32_min_value);
1508 		reg->s32_max_value = reg->u32_max_value;
1509 	}
1510 }
1511 
1512 static void __reg64_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1513 {
1514 	/* Learn sign from signed bounds.
1515 	 * If we cannot cross the sign boundary, then signed and unsigned bounds
1516 	 * are the same, so combine.  This works even in the negative case, e.g.
1517 	 * -3 s<= x s<= -1 implies 0xf...fd u<= x u<= 0xf...ff.
1518 	 */
1519 	if (reg->smin_value >= 0 || reg->smax_value < 0) {
1520 		reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->smin_value,
1521 							  reg->umin_value);
1522 		reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->smax_value,
1523 							  reg->umax_value);
1524 		return;
1525 	}
1526 	/* Learn sign from unsigned bounds.  Signed bounds cross the sign
1527 	 * boundary, so we must be careful.
1528 	 */
1529 	if ((s64)reg->umax_value >= 0) {
1530 		/* Positive.  We can't learn anything from the smin, but smax
1531 		 * is positive, hence safe.
1532 		 */
1533 		reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value;
1534 		reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->smax_value,
1535 							  reg->umax_value);
1536 	} else if ((s64)reg->umin_value < 0) {
1537 		/* Negative.  We can't learn anything from the smax, but smin
1538 		 * is negative, hence safe.
1539 		 */
1540 		reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->smin_value,
1541 							  reg->umin_value);
1542 		reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value;
1543 	}
1544 }
1545 
1546 static void __reg_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1547 {
1548 	__reg32_deduce_bounds(reg);
1549 	__reg64_deduce_bounds(reg);
1550 }
1551 
1552 /* Attempts to improve var_off based on unsigned min/max information */
1553 static void __reg_bound_offset(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1554 {
1555 	struct tnum var64_off = tnum_intersect(reg->var_off,
1556 					       tnum_range(reg->umin_value,
1557 							  reg->umax_value));
1558 	struct tnum var32_off = tnum_intersect(tnum_subreg(reg->var_off),
1559 						tnum_range(reg->u32_min_value,
1560 							   reg->u32_max_value));
1561 
1562 	reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(var64_off), var32_off);
1563 }
1564 
1565 static bool __reg32_bound_s64(s32 a)
1566 {
1567 	return a >= 0 && a <= S32_MAX;
1568 }
1569 
1570 static void __reg_assign_32_into_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1571 {
1572 	reg->umin_value = reg->u32_min_value;
1573 	reg->umax_value = reg->u32_max_value;
1574 
1575 	/* Attempt to pull 32-bit signed bounds into 64-bit bounds but must
1576 	 * be positive otherwise set to worse case bounds and refine later
1577 	 * from tnum.
1578 	 */
1579 	if (__reg32_bound_s64(reg->s32_min_value) &&
1580 	    __reg32_bound_s64(reg->s32_max_value)) {
1581 		reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value;
1582 		reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value;
1583 	} else {
1584 		reg->smin_value = 0;
1585 		reg->smax_value = U32_MAX;
1586 	}
1587 }
1588 
1589 static void __reg_combine_32_into_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1590 {
1591 	/* special case when 64-bit register has upper 32-bit register
1592 	 * zeroed. Typically happens after zext or <<32, >>32 sequence
1593 	 * allowing us to use 32-bit bounds directly,
1594 	 */
1595 	if (tnum_equals_const(tnum_clear_subreg(reg->var_off), 0)) {
1596 		__reg_assign_32_into_64(reg);
1597 	} else {
1598 		/* Otherwise the best we can do is push lower 32bit known and
1599 		 * unknown bits into register (var_off set from jmp logic)
1600 		 * then learn as much as possible from the 64-bit tnum
1601 		 * known and unknown bits. The previous smin/smax bounds are
1602 		 * invalid here because of jmp32 compare so mark them unknown
1603 		 * so they do not impact tnum bounds calculation.
1604 		 */
1605 		__mark_reg64_unbounded(reg);
1606 		__update_reg_bounds(reg);
1607 	}
1608 
1609 	/* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds
1610 	 * slightly.  e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc),
1611 	 * then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax.
1612 	 */
1613 	__reg_deduce_bounds(reg);
1614 	__reg_bound_offset(reg);
1615 	__update_reg_bounds(reg);
1616 }
1617 
1618 static bool __reg64_bound_s32(s64 a)
1619 {
1620 	return a >= S32_MIN && a <= S32_MAX;
1621 }
1622 
1623 static bool __reg64_bound_u32(u64 a)
1624 {
1625 	return a >= U32_MIN && a <= U32_MAX;
1626 }
1627 
1628 static void __reg_combine_64_into_32(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1629 {
1630 	__mark_reg32_unbounded(reg);
1631 
1632 	if (__reg64_bound_s32(reg->smin_value) && __reg64_bound_s32(reg->smax_value)) {
1633 		reg->s32_min_value = (s32)reg->smin_value;
1634 		reg->s32_max_value = (s32)reg->smax_value;
1635 	}
1636 	if (__reg64_bound_u32(reg->umin_value) && __reg64_bound_u32(reg->umax_value)) {
1637 		reg->u32_min_value = (u32)reg->umin_value;
1638 		reg->u32_max_value = (u32)reg->umax_value;
1639 	}
1640 
1641 	/* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds
1642 	 * slightly.  e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc),
1643 	 * then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax.
1644 	 */
1645 	__reg_deduce_bounds(reg);
1646 	__reg_bound_offset(reg);
1647 	__update_reg_bounds(reg);
1648 }
1649 
1650 /* Mark a register as having a completely unknown (scalar) value. */
1651 static void __mark_reg_unknown(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1652 			       struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1653 {
1654 	/*
1655 	 * Clear type, id, off, and union(map_ptr, range) and
1656 	 * padding between 'type' and union
1657 	 */
1658 	memset(reg, 0, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off));
1659 	reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE;
1660 	reg->var_off = tnum_unknown;
1661 	reg->frameno = 0;
1662 	reg->precise = env->subprog_cnt > 1 || !env->bpf_capable;
1663 	__mark_reg_unbounded(reg);
1664 }
1665 
1666 static void mark_reg_unknown(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1667 			     struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
1668 {
1669 	if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) {
1670 		verbose(env, "mark_reg_unknown(regs, %u)\n", regno);
1671 		/* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs except FP */
1672 		for (regno = 0; regno < BPF_REG_FP; regno++)
1673 			__mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno);
1674 		return;
1675 	}
1676 	__mark_reg_unknown(env, regs + regno);
1677 }
1678 
1679 static void __mark_reg_not_init(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1680 				struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1681 {
1682 	__mark_reg_unknown(env, reg);
1683 	reg->type = NOT_INIT;
1684 }
1685 
1686 static void mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1687 			      struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
1688 {
1689 	if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) {
1690 		verbose(env, "mark_reg_not_init(regs, %u)\n", regno);
1691 		/* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs except FP */
1692 		for (regno = 0; regno < BPF_REG_FP; regno++)
1693 			__mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno);
1694 		return;
1695 	}
1696 	__mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno);
1697 }
1698 
1699 static void mark_btf_ld_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1700 			    struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno,
1701 			    enum bpf_reg_type reg_type,
1702 			    struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id,
1703 			    enum bpf_type_flag flag)
1704 {
1705 	if (reg_type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
1706 		mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, regno);
1707 		return;
1708 	}
1709 	mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, regno);
1710 	regs[regno].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | flag;
1711 	regs[regno].btf = btf;
1712 	regs[regno].btf_id = btf_id;
1713 }
1714 
1715 #define DEF_NOT_SUBREG	(0)
1716 static void init_reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1717 			   struct bpf_func_state *state)
1718 {
1719 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
1720 	int i;
1721 
1722 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) {
1723 		mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, i);
1724 		regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE;
1725 		regs[i].parent = NULL;
1726 		regs[i].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG;
1727 	}
1728 
1729 	/* frame pointer */
1730 	regs[BPF_REG_FP].type = PTR_TO_STACK;
1731 	mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_FP);
1732 	regs[BPF_REG_FP].frameno = state->frameno;
1733 }
1734 
1735 #define BPF_MAIN_FUNC (-1)
1736 static void init_func_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1737 			    struct bpf_func_state *state,
1738 			    int callsite, int frameno, int subprogno)
1739 {
1740 	state->callsite = callsite;
1741 	state->frameno = frameno;
1742 	state->subprogno = subprogno;
1743 	init_reg_state(env, state);
1744 	mark_verifier_state_scratched(env);
1745 }
1746 
1747 /* Similar to push_stack(), but for async callbacks */
1748 static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_async_cb(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1749 						int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx,
1750 						int subprog)
1751 {
1752 	struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem;
1753 	struct bpf_func_state *frame;
1754 
1755 	elem = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem), GFP_KERNEL);
1756 	if (!elem)
1757 		goto err;
1758 
1759 	elem->insn_idx = insn_idx;
1760 	elem->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx;
1761 	elem->next = env->head;
1762 	elem->log_pos = env->log.len_used;
1763 	env->head = elem;
1764 	env->stack_size++;
1765 	if (env->stack_size > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ) {
1766 		verbose(env,
1767 			"The sequence of %d jumps is too complex for async cb.\n",
1768 			env->stack_size);
1769 		goto err;
1770 	}
1771 	/* Unlike push_stack() do not copy_verifier_state().
1772 	 * The caller state doesn't matter.
1773 	 * This is async callback. It starts in a fresh stack.
1774 	 * Initialize it similar to do_check_common().
1775 	 */
1776 	elem->st.branches = 1;
1777 	frame = kzalloc(sizeof(*frame), GFP_KERNEL);
1778 	if (!frame)
1779 		goto err;
1780 	init_func_state(env, frame,
1781 			BPF_MAIN_FUNC /* callsite */,
1782 			0 /* frameno within this callchain */,
1783 			subprog /* subprog number within this prog */);
1784 	elem->st.frame[0] = frame;
1785 	return &elem->st;
1786 err:
1787 	free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true);
1788 	env->cur_state = NULL;
1789 	/* pop all elements and return */
1790 	while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false));
1791 	return NULL;
1792 }
1793 
1794 
1795 enum reg_arg_type {
1796 	SRC_OP,		/* register is used as source operand */
1797 	DST_OP,		/* register is used as destination operand */
1798 	DST_OP_NO_MARK	/* same as above, check only, don't mark */
1799 };
1800 
1801 static int cmp_subprogs(const void *a, const void *b)
1802 {
1803 	return ((struct bpf_subprog_info *)a)->start -
1804 	       ((struct bpf_subprog_info *)b)->start;
1805 }
1806 
1807 static int find_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off)
1808 {
1809 	struct bpf_subprog_info *p;
1810 
1811 	p = bsearch(&off, env->subprog_info, env->subprog_cnt,
1812 		    sizeof(env->subprog_info[0]), cmp_subprogs);
1813 	if (!p)
1814 		return -ENOENT;
1815 	return p - env->subprog_info;
1816 
1817 }
1818 
1819 static int add_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off)
1820 {
1821 	int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
1822 	int ret;
1823 
1824 	if (off >= insn_cnt || off < 0) {
1825 		verbose(env, "call to invalid destination\n");
1826 		return -EINVAL;
1827 	}
1828 	ret = find_subprog(env, off);
1829 	if (ret >= 0)
1830 		return ret;
1831 	if (env->subprog_cnt >= BPF_MAX_SUBPROGS) {
1832 		verbose(env, "too many subprograms\n");
1833 		return -E2BIG;
1834 	}
1835 	/* determine subprog starts. The end is one before the next starts */
1836 	env->subprog_info[env->subprog_cnt++].start = off;
1837 	sort(env->subprog_info, env->subprog_cnt,
1838 	     sizeof(env->subprog_info[0]), cmp_subprogs, NULL);
1839 	return env->subprog_cnt - 1;
1840 }
1841 
1842 #define MAX_KFUNC_DESCS 256
1843 #define MAX_KFUNC_BTFS	256
1844 
1845 struct bpf_kfunc_desc {
1846 	struct btf_func_model func_model;
1847 	u32 func_id;
1848 	s32 imm;
1849 	u16 offset;
1850 };
1851 
1852 struct bpf_kfunc_btf {
1853 	struct btf *btf;
1854 	struct module *module;
1855 	u16 offset;
1856 };
1857 
1858 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab {
1859 	struct bpf_kfunc_desc descs[MAX_KFUNC_DESCS];
1860 	u32 nr_descs;
1861 };
1862 
1863 struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab {
1864 	struct bpf_kfunc_btf descs[MAX_KFUNC_BTFS];
1865 	u32 nr_descs;
1866 };
1867 
1868 static int kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id_off(const void *a, const void *b)
1869 {
1870 	const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d0 = a;
1871 	const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d1 = b;
1872 
1873 	/* func_id is not greater than BTF_MAX_TYPE */
1874 	return d0->func_id - d1->func_id ?: d0->offset - d1->offset;
1875 }
1876 
1877 static int kfunc_btf_cmp_by_off(const void *a, const void *b)
1878 {
1879 	const struct bpf_kfunc_btf *d0 = a;
1880 	const struct bpf_kfunc_btf *d1 = b;
1881 
1882 	return d0->offset - d1->offset;
1883 }
1884 
1885 static const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *
1886 find_kfunc_desc(const struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 func_id, u16 offset)
1887 {
1888 	struct bpf_kfunc_desc desc = {
1889 		.func_id = func_id,
1890 		.offset = offset,
1891 	};
1892 	struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab;
1893 
1894 	tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab;
1895 	return bsearch(&desc, tab->descs, tab->nr_descs,
1896 		       sizeof(tab->descs[0]), kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id_off);
1897 }
1898 
1899 static struct btf *__find_kfunc_desc_btf(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1900 					 s16 offset)
1901 {
1902 	struct bpf_kfunc_btf kf_btf = { .offset = offset };
1903 	struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab *tab;
1904 	struct bpf_kfunc_btf *b;
1905 	struct module *mod;
1906 	struct btf *btf;
1907 	int btf_fd;
1908 
1909 	tab = env->prog->aux->kfunc_btf_tab;
1910 	b = bsearch(&kf_btf, tab->descs, tab->nr_descs,
1911 		    sizeof(tab->descs[0]), kfunc_btf_cmp_by_off);
1912 	if (!b) {
1913 		if (tab->nr_descs == MAX_KFUNC_BTFS) {
1914 			verbose(env, "too many different module BTFs\n");
1915 			return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG);
1916 		}
1917 
1918 		if (bpfptr_is_null(env->fd_array)) {
1919 			verbose(env, "kfunc offset > 0 without fd_array is invalid\n");
1920 			return ERR_PTR(-EPROTO);
1921 		}
1922 
1923 		if (copy_from_bpfptr_offset(&btf_fd, env->fd_array,
1924 					    offset * sizeof(btf_fd),
1925 					    sizeof(btf_fd)))
1926 			return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
1927 
1928 		btf = btf_get_by_fd(btf_fd);
1929 		if (IS_ERR(btf)) {
1930 			verbose(env, "invalid module BTF fd specified\n");
1931 			return btf;
1932 		}
1933 
1934 		if (!btf_is_module(btf)) {
1935 			verbose(env, "BTF fd for kfunc is not a module BTF\n");
1936 			btf_put(btf);
1937 			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
1938 		}
1939 
1940 		mod = btf_try_get_module(btf);
1941 		if (!mod) {
1942 			btf_put(btf);
1943 			return ERR_PTR(-ENXIO);
1944 		}
1945 
1946 		b = &tab->descs[tab->nr_descs++];
1947 		b->btf = btf;
1948 		b->module = mod;
1949 		b->offset = offset;
1950 
1951 		sort(tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, sizeof(tab->descs[0]),
1952 		     kfunc_btf_cmp_by_off, NULL);
1953 	}
1954 	return b->btf;
1955 }
1956 
1957 void bpf_free_kfunc_btf_tab(struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab *tab)
1958 {
1959 	if (!tab)
1960 		return;
1961 
1962 	while (tab->nr_descs--) {
1963 		module_put(tab->descs[tab->nr_descs].module);
1964 		btf_put(tab->descs[tab->nr_descs].btf);
1965 	}
1966 	kfree(tab);
1967 }
1968 
1969 static struct btf *find_kfunc_desc_btf(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, s16 offset)
1970 {
1971 	if (offset) {
1972 		if (offset < 0) {
1973 			/* In the future, this can be allowed to increase limit
1974 			 * of fd index into fd_array, interpreted as u16.
1975 			 */
1976 			verbose(env, "negative offset disallowed for kernel module function call\n");
1977 			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
1978 		}
1979 
1980 		return __find_kfunc_desc_btf(env, offset);
1981 	}
1982 	return btf_vmlinux ?: ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
1983 }
1984 
1985 static int add_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 func_id, s16 offset)
1986 {
1987 	const struct btf_type *func, *func_proto;
1988 	struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab *btf_tab;
1989 	struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab;
1990 	struct bpf_prog_aux *prog_aux;
1991 	struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc;
1992 	const char *func_name;
1993 	struct btf *desc_btf;
1994 	unsigned long call_imm;
1995 	unsigned long addr;
1996 	int err;
1997 
1998 	prog_aux = env->prog->aux;
1999 	tab = prog_aux->kfunc_tab;
2000 	btf_tab = prog_aux->kfunc_btf_tab;
2001 	if (!tab) {
2002 		if (!btf_vmlinux) {
2003 			verbose(env, "calling kernel function is not supported without CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF\n");
2004 			return -ENOTSUPP;
2005 		}
2006 
2007 		if (!env->prog->jit_requested) {
2008 			verbose(env, "JIT is required for calling kernel function\n");
2009 			return -ENOTSUPP;
2010 		}
2011 
2012 		if (!bpf_jit_supports_kfunc_call()) {
2013 			verbose(env, "JIT does not support calling kernel function\n");
2014 			return -ENOTSUPP;
2015 		}
2016 
2017 		if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible) {
2018 			verbose(env, "cannot call kernel function from non-GPL compatible program\n");
2019 			return -EINVAL;
2020 		}
2021 
2022 		tab = kzalloc(sizeof(*tab), GFP_KERNEL);
2023 		if (!tab)
2024 			return -ENOMEM;
2025 		prog_aux->kfunc_tab = tab;
2026 	}
2027 
2028 	/* func_id == 0 is always invalid, but instead of returning an error, be
2029 	 * conservative and wait until the code elimination pass before returning
2030 	 * error, so that invalid calls that get pruned out can be in BPF programs
2031 	 * loaded from userspace.  It is also required that offset be untouched
2032 	 * for such calls.
2033 	 */
2034 	if (!func_id && !offset)
2035 		return 0;
2036 
2037 	if (!btf_tab && offset) {
2038 		btf_tab = kzalloc(sizeof(*btf_tab), GFP_KERNEL);
2039 		if (!btf_tab)
2040 			return -ENOMEM;
2041 		prog_aux->kfunc_btf_tab = btf_tab;
2042 	}
2043 
2044 	desc_btf = find_kfunc_desc_btf(env, offset);
2045 	if (IS_ERR(desc_btf)) {
2046 		verbose(env, "failed to find BTF for kernel function\n");
2047 		return PTR_ERR(desc_btf);
2048 	}
2049 
2050 	if (find_kfunc_desc(env->prog, func_id, offset))
2051 		return 0;
2052 
2053 	if (tab->nr_descs == MAX_KFUNC_DESCS) {
2054 		verbose(env, "too many different kernel function calls\n");
2055 		return -E2BIG;
2056 	}
2057 
2058 	func = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, func_id);
2059 	if (!func || !btf_type_is_func(func)) {
2060 		verbose(env, "kernel btf_id %u is not a function\n",
2061 			func_id);
2062 		return -EINVAL;
2063 	}
2064 	func_proto = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, func->type);
2065 	if (!func_proto || !btf_type_is_func_proto(func_proto)) {
2066 		verbose(env, "kernel function btf_id %u does not have a valid func_proto\n",
2067 			func_id);
2068 		return -EINVAL;
2069 	}
2070 
2071 	func_name = btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf, func->name_off);
2072 	addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(func_name);
2073 	if (!addr) {
2074 		verbose(env, "cannot find address for kernel function %s\n",
2075 			func_name);
2076 		return -EINVAL;
2077 	}
2078 
2079 	call_imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(addr);
2080 	/* Check whether or not the relative offset overflows desc->imm */
2081 	if ((unsigned long)(s32)call_imm != call_imm) {
2082 		verbose(env, "address of kernel function %s is out of range\n",
2083 			func_name);
2084 		return -EINVAL;
2085 	}
2086 
2087 	desc = &tab->descs[tab->nr_descs++];
2088 	desc->func_id = func_id;
2089 	desc->imm = call_imm;
2090 	desc->offset = offset;
2091 	err = btf_distill_func_proto(&env->log, desc_btf,
2092 				     func_proto, func_name,
2093 				     &desc->func_model);
2094 	if (!err)
2095 		sort(tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, sizeof(tab->descs[0]),
2096 		     kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id_off, NULL);
2097 	return err;
2098 }
2099 
2100 static int kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm(const void *a, const void *b)
2101 {
2102 	const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d0 = a;
2103 	const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d1 = b;
2104 
2105 	if (d0->imm > d1->imm)
2106 		return 1;
2107 	else if (d0->imm < d1->imm)
2108 		return -1;
2109 	return 0;
2110 }
2111 
2112 static void sort_kfunc_descs_by_imm(struct bpf_prog *prog)
2113 {
2114 	struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab;
2115 
2116 	tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab;
2117 	if (!tab)
2118 		return;
2119 
2120 	sort(tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, sizeof(tab->descs[0]),
2121 	     kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm, NULL);
2122 }
2123 
2124 bool bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call(const struct bpf_prog *prog)
2125 {
2126 	return !!prog->aux->kfunc_tab;
2127 }
2128 
2129 const struct btf_func_model *
2130 bpf_jit_find_kfunc_model(const struct bpf_prog *prog,
2131 			 const struct bpf_insn *insn)
2132 {
2133 	const struct bpf_kfunc_desc desc = {
2134 		.imm = insn->imm,
2135 	};
2136 	const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *res;
2137 	struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab;
2138 
2139 	tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab;
2140 	res = bsearch(&desc, tab->descs, tab->nr_descs,
2141 		      sizeof(tab->descs[0]), kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm);
2142 
2143 	return res ? &res->func_model : NULL;
2144 }
2145 
2146 static int add_subprog_and_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
2147 {
2148 	struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info;
2149 	struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
2150 	int i, ret, insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
2151 
2152 	/* Add entry function. */
2153 	ret = add_subprog(env, 0);
2154 	if (ret)
2155 		return ret;
2156 
2157 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
2158 		if (!bpf_pseudo_func(insn) && !bpf_pseudo_call(insn) &&
2159 		    !bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn))
2160 			continue;
2161 
2162 		if (!env->bpf_capable) {
2163 			verbose(env, "loading/calling other bpf or kernel functions are allowed for CAP_BPF and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n");
2164 			return -EPERM;
2165 		}
2166 
2167 		if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn) || bpf_pseudo_call(insn))
2168 			ret = add_subprog(env, i + insn->imm + 1);
2169 		else
2170 			ret = add_kfunc_call(env, insn->imm, insn->off);
2171 
2172 		if (ret < 0)
2173 			return ret;
2174 	}
2175 
2176 	/* Add a fake 'exit' subprog which could simplify subprog iteration
2177 	 * logic. 'subprog_cnt' should not be increased.
2178 	 */
2179 	subprog[env->subprog_cnt].start = insn_cnt;
2180 
2181 	if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2)
2182 		for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++)
2183 			verbose(env, "func#%d @%d\n", i, subprog[i].start);
2184 
2185 	return 0;
2186 }
2187 
2188 static int check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
2189 {
2190 	int i, subprog_start, subprog_end, off, cur_subprog = 0;
2191 	struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info;
2192 	struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
2193 	int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
2194 
2195 	/* now check that all jumps are within the same subprog */
2196 	subprog_start = subprog[cur_subprog].start;
2197 	subprog_end = subprog[cur_subprog + 1].start;
2198 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) {
2199 		u8 code = insn[i].code;
2200 
2201 		if (code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) &&
2202 		    insn[i].imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call &&
2203 		    insn[i].src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
2204 			subprog[cur_subprog].has_tail_call = true;
2205 		if (BPF_CLASS(code) == BPF_LD &&
2206 		    (BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_ABS || BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_IND))
2207 			subprog[cur_subprog].has_ld_abs = true;
2208 		if (BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP && BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP32)
2209 			goto next;
2210 		if (BPF_OP(code) == BPF_EXIT || BPF_OP(code) == BPF_CALL)
2211 			goto next;
2212 		off = i + insn[i].off + 1;
2213 		if (off < subprog_start || off >= subprog_end) {
2214 			verbose(env, "jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", i, off);
2215 			return -EINVAL;
2216 		}
2217 next:
2218 		if (i == subprog_end - 1) {
2219 			/* to avoid fall-through from one subprog into another
2220 			 * the last insn of the subprog should be either exit
2221 			 * or unconditional jump back
2222 			 */
2223 			if (code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT) &&
2224 			    code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_JA)) {
2225 				verbose(env, "last insn is not an exit or jmp\n");
2226 				return -EINVAL;
2227 			}
2228 			subprog_start = subprog_end;
2229 			cur_subprog++;
2230 			if (cur_subprog < env->subprog_cnt)
2231 				subprog_end = subprog[cur_subprog + 1].start;
2232 		}
2233 	}
2234 	return 0;
2235 }
2236 
2237 /* Parentage chain of this register (or stack slot) should take care of all
2238  * issues like callee-saved registers, stack slot allocation time, etc.
2239  */
2240 static int mark_reg_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
2241 			 const struct bpf_reg_state *state,
2242 			 struct bpf_reg_state *parent, u8 flag)
2243 {
2244 	bool writes = parent == state->parent; /* Observe write marks */
2245 	int cnt = 0;
2246 
2247 	while (parent) {
2248 		/* if read wasn't screened by an earlier write ... */
2249 		if (writes && state->live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN)
2250 			break;
2251 		if (parent->live & REG_LIVE_DONE) {
2252 			verbose(env, "verifier BUG type %s var_off %lld off %d\n",
2253 				reg_type_str(env, parent->type),
2254 				parent->var_off.value, parent->off);
2255 			return -EFAULT;
2256 		}
2257 		/* The first condition is more likely to be true than the
2258 		 * second, checked it first.
2259 		 */
2260 		if ((parent->live & REG_LIVE_READ) == flag ||
2261 		    parent->live & REG_LIVE_READ64)
2262 			/* The parentage chain never changes and
2263 			 * this parent was already marked as LIVE_READ.
2264 			 * There is no need to keep walking the chain again and
2265 			 * keep re-marking all parents as LIVE_READ.
2266 			 * This case happens when the same register is read
2267 			 * multiple times without writes into it in-between.
2268 			 * Also, if parent has the stronger REG_LIVE_READ64 set,
2269 			 * then no need to set the weak REG_LIVE_READ32.
2270 			 */
2271 			break;
2272 		/* ... then we depend on parent's value */
2273 		parent->live |= flag;
2274 		/* REG_LIVE_READ64 overrides REG_LIVE_READ32. */
2275 		if (flag == REG_LIVE_READ64)
2276 			parent->live &= ~REG_LIVE_READ32;
2277 		state = parent;
2278 		parent = state->parent;
2279 		writes = true;
2280 		cnt++;
2281 	}
2282 
2283 	if (env->longest_mark_read_walk < cnt)
2284 		env->longest_mark_read_walk = cnt;
2285 	return 0;
2286 }
2287 
2288 /* This function is supposed to be used by the following 32-bit optimization
2289  * code only. It returns TRUE if the source or destination register operates
2290  * on 64-bit, otherwise return FALSE.
2291  */
2292 static bool is_reg64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
2293 		     u32 regno, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, enum reg_arg_type t)
2294 {
2295 	u8 code, class, op;
2296 
2297 	code = insn->code;
2298 	class = BPF_CLASS(code);
2299 	op = BPF_OP(code);
2300 	if (class == BPF_JMP) {
2301 		/* BPF_EXIT for "main" will reach here. Return TRUE
2302 		 * conservatively.
2303 		 */
2304 		if (op == BPF_EXIT)
2305 			return true;
2306 		if (op == BPF_CALL) {
2307 			/* BPF to BPF call will reach here because of marking
2308 			 * caller saved clobber with DST_OP_NO_MARK for which we
2309 			 * don't care the register def because they are anyway
2310 			 * marked as NOT_INIT already.
2311 			 */
2312 			if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
2313 				return false;
2314 			/* Helper call will reach here because of arg type
2315 			 * check, conservatively return TRUE.
2316 			 */
2317 			if (t == SRC_OP)
2318 				return true;
2319 
2320 			return false;
2321 		}
2322 	}
2323 
2324 	if (class == BPF_ALU64 || class == BPF_JMP ||
2325 	    /* BPF_END always use BPF_ALU class. */
2326 	    (class == BPF_ALU && op == BPF_END && insn->imm == 64))
2327 		return true;
2328 
2329 	if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_JMP32)
2330 		return false;
2331 
2332 	if (class == BPF_LDX) {
2333 		if (t != SRC_OP)
2334 			return BPF_SIZE(code) == BPF_DW;
2335 		/* LDX source must be ptr. */
2336 		return true;
2337 	}
2338 
2339 	if (class == BPF_STX) {
2340 		/* BPF_STX (including atomic variants) has multiple source
2341 		 * operands, one of which is a ptr. Check whether the caller is
2342 		 * asking about it.
2343 		 */
2344 		if (t == SRC_OP && reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE)
2345 			return true;
2346 		return BPF_SIZE(code) == BPF_DW;
2347 	}
2348 
2349 	if (class == BPF_LD) {
2350 		u8 mode = BPF_MODE(code);
2351 
2352 		/* LD_IMM64 */
2353 		if (mode == BPF_IMM)
2354 			return true;
2355 
2356 		/* Both LD_IND and LD_ABS return 32-bit data. */
2357 		if (t != SRC_OP)
2358 			return  false;
2359 
2360 		/* Implicit ctx ptr. */
2361 		if (regno == BPF_REG_6)
2362 			return true;
2363 
2364 		/* Explicit source could be any width. */
2365 		return true;
2366 	}
2367 
2368 	if (class == BPF_ST)
2369 		/* The only source register for BPF_ST is a ptr. */
2370 		return true;
2371 
2372 	/* Conservatively return true at default. */
2373 	return true;
2374 }
2375 
2376 /* Return the regno defined by the insn, or -1. */
2377 static int insn_def_regno(const struct bpf_insn *insn)
2378 {
2379 	switch (BPF_CLASS(insn->code)) {
2380 	case BPF_JMP:
2381 	case BPF_JMP32:
2382 	case BPF_ST:
2383 		return -1;
2384 	case BPF_STX:
2385 		if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC &&
2386 		    (insn->imm & BPF_FETCH)) {
2387 			if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG)
2388 				return BPF_REG_0;
2389 			else
2390 				return insn->src_reg;
2391 		} else {
2392 			return -1;
2393 		}
2394 	default:
2395 		return insn->dst_reg;
2396 	}
2397 }
2398 
2399 /* Return TRUE if INSN has defined any 32-bit value explicitly. */
2400 static bool insn_has_def32(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
2401 {
2402 	int dst_reg = insn_def_regno(insn);
2403 
2404 	if (dst_reg == -1)
2405 		return false;
2406 
2407 	return !is_reg64(env, insn, dst_reg, NULL, DST_OP);
2408 }
2409 
2410 static void mark_insn_zext(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
2411 			   struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2412 {
2413 	s32 def_idx = reg->subreg_def;
2414 
2415 	if (def_idx == DEF_NOT_SUBREG)
2416 		return;
2417 
2418 	env->insn_aux_data[def_idx - 1].zext_dst = true;
2419 	/* The dst will be zero extended, so won't be sub-register anymore. */
2420 	reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG;
2421 }
2422 
2423 static int check_reg_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
2424 			 enum reg_arg_type t)
2425 {
2426 	struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
2427 	struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
2428 	struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi + env->insn_idx;
2429 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg, *regs = state->regs;
2430 	bool rw64;
2431 
2432 	if (regno >= MAX_BPF_REG) {
2433 		verbose(env, "R%d is invalid\n", regno);
2434 		return -EINVAL;
2435 	}
2436 
2437 	mark_reg_scratched(env, regno);
2438 
2439 	reg = &regs[regno];
2440 	rw64 = is_reg64(env, insn, regno, reg, t);
2441 	if (t == SRC_OP) {
2442 		/* check whether register used as source operand can be read */
2443 		if (reg->type == NOT_INIT) {
2444 			verbose(env, "R%d !read_ok\n", regno);
2445 			return -EACCES;
2446 		}
2447 		/* We don't need to worry about FP liveness because it's read-only */
2448 		if (regno == BPF_REG_FP)
2449 			return 0;
2450 
2451 		if (rw64)
2452 			mark_insn_zext(env, reg);
2453 
2454 		return mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent,
2455 				     rw64 ? REG_LIVE_READ64 : REG_LIVE_READ32);
2456 	} else {
2457 		/* check whether register used as dest operand can be written to */
2458 		if (regno == BPF_REG_FP) {
2459 			verbose(env, "frame pointer is read only\n");
2460 			return -EACCES;
2461 		}
2462 		reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
2463 		reg->subreg_def = rw64 ? DEF_NOT_SUBREG : env->insn_idx + 1;
2464 		if (t == DST_OP)
2465 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, regno);
2466 	}
2467 	return 0;
2468 }
2469 
2470 /* for any branch, call, exit record the history of jmps in the given state */
2471 static int push_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
2472 			    struct bpf_verifier_state *cur)
2473 {
2474 	u32 cnt = cur->jmp_history_cnt;
2475 	struct bpf_idx_pair *p;
2476 
2477 	cnt++;
2478 	p = krealloc(cur->jmp_history, cnt * sizeof(*p), GFP_USER);
2479 	if (!p)
2480 		return -ENOMEM;
2481 	p[cnt - 1].idx = env->insn_idx;
2482 	p[cnt - 1].prev_idx = env->prev_insn_idx;
2483 	cur->jmp_history = p;
2484 	cur->jmp_history_cnt = cnt;
2485 	return 0;
2486 }
2487 
2488 /* Backtrack one insn at a time. If idx is not at the top of recorded
2489  * history then previous instruction came from straight line execution.
2490  */
2491 static int get_prev_insn_idx(struct bpf_verifier_state *st, int i,
2492 			     u32 *history)
2493 {
2494 	u32 cnt = *history;
2495 
2496 	if (cnt && st->jmp_history[cnt - 1].idx == i) {
2497 		i = st->jmp_history[cnt - 1].prev_idx;
2498 		(*history)--;
2499 	} else {
2500 		i--;
2501 	}
2502 	return i;
2503 }
2504 
2505 static const char *disasm_kfunc_name(void *data, const struct bpf_insn *insn)
2506 {
2507 	const struct btf_type *func;
2508 	struct btf *desc_btf;
2509 
2510 	if (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL)
2511 		return NULL;
2512 
2513 	desc_btf = find_kfunc_desc_btf(data, insn->off);
2514 	if (IS_ERR(desc_btf))
2515 		return "<error>";
2516 
2517 	func = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, insn->imm);
2518 	return btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf, func->name_off);
2519 }
2520 
2521 /* For given verifier state backtrack_insn() is called from the last insn to
2522  * the first insn. Its purpose is to compute a bitmask of registers and
2523  * stack slots that needs precision in the parent verifier state.
2524  */
2525 static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx,
2526 			  u32 *reg_mask, u64 *stack_mask)
2527 {
2528 	const struct bpf_insn_cbs cbs = {
2529 		.cb_call	= disasm_kfunc_name,
2530 		.cb_print	= verbose,
2531 		.private_data	= env,
2532 	};
2533 	struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi + idx;
2534 	u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
2535 	u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
2536 	u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code);
2537 	u32 dreg = 1u << insn->dst_reg;
2538 	u32 sreg = 1u << insn->src_reg;
2539 	u32 spi;
2540 
2541 	if (insn->code == 0)
2542 		return 0;
2543 	if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) {
2544 		verbose(env, "regs=%x stack=%llx before ", *reg_mask, *stack_mask);
2545 		verbose(env, "%d: ", idx);
2546 		print_bpf_insn(&cbs, insn, env->allow_ptr_leaks);
2547 	}
2548 
2549 	if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
2550 		if (!(*reg_mask & dreg))
2551 			return 0;
2552 		if (opcode == BPF_MOV) {
2553 			if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
2554 				/* dreg = sreg
2555 				 * dreg needs precision after this insn
2556 				 * sreg needs precision before this insn
2557 				 */
2558 				*reg_mask &= ~dreg;
2559 				*reg_mask |= sreg;
2560 			} else {
2561 				/* dreg = K
2562 				 * dreg needs precision after this insn.
2563 				 * Corresponding register is already marked
2564 				 * as precise=true in this verifier state.
2565 				 * No further markings in parent are necessary
2566 				 */
2567 				*reg_mask &= ~dreg;
2568 			}
2569 		} else {
2570 			if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
2571 				/* dreg += sreg
2572 				 * both dreg and sreg need precision
2573 				 * before this insn
2574 				 */
2575 				*reg_mask |= sreg;
2576 			} /* else dreg += K
2577 			   * dreg still needs precision before this insn
2578 			   */
2579 		}
2580 	} else if (class == BPF_LDX) {
2581 		if (!(*reg_mask & dreg))
2582 			return 0;
2583 		*reg_mask &= ~dreg;
2584 
2585 		/* scalars can only be spilled into stack w/o losing precision.
2586 		 * Load from any other memory can be zero extended.
2587 		 * The desire to keep that precision is already indicated
2588 		 * by 'precise' mark in corresponding register of this state.
2589 		 * No further tracking necessary.
2590 		 */
2591 		if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_FP)
2592 			return 0;
2593 
2594 		/* dreg = *(u64 *)[fp - off] was a fill from the stack.
2595 		 * that [fp - off] slot contains scalar that needs to be
2596 		 * tracked with precision
2597 		 */
2598 		spi = (-insn->off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE;
2599 		if (spi >= 64) {
2600 			verbose(env, "BUG spi %d\n", spi);
2601 			WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug");
2602 			return -EFAULT;
2603 		}
2604 		*stack_mask |= 1ull << spi;
2605 	} else if (class == BPF_STX || class == BPF_ST) {
2606 		if (*reg_mask & dreg)
2607 			/* stx & st shouldn't be using _scalar_ dst_reg
2608 			 * to access memory. It means backtracking
2609 			 * encountered a case of pointer subtraction.
2610 			 */
2611 			return -ENOTSUPP;
2612 		/* scalars can only be spilled into stack */
2613 		if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_FP)
2614 			return 0;
2615 		spi = (-insn->off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE;
2616 		if (spi >= 64) {
2617 			verbose(env, "BUG spi %d\n", spi);
2618 			WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug");
2619 			return -EFAULT;
2620 		}
2621 		if (!(*stack_mask & (1ull << spi)))
2622 			return 0;
2623 		*stack_mask &= ~(1ull << spi);
2624 		if (class == BPF_STX)
2625 			*reg_mask |= sreg;
2626 	} else if (class == BPF_JMP || class == BPF_JMP32) {
2627 		if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
2628 			if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
2629 				return -ENOTSUPP;
2630 			/* regular helper call sets R0 */
2631 			*reg_mask &= ~1;
2632 			if (*reg_mask & 0x3f) {
2633 				/* if backtracing was looking for registers R1-R5
2634 				 * they should have been found already.
2635 				 */
2636 				verbose(env, "BUG regs %x\n", *reg_mask);
2637 				WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug");
2638 				return -EFAULT;
2639 			}
2640 		} else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) {
2641 			return -ENOTSUPP;
2642 		}
2643 	} else if (class == BPF_LD) {
2644 		if (!(*reg_mask & dreg))
2645 			return 0;
2646 		*reg_mask &= ~dreg;
2647 		/* It's ld_imm64 or ld_abs or ld_ind.
2648 		 * For ld_imm64 no further tracking of precision
2649 		 * into parent is necessary
2650 		 */
2651 		if (mode == BPF_IND || mode == BPF_ABS)
2652 			/* to be analyzed */
2653 			return -ENOTSUPP;
2654 	}
2655 	return 0;
2656 }
2657 
2658 /* the scalar precision tracking algorithm:
2659  * . at the start all registers have precise=false.
2660  * . scalar ranges are tracked as normal through alu and jmp insns.
2661  * . once precise value of the scalar register is used in:
2662  *   .  ptr + scalar alu
2663  *   . if (scalar cond K|scalar)
2664  *   .  helper_call(.., scalar, ...) where ARG_CONST is expected
2665  *   backtrack through the verifier states and mark all registers and
2666  *   stack slots with spilled constants that these scalar regisers
2667  *   should be precise.
2668  * . during state pruning two registers (or spilled stack slots)
2669  *   are equivalent if both are not precise.
2670  *
2671  * Note the verifier cannot simply walk register parentage chain,
2672  * since many different registers and stack slots could have been
2673  * used to compute single precise scalar.
2674  *
2675  * The approach of starting with precise=true for all registers and then
2676  * backtrack to mark a register as not precise when the verifier detects
2677  * that program doesn't care about specific value (e.g., when helper
2678  * takes register as ARG_ANYTHING parameter) is not safe.
2679  *
2680  * It's ok to walk single parentage chain of the verifier states.
2681  * It's possible that this backtracking will go all the way till 1st insn.
2682  * All other branches will be explored for needing precision later.
2683  *
2684  * The backtracking needs to deal with cases like:
2685  *   R8=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=1952,imm=0) R9_w=map_value(id=0,off=40,ks=4,vs=1952,imm=0)
2686  * r9 -= r8
2687  * r5 = r9
2688  * if r5 > 0x79f goto pc+7
2689  *    R5_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=1951,var_off=(0x0; 0x7ff))
2690  * r5 += 1
2691  * ...
2692  * call bpf_perf_event_output#25
2693  *   where .arg5_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO
2694  *
2695  * and this case:
2696  * r6 = 1
2697  * call foo // uses callee's r6 inside to compute r0
2698  * r0 += r6
2699  * if r0 == 0 goto
2700  *
2701  * to track above reg_mask/stack_mask needs to be independent for each frame.
2702  *
2703  * Also if parent's curframe > frame where backtracking started,
2704  * the verifier need to mark registers in both frames, otherwise callees
2705  * may incorrectly prune callers. This is similar to
2706  * commit 7640ead93924 ("bpf: verifier: make sure callees don't prune with caller differences")
2707  *
2708  * For now backtracking falls back into conservative marking.
2709  */
2710 static void mark_all_scalars_precise(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
2711 				     struct bpf_verifier_state *st)
2712 {
2713 	struct bpf_func_state *func;
2714 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
2715 	int i, j;
2716 
2717 	/* big hammer: mark all scalars precise in this path.
2718 	 * pop_stack may still get !precise scalars.
2719 	 */
2720 	for (; st; st = st->parent)
2721 		for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) {
2722 			func = st->frame[i];
2723 			for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_FP; j++) {
2724 				reg = &func->regs[j];
2725 				if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE)
2726 					continue;
2727 				reg->precise = true;
2728 			}
2729 			for (j = 0; j < func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) {
2730 				if (!is_spilled_reg(&func->stack[j]))
2731 					continue;
2732 				reg = &func->stack[j].spilled_ptr;
2733 				if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE)
2734 					continue;
2735 				reg->precise = true;
2736 			}
2737 		}
2738 }
2739 
2740 static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
2741 				  int spi)
2742 {
2743 	struct bpf_verifier_state *st = env->cur_state;
2744 	int first_idx = st->first_insn_idx;
2745 	int last_idx = env->insn_idx;
2746 	struct bpf_func_state *func;
2747 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
2748 	u32 reg_mask = regno >= 0 ? 1u << regno : 0;
2749 	u64 stack_mask = spi >= 0 ? 1ull << spi : 0;
2750 	bool skip_first = true;
2751 	bool new_marks = false;
2752 	int i, err;
2753 
2754 	if (!env->bpf_capable)
2755 		return 0;
2756 
2757 	func = st->frame[st->curframe];
2758 	if (regno >= 0) {
2759 		reg = &func->regs[regno];
2760 		if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
2761 			WARN_ONCE(1, "backtracing misuse");
2762 			return -EFAULT;
2763 		}
2764 		if (!reg->precise)
2765 			new_marks = true;
2766 		else
2767 			reg_mask = 0;
2768 		reg->precise = true;
2769 	}
2770 
2771 	while (spi >= 0) {
2772 		if (!is_spilled_reg(&func->stack[spi])) {
2773 			stack_mask = 0;
2774 			break;
2775 		}
2776 		reg = &func->stack[spi].spilled_ptr;
2777 		if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
2778 			stack_mask = 0;
2779 			break;
2780 		}
2781 		if (!reg->precise)
2782 			new_marks = true;
2783 		else
2784 			stack_mask = 0;
2785 		reg->precise = true;
2786 		break;
2787 	}
2788 
2789 	if (!new_marks)
2790 		return 0;
2791 	if (!reg_mask && !stack_mask)
2792 		return 0;
2793 	for (;;) {
2794 		DECLARE_BITMAP(mask, 64);
2795 		u32 history = st->jmp_history_cnt;
2796 
2797 		if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2)
2798 			verbose(env, "last_idx %d first_idx %d\n", last_idx, first_idx);
2799 		for (i = last_idx;;) {
2800 			if (skip_first) {
2801 				err = 0;
2802 				skip_first = false;
2803 			} else {
2804 				err = backtrack_insn(env, i, &reg_mask, &stack_mask);
2805 			}
2806 			if (err == -ENOTSUPP) {
2807 				mark_all_scalars_precise(env, st);
2808 				return 0;
2809 			} else if (err) {
2810 				return err;
2811 			}
2812 			if (!reg_mask && !stack_mask)
2813 				/* Found assignment(s) into tracked register in this state.
2814 				 * Since this state is already marked, just return.
2815 				 * Nothing to be tracked further in the parent state.
2816 				 */
2817 				return 0;
2818 			if (i == first_idx)
2819 				break;
2820 			i = get_prev_insn_idx(st, i, &history);
2821 			if (i >= env->prog->len) {
2822 				/* This can happen if backtracking reached insn 0
2823 				 * and there are still reg_mask or stack_mask
2824 				 * to backtrack.
2825 				 * It means the backtracking missed the spot where
2826 				 * particular register was initialized with a constant.
2827 				 */
2828 				verbose(env, "BUG backtracking idx %d\n", i);
2829 				WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug");
2830 				return -EFAULT;
2831 			}
2832 		}
2833 		st = st->parent;
2834 		if (!st)
2835 			break;
2836 
2837 		new_marks = false;
2838 		func = st->frame[st->curframe];
2839 		bitmap_from_u64(mask, reg_mask);
2840 		for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) {
2841 			reg = &func->regs[i];
2842 			if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
2843 				reg_mask &= ~(1u << i);
2844 				continue;
2845 			}
2846 			if (!reg->precise)
2847 				new_marks = true;
2848 			reg->precise = true;
2849 		}
2850 
2851 		bitmap_from_u64(mask, stack_mask);
2852 		for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 64) {
2853 			if (i >= func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE) {
2854 				/* the sequence of instructions:
2855 				 * 2: (bf) r3 = r10
2856 				 * 3: (7b) *(u64 *)(r3 -8) = r0
2857 				 * 4: (79) r4 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8)
2858 				 * doesn't contain jmps. It's backtracked
2859 				 * as a single block.
2860 				 * During backtracking insn 3 is not recognized as
2861 				 * stack access, so at the end of backtracking
2862 				 * stack slot fp-8 is still marked in stack_mask.
2863 				 * However the parent state may not have accessed
2864 				 * fp-8 and it's "unallocated" stack space.
2865 				 * In such case fallback to conservative.
2866 				 */
2867 				mark_all_scalars_precise(env, st);
2868 				return 0;
2869 			}
2870 
2871 			if (!is_spilled_reg(&func->stack[i])) {
2872 				stack_mask &= ~(1ull << i);
2873 				continue;
2874 			}
2875 			reg = &func->stack[i].spilled_ptr;
2876 			if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
2877 				stack_mask &= ~(1ull << i);
2878 				continue;
2879 			}
2880 			if (!reg->precise)
2881 				new_marks = true;
2882 			reg->precise = true;
2883 		}
2884 		if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) {
2885 			verbose(env, "parent %s regs=%x stack=%llx marks:",
2886 				new_marks ? "didn't have" : "already had",
2887 				reg_mask, stack_mask);
2888 			print_verifier_state(env, func, true);
2889 		}
2890 
2891 		if (!reg_mask && !stack_mask)
2892 			break;
2893 		if (!new_marks)
2894 			break;
2895 
2896 		last_idx = st->last_insn_idx;
2897 		first_idx = st->first_insn_idx;
2898 	}
2899 	return 0;
2900 }
2901 
2902 static int mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
2903 {
2904 	return __mark_chain_precision(env, regno, -1);
2905 }
2906 
2907 static int mark_chain_precision_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int spi)
2908 {
2909 	return __mark_chain_precision(env, -1, spi);
2910 }
2911 
2912 static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type)
2913 {
2914 	switch (base_type(type)) {
2915 	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
2916 	case PTR_TO_STACK:
2917 	case PTR_TO_CTX:
2918 	case PTR_TO_PACKET:
2919 	case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
2920 	case PTR_TO_PACKET_END:
2921 	case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS:
2922 	case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP:
2923 	case PTR_TO_SOCKET:
2924 	case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON:
2925 	case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
2926 	case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK:
2927 	case PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
2928 	case PTR_TO_BUF:
2929 	case PTR_TO_MEM:
2930 	case PTR_TO_FUNC:
2931 	case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY:
2932 		return true;
2933 	default:
2934 		return false;
2935 	}
2936 }
2937 
2938 /* Does this register contain a constant zero? */
2939 static bool register_is_null(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2940 {
2941 	return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0);
2942 }
2943 
2944 static bool register_is_const(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2945 {
2946 	return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_is_const(reg->var_off);
2947 }
2948 
2949 static bool __is_scalar_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2950 {
2951 	return tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off) &&
2952 	       reg->smin_value == S64_MIN && reg->smax_value == S64_MAX &&
2953 	       reg->umin_value == 0 && reg->umax_value == U64_MAX &&
2954 	       reg->s32_min_value == S32_MIN && reg->s32_max_value == S32_MAX &&
2955 	       reg->u32_min_value == 0 && reg->u32_max_value == U32_MAX;
2956 }
2957 
2958 static bool register_is_bounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2959 {
2960 	return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && !__is_scalar_unbounded(reg);
2961 }
2962 
2963 static bool __is_pointer_value(bool allow_ptr_leaks,
2964 			       const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2965 {
2966 	if (allow_ptr_leaks)
2967 		return false;
2968 
2969 	return reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE;
2970 }
2971 
2972 static void save_register_state(struct bpf_func_state *state,
2973 				int spi, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
2974 				int size)
2975 {
2976 	int i;
2977 
2978 	state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr = *reg;
2979 	if (size == BPF_REG_SIZE)
2980 		state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
2981 
2982 	for (i = BPF_REG_SIZE; i > BPF_REG_SIZE - size; i--)
2983 		state->stack[spi].slot_type[i - 1] = STACK_SPILL;
2984 
2985 	/* size < 8 bytes spill */
2986 	for (; i; i--)
2987 		scrub_spilled_slot(&state->stack[spi].slot_type[i - 1]);
2988 }
2989 
2990 /* check_stack_{read,write}_fixed_off functions track spill/fill of registers,
2991  * stack boundary and alignment are checked in check_mem_access()
2992  */
2993 static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
2994 				       /* stack frame we're writing to */
2995 				       struct bpf_func_state *state,
2996 				       int off, int size, int value_regno,
2997 				       int insn_idx)
2998 {
2999 	struct bpf_func_state *cur; /* state of the current function */
3000 	int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE, err;
3001 	u32 dst_reg = env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx].dst_reg;
3002 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = NULL;
3003 
3004 	err = grow_stack_state(state, round_up(slot + 1, BPF_REG_SIZE));
3005 	if (err)
3006 		return err;
3007 	/* caller checked that off % size == 0 and -MAX_BPF_STACK <= off < 0,
3008 	 * so it's aligned access and [off, off + size) are within stack limits
3009 	 */
3010 	if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks &&
3011 	    state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL &&
3012 	    size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
3013 		verbose(env, "attempt to corrupt spilled pointer on stack\n");
3014 		return -EACCES;
3015 	}
3016 
3017 	cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe];
3018 	if (value_regno >= 0)
3019 		reg = &cur->regs[value_regno];
3020 	if (!env->bypass_spec_v4) {
3021 		bool sanitize = reg && is_spillable_regtype(reg->type);
3022 
3023 		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
3024 			if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] == STACK_INVALID) {
3025 				sanitize = true;
3026 				break;
3027 			}
3028 		}
3029 
3030 		if (sanitize)
3031 			env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].sanitize_stack_spill = true;
3032 	}
3033 
3034 	mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi);
3035 	if (reg && !(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && register_is_bounded(reg) &&
3036 	    !register_is_null(reg) && env->bpf_capable) {
3037 		if (dst_reg != BPF_REG_FP) {
3038 			/* The backtracking logic can only recognize explicit
3039 			 * stack slot address like [fp - 8]. Other spill of
3040 			 * scalar via different register has to be conservative.
3041 			 * Backtrack from here and mark all registers as precise
3042 			 * that contributed into 'reg' being a constant.
3043 			 */
3044 			err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno);
3045 			if (err)
3046 				return err;
3047 		}
3048 		save_register_state(state, spi, reg, size);
3049 	} else if (reg && is_spillable_regtype(reg->type)) {
3050 		/* register containing pointer is being spilled into stack */
3051 		if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
3052 			verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; ");
3053 			verbose(env, "invalid size of register spill\n");
3054 			return -EACCES;
3055 		}
3056 		if (state != cur && reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
3057 			verbose(env, "cannot spill pointers to stack into stack frame of the caller\n");
3058 			return -EINVAL;
3059 		}
3060 		save_register_state(state, spi, reg, size);
3061 	} else {
3062 		u8 type = STACK_MISC;
3063 
3064 		/* regular write of data into stack destroys any spilled ptr */
3065 		state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type = NOT_INIT;
3066 		/* Mark slots as STACK_MISC if they belonged to spilled ptr. */
3067 		if (is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[spi]))
3068 			for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++)
3069 				scrub_spilled_slot(&state->stack[spi].slot_type[i]);
3070 
3071 		/* only mark the slot as written if all 8 bytes were written
3072 		 * otherwise read propagation may incorrectly stop too soon
3073 		 * when stack slots are partially written.
3074 		 * This heuristic means that read propagation will be
3075 		 * conservative, since it will add reg_live_read marks
3076 		 * to stack slots all the way to first state when programs
3077 		 * writes+reads less than 8 bytes
3078 		 */
3079 		if (size == BPF_REG_SIZE)
3080 			state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
3081 
3082 		/* when we zero initialize stack slots mark them as such */
3083 		if (reg && register_is_null(reg)) {
3084 			/* backtracking doesn't work for STACK_ZERO yet. */
3085 			err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno);
3086 			if (err)
3087 				return err;
3088 			type = STACK_ZERO;
3089 		}
3090 
3091 		/* Mark slots affected by this stack write. */
3092 		for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
3093 			state->stack[spi].slot_type[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] =
3094 				type;
3095 	}
3096 	return 0;
3097 }
3098 
3099 /* Write the stack: 'stack[ptr_regno + off] = value_regno'. 'ptr_regno' is
3100  * known to contain a variable offset.
3101  * This function checks whether the write is permitted and conservatively
3102  * tracks the effects of the write, considering that each stack slot in the
3103  * dynamic range is potentially written to.
3104  *
3105  * 'off' includes 'regno->off'.
3106  * 'value_regno' can be -1, meaning that an unknown value is being written to
3107  * the stack.
3108  *
3109  * Spilled pointers in range are not marked as written because we don't know
3110  * what's going to be actually written. This means that read propagation for
3111  * future reads cannot be terminated by this write.
3112  *
3113  * For privileged programs, uninitialized stack slots are considered
3114  * initialized by this write (even though we don't know exactly what offsets
3115  * are going to be written to). The idea is that we don't want the verifier to
3116  * reject future reads that access slots written to through variable offsets.
3117  */
3118 static int check_stack_write_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
3119 				     /* func where register points to */
3120 				     struct bpf_func_state *state,
3121 				     int ptr_regno, int off, int size,
3122 				     int value_regno, int insn_idx)
3123 {
3124 	struct bpf_func_state *cur; /* state of the current function */
3125 	int min_off, max_off;
3126 	int i, err;
3127 	struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, *value_reg = NULL;
3128 	bool writing_zero = false;
3129 	/* set if the fact that we're writing a zero is used to let any
3130 	 * stack slots remain STACK_ZERO
3131 	 */
3132 	bool zero_used = false;
3133 
3134 	cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe];
3135 	ptr_reg = &cur->regs[ptr_regno];
3136 	min_off = ptr_reg->smin_value + off;
3137 	max_off = ptr_reg->smax_value + off + size;
3138 	if (value_regno >= 0)
3139 		value_reg = &cur->regs[value_regno];
3140 	if (value_reg && register_is_null(value_reg))
3141 		writing_zero = true;
3142 
3143 	err = grow_stack_state(state, round_up(-min_off, BPF_REG_SIZE));
3144 	if (err)
3145 		return err;
3146 
3147 
3148 	/* Variable offset writes destroy any spilled pointers in range. */
3149 	for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) {
3150 		u8 new_type, *stype;
3151 		int slot, spi;
3152 
3153 		slot = -i - 1;
3154 		spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE;
3155 		stype = &state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE];
3156 		mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi);
3157 
3158 		if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks
3159 				&& *stype != NOT_INIT
3160 				&& *stype != SCALAR_VALUE) {
3161 			/* Reject the write if there's are spilled pointers in
3162 			 * range. If we didn't reject here, the ptr status
3163 			 * would be erased below (even though not all slots are
3164 			 * actually overwritten), possibly opening the door to
3165 			 * leaks.
3166 			 */
3167 			verbose(env, "spilled ptr in range of var-offset stack write; insn %d, ptr off: %d",
3168 				insn_idx, i);
3169 			return -EINVAL;
3170 		}
3171 
3172 		/* Erase all spilled pointers. */
3173 		state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type = NOT_INIT;
3174 
3175 		/* Update the slot type. */
3176 		new_type = STACK_MISC;
3177 		if (writing_zero && *stype == STACK_ZERO) {
3178 			new_type = STACK_ZERO;
3179 			zero_used = true;
3180 		}
3181 		/* If the slot is STACK_INVALID, we check whether it's OK to
3182 		 * pretend that it will be initialized by this write. The slot
3183 		 * might not actually be written to, and so if we mark it as
3184 		 * initialized future reads might leak uninitialized memory.
3185 		 * For privileged programs, we will accept such reads to slots
3186 		 * that may or may not be written because, if we're reject
3187 		 * them, the error would be too confusing.
3188 		 */
3189 		if (*stype == STACK_INVALID && !env->allow_uninit_stack) {
3190 			verbose(env, "uninit stack in range of var-offset write prohibited for !root; insn %d, off: %d",
3191 					insn_idx, i);
3192 			return -EINVAL;
3193 		}
3194 		*stype = new_type;
3195 	}
3196 	if (zero_used) {
3197 		/* backtracking doesn't work for STACK_ZERO yet. */
3198 		err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno);
3199 		if (err)
3200 			return err;
3201 	}
3202 	return 0;
3203 }
3204 
3205 /* When register 'dst_regno' is assigned some values from stack[min_off,
3206  * max_off), we set the register's type according to the types of the
3207  * respective stack slots. If all the stack values are known to be zeros, then
3208  * so is the destination reg. Otherwise, the register is considered to be
3209  * SCALAR. This function does not deal with register filling; the caller must
3210  * ensure that all spilled registers in the stack range have been marked as
3211  * read.
3212  */
3213 static void mark_reg_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
3214 				/* func where src register points to */
3215 				struct bpf_func_state *ptr_state,
3216 				int min_off, int max_off, int dst_regno)
3217 {
3218 	struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
3219 	struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
3220 	int i, slot, spi;
3221 	u8 *stype;
3222 	int zeros = 0;
3223 
3224 	for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) {
3225 		slot = -i - 1;
3226 		spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE;
3227 		stype = ptr_state->stack[spi].slot_type;
3228 		if (stype[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE] != STACK_ZERO)
3229 			break;
3230 		zeros++;
3231 	}
3232 	if (zeros == max_off - min_off) {
3233 		/* any access_size read into register is zero extended,
3234 		 * so the whole register == const_zero
3235 		 */
3236 		__mark_reg_const_zero(&state->regs[dst_regno]);
3237 		/* backtracking doesn't support STACK_ZERO yet,
3238 		 * so mark it precise here, so that later
3239 		 * backtracking can stop here.
3240 		 * Backtracking may not need this if this register
3241 		 * doesn't participate in pointer adjustment.
3242 		 * Forward propagation of precise flag is not
3243 		 * necessary either. This mark is only to stop
3244 		 * backtracking. Any register that contributed
3245 		 * to const 0 was marked precise before spill.
3246 		 */
3247 		state->regs[dst_regno].precise = true;
3248 	} else {
3249 		/* have read misc data from the stack */
3250 		mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, dst_regno);
3251 	}
3252 	state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
3253 }
3254 
3255 /* Read the stack at 'off' and put the results into the register indicated by
3256  * 'dst_regno'. It handles reg filling if the addressed stack slot is a
3257  * spilled reg.
3258  *
3259  * 'dst_regno' can be -1, meaning that the read value is not going to a
3260  * register.
3261  *
3262  * The access is assumed to be within the current stack bounds.
3263  */
3264 static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
3265 				      /* func where src register points to */
3266 				      struct bpf_func_state *reg_state,
3267 				      int off, int size, int dst_regno)
3268 {
3269 	struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
3270 	struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
3271 	int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE;
3272 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
3273 	u8 *stype, type;
3274 
3275 	stype = reg_state->stack[spi].slot_type;
3276 	reg = &reg_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr;
3277 
3278 	if (is_spilled_reg(&reg_state->stack[spi])) {
3279 		u8 spill_size = 1;
3280 
3281 		for (i = BPF_REG_SIZE - 1; i > 0 && stype[i - 1] == STACK_SPILL; i--)
3282 			spill_size++;
3283 
3284 		if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE || spill_size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
3285 			if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
3286 				verbose_linfo(env, env->insn_idx, "; ");
3287 				verbose(env, "invalid size of register fill\n");
3288 				return -EACCES;
3289 			}
3290 
3291 			mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64);
3292 			if (dst_regno < 0)
3293 				return 0;
3294 
3295 			if (!(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && size == spill_size) {
3296 				/* The earlier check_reg_arg() has decided the
3297 				 * subreg_def for this insn.  Save it first.
3298 				 */
3299 				s32 subreg_def = state->regs[dst_regno].subreg_def;
3300 
3301 				state->regs[dst_regno] = *reg;
3302 				state->regs[dst_regno].subreg_def = subreg_def;
3303 			} else {
3304 				for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
3305 					type = stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE];
3306 					if (type == STACK_SPILL)
3307 						continue;
3308 					if (type == STACK_MISC)
3309 						continue;
3310 					verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
3311 						off, i, size);
3312 					return -EACCES;
3313 				}
3314 				mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, dst_regno);
3315 			}
3316 			state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
3317 			return 0;
3318 		}
3319 
3320 		if (dst_regno >= 0) {
3321 			/* restore register state from stack */
3322 			state->regs[dst_regno] = *reg;
3323 			/* mark reg as written since spilled pointer state likely
3324 			 * has its liveness marks cleared by is_state_visited()
3325 			 * which resets stack/reg liveness for state transitions
3326 			 */
3327 			state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
3328 		} else if (__is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, reg)) {
3329 			/* If dst_regno==-1, the caller is asking us whether
3330 			 * it is acceptable to use this value as a SCALAR_VALUE
3331 			 * (e.g. for XADD).
3332 			 * We must not allow unprivileged callers to do that
3333 			 * with spilled pointers.
3334 			 */
3335 			verbose(env, "leaking pointer from stack off %d\n",
3336 				off);
3337 			return -EACCES;
3338 		}
3339 		mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64);
3340 	} else {
3341 		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
3342 			type = stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE];
3343 			if (type == STACK_MISC)
3344 				continue;
3345 			if (type == STACK_ZERO)
3346 				continue;
3347 			verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
3348 				off, i, size);
3349 			return -EACCES;
3350 		}
3351 		mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64);
3352 		if (dst_regno >= 0)
3353 			mark_reg_stack_read(env, reg_state, off, off + size, dst_regno);
3354 	}
3355 	return 0;
3356 }
3357 
3358 enum bpf_access_src {
3359 	ACCESS_DIRECT = 1,  /* the access is performed by an instruction */
3360 	ACCESS_HELPER = 2,  /* the access is performed by a helper */
3361 };
3362 
3363 static int check_stack_range_initialized(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
3364 					 int regno, int off, int access_size,
3365 					 bool zero_size_allowed,
3366 					 enum bpf_access_src type,
3367 					 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta);
3368 
3369 static struct bpf_reg_state *reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
3370 {
3371 	return cur_regs(env) + regno;
3372 }
3373 
3374 /* Read the stack at 'ptr_regno + off' and put the result into the register
3375  * 'dst_regno'.
3376  * 'off' includes the pointer register's fixed offset(i.e. 'ptr_regno.off'),
3377  * but not its variable offset.
3378  * 'size' is assumed to be <= reg size and the access is assumed to be aligned.
3379  *
3380  * As opposed to check_stack_read_fixed_off, this function doesn't deal with
3381  * filling registers (i.e. reads of spilled register cannot be detected when
3382  * the offset is not fixed). We conservatively mark 'dst_regno' as containing
3383  * SCALAR_VALUE. That's why we assert that the 'ptr_regno' has a variable
3384  * offset; for a fixed offset check_stack_read_fixed_off should be used
3385  * instead.
3386  */
3387 static int check_stack_read_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
3388 				    int ptr_regno, int off, int size, int dst_regno)
3389 {
3390 	/* The state of the source register. */
3391 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno);
3392 	struct bpf_func_state *ptr_state = func(env, reg);
3393 	int err;
3394 	int min_off, max_off;
3395 
3396 	/* Note that we pass a NULL meta, so raw access will not be permitted.
3397 	 */
3398 	err = check_stack_range_initialized(env, ptr_regno, off, size,
3399 					    false, ACCESS_DIRECT, NULL);
3400 	if (err)
3401 		return err;
3402 
3403 	min_off = reg->smin_value + off;
3404 	max_off = reg->smax_value + off;
3405 	mark_reg_stack_read(env, ptr_state, min_off, max_off + size, dst_regno);
3406 	return 0;
3407 }
3408 
3409 /* check_stack_read dispatches to check_stack_read_fixed_off or
3410  * check_stack_read_var_off.
3411  *
3412  * The caller must ensure that the offset falls within the allocated stack
3413  * bounds.
3414  *
3415  * 'dst_regno' is a register which will receive the value from the stack. It
3416  * can be -1, meaning that the read value is not going to a register.
3417  */
3418 static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
3419 			    int ptr_regno, int off, int size,
3420 			    int dst_regno)
3421 {
3422 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno);
3423 	struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
3424 	int err;
3425 	/* Some accesses are only permitted with a static offset. */
3426 	bool var_off = !tnum_is_const(reg->var_off);
3427 
3428 	/* The offset is required to be static when reads don't go to a
3429 	 * register, in order to not leak pointers (see
3430 	 * check_stack_read_fixed_off).
3431 	 */
3432 	if (dst_regno < 0 && var_off) {
3433 		char tn_buf[48];
3434 
3435 		tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
3436 		verbose(env, "variable offset stack pointer cannot be passed into helper function; var_off=%s off=%d size=%d\n",
3437 			tn_buf, off, size);
3438 		return -EACCES;
3439 	}
3440 	/* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for simplicity
3441 	 * since it requires corresponding support in Spectre masking for stack
3442 	 * ALU. See also retrieve_ptr_limit().
3443 	 */
3444 	if (!env->bypass_spec_v1 && var_off) {
3445 		char tn_buf[48];
3446 
3447 		tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
3448 		verbose(env, "R%d variable offset stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n",
3449 				ptr_regno, tn_buf);
3450 		return -EACCES;
3451 	}
3452 
3453 	if (!var_off) {
3454 		off += reg->var_off.value;
3455 		err = check_stack_read_fixed_off(env, state, off, size,
3456 						 dst_regno);
3457 	} else {
3458 		/* Variable offset stack reads need more conservative handling
3459 		 * than fixed offset ones. Note that dst_regno >= 0 on this
3460 		 * branch.
3461 		 */
3462 		err = check_stack_read_var_off(env, ptr_regno, off, size,
3463 					       dst_regno);
3464 	}
3465 	return err;
3466 }
3467 
3468 
3469 /* check_stack_write dispatches to check_stack_write_fixed_off or
3470  * check_stack_write_var_off.
3471  *
3472  * 'ptr_regno' is the register used as a pointer into the stack.
3473  * 'off' includes 'ptr_regno->off', but not its variable offset (if any).
3474  * 'value_regno' is the register whose value we're writing to the stack. It can
3475  * be -1, meaning that we're not writing from a register.
3476  *
3477  * The caller must ensure that the offset falls within the maximum stack size.
3478  */
3479 static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
3480 			     int ptr_regno, int off, int size,
3481 			     int value_regno, int insn_idx)
3482 {
3483 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno);
3484 	struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
3485 	int err;
3486 
3487 	if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
3488 		off += reg->var_off.value;
3489 		err = check_stack_write_fixed_off(env, state, off, size,
3490 						  value_regno, insn_idx);
3491 	} else {
3492 		/* Variable offset stack reads need more conservative handling
3493 		 * than fixed offset ones.
3494 		 */
3495 		err = check_stack_write_var_off(env, state,
3496 						ptr_regno, off, size,
3497 						value_regno, insn_idx);
3498 	}
3499 	return err;
3500 }
3501 
3502 static int check_map_access_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
3503 				 int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type)
3504 {
3505 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
3506 	struct bpf_map *map = regs[regno].map_ptr;
3507 	u32 cap = bpf_map_flags_to_cap(map);
3508 
3509 	if (type == BPF_WRITE && !(cap & BPF_MAP_CAN_WRITE)) {
3510 		verbose(env, "write into map forbidden, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n",
3511 			map->value_size, off, size);
3512 		return -EACCES;
3513 	}
3514 
3515 	if (type == BPF_READ && !(cap & BPF_MAP_CAN_READ)) {
3516 		verbose(env, "read from map forbidden, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n",
3517 			map->value_size, off, size);
3518 		return -EACCES;
3519 	}
3520 
3521 	return 0;
3522 }
3523 
3524 /* check read/write into memory region (e.g., map value, ringbuf sample, etc) */
3525 static int __check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
3526 			      int off, int size, u32 mem_size,
3527 			      bool zero_size_allowed)
3528 {
3529 	bool size_ok = size > 0 || (size == 0 && zero_size_allowed);
3530 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
3531 
3532 	if (off >= 0 && size_ok && (u64)off + size <= mem_size)
3533 		return 0;
3534 
3535 	reg = &cur_regs(env)[regno];
3536 	switch (reg->type) {
3537 	case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY:
3538 		verbose(env, "invalid access to map key, key_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n",
3539 			mem_size, off, size);
3540 		break;
3541 	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
3542 		verbose(env, "invalid access to map value, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n",
3543 			mem_size, off, size);
3544 		break;
3545 	case PTR_TO_PACKET:
3546 	case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
3547 	case PTR_TO_PACKET_END:
3548 		verbose(env, "invalid access to packet, off=%d size=%d, R%d(id=%d,off=%d,r=%d)\n",
3549 			off, size, regno, reg->id, off, mem_size);
3550 		break;
3551 	case PTR_TO_MEM:
3552 	default:
3553 		verbose(env, "invalid access to memory, mem_size=%u off=%d size=%d\n",
3554 			mem_size, off, size);
3555 	}
3556 
3557 	return -EACCES;
3558 }
3559 
3560 /* check read/write into a memory region with possible variable offset */
3561 static int check_mem_region_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
3562 				   int off, int size, u32 mem_size,
3563 				   bool zero_size_allowed)
3564 {
3565 	struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
3566 	struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
3567 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno];
3568 	int err;
3569 
3570 	/* We may have adjusted the register pointing to memory region, so we
3571 	 * need to try adding each of min_value and max_value to off
3572 	 * to make sure our theoretical access will be safe.
3573 	 *
3574 	 * The minimum value is only important with signed
3575 	 * comparisons where we can't assume the floor of a
3576 	 * value is 0.  If we are using signed variables for our
3577 	 * index'es we need to make sure that whatever we use
3578 	 * will have a set floor within our range.
3579 	 */
3580 	if (reg->smin_value < 0 &&
3581 	    (reg->smin_value == S64_MIN ||
3582 	     (off + reg->smin_value != (s64)(s32)(off + reg->smin_value)) ||
3583 	      reg->smin_value + off < 0)) {
3584 		verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n",
3585 			regno);
3586 		return -EACCES;
3587 	}
3588 	err = __check_mem_access(env, regno, reg->smin_value + off, size,
3589 				 mem_size, zero_size_allowed);
3590 	if (err) {
3591 		verbose(env, "R%d min value is outside of the allowed memory range\n",
3592 			regno);
3593 		return err;
3594 	}
3595 
3596 	/* If we haven't set a max value then we need to bail since we can't be
3597 	 * sure we won't do bad things.
3598 	 * If reg->umax_value + off could overflow, treat that as unbounded too.
3599 	 */
3600 	if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) {
3601 		verbose(env, "R%d unbounded memory access, make sure to bounds check any such access\n",
3602 			regno);
3603 		return -EACCES;
3604 	}
3605 	err = __check_mem_access(env, regno, reg->umax_value + off, size,
3606 				 mem_size, zero_size_allowed);
3607 	if (err) {
3608 		verbose(env, "R%d max value is outside of the allowed memory range\n",
3609 			regno);
3610 		return err;
3611 	}
3612 
3613 	return 0;
3614 }
3615 
3616 static int __check_ptr_off_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
3617 			       const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno,
3618 			       bool fixed_off_ok)
3619 {
3620 	/* Access to this pointer-typed register or passing it to a helper
3621 	 * is only allowed in its original, unmodified form.
3622 	 */
3623 
3624 	if (reg->off < 0) {
3625 		verbose(env, "negative offset %s ptr R%d off=%d disallowed\n",
3626 			reg_type_str(env, reg->type), regno, reg->off);
3627 		return -EACCES;
3628 	}
3629 
3630 	if (!fixed_off_ok && reg->off) {
3631 		verbose(env, "dereference of modified %s ptr R%d off=%d disallowed\n",
3632 			reg_type_str(env, reg->type), regno, reg->off);
3633 		return -EACCES;
3634 	}
3635 
3636 	if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) {
3637 		char tn_buf[48];
3638 
3639 		tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
3640 		verbose(env, "variable %s access var_off=%s disallowed\n",
3641 			reg_type_str(env, reg->type), tn_buf);
3642 		return -EACCES;
3643 	}
3644 
3645 	return 0;
3646 }
3647 
3648 int check_ptr_off_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
3649 		      const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno)
3650 {
3651 	return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, false);
3652 }
3653 
3654 static int map_kptr_match_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
3655 			       struct bpf_map_value_off_desc *off_desc,
3656 			       struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno)
3657 {
3658 	const char *targ_name = kernel_type_name(off_desc->kptr.btf, off_desc->kptr.btf_id);
3659 	int perm_flags = PTR_MAYBE_NULL;
3660 	const char *reg_name = "";
3661 
3662 	/* Only unreferenced case accepts untrusted pointers */
3663 	if (off_desc->type == BPF_KPTR_UNREF)
3664 		perm_flags |= PTR_UNTRUSTED;
3665 
3666 	if (base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID || (type_flag(reg->type) & ~perm_flags))
3667 		goto bad_type;
3668 
3669 	if (!btf_is_kernel(reg->btf)) {
3670 		verbose(env, "R%d must point to kernel BTF\n", regno);
3671 		return -EINVAL;
3672 	}
3673 	/* We need to verify reg->type and reg->btf, before accessing reg->btf */
3674 	reg_name = kernel_type_name(reg->btf, reg->btf_id);
3675 
3676 	/* For ref_ptr case, release function check should ensure we get one
3677 	 * referenced PTR_TO_BTF_ID, and that its fixed offset is 0. For the
3678 	 * normal store of unreferenced kptr, we must ensure var_off is zero.
3679 	 * Since ref_ptr cannot be accessed directly by BPF insns, checks for
3680 	 * reg->off and reg->ref_obj_id are not needed here.
3681 	 */
3682 	if (__check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, true))
3683 		return -EACCES;
3684 
3685 	/* A full type match is needed, as BTF can be vmlinux or module BTF, and
3686 	 * we also need to take into account the reg->off.
3687 	 *
3688 	 * We want to support cases like:
3689 	 *
3690 	 * struct foo {
3691 	 *         struct bar br;
3692 	 *         struct baz bz;
3693 	 * };
3694 	 *
3695 	 * struct foo *v;
3696 	 * v = func();	      // PTR_TO_BTF_ID
3697 	 * val->foo = v;      // reg->off is zero, btf and btf_id match type
3698 	 * val->bar = &v->br; // reg->off is still zero, but we need to retry with
3699 	 *                    // first member type of struct after comparison fails
3700 	 * val->baz = &v->bz; // reg->off is non-zero, so struct needs to be walked
3701 	 *                    // to match type
3702 	 *
3703 	 * In the kptr_ref case, check_func_arg_reg_off already ensures reg->off
3704 	 * is zero. We must also ensure that btf_struct_ids_match does not walk
3705 	 * the struct to match type against first member of struct, i.e. reject
3706 	 * second case from above. Hence, when type is BPF_KPTR_REF, we set
3707 	 * strict mode to true for type match.
3708 	 */
3709 	if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg->btf, reg->btf_id, reg->off,
3710 				  off_desc->kptr.btf, off_desc->kptr.btf_id,
3711 				  off_desc->type == BPF_KPTR_REF))
3712 		goto bad_type;
3713 	return 0;
3714 bad_type:
3715 	verbose(env, "invalid kptr access, R%d type=%s%s ", regno,
3716 		reg_type_str(env, reg->type), reg_name);
3717 	verbose(env, "expected=%s%s", reg_type_str(env, PTR_TO_BTF_ID), targ_name);
3718 	if (off_desc->type == BPF_KPTR_UNREF)
3719 		verbose(env, " or %s%s\n", reg_type_str(env, PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED),
3720 			targ_name);
3721 	else
3722 		verbose(env, "\n");
3723 	return -EINVAL;
3724 }
3725 
3726 static int check_map_kptr_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
3727 				 int value_regno, int insn_idx,
3728 				 struct bpf_map_value_off_desc *off_desc)
3729 {
3730 	struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx];
3731 	int class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
3732 	struct bpf_reg_state *val_reg;
3733 
3734 	/* Things we already checked for in check_map_access and caller:
3735 	 *  - Reject cases where variable offset may touch kptr
3736 	 *  - size of access (must be BPF_DW)
3737 	 *  - tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)
3738 	 *  - off_desc->offset == off + reg->var_off.value
3739 	 */
3740 	/* Only BPF_[LDX,STX,ST] | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW is supported */
3741 	if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) {
3742 		verbose(env, "kptr in map can only be accessed using BPF_MEM instruction mode\n");
3743 		return -EACCES;
3744 	}
3745 
3746 	/* We only allow loading referenced kptr, since it will be marked as
3747 	 * untrusted, similar to unreferenced kptr.
3748 	 */
3749 	if (class != BPF_LDX && off_desc->type == BPF_KPTR_REF) {
3750 		verbose(env, "store to referenced kptr disallowed\n");
3751 		return -EACCES;
3752 	}
3753 
3754 	if (class == BPF_LDX) {
3755 		val_reg = reg_state(env, value_regno);
3756 		/* We can simply mark the value_regno receiving the pointer
3757 		 * value from map as PTR_TO_BTF_ID, with the correct type.
3758 		 */
3759 		mark_btf_ld_reg(env, cur_regs(env), value_regno, PTR_TO_BTF_ID, off_desc->kptr.btf,
3760 				off_desc->kptr.btf_id, PTR_MAYBE_NULL | PTR_UNTRUSTED);
3761 		/* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg */
3762 		val_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
3763 	} else if (class == BPF_STX) {
3764 		val_reg = reg_state(env, value_regno);
3765 		if (!register_is_null(val_reg) &&
3766 		    map_kptr_match_type(env, off_desc, val_reg, value_regno))
3767 			return -EACCES;
3768 	} else if (class == BPF_ST) {
3769 		if (insn->imm) {
3770 			verbose(env, "BPF_ST imm must be 0 when storing to kptr at off=%u\n",
3771 				off_desc->offset);
3772 			return -EACCES;
3773 		}
3774 	} else {
3775 		verbose(env, "kptr in map can only be accessed using BPF_LDX/BPF_STX/BPF_ST\n");
3776 		return -EACCES;
3777 	}
3778 	return 0;
3779 }
3780 
3781 /* check read/write into a map element with possible variable offset */
3782 static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
3783 			    int off, int size, bool zero_size_allowed,
3784 			    enum bpf_access_src src)
3785 {
3786 	struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
3787 	struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
3788 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno];
3789 	struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr;
3790 	int err;
3791 
3792 	err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size, map->value_size,
3793 				      zero_size_allowed);
3794 	if (err)
3795 		return err;
3796 
3797 	if (map_value_has_spin_lock(map)) {
3798 		u32 lock = map->spin_lock_off;
3799 
3800 		/* if any part of struct bpf_spin_lock can be touched by
3801 		 * load/store reject this program.
3802 		 * To check that [x1, x2) overlaps with [y1, y2)
3803 		 * it is sufficient to check x1 < y2 && y1 < x2.
3804 		 */
3805 		if (reg->smin_value + off < lock + sizeof(struct bpf_spin_lock) &&
3806 		     lock < reg->umax_value + off + size) {
3807 			verbose(env, "bpf_spin_lock cannot be accessed directly by load/store\n");
3808 			return -EACCES;
3809 		}
3810 	}
3811 	if (map_value_has_timer(map)) {
3812 		u32 t = map->timer_off;
3813 
3814 		if (reg->smin_value + off < t + sizeof(struct bpf_timer) &&
3815 		     t < reg->umax_value + off + size) {
3816 			verbose(env, "bpf_timer cannot be accessed directly by load/store\n");
3817 			return -EACCES;
3818 		}
3819 	}
3820 	if (map_value_has_kptrs(map)) {
3821 		struct bpf_map_value_off *tab = map->kptr_off_tab;
3822 		int i;
3823 
3824 		for (i = 0; i < tab->nr_off; i++) {
3825 			u32 p = tab->off[i].offset;
3826 
3827 			if (reg->smin_value + off < p + sizeof(u64) &&
3828 			    p < reg->umax_value + off + size) {
3829 				if (src != ACCESS_DIRECT) {
3830 					verbose(env, "kptr cannot be accessed indirectly by helper\n");
3831 					return -EACCES;
3832 				}
3833 				if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
3834 					verbose(env, "kptr access cannot have variable offset\n");
3835 					return -EACCES;
3836 				}
3837 				if (p != off + reg->var_off.value) {
3838 					verbose(env, "kptr access misaligned expected=%u off=%llu\n",
3839 						p, off + reg->var_off.value);
3840 					return -EACCES;
3841 				}
3842 				if (size != bpf_size_to_bytes(BPF_DW)) {
3843 					verbose(env, "kptr access size must be BPF_DW\n");
3844 					return -EACCES;
3845 				}
3846 				break;
3847 			}
3848 		}
3849 	}
3850 	return err;
3851 }
3852 
3853 #define MAX_PACKET_OFF 0xffff
3854 
3855 static bool may_access_direct_pkt_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
3856 				       const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,
3857 				       enum bpf_access_type t)
3858 {
3859 	enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog);
3860 
3861 	switch (prog_type) {
3862 	/* Program types only with direct read access go here! */
3863 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN:
3864 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_OUT:
3865 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_SEG6LOCAL:
3866 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT:
3867 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR:
3868 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB:
3869 		if (t == BPF_WRITE)
3870 			return false;
3871 		fallthrough;
3872 
3873 	/* Program types with direct read + write access go here! */
3874 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS:
3875 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT:
3876 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP:
3877 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT:
3878 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_SKB:
3879 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_MSG:
3880 		if (meta)
3881 			return meta->pkt_access;
3882 
3883 		env->seen_direct_write = true;
3884 		return true;
3885 
3886 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT:
3887 		if (t == BPF_WRITE)
3888 			env->seen_direct_write = true;
3889 
3890 		return true;
3891 
3892 	default:
3893 		return false;
3894 	}
3895 }
3896 
3897 static int check_packet_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
3898 			       int size, bool zero_size_allowed)
3899 {
3900 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
3901 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &regs[regno];
3902 	int err;
3903 
3904 	/* We may have added a variable offset to the packet pointer; but any
3905 	 * reg->range we have comes after that.  We are only checking the fixed
3906 	 * offset.
3907 	 */
3908 
3909 	/* We don't allow negative numbers, because we aren't tracking enough
3910 	 * detail to prove they're safe.
3911 	 */
3912 	if (reg->smin_value < 0) {
3913 		verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n",
3914 			regno);
3915 		return -EACCES;
3916 	}
3917 
3918 	err = reg->range < 0 ? -EINVAL :
3919 	      __check_mem_access(env, regno, off, size, reg->range,
3920 				 zero_size_allowed);
3921 	if (err) {
3922 		verbose(env, "R%d offset is outside of the packet\n", regno);
3923 		return err;
3924 	}
3925 
3926 	/* __check_mem_access has made sure "off + size - 1" is within u16.
3927 	 * reg->umax_value can't be bigger than MAX_PACKET_OFF which is 0xffff,
3928 	 * otherwise find_good_pkt_pointers would have refused to set range info
3929 	 * that __check_mem_access would have rejected this pkt access.
3930 	 * Therefore, "off + reg->umax_value + size - 1" won't overflow u32.
3931 	 */
3932 	env->prog->aux->max_pkt_offset =
3933 		max_t(u32, env->prog->aux->max_pkt_offset,
3934 		      off + reg->umax_value + size - 1);
3935 
3936 	return err;
3937 }
3938 
3939 /* check access to 'struct bpf_context' fields.  Supports fixed offsets only */
3940 static int check_ctx_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, int off, int size,
3941 			    enum bpf_access_type t, enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type,
3942 			    struct btf **btf, u32 *btf_id)
3943 {
3944 	struct bpf_insn_access_aux info = {
3945 		.reg_type = *reg_type,
3946 		.log = &env->log,
3947 	};
3948 
3949 	if (env->ops->is_valid_access &&
3950 	    env->ops->is_valid_access(off, size, t, env->prog, &info)) {
3951 		/* A non zero info.ctx_field_size indicates that this field is a
3952 		 * candidate for later verifier transformation to load the whole
3953 		 * field and then apply a mask when accessed with a narrower
3954 		 * access than actual ctx access size. A zero info.ctx_field_size
3955 		 * will only allow for whole field access and rejects any other
3956 		 * type of narrower access.
3957 		 */
3958 		*reg_type = info.reg_type;
3959 
3960 		if (base_type(*reg_type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) {
3961 			*btf = info.btf;
3962 			*btf_id = info.btf_id;
3963 		} else {
3964 			env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ctx_field_size = info.ctx_field_size;
3965 		}
3966 		/* remember the offset of last byte accessed in ctx */
3967 		if (env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset < off + size)
3968 			env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset = off + size;
3969 		return 0;
3970 	}
3971 
3972 	verbose(env, "invalid bpf_context access off=%d size=%d\n", off, size);
3973 	return -EACCES;
3974 }
3975 
3976 static int check_flow_keys_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off,
3977 				  int size)
3978 {
3979 	if (size < 0 || off < 0 ||
3980 	    (u64)off + size > sizeof(struct bpf_flow_keys)) {
3981 		verbose(env, "invalid access to flow keys off=%d size=%d\n",
3982 			off, size);
3983 		return -EACCES;
3984 	}
3985 	return 0;
3986 }
3987 
3988 static int check_sock_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx,
3989 			     u32 regno, int off, int size,
3990 			     enum bpf_access_type t)
3991 {
3992 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
3993 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &regs[regno];
3994 	struct bpf_insn_access_aux info = {};
3995 	bool valid;
3996 
3997 	if (reg->smin_value < 0) {
3998 		verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n",
3999 			regno);
4000 		return -EACCES;
4001 	}
4002 
4003 	switch (reg->type) {
4004 	case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON:
4005 		valid = bpf_sock_common_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info);
4006 		break;
4007 	case PTR_TO_SOCKET:
4008 		valid = bpf_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info);
4009 		break;
4010 	case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
4011 		valid = bpf_tcp_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info);
4012 		break;
4013 	case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK:
4014 		valid = bpf_xdp_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info);
4015 		break;
4016 	default:
4017 		valid = false;
4018 	}
4019 
4020 
4021 	if (valid) {
4022 		env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ctx_field_size =
4023 			info.ctx_field_size;
4024 		return 0;
4025 	}
4026 
4027 	verbose(env, "R%d invalid %s access off=%d size=%d\n",
4028 		regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type), off, size);
4029 
4030 	return -EACCES;
4031 }
4032 
4033 static bool is_pointer_value(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
4034 {
4035 	return __is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, reg_state(env, regno));
4036 }
4037 
4038 static bool is_ctx_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
4039 {
4040 	const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
4041 
4042 	return reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX;
4043 }
4044 
4045 static bool is_sk_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
4046 {
4047 	const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
4048 
4049 	return type_is_sk_pointer(reg->type);
4050 }
4051 
4052 static bool is_pkt_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
4053 {
4054 	const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
4055 
4056 	return type_is_pkt_pointer(reg->type);
4057 }
4058 
4059 static bool is_flow_key_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
4060 {
4061 	const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
4062 
4063 	/* Separate to is_ctx_reg() since we still want to allow BPF_ST here. */
4064 	return reg->type == PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS;
4065 }
4066 
4067 static int check_pkt_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
4068 				   const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
4069 				   int off, int size, bool strict)
4070 {
4071 	struct tnum reg_off;
4072 	int ip_align;
4073 
4074 	/* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */
4075 	if (!strict || size == 1)
4076 		return 0;
4077 
4078 	/* For platforms that do not have a Kconfig enabling
4079 	 * CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS the value of
4080 	 * NET_IP_ALIGN is universally set to '2'.  And on platforms
4081 	 * that do set CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS, we get
4082 	 * to this code only in strict mode where we want to emulate
4083 	 * the NET_IP_ALIGN==2 checking.  Therefore use an
4084 	 * unconditional IP align value of '2'.
4085 	 */
4086 	ip_align = 2;
4087 
4088 	reg_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, tnum_const(ip_align + reg->off + off));
4089 	if (!tnum_is_aligned(reg_off, size)) {
4090 		char tn_buf[48];
4091 
4092 		tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
4093 		verbose(env,
4094 			"misaligned packet access off %d+%s+%d+%d size %d\n",
4095 			ip_align, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size);
4096 		return -EACCES;
4097 	}
4098 
4099 	return 0;
4100 }
4101 
4102 static int check_generic_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
4103 				       const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
4104 				       const char *pointer_desc,
4105 				       int off, int size, bool strict)
4106 {
4107 	struct tnum reg_off;
4108 
4109 	/* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */
4110 	if (!strict || size == 1)
4111 		return 0;
4112 
4113 	reg_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, tnum_const(reg->off + off));
4114 	if (!tnum_is_aligned(reg_off, size)) {
4115 		char tn_buf[48];
4116 
4117 		tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
4118 		verbose(env, "misaligned %saccess off %s+%d+%d size %d\n",
4119 			pointer_desc, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size);
4120 		return -EACCES;
4121 	}
4122 
4123 	return 0;
4124 }
4125 
4126 static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
4127 			       const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int off,
4128 			       int size, bool strict_alignment_once)
4129 {
4130 	bool strict = env->strict_alignment || strict_alignment_once;
4131 	const char *pointer_desc = "";
4132 
4133 	switch (reg->type) {
4134 	case PTR_TO_PACKET:
4135 	case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
4136 		/* Special case, because of NET_IP_ALIGN. Given metadata sits
4137 		 * right in front, treat it the very same way.
4138 		 */
4139 		return check_pkt_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size, strict);
4140 	case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS:
4141 		pointer_desc = "flow keys ";
4142 		break;
4143 	case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY:
4144 		pointer_desc = "key ";
4145 		break;
4146 	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
4147 		pointer_desc = "value ";
4148 		break;
4149 	case PTR_TO_CTX:
4150 		pointer_desc = "context ";
4151 		break;
4152 	case PTR_TO_STACK:
4153 		pointer_desc = "stack ";
4154 		/* The stack spill tracking logic in check_stack_write_fixed_off()
4155 		 * and check_stack_read_fixed_off() relies on stack accesses being
4156 		 * aligned.
4157 		 */
4158 		strict = true;
4159 		break;
4160 	case PTR_TO_SOCKET:
4161 		pointer_desc = "sock ";
4162 		break;
4163 	case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON:
4164 		pointer_desc = "sock_common ";
4165 		break;
4166 	case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
4167 		pointer_desc = "tcp_sock ";
4168 		break;
4169 	case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK:
4170 		pointer_desc = "xdp_sock ";
4171 		break;
4172 	default:
4173 		break;
4174 	}
4175 	return check_generic_ptr_alignment(env, reg, pointer_desc, off, size,
4176 					   strict);
4177 }
4178 
4179 static int update_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
4180 			      const struct bpf_func_state *func,
4181 			      int off)
4182 {
4183 	u16 stack = env->subprog_info[func->subprogno].stack_depth;
4184 
4185 	if (stack >= -off)
4186 		return 0;
4187 
4188 	/* update known max for given subprogram */
4189 	env->subprog_info[func->subprogno].stack_depth = -off;
4190 	return 0;
4191 }
4192 
4193 /* starting from main bpf function walk all instructions of the function
4194  * and recursively walk all callees that given function can call.
4195  * Ignore jump and exit insns.
4196  * Since recursion is prevented by check_cfg() this algorithm
4197  * only needs a local stack of MAX_CALL_FRAMES to remember callsites
4198  */
4199 static int check_max_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
4200 {
4201 	int depth = 0, frame = 0, idx = 0, i = 0, subprog_end;
4202 	struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info;
4203 	struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
4204 	bool tail_call_reachable = false;
4205 	int ret_insn[MAX_CALL_FRAMES];
4206 	int ret_prog[MAX_CALL_FRAMES];
4207 	int j;
4208 
4209 process_func:
4210 	/* protect against potential stack overflow that might happen when
4211 	 * bpf2bpf calls get combined with tailcalls. Limit the caller's stack
4212 	 * depth for such case down to 256 so that the worst case scenario
4213 	 * would result in 8k stack size (32 which is tailcall limit * 256 =
4214 	 * 8k).
4215 	 *
4216 	 * To get the idea what might happen, see an example:
4217 	 * func1 -> sub rsp, 128
4218 	 *  subfunc1 -> sub rsp, 256
4219 	 *  tailcall1 -> add rsp, 256
4220 	 *   func2 -> sub rsp, 192 (total stack size = 128 + 192 = 320)
4221 	 *   subfunc2 -> sub rsp, 64
4222 	 *   subfunc22 -> sub rsp, 128
4223 	 *   tailcall2 -> add rsp, 128
4224 	 *    func3 -> sub rsp, 32 (total stack size 128 + 192 + 64 + 32 = 416)
4225 	 *
4226 	 * tailcall will unwind the current stack frame but it will not get rid
4227 	 * of caller's stack as shown on the example above.
4228 	 */
4229 	if (idx && subprog[idx].has_tail_call && depth >= 256) {
4230 		verbose(env,
4231 			"tail_calls are not allowed when call stack of previous frames is %d bytes. Too large\n",
4232 			depth);
4233 		return -EACCES;
4234 	}
4235 	/* round up to 32-bytes, since this is granularity
4236 	 * of interpreter stack size
4237 	 */
4238 	depth += round_up(max_t(u32, subprog[idx].stack_depth, 1), 32);
4239 	if (depth > MAX_BPF_STACK) {
4240 		verbose(env, "combined stack size of %d calls is %d. Too large\n",
4241 			frame + 1, depth);
4242 		return -EACCES;
4243 	}
4244 continue_func:
4245 	subprog_end = subprog[idx + 1].start;
4246 	for (; i < subprog_end; i++) {
4247 		int next_insn;
4248 
4249 		if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn + i) && !bpf_pseudo_func(insn + i))
4250 			continue;
4251 		/* remember insn and function to return to */
4252 		ret_insn[frame] = i + 1;
4253 		ret_prog[frame] = idx;
4254 
4255 		/* find the callee */
4256 		next_insn = i + insn[i].imm + 1;
4257 		idx = find_subprog(env, next_insn);
4258 		if (idx < 0) {
4259 			WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n",
4260 				  next_insn);
4261 			return -EFAULT;
4262 		}
4263 		if (subprog[idx].is_async_cb) {
4264 			if (subprog[idx].has_tail_call) {
4265 				verbose(env, "verifier bug. subprog has tail_call and async cb\n");
4266 				return -EFAULT;
4267 			}
4268 			 /* async callbacks don't increase bpf prog stack size */
4269 			continue;
4270 		}
4271 		i = next_insn;
4272 
4273 		if (subprog[idx].has_tail_call)
4274 			tail_call_reachable = true;
4275 
4276 		frame++;
4277 		if (frame >= MAX_CALL_FRAMES) {
4278 			verbose(env, "the call stack of %d frames is too deep !\n",
4279 				frame);
4280 			return -E2BIG;
4281 		}
4282 		goto process_func;
4283 	}
4284 	/* if tail call got detected across bpf2bpf calls then mark each of the
4285 	 * currently present subprog frames as tail call reachable subprogs;
4286 	 * this info will be utilized by JIT so that we will be preserving the
4287 	 * tail call counter throughout bpf2bpf calls combined with tailcalls
4288 	 */
4289 	if (tail_call_reachable)
4290 		for (j = 0; j < frame; j++)
4291 			subprog[ret_prog[j]].tail_call_reachable = true;
4292 	if (subprog[0].tail_call_reachable)
4293 		env->prog->aux->tail_call_reachable = true;
4294 
4295 	/* end of for() loop means the last insn of the 'subprog'
4296 	 * was reached. Doesn't matter whether it was JA or EXIT
4297 	 */
4298 	if (frame == 0)
4299 		return 0;
4300 	depth -= round_up(max_t(u32, subprog[idx].stack_depth, 1), 32);
4301 	frame--;
4302 	i = ret_insn[frame];
4303 	idx = ret_prog[frame];
4304 	goto continue_func;
4305 }
4306 
4307 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON
4308 static int get_callee_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
4309 				  const struct bpf_insn *insn, int idx)
4310 {
4311 	int start = idx + insn->imm + 1, subprog;
4312 
4313 	subprog = find_subprog(env, start);
4314 	if (subprog < 0) {
4315 		WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n",
4316 			  start);
4317 		return -EFAULT;
4318 	}
4319 	return env->subprog_info[subprog].stack_depth;
4320 }
4321 #endif
4322 
4323 static int __check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
4324 				 const char *buf_info,
4325 				 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
4326 				 int regno, int off, int size)
4327 {
4328 	if (off < 0) {
4329 		verbose(env,
4330 			"R%d invalid %s buffer access: off=%d, size=%d\n",
4331 			regno, buf_info, off, size);
4332 		return -EACCES;
4333 	}
4334 	if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) {
4335 		char tn_buf[48];
4336 
4337 		tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
4338 		verbose(env,
4339 			"R%d invalid variable buffer offset: off=%d, var_off=%s\n",
4340 			regno, off, tn_buf);
4341 		return -EACCES;
4342 	}
4343 
4344 	return 0;
4345 }
4346 
4347 static int check_tp_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
4348 				  const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
4349 				  int regno, int off, int size)
4350 {
4351 	int err;
4352 
4353 	err = __check_buffer_access(env, "tracepoint", reg, regno, off, size);
4354 	if (err)
4355 		return err;
4356 
4357 	if (off + size > env->prog->aux->max_tp_access)
4358 		env->prog->aux->max_tp_access = off + size;
4359 
4360 	return 0;
4361 }
4362 
4363 static int check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
4364 			       const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
4365 			       int regno, int off, int size,
4366 			       bool zero_size_allowed,
4367 			       u32 *max_access)
4368 {
4369 	const char *buf_info = type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type) ? "rdonly" : "rdwr";
4370 	int err;
4371 
4372 	err = __check_buffer_access(env, buf_info, reg, regno, off, size);
4373 	if (err)
4374 		return err;
4375 
4376 	if (off + size > *max_access)
4377 		*max_access = off + size;
4378 
4379 	return 0;
4380 }
4381 
4382 /* BPF architecture zero extends alu32 ops into 64-bit registesr */
4383 static void zext_32_to_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
4384 {
4385 	reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off);
4386 	__reg_assign_32_into_64(reg);
4387 }
4388 
4389 /* truncate register to smaller size (in bytes)
4390  * must be called with size < BPF_REG_SIZE
4391  */
4392 static void coerce_reg_to_size(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size)
4393 {
4394 	u64 mask;
4395 
4396 	/* clear high bits in bit representation */
4397 	reg->var_off = tnum_cast(reg->var_off, size);
4398 
4399 	/* fix arithmetic bounds */
4400 	mask = ((u64)1 << (size * 8)) - 1;
4401 	if ((reg->umin_value & ~mask) == (reg->umax_value & ~mask)) {
4402 		reg->umin_value &= mask;
4403 		reg->umax_value &= mask;
4404 	} else {
4405 		reg->umin_value = 0;
4406 		reg->umax_value = mask;
4407 	}
4408 	reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value;
4409 	reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value;
4410 
4411 	/* If size is smaller than 32bit register the 32bit register
4412 	 * values are also truncated so we push 64-bit bounds into
4413 	 * 32-bit bounds. Above were truncated < 32-bits already.
4414 	 */
4415 	if (size >= 4)
4416 		return;
4417 	__reg_combine_64_into_32(reg);
4418 }
4419 
4420 static bool bpf_map_is_rdonly(const struct bpf_map *map)
4421 {
4422 	/* A map is considered read-only if the following condition are true:
4423 	 *
4424 	 * 1) BPF program side cannot change any of the map content. The
4425 	 *    BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG flag is throughout the lifetime of a map
4426 	 *    and was set at map creation time.
4427 	 * 2) The map value(s) have been initialized from user space by a
4428 	 *    loader and then "frozen", such that no new map update/delete
4429 	 *    operations from syscall side are possible for the rest of
4430 	 *    the map's lifetime from that point onwards.
4431 	 * 3) Any parallel/pending map update/delete operations from syscall
4432 	 *    side have been completed. Only after that point, it's safe to
4433 	 *    assume that map value(s) are immutable.
4434 	 */
4435 	return (map->map_flags & BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG) &&
4436 	       READ_ONCE(map->frozen) &&
4437 	       !bpf_map_write_active(map);
4438 }
4439 
4440 static int bpf_map_direct_read(struct bpf_map *map, int off, int size, u64 *val)
4441 {
4442 	void *ptr;
4443 	u64 addr;
4444 	int err;
4445 
4446 	err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &addr, off);
4447 	if (err)
4448 		return err;
4449 	ptr = (void *)(long)addr + off;
4450 
4451 	switch (size) {
4452 	case sizeof(u8):
4453 		*val = (u64)*(u8 *)ptr;
4454 		break;
4455 	case sizeof(u16):
4456 		*val = (u64)*(u16 *)ptr;
4457 		break;
4458 	case sizeof(u32):
4459 		*val = (u64)*(u32 *)ptr;
4460 		break;
4461 	case sizeof(u64):
4462 		*val = *(u64 *)ptr;
4463 		break;
4464 	default:
4465 		return -EINVAL;
4466 	}
4467 	return 0;
4468 }
4469 
4470 static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
4471 				   struct bpf_reg_state *regs,
4472 				   int regno, int off, int size,
4473 				   enum bpf_access_type atype,
4474 				   int value_regno)
4475 {
4476 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno;
4477 	const struct btf_type *t = btf_type_by_id(reg->btf, reg->btf_id);
4478 	const char *tname = btf_name_by_offset(reg->btf, t->name_off);
4479 	enum bpf_type_flag flag = 0;
4480 	u32 btf_id;
4481 	int ret;
4482 
4483 	if (off < 0) {
4484 		verbose(env,
4485 			"R%d is ptr_%s invalid negative access: off=%d\n",
4486 			regno, tname, off);
4487 		return -EACCES;
4488 	}
4489 	if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) {
4490 		char tn_buf[48];
4491 
4492 		tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
4493 		verbose(env,
4494 			"R%d is ptr_%s invalid variable offset: off=%d, var_off=%s\n",
4495 			regno, tname, off, tn_buf);
4496 		return -EACCES;
4497 	}
4498 
4499 	if (reg->type & MEM_USER) {
4500 		verbose(env,
4501 			"R%d is ptr_%s access user memory: off=%d\n",
4502 			regno, tname, off);
4503 		return -EACCES;
4504 	}
4505 
4506 	if (reg->type & MEM_PERCPU) {
4507 		verbose(env,
4508 			"R%d is ptr_%s access percpu memory: off=%d\n",
4509 			regno, tname, off);
4510 		return -EACCES;
4511 	}
4512 
4513 	if (env->ops->btf_struct_access) {
4514 		ret = env->ops->btf_struct_access(&env->log, reg->btf, t,
4515 						  off, size, atype, &btf_id, &flag);
4516 	} else {
4517 		if (atype != BPF_READ) {
4518 			verbose(env, "only read is supported\n");
4519 			return -EACCES;
4520 		}
4521 
4522 		ret = btf_struct_access(&env->log, reg->btf, t, off, size,
4523 					atype, &btf_id, &flag);
4524 	}
4525 
4526 	if (ret < 0)
4527 		return ret;
4528 
4529 	/* If this is an untrusted pointer, all pointers formed by walking it
4530 	 * also inherit the untrusted flag.
4531 	 */
4532 	if (type_flag(reg->type) & PTR_UNTRUSTED)
4533 		flag |= PTR_UNTRUSTED;
4534 
4535 	if (atype == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
4536 		mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, reg->btf, btf_id, flag);
4537 
4538 	return 0;
4539 }
4540 
4541 static int check_ptr_to_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
4542 				   struct bpf_reg_state *regs,
4543 				   int regno, int off, int size,
4544 				   enum bpf_access_type atype,
4545 				   int value_regno)
4546 {
4547 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno;
4548 	struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr;
4549 	enum bpf_type_flag flag = 0;
4550 	const struct btf_type *t;
4551 	const char *tname;
4552 	u32 btf_id;
4553 	int ret;
4554 
4555 	if (!btf_vmlinux) {
4556 		verbose(env, "map_ptr access not supported without CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF\n");
4557 		return -ENOTSUPP;
4558 	}
4559 
4560 	if (!map->ops->map_btf_id || !*map->ops->map_btf_id) {
4561 		verbose(env, "map_ptr access not supported for map type %d\n",
4562 			map->map_type);
4563 		return -ENOTSUPP;
4564 	}
4565 
4566 	t = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, *map->ops->map_btf_id);
4567 	tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, t->name_off);
4568 
4569 	if (!env->allow_ptr_to_map_access) {
4570 		verbose(env,
4571 			"%s access is allowed only to CAP_PERFMON and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n",
4572 			tname);
4573 		return -EPERM;
4574 	}
4575 
4576 	if (off < 0) {
4577 		verbose(env, "R%d is %s invalid negative access: off=%d\n",
4578 			regno, tname, off);
4579 		return -EACCES;
4580 	}
4581 
4582 	if (atype != BPF_READ) {
4583 		verbose(env, "only read from %s is supported\n", tname);
4584 		return -EACCES;
4585 	}
4586 
4587 	ret = btf_struct_access(&env->log, btf_vmlinux, t, off, size, atype, &btf_id, &flag);
4588 	if (ret < 0)
4589 		return ret;
4590 
4591 	if (value_regno >= 0)
4592 		mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, btf_vmlinux, btf_id, flag);
4593 
4594 	return 0;
4595 }
4596 
4597 /* Check that the stack access at the given offset is within bounds. The
4598  * maximum valid offset is -1.
4599  *
4600  * The minimum valid offset is -MAX_BPF_STACK for writes, and
4601  * -state->allocated_stack for reads.
4602  */
4603 static int check_stack_slot_within_bounds(int off,
4604 					  struct bpf_func_state *state,
4605 					  enum bpf_access_type t)
4606 {
4607 	int min_valid_off;
4608 
4609 	if (t == BPF_WRITE)
4610 		min_valid_off = -MAX_BPF_STACK;
4611 	else
4612 		min_valid_off = -state->allocated_stack;
4613 
4614 	if (off < min_valid_off || off > -1)
4615 		return -EACCES;
4616 	return 0;
4617 }
4618 
4619 /* Check that the stack access at 'regno + off' falls within the maximum stack
4620  * bounds.
4621  *
4622  * 'off' includes `regno->offset`, but not its dynamic part (if any).
4623  */
4624 static int check_stack_access_within_bounds(
4625 		struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
4626 		int regno, int off, int access_size,
4627 		enum bpf_access_src src, enum bpf_access_type type)
4628 {
4629 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
4630 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno;
4631 	struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
4632 	int min_off, max_off;
4633 	int err;
4634 	char *err_extra;
4635 
4636 	if (src == ACCESS_HELPER)
4637 		/* We don't know if helpers are reading or writing (or both). */
4638 		err_extra = " indirect access to";
4639 	else if (type == BPF_READ)
4640 		err_extra = " read from";
4641 	else
4642 		err_extra = " write to";
4643 
4644 	if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
4645 		min_off = reg->var_off.value + off;
4646 		if (access_size > 0)
4647 			max_off = min_off + access_size - 1;
4648 		else
4649 			max_off = min_off;
4650 	} else {
4651 		if (reg->smax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF ||
4652 		    reg->smin_value <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) {
4653 			verbose(env, "invalid unbounded variable-offset%s stack R%d\n",
4654 				err_extra, regno);
4655 			return -EACCES;
4656 		}
4657 		min_off = reg->smin_value + off;
4658 		if (access_size > 0)
4659 			max_off = reg->smax_value + off + access_size - 1;
4660 		else
4661 			max_off = min_off;
4662 	}
4663 
4664 	err = check_stack_slot_within_bounds(min_off, state, type);
4665 	if (!err)
4666 		err = check_stack_slot_within_bounds(max_off, state, type);
4667 
4668 	if (err) {
4669 		if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
4670 			verbose(env, "invalid%s stack R%d off=%d size=%d\n",
4671 				err_extra, regno, off, access_size);
4672 		} else {
4673 			char tn_buf[48];
4674 
4675 			tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
4676 			verbose(env, "invalid variable-offset%s stack R%d var_off=%s size=%d\n",
4677 				err_extra, regno, tn_buf, access_size);
4678 		}
4679 	}
4680 	return err;
4681 }
4682 
4683 /* check whether memory at (regno + off) is accessible for t = (read | write)
4684  * if t==write, value_regno is a register which value is stored into memory
4685  * if t==read, value_regno is a register which will receive the value from memory
4686  * if t==write && value_regno==-1, some unknown value is stored into memory
4687  * if t==read && value_regno==-1, don't care what we read from memory
4688  */
4689 static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regno,
4690 			    int off, int bpf_size, enum bpf_access_type t,
4691 			    int value_regno, bool strict_alignment_once)
4692 {
4693 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
4694 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno;
4695 	struct bpf_func_state *state;
4696 	int size, err = 0;
4697 
4698 	size = bpf_size_to_bytes(bpf_size);
4699 	if (size < 0)
4700 		return size;
4701 
4702 	/* alignment checks will add in reg->off themselves */
4703 	err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size, strict_alignment_once);
4704 	if (err)
4705 		return err;
4706 
4707 	/* for access checks, reg->off is just part of off */
4708 	off += reg->off;
4709 
4710 	if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY) {
4711 		if (t == BPF_WRITE) {
4712 			verbose(env, "write to change key R%d not allowed\n", regno);
4713 			return -EACCES;
4714 		}
4715 
4716 		err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size,
4717 					      reg->map_ptr->key_size, false);
4718 		if (err)
4719 			return err;
4720 		if (value_regno >= 0)
4721 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
4722 	} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
4723 		struct bpf_map_value_off_desc *kptr_off_desc = NULL;
4724 
4725 		if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
4726 		    is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
4727 			verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into map\n", value_regno);
4728 			return -EACCES;
4729 		}
4730 		err = check_map_access_type(env, regno, off, size, t);
4731 		if (err)
4732 			return err;
4733 		err = check_map_access(env, regno, off, size, false, ACCESS_DIRECT);
4734 		if (err)
4735 			return err;
4736 		if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off))
4737 			kptr_off_desc = bpf_map_kptr_off_contains(reg->map_ptr,
4738 								  off + reg->var_off.value);
4739 		if (kptr_off_desc) {
4740 			err = check_map_kptr_access(env, regno, value_regno, insn_idx,
4741 						    kptr_off_desc);
4742 		} else if (t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) {
4743 			struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr;
4744 
4745 			/* if map is read-only, track its contents as scalars */
4746 			if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) &&
4747 			    bpf_map_is_rdonly(map) &&
4748 			    map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) {
4749 				int map_off = off + reg->var_off.value;
4750 				u64 val = 0;
4751 
4752 				err = bpf_map_direct_read(map, map_off, size,
4753 							  &val);
4754 				if (err)
4755 					return err;
4756 
4757 				regs[value_regno].type = SCALAR_VALUE;
4758 				__mark_reg_known(&regs[value_regno], val);
4759 			} else {
4760 				mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
4761 			}
4762 		}
4763 	} else if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_MEM) {
4764 		bool rdonly_mem = type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type);
4765 
4766 		if (type_may_be_null(reg->type)) {
4767 			verbose(env, "R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n", regno,
4768 				reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
4769 			return -EACCES;
4770 		}
4771 
4772 		if (t == BPF_WRITE && rdonly_mem) {
4773 			verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n",
4774 				regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
4775 			return -EACCES;
4776 		}
4777 
4778 		if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
4779 		    is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
4780 			verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", value_regno);
4781 			return -EACCES;
4782 		}
4783 
4784 		err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size,
4785 					      reg->mem_size, false);
4786 		if (!err && value_regno >= 0 && (t == BPF_READ || rdonly_mem))
4787 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
4788 	} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX) {
4789 		enum bpf_reg_type reg_type = SCALAR_VALUE;
4790 		struct btf *btf = NULL;
4791 		u32 btf_id = 0;
4792 
4793 		if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
4794 		    is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
4795 			verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into ctx\n", value_regno);
4796 			return -EACCES;
4797 		}
4798 
4799 		err = check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno);
4800 		if (err < 0)
4801 			return err;
4802 
4803 		err = check_ctx_access(env, insn_idx, off, size, t, &reg_type, &btf,
4804 				       &btf_id);
4805 		if (err)
4806 			verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; ");
4807 		if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) {
4808 			/* ctx access returns either a scalar, or a
4809 			 * PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END]. In the latter
4810 			 * case, we know the offset is zero.
4811 			 */
4812 			if (reg_type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
4813 				mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
4814 			} else {
4815 				mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs,
4816 						    value_regno);
4817 				if (type_may_be_null(reg_type))
4818 					regs[value_regno].id = ++env->id_gen;
4819 				/* A load of ctx field could have different
4820 				 * actual load size with the one encoded in the
4821 				 * insn. When the dst is PTR, it is for sure not
4822 				 * a sub-register.
4823 				 */
4824 				regs[value_regno].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG;
4825 				if (base_type(reg_type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) {
4826 					regs[value_regno].btf = btf;
4827 					regs[value_regno].btf_id = btf_id;
4828 				}
4829 			}
4830 			regs[value_regno].type = reg_type;
4831 		}
4832 
4833 	} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
4834 		/* Basic bounds checks. */
4835 		err = check_stack_access_within_bounds(env, regno, off, size, ACCESS_DIRECT, t);
4836 		if (err)
4837 			return err;
4838 
4839 		state = func(env, reg);
4840 		err = update_stack_depth(env, state, off);
4841 		if (err)
4842 			return err;
4843 
4844 		if (t == BPF_READ)
4845 			err = check_stack_read(env, regno, off, size,
4846 					       value_regno);
4847 		else
4848 			err = check_stack_write(env, regno, off, size,
4849 						value_regno, insn_idx);
4850 	} else if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg)) {
4851 		if (t == BPF_WRITE && !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, t)) {
4852 			verbose(env, "cannot write into packet\n");
4853 			return -EACCES;
4854 		}
4855 		if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
4856 		    is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
4857 			verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into packet\n",
4858 				value_regno);
4859 			return -EACCES;
4860 		}
4861 		err = check_packet_access(env, regno, off, size, false);
4862 		if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
4863 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
4864 	} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS) {
4865 		if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
4866 		    is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
4867 			verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into flow keys\n",
4868 				value_regno);
4869 			return -EACCES;
4870 		}
4871 
4872 		err = check_flow_keys_access(env, off, size);
4873 		if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
4874 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
4875 	} else if (type_is_sk_pointer(reg->type)) {
4876 		if (t == BPF_WRITE) {
4877 			verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n",
4878 				regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
4879 			return -EACCES;
4880 		}
4881 		err = check_sock_access(env, insn_idx, regno, off, size, t);
4882 		if (!err && value_regno >= 0)
4883 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
4884 	} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER) {
4885 		err = check_tp_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, off, size);
4886 		if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
4887 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
4888 	} else if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID &&
4889 		   !type_may_be_null(reg->type)) {
4890 		err = check_ptr_to_btf_access(env, regs, regno, off, size, t,
4891 					      value_regno);
4892 	} else if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP) {
4893 		err = check_ptr_to_map_access(env, regs, regno, off, size, t,
4894 					      value_regno);
4895 	} else if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BUF) {
4896 		bool rdonly_mem = type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type);
4897 		u32 *max_access;
4898 
4899 		if (rdonly_mem) {
4900 			if (t == BPF_WRITE) {
4901 				verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n",
4902 					regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
4903 				return -EACCES;
4904 			}
4905 			max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdonly_access;
4906 		} else {
4907 			max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdwr_access;
4908 		}
4909 
4910 		err = check_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, off, size, false,
4911 					  max_access);
4912 
4913 		if (!err && value_regno >= 0 && (rdonly_mem || t == BPF_READ))
4914 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
4915 	} else {
4916 		verbose(env, "R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n", regno,
4917 			reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
4918 		return -EACCES;
4919 	}
4920 
4921 	if (!err && size < BPF_REG_SIZE && value_regno >= 0 && t == BPF_READ &&
4922 	    regs[value_regno].type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
4923 		/* b/h/w load zero-extends, mark upper bits as known 0 */
4924 		coerce_reg_to_size(&regs[value_regno], size);
4925 	}
4926 	return err;
4927 }
4928 
4929 static int check_atomic(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_insn *insn)
4930 {
4931 	int load_reg;
4932 	int err;
4933 
4934 	switch (insn->imm) {
4935 	case BPF_ADD:
4936 	case BPF_ADD | BPF_FETCH:
4937 	case BPF_AND:
4938 	case BPF_AND | BPF_FETCH:
4939 	case BPF_OR:
4940 	case BPF_OR | BPF_FETCH:
4941 	case BPF_XOR:
4942 	case BPF_XOR | BPF_FETCH:
4943 	case BPF_XCHG:
4944 	case BPF_CMPXCHG:
4945 		break;
4946 	default:
4947 		verbose(env, "BPF_ATOMIC uses invalid atomic opcode %02x\n", insn->imm);
4948 		return -EINVAL;
4949 	}
4950 
4951 	if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_W && BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) {
4952 		verbose(env, "invalid atomic operand size\n");
4953 		return -EINVAL;
4954 	}
4955 
4956 	/* check src1 operand */
4957 	err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
4958 	if (err)
4959 		return err;
4960 
4961 	/* check src2 operand */
4962 	err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
4963 	if (err)
4964 		return err;
4965 
4966 	if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG) {
4967 		/* Check comparison of R0 with memory location */
4968 		const u32 aux_reg = BPF_REG_0;
4969 
4970 		err = check_reg_arg(env, aux_reg, SRC_OP);
4971 		if (err)
4972 			return err;
4973 
4974 		if (is_pointer_value(env, aux_reg)) {
4975 			verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", aux_reg);
4976 			return -EACCES;
4977 		}
4978 	}
4979 
4980 	if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
4981 		verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", insn->src_reg);
4982 		return -EACCES;
4983 	}
4984 
4985 	if (is_ctx_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) ||
4986 	    is_pkt_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) ||
4987 	    is_flow_key_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) ||
4988 	    is_sk_reg(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
4989 		verbose(env, "BPF_ATOMIC stores into R%d %s is not allowed\n",
4990 			insn->dst_reg,
4991 			reg_type_str(env, reg_state(env, insn->dst_reg)->type));
4992 		return -EACCES;
4993 	}
4994 
4995 	if (insn->imm & BPF_FETCH) {
4996 		if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG)
4997 			load_reg = BPF_REG_0;
4998 		else
4999 			load_reg = insn->src_reg;
5000 
5001 		/* check and record load of old value */
5002 		err = check_reg_arg(env, load_reg, DST_OP);
5003 		if (err)
5004 			return err;
5005 	} else {
5006 		/* This instruction accesses a memory location but doesn't
5007 		 * actually load it into a register.
5008 		 */
5009 		load_reg = -1;
5010 	}
5011 
5012 	/* Check whether we can read the memory, with second call for fetch
5013 	 * case to simulate the register fill.
5014 	 */
5015 	err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
5016 			       BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, -1, true);
5017 	if (!err && load_reg >= 0)
5018 		err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
5019 				       BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, load_reg,
5020 				       true);
5021 	if (err)
5022 		return err;
5023 
5024 	/* Check whether we can write into the same memory. */
5025 	err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
5026 			       BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1, true);
5027 	if (err)
5028 		return err;
5029 
5030 	return 0;
5031 }
5032 
5033 /* When register 'regno' is used to read the stack (either directly or through
5034  * a helper function) make sure that it's within stack boundary and, depending
5035  * on the access type, that all elements of the stack are initialized.
5036  *
5037  * 'off' includes 'regno->off', but not its dynamic part (if any).
5038  *
5039  * All registers that have been spilled on the stack in the slots within the
5040  * read offsets are marked as read.
5041  */
5042 static int check_stack_range_initialized(
5043 		struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int off,
5044 		int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed,
5045 		enum bpf_access_src type, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
5046 {
5047 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
5048 	struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
5049 	int err, min_off, max_off, i, j, slot, spi;
5050 	char *err_extra = type == ACCESS_HELPER ? " indirect" : "";
5051 	enum bpf_access_type bounds_check_type;
5052 	/* Some accesses can write anything into the stack, others are
5053 	 * read-only.
5054 	 */
5055 	bool clobber = false;
5056 
5057 	if (access_size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed) {
5058 		verbose(env, "invalid zero-sized read\n");
5059 		return -EACCES;
5060 	}
5061 
5062 	if (type == ACCESS_HELPER) {
5063 		/* The bounds checks for writes are more permissive than for
5064 		 * reads. However, if raw_mode is not set, we'll do extra
5065 		 * checks below.
5066 		 */
5067 		bounds_check_type = BPF_WRITE;
5068 		clobber = true;
5069 	} else {
5070 		bounds_check_type = BPF_READ;
5071 	}
5072 	err = check_stack_access_within_bounds(env, regno, off, access_size,
5073 					       type, bounds_check_type);
5074 	if (err)
5075 		return err;
5076 
5077 
5078 	if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
5079 		min_off = max_off = reg->var_off.value + off;
5080 	} else {
5081 		/* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for
5082 		 * simplicity since it requires corresponding support in
5083 		 * Spectre masking for stack ALU.
5084 		 * See also retrieve_ptr_limit().
5085 		 */
5086 		if (!env->bypass_spec_v1) {
5087 			char tn_buf[48];
5088 
5089 			tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
5090 			verbose(env, "R%d%s variable offset stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n",
5091 				regno, err_extra, tn_buf);
5092 			return -EACCES;
5093 		}
5094 		/* Only initialized buffer on stack is allowed to be accessed
5095 		 * with variable offset. With uninitialized buffer it's hard to
5096 		 * guarantee that whole memory is marked as initialized on
5097 		 * helper return since specific bounds are unknown what may
5098 		 * cause uninitialized stack leaking.
5099 		 */
5100 		if (meta && meta->raw_mode)
5101 			meta = NULL;
5102 
5103 		min_off = reg->smin_value + off;
5104 		max_off = reg->smax_value + off;
5105 	}
5106 
5107 	if (meta && meta->raw_mode) {
5108 		meta->access_size = access_size;
5109 		meta->regno = regno;
5110 		return 0;
5111 	}
5112 
5113 	for (i = min_off; i < max_off + access_size; i++) {
5114 		u8 *stype;
5115 
5116 		slot = -i - 1;
5117 		spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE;
5118 		if (state->allocated_stack <= slot)
5119 			goto err;
5120 		stype = &state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE];
5121 		if (*stype == STACK_MISC)
5122 			goto mark;
5123 		if (*stype == STACK_ZERO) {
5124 			if (clobber) {
5125 				/* helper can write anything into the stack */
5126 				*stype = STACK_MISC;
5127 			}
5128 			goto mark;
5129 		}
5130 
5131 		if (is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[spi]) &&
5132 		    base_type(state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID)
5133 			goto mark;
5134 
5135 		if (is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[spi]) &&
5136 		    (state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type == SCALAR_VALUE ||
5137 		     env->allow_ptr_leaks)) {
5138 			if (clobber) {
5139 				__mark_reg_unknown(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr);
5140 				for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++)
5141 					scrub_spilled_slot(&state->stack[spi].slot_type[j]);
5142 			}
5143 			goto mark;
5144 		}
5145 
5146 err:
5147 		if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
5148 			verbose(env, "invalid%s read from stack R%d off %d+%d size %d\n",
5149 				err_extra, regno, min_off, i - min_off, access_size);
5150 		} else {
5151 			char tn_buf[48];
5152 
5153 			tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
5154 			verbose(env, "invalid%s read from stack R%d var_off %s+%d size %d\n",
5155 				err_extra, regno, tn_buf, i - min_off, access_size);
5156 		}
5157 		return -EACCES;
5158 mark:
5159 		/* reading any byte out of 8-byte 'spill_slot' will cause
5160 		 * the whole slot to be marked as 'read'
5161 		 */
5162 		mark_reg_read(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr,
5163 			      state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.parent,
5164 			      REG_LIVE_READ64);
5165 	}
5166 	return update_stack_depth(env, state, min_off);
5167 }
5168 
5169 static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
5170 				   int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed,
5171 				   struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
5172 {
5173 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = &regs[regno];
5174 	u32 *max_access;
5175 
5176 	switch (base_type(reg->type)) {
5177 	case PTR_TO_PACKET:
5178 	case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
5179 		return check_packet_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size,
5180 					   zero_size_allowed);
5181 	case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY:
5182 		if (meta && meta->raw_mode) {
5183 			verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", regno,
5184 				reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
5185 			return -EACCES;
5186 		}
5187 		return check_mem_region_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size,
5188 					       reg->map_ptr->key_size, false);
5189 	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
5190 		if (check_map_access_type(env, regno, reg->off, access_size,
5191 					  meta && meta->raw_mode ? BPF_WRITE :
5192 					  BPF_READ))
5193 			return -EACCES;
5194 		return check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size,
5195 					zero_size_allowed, ACCESS_HELPER);
5196 	case PTR_TO_MEM:
5197 		if (type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type)) {
5198 			if (meta && meta->raw_mode) {
5199 				verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", regno,
5200 					reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
5201 				return -EACCES;
5202 			}
5203 		}
5204 		return check_mem_region_access(env, regno, reg->off,
5205 					       access_size, reg->mem_size,
5206 					       zero_size_allowed);
5207 	case PTR_TO_BUF:
5208 		if (type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type)) {
5209 			if (meta && meta->raw_mode) {
5210 				verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", regno,
5211 					reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
5212 				return -EACCES;
5213 			}
5214 
5215 			max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdonly_access;
5216 		} else {
5217 			max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdwr_access;
5218 		}
5219 		return check_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, reg->off,
5220 					   access_size, zero_size_allowed,
5221 					   max_access);
5222 	case PTR_TO_STACK:
5223 		return check_stack_range_initialized(
5224 				env,
5225 				regno, reg->off, access_size,
5226 				zero_size_allowed, ACCESS_HELPER, meta);
5227 	default: /* scalar_value or invalid ptr */
5228 		/* Allow zero-byte read from NULL, regardless of pointer type */
5229 		if (zero_size_allowed && access_size == 0 &&
5230 		    register_is_null(reg))
5231 			return 0;
5232 
5233 		verbose(env, "R%d type=%s ", regno,
5234 			reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
5235 		verbose(env, "expected=%s\n", reg_type_str(env, PTR_TO_STACK));
5236 		return -EACCES;
5237 	}
5238 }
5239 
5240 static int check_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5241 			      struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno,
5242 			      bool zero_size_allowed,
5243 			      struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
5244 {
5245 	int err;
5246 
5247 	/* This is used to refine r0 return value bounds for helpers
5248 	 * that enforce this value as an upper bound on return values.
5249 	 * See do_refine_retval_range() for helpers that can refine
5250 	 * the return value. C type of helper is u32 so we pull register
5251 	 * bound from umax_value however, if negative verifier errors
5252 	 * out. Only upper bounds can be learned because retval is an
5253 	 * int type and negative retvals are allowed.
5254 	 */
5255 	meta->msize_max_value = reg->umax_value;
5256 
5257 	/* The register is SCALAR_VALUE; the access check
5258 	 * happens using its boundaries.
5259 	 */
5260 	if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off))
5261 		/* For unprivileged variable accesses, disable raw
5262 		 * mode so that the program is required to
5263 		 * initialize all the memory that the helper could
5264 		 * just partially fill up.
5265 		 */
5266 		meta = NULL;
5267 
5268 	if (reg->smin_value < 0) {
5269 		verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned or 'var &= const'\n",
5270 			regno);
5271 		return -EACCES;
5272 	}
5273 
5274 	if (reg->umin_value == 0) {
5275 		err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1, 0,
5276 					      zero_size_allowed,
5277 					      meta);
5278 		if (err)
5279 			return err;
5280 	}
5281 
5282 	if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ) {
5283 		verbose(env, "R%d unbounded memory access, use 'var &= const' or 'if (var < const)'\n",
5284 			regno);
5285 		return -EACCES;
5286 	}
5287 	err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1,
5288 				      reg->umax_value,
5289 				      zero_size_allowed, meta);
5290 	if (!err)
5291 		err = mark_chain_precision(env, regno);
5292 	return err;
5293 }
5294 
5295 int check_mem_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
5296 		   u32 regno, u32 mem_size)
5297 {
5298 	bool may_be_null = type_may_be_null(reg->type);
5299 	struct bpf_reg_state saved_reg;
5300 	struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta;
5301 	int err;
5302 
5303 	if (register_is_null(reg))
5304 		return 0;
5305 
5306 	memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta));
5307 	/* Assuming that the register contains a value check if the memory
5308 	 * access is safe. Temporarily save and restore the register's state as
5309 	 * the conversion shouldn't be visible to a caller.
5310 	 */
5311 	if (may_be_null) {
5312 		saved_reg = *reg;
5313 		mark_ptr_not_null_reg(reg);
5314 	}
5315 
5316 	err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, mem_size, true, &meta);
5317 	/* Check access for BPF_WRITE */
5318 	meta.raw_mode = true;
5319 	err = err ?: check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, mem_size, true, &meta);
5320 
5321 	if (may_be_null)
5322 		*reg = saved_reg;
5323 
5324 	return err;
5325 }
5326 
5327 int check_kfunc_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
5328 			     u32 regno)
5329 {
5330 	struct bpf_reg_state *mem_reg = &cur_regs(env)[regno - 1];
5331 	bool may_be_null = type_may_be_null(mem_reg->type);
5332 	struct bpf_reg_state saved_reg;
5333 	struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta;
5334 	int err;
5335 
5336 	WARN_ON_ONCE(regno < BPF_REG_2 || regno > BPF_REG_5);
5337 
5338 	memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta));
5339 
5340 	if (may_be_null) {
5341 		saved_reg = *mem_reg;
5342 		mark_ptr_not_null_reg(mem_reg);
5343 	}
5344 
5345 	err = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, true, &meta);
5346 	/* Check access for BPF_WRITE */
5347 	meta.raw_mode = true;
5348 	err = err ?: check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, true, &meta);
5349 
5350 	if (may_be_null)
5351 		*mem_reg = saved_reg;
5352 	return err;
5353 }
5354 
5355 /* Implementation details:
5356  * bpf_map_lookup returns PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL
5357  * Two bpf_map_lookups (even with the same key) will have different reg->id.
5358  * For traditional PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE the verifier clears reg->id after
5359  * value_or_null->value transition, since the verifier only cares about
5360  * the range of access to valid map value pointer and doesn't care about actual
5361  * address of the map element.
5362  * For maps with 'struct bpf_spin_lock' inside map value the verifier keeps
5363  * reg->id > 0 after value_or_null->value transition. By doing so
5364  * two bpf_map_lookups will be considered two different pointers that
5365  * point to different bpf_spin_locks.
5366  * The verifier allows taking only one bpf_spin_lock at a time to avoid
5367  * dead-locks.
5368  * Since only one bpf_spin_lock is allowed the checks are simpler than
5369  * reg_is_refcounted() logic. The verifier needs to remember only
5370  * one spin_lock instead of array of acquired_refs.
5371  * cur_state->active_spin_lock remembers which map value element got locked
5372  * and clears it after bpf_spin_unlock.
5373  */
5374 static int process_spin_lock(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
5375 			     bool is_lock)
5376 {
5377 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = &regs[regno];
5378 	struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state;
5379 	bool is_const = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off);
5380 	struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr;
5381 	u64 val = reg->var_off.value;
5382 
5383 	if (!is_const) {
5384 		verbose(env,
5385 			"R%d doesn't have constant offset. bpf_spin_lock has to be at the constant offset\n",
5386 			regno);
5387 		return -EINVAL;
5388 	}
5389 	if (!map->btf) {
5390 		verbose(env,
5391 			"map '%s' has to have BTF in order to use bpf_spin_lock\n",
5392 			map->name);
5393 		return -EINVAL;
5394 	}
5395 	if (!map_value_has_spin_lock(map)) {
5396 		if (map->spin_lock_off == -E2BIG)
5397 			verbose(env,
5398 				"map '%s' has more than one 'struct bpf_spin_lock'\n",
5399 				map->name);
5400 		else if (map->spin_lock_off == -ENOENT)
5401 			verbose(env,
5402 				"map '%s' doesn't have 'struct bpf_spin_lock'\n",
5403 				map->name);
5404 		else
5405 			verbose(env,
5406 				"map '%s' is not a struct type or bpf_spin_lock is mangled\n",
5407 				map->name);
5408 		return -EINVAL;
5409 	}
5410 	if (map->spin_lock_off != val + reg->off) {
5411 		verbose(env, "off %lld doesn't point to 'struct bpf_spin_lock'\n",
5412 			val + reg->off);
5413 		return -EINVAL;
5414 	}
5415 	if (is_lock) {
5416 		if (cur->active_spin_lock) {
5417 			verbose(env,
5418 				"Locking two bpf_spin_locks are not allowed\n");
5419 			return -EINVAL;
5420 		}
5421 		cur->active_spin_lock = reg->id;
5422 	} else {
5423 		if (!cur->active_spin_lock) {
5424 			verbose(env, "bpf_spin_unlock without taking a lock\n");
5425 			return -EINVAL;
5426 		}
5427 		if (cur->active_spin_lock != reg->id) {
5428 			verbose(env, "bpf_spin_unlock of different lock\n");
5429 			return -EINVAL;
5430 		}
5431 		cur->active_spin_lock = 0;
5432 	}
5433 	return 0;
5434 }
5435 
5436 static int process_timer_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
5437 			      struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
5438 {
5439 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = &regs[regno];
5440 	bool is_const = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off);
5441 	struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr;
5442 	u64 val = reg->var_off.value;
5443 
5444 	if (!is_const) {
5445 		verbose(env,
5446 			"R%d doesn't have constant offset. bpf_timer has to be at the constant offset\n",
5447 			regno);
5448 		return -EINVAL;
5449 	}
5450 	if (!map->btf) {
5451 		verbose(env, "map '%s' has to have BTF in order to use bpf_timer\n",
5452 			map->name);
5453 		return -EINVAL;
5454 	}
5455 	if (!map_value_has_timer(map)) {
5456 		if (map->timer_off == -E2BIG)
5457 			verbose(env,
5458 				"map '%s' has more than one 'struct bpf_timer'\n",
5459 				map->name);
5460 		else if (map->timer_off == -ENOENT)
5461 			verbose(env,
5462 				"map '%s' doesn't have 'struct bpf_timer'\n",
5463 				map->name);
5464 		else
5465 			verbose(env,
5466 				"map '%s' is not a struct type or bpf_timer is mangled\n",
5467 				map->name);
5468 		return -EINVAL;
5469 	}
5470 	if (map->timer_off != val + reg->off) {
5471 		verbose(env, "off %lld doesn't point to 'struct bpf_timer' that is at %d\n",
5472 			val + reg->off, map->timer_off);
5473 		return -EINVAL;
5474 	}
5475 	if (meta->map_ptr) {
5476 		verbose(env, "verifier bug. Two map pointers in a timer helper\n");
5477 		return -EFAULT;
5478 	}
5479 	meta->map_uid = reg->map_uid;
5480 	meta->map_ptr = map;
5481 	return 0;
5482 }
5483 
5484 static int process_kptr_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
5485 			     struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
5486 {
5487 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = &regs[regno];
5488 	struct bpf_map_value_off_desc *off_desc;
5489 	struct bpf_map *map_ptr = reg->map_ptr;
5490 	u32 kptr_off;
5491 	int ret;
5492 
5493 	if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
5494 		verbose(env,
5495 			"R%d doesn't have constant offset. kptr has to be at the constant offset\n",
5496 			regno);
5497 		return -EINVAL;
5498 	}
5499 	if (!map_ptr->btf) {
5500 		verbose(env, "map '%s' has to have BTF in order to use bpf_kptr_xchg\n",
5501 			map_ptr->name);
5502 		return -EINVAL;
5503 	}
5504 	if (!map_value_has_kptrs(map_ptr)) {
5505 		ret = PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(map_ptr->kptr_off_tab);
5506 		if (ret == -E2BIG)
5507 			verbose(env, "map '%s' has more than %d kptr\n", map_ptr->name,
5508 				BPF_MAP_VALUE_OFF_MAX);
5509 		else if (ret == -EEXIST)
5510 			verbose(env, "map '%s' has repeating kptr BTF tags\n", map_ptr->name);
5511 		else
5512 			verbose(env, "map '%s' has no valid kptr\n", map_ptr->name);
5513 		return -EINVAL;
5514 	}
5515 
5516 	meta->map_ptr = map_ptr;
5517 	kptr_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value;
5518 	off_desc = bpf_map_kptr_off_contains(map_ptr, kptr_off);
5519 	if (!off_desc) {
5520 		verbose(env, "off=%d doesn't point to kptr\n", kptr_off);
5521 		return -EACCES;
5522 	}
5523 	if (off_desc->type != BPF_KPTR_REF) {
5524 		verbose(env, "off=%d kptr isn't referenced kptr\n", kptr_off);
5525 		return -EACCES;
5526 	}
5527 	meta->kptr_off_desc = off_desc;
5528 	return 0;
5529 }
5530 
5531 static bool arg_type_is_mem_size(enum bpf_arg_type type)
5532 {
5533 	return type == ARG_CONST_SIZE ||
5534 	       type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO;
5535 }
5536 
5537 static bool arg_type_is_alloc_size(enum bpf_arg_type type)
5538 {
5539 	return type == ARG_CONST_ALLOC_SIZE_OR_ZERO;
5540 }
5541 
5542 static bool arg_type_is_int_ptr(enum bpf_arg_type type)
5543 {
5544 	return type == ARG_PTR_TO_INT ||
5545 	       type == ARG_PTR_TO_LONG;
5546 }
5547 
5548 static bool arg_type_is_release(enum bpf_arg_type type)
5549 {
5550 	return type & OBJ_RELEASE;
5551 }
5552 
5553 static bool arg_type_is_dynptr(enum bpf_arg_type type)
5554 {
5555 	return base_type(type) == ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR;
5556 }
5557 
5558 static int int_ptr_type_to_size(enum bpf_arg_type type)
5559 {
5560 	if (type == ARG_PTR_TO_INT)
5561 		return sizeof(u32);
5562 	else if (type == ARG_PTR_TO_LONG)
5563 		return sizeof(u64);
5564 
5565 	return -EINVAL;
5566 }
5567 
5568 static int resolve_map_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5569 				 const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,
5570 				 enum bpf_arg_type *arg_type)
5571 {
5572 	if (!meta->map_ptr) {
5573 		/* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */
5574 		verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->type\n");
5575 		return -EACCES;
5576 	}
5577 
5578 	switch (meta->map_ptr->map_type) {
5579 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP:
5580 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH:
5581 		if (*arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
5582 			*arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_SOCK_COMMON;
5583 		} else {
5584 			verbose(env, "invalid arg_type for sockmap/sockhash\n");
5585 			return -EINVAL;
5586 		}
5587 		break;
5588 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER:
5589 		if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem)
5590 			*arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE;
5591 		break;
5592 	default:
5593 		break;
5594 	}
5595 	return 0;
5596 }
5597 
5598 struct bpf_reg_types {
5599 	const enum bpf_reg_type types[10];
5600 	u32 *btf_id;
5601 };
5602 
5603 static const struct bpf_reg_types map_key_value_types = {
5604 	.types = {
5605 		PTR_TO_STACK,
5606 		PTR_TO_PACKET,
5607 		PTR_TO_PACKET_META,
5608 		PTR_TO_MAP_KEY,
5609 		PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE,
5610 	},
5611 };
5612 
5613 static const struct bpf_reg_types sock_types = {
5614 	.types = {
5615 		PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON,
5616 		PTR_TO_SOCKET,
5617 		PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK,
5618 		PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK,
5619 	},
5620 };
5621 
5622 #ifdef CONFIG_NET
5623 static const struct bpf_reg_types btf_id_sock_common_types = {
5624 	.types = {
5625 		PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON,
5626 		PTR_TO_SOCKET,
5627 		PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK,
5628 		PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK,
5629 		PTR_TO_BTF_ID,
5630 	},
5631 	.btf_id = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_SOCK_COMMON],
5632 };
5633 #endif
5634 
5635 static const struct bpf_reg_types mem_types = {
5636 	.types = {
5637 		PTR_TO_STACK,
5638 		PTR_TO_PACKET,
5639 		PTR_TO_PACKET_META,
5640 		PTR_TO_MAP_KEY,
5641 		PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE,
5642 		PTR_TO_MEM,
5643 		PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_ALLOC,
5644 		PTR_TO_BUF,
5645 	},
5646 };
5647 
5648 static const struct bpf_reg_types int_ptr_types = {
5649 	.types = {
5650 		PTR_TO_STACK,
5651 		PTR_TO_PACKET,
5652 		PTR_TO_PACKET_META,
5653 		PTR_TO_MAP_KEY,
5654 		PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE,
5655 	},
5656 };
5657 
5658 static const struct bpf_reg_types fullsock_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_SOCKET } };
5659 static const struct bpf_reg_types scalar_types = { .types = { SCALAR_VALUE } };
5660 static const struct bpf_reg_types context_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_CTX } };
5661 static const struct bpf_reg_types alloc_mem_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_ALLOC } };
5662 static const struct bpf_reg_types const_map_ptr_types = { .types = { CONST_PTR_TO_MAP } };
5663 static const struct bpf_reg_types btf_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_BTF_ID } };
5664 static const struct bpf_reg_types spin_lock_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE } };
5665 static const struct bpf_reg_types percpu_btf_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU } };
5666 static const struct bpf_reg_types func_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_FUNC } };
5667 static const struct bpf_reg_types stack_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_STACK } };
5668 static const struct bpf_reg_types const_str_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE } };
5669 static const struct bpf_reg_types timer_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE } };
5670 static const struct bpf_reg_types kptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE } };
5671 
5672 static const struct bpf_reg_types *compatible_reg_types[__BPF_ARG_TYPE_MAX] = {
5673 	[ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY]		= &map_key_value_types,
5674 	[ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE]		= &map_key_value_types,
5675 	[ARG_CONST_SIZE]		= &scalar_types,
5676 	[ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO]	= &scalar_types,
5677 	[ARG_CONST_ALLOC_SIZE_OR_ZERO]	= &scalar_types,
5678 	[ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR]		= &const_map_ptr_types,
5679 	[ARG_PTR_TO_CTX]		= &context_types,
5680 	[ARG_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON]	= &sock_types,
5681 #ifdef CONFIG_NET
5682 	[ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_SOCK_COMMON]	= &btf_id_sock_common_types,
5683 #endif
5684 	[ARG_PTR_TO_SOCKET]		= &fullsock_types,
5685 	[ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID]		= &btf_ptr_types,
5686 	[ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK]		= &spin_lock_types,
5687 	[ARG_PTR_TO_MEM]		= &mem_types,
5688 	[ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM]		= &alloc_mem_types,
5689 	[ARG_PTR_TO_INT]		= &int_ptr_types,
5690 	[ARG_PTR_TO_LONG]		= &int_ptr_types,
5691 	[ARG_PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID]	= &percpu_btf_ptr_types,
5692 	[ARG_PTR_TO_FUNC]		= &func_ptr_types,
5693 	[ARG_PTR_TO_STACK]		= &stack_ptr_types,
5694 	[ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR]		= &const_str_ptr_types,
5695 	[ARG_PTR_TO_TIMER]		= &timer_types,
5696 	[ARG_PTR_TO_KPTR]		= &kptr_types,
5697 	[ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR]		= &stack_ptr_types,
5698 };
5699 
5700 static int check_reg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
5701 			  enum bpf_arg_type arg_type,
5702 			  const u32 *arg_btf_id,
5703 			  struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
5704 {
5705 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = &regs[regno];
5706 	enum bpf_reg_type expected, type = reg->type;
5707 	const struct bpf_reg_types *compatible;
5708 	int i, j;
5709 
5710 	compatible = compatible_reg_types[base_type(arg_type)];
5711 	if (!compatible) {
5712 		verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unsupported arg type %d\n", arg_type);
5713 		return -EFAULT;
5714 	}
5715 
5716 	/* ARG_PTR_TO_MEM + RDONLY is compatible with PTR_TO_MEM and PTR_TO_MEM + RDONLY,
5717 	 * but ARG_PTR_TO_MEM is compatible only with PTR_TO_MEM and NOT with PTR_TO_MEM + RDONLY
5718 	 *
5719 	 * Same for MAYBE_NULL:
5720 	 *
5721 	 * ARG_PTR_TO_MEM + MAYBE_NULL is compatible with PTR_TO_MEM and PTR_TO_MEM + MAYBE_NULL,
5722 	 * but ARG_PTR_TO_MEM is compatible only with PTR_TO_MEM but NOT with PTR_TO_MEM + MAYBE_NULL
5723 	 *
5724 	 * Therefore we fold these flags depending on the arg_type before comparison.
5725 	 */
5726 	if (arg_type & MEM_RDONLY)
5727 		type &= ~MEM_RDONLY;
5728 	if (arg_type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL)
5729 		type &= ~PTR_MAYBE_NULL;
5730 
5731 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(compatible->types); i++) {
5732 		expected = compatible->types[i];
5733 		if (expected == NOT_INIT)
5734 			break;
5735 
5736 		if (type == expected)
5737 			goto found;
5738 	}
5739 
5740 	verbose(env, "R%d type=%s expected=", regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
5741 	for (j = 0; j + 1 < i; j++)
5742 		verbose(env, "%s, ", reg_type_str(env, compatible->types[j]));
5743 	verbose(env, "%s\n", reg_type_str(env, compatible->types[j]));
5744 	return -EACCES;
5745 
5746 found:
5747 	if (reg->type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) {
5748 		/* For bpf_sk_release, it needs to match against first member
5749 		 * 'struct sock_common', hence make an exception for it. This
5750 		 * allows bpf_sk_release to work for multiple socket types.
5751 		 */
5752 		bool strict_type_match = arg_type_is_release(arg_type) &&
5753 					 meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_release;
5754 
5755 		if (!arg_btf_id) {
5756 			if (!compatible->btf_id) {
5757 				verbose(env, "verifier internal error: missing arg compatible BTF ID\n");
5758 				return -EFAULT;
5759 			}
5760 			arg_btf_id = compatible->btf_id;
5761 		}
5762 
5763 		if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) {
5764 			if (map_kptr_match_type(env, meta->kptr_off_desc, reg, regno))
5765 				return -EACCES;
5766 		} else if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg->btf, reg->btf_id, reg->off,
5767 						 btf_vmlinux, *arg_btf_id,
5768 						 strict_type_match)) {
5769 			verbose(env, "R%d is of type %s but %s is expected\n",
5770 				regno, kernel_type_name(reg->btf, reg->btf_id),
5771 				kernel_type_name(btf_vmlinux, *arg_btf_id));
5772 			return -EACCES;
5773 		}
5774 	}
5775 
5776 	return 0;
5777 }
5778 
5779 int check_func_arg_reg_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5780 			   const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno,
5781 			   enum bpf_arg_type arg_type)
5782 {
5783 	enum bpf_reg_type type = reg->type;
5784 	bool fixed_off_ok = false;
5785 
5786 	switch ((u32)type) {
5787 	/* Pointer types where reg offset is explicitly allowed: */
5788 	case PTR_TO_STACK:
5789 		if (arg_type_is_dynptr(arg_type) && reg->off % BPF_REG_SIZE) {
5790 			verbose(env, "cannot pass in dynptr at an offset\n");
5791 			return -EINVAL;
5792 		}
5793 		fallthrough;
5794 	case PTR_TO_PACKET:
5795 	case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
5796 	case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY:
5797 	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
5798 	case PTR_TO_MEM:
5799 	case PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY:
5800 	case PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_ALLOC:
5801 	case PTR_TO_BUF:
5802 	case PTR_TO_BUF | MEM_RDONLY:
5803 	case SCALAR_VALUE:
5804 		/* Some of the argument types nevertheless require a
5805 		 * zero register offset.
5806 		 */
5807 		if (base_type(arg_type) != ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM)
5808 			return 0;
5809 		break;
5810 	/* All the rest must be rejected, except PTR_TO_BTF_ID which allows
5811 	 * fixed offset.
5812 	 */
5813 	case PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
5814 		/* When referenced PTR_TO_BTF_ID is passed to release function,
5815 		 * it's fixed offset must be 0.	In the other cases, fixed offset
5816 		 * can be non-zero.
5817 		 */
5818 		if (arg_type_is_release(arg_type) && reg->off) {
5819 			verbose(env, "R%d must have zero offset when passed to release func\n",
5820 				regno);
5821 			return -EINVAL;
5822 		}
5823 		/* For arg is release pointer, fixed_off_ok must be false, but
5824 		 * we already checked and rejected reg->off != 0 above, so set
5825 		 * to true to allow fixed offset for all other cases.
5826 		 */
5827 		fixed_off_ok = true;
5828 		break;
5829 	default:
5830 		break;
5831 	}
5832 	return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, fixed_off_ok);
5833 }
5834 
5835 static u32 stack_slot_get_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
5836 {
5837 	struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
5838 	int spi = get_spi(reg->off);
5839 
5840 	return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.id;
5841 }
5842 
5843 static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg,
5844 			  struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,
5845 			  const struct bpf_func_proto *fn)
5846 {
5847 	u32 regno = BPF_REG_1 + arg;
5848 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = &regs[regno];
5849 	enum bpf_arg_type arg_type = fn->arg_type[arg];
5850 	enum bpf_reg_type type = reg->type;
5851 	u32 *arg_btf_id = NULL;
5852 	int err = 0;
5853 
5854 	if (arg_type == ARG_DONTCARE)
5855 		return 0;
5856 
5857 	err = check_reg_arg(env, regno, SRC_OP);
5858 	if (err)
5859 		return err;
5860 
5861 	if (arg_type == ARG_ANYTHING) {
5862 		if (is_pointer_value(env, regno)) {
5863 			verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into helper function\n",
5864 				regno);
5865 			return -EACCES;
5866 		}
5867 		return 0;
5868 	}
5869 
5870 	if (type_is_pkt_pointer(type) &&
5871 	    !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, meta, BPF_READ)) {
5872 		verbose(env, "helper access to the packet is not allowed\n");
5873 		return -EACCES;
5874 	}
5875 
5876 	if (base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
5877 		err = resolve_map_arg_type(env, meta, &arg_type);
5878 		if (err)
5879 			return err;
5880 	}
5881 
5882 	if (register_is_null(reg) && type_may_be_null(arg_type))
5883 		/* A NULL register has a SCALAR_VALUE type, so skip
5884 		 * type checking.
5885 		 */
5886 		goto skip_type_check;
5887 
5888 	/* arg_btf_id and arg_size are in a union. */
5889 	if (base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID)
5890 		arg_btf_id = fn->arg_btf_id[arg];
5891 
5892 	err = check_reg_type(env, regno, arg_type, arg_btf_id, meta);
5893 	if (err)
5894 		return err;
5895 
5896 	err = check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, regno, arg_type);
5897 	if (err)
5898 		return err;
5899 
5900 skip_type_check:
5901 	if (arg_type_is_release(arg_type)) {
5902 		if (arg_type_is_dynptr(arg_type)) {
5903 			struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
5904 			int spi = get_spi(reg->off);
5905 
5906 			if (!is_spi_bounds_valid(state, spi, BPF_DYNPTR_NR_SLOTS) ||
5907 			    !state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.id) {
5908 				verbose(env, "arg %d is an unacquired reference\n", regno);
5909 				return -EINVAL;
5910 			}
5911 		} else if (!reg->ref_obj_id && !register_is_null(reg)) {
5912 			verbose(env, "R%d must be referenced when passed to release function\n",
5913 				regno);
5914 			return -EINVAL;
5915 		}
5916 		if (meta->release_regno) {
5917 			verbose(env, "verifier internal error: more than one release argument\n");
5918 			return -EFAULT;
5919 		}
5920 		meta->release_regno = regno;
5921 	}
5922 
5923 	if (reg->ref_obj_id) {
5924 		if (meta->ref_obj_id) {
5925 			verbose(env, "verifier internal error: more than one arg with ref_obj_id R%d %u %u\n",
5926 				regno, reg->ref_obj_id,
5927 				meta->ref_obj_id);
5928 			return -EFAULT;
5929 		}
5930 		meta->ref_obj_id = reg->ref_obj_id;
5931 	}
5932 
5933 	if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR) {
5934 		/* bpf_map_xxx(map_ptr) call: remember that map_ptr */
5935 		if (meta->map_ptr) {
5936 			/* Use map_uid (which is unique id of inner map) to reject:
5937 			 * inner_map1 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(outer_map, key1)
5938 			 * inner_map2 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(outer_map, key2)
5939 			 * if (inner_map1 && inner_map2) {
5940 			 *     timer = bpf_map_lookup_elem(inner_map1);
5941 			 *     if (timer)
5942 			 *         // mismatch would have been allowed
5943 			 *         bpf_timer_init(timer, inner_map2);
5944 			 * }
5945 			 *
5946 			 * Comparing map_ptr is enough to distinguish normal and outer maps.
5947 			 */
5948 			if (meta->map_ptr != reg->map_ptr ||
5949 			    meta->map_uid != reg->map_uid) {
5950 				verbose(env,
5951 					"timer pointer in R1 map_uid=%d doesn't match map pointer in R2 map_uid=%d\n",
5952 					meta->map_uid, reg->map_uid);
5953 				return -EINVAL;
5954 			}
5955 		}
5956 		meta->map_ptr = reg->map_ptr;
5957 		meta->map_uid = reg->map_uid;
5958 	} else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY) {
5959 		/* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., key) call:
5960 		 * check that [key, key + map->key_size) are within
5961 		 * stack limits and initialized
5962 		 */
5963 		if (!meta->map_ptr) {
5964 			/* in function declaration map_ptr must come before
5965 			 * map_key, so that it's verified and known before
5966 			 * we have to check map_key here. Otherwise it means
5967 			 * that kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier
5968 			 */
5969 			verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->key\n");
5970 			return -EACCES;
5971 		}
5972 		err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno,
5973 					      meta->map_ptr->key_size, false,
5974 					      NULL);
5975 	} else if (base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
5976 		if (type_may_be_null(arg_type) && register_is_null(reg))
5977 			return 0;
5978 
5979 		/* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., value) call:
5980 		 * check [value, value + map->value_size) validity
5981 		 */
5982 		if (!meta->map_ptr) {
5983 			/* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */
5984 			verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->value\n");
5985 			return -EACCES;
5986 		}
5987 		meta->raw_mode = arg_type & MEM_UNINIT;
5988 		err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno,
5989 					      meta->map_ptr->value_size, false,
5990 					      meta);
5991 	} else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID) {
5992 		if (!reg->btf_id) {
5993 			verbose(env, "Helper has invalid btf_id in R%d\n", regno);
5994 			return -EACCES;
5995 		}
5996 		meta->ret_btf = reg->btf;
5997 		meta->ret_btf_id = reg->btf_id;
5998 	} else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK) {
5999 		if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_spin_lock) {
6000 			if (process_spin_lock(env, regno, true))
6001 				return -EACCES;
6002 		} else if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock) {
6003 			if (process_spin_lock(env, regno, false))
6004 				return -EACCES;
6005 		} else {
6006 			verbose(env, "verifier internal error\n");
6007 			return -EFAULT;
6008 		}
6009 	} else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_TIMER) {
6010 		if (process_timer_func(env, regno, meta))
6011 			return -EACCES;
6012 	} else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_FUNC) {
6013 		meta->subprogno = reg->subprogno;
6014 	} else if (base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM) {
6015 		/* The access to this pointer is only checked when we hit the
6016 		 * next is_mem_size argument below.
6017 		 */
6018 		meta->raw_mode = arg_type & MEM_UNINIT;
6019 		if (arg_type & MEM_FIXED_SIZE) {
6020 			err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno,
6021 						      fn->arg_size[arg], false,
6022 						      meta);
6023 		}
6024 	} else if (arg_type_is_mem_size(arg_type)) {
6025 		bool zero_size_allowed = (arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO);
6026 
6027 		err = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, zero_size_allowed, meta);
6028 	} else if (arg_type_is_dynptr(arg_type)) {
6029 		if (arg_type & MEM_UNINIT) {
6030 			if (!is_dynptr_reg_valid_uninit(env, reg)) {
6031 				verbose(env, "Dynptr has to be an uninitialized dynptr\n");
6032 				return -EINVAL;
6033 			}
6034 
6035 			/* We only support one dynptr being uninitialized at the moment,
6036 			 * which is sufficient for the helper functions we have right now.
6037 			 */
6038 			if (meta->uninit_dynptr_regno) {
6039 				verbose(env, "verifier internal error: multiple uninitialized dynptr args\n");
6040 				return -EFAULT;
6041 			}
6042 
6043 			meta->uninit_dynptr_regno = regno;
6044 		} else if (!is_dynptr_reg_valid_init(env, reg, arg_type)) {
6045 			const char *err_extra = "";
6046 
6047 			switch (arg_type & DYNPTR_TYPE_FLAG_MASK) {
6048 			case DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL:
6049 				err_extra = "local ";
6050 				break;
6051 			case DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF:
6052 				err_extra = "ringbuf ";
6053 				break;
6054 			default:
6055 				break;
6056 			}
6057 
6058 			verbose(env, "Expected an initialized %sdynptr as arg #%d\n",
6059 				err_extra, arg + 1);
6060 			return -EINVAL;
6061 		}
6062 	} else if (arg_type_is_alloc_size(arg_type)) {
6063 		if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
6064 			verbose(env, "R%d is not a known constant'\n",
6065 				regno);
6066 			return -EACCES;
6067 		}
6068 		meta->mem_size = reg->var_off.value;
6069 	} else if (arg_type_is_int_ptr(arg_type)) {
6070 		int size = int_ptr_type_to_size(arg_type);
6071 
6072 		err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, size, false, meta);
6073 		if (err)
6074 			return err;
6075 		err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, 0, size, true);
6076 	} else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR) {
6077 		struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr;
6078 		int map_off;
6079 		u64 map_addr;
6080 		char *str_ptr;
6081 
6082 		if (!bpf_map_is_rdonly(map)) {
6083 			verbose(env, "R%d does not point to a readonly map'\n", regno);
6084 			return -EACCES;
6085 		}
6086 
6087 		if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
6088 			verbose(env, "R%d is not a constant address'\n", regno);
6089 			return -EACCES;
6090 		}
6091 
6092 		if (!map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) {
6093 			verbose(env, "no direct value access support for this map type\n");
6094 			return -EACCES;
6095 		}
6096 
6097 		err = check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off,
6098 				       map->value_size - reg->off, false,
6099 				       ACCESS_HELPER);
6100 		if (err)
6101 			return err;
6102 
6103 		map_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value;
6104 		err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &map_addr, map_off);
6105 		if (err) {
6106 			verbose(env, "direct value access on string failed\n");
6107 			return err;
6108 		}
6109 
6110 		str_ptr = (char *)(long)(map_addr);
6111 		if (!strnchr(str_ptr + map_off, map->value_size - map_off, 0)) {
6112 			verbose(env, "string is not zero-terminated\n");
6113 			return -EINVAL;
6114 		}
6115 	} else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_KPTR) {
6116 		if (process_kptr_func(env, regno, meta))
6117 			return -EACCES;
6118 	}
6119 
6120 	return err;
6121 }
6122 
6123 static bool may_update_sockmap(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id)
6124 {
6125 	enum bpf_attach_type eatype = env->prog->expected_attach_type;
6126 	enum bpf_prog_type type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog);
6127 
6128 	if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem)
6129 		return false;
6130 
6131 	/* It's not possible to get access to a locked struct sock in these
6132 	 * contexts, so updating is safe.
6133 	 */
6134 	switch (type) {
6135 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING:
6136 		if (eatype == BPF_TRACE_ITER)
6137 			return true;
6138 		break;
6139 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER:
6140 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS:
6141 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT:
6142 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP:
6143 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT:
6144 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR:
6145 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP:
6146 		return true;
6147 	default:
6148 		break;
6149 	}
6150 
6151 	verbose(env, "cannot update sockmap in this context\n");
6152 	return false;
6153 }
6154 
6155 static bool allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
6156 {
6157 	return env->prog->jit_requested &&
6158 	       bpf_jit_supports_subprog_tailcalls();
6159 }
6160 
6161 static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
6162 					struct bpf_map *map, int func_id)
6163 {
6164 	if (!map)
6165 		return 0;
6166 
6167 	/* We need a two way check, first is from map perspective ... */
6168 	switch (map->map_type) {
6169 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY:
6170 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call)
6171 			goto error;
6172 		break;
6173 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY:
6174 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read &&
6175 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output &&
6176 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_output &&
6177 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read_value &&
6178 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_xdp_output)
6179 			goto error;
6180 		break;
6181 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF:
6182 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_output &&
6183 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve &&
6184 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_query &&
6185 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve_dynptr &&
6186 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_submit_dynptr &&
6187 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_discard_dynptr)
6188 			goto error;
6189 		break;
6190 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE:
6191 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stackid)
6192 			goto error;
6193 		break;
6194 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY:
6195 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup &&
6196 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup)
6197 			goto error;
6198 		break;
6199 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE:
6200 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE:
6201 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage)
6202 			goto error;
6203 		break;
6204 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP:
6205 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP_HASH:
6206 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map &&
6207 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem)
6208 			goto error;
6209 		break;
6210 	/* Restrict bpf side of cpumap and xskmap, open when use-cases
6211 	 * appear.
6212 	 */
6213 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP:
6214 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map)
6215 			goto error;
6216 		break;
6217 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP:
6218 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map &&
6219 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem)
6220 			goto error;
6221 		break;
6222 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS:
6223 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS:
6224 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem)
6225 			goto error;
6226 		break;
6227 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP:
6228 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map &&
6229 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update &&
6230 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem &&
6231 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_map &&
6232 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport &&
6233 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem &&
6234 		    !may_update_sockmap(env, func_id))
6235 			goto error;
6236 		break;
6237 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH:
6238 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_hash &&
6239 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_hash_update &&
6240 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem &&
6241 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_hash &&
6242 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport &&
6243 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem &&
6244 		    !may_update_sockmap(env, func_id))
6245 			goto error;
6246 		break;
6247 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY:
6248 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport)
6249 			goto error;
6250 		break;
6251 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE:
6252 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK:
6253 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem &&
6254 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem &&
6255 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem)
6256 			goto error;
6257 		break;
6258 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE:
6259 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get &&
6260 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_delete)
6261 			goto error;
6262 		break;
6263 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE:
6264 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get &&
6265 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_delete)
6266 			goto error;
6267 		break;
6268 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE:
6269 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_task_storage_get &&
6270 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_task_storage_delete)
6271 			goto error;
6272 		break;
6273 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER:
6274 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem &&
6275 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem)
6276 			goto error;
6277 		break;
6278 	default:
6279 		break;
6280 	}
6281 
6282 	/* ... and second from the function itself. */
6283 	switch (func_id) {
6284 	case BPF_FUNC_tail_call:
6285 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY)
6286 			goto error;
6287 		if (env->subprog_cnt > 1 && !allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(env)) {
6288 			verbose(env, "tail_calls are not allowed in non-JITed programs with bpf-to-bpf calls\n");
6289 			return -EINVAL;
6290 		}
6291 		break;
6292 	case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read:
6293 	case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output:
6294 	case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read_value:
6295 	case BPF_FUNC_skb_output:
6296 	case BPF_FUNC_xdp_output:
6297 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY)
6298 			goto error;
6299 		break;
6300 	case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_output:
6301 	case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve:
6302 	case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_query:
6303 	case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve_dynptr:
6304 	case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_submit_dynptr:
6305 	case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_discard_dynptr:
6306 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF)
6307 			goto error;
6308 		break;
6309 	case BPF_FUNC_get_stackid:
6310 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE)
6311 			goto error;
6312 		break;
6313 	case BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup:
6314 	case BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup:
6315 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY)
6316 			goto error;
6317 		break;
6318 	case BPF_FUNC_redirect_map:
6319 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP &&
6320 		    map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP_HASH &&
6321 		    map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP &&
6322 		    map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP)
6323 			goto error;
6324 		break;
6325 	case BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map:
6326 	case BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_map:
6327 	case BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update:
6328 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP)
6329 			goto error;
6330 		break;
6331 	case BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_hash:
6332 	case BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_hash:
6333 	case BPF_FUNC_sock_hash_update:
6334 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH)
6335 			goto error;
6336 		break;
6337 	case BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage:
6338 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE &&
6339 		    map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE)
6340 			goto error;
6341 		break;
6342 	case BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport:
6343 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY &&
6344 		    map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP &&
6345 		    map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH)
6346 			goto error;
6347 		break;
6348 	case BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem:
6349 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE &&
6350 		    map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK)
6351 			goto error;
6352 		break;
6353 	case BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem:
6354 	case BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem:
6355 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE &&
6356 		    map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK &&
6357 		    map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER)
6358 			goto error;
6359 		break;
6360 	case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem:
6361 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY &&
6362 		    map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH &&
6363 		    map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_PERCPU_HASH)
6364 			goto error;
6365 		break;
6366 	case BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get:
6367 	case BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_delete:
6368 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE)
6369 			goto error;
6370 		break;
6371 	case BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get:
6372 	case BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_delete:
6373 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE)
6374 			goto error;
6375 		break;
6376 	case BPF_FUNC_task_storage_get:
6377 	case BPF_FUNC_task_storage_delete:
6378 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE)
6379 			goto error;
6380 		break;
6381 	default:
6382 		break;
6383 	}
6384 
6385 	return 0;
6386 error:
6387 	verbose(env, "cannot pass map_type %d into func %s#%d\n",
6388 		map->map_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
6389 	return -EINVAL;
6390 }
6391 
6392 static bool check_raw_mode_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn)
6393 {
6394 	int count = 0;
6395 
6396 	if (fn->arg1_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
6397 		count++;
6398 	if (fn->arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
6399 		count++;
6400 	if (fn->arg3_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
6401 		count++;
6402 	if (fn->arg4_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
6403 		count++;
6404 	if (fn->arg5_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
6405 		count++;
6406 
6407 	/* We only support one arg being in raw mode at the moment,
6408 	 * which is sufficient for the helper functions we have
6409 	 * right now.
6410 	 */
6411 	return count <= 1;
6412 }
6413 
6414 static bool check_args_pair_invalid(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, int arg)
6415 {
6416 	bool is_fixed = fn->arg_type[arg] & MEM_FIXED_SIZE;
6417 	bool has_size = fn->arg_size[arg] != 0;
6418 	bool is_next_size = false;
6419 
6420 	if (arg + 1 < ARRAY_SIZE(fn->arg_type))
6421 		is_next_size = arg_type_is_mem_size(fn->arg_type[arg + 1]);
6422 
6423 	if (base_type(fn->arg_type[arg]) != ARG_PTR_TO_MEM)
6424 		return is_next_size;
6425 
6426 	return has_size == is_next_size || is_next_size == is_fixed;
6427 }
6428 
6429 static bool check_arg_pair_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn)
6430 {
6431 	/* bpf_xxx(..., buf, len) call will access 'len'
6432 	 * bytes from memory 'buf'. Both arg types need
6433 	 * to be paired, so make sure there's no buggy
6434 	 * helper function specification.
6435 	 */
6436 	if (arg_type_is_mem_size(fn->arg1_type) ||
6437 	    check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 0) ||
6438 	    check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 1) ||
6439 	    check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 2) ||
6440 	    check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 3) ||
6441 	    check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 4))
6442 		return false;
6443 
6444 	return true;
6445 }
6446 
6447 static bool check_refcount_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, int func_id)
6448 {
6449 	int count = 0;
6450 
6451 	if (arg_type_may_be_refcounted(fn->arg1_type))
6452 		count++;
6453 	if (arg_type_may_be_refcounted(fn->arg2_type))
6454 		count++;
6455 	if (arg_type_may_be_refcounted(fn->arg3_type))
6456 		count++;
6457 	if (arg_type_may_be_refcounted(fn->arg4_type))
6458 		count++;
6459 	if (arg_type_may_be_refcounted(fn->arg5_type))
6460 		count++;
6461 
6462 	/* A reference acquiring function cannot acquire
6463 	 * another refcounted ptr.
6464 	 */
6465 	if (may_be_acquire_function(func_id) && count)
6466 		return false;
6467 
6468 	/* We only support one arg being unreferenced at the moment,
6469 	 * which is sufficient for the helper functions we have right now.
6470 	 */
6471 	return count <= 1;
6472 }
6473 
6474 static bool check_btf_id_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn)
6475 {
6476 	int i;
6477 
6478 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(fn->arg_type); i++) {
6479 		if (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) == ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID && !fn->arg_btf_id[i])
6480 			return false;
6481 
6482 		if (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) != ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID && fn->arg_btf_id[i] &&
6483 		    /* arg_btf_id and arg_size are in a union. */
6484 		    (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) != ARG_PTR_TO_MEM ||
6485 		     !(fn->arg_type[i] & MEM_FIXED_SIZE)))
6486 			return false;
6487 	}
6488 
6489 	return true;
6490 }
6491 
6492 static int check_func_proto(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, int func_id,
6493 			    struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
6494 {
6495 	return check_raw_mode_ok(fn) &&
6496 	       check_arg_pair_ok(fn) &&
6497 	       check_btf_id_ok(fn) &&
6498 	       check_refcount_ok(fn, func_id) ? 0 : -EINVAL;
6499 }
6500 
6501 /* Packet data might have moved, any old PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END]
6502  * are now invalid, so turn them into unknown SCALAR_VALUE.
6503  */
6504 static void __clear_all_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
6505 				     struct bpf_func_state *state)
6506 {
6507 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg;
6508 	int i;
6509 
6510 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
6511 		if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(&regs[i]))
6512 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, i);
6513 
6514 	bpf_for_each_spilled_reg(i, state, reg) {
6515 		if (!reg)
6516 			continue;
6517 		if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(reg))
6518 			__mark_reg_unknown(env, reg);
6519 	}
6520 }
6521 
6522 static void clear_all_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
6523 {
6524 	struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
6525 	int i;
6526 
6527 	for (i = 0; i <= vstate->curframe; i++)
6528 		__clear_all_pkt_pointers(env, vstate->frame[i]);
6529 }
6530 
6531 enum {
6532 	AT_PKT_END = -1,
6533 	BEYOND_PKT_END = -2,
6534 };
6535 
6536 static void mark_pkt_end(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, int regn, bool range_open)
6537 {
6538 	struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
6539 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regn];
6540 
6541 	if (reg->type != PTR_TO_PACKET)
6542 		/* PTR_TO_PACKET_META is not supported yet */
6543 		return;
6544 
6545 	/* The 'reg' is pkt > pkt_end or pkt >= pkt_end.
6546 	 * How far beyond pkt_end it goes is unknown.
6547 	 * if (!range_open) it's the case of pkt >= pkt_end
6548 	 * if (range_open) it's the case of pkt > pkt_end
6549 	 * hence this pointer is at least 1 byte bigger than pkt_end
6550 	 */
6551 	if (range_open)
6552 		reg->range = BEYOND_PKT_END;
6553 	else
6554 		reg->range = AT_PKT_END;
6555 }
6556 
6557 static void release_reg_references(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
6558 				   struct bpf_func_state *state,
6559 				   int ref_obj_id)
6560 {
6561 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg;
6562 	int i;
6563 
6564 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
6565 		if (regs[i].ref_obj_id == ref_obj_id)
6566 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, i);
6567 
6568 	bpf_for_each_spilled_reg(i, state, reg) {
6569 		if (!reg)
6570 			continue;
6571 		if (reg->ref_obj_id == ref_obj_id)
6572 			__mark_reg_unknown(env, reg);
6573 	}
6574 }
6575 
6576 /* The pointer with the specified id has released its reference to kernel
6577  * resources. Identify all copies of the same pointer and clear the reference.
6578  */
6579 static int release_reference(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
6580 			     int ref_obj_id)
6581 {
6582 	struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
6583 	int err;
6584 	int i;
6585 
6586 	err = release_reference_state(cur_func(env), ref_obj_id);
6587 	if (err)
6588 		return err;
6589 
6590 	for (i = 0; i <= vstate->curframe; i++)
6591 		release_reg_references(env, vstate->frame[i], ref_obj_id);
6592 
6593 	return 0;
6594 }
6595 
6596 static void clear_caller_saved_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
6597 				    struct bpf_reg_state *regs)
6598 {
6599 	int i;
6600 
6601 	/* after the call registers r0 - r5 were scratched */
6602 	for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) {
6603 		mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]);
6604 		check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK);
6605 	}
6606 }
6607 
6608 typedef int (*set_callee_state_fn)(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
6609 				   struct bpf_func_state *caller,
6610 				   struct bpf_func_state *callee,
6611 				   int insn_idx);
6612 
6613 static int __check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
6614 			     int *insn_idx, int subprog,
6615 			     set_callee_state_fn set_callee_state_cb)
6616 {
6617 	struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state;
6618 	struct bpf_func_info_aux *func_info_aux;
6619 	struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee;
6620 	int err;
6621 	bool is_global = false;
6622 
6623 	if (state->curframe + 1 >= MAX_CALL_FRAMES) {
6624 		verbose(env, "the call stack of %d frames is too deep\n",
6625 			state->curframe + 2);
6626 		return -E2BIG;
6627 	}
6628 
6629 	caller = state->frame[state->curframe];
6630 	if (state->frame[state->curframe + 1]) {
6631 		verbose(env, "verifier bug. Frame %d already allocated\n",
6632 			state->curframe + 1);
6633 		return -EFAULT;
6634 	}
6635 
6636 	func_info_aux = env->prog->aux->func_info_aux;
6637 	if (func_info_aux)
6638 		is_global = func_info_aux[subprog].linkage == BTF_FUNC_GLOBAL;
6639 	err = btf_check_subprog_arg_match(env, subprog, caller->regs);
6640 	if (err == -EFAULT)
6641 		return err;
6642 	if (is_global) {
6643 		if (err) {
6644 			verbose(env, "Caller passes invalid args into func#%d\n",
6645 				subprog);
6646 			return err;
6647 		} else {
6648 			if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL)
6649 				verbose(env,
6650 					"Func#%d is global and valid. Skipping.\n",
6651 					subprog);
6652 			clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs);
6653 
6654 			/* All global functions return a 64-bit SCALAR_VALUE */
6655 			mark_reg_unknown(env, caller->regs, BPF_REG_0);
6656 			caller->regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG;
6657 
6658 			/* continue with next insn after call */
6659 			return 0;
6660 		}
6661 	}
6662 
6663 	if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) &&
6664 	    insn->src_reg == 0 &&
6665 	    insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback) {
6666 		struct bpf_verifier_state *async_cb;
6667 
6668 		/* there is no real recursion here. timer callbacks are async */
6669 		env->subprog_info[subprog].is_async_cb = true;
6670 		async_cb = push_async_cb(env, env->subprog_info[subprog].start,
6671 					 *insn_idx, subprog);
6672 		if (!async_cb)
6673 			return -EFAULT;
6674 		callee = async_cb->frame[0];
6675 		callee->async_entry_cnt = caller->async_entry_cnt + 1;
6676 
6677 		/* Convert bpf_timer_set_callback() args into timer callback args */
6678 		err = set_callee_state_cb(env, caller, callee, *insn_idx);
6679 		if (err)
6680 			return err;
6681 
6682 		clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs);
6683 		mark_reg_unknown(env, caller->regs, BPF_REG_0);
6684 		caller->regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG;
6685 		/* continue with next insn after call */
6686 		return 0;
6687 	}
6688 
6689 	callee = kzalloc(sizeof(*callee), GFP_KERNEL);
6690 	if (!callee)
6691 		return -ENOMEM;
6692 	state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = callee;
6693 
6694 	/* callee cannot access r0, r6 - r9 for reading and has to write
6695 	 * into its own stack before reading from it.
6696 	 * callee can read/write into caller's stack
6697 	 */
6698 	init_func_state(env, callee,
6699 			/* remember the callsite, it will be used by bpf_exit */
6700 			*insn_idx /* callsite */,
6701 			state->curframe + 1 /* frameno within this callchain */,
6702 			subprog /* subprog number within this prog */);
6703 
6704 	/* Transfer references to the callee */
6705 	err = copy_reference_state(callee, caller);
6706 	if (err)
6707 		return err;
6708 
6709 	err = set_callee_state_cb(env, caller, callee, *insn_idx);
6710 	if (err)
6711 		return err;
6712 
6713 	clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs);
6714 
6715 	/* only increment it after check_reg_arg() finished */
6716 	state->curframe++;
6717 
6718 	/* and go analyze first insn of the callee */
6719 	*insn_idx = env->subprog_info[subprog].start - 1;
6720 
6721 	if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) {
6722 		verbose(env, "caller:\n");
6723 		print_verifier_state(env, caller, true);
6724 		verbose(env, "callee:\n");
6725 		print_verifier_state(env, callee, true);
6726 	}
6727 	return 0;
6728 }
6729 
6730 int map_set_for_each_callback_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
6731 				   struct bpf_func_state *caller,
6732 				   struct bpf_func_state *callee)
6733 {
6734 	/* bpf_for_each_map_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *callback_fn,
6735 	 *      void *callback_ctx, u64 flags);
6736 	 * callback_fn(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value,
6737 	 *      void *callback_ctx);
6738 	 */
6739 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_1] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1];
6740 
6741 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].type = PTR_TO_MAP_KEY;
6742 	__mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]);
6743 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr;
6744 
6745 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE;
6746 	__mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]);
6747 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr;
6748 
6749 	/* pointer to stack or null */
6750 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_4] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_3];
6751 
6752 	/* unused */
6753 	__mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]);
6754 	return 0;
6755 }
6756 
6757 static int set_callee_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
6758 			    struct bpf_func_state *caller,
6759 			    struct bpf_func_state *callee, int insn_idx)
6760 {
6761 	int i;
6762 
6763 	/* copy r1 - r5 args that callee can access.  The copy includes parent
6764 	 * pointers, which connects us up to the liveness chain
6765 	 */
6766 	for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++)
6767 		callee->regs[i] = caller->regs[i];
6768 	return 0;
6769 }
6770 
6771 static int check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
6772 			   int *insn_idx)
6773 {
6774 	int subprog, target_insn;
6775 
6776 	target_insn = *insn_idx + insn->imm + 1;
6777 	subprog = find_subprog(env, target_insn);
6778 	if (subprog < 0) {
6779 		verbose(env, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n",
6780 			target_insn);
6781 		return -EFAULT;
6782 	}
6783 
6784 	return __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx, subprog, set_callee_state);
6785 }
6786 
6787 static int set_map_elem_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
6788 				       struct bpf_func_state *caller,
6789 				       struct bpf_func_state *callee,
6790 				       int insn_idx)
6791 {
6792 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx];
6793 	struct bpf_map *map;
6794 	int err;
6795 
6796 	if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(insn_aux)) {
6797 		verbose(env, "tail_call abusing map_ptr\n");
6798 		return -EINVAL;
6799 	}
6800 
6801 	map = BPF_MAP_PTR(insn_aux->map_ptr_state);
6802 	if (!map->ops->map_set_for_each_callback_args ||
6803 	    !map->ops->map_for_each_callback) {
6804 		verbose(env, "callback function not allowed for map\n");
6805 		return -ENOTSUPP;
6806 	}
6807 
6808 	err = map->ops->map_set_for_each_callback_args(env, caller, callee);
6809 	if (err)
6810 		return err;
6811 
6812 	callee->in_callback_fn = true;
6813 	return 0;
6814 }
6815 
6816 static int set_loop_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
6817 				   struct bpf_func_state *caller,
6818 				   struct bpf_func_state *callee,
6819 				   int insn_idx)
6820 {
6821 	/* bpf_loop(u32 nr_loops, void *callback_fn, void *callback_ctx,
6822 	 *	    u64 flags);
6823 	 * callback_fn(u32 index, void *callback_ctx);
6824 	 */
6825 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_1].type = SCALAR_VALUE;
6826 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_2] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_3];
6827 
6828 	/* unused */
6829 	__mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]);
6830 	__mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]);
6831 	__mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]);
6832 
6833 	callee->in_callback_fn = true;
6834 	return 0;
6835 }
6836 
6837 static int set_timer_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
6838 				    struct bpf_func_state *caller,
6839 				    struct bpf_func_state *callee,
6840 				    int insn_idx)
6841 {
6842 	struct bpf_map *map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr;
6843 
6844 	/* bpf_timer_set_callback(struct bpf_timer *timer, void *callback_fn);
6845 	 * callback_fn(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value);
6846 	 */
6847 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_1].type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
6848 	__mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_1]);
6849 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr = map_ptr;
6850 
6851 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].type = PTR_TO_MAP_KEY;
6852 	__mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]);
6853 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].map_ptr = map_ptr;
6854 
6855 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE;
6856 	__mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]);
6857 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].map_ptr = map_ptr;
6858 
6859 	/* unused */
6860 	__mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]);
6861 	__mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]);
6862 	callee->in_async_callback_fn = true;
6863 	return 0;
6864 }
6865 
6866 static int set_find_vma_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
6867 				       struct bpf_func_state *caller,
6868 				       struct bpf_func_state *callee,
6869 				       int insn_idx)
6870 {
6871 	/* bpf_find_vma(struct task_struct *task, u64 addr,
6872 	 *               void *callback_fn, void *callback_ctx, u64 flags)
6873 	 * (callback_fn)(struct task_struct *task,
6874 	 *               struct vm_area_struct *vma, void *callback_ctx);
6875 	 */
6876 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_1] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1];
6877 
6878 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID;
6879 	__mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]);
6880 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].btf =  btf_vmlinux;
6881 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].btf_id = btf_tracing_ids[BTF_TRACING_TYPE_VMA],
6882 
6883 	/* pointer to stack or null */
6884 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_3] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_4];
6885 
6886 	/* unused */
6887 	__mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]);
6888 	__mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]);
6889 	callee->in_callback_fn = true;
6890 	return 0;
6891 }
6892 
6893 static int prepare_func_exit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *insn_idx)
6894 {
6895 	struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state;
6896 	struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee;
6897 	struct bpf_reg_state *r0;
6898 	int err;
6899 
6900 	callee = state->frame[state->curframe];
6901 	r0 = &callee->regs[BPF_REG_0];
6902 	if (r0->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
6903 		/* technically it's ok to return caller's stack pointer
6904 		 * (or caller's caller's pointer) back to the caller,
6905 		 * since these pointers are valid. Only current stack
6906 		 * pointer will be invalid as soon as function exits,
6907 		 * but let's be conservative
6908 		 */
6909 		verbose(env, "cannot return stack pointer to the caller\n");
6910 		return -EINVAL;
6911 	}
6912 
6913 	state->curframe--;
6914 	caller = state->frame[state->curframe];
6915 	if (callee->in_callback_fn) {
6916 		/* enforce R0 return value range [0, 1]. */
6917 		struct tnum range = tnum_range(0, 1);
6918 
6919 		if (r0->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
6920 			verbose(env, "R0 not a scalar value\n");
6921 			return -EACCES;
6922 		}
6923 		if (!tnum_in(range, r0->var_off)) {
6924 			verbose_invalid_scalar(env, r0, &range, "callback return", "R0");
6925 			return -EINVAL;
6926 		}
6927 	} else {
6928 		/* return to the caller whatever r0 had in the callee */
6929 		caller->regs[BPF_REG_0] = *r0;
6930 	}
6931 
6932 	/* Transfer references to the caller */
6933 	err = copy_reference_state(caller, callee);
6934 	if (err)
6935 		return err;
6936 
6937 	*insn_idx = callee->callsite + 1;
6938 	if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) {
6939 		verbose(env, "returning from callee:\n");
6940 		print_verifier_state(env, callee, true);
6941 		verbose(env, "to caller at %d:\n", *insn_idx);
6942 		print_verifier_state(env, caller, true);
6943 	}
6944 	/* clear everything in the callee */
6945 	free_func_state(callee);
6946 	state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = NULL;
6947 	return 0;
6948 }
6949 
6950 static void do_refine_retval_range(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, int ret_type,
6951 				   int func_id,
6952 				   struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
6953 {
6954 	struct bpf_reg_state *ret_reg = &regs[BPF_REG_0];
6955 
6956 	if (ret_type != RET_INTEGER ||
6957 	    (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stack &&
6958 	     func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_task_stack &&
6959 	     func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_str &&
6960 	     func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel_str &&
6961 	     func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_user_str))
6962 		return;
6963 
6964 	ret_reg->smax_value = meta->msize_max_value;
6965 	ret_reg->s32_max_value = meta->msize_max_value;
6966 	ret_reg->smin_value = -MAX_ERRNO;
6967 	ret_reg->s32_min_value = -MAX_ERRNO;
6968 	__reg_deduce_bounds(ret_reg);
6969 	__reg_bound_offset(ret_reg);
6970 	__update_reg_bounds(ret_reg);
6971 }
6972 
6973 static int
6974 record_func_map(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,
6975 		int func_id, int insn_idx)
6976 {
6977 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx];
6978 	struct bpf_map *map = meta->map_ptr;
6979 
6980 	if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call &&
6981 	    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem &&
6982 	    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem &&
6983 	    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem &&
6984 	    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem &&
6985 	    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem &&
6986 	    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem &&
6987 	    func_id != BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem &&
6988 	    func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map &&
6989 	    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem)
6990 		return 0;
6991 
6992 	if (map == NULL) {
6993 		verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n");
6994 		return -EINVAL;
6995 	}
6996 
6997 	/* In case of read-only, some additional restrictions
6998 	 * need to be applied in order to prevent altering the
6999 	 * state of the map from program side.
7000 	 */
7001 	if ((map->map_flags & BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG) &&
7002 	    (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem ||
7003 	     func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem ||
7004 	     func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem ||
7005 	     func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem)) {
7006 		verbose(env, "write into map forbidden\n");
7007 		return -EACCES;
7008 	}
7009 
7010 	if (!BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state))
7011 		bpf_map_ptr_store(aux, meta->map_ptr,
7012 				  !meta->map_ptr->bypass_spec_v1);
7013 	else if (BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state) != meta->map_ptr)
7014 		bpf_map_ptr_store(aux, BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON,
7015 				  !meta->map_ptr->bypass_spec_v1);
7016 	return 0;
7017 }
7018 
7019 static int
7020 record_func_key(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,
7021 		int func_id, int insn_idx)
7022 {
7023 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx];
7024 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg;
7025 	struct bpf_map *map = meta->map_ptr;
7026 	struct tnum range;
7027 	u64 val;
7028 	int err;
7029 
7030 	if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call)
7031 		return 0;
7032 	if (!map || map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY) {
7033 		verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n");
7034 		return -EINVAL;
7035 	}
7036 
7037 	range = tnum_range(0, map->max_entries - 1);
7038 	reg = &regs[BPF_REG_3];
7039 
7040 	if (!register_is_const(reg) || !tnum_in(range, reg->var_off)) {
7041 		bpf_map_key_store(aux, BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON);
7042 		return 0;
7043 	}
7044 
7045 	err = mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_3);
7046 	if (err)
7047 		return err;
7048 
7049 	val = reg->var_off.value;
7050 	if (bpf_map_key_unseen(aux))
7051 		bpf_map_key_store(aux, val);
7052 	else if (!bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux) &&
7053 		  bpf_map_key_immediate(aux) != val)
7054 		bpf_map_key_store(aux, BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON);
7055 	return 0;
7056 }
7057 
7058 static int check_reference_leak(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
7059 {
7060 	struct bpf_func_state *state = cur_func(env);
7061 	int i;
7062 
7063 	for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) {
7064 		verbose(env, "Unreleased reference id=%d alloc_insn=%d\n",
7065 			state->refs[i].id, state->refs[i].insn_idx);
7066 	}
7067 	return state->acquired_refs ? -EINVAL : 0;
7068 }
7069 
7070 static int check_bpf_snprintf_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
7071 				   struct bpf_reg_state *regs)
7072 {
7073 	struct bpf_reg_state *fmt_reg = &regs[BPF_REG_3];
7074 	struct bpf_reg_state *data_len_reg = &regs[BPF_REG_5];
7075 	struct bpf_map *fmt_map = fmt_reg->map_ptr;
7076 	int err, fmt_map_off, num_args;
7077 	u64 fmt_addr;
7078 	char *fmt;
7079 
7080 	/* data must be an array of u64 */
7081 	if (data_len_reg->var_off.value % 8)
7082 		return -EINVAL;
7083 	num_args = data_len_reg->var_off.value / 8;
7084 
7085 	/* fmt being ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR guarantees that var_off is const
7086 	 * and map_direct_value_addr is set.
7087 	 */
7088 	fmt_map_off = fmt_reg->off + fmt_reg->var_off.value;
7089 	err = fmt_map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(fmt_map, &fmt_addr,
7090 						  fmt_map_off);
7091 	if (err) {
7092 		verbose(env, "verifier bug\n");
7093 		return -EFAULT;
7094 	}
7095 	fmt = (char *)(long)fmt_addr + fmt_map_off;
7096 
7097 	/* We are also guaranteed that fmt+fmt_map_off is NULL terminated, we
7098 	 * can focus on validating the format specifiers.
7099 	 */
7100 	err = bpf_bprintf_prepare(fmt, UINT_MAX, NULL, NULL, num_args);
7101 	if (err < 0)
7102 		verbose(env, "Invalid format string\n");
7103 
7104 	return err;
7105 }
7106 
7107 static int check_get_func_ip(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
7108 {
7109 	enum bpf_prog_type type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog);
7110 	int func_id = BPF_FUNC_get_func_ip;
7111 
7112 	if (type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING) {
7113 		if (!bpf_prog_has_trampoline(env->prog)) {
7114 			verbose(env, "func %s#%d supported only for fentry/fexit/fmod_ret programs\n",
7115 				func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
7116 			return -ENOTSUPP;
7117 		}
7118 		return 0;
7119 	} else if (type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE) {
7120 		return 0;
7121 	}
7122 
7123 	verbose(env, "func %s#%d not supported for program type %d\n",
7124 		func_id_name(func_id), func_id, type);
7125 	return -ENOTSUPP;
7126 }
7127 
7128 static struct bpf_insn_aux_data *cur_aux(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
7129 {
7130 	return &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx];
7131 }
7132 
7133 static bool loop_flag_is_zero(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
7134 {
7135 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
7136 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &regs[BPF_REG_4];
7137 	bool reg_is_null = register_is_null(reg);
7138 
7139 	if (reg_is_null)
7140 		mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_4);
7141 
7142 	return reg_is_null;
7143 }
7144 
7145 static void update_loop_inline_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 subprogno)
7146 {
7147 	struct bpf_loop_inline_state *state = &cur_aux(env)->loop_inline_state;
7148 
7149 	if (!state->initialized) {
7150 		state->initialized = 1;
7151 		state->fit_for_inline = loop_flag_is_zero(env);
7152 		state->callback_subprogno = subprogno;
7153 		return;
7154 	}
7155 
7156 	if (!state->fit_for_inline)
7157 		return;
7158 
7159 	state->fit_for_inline = (loop_flag_is_zero(env) &&
7160 				 state->callback_subprogno == subprogno);
7161 }
7162 
7163 static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
7164 			     int *insn_idx_p)
7165 {
7166 	const struct bpf_func_proto *fn = NULL;
7167 	enum bpf_return_type ret_type;
7168 	enum bpf_type_flag ret_flag;
7169 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs;
7170 	struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta;
7171 	int insn_idx = *insn_idx_p;
7172 	bool changes_data;
7173 	int i, err, func_id;
7174 
7175 	/* find function prototype */
7176 	func_id = insn->imm;
7177 	if (func_id < 0 || func_id >= __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID) {
7178 		verbose(env, "invalid func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id),
7179 			func_id);
7180 		return -EINVAL;
7181 	}
7182 
7183 	if (env->ops->get_func_proto)
7184 		fn = env->ops->get_func_proto(func_id, env->prog);
7185 	if (!fn) {
7186 		verbose(env, "unknown func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id),
7187 			func_id);
7188 		return -EINVAL;
7189 	}
7190 
7191 	/* eBPF programs must be GPL compatible to use GPL-ed functions */
7192 	if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible && fn->gpl_only) {
7193 		verbose(env, "cannot call GPL-restricted function from non-GPL compatible program\n");
7194 		return -EINVAL;
7195 	}
7196 
7197 	if (fn->allowed && !fn->allowed(env->prog)) {
7198 		verbose(env, "helper call is not allowed in probe\n");
7199 		return -EINVAL;
7200 	}
7201 
7202 	/* With LD_ABS/IND some JITs save/restore skb from r1. */
7203 	changes_data = bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(fn->func);
7204 	if (changes_data && fn->arg1_type != ARG_PTR_TO_CTX) {
7205 		verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d: r1 != ctx\n",
7206 			func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
7207 		return -EINVAL;
7208 	}
7209 
7210 	memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta));
7211 	meta.pkt_access = fn->pkt_access;
7212 
7213 	err = check_func_proto(fn, func_id, &meta);
7214 	if (err) {
7215 		verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n",
7216 			func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
7217 		return err;
7218 	}
7219 
7220 	meta.func_id = func_id;
7221 	/* check args */
7222 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS; i++) {
7223 		err = check_func_arg(env, i, &meta, fn);
7224 		if (err)
7225 			return err;
7226 	}
7227 
7228 	err = record_func_map(env, &meta, func_id, insn_idx);
7229 	if (err)
7230 		return err;
7231 
7232 	err = record_func_key(env, &meta, func_id, insn_idx);
7233 	if (err)
7234 		return err;
7235 
7236 	/* Mark slots with STACK_MISC in case of raw mode, stack offset
7237 	 * is inferred from register state.
7238 	 */
7239 	for (i = 0; i < meta.access_size; i++) {
7240 		err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, meta.regno, i, BPF_B,
7241 				       BPF_WRITE, -1, false);
7242 		if (err)
7243 			return err;
7244 	}
7245 
7246 	regs = cur_regs(env);
7247 
7248 	if (meta.uninit_dynptr_regno) {
7249 		/* we write BPF_DW bits (8 bytes) at a time */
7250 		for (i = 0; i < BPF_DYNPTR_SIZE; i += 8) {
7251 			err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, meta.uninit_dynptr_regno,
7252 					       i, BPF_DW, BPF_WRITE, -1, false);
7253 			if (err)
7254 				return err;
7255 		}
7256 
7257 		err = mark_stack_slots_dynptr(env, &regs[meta.uninit_dynptr_regno],
7258 					      fn->arg_type[meta.uninit_dynptr_regno - BPF_REG_1],
7259 					      insn_idx);
7260 		if (err)
7261 			return err;
7262 	}
7263 
7264 	if (meta.release_regno) {
7265 		err = -EINVAL;
7266 		if (arg_type_is_dynptr(fn->arg_type[meta.release_regno - BPF_REG_1]))
7267 			err = unmark_stack_slots_dynptr(env, &regs[meta.release_regno]);
7268 		else if (meta.ref_obj_id)
7269 			err = release_reference(env, meta.ref_obj_id);
7270 		/* meta.ref_obj_id can only be 0 if register that is meant to be
7271 		 * released is NULL, which must be > R0.
7272 		 */
7273 		else if (register_is_null(&regs[meta.release_regno]))
7274 			err = 0;
7275 		if (err) {
7276 			verbose(env, "func %s#%d reference has not been acquired before\n",
7277 				func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
7278 			return err;
7279 		}
7280 	}
7281 
7282 	switch (func_id) {
7283 	case BPF_FUNC_tail_call:
7284 		err = check_reference_leak(env);
7285 		if (err) {
7286 			verbose(env, "tail_call would lead to reference leak\n");
7287 			return err;
7288 		}
7289 		break;
7290 	case BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage:
7291 		/* check that flags argument in get_local_storage(map, flags) is 0,
7292 		 * this is required because get_local_storage() can't return an error.
7293 		 */
7294 		if (!register_is_null(&regs[BPF_REG_2])) {
7295 			verbose(env, "get_local_storage() doesn't support non-zero flags\n");
7296 			return -EINVAL;
7297 		}
7298 		break;
7299 	case BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem:
7300 		err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno,
7301 					set_map_elem_callback_state);
7302 		break;
7303 	case BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback:
7304 		err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno,
7305 					set_timer_callback_state);
7306 		break;
7307 	case BPF_FUNC_find_vma:
7308 		err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno,
7309 					set_find_vma_callback_state);
7310 		break;
7311 	case BPF_FUNC_snprintf:
7312 		err = check_bpf_snprintf_call(env, regs);
7313 		break;
7314 	case BPF_FUNC_loop:
7315 		update_loop_inline_state(env, meta.subprogno);
7316 		err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno,
7317 					set_loop_callback_state);
7318 		break;
7319 	case BPF_FUNC_dynptr_from_mem:
7320 		if (regs[BPF_REG_1].type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
7321 			verbose(env, "Unsupported reg type %s for bpf_dynptr_from_mem data\n",
7322 				reg_type_str(env, regs[BPF_REG_1].type));
7323 			return -EACCES;
7324 		}
7325 		break;
7326 	case BPF_FUNC_set_retval:
7327 		if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_LSM_CGROUP) {
7328 			if (!env->prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) {
7329 				/* Make sure programs that attach to void
7330 				 * hooks don't try to modify return value.
7331 				 */
7332 				verbose(env, "BPF_LSM_CGROUP that attach to void LSM hooks can't modify return value!\n");
7333 				return -EINVAL;
7334 			}
7335 		}
7336 		break;
7337 	}
7338 
7339 	if (err)
7340 		return err;
7341 
7342 	/* reset caller saved regs */
7343 	for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) {
7344 		mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]);
7345 		check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK);
7346 	}
7347 
7348 	/* helper call returns 64-bit value. */
7349 	regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG;
7350 
7351 	/* update return register (already marked as written above) */
7352 	ret_type = fn->ret_type;
7353 	ret_flag = type_flag(fn->ret_type);
7354 	if (ret_type == RET_INTEGER) {
7355 		/* sets type to SCALAR_VALUE */
7356 		mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
7357 	} else if (ret_type == RET_VOID) {
7358 		regs[BPF_REG_0].type = NOT_INIT;
7359 	} else if (base_type(ret_type) == RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
7360 		/* There is no offset yet applied, variable or fixed */
7361 		mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
7362 		/* remember map_ptr, so that check_map_access()
7363 		 * can check 'value_size' boundary of memory access
7364 		 * to map element returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem()
7365 		 */
7366 		if (meta.map_ptr == NULL) {
7367 			verbose(env,
7368 				"kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n");
7369 			return -EINVAL;
7370 		}
7371 		regs[BPF_REG_0].map_ptr = meta.map_ptr;
7372 		regs[BPF_REG_0].map_uid = meta.map_uid;
7373 		regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE | ret_flag;
7374 		if (!type_may_be_null(ret_type) &&
7375 		    map_value_has_spin_lock(meta.map_ptr)) {
7376 			regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen;
7377 		}
7378 	} else if (base_type(ret_type) == RET_PTR_TO_SOCKET) {
7379 		mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
7380 		regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_SOCKET | ret_flag;
7381 	} else if (base_type(ret_type) == RET_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON) {
7382 		mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
7383 		regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON | ret_flag;
7384 	} else if (base_type(ret_type) == RET_PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK) {
7385 		mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
7386 		regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK | ret_flag;
7387 	} else if (base_type(ret_type) == RET_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM) {
7388 		mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
7389 		regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM | ret_flag;
7390 		regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = meta.mem_size;
7391 	} else if (base_type(ret_type) == RET_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_BTF_ID) {
7392 		const struct btf_type *t;
7393 
7394 		mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
7395 		t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(meta.ret_btf, meta.ret_btf_id, NULL);
7396 		if (!btf_type_is_struct(t)) {
7397 			u32 tsize;
7398 			const struct btf_type *ret;
7399 			const char *tname;
7400 
7401 			/* resolve the type size of ksym. */
7402 			ret = btf_resolve_size(meta.ret_btf, t, &tsize);
7403 			if (IS_ERR(ret)) {
7404 				tname = btf_name_by_offset(meta.ret_btf, t->name_off);
7405 				verbose(env, "unable to resolve the size of type '%s': %ld\n",
7406 					tname, PTR_ERR(ret));
7407 				return -EINVAL;
7408 			}
7409 			regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM | ret_flag;
7410 			regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = tsize;
7411 		} else {
7412 			/* MEM_RDONLY may be carried from ret_flag, but it
7413 			 * doesn't apply on PTR_TO_BTF_ID. Fold it, otherwise
7414 			 * it will confuse the check of PTR_TO_BTF_ID in
7415 			 * check_mem_access().
7416 			 */
7417 			ret_flag &= ~MEM_RDONLY;
7418 
7419 			regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | ret_flag;
7420 			regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = meta.ret_btf;
7421 			regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta.ret_btf_id;
7422 		}
7423 	} else if (base_type(ret_type) == RET_PTR_TO_BTF_ID) {
7424 		struct btf *ret_btf;
7425 		int ret_btf_id;
7426 
7427 		mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
7428 		regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | ret_flag;
7429 		if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) {
7430 			ret_btf = meta.kptr_off_desc->kptr.btf;
7431 			ret_btf_id = meta.kptr_off_desc->kptr.btf_id;
7432 		} else {
7433 			ret_btf = btf_vmlinux;
7434 			ret_btf_id = *fn->ret_btf_id;
7435 		}
7436 		if (ret_btf_id == 0) {
7437 			verbose(env, "invalid return type %u of func %s#%d\n",
7438 				base_type(ret_type), func_id_name(func_id),
7439 				func_id);
7440 			return -EINVAL;
7441 		}
7442 		regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = ret_btf;
7443 		regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ret_btf_id;
7444 	} else {
7445 		verbose(env, "unknown return type %u of func %s#%d\n",
7446 			base_type(ret_type), func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
7447 		return -EINVAL;
7448 	}
7449 
7450 	if (type_may_be_null(regs[BPF_REG_0].type))
7451 		regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen;
7452 
7453 	if (is_ptr_cast_function(func_id)) {
7454 		/* For release_reference() */
7455 		regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = meta.ref_obj_id;
7456 	} else if (is_acquire_function(func_id, meta.map_ptr)) {
7457 		int id = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx);
7458 
7459 		if (id < 0)
7460 			return id;
7461 		/* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg() */
7462 		regs[BPF_REG_0].id = id;
7463 		/* For release_reference() */
7464 		regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = id;
7465 	} else if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_dynptr_data) {
7466 		int dynptr_id = 0, i;
7467 
7468 		/* Find the id of the dynptr we're acquiring a reference to */
7469 		for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS; i++) {
7470 			if (arg_type_is_dynptr(fn->arg_type[i])) {
7471 				if (dynptr_id) {
7472 					verbose(env, "verifier internal error: multiple dynptr args in func\n");
7473 					return -EFAULT;
7474 				}
7475 				dynptr_id = stack_slot_get_id(env, &regs[BPF_REG_1 + i]);
7476 			}
7477 		}
7478 		/* For release_reference() */
7479 		regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = dynptr_id;
7480 	}
7481 
7482 	do_refine_retval_range(regs, fn->ret_type, func_id, &meta);
7483 
7484 	err = check_map_func_compatibility(env, meta.map_ptr, func_id);
7485 	if (err)
7486 		return err;
7487 
7488 	if ((func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stack ||
7489 	     func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_task_stack) &&
7490 	    !env->prog->has_callchain_buf) {
7491 		const char *err_str;
7492 
7493 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
7494 		err = get_callchain_buffers(sysctl_perf_event_max_stack);
7495 		err_str = "cannot get callchain buffer for func %s#%d\n";
7496 #else
7497 		err = -ENOTSUPP;
7498 		err_str = "func %s#%d not supported without CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS\n";
7499 #endif
7500 		if (err) {
7501 			verbose(env, err_str, func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
7502 			return err;
7503 		}
7504 
7505 		env->prog->has_callchain_buf = true;
7506 	}
7507 
7508 	if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stackid || func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stack)
7509 		env->prog->call_get_stack = true;
7510 
7511 	if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_func_ip) {
7512 		if (check_get_func_ip(env))
7513 			return -ENOTSUPP;
7514 		env->prog->call_get_func_ip = true;
7515 	}
7516 
7517 	if (changes_data)
7518 		clear_all_pkt_pointers(env);
7519 	return 0;
7520 }
7521 
7522 /* mark_btf_func_reg_size() is used when the reg size is determined by
7523  * the BTF func_proto's return value size and argument.
7524  */
7525 static void mark_btf_func_reg_size(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
7526 				   size_t reg_size)
7527 {
7528 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &cur_regs(env)[regno];
7529 
7530 	if (regno == BPF_REG_0) {
7531 		/* Function return value */
7532 		reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
7533 		reg->subreg_def = reg_size == sizeof(u64) ?
7534 			DEF_NOT_SUBREG : env->insn_idx + 1;
7535 	} else {
7536 		/* Function argument */
7537 		if (reg_size == sizeof(u64)) {
7538 			mark_insn_zext(env, reg);
7539 			mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64);
7540 		} else {
7541 			mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ32);
7542 		}
7543 	}
7544 }
7545 
7546 static int check_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
7547 			    int *insn_idx_p)
7548 {
7549 	const struct btf_type *t, *func, *func_proto, *ptr_type;
7550 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
7551 	const char *func_name, *ptr_type_name;
7552 	u32 i, nargs, func_id, ptr_type_id;
7553 	int err, insn_idx = *insn_idx_p;
7554 	const struct btf_param *args;
7555 	struct btf *desc_btf;
7556 	bool acq;
7557 
7558 	/* skip for now, but return error when we find this in fixup_kfunc_call */
7559 	if (!insn->imm)
7560 		return 0;
7561 
7562 	desc_btf = find_kfunc_desc_btf(env, insn->off);
7563 	if (IS_ERR(desc_btf))
7564 		return PTR_ERR(desc_btf);
7565 
7566 	func_id = insn->imm;
7567 	func = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, func_id);
7568 	func_name = btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf, func->name_off);
7569 	func_proto = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, func->type);
7570 
7571 	if (!btf_kfunc_id_set_contains(desc_btf, resolve_prog_type(env->prog),
7572 				      BTF_KFUNC_TYPE_CHECK, func_id)) {
7573 		verbose(env, "calling kernel function %s is not allowed\n",
7574 			func_name);
7575 		return -EACCES;
7576 	}
7577 
7578 	acq = btf_kfunc_id_set_contains(desc_btf, resolve_prog_type(env->prog),
7579 					BTF_KFUNC_TYPE_ACQUIRE, func_id);
7580 
7581 	/* Check the arguments */
7582 	err = btf_check_kfunc_arg_match(env, desc_btf, func_id, regs);
7583 	if (err < 0)
7584 		return err;
7585 	/* In case of release function, we get register number of refcounted
7586 	 * PTR_TO_BTF_ID back from btf_check_kfunc_arg_match, do the release now
7587 	 */
7588 	if (err) {
7589 		err = release_reference(env, regs[err].ref_obj_id);
7590 		if (err) {
7591 			verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d reference has not been acquired before\n",
7592 				func_name, func_id);
7593 			return err;
7594 		}
7595 	}
7596 
7597 	for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++)
7598 		mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]);
7599 
7600 	/* Check return type */
7601 	t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(desc_btf, func_proto->type, NULL);
7602 
7603 	if (acq && !btf_type_is_ptr(t)) {
7604 		verbose(env, "acquire kernel function does not return PTR_TO_BTF_ID\n");
7605 		return -EINVAL;
7606 	}
7607 
7608 	if (btf_type_is_scalar(t)) {
7609 		mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
7610 		mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, BPF_REG_0, t->size);
7611 	} else if (btf_type_is_ptr(t)) {
7612 		ptr_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(desc_btf, t->type,
7613 						   &ptr_type_id);
7614 		if (!btf_type_is_struct(ptr_type)) {
7615 			ptr_type_name = btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf,
7616 							   ptr_type->name_off);
7617 			verbose(env, "kernel function %s returns pointer type %s %s is not supported\n",
7618 				func_name, btf_type_str(ptr_type),
7619 				ptr_type_name);
7620 			return -EINVAL;
7621 		}
7622 		mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
7623 		regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = desc_btf;
7624 		regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID;
7625 		regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ptr_type_id;
7626 		if (btf_kfunc_id_set_contains(desc_btf, resolve_prog_type(env->prog),
7627 					      BTF_KFUNC_TYPE_RET_NULL, func_id)) {
7628 			regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= PTR_MAYBE_NULL;
7629 			/* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg, see 93c230e3f5bd6 */
7630 			regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen;
7631 		}
7632 		mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, BPF_REG_0, sizeof(void *));
7633 		if (acq) {
7634 			int id = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx);
7635 
7636 			if (id < 0)
7637 				return id;
7638 			regs[BPF_REG_0].id = id;
7639 			regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = id;
7640 		}
7641 	} /* else { add_kfunc_call() ensures it is btf_type_is_void(t) } */
7642 
7643 	nargs = btf_type_vlen(func_proto);
7644 	args = (const struct btf_param *)(func_proto + 1);
7645 	for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) {
7646 		u32 regno = i + 1;
7647 
7648 		t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(desc_btf, args[i].type, NULL);
7649 		if (btf_type_is_ptr(t))
7650 			mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, regno, sizeof(void *));
7651 		else
7652 			/* scalar. ensured by btf_check_kfunc_arg_match() */
7653 			mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, regno, t->size);
7654 	}
7655 
7656 	return 0;
7657 }
7658 
7659 static bool signed_add_overflows(s64 a, s64 b)
7660 {
7661 	/* Do the add in u64, where overflow is well-defined */
7662 	s64 res = (s64)((u64)a + (u64)b);
7663 
7664 	if (b < 0)
7665 		return res > a;
7666 	return res < a;
7667 }
7668 
7669 static bool signed_add32_overflows(s32 a, s32 b)
7670 {
7671 	/* Do the add in u32, where overflow is well-defined */
7672 	s32 res = (s32)((u32)a + (u32)b);
7673 
7674 	if (b < 0)
7675 		return res > a;
7676 	return res < a;
7677 }
7678 
7679 static bool signed_sub_overflows(s64 a, s64 b)
7680 {
7681 	/* Do the sub in u64, where overflow is well-defined */
7682 	s64 res = (s64)((u64)a - (u64)b);
7683 
7684 	if (b < 0)
7685 		return res < a;
7686 	return res > a;
7687 }
7688 
7689 static bool signed_sub32_overflows(s32 a, s32 b)
7690 {
7691 	/* Do the sub in u32, where overflow is well-defined */
7692 	s32 res = (s32)((u32)a - (u32)b);
7693 
7694 	if (b < 0)
7695 		return res < a;
7696 	return res > a;
7697 }
7698 
7699 static bool check_reg_sane_offset(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
7700 				  const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
7701 				  enum bpf_reg_type type)
7702 {
7703 	bool known = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off);
7704 	s64 val = reg->var_off.value;
7705 	s64 smin = reg->smin_value;
7706 
7707 	if (known && (val >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || val <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF)) {
7708 		verbose(env, "math between %s pointer and %lld is not allowed\n",
7709 			reg_type_str(env, type), val);
7710 		return false;
7711 	}
7712 
7713 	if (reg->off >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || reg->off <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) {
7714 		verbose(env, "%s pointer offset %d is not allowed\n",
7715 			reg_type_str(env, type), reg->off);
7716 		return false;
7717 	}
7718 
7719 	if (smin == S64_MIN) {
7720 		verbose(env, "math between %s pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed\n",
7721 			reg_type_str(env, type));
7722 		return false;
7723 	}
7724 
7725 	if (smin >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || smin <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) {
7726 		verbose(env, "value %lld makes %s pointer be out of bounds\n",
7727 			smin, reg_type_str(env, type));
7728 		return false;
7729 	}
7730 
7731 	return true;
7732 }
7733 
7734 enum {
7735 	REASON_BOUNDS	= -1,
7736 	REASON_TYPE	= -2,
7737 	REASON_PATHS	= -3,
7738 	REASON_LIMIT	= -4,
7739 	REASON_STACK	= -5,
7740 };
7741 
7742 static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
7743 			      u32 *alu_limit, bool mask_to_left)
7744 {
7745 	u32 max = 0, ptr_limit = 0;
7746 
7747 	switch (ptr_reg->type) {
7748 	case PTR_TO_STACK:
7749 		/* Offset 0 is out-of-bounds, but acceptable start for the
7750 		 * left direction, see BPF_REG_FP. Also, unknown scalar
7751 		 * offset where we would need to deal with min/max bounds is
7752 		 * currently prohibited for unprivileged.
7753 		 */
7754 		max = MAX_BPF_STACK + mask_to_left;
7755 		ptr_limit = -(ptr_reg->var_off.value + ptr_reg->off);
7756 		break;
7757 	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
7758 		max = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size;
7759 		ptr_limit = (mask_to_left ?
7760 			     ptr_reg->smin_value :
7761 			     ptr_reg->umax_value) + ptr_reg->off;
7762 		break;
7763 	default:
7764 		return REASON_TYPE;
7765 	}
7766 
7767 	if (ptr_limit >= max)
7768 		return REASON_LIMIT;
7769 	*alu_limit = ptr_limit;
7770 	return 0;
7771 }
7772 
7773 static bool can_skip_alu_sanitation(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
7774 				    const struct bpf_insn *insn)
7775 {
7776 	return env->bypass_spec_v1 || BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K;
7777 }
7778 
7779 static int update_alu_sanitation_state(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux,
7780 				       u32 alu_state, u32 alu_limit)
7781 {
7782 	/* If we arrived here from different branches with different
7783 	 * state or limits to sanitize, then this won't work.
7784 	 */
7785 	if (aux->alu_state &&
7786 	    (aux->alu_state != alu_state ||
7787 	     aux->alu_limit != alu_limit))
7788 		return REASON_PATHS;
7789 
7790 	/* Corresponding fixup done in do_misc_fixups(). */
7791 	aux->alu_state = alu_state;
7792 	aux->alu_limit = alu_limit;
7793 	return 0;
7794 }
7795 
7796 static int sanitize_val_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
7797 			    struct bpf_insn *insn)
7798 {
7799 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env);
7800 
7801 	if (can_skip_alu_sanitation(env, insn))
7802 		return 0;
7803 
7804 	return update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER, 0);
7805 }
7806 
7807 static bool sanitize_needed(u8 opcode)
7808 {
7809 	return opcode == BPF_ADD || opcode == BPF_SUB;
7810 }
7811 
7812 struct bpf_sanitize_info {
7813 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data aux;
7814 	bool mask_to_left;
7815 };
7816 
7817 static struct bpf_verifier_state *
7818 sanitize_speculative_path(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
7819 			  const struct bpf_insn *insn,
7820 			  u32 next_idx, u32 curr_idx)
7821 {
7822 	struct bpf_verifier_state *branch;
7823 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs;
7824 
7825 	branch = push_stack(env, next_idx, curr_idx, true);
7826 	if (branch && insn) {
7827 		regs = branch->frame[branch->curframe]->regs;
7828 		if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
7829 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
7830 		} else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
7831 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
7832 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->src_reg);
7833 		}
7834 	}
7835 	return branch;
7836 }
7837 
7838 static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
7839 			    struct bpf_insn *insn,
7840 			    const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
7841 			    const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg,
7842 			    struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
7843 			    struct bpf_sanitize_info *info,
7844 			    const bool commit_window)
7845 {
7846 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = commit_window ? cur_aux(env) : &info->aux;
7847 	struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
7848 	bool off_is_imm = tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off);
7849 	bool off_is_neg = off_reg->smin_value < 0;
7850 	bool ptr_is_dst_reg = ptr_reg == dst_reg;
7851 	u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
7852 	u32 alu_state, alu_limit;
7853 	struct bpf_reg_state tmp;
7854 	bool ret;
7855 	int err;
7856 
7857 	if (can_skip_alu_sanitation(env, insn))
7858 		return 0;
7859 
7860 	/* We already marked aux for masking from non-speculative
7861 	 * paths, thus we got here in the first place. We only care
7862 	 * to explore bad access from here.
7863 	 */
7864 	if (vstate->speculative)
7865 		goto do_sim;
7866 
7867 	if (!commit_window) {
7868 		if (!tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off) &&
7869 		    (off_reg->smin_value < 0) != (off_reg->smax_value < 0))
7870 			return REASON_BOUNDS;
7871 
7872 		info->mask_to_left = (opcode == BPF_ADD &&  off_is_neg) ||
7873 				     (opcode == BPF_SUB && !off_is_neg);
7874 	}
7875 
7876 	err = retrieve_ptr_limit(ptr_reg, &alu_limit, info->mask_to_left);
7877 	if (err < 0)
7878 		return err;
7879 
7880 	if (commit_window) {
7881 		/* In commit phase we narrow the masking window based on
7882 		 * the observed pointer move after the simulated operation.
7883 		 */
7884 		alu_state = info->aux.alu_state;
7885 		alu_limit = abs(info->aux.alu_limit - alu_limit);
7886 	} else {
7887 		alu_state  = off_is_neg ? BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE : 0;
7888 		alu_state |= off_is_imm ? BPF_ALU_IMMEDIATE : 0;
7889 		alu_state |= ptr_is_dst_reg ?
7890 			     BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC : BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST;
7891 
7892 		/* Limit pruning on unknown scalars to enable deep search for
7893 		 * potential masking differences from other program paths.
7894 		 */
7895 		if (!off_is_imm)
7896 			env->explore_alu_limits = true;
7897 	}
7898 
7899 	err = update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, alu_state, alu_limit);
7900 	if (err < 0)
7901 		return err;
7902 do_sim:
7903 	/* If we're in commit phase, we're done here given we already
7904 	 * pushed the truncated dst_reg into the speculative verification
7905 	 * stack.
7906 	 *
7907 	 * Also, when register is a known constant, we rewrite register-based
7908 	 * operation to immediate-based, and thus do not need masking (and as
7909 	 * a consequence, do not need to simulate the zero-truncation either).
7910 	 */
7911 	if (commit_window || off_is_imm)
7912 		return 0;
7913 
7914 	/* Simulate and find potential out-of-bounds access under
7915 	 * speculative execution from truncation as a result of
7916 	 * masking when off was not within expected range. If off
7917 	 * sits in dst, then we temporarily need to move ptr there
7918 	 * to simulate dst (== 0) +/-= ptr. Needed, for example,
7919 	 * for cases where we use K-based arithmetic in one direction
7920 	 * and truncated reg-based in the other in order to explore
7921 	 * bad access.
7922 	 */
7923 	if (!ptr_is_dst_reg) {
7924 		tmp = *dst_reg;
7925 		*dst_reg = *ptr_reg;
7926 	}
7927 	ret = sanitize_speculative_path(env, NULL, env->insn_idx + 1,
7928 					env->insn_idx);
7929 	if (!ptr_is_dst_reg && ret)
7930 		*dst_reg = tmp;
7931 	return !ret ? REASON_STACK : 0;
7932 }
7933 
7934 static void sanitize_mark_insn_seen(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
7935 {
7936 	struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
7937 
7938 	/* If we simulate paths under speculation, we don't update the
7939 	 * insn as 'seen' such that when we verify unreachable paths in
7940 	 * the non-speculative domain, sanitize_dead_code() can still
7941 	 * rewrite/sanitize them.
7942 	 */
7943 	if (!vstate->speculative)
7944 		env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = env->pass_cnt;
7945 }
7946 
7947 static int sanitize_err(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
7948 			const struct bpf_insn *insn, int reason,
7949 			const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg,
7950 			const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg)
7951 {
7952 	static const char *err = "pointer arithmetic with it prohibited for !root";
7953 	const char *op = BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_ADD ? "add" : "sub";
7954 	u32 dst = insn->dst_reg, src = insn->src_reg;
7955 
7956 	switch (reason) {
7957 	case REASON_BOUNDS:
7958 		verbose(env, "R%d has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds, %s\n",
7959 			off_reg == dst_reg ? dst : src, err);
7960 		break;
7961 	case REASON_TYPE:
7962 		verbose(env, "R%d has pointer with unsupported alu operation, %s\n",
7963 			off_reg == dst_reg ? src : dst, err);
7964 		break;
7965 	case REASON_PATHS:
7966 		verbose(env, "R%d tried to %s from different maps, paths or scalars, %s\n",
7967 			dst, op, err);
7968 		break;
7969 	case REASON_LIMIT:
7970 		verbose(env, "R%d tried to %s beyond pointer bounds, %s\n",
7971 			dst, op, err);
7972 		break;
7973 	case REASON_STACK:
7974 		verbose(env, "R%d could not be pushed for speculative verification, %s\n",
7975 			dst, err);
7976 		break;
7977 	default:
7978 		verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unknown reason (%d)\n",
7979 			reason);
7980 		break;
7981 	}
7982 
7983 	return -EACCES;
7984 }
7985 
7986 /* check that stack access falls within stack limits and that 'reg' doesn't
7987  * have a variable offset.
7988  *
7989  * Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for simplicity since it
7990  * requires corresponding support in Spectre masking for stack ALU.  See also
7991  * retrieve_ptr_limit().
7992  *
7993  *
7994  * 'off' includes 'reg->off'.
7995  */
7996 static int check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic(
7997 				struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
7998 				int regno,
7999 				const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
8000 				int off)
8001 {
8002 	if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
8003 		char tn_buf[48];
8004 
8005 		tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
8006 		verbose(env, "R%d variable stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s off=%d\n",
8007 			regno, tn_buf, off);
8008 		return -EACCES;
8009 	}
8010 
8011 	if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK) {
8012 		verbose(env, "R%d stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, "
8013 			"prohibited for !root; off=%d\n", regno, off);
8014 		return -EACCES;
8015 	}
8016 
8017 	return 0;
8018 }
8019 
8020 static int sanitize_check_bounds(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
8021 				 const struct bpf_insn *insn,
8022 				 const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg)
8023 {
8024 	u32 dst = insn->dst_reg;
8025 
8026 	/* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds
8027 	 * in order to be able to sanitize access later on.
8028 	 */
8029 	if (env->bypass_spec_v1)
8030 		return 0;
8031 
8032 	switch (dst_reg->type) {
8033 	case PTR_TO_STACK:
8034 		if (check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic(env, dst, dst_reg,
8035 					dst_reg->off + dst_reg->var_off.value))
8036 			return -EACCES;
8037 		break;
8038 	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
8039 		if (check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1, false, ACCESS_HELPER)) {
8040 			verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, "
8041 				"prohibited for !root\n", dst);
8042 			return -EACCES;
8043 		}
8044 		break;
8045 	default:
8046 		break;
8047 	}
8048 
8049 	return 0;
8050 }
8051 
8052 /* Handles arithmetic on a pointer and a scalar: computes new min/max and var_off.
8053  * Caller should also handle BPF_MOV case separately.
8054  * If we return -EACCES, caller may want to try again treating pointer as a
8055  * scalar.  So we only emit a diagnostic if !env->allow_ptr_leaks.
8056  */
8057 static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
8058 				   struct bpf_insn *insn,
8059 				   const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
8060 				   const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg)
8061 {
8062 	struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
8063 	struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
8064 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *dst_reg;
8065 	bool known = tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off);
8066 	s64 smin_val = off_reg->smin_value, smax_val = off_reg->smax_value,
8067 	    smin_ptr = ptr_reg->smin_value, smax_ptr = ptr_reg->smax_value;
8068 	u64 umin_val = off_reg->umin_value, umax_val = off_reg->umax_value,
8069 	    umin_ptr = ptr_reg->umin_value, umax_ptr = ptr_reg->umax_value;
8070 	struct bpf_sanitize_info info = {};
8071 	u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
8072 	u32 dst = insn->dst_reg;
8073 	int ret;
8074 
8075 	dst_reg = &regs[dst];
8076 
8077 	if ((known && (smin_val != smax_val || umin_val != umax_val)) ||
8078 	    smin_val > smax_val || umin_val > umax_val) {
8079 		/* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds derived from
8080 		 * e.g. dead branches.
8081 		 */
8082 		__mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg);
8083 		return 0;
8084 	}
8085 
8086 	if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) {
8087 		/* 32-bit ALU ops on pointers produce (meaningless) scalars */
8088 		if (opcode == BPF_SUB && env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
8089 			__mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg);
8090 			return 0;
8091 		}
8092 
8093 		verbose(env,
8094 			"R%d 32-bit pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
8095 			dst);
8096 		return -EACCES;
8097 	}
8098 
8099 	if (ptr_reg->type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL) {
8100 		verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited, null-check it first\n",
8101 			dst, reg_type_str(env, ptr_reg->type));
8102 		return -EACCES;
8103 	}
8104 
8105 	switch (base_type(ptr_reg->type)) {
8106 	case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP:
8107 		/* smin_val represents the known value */
8108 		if (known && smin_val == 0 && opcode == BPF_ADD)
8109 			break;
8110 		fallthrough;
8111 	case PTR_TO_PACKET_END:
8112 	case PTR_TO_SOCKET:
8113 	case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON:
8114 	case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
8115 	case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK:
8116 		verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited\n",
8117 			dst, reg_type_str(env, ptr_reg->type));
8118 		return -EACCES;
8119 	default:
8120 		break;
8121 	}
8122 
8123 	/* In case of 'scalar += pointer', dst_reg inherits pointer type and id.
8124 	 * The id may be overwritten later if we create a new variable offset.
8125 	 */
8126 	dst_reg->type = ptr_reg->type;
8127 	dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id;
8128 
8129 	if (!check_reg_sane_offset(env, off_reg, ptr_reg->type) ||
8130 	    !check_reg_sane_offset(env, ptr_reg, ptr_reg->type))
8131 		return -EINVAL;
8132 
8133 	/* pointer types do not carry 32-bit bounds at the moment. */
8134 	__mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg);
8135 
8136 	if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) {
8137 		ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg,
8138 				       &info, false);
8139 		if (ret < 0)
8140 			return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg);
8141 	}
8142 
8143 	switch (opcode) {
8144 	case BPF_ADD:
8145 		/* We can take a fixed offset as long as it doesn't overflow
8146 		 * the s32 'off' field
8147 		 */
8148 		if (known && (ptr_reg->off + smin_val ==
8149 			      (s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off + smin_val))) {
8150 			/* pointer += K.  Accumulate it into fixed offset */
8151 			dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr;
8152 			dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr;
8153 			dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr;
8154 			dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr;
8155 			dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off;
8156 			dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off + smin_val;
8157 			dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw;
8158 			break;
8159 		}
8160 		/* A new variable offset is created.  Note that off_reg->off
8161 		 * == 0, since it's a scalar.
8162 		 * dst_reg gets the pointer type and since some positive
8163 		 * integer value was added to the pointer, give it a new 'id'
8164 		 * if it's a PTR_TO_PACKET.
8165 		 * this creates a new 'base' pointer, off_reg (variable) gets
8166 		 * added into the variable offset, and we copy the fixed offset
8167 		 * from ptr_reg.
8168 		 */
8169 		if (signed_add_overflows(smin_ptr, smin_val) ||
8170 		    signed_add_overflows(smax_ptr, smax_val)) {
8171 			dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
8172 			dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
8173 		} else {
8174 			dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr + smin_val;
8175 			dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr + smax_val;
8176 		}
8177 		if (umin_ptr + umin_val < umin_ptr ||
8178 		    umax_ptr + umax_val < umax_ptr) {
8179 			dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
8180 			dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
8181 		} else {
8182 			dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr + umin_val;
8183 			dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr + umax_val;
8184 		}
8185 		dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off);
8186 		dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off;
8187 		dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw;
8188 		if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) {
8189 			dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
8190 			/* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */
8191 			memset(&dst_reg->raw, 0, sizeof(dst_reg->raw));
8192 		}
8193 		break;
8194 	case BPF_SUB:
8195 		if (dst_reg == off_reg) {
8196 			/* scalar -= pointer.  Creates an unknown scalar */
8197 			verbose(env, "R%d tried to subtract pointer from scalar\n",
8198 				dst);
8199 			return -EACCES;
8200 		}
8201 		/* We don't allow subtraction from FP, because (according to
8202 		 * test_verifier.c test "invalid fp arithmetic", JITs might not
8203 		 * be able to deal with it.
8204 		 */
8205 		if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
8206 			verbose(env, "R%d subtraction from stack pointer prohibited\n",
8207 				dst);
8208 			return -EACCES;
8209 		}
8210 		if (known && (ptr_reg->off - smin_val ==
8211 			      (s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off - smin_val))) {
8212 			/* pointer -= K.  Subtract it from fixed offset */
8213 			dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr;
8214 			dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr;
8215 			dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr;
8216 			dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr;
8217 			dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off;
8218 			dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id;
8219 			dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off - smin_val;
8220 			dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw;
8221 			break;
8222 		}
8223 		/* A new variable offset is created.  If the subtrahend is known
8224 		 * nonnegative, then any reg->range we had before is still good.
8225 		 */
8226 		if (signed_sub_overflows(smin_ptr, smax_val) ||
8227 		    signed_sub_overflows(smax_ptr, smin_val)) {
8228 			/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
8229 			dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
8230 			dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
8231 		} else {
8232 			dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr - smax_val;
8233 			dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr - smin_val;
8234 		}
8235 		if (umin_ptr < umax_val) {
8236 			/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
8237 			dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
8238 			dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
8239 		} else {
8240 			/* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */
8241 			dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr - umax_val;
8242 			dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr - umin_val;
8243 		}
8244 		dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off);
8245 		dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off;
8246 		dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw;
8247 		if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) {
8248 			dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
8249 			/* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */
8250 			if (smin_val < 0)
8251 				memset(&dst_reg->raw, 0, sizeof(dst_reg->raw));
8252 		}
8253 		break;
8254 	case BPF_AND:
8255 	case BPF_OR:
8256 	case BPF_XOR:
8257 		/* bitwise ops on pointers are troublesome, prohibit. */
8258 		verbose(env, "R%d bitwise operator %s on pointer prohibited\n",
8259 			dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
8260 		return -EACCES;
8261 	default:
8262 		/* other operators (e.g. MUL,LSH) produce non-pointer results */
8263 		verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic with %s operator prohibited\n",
8264 			dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
8265 		return -EACCES;
8266 	}
8267 
8268 	if (!check_reg_sane_offset(env, dst_reg, ptr_reg->type))
8269 		return -EINVAL;
8270 
8271 	__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
8272 	__reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
8273 	__reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
8274 
8275 	if (sanitize_check_bounds(env, insn, dst_reg) < 0)
8276 		return -EACCES;
8277 	if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) {
8278 		ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, dst_reg, off_reg, dst_reg,
8279 				       &info, true);
8280 		if (ret < 0)
8281 			return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg);
8282 	}
8283 
8284 	return 0;
8285 }
8286 
8287 static void scalar32_min_max_add(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
8288 				 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
8289 {
8290 	s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value;
8291 	s32 smax_val = src_reg->s32_max_value;
8292 	u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value;
8293 	u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value;
8294 
8295 	if (signed_add32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_min_value, smin_val) ||
8296 	    signed_add32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_max_value, smax_val)) {
8297 		dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
8298 		dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
8299 	} else {
8300 		dst_reg->s32_min_value += smin_val;
8301 		dst_reg->s32_max_value += smax_val;
8302 	}
8303 	if (dst_reg->u32_min_value + umin_val < umin_val ||
8304 	    dst_reg->u32_max_value + umax_val < umax_val) {
8305 		dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0;
8306 		dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX;
8307 	} else {
8308 		dst_reg->u32_min_value += umin_val;
8309 		dst_reg->u32_max_value += umax_val;
8310 	}
8311 }
8312 
8313 static void scalar_min_max_add(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
8314 			       struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
8315 {
8316 	s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value;
8317 	s64 smax_val = src_reg->smax_value;
8318 	u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value;
8319 	u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value;
8320 
8321 	if (signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smin_val) ||
8322 	    signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smax_val)) {
8323 		dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
8324 		dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
8325 	} else {
8326 		dst_reg->smin_value += smin_val;
8327 		dst_reg->smax_value += smax_val;
8328 	}
8329 	if (dst_reg->umin_value + umin_val < umin_val ||
8330 	    dst_reg->umax_value + umax_val < umax_val) {
8331 		dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
8332 		dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
8333 	} else {
8334 		dst_reg->umin_value += umin_val;
8335 		dst_reg->umax_value += umax_val;
8336 	}
8337 }
8338 
8339 static void scalar32_min_max_sub(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
8340 				 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
8341 {
8342 	s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value;
8343 	s32 smax_val = src_reg->s32_max_value;
8344 	u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value;
8345 	u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value;
8346 
8347 	if (signed_sub32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_min_value, smax_val) ||
8348 	    signed_sub32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_max_value, smin_val)) {
8349 		/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
8350 		dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
8351 		dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
8352 	} else {
8353 		dst_reg->s32_min_value -= smax_val;
8354 		dst_reg->s32_max_value -= smin_val;
8355 	}
8356 	if (dst_reg->u32_min_value < umax_val) {
8357 		/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
8358 		dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0;
8359 		dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX;
8360 	} else {
8361 		/* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */
8362 		dst_reg->u32_min_value -= umax_val;
8363 		dst_reg->u32_max_value -= umin_val;
8364 	}
8365 }
8366 
8367 static void scalar_min_max_sub(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
8368 			       struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
8369 {
8370 	s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value;
8371 	s64 smax_val = src_reg->smax_value;
8372 	u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value;
8373 	u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value;
8374 
8375 	if (signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smax_val) ||
8376 	    signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smin_val)) {
8377 		/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
8378 		dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
8379 		dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
8380 	} else {
8381 		dst_reg->smin_value -= smax_val;
8382 		dst_reg->smax_value -= smin_val;
8383 	}
8384 	if (dst_reg->umin_value < umax_val) {
8385 		/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
8386 		dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
8387 		dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
8388 	} else {
8389 		/* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */
8390 		dst_reg->umin_value -= umax_val;
8391 		dst_reg->umax_value -= umin_val;
8392 	}
8393 }
8394 
8395 static void scalar32_min_max_mul(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
8396 				 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
8397 {
8398 	s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value;
8399 	u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value;
8400 	u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value;
8401 
8402 	if (smin_val < 0 || dst_reg->s32_min_value < 0) {
8403 		/* Ain't nobody got time to multiply that sign */
8404 		__mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg);
8405 		return;
8406 	}
8407 	/* Both values are positive, so we can work with unsigned and
8408 	 * copy the result to signed (unless it exceeds S32_MAX).
8409 	 */
8410 	if (umax_val > U16_MAX || dst_reg->u32_max_value > U16_MAX) {
8411 		/* Potential overflow, we know nothing */
8412 		__mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg);
8413 		return;
8414 	}
8415 	dst_reg->u32_min_value *= umin_val;
8416 	dst_reg->u32_max_value *= umax_val;
8417 	if (dst_reg->u32_max_value > S32_MAX) {
8418 		/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
8419 		dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
8420 		dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
8421 	} else {
8422 		dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value;
8423 		dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value;
8424 	}
8425 }
8426 
8427 static void scalar_min_max_mul(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
8428 			       struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
8429 {
8430 	s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value;
8431 	u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value;
8432 	u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value;
8433 
8434 	if (smin_val < 0 || dst_reg->smin_value < 0) {
8435 		/* Ain't nobody got time to multiply that sign */
8436 		__mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg);
8437 		return;
8438 	}
8439 	/* Both values are positive, so we can work with unsigned and
8440 	 * copy the result to signed (unless it exceeds S64_MAX).
8441 	 */
8442 	if (umax_val > U32_MAX || dst_reg->umax_value > U32_MAX) {
8443 		/* Potential overflow, we know nothing */
8444 		__mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg);
8445 		return;
8446 	}
8447 	dst_reg->umin_value *= umin_val;
8448 	dst_reg->umax_value *= umax_val;
8449 	if (dst_reg->umax_value > S64_MAX) {
8450 		/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
8451 		dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
8452 		dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
8453 	} else {
8454 		dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
8455 		dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
8456 	}
8457 }
8458 
8459 static void scalar32_min_max_and(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
8460 				 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
8461 {
8462 	bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off);
8463 	bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off);
8464 	struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off);
8465 	s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value;
8466 	u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value;
8467 
8468 	if (src_known && dst_known) {
8469 		__mark_reg32_known(dst_reg, var32_off.value);
8470 		return;
8471 	}
8472 
8473 	/* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently
8474 	 * bitwise.  Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima.
8475 	 */
8476 	dst_reg->u32_min_value = var32_off.value;
8477 	dst_reg->u32_max_value = min(dst_reg->u32_max_value, umax_val);
8478 	if (dst_reg->s32_min_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) {
8479 		/* Lose signed bounds when ANDing negative numbers,
8480 		 * ain't nobody got time for that.
8481 		 */
8482 		dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
8483 		dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
8484 	} else {
8485 		/* ANDing two positives gives a positive, so safe to
8486 		 * cast result into s64.
8487 		 */
8488 		dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value;
8489 		dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value;
8490 	}
8491 }
8492 
8493 static void scalar_min_max_and(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
8494 			       struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
8495 {
8496 	bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off);
8497 	bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off);
8498 	s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value;
8499 	u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value;
8500 
8501 	if (src_known && dst_known) {
8502 		__mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value);
8503 		return;
8504 	}
8505 
8506 	/* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently
8507 	 * bitwise.  Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima.
8508 	 */
8509 	dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value;
8510 	dst_reg->umax_value = min(dst_reg->umax_value, umax_val);
8511 	if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) {
8512 		/* Lose signed bounds when ANDing negative numbers,
8513 		 * ain't nobody got time for that.
8514 		 */
8515 		dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
8516 		dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
8517 	} else {
8518 		/* ANDing two positives gives a positive, so safe to
8519 		 * cast result into s64.
8520 		 */
8521 		dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
8522 		dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
8523 	}
8524 	/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
8525 	__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
8526 }
8527 
8528 static void scalar32_min_max_or(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
8529 				struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
8530 {
8531 	bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off);
8532 	bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off);
8533 	struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off);
8534 	s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value;
8535 	u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value;
8536 
8537 	if (src_known && dst_known) {
8538 		__mark_reg32_known(dst_reg, var32_off.value);
8539 		return;
8540 	}
8541 
8542 	/* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the
8543 	 * maximum of the operands' minima
8544 	 */
8545 	dst_reg->u32_min_value = max(dst_reg->u32_min_value, umin_val);
8546 	dst_reg->u32_max_value = var32_off.value | var32_off.mask;
8547 	if (dst_reg->s32_min_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) {
8548 		/* Lose signed bounds when ORing negative numbers,
8549 		 * ain't nobody got time for that.
8550 		 */
8551 		dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
8552 		dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
8553 	} else {
8554 		/* ORing two positives gives a positive, so safe to
8555 		 * cast result into s64.
8556 		 */
8557 		dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value;
8558 		dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value;
8559 	}
8560 }
8561 
8562 static void scalar_min_max_or(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
8563 			      struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
8564 {
8565 	bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off);
8566 	bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off);
8567 	s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value;
8568 	u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value;
8569 
8570 	if (src_known && dst_known) {
8571 		__mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value);
8572 		return;
8573 	}
8574 
8575 	/* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the
8576 	 * maximum of the operands' minima
8577 	 */
8578 	dst_reg->umin_value = max(dst_reg->umin_value, umin_val);
8579 	dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value | dst_reg->var_off.mask;
8580 	if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) {
8581 		/* Lose signed bounds when ORing negative numbers,
8582 		 * ain't nobody got time for that.
8583 		 */
8584 		dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
8585 		dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
8586 	} else {
8587 		/* ORing two positives gives a positive, so safe to
8588 		 * cast result into s64.
8589 		 */
8590 		dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
8591 		dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
8592 	}
8593 	/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
8594 	__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
8595 }
8596 
8597 static void scalar32_min_max_xor(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
8598 				 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
8599 {
8600 	bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off);
8601 	bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off);
8602 	struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off);
8603 	s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value;
8604 
8605 	if (src_known && dst_known) {
8606 		__mark_reg32_known(dst_reg, var32_off.value);
8607 		return;
8608 	}
8609 
8610 	/* We get both minimum and maximum from the var32_off. */
8611 	dst_reg->u32_min_value = var32_off.value;
8612 	dst_reg->u32_max_value = var32_off.value | var32_off.mask;
8613 
8614 	if (dst_reg->s32_min_value >= 0 && smin_val >= 0) {
8615 		/* XORing two positive sign numbers gives a positive,
8616 		 * so safe to cast u32 result into s32.
8617 		 */
8618 		dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value;
8619 		dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value;
8620 	} else {
8621 		dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
8622 		dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
8623 	}
8624 }
8625 
8626 static void scalar_min_max_xor(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
8627 			       struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
8628 {
8629 	bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off);
8630 	bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off);
8631 	s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value;
8632 
8633 	if (src_known && dst_known) {
8634 		/* dst_reg->var_off.value has been updated earlier */
8635 		__mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value);
8636 		return;
8637 	}
8638 
8639 	/* We get both minimum and maximum from the var_off. */
8640 	dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value;
8641 	dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value | dst_reg->var_off.mask;
8642 
8643 	if (dst_reg->smin_value >= 0 && smin_val >= 0) {
8644 		/* XORing two positive sign numbers gives a positive,
8645 		 * so safe to cast u64 result into s64.
8646 		 */
8647 		dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
8648 		dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
8649 	} else {
8650 		dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
8651 		dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
8652 	}
8653 
8654 	__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
8655 }
8656 
8657 static void __scalar32_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
8658 				   u64 umin_val, u64 umax_val)
8659 {
8660 	/* We lose all sign bit information (except what we can pick
8661 	 * up from var_off)
8662 	 */
8663 	dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
8664 	dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
8665 	/* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */
8666 	if (umax_val > 31 || dst_reg->u32_max_value > 1ULL << (31 - umax_val)) {
8667 		dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0;
8668 		dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX;
8669 	} else {
8670 		dst_reg->u32_min_value <<= umin_val;
8671 		dst_reg->u32_max_value <<= umax_val;
8672 	}
8673 }
8674 
8675 static void scalar32_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
8676 				 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
8677 {
8678 	u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value;
8679 	u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value;
8680 	/* u32 alu operation will zext upper bits */
8681 	struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off);
8682 
8683 	__scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val);
8684 	dst_reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(tnum_lshift(subreg, umin_val));
8685 	/* Not required but being careful mark reg64 bounds as unknown so
8686 	 * that we are forced to pick them up from tnum and zext later and
8687 	 * if some path skips this step we are still safe.
8688 	 */
8689 	__mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg);
8690 	__update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg);
8691 }
8692 
8693 static void __scalar64_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
8694 				   u64 umin_val, u64 umax_val)
8695 {
8696 	/* Special case <<32 because it is a common compiler pattern to sign
8697 	 * extend subreg by doing <<32 s>>32. In this case if 32bit bounds are
8698 	 * positive we know this shift will also be positive so we can track
8699 	 * bounds correctly. Otherwise we lose all sign bit information except
8700 	 * what we can pick up from var_off. Perhaps we can generalize this
8701 	 * later to shifts of any length.
8702 	 */
8703 	if (umin_val == 32 && umax_val == 32 && dst_reg->s32_max_value >= 0)
8704 		dst_reg->smax_value = (s64)dst_reg->s32_max_value << 32;
8705 	else
8706 		dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
8707 
8708 	if (umin_val == 32 && umax_val == 32 && dst_reg->s32_min_value >= 0)
8709 		dst_reg->smin_value = (s64)dst_reg->s32_min_value << 32;
8710 	else
8711 		dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
8712 
8713 	/* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */
8714 	if (dst_reg->umax_value > 1ULL << (63 - umax_val)) {
8715 		dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
8716 		dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
8717 	} else {
8718 		dst_reg->umin_value <<= umin_val;
8719 		dst_reg->umax_value <<= umax_val;
8720 	}
8721 }
8722 
8723 static void scalar_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
8724 			       struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
8725 {
8726 	u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value;
8727 	u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value;
8728 
8729 	/* scalar64 calc uses 32bit unshifted bounds so must be called first */
8730 	__scalar64_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val);
8731 	__scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val);
8732 
8733 	dst_reg->var_off = tnum_lshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val);
8734 	/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
8735 	__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
8736 }
8737 
8738 static void scalar32_min_max_rsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
8739 				 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
8740 {
8741 	struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off);
8742 	u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value;
8743 	u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value;
8744 
8745 	/* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift.  If the value in dst_reg might
8746 	 * be negative, then either:
8747 	 * 1) src_reg might be zero, so the sign bit of the result is
8748 	 *    unknown, so we lose our signed bounds
8749 	 * 2) it's known negative, thus the unsigned bounds capture the
8750 	 *    signed bounds
8751 	 * 3) the signed bounds cross zero, so they tell us nothing
8752 	 *    about the result
8753 	 * If the value in dst_reg is known nonnegative, then again the
8754 	 * unsigned bounds capture the signed bounds.
8755 	 * Thus, in all cases it suffices to blow away our signed bounds
8756 	 * and rely on inferring new ones from the unsigned bounds and
8757 	 * var_off of the result.
8758 	 */
8759 	dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
8760 	dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
8761 
8762 	dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(subreg, umin_val);
8763 	dst_reg->u32_min_value >>= umax_val;
8764 	dst_reg->u32_max_value >>= umin_val;
8765 
8766 	__mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg);
8767 	__update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg);
8768 }
8769 
8770 static void scalar_min_max_rsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
8771 			       struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
8772 {
8773 	u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value;
8774 	u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value;
8775 
8776 	/* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift.  If the value in dst_reg might
8777 	 * be negative, then either:
8778 	 * 1) src_reg might be zero, so the sign bit of the result is
8779 	 *    unknown, so we lose our signed bounds
8780 	 * 2) it's known negative, thus the unsigned bounds capture the
8781 	 *    signed bounds
8782 	 * 3) the signed bounds cross zero, so they tell us nothing
8783 	 *    about the result
8784 	 * If the value in dst_reg is known nonnegative, then again the
8785 	 * unsigned bounds capture the signed bounds.
8786 	 * Thus, in all cases it suffices to blow away our signed bounds
8787 	 * and rely on inferring new ones from the unsigned bounds and
8788 	 * var_off of the result.
8789 	 */
8790 	dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
8791 	dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
8792 	dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val);
8793 	dst_reg->umin_value >>= umax_val;
8794 	dst_reg->umax_value >>= umin_val;
8795 
8796 	/* Its not easy to operate on alu32 bounds here because it depends
8797 	 * on bits being shifted in. Take easy way out and mark unbounded
8798 	 * so we can recalculate later from tnum.
8799 	 */
8800 	__mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg);
8801 	__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
8802 }
8803 
8804 static void scalar32_min_max_arsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
8805 				  struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
8806 {
8807 	u64 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value;
8808 
8809 	/* Upon reaching here, src_known is true and
8810 	 * umax_val is equal to umin_val.
8811 	 */
8812 	dst_reg->s32_min_value = (u32)(((s32)dst_reg->s32_min_value) >> umin_val);
8813 	dst_reg->s32_max_value = (u32)(((s32)dst_reg->s32_max_value) >> umin_val);
8814 
8815 	dst_reg->var_off = tnum_arshift(tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off), umin_val, 32);
8816 
8817 	/* blow away the dst_reg umin_value/umax_value and rely on
8818 	 * dst_reg var_off to refine the result.
8819 	 */
8820 	dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0;
8821 	dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX;
8822 
8823 	__mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg);
8824 	__update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg);
8825 }
8826 
8827 static void scalar_min_max_arsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
8828 				struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
8829 {
8830 	u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value;
8831 
8832 	/* Upon reaching here, src_known is true and umax_val is equal
8833 	 * to umin_val.
8834 	 */
8835 	dst_reg->smin_value >>= umin_val;
8836 	dst_reg->smax_value >>= umin_val;
8837 
8838 	dst_reg->var_off = tnum_arshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val, 64);
8839 
8840 	/* blow away the dst_reg umin_value/umax_value and rely on
8841 	 * dst_reg var_off to refine the result.
8842 	 */
8843 	dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
8844 	dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
8845 
8846 	/* Its not easy to operate on alu32 bounds here because it depends
8847 	 * on bits being shifted in from upper 32-bits. Take easy way out
8848 	 * and mark unbounded so we can recalculate later from tnum.
8849 	 */
8850 	__mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg);
8851 	__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
8852 }
8853 
8854 /* WARNING: This function does calculations on 64-bit values, but the actual
8855  * execution may occur on 32-bit values. Therefore, things like bitshifts
8856  * need extra checks in the 32-bit case.
8857  */
8858 static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
8859 				      struct bpf_insn *insn,
8860 				      struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
8861 				      struct bpf_reg_state src_reg)
8862 {
8863 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
8864 	u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
8865 	bool src_known;
8866 	s64 smin_val, smax_val;
8867 	u64 umin_val, umax_val;
8868 	s32 s32_min_val, s32_max_val;
8869 	u32 u32_min_val, u32_max_val;
8870 	u64 insn_bitness = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) ? 64 : 32;
8871 	bool alu32 = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64);
8872 	int ret;
8873 
8874 	smin_val = src_reg.smin_value;
8875 	smax_val = src_reg.smax_value;
8876 	umin_val = src_reg.umin_value;
8877 	umax_val = src_reg.umax_value;
8878 
8879 	s32_min_val = src_reg.s32_min_value;
8880 	s32_max_val = src_reg.s32_max_value;
8881 	u32_min_val = src_reg.u32_min_value;
8882 	u32_max_val = src_reg.u32_max_value;
8883 
8884 	if (alu32) {
8885 		src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg.var_off);
8886 		if ((src_known &&
8887 		     (s32_min_val != s32_max_val || u32_min_val != u32_max_val)) ||
8888 		    s32_min_val > s32_max_val || u32_min_val > u32_max_val) {
8889 			/* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds
8890 			 * derived from e.g. dead branches.
8891 			 */
8892 			__mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg);
8893 			return 0;
8894 		}
8895 	} else {
8896 		src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg.var_off);
8897 		if ((src_known &&
8898 		     (smin_val != smax_val || umin_val != umax_val)) ||
8899 		    smin_val > smax_val || umin_val > umax_val) {
8900 			/* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds
8901 			 * derived from e.g. dead branches.
8902 			 */
8903 			__mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg);
8904 			return 0;
8905 		}
8906 	}
8907 
8908 	if (!src_known &&
8909 	    opcode != BPF_ADD && opcode != BPF_SUB && opcode != BPF_AND) {
8910 		__mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg);
8911 		return 0;
8912 	}
8913 
8914 	if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) {
8915 		ret = sanitize_val_alu(env, insn);
8916 		if (ret < 0)
8917 			return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, NULL, NULL);
8918 	}
8919 
8920 	/* Calculate sign/unsigned bounds and tnum for alu32 and alu64 bit ops.
8921 	 * There are two classes of instructions: The first class we track both
8922 	 * alu32 and alu64 sign/unsigned bounds independently this provides the
8923 	 * greatest amount of precision when alu operations are mixed with jmp32
8924 	 * operations. These operations are BPF_ADD, BPF_SUB, BPF_MUL, BPF_ADD,
8925 	 * and BPF_OR. This is possible because these ops have fairly easy to
8926 	 * understand and calculate behavior in both 32-bit and 64-bit alu ops.
8927 	 * See alu32 verifier tests for examples. The second class of
8928 	 * operations, BPF_LSH, BPF_RSH, and BPF_ARSH, however are not so easy
8929 	 * with regards to tracking sign/unsigned bounds because the bits may
8930 	 * cross subreg boundaries in the alu64 case. When this happens we mark
8931 	 * the reg unbounded in the subreg bound space and use the resulting
8932 	 * tnum to calculate an approximation of the sign/unsigned bounds.
8933 	 */
8934 	switch (opcode) {
8935 	case BPF_ADD:
8936 		scalar32_min_max_add(dst_reg, &src_reg);
8937 		scalar_min_max_add(dst_reg, &src_reg);
8938 		dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
8939 		break;
8940 	case BPF_SUB:
8941 		scalar32_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &src_reg);
8942 		scalar_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &src_reg);
8943 		dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
8944 		break;
8945 	case BPF_MUL:
8946 		dst_reg->var_off = tnum_mul(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
8947 		scalar32_min_max_mul(dst_reg, &src_reg);
8948 		scalar_min_max_mul(dst_reg, &src_reg);
8949 		break;
8950 	case BPF_AND:
8951 		dst_reg->var_off = tnum_and(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
8952 		scalar32_min_max_and(dst_reg, &src_reg);
8953 		scalar_min_max_and(dst_reg, &src_reg);
8954 		break;
8955 	case BPF_OR:
8956 		dst_reg->var_off = tnum_or(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
8957 		scalar32_min_max_or(dst_reg, &src_reg);
8958 		scalar_min_max_or(dst_reg, &src_reg);
8959 		break;
8960 	case BPF_XOR:
8961 		dst_reg->var_off = tnum_xor(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
8962 		scalar32_min_max_xor(dst_reg, &src_reg);
8963 		scalar_min_max_xor(dst_reg, &src_reg);
8964 		break;
8965 	case BPF_LSH:
8966 		if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) {
8967 			/* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined.
8968 			 * This includes shifts by a negative number.
8969 			 */
8970 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
8971 			break;
8972 		}
8973 		if (alu32)
8974 			scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, &src_reg);
8975 		else
8976 			scalar_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, &src_reg);
8977 		break;
8978 	case BPF_RSH:
8979 		if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) {
8980 			/* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined.
8981 			 * This includes shifts by a negative number.
8982 			 */
8983 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
8984 			break;
8985 		}
8986 		if (alu32)
8987 			scalar32_min_max_rsh(dst_reg, &src_reg);
8988 		else
8989 			scalar_min_max_rsh(dst_reg, &src_reg);
8990 		break;
8991 	case BPF_ARSH:
8992 		if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) {
8993 			/* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined.
8994 			 * This includes shifts by a negative number.
8995 			 */
8996 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
8997 			break;
8998 		}
8999 		if (alu32)
9000 			scalar32_min_max_arsh(dst_reg, &src_reg);
9001 		else
9002 			scalar_min_max_arsh(dst_reg, &src_reg);
9003 		break;
9004 	default:
9005 		mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
9006 		break;
9007 	}
9008 
9009 	/* ALU32 ops are zero extended into 64bit register */
9010 	if (alu32)
9011 		zext_32_to_64(dst_reg);
9012 
9013 	__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
9014 	__reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
9015 	__reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
9016 	return 0;
9017 }
9018 
9019 /* Handles ALU ops other than BPF_END, BPF_NEG and BPF_MOV: computes new min/max
9020  * and var_off.
9021  */
9022 static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
9023 				   struct bpf_insn *insn)
9024 {
9025 	struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
9026 	struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
9027 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *dst_reg, *src_reg;
9028 	struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, off_reg = {0};
9029 	u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
9030 	int err;
9031 
9032 	dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
9033 	src_reg = NULL;
9034 	if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE)
9035 		ptr_reg = dst_reg;
9036 	else
9037 		/* Make sure ID is cleared otherwise dst_reg min/max could be
9038 		 * incorrectly propagated into other registers by find_equal_scalars()
9039 		 */
9040 		dst_reg->id = 0;
9041 	if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
9042 		src_reg = &regs[insn->src_reg];
9043 		if (src_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
9044 			if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
9045 				/* Combining two pointers by any ALU op yields
9046 				 * an arbitrary scalar. Disallow all math except
9047 				 * pointer subtraction
9048 				 */
9049 				if (opcode == BPF_SUB && env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
9050 					mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
9051 					return 0;
9052 				}
9053 				verbose(env, "R%d pointer %s pointer prohibited\n",
9054 					insn->dst_reg,
9055 					bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
9056 				return -EACCES;
9057 			} else {
9058 				/* scalar += pointer
9059 				 * This is legal, but we have to reverse our
9060 				 * src/dest handling in computing the range
9061 				 */
9062 				err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->dst_reg);
9063 				if (err)
9064 					return err;
9065 				return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn,
9066 							       src_reg, dst_reg);
9067 			}
9068 		} else if (ptr_reg) {
9069 			/* pointer += scalar */
9070 			err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg);
9071 			if (err)
9072 				return err;
9073 			return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn,
9074 						       dst_reg, src_reg);
9075 		}
9076 	} else {
9077 		/* Pretend the src is a reg with a known value, since we only
9078 		 * need to be able to read from this state.
9079 		 */
9080 		off_reg.type = SCALAR_VALUE;
9081 		__mark_reg_known(&off_reg, insn->imm);
9082 		src_reg = &off_reg;
9083 		if (ptr_reg) /* pointer += K */
9084 			return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn,
9085 						       ptr_reg, src_reg);
9086 	}
9087 
9088 	/* Got here implies adding two SCALAR_VALUEs */
9089 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ptr_reg)) {
9090 		print_verifier_state(env, state, true);
9091 		verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected ptr_reg\n");
9092 		return -EINVAL;
9093 	}
9094 	if (WARN_ON(!src_reg)) {
9095 		print_verifier_state(env, state, true);
9096 		verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no src_reg\n");
9097 		return -EINVAL;
9098 	}
9099 	return adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(env, insn, dst_reg, *src_reg);
9100 }
9101 
9102 /* check validity of 32-bit and 64-bit arithmetic operations */
9103 static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
9104 {
9105 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
9106 	u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
9107 	int err;
9108 
9109 	if (opcode == BPF_END || opcode == BPF_NEG) {
9110 		if (opcode == BPF_NEG) {
9111 			if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K ||
9112 			    insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
9113 			    insn->off != 0 || insn->imm != 0) {
9114 				verbose(env, "BPF_NEG uses reserved fields\n");
9115 				return -EINVAL;
9116 			}
9117 		} else {
9118 			if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 ||
9119 			    (insn->imm != 16 && insn->imm != 32 && insn->imm != 64) ||
9120 			    BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
9121 				verbose(env, "BPF_END uses reserved fields\n");
9122 				return -EINVAL;
9123 			}
9124 		}
9125 
9126 		/* check src operand */
9127 		err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
9128 		if (err)
9129 			return err;
9130 
9131 		if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
9132 			verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
9133 				insn->dst_reg);
9134 			return -EACCES;
9135 		}
9136 
9137 		/* check dest operand */
9138 		err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
9139 		if (err)
9140 			return err;
9141 
9142 	} else if (opcode == BPF_MOV) {
9143 
9144 		if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
9145 			if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) {
9146 				verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
9147 				return -EINVAL;
9148 			}
9149 
9150 			/* check src operand */
9151 			err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
9152 			if (err)
9153 				return err;
9154 		} else {
9155 			if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) {
9156 				verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
9157 				return -EINVAL;
9158 			}
9159 		}
9160 
9161 		/* check dest operand, mark as required later */
9162 		err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK);
9163 		if (err)
9164 			return err;
9165 
9166 		if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
9167 			struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg = regs + insn->src_reg;
9168 			struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg = regs + insn->dst_reg;
9169 
9170 			if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
9171 				/* case: R1 = R2
9172 				 * copy register state to dest reg
9173 				 */
9174 				if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && !src_reg->id)
9175 					/* Assign src and dst registers the same ID
9176 					 * that will be used by find_equal_scalars()
9177 					 * to propagate min/max range.
9178 					 */
9179 					src_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
9180 				*dst_reg = *src_reg;
9181 				dst_reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
9182 				dst_reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG;
9183 			} else {
9184 				/* R1 = (u32) R2 */
9185 				if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
9186 					verbose(env,
9187 						"R%d partial copy of pointer\n",
9188 						insn->src_reg);
9189 					return -EACCES;
9190 				} else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
9191 					*dst_reg = *src_reg;
9192 					/* Make sure ID is cleared otherwise
9193 					 * dst_reg min/max could be incorrectly
9194 					 * propagated into src_reg by find_equal_scalars()
9195 					 */
9196 					dst_reg->id = 0;
9197 					dst_reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
9198 					dst_reg->subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1;
9199 				} else {
9200 					mark_reg_unknown(env, regs,
9201 							 insn->dst_reg);
9202 				}
9203 				zext_32_to_64(dst_reg);
9204 
9205 				__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
9206 				__reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
9207 				__reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
9208 			}
9209 		} else {
9210 			/* case: R = imm
9211 			 * remember the value we stored into this reg
9212 			 */
9213 			/* clear any state __mark_reg_known doesn't set */
9214 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
9215 			regs[insn->dst_reg].type = SCALAR_VALUE;
9216 			if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
9217 				__mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg,
9218 						 insn->imm);
9219 			} else {
9220 				__mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg,
9221 						 (u32)insn->imm);
9222 			}
9223 		}
9224 
9225 	} else if (opcode > BPF_END) {
9226 		verbose(env, "invalid BPF_ALU opcode %x\n", opcode);
9227 		return -EINVAL;
9228 
9229 	} else {	/* all other ALU ops: and, sub, xor, add, ... */
9230 
9231 		if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
9232 			if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) {
9233 				verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
9234 				return -EINVAL;
9235 			}
9236 			/* check src1 operand */
9237 			err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
9238 			if (err)
9239 				return err;
9240 		} else {
9241 			if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) {
9242 				verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
9243 				return -EINVAL;
9244 			}
9245 		}
9246 
9247 		/* check src2 operand */
9248 		err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
9249 		if (err)
9250 			return err;
9251 
9252 		if ((opcode == BPF_MOD || opcode == BPF_DIV) &&
9253 		    BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && insn->imm == 0) {
9254 			verbose(env, "div by zero\n");
9255 			return -EINVAL;
9256 		}
9257 
9258 		if ((opcode == BPF_LSH || opcode == BPF_RSH ||
9259 		     opcode == BPF_ARSH) && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
9260 			int size = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 ? 64 : 32;
9261 
9262 			if (insn->imm < 0 || insn->imm >= size) {
9263 				verbose(env, "invalid shift %d\n", insn->imm);
9264 				return -EINVAL;
9265 			}
9266 		}
9267 
9268 		/* check dest operand */
9269 		err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK);
9270 		if (err)
9271 			return err;
9272 
9273 		return adjust_reg_min_max_vals(env, insn);
9274 	}
9275 
9276 	return 0;
9277 }
9278 
9279 static void __find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_func_state *state,
9280 				     struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
9281 				     enum bpf_reg_type type, int new_range)
9282 {
9283 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
9284 	int i;
9285 
9286 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) {
9287 		reg = &state->regs[i];
9288 		if (reg->type == type && reg->id == dst_reg->id)
9289 			/* keep the maximum range already checked */
9290 			reg->range = max(reg->range, new_range);
9291 	}
9292 
9293 	bpf_for_each_spilled_reg(i, state, reg) {
9294 		if (!reg)
9295 			continue;
9296 		if (reg->type == type && reg->id == dst_reg->id)
9297 			reg->range = max(reg->range, new_range);
9298 	}
9299 }
9300 
9301 static void find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate,
9302 				   struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
9303 				   enum bpf_reg_type type,
9304 				   bool range_right_open)
9305 {
9306 	int new_range, i;
9307 
9308 	if (dst_reg->off < 0 ||
9309 	    (dst_reg->off == 0 && range_right_open))
9310 		/* This doesn't give us any range */
9311 		return;
9312 
9313 	if (dst_reg->umax_value > MAX_PACKET_OFF ||
9314 	    dst_reg->umax_value + dst_reg->off > MAX_PACKET_OFF)
9315 		/* Risk of overflow.  For instance, ptr + (1<<63) may be less
9316 		 * than pkt_end, but that's because it's also less than pkt.
9317 		 */
9318 		return;
9319 
9320 	new_range = dst_reg->off;
9321 	if (range_right_open)
9322 		new_range++;
9323 
9324 	/* Examples for register markings:
9325 	 *
9326 	 * pkt_data in dst register:
9327 	 *
9328 	 *   r2 = r3;
9329 	 *   r2 += 8;
9330 	 *   if (r2 > pkt_end) goto <handle exception>
9331 	 *   <access okay>
9332 	 *
9333 	 *   r2 = r3;
9334 	 *   r2 += 8;
9335 	 *   if (r2 < pkt_end) goto <access okay>
9336 	 *   <handle exception>
9337 	 *
9338 	 *   Where:
9339 	 *     r2 == dst_reg, pkt_end == src_reg
9340 	 *     r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0)
9341 	 *     r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0)
9342 	 *
9343 	 * pkt_data in src register:
9344 	 *
9345 	 *   r2 = r3;
9346 	 *   r2 += 8;
9347 	 *   if (pkt_end >= r2) goto <access okay>
9348 	 *   <handle exception>
9349 	 *
9350 	 *   r2 = r3;
9351 	 *   r2 += 8;
9352 	 *   if (pkt_end <= r2) goto <handle exception>
9353 	 *   <access okay>
9354 	 *
9355 	 *   Where:
9356 	 *     pkt_end == dst_reg, r2 == src_reg
9357 	 *     r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0)
9358 	 *     r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0)
9359 	 *
9360 	 * Find register r3 and mark its range as r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8)
9361 	 * or r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8-1), so that range of bytes [r3, r3 + 8)
9362 	 * and [r3, r3 + 8-1) respectively is safe to access depending on
9363 	 * the check.
9364 	 */
9365 
9366 	/* If our ids match, then we must have the same max_value.  And we
9367 	 * don't care about the other reg's fixed offset, since if it's too big
9368 	 * the range won't allow anything.
9369 	 * dst_reg->off is known < MAX_PACKET_OFF, therefore it fits in a u16.
9370 	 */
9371 	for (i = 0; i <= vstate->curframe; i++)
9372 		__find_good_pkt_pointers(vstate->frame[i], dst_reg, type,
9373 					 new_range);
9374 }
9375 
9376 static int is_branch32_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 val, u8 opcode)
9377 {
9378 	struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off);
9379 	s32 sval = (s32)val;
9380 
9381 	switch (opcode) {
9382 	case BPF_JEQ:
9383 		if (tnum_is_const(subreg))
9384 			return !!tnum_equals_const(subreg, val);
9385 		break;
9386 	case BPF_JNE:
9387 		if (tnum_is_const(subreg))
9388 			return !tnum_equals_const(subreg, val);
9389 		break;
9390 	case BPF_JSET:
9391 		if ((~subreg.mask & subreg.value) & val)
9392 			return 1;
9393 		if (!((subreg.mask | subreg.value) & val))
9394 			return 0;
9395 		break;
9396 	case BPF_JGT:
9397 		if (reg->u32_min_value > val)
9398 			return 1;
9399 		else if (reg->u32_max_value <= val)
9400 			return 0;
9401 		break;
9402 	case BPF_JSGT:
9403 		if (reg->s32_min_value > sval)
9404 			return 1;
9405 		else if (reg->s32_max_value <= sval)
9406 			return 0;
9407 		break;
9408 	case BPF_JLT:
9409 		if (reg->u32_max_value < val)
9410 			return 1;
9411 		else if (reg->u32_min_value >= val)
9412 			return 0;
9413 		break;
9414 	case BPF_JSLT:
9415 		if (reg->s32_max_value < sval)
9416 			return 1;
9417 		else if (reg->s32_min_value >= sval)
9418 			return 0;
9419 		break;
9420 	case BPF_JGE:
9421 		if (reg->u32_min_value >= val)
9422 			return 1;
9423 		else if (reg->u32_max_value < val)
9424 			return 0;
9425 		break;
9426 	case BPF_JSGE:
9427 		if (reg->s32_min_value >= sval)
9428 			return 1;
9429 		else if (reg->s32_max_value < sval)
9430 			return 0;
9431 		break;
9432 	case BPF_JLE:
9433 		if (reg->u32_max_value <= val)
9434 			return 1;
9435 		else if (reg->u32_min_value > val)
9436 			return 0;
9437 		break;
9438 	case BPF_JSLE:
9439 		if (reg->s32_max_value <= sval)
9440 			return 1;
9441 		else if (reg->s32_min_value > sval)
9442 			return 0;
9443 		break;
9444 	}
9445 
9446 	return -1;
9447 }
9448 
9449 
9450 static int is_branch64_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 val, u8 opcode)
9451 {
9452 	s64 sval = (s64)val;
9453 
9454 	switch (opcode) {
9455 	case BPF_JEQ:
9456 		if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off))
9457 			return !!tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, val);
9458 		break;
9459 	case BPF_JNE:
9460 		if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off))
9461 			return !tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, val);
9462 		break;
9463 	case BPF_JSET:
9464 		if ((~reg->var_off.mask & reg->var_off.value) & val)
9465 			return 1;
9466 		if (!((reg->var_off.mask | reg->var_off.value) & val))
9467 			return 0;
9468 		break;
9469 	case BPF_JGT:
9470 		if (reg->umin_value > val)
9471 			return 1;
9472 		else if (reg->umax_value <= val)
9473 			return 0;
9474 		break;
9475 	case BPF_JSGT:
9476 		if (reg->smin_value > sval)
9477 			return 1;
9478 		else if (reg->smax_value <= sval)
9479 			return 0;
9480 		break;
9481 	case BPF_JLT:
9482 		if (reg->umax_value < val)
9483 			return 1;
9484 		else if (reg->umin_value >= val)
9485 			return 0;
9486 		break;
9487 	case BPF_JSLT:
9488 		if (reg->smax_value < sval)
9489 			return 1;
9490 		else if (reg->smin_value >= sval)
9491 			return 0;
9492 		break;
9493 	case BPF_JGE:
9494 		if (reg->umin_value >= val)
9495 			return 1;
9496 		else if (reg->umax_value < val)
9497 			return 0;
9498 		break;
9499 	case BPF_JSGE:
9500 		if (reg->smin_value >= sval)
9501 			return 1;
9502 		else if (reg->smax_value < sval)
9503 			return 0;
9504 		break;
9505 	case BPF_JLE:
9506 		if (reg->umax_value <= val)
9507 			return 1;
9508 		else if (reg->umin_value > val)
9509 			return 0;
9510 		break;
9511 	case BPF_JSLE:
9512 		if (reg->smax_value <= sval)
9513 			return 1;
9514 		else if (reg->smin_value > sval)
9515 			return 0;
9516 		break;
9517 	}
9518 
9519 	return -1;
9520 }
9521 
9522 /* compute branch direction of the expression "if (reg opcode val) goto target;"
9523  * and return:
9524  *  1 - branch will be taken and "goto target" will be executed
9525  *  0 - branch will not be taken and fall-through to next insn
9526  * -1 - unknown. Example: "if (reg < 5)" is unknown when register value
9527  *      range [0,10]
9528  */
9529 static int is_branch_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 val, u8 opcode,
9530 			   bool is_jmp32)
9531 {
9532 	if (__is_pointer_value(false, reg)) {
9533 		if (!reg_type_not_null(reg->type))
9534 			return -1;
9535 
9536 		/* If pointer is valid tests against zero will fail so we can
9537 		 * use this to direct branch taken.
9538 		 */
9539 		if (val != 0)
9540 			return -1;
9541 
9542 		switch (opcode) {
9543 		case BPF_JEQ:
9544 			return 0;
9545 		case BPF_JNE:
9546 			return 1;
9547 		default:
9548 			return -1;
9549 		}
9550 	}
9551 
9552 	if (is_jmp32)
9553 		return is_branch32_taken(reg, val, opcode);
9554 	return is_branch64_taken(reg, val, opcode);
9555 }
9556 
9557 static int flip_opcode(u32 opcode)
9558 {
9559 	/* How can we transform "a <op> b" into "b <op> a"? */
9560 	static const u8 opcode_flip[16] = {
9561 		/* these stay the same */
9562 		[BPF_JEQ  >> 4] = BPF_JEQ,
9563 		[BPF_JNE  >> 4] = BPF_JNE,
9564 		[BPF_JSET >> 4] = BPF_JSET,
9565 		/* these swap "lesser" and "greater" (L and G in the opcodes) */
9566 		[BPF_JGE  >> 4] = BPF_JLE,
9567 		[BPF_JGT  >> 4] = BPF_JLT,
9568 		[BPF_JLE  >> 4] = BPF_JGE,
9569 		[BPF_JLT  >> 4] = BPF_JGT,
9570 		[BPF_JSGE >> 4] = BPF_JSLE,
9571 		[BPF_JSGT >> 4] = BPF_JSLT,
9572 		[BPF_JSLE >> 4] = BPF_JSGE,
9573 		[BPF_JSLT >> 4] = BPF_JSGT
9574 	};
9575 	return opcode_flip[opcode >> 4];
9576 }
9577 
9578 static int is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
9579 				   struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg,
9580 				   u8 opcode)
9581 {
9582 	struct bpf_reg_state *pkt;
9583 
9584 	if (src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) {
9585 		pkt = dst_reg;
9586 	} else if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) {
9587 		pkt = src_reg;
9588 		opcode = flip_opcode(opcode);
9589 	} else {
9590 		return -1;
9591 	}
9592 
9593 	if (pkt->range >= 0)
9594 		return -1;
9595 
9596 	switch (opcode) {
9597 	case BPF_JLE:
9598 		/* pkt <= pkt_end */
9599 		fallthrough;
9600 	case BPF_JGT:
9601 		/* pkt > pkt_end */
9602 		if (pkt->range == BEYOND_PKT_END)
9603 			/* pkt has at last one extra byte beyond pkt_end */
9604 			return opcode == BPF_JGT;
9605 		break;
9606 	case BPF_JLT:
9607 		/* pkt < pkt_end */
9608 		fallthrough;
9609 	case BPF_JGE:
9610 		/* pkt >= pkt_end */
9611 		if (pkt->range == BEYOND_PKT_END || pkt->range == AT_PKT_END)
9612 			return opcode == BPF_JGE;
9613 		break;
9614 	}
9615 	return -1;
9616 }
9617 
9618 /* Adjusts the register min/max values in the case that the dst_reg is the
9619  * variable register that we are working on, and src_reg is a constant or we're
9620  * simply doing a BPF_K check.
9621  * In JEQ/JNE cases we also adjust the var_off values.
9622  */
9623 static void reg_set_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg,
9624 			    struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg,
9625 			    u64 val, u32 val32,
9626 			    u8 opcode, bool is_jmp32)
9627 {
9628 	struct tnum false_32off = tnum_subreg(false_reg->var_off);
9629 	struct tnum false_64off = false_reg->var_off;
9630 	struct tnum true_32off = tnum_subreg(true_reg->var_off);
9631 	struct tnum true_64off = true_reg->var_off;
9632 	s64 sval = (s64)val;
9633 	s32 sval32 = (s32)val32;
9634 
9635 	/* If the dst_reg is a pointer, we can't learn anything about its
9636 	 * variable offset from the compare (unless src_reg were a pointer into
9637 	 * the same object, but we don't bother with that.
9638 	 * Since false_reg and true_reg have the same type by construction, we
9639 	 * only need to check one of them for pointerness.
9640 	 */
9641 	if (__is_pointer_value(false, false_reg))
9642 		return;
9643 
9644 	switch (opcode) {
9645 	case BPF_JEQ:
9646 	case BPF_JNE:
9647 	{
9648 		struct bpf_reg_state *reg =
9649 			opcode == BPF_JEQ ? true_reg : false_reg;
9650 
9651 		/* JEQ/JNE comparison doesn't change the register equivalence.
9652 		 * r1 = r2;
9653 		 * if (r1 == 42) goto label;
9654 		 * ...
9655 		 * label: // here both r1 and r2 are known to be 42.
9656 		 *
9657 		 * Hence when marking register as known preserve it's ID.
9658 		 */
9659 		if (is_jmp32)
9660 			__mark_reg32_known(reg, val32);
9661 		else
9662 			___mark_reg_known(reg, val);
9663 		break;
9664 	}
9665 	case BPF_JSET:
9666 		if (is_jmp32) {
9667 			false_32off = tnum_and(false_32off, tnum_const(~val32));
9668 			if (is_power_of_2(val32))
9669 				true_32off = tnum_or(true_32off,
9670 						     tnum_const(val32));
9671 		} else {
9672 			false_64off = tnum_and(false_64off, tnum_const(~val));
9673 			if (is_power_of_2(val))
9674 				true_64off = tnum_or(true_64off,
9675 						     tnum_const(val));
9676 		}
9677 		break;
9678 	case BPF_JGE:
9679 	case BPF_JGT:
9680 	{
9681 		if (is_jmp32) {
9682 			u32 false_umax = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val32  : val32 - 1;
9683 			u32 true_umin = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val32 + 1 : val32;
9684 
9685 			false_reg->u32_max_value = min(false_reg->u32_max_value,
9686 						       false_umax);
9687 			true_reg->u32_min_value = max(true_reg->u32_min_value,
9688 						      true_umin);
9689 		} else {
9690 			u64 false_umax = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val    : val - 1;
9691 			u64 true_umin = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val + 1 : val;
9692 
9693 			false_reg->umax_value = min(false_reg->umax_value, false_umax);
9694 			true_reg->umin_value = max(true_reg->umin_value, true_umin);
9695 		}
9696 		break;
9697 	}
9698 	case BPF_JSGE:
9699 	case BPF_JSGT:
9700 	{
9701 		if (is_jmp32) {
9702 			s32 false_smax = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval32    : sval32 - 1;
9703 			s32 true_smin = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval32 + 1 : sval32;
9704 
9705 			false_reg->s32_max_value = min(false_reg->s32_max_value, false_smax);
9706 			true_reg->s32_min_value = max(true_reg->s32_min_value, true_smin);
9707 		} else {
9708 			s64 false_smax = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval    : sval - 1;
9709 			s64 true_smin = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval + 1 : sval;
9710 
9711 			false_reg->smax_value = min(false_reg->smax_value, false_smax);
9712 			true_reg->smin_value = max(true_reg->smin_value, true_smin);
9713 		}
9714 		break;
9715 	}
9716 	case BPF_JLE:
9717 	case BPF_JLT:
9718 	{
9719 		if (is_jmp32) {
9720 			u32 false_umin = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val32  : val32 + 1;
9721 			u32 true_umax = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val32 - 1 : val32;
9722 
9723 			false_reg->u32_min_value = max(false_reg->u32_min_value,
9724 						       false_umin);
9725 			true_reg->u32_max_value = min(true_reg->u32_max_value,
9726 						      true_umax);
9727 		} else {
9728 			u64 false_umin = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val    : val + 1;
9729 			u64 true_umax = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val - 1 : val;
9730 
9731 			false_reg->umin_value = max(false_reg->umin_value, false_umin);
9732 			true_reg->umax_value = min(true_reg->umax_value, true_umax);
9733 		}
9734 		break;
9735 	}
9736 	case BPF_JSLE:
9737 	case BPF_JSLT:
9738 	{
9739 		if (is_jmp32) {
9740 			s32 false_smin = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval32    : sval32 + 1;
9741 			s32 true_smax = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval32 - 1 : sval32;
9742 
9743 			false_reg->s32_min_value = max(false_reg->s32_min_value, false_smin);
9744 			true_reg->s32_max_value = min(true_reg->s32_max_value, true_smax);
9745 		} else {
9746 			s64 false_smin = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval    : sval + 1;
9747 			s64 true_smax = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval - 1 : sval;
9748 
9749 			false_reg->smin_value = max(false_reg->smin_value, false_smin);
9750 			true_reg->smax_value = min(true_reg->smax_value, true_smax);
9751 		}
9752 		break;
9753 	}
9754 	default:
9755 		return;
9756 	}
9757 
9758 	if (is_jmp32) {
9759 		false_reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(false_64off),
9760 					     tnum_subreg(false_32off));
9761 		true_reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(true_64off),
9762 					    tnum_subreg(true_32off));
9763 		__reg_combine_32_into_64(false_reg);
9764 		__reg_combine_32_into_64(true_reg);
9765 	} else {
9766 		false_reg->var_off = false_64off;
9767 		true_reg->var_off = true_64off;
9768 		__reg_combine_64_into_32(false_reg);
9769 		__reg_combine_64_into_32(true_reg);
9770 	}
9771 }
9772 
9773 /* Same as above, but for the case that dst_reg holds a constant and src_reg is
9774  * the variable reg.
9775  */
9776 static void reg_set_min_max_inv(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg,
9777 				struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg,
9778 				u64 val, u32 val32,
9779 				u8 opcode, bool is_jmp32)
9780 {
9781 	opcode = flip_opcode(opcode);
9782 	/* This uses zero as "not present in table"; luckily the zero opcode,
9783 	 * BPF_JA, can't get here.
9784 	 */
9785 	if (opcode)
9786 		reg_set_min_max(true_reg, false_reg, val, val32, opcode, is_jmp32);
9787 }
9788 
9789 /* Regs are known to be equal, so intersect their min/max/var_off */
9790 static void __reg_combine_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg,
9791 				  struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg)
9792 {
9793 	src_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->umin_value = max(src_reg->umin_value,
9794 							dst_reg->umin_value);
9795 	src_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->umax_value = min(src_reg->umax_value,
9796 							dst_reg->umax_value);
9797 	src_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->smin_value = max(src_reg->smin_value,
9798 							dst_reg->smin_value);
9799 	src_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->smax_value = min(src_reg->smax_value,
9800 							dst_reg->smax_value);
9801 	src_reg->var_off = dst_reg->var_off = tnum_intersect(src_reg->var_off,
9802 							     dst_reg->var_off);
9803 	/* We might have learned new bounds from the var_off. */
9804 	__update_reg_bounds(src_reg);
9805 	__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
9806 	/* We might have learned something about the sign bit. */
9807 	__reg_deduce_bounds(src_reg);
9808 	__reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
9809 	/* We might have learned some bits from the bounds. */
9810 	__reg_bound_offset(src_reg);
9811 	__reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
9812 	/* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds
9813 	 * slightly.  e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc),
9814 	 * then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax.
9815 	 */
9816 	__update_reg_bounds(src_reg);
9817 	__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
9818 }
9819 
9820 static void reg_combine_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *true_src,
9821 				struct bpf_reg_state *true_dst,
9822 				struct bpf_reg_state *false_src,
9823 				struct bpf_reg_state *false_dst,
9824 				u8 opcode)
9825 {
9826 	switch (opcode) {
9827 	case BPF_JEQ:
9828 		__reg_combine_min_max(true_src, true_dst);
9829 		break;
9830 	case BPF_JNE:
9831 		__reg_combine_min_max(false_src, false_dst);
9832 		break;
9833 	}
9834 }
9835 
9836 static void mark_ptr_or_null_reg(struct bpf_func_state *state,
9837 				 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 id,
9838 				 bool is_null)
9839 {
9840 	if (type_may_be_null(reg->type) && reg->id == id &&
9841 	    !WARN_ON_ONCE(!reg->id)) {
9842 		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(reg->smin_value || reg->smax_value ||
9843 				 !tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0) ||
9844 				 reg->off)) {
9845 			/* Old offset (both fixed and variable parts) should
9846 			 * have been known-zero, because we don't allow pointer
9847 			 * arithmetic on pointers that might be NULL. If we
9848 			 * see this happening, don't convert the register.
9849 			 */
9850 			return;
9851 		}
9852 		if (is_null) {
9853 			reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE;
9854 			/* We don't need id and ref_obj_id from this point
9855 			 * onwards anymore, thus we should better reset it,
9856 			 * so that state pruning has chances to take effect.
9857 			 */
9858 			reg->id = 0;
9859 			reg->ref_obj_id = 0;
9860 
9861 			return;
9862 		}
9863 
9864 		mark_ptr_not_null_reg(reg);
9865 
9866 		if (!reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(reg)) {
9867 			/* For not-NULL ptr, reg->ref_obj_id will be reset
9868 			 * in release_reg_references().
9869 			 *
9870 			 * reg->id is still used by spin_lock ptr. Other
9871 			 * than spin_lock ptr type, reg->id can be reset.
9872 			 */
9873 			reg->id = 0;
9874 		}
9875 	}
9876 }
9877 
9878 static void __mark_ptr_or_null_regs(struct bpf_func_state *state, u32 id,
9879 				    bool is_null)
9880 {
9881 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
9882 	int i;
9883 
9884 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
9885 		mark_ptr_or_null_reg(state, &state->regs[i], id, is_null);
9886 
9887 	bpf_for_each_spilled_reg(i, state, reg) {
9888 		if (!reg)
9889 			continue;
9890 		mark_ptr_or_null_reg(state, reg, id, is_null);
9891 	}
9892 }
9893 
9894 /* The logic is similar to find_good_pkt_pointers(), both could eventually
9895  * be folded together at some point.
9896  */
9897 static void mark_ptr_or_null_regs(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, u32 regno,
9898 				  bool is_null)
9899 {
9900 	struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
9901 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
9902 	u32 ref_obj_id = regs[regno].ref_obj_id;
9903 	u32 id = regs[regno].id;
9904 	int i;
9905 
9906 	if (ref_obj_id && ref_obj_id == id && is_null)
9907 		/* regs[regno] is in the " == NULL" branch.
9908 		 * No one could have freed the reference state before
9909 		 * doing the NULL check.
9910 		 */
9911 		WARN_ON_ONCE(release_reference_state(state, id));
9912 
9913 	for (i = 0; i <= vstate->curframe; i++)
9914 		__mark_ptr_or_null_regs(vstate->frame[i], id, is_null);
9915 }
9916 
9917 static bool try_match_pkt_pointers(const struct bpf_insn *insn,
9918 				   struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
9919 				   struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg,
9920 				   struct bpf_verifier_state *this_branch,
9921 				   struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch)
9922 {
9923 	if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_X)
9924 		return false;
9925 
9926 	/* Pointers are always 64-bit. */
9927 	if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP32)
9928 		return false;
9929 
9930 	switch (BPF_OP(insn->code)) {
9931 	case BPF_JGT:
9932 		if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
9933 		     src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) ||
9934 		    (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META &&
9935 		     reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) {
9936 			/* pkt_data' > pkt_end, pkt_meta' > pkt_data */
9937 			find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg,
9938 					       dst_reg->type, false);
9939 			mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, true);
9940 		} else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END &&
9941 			    src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) ||
9942 			   (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) &&
9943 			    src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) {
9944 			/* pkt_end > pkt_data', pkt_data > pkt_meta' */
9945 			find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, src_reg,
9946 					       src_reg->type, true);
9947 			mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->src_reg, false);
9948 		} else {
9949 			return false;
9950 		}
9951 		break;
9952 	case BPF_JLT:
9953 		if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
9954 		     src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) ||
9955 		    (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META &&
9956 		     reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) {
9957 			/* pkt_data' < pkt_end, pkt_meta' < pkt_data */
9958 			find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg,
9959 					       dst_reg->type, true);
9960 			mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, false);
9961 		} else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END &&
9962 			    src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) ||
9963 			   (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) &&
9964 			    src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) {
9965 			/* pkt_end < pkt_data', pkt_data > pkt_meta' */
9966 			find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, src_reg,
9967 					       src_reg->type, false);
9968 			mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->src_reg, true);
9969 		} else {
9970 			return false;
9971 		}
9972 		break;
9973 	case BPF_JGE:
9974 		if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
9975 		     src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) ||
9976 		    (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META &&
9977 		     reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) {
9978 			/* pkt_data' >= pkt_end, pkt_meta' >= pkt_data */
9979 			find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg,
9980 					       dst_reg->type, true);
9981 			mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, false);
9982 		} else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END &&
9983 			    src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) ||
9984 			   (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) &&
9985 			    src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) {
9986 			/* pkt_end >= pkt_data', pkt_data >= pkt_meta' */
9987 			find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, src_reg,
9988 					       src_reg->type, false);
9989 			mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->src_reg, true);
9990 		} else {
9991 			return false;
9992 		}
9993 		break;
9994 	case BPF_JLE:
9995 		if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
9996 		     src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) ||
9997 		    (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META &&
9998 		     reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) {
9999 			/* pkt_data' <= pkt_end, pkt_meta' <= pkt_data */
10000 			find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg,
10001 					       dst_reg->type, false);
10002 			mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, true);
10003 		} else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END &&
10004 			    src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) ||
10005 			   (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) &&
10006 			    src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) {
10007 			/* pkt_end <= pkt_data', pkt_data <= pkt_meta' */
10008 			find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, src_reg,
10009 					       src_reg->type, true);
10010 			mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->src_reg, false);
10011 		} else {
10012 			return false;
10013 		}
10014 		break;
10015 	default:
10016 		return false;
10017 	}
10018 
10019 	return true;
10020 }
10021 
10022 static void find_equal_scalars(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate,
10023 			       struct bpf_reg_state *known_reg)
10024 {
10025 	struct bpf_func_state *state;
10026 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
10027 	int i, j;
10028 
10029 	for (i = 0; i <= vstate->curframe; i++) {
10030 		state = vstate->frame[i];
10031 		for (j = 0; j < MAX_BPF_REG; j++) {
10032 			reg = &state->regs[j];
10033 			if (reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->id == known_reg->id)
10034 				*reg = *known_reg;
10035 		}
10036 
10037 		bpf_for_each_spilled_reg(j, state, reg) {
10038 			if (!reg)
10039 				continue;
10040 			if (reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->id == known_reg->id)
10041 				*reg = *known_reg;
10042 		}
10043 	}
10044 }
10045 
10046 static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
10047 			     struct bpf_insn *insn, int *insn_idx)
10048 {
10049 	struct bpf_verifier_state *this_branch = env->cur_state;
10050 	struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch;
10051 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]->regs;
10052 	struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, *other_branch_regs, *src_reg = NULL;
10053 	u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
10054 	bool is_jmp32;
10055 	int pred = -1;
10056 	int err;
10057 
10058 	/* Only conditional jumps are expected to reach here. */
10059 	if (opcode == BPF_JA || opcode > BPF_JSLE) {
10060 		verbose(env, "invalid BPF_JMP/JMP32 opcode %x\n", opcode);
10061 		return -EINVAL;
10062 	}
10063 
10064 	if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
10065 		if (insn->imm != 0) {
10066 			verbose(env, "BPF_JMP/JMP32 uses reserved fields\n");
10067 			return -EINVAL;
10068 		}
10069 
10070 		/* check src1 operand */
10071 		err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
10072 		if (err)
10073 			return err;
10074 
10075 		if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
10076 			verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n",
10077 				insn->src_reg);
10078 			return -EACCES;
10079 		}
10080 		src_reg = &regs[insn->src_reg];
10081 	} else {
10082 		if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
10083 			verbose(env, "BPF_JMP/JMP32 uses reserved fields\n");
10084 			return -EINVAL;
10085 		}
10086 	}
10087 
10088 	/* check src2 operand */
10089 	err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
10090 	if (err)
10091 		return err;
10092 
10093 	dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
10094 	is_jmp32 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP32;
10095 
10096 	if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
10097 		pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, insn->imm, opcode, is_jmp32);
10098 	} else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE &&
10099 		   is_jmp32 && tnum_is_const(tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off))) {
10100 		pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg,
10101 				       tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off).value,
10102 				       opcode,
10103 				       is_jmp32);
10104 	} else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE &&
10105 		   !is_jmp32 && tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off)) {
10106 		pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg,
10107 				       src_reg->var_off.value,
10108 				       opcode,
10109 				       is_jmp32);
10110 	} else if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(dst_reg) &&
10111 		   reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(src_reg) &&
10112 		   !is_jmp32) {
10113 		pred = is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken(dst_reg, src_reg, opcode);
10114 	}
10115 
10116 	if (pred >= 0) {
10117 		/* If we get here with a dst_reg pointer type it is because
10118 		 * above is_branch_taken() special cased the 0 comparison.
10119 		 */
10120 		if (!__is_pointer_value(false, dst_reg))
10121 			err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->dst_reg);
10122 		if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && !err &&
10123 		    !__is_pointer_value(false, src_reg))
10124 			err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg);
10125 		if (err)
10126 			return err;
10127 	}
10128 
10129 	if (pred == 1) {
10130 		/* Only follow the goto, ignore fall-through. If needed, push
10131 		 * the fall-through branch for simulation under speculative
10132 		 * execution.
10133 		 */
10134 		if (!env->bypass_spec_v1 &&
10135 		    !sanitize_speculative_path(env, insn, *insn_idx + 1,
10136 					       *insn_idx))
10137 			return -EFAULT;
10138 		*insn_idx += insn->off;
10139 		return 0;
10140 	} else if (pred == 0) {
10141 		/* Only follow the fall-through branch, since that's where the
10142 		 * program will go. If needed, push the goto branch for
10143 		 * simulation under speculative execution.
10144 		 */
10145 		if (!env->bypass_spec_v1 &&
10146 		    !sanitize_speculative_path(env, insn,
10147 					       *insn_idx + insn->off + 1,
10148 					       *insn_idx))
10149 			return -EFAULT;
10150 		return 0;
10151 	}
10152 
10153 	other_branch = push_stack(env, *insn_idx + insn->off + 1, *insn_idx,
10154 				  false);
10155 	if (!other_branch)
10156 		return -EFAULT;
10157 	other_branch_regs = other_branch->frame[other_branch->curframe]->regs;
10158 
10159 	/* detect if we are comparing against a constant value so we can adjust
10160 	 * our min/max values for our dst register.
10161 	 * this is only legit if both are scalars (or pointers to the same
10162 	 * object, I suppose, but we don't support that right now), because
10163 	 * otherwise the different base pointers mean the offsets aren't
10164 	 * comparable.
10165 	 */
10166 	if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
10167 		struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg = &regs[insn->src_reg];
10168 
10169 		if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE &&
10170 		    src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
10171 			if (tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off) ||
10172 			    (is_jmp32 &&
10173 			     tnum_is_const(tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off))))
10174 				reg_set_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg],
10175 						dst_reg,
10176 						src_reg->var_off.value,
10177 						tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off).value,
10178 						opcode, is_jmp32);
10179 			else if (tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off) ||
10180 				 (is_jmp32 &&
10181 				  tnum_is_const(tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off))))
10182 				reg_set_min_max_inv(&other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg],
10183 						    src_reg,
10184 						    dst_reg->var_off.value,
10185 						    tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off).value,
10186 						    opcode, is_jmp32);
10187 			else if (!is_jmp32 &&
10188 				 (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE))
10189 				/* Comparing for equality, we can combine knowledge */
10190 				reg_combine_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg],
10191 						    &other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg],
10192 						    src_reg, dst_reg, opcode);
10193 			if (src_reg->id &&
10194 			    !WARN_ON_ONCE(src_reg->id != other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg].id)) {
10195 				find_equal_scalars(this_branch, src_reg);
10196 				find_equal_scalars(other_branch, &other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg]);
10197 			}
10198 
10199 		}
10200 	} else if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
10201 		reg_set_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg],
10202 					dst_reg, insn->imm, (u32)insn->imm,
10203 					opcode, is_jmp32);
10204 	}
10205 
10206 	if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && dst_reg->id &&
10207 	    !WARN_ON_ONCE(dst_reg->id != other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg].id)) {
10208 		find_equal_scalars(this_branch, dst_reg);
10209 		find_equal_scalars(other_branch, &other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg]);
10210 	}
10211 
10212 	/* detect if R == 0 where R is returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem().
10213 	 * NOTE: these optimizations below are related with pointer comparison
10214 	 *       which will never be JMP32.
10215 	 */
10216 	if (!is_jmp32 && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K &&
10217 	    insn->imm == 0 && (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE) &&
10218 	    type_may_be_null(dst_reg->type)) {
10219 		/* Mark all identical registers in each branch as either
10220 		 * safe or unknown depending R == 0 or R != 0 conditional.
10221 		 */
10222 		mark_ptr_or_null_regs(this_branch, insn->dst_reg,
10223 				      opcode == BPF_JNE);
10224 		mark_ptr_or_null_regs(other_branch, insn->dst_reg,
10225 				      opcode == BPF_JEQ);
10226 	} else if (!try_match_pkt_pointers(insn, dst_reg, &regs[insn->src_reg],
10227 					   this_branch, other_branch) &&
10228 		   is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
10229 		verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n",
10230 			insn->dst_reg);
10231 		return -EACCES;
10232 	}
10233 	if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL)
10234 		print_insn_state(env, this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]);
10235 	return 0;
10236 }
10237 
10238 /* verify BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */
10239 static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
10240 {
10241 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env);
10242 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
10243 	struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg;
10244 	struct bpf_map *map;
10245 	int err;
10246 
10247 	if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) {
10248 		verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD_IMM insn\n");
10249 		return -EINVAL;
10250 	}
10251 	if (insn->off != 0) {
10252 		verbose(env, "BPF_LD_IMM64 uses reserved fields\n");
10253 		return -EINVAL;
10254 	}
10255 
10256 	err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
10257 	if (err)
10258 		return err;
10259 
10260 	dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
10261 	if (insn->src_reg == 0) {
10262 		u64 imm = ((u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32) | (u32)insn->imm;
10263 
10264 		dst_reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE;
10265 		__mark_reg_known(&regs[insn->dst_reg], imm);
10266 		return 0;
10267 	}
10268 
10269 	/* All special src_reg cases are listed below. From this point onwards
10270 	 * we either succeed and assign a corresponding dst_reg->type after
10271 	 * zeroing the offset, or fail and reject the program.
10272 	 */
10273 	mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
10274 
10275 	if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_BTF_ID) {
10276 		dst_reg->type = aux->btf_var.reg_type;
10277 		switch (base_type(dst_reg->type)) {
10278 		case PTR_TO_MEM:
10279 			dst_reg->mem_size = aux->btf_var.mem_size;
10280 			break;
10281 		case PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
10282 			dst_reg->btf = aux->btf_var.btf;
10283 			dst_reg->btf_id = aux->btf_var.btf_id;
10284 			break;
10285 		default:
10286 			verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
10287 			return -EFAULT;
10288 		}
10289 		return 0;
10290 	}
10291 
10292 	if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) {
10293 		struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux;
10294 		u32 subprogno = find_subprog(env,
10295 					     env->insn_idx + insn->imm + 1);
10296 
10297 		if (!aux->func_info) {
10298 			verbose(env, "missing btf func_info\n");
10299 			return -EINVAL;
10300 		}
10301 		if (aux->func_info_aux[subprogno].linkage != BTF_FUNC_STATIC) {
10302 			verbose(env, "callback function not static\n");
10303 			return -EINVAL;
10304 		}
10305 
10306 		dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_FUNC;
10307 		dst_reg->subprogno = subprogno;
10308 		return 0;
10309 	}
10310 
10311 	map = env->used_maps[aux->map_index];
10312 	dst_reg->map_ptr = map;
10313 
10314 	if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE ||
10315 	    insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE) {
10316 		dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE;
10317 		dst_reg->off = aux->map_off;
10318 		if (map_value_has_spin_lock(map))
10319 			dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
10320 	} else if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD ||
10321 		   insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX) {
10322 		dst_reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
10323 	} else {
10324 		verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
10325 		return -EINVAL;
10326 	}
10327 
10328 	return 0;
10329 }
10330 
10331 static bool may_access_skb(enum bpf_prog_type type)
10332 {
10333 	switch (type) {
10334 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER:
10335 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS:
10336 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT:
10337 		return true;
10338 	default:
10339 		return false;
10340 	}
10341 }
10342 
10343 /* verify safety of LD_ABS|LD_IND instructions:
10344  * - they can only appear in the programs where ctx == skb
10345  * - since they are wrappers of function calls, they scratch R1-R5 registers,
10346  *   preserve R6-R9, and store return value into R0
10347  *
10348  * Implicit input:
10349  *   ctx == skb == R6 == CTX
10350  *
10351  * Explicit input:
10352  *   SRC == any register
10353  *   IMM == 32-bit immediate
10354  *
10355  * Output:
10356  *   R0 - 8/16/32-bit skb data converted to cpu endianness
10357  */
10358 static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
10359 {
10360 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
10361 	static const int ctx_reg = BPF_REG_6;
10362 	u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code);
10363 	int i, err;
10364 
10365 	if (!may_access_skb(resolve_prog_type(env->prog))) {
10366 		verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] instructions not allowed for this program type\n");
10367 		return -EINVAL;
10368 	}
10369 
10370 	if (!env->ops->gen_ld_abs) {
10371 		verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
10372 		return -EINVAL;
10373 	}
10374 
10375 	if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 ||
10376 	    BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW ||
10377 	    (mode == BPF_ABS && insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0)) {
10378 		verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] uses reserved fields\n");
10379 		return -EINVAL;
10380 	}
10381 
10382 	/* check whether implicit source operand (register R6) is readable */
10383 	err = check_reg_arg(env, ctx_reg, SRC_OP);
10384 	if (err)
10385 		return err;
10386 
10387 	/* Disallow usage of BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] with reference tracking, as
10388 	 * gen_ld_abs() may terminate the program at runtime, leading to
10389 	 * reference leak.
10390 	 */
10391 	err = check_reference_leak(env);
10392 	if (err) {
10393 		verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] cannot be mixed with socket references\n");
10394 		return err;
10395 	}
10396 
10397 	if (env->cur_state->active_spin_lock) {
10398 		verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] cannot be used inside bpf_spin_lock-ed region\n");
10399 		return -EINVAL;
10400 	}
10401 
10402 	if (regs[ctx_reg].type != PTR_TO_CTX) {
10403 		verbose(env,
10404 			"at the time of BPF_LD_ABS|IND R6 != pointer to skb\n");
10405 		return -EINVAL;
10406 	}
10407 
10408 	if (mode == BPF_IND) {
10409 		/* check explicit source operand */
10410 		err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
10411 		if (err)
10412 			return err;
10413 	}
10414 
10415 	err = check_ptr_off_reg(env, &regs[ctx_reg], ctx_reg);
10416 	if (err < 0)
10417 		return err;
10418 
10419 	/* reset caller saved regs to unreadable */
10420 	for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) {
10421 		mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]);
10422 		check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK);
10423 	}
10424 
10425 	/* mark destination R0 register as readable, since it contains
10426 	 * the value fetched from the packet.
10427 	 * Already marked as written above.
10428 	 */
10429 	mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
10430 	/* ld_abs load up to 32-bit skb data. */
10431 	regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1;
10432 	return 0;
10433 }
10434 
10435 static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
10436 {
10437 	struct tnum enforce_attach_type_range = tnum_unknown;
10438 	const struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
10439 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
10440 	struct tnum range = tnum_range(0, 1);
10441 	enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog);
10442 	int err;
10443 	struct bpf_func_state *frame = env->cur_state->frame[0];
10444 	const bool is_subprog = frame->subprogno;
10445 
10446 	/* LSM and struct_ops func-ptr's return type could be "void" */
10447 	if (!is_subprog &&
10448 	    (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS ||
10449 	     prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) &&
10450 	    !prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type)
10451 		return 0;
10452 
10453 	/* eBPF calling convention is such that R0 is used
10454 	 * to return the value from eBPF program.
10455 	 * Make sure that it's readable at this time
10456 	 * of bpf_exit, which means that program wrote
10457 	 * something into it earlier
10458 	 */
10459 	err = check_reg_arg(env, BPF_REG_0, SRC_OP);
10460 	if (err)
10461 		return err;
10462 
10463 	if (is_pointer_value(env, BPF_REG_0)) {
10464 		verbose(env, "R0 leaks addr as return value\n");
10465 		return -EACCES;
10466 	}
10467 
10468 	reg = cur_regs(env) + BPF_REG_0;
10469 
10470 	if (frame->in_async_callback_fn) {
10471 		/* enforce return zero from async callbacks like timer */
10472 		if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
10473 			verbose(env, "In async callback the register R0 is not a known value (%s)\n",
10474 				reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
10475 			return -EINVAL;
10476 		}
10477 
10478 		if (!tnum_in(tnum_const(0), reg->var_off)) {
10479 			verbose_invalid_scalar(env, reg, &range, "async callback", "R0");
10480 			return -EINVAL;
10481 		}
10482 		return 0;
10483 	}
10484 
10485 	if (is_subprog) {
10486 		if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
10487 			verbose(env, "At subprogram exit the register R0 is not a scalar value (%s)\n",
10488 				reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
10489 			return -EINVAL;
10490 		}
10491 		return 0;
10492 	}
10493 
10494 	switch (prog_type) {
10495 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR:
10496 		if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UDP4_RECVMSG ||
10497 		    env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UDP6_RECVMSG ||
10498 		    env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETPEERNAME ||
10499 		    env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETPEERNAME ||
10500 		    env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETSOCKNAME ||
10501 		    env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETSOCKNAME)
10502 			range = tnum_range(1, 1);
10503 		if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_BIND ||
10504 		    env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_BIND)
10505 			range = tnum_range(0, 3);
10506 		break;
10507 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB:
10508 		if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET_EGRESS) {
10509 			range = tnum_range(0, 3);
10510 			enforce_attach_type_range = tnum_range(2, 3);
10511 		}
10512 		break;
10513 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK:
10514 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS:
10515 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_DEVICE:
10516 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SYSCTL:
10517 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT:
10518 		break;
10519 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT:
10520 		if (!env->prog->aux->attach_btf_id)
10521 			return 0;
10522 		range = tnum_const(0);
10523 		break;
10524 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING:
10525 		switch (env->prog->expected_attach_type) {
10526 		case BPF_TRACE_FENTRY:
10527 		case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT:
10528 			range = tnum_const(0);
10529 			break;
10530 		case BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP:
10531 		case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN:
10532 			return 0;
10533 		case BPF_TRACE_ITER:
10534 			break;
10535 		default:
10536 			return -ENOTSUPP;
10537 		}
10538 		break;
10539 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP:
10540 		range = tnum_range(SK_DROP, SK_PASS);
10541 		break;
10542 
10543 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM:
10544 		if (env->prog->expected_attach_type != BPF_LSM_CGROUP) {
10545 			/* Regular BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM programs can return
10546 			 * any value.
10547 			 */
10548 			return 0;
10549 		}
10550 		if (!env->prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) {
10551 			/* Make sure programs that attach to void
10552 			 * hooks don't try to modify return value.
10553 			 */
10554 			range = tnum_range(1, 1);
10555 		}
10556 		break;
10557 
10558 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT:
10559 		/* freplace program can return anything as its return value
10560 		 * depends on the to-be-replaced kernel func or bpf program.
10561 		 */
10562 	default:
10563 		return 0;
10564 	}
10565 
10566 	if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
10567 		verbose(env, "At program exit the register R0 is not a known value (%s)\n",
10568 			reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
10569 		return -EINVAL;
10570 	}
10571 
10572 	if (!tnum_in(range, reg->var_off)) {
10573 		verbose_invalid_scalar(env, reg, &range, "program exit", "R0");
10574 		if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_LSM_CGROUP &&
10575 		    !prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type)
10576 			verbose(env, "Note, BPF_LSM_CGROUP that attach to void LSM hooks can't modify return value!\n");
10577 		return -EINVAL;
10578 	}
10579 
10580 	if (!tnum_is_unknown(enforce_attach_type_range) &&
10581 	    tnum_in(enforce_attach_type_range, reg->var_off))
10582 		env->prog->enforce_expected_attach_type = 1;
10583 	return 0;
10584 }
10585 
10586 /* non-recursive DFS pseudo code
10587  * 1  procedure DFS-iterative(G,v):
10588  * 2      label v as discovered
10589  * 3      let S be a stack
10590  * 4      S.push(v)
10591  * 5      while S is not empty
10592  * 6            t <- S.pop()
10593  * 7            if t is what we're looking for:
10594  * 8                return t
10595  * 9            for all edges e in G.adjacentEdges(t) do
10596  * 10               if edge e is already labelled
10597  * 11                   continue with the next edge
10598  * 12               w <- G.adjacentVertex(t,e)
10599  * 13               if vertex w is not discovered and not explored
10600  * 14                   label e as tree-edge
10601  * 15                   label w as discovered
10602  * 16                   S.push(w)
10603  * 17                   continue at 5
10604  * 18               else if vertex w is discovered
10605  * 19                   label e as back-edge
10606  * 20               else
10607  * 21                   // vertex w is explored
10608  * 22                   label e as forward- or cross-edge
10609  * 23           label t as explored
10610  * 24           S.pop()
10611  *
10612  * convention:
10613  * 0x10 - discovered
10614  * 0x11 - discovered and fall-through edge labelled
10615  * 0x12 - discovered and fall-through and branch edges labelled
10616  * 0x20 - explored
10617  */
10618 
10619 enum {
10620 	DISCOVERED = 0x10,
10621 	EXPLORED = 0x20,
10622 	FALLTHROUGH = 1,
10623 	BRANCH = 2,
10624 };
10625 
10626 static u32 state_htab_size(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
10627 {
10628 	return env->prog->len;
10629 }
10630 
10631 static struct bpf_verifier_state_list **explored_state(
10632 					struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
10633 					int idx)
10634 {
10635 	struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state;
10636 	struct bpf_func_state *state = cur->frame[cur->curframe];
10637 
10638 	return &env->explored_states[(idx ^ state->callsite) % state_htab_size(env)];
10639 }
10640 
10641 static void init_explored_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx)
10642 {
10643 	env->insn_aux_data[idx].prune_point = true;
10644 }
10645 
10646 enum {
10647 	DONE_EXPLORING = 0,
10648 	KEEP_EXPLORING = 1,
10649 };
10650 
10651 /* t, w, e - match pseudo-code above:
10652  * t - index of current instruction
10653  * w - next instruction
10654  * e - edge
10655  */
10656 static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
10657 		     bool loop_ok)
10658 {
10659 	int *insn_stack = env->cfg.insn_stack;
10660 	int *insn_state = env->cfg.insn_state;
10661 
10662 	if (e == FALLTHROUGH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | FALLTHROUGH))
10663 		return DONE_EXPLORING;
10664 
10665 	if (e == BRANCH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | BRANCH))
10666 		return DONE_EXPLORING;
10667 
10668 	if (w < 0 || w >= env->prog->len) {
10669 		verbose_linfo(env, t, "%d: ", t);
10670 		verbose(env, "jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", t, w);
10671 		return -EINVAL;
10672 	}
10673 
10674 	if (e == BRANCH)
10675 		/* mark branch target for state pruning */
10676 		init_explored_state(env, w);
10677 
10678 	if (insn_state[w] == 0) {
10679 		/* tree-edge */
10680 		insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e;
10681 		insn_state[w] = DISCOVERED;
10682 		if (env->cfg.cur_stack >= env->prog->len)
10683 			return -E2BIG;
10684 		insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack++] = w;
10685 		return KEEP_EXPLORING;
10686 	} else if ((insn_state[w] & 0xF0) == DISCOVERED) {
10687 		if (loop_ok && env->bpf_capable)
10688 			return DONE_EXPLORING;
10689 		verbose_linfo(env, t, "%d: ", t);
10690 		verbose_linfo(env, w, "%d: ", w);
10691 		verbose(env, "back-edge from insn %d to %d\n", t, w);
10692 		return -EINVAL;
10693 	} else if (insn_state[w] == EXPLORED) {
10694 		/* forward- or cross-edge */
10695 		insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e;
10696 	} else {
10697 		verbose(env, "insn state internal bug\n");
10698 		return -EFAULT;
10699 	}
10700 	return DONE_EXPLORING;
10701 }
10702 
10703 static int visit_func_call_insn(int t, int insn_cnt,
10704 				struct bpf_insn *insns,
10705 				struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
10706 				bool visit_callee)
10707 {
10708 	int ret;
10709 
10710 	ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, false);
10711 	if (ret)
10712 		return ret;
10713 
10714 	if (t + 1 < insn_cnt)
10715 		init_explored_state(env, t + 1);
10716 	if (visit_callee) {
10717 		init_explored_state(env, t);
10718 		ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].imm + 1, BRANCH, env,
10719 				/* It's ok to allow recursion from CFG point of
10720 				 * view. __check_func_call() will do the actual
10721 				 * check.
10722 				 */
10723 				bpf_pseudo_func(insns + t));
10724 	}
10725 	return ret;
10726 }
10727 
10728 /* Visits the instruction at index t and returns one of the following:
10729  *  < 0 - an error occurred
10730  *  DONE_EXPLORING - the instruction was fully explored
10731  *  KEEP_EXPLORING - there is still work to be done before it is fully explored
10732  */
10733 static int visit_insn(int t, int insn_cnt, struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
10734 {
10735 	struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
10736 	int ret;
10737 
10738 	if (bpf_pseudo_func(insns + t))
10739 		return visit_func_call_insn(t, insn_cnt, insns, env, true);
10740 
10741 	/* All non-branch instructions have a single fall-through edge. */
10742 	if (BPF_CLASS(insns[t].code) != BPF_JMP &&
10743 	    BPF_CLASS(insns[t].code) != BPF_JMP32)
10744 		return push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, false);
10745 
10746 	switch (BPF_OP(insns[t].code)) {
10747 	case BPF_EXIT:
10748 		return DONE_EXPLORING;
10749 
10750 	case BPF_CALL:
10751 		if (insns[t].imm == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback)
10752 			/* Mark this call insn to trigger is_state_visited() check
10753 			 * before call itself is processed by __check_func_call().
10754 			 * Otherwise new async state will be pushed for further
10755 			 * exploration.
10756 			 */
10757 			init_explored_state(env, t);
10758 		return visit_func_call_insn(t, insn_cnt, insns, env,
10759 					    insns[t].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL);
10760 
10761 	case BPF_JA:
10762 		if (BPF_SRC(insns[t].code) != BPF_K)
10763 			return -EINVAL;
10764 
10765 		/* unconditional jump with single edge */
10766 		ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env,
10767 				true);
10768 		if (ret)
10769 			return ret;
10770 
10771 		/* unconditional jmp is not a good pruning point,
10772 		 * but it's marked, since backtracking needs
10773 		 * to record jmp history in is_state_visited().
10774 		 */
10775 		init_explored_state(env, t + insns[t].off + 1);
10776 		/* tell verifier to check for equivalent states
10777 		 * after every call and jump
10778 		 */
10779 		if (t + 1 < insn_cnt)
10780 			init_explored_state(env, t + 1);
10781 
10782 		return ret;
10783 
10784 	default:
10785 		/* conditional jump with two edges */
10786 		init_explored_state(env, t);
10787 		ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, true);
10788 		if (ret)
10789 			return ret;
10790 
10791 		return push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1, BRANCH, env, true);
10792 	}
10793 }
10794 
10795 /* non-recursive depth-first-search to detect loops in BPF program
10796  * loop == back-edge in directed graph
10797  */
10798 static int check_cfg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
10799 {
10800 	int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
10801 	int *insn_stack, *insn_state;
10802 	int ret = 0;
10803 	int i;
10804 
10805 	insn_state = env->cfg.insn_state = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
10806 	if (!insn_state)
10807 		return -ENOMEM;
10808 
10809 	insn_stack = env->cfg.insn_stack = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
10810 	if (!insn_stack) {
10811 		kvfree(insn_state);
10812 		return -ENOMEM;
10813 	}
10814 
10815 	insn_state[0] = DISCOVERED; /* mark 1st insn as discovered */
10816 	insn_stack[0] = 0; /* 0 is the first instruction */
10817 	env->cfg.cur_stack = 1;
10818 
10819 	while (env->cfg.cur_stack > 0) {
10820 		int t = insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack - 1];
10821 
10822 		ret = visit_insn(t, insn_cnt, env);
10823 		switch (ret) {
10824 		case DONE_EXPLORING:
10825 			insn_state[t] = EXPLORED;
10826 			env->cfg.cur_stack--;
10827 			break;
10828 		case KEEP_EXPLORING:
10829 			break;
10830 		default:
10831 			if (ret > 0) {
10832 				verbose(env, "visit_insn internal bug\n");
10833 				ret = -EFAULT;
10834 			}
10835 			goto err_free;
10836 		}
10837 	}
10838 
10839 	if (env->cfg.cur_stack < 0) {
10840 		verbose(env, "pop stack internal bug\n");
10841 		ret = -EFAULT;
10842 		goto err_free;
10843 	}
10844 
10845 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) {
10846 		if (insn_state[i] != EXPLORED) {
10847 			verbose(env, "unreachable insn %d\n", i);
10848 			ret = -EINVAL;
10849 			goto err_free;
10850 		}
10851 	}
10852 	ret = 0; /* cfg looks good */
10853 
10854 err_free:
10855 	kvfree(insn_state);
10856 	kvfree(insn_stack);
10857 	env->cfg.insn_state = env->cfg.insn_stack = NULL;
10858 	return ret;
10859 }
10860 
10861 static int check_abnormal_return(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
10862 {
10863 	int i;
10864 
10865 	for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
10866 		if (env->subprog_info[i].has_ld_abs) {
10867 			verbose(env, "LD_ABS is not allowed in subprogs without BTF\n");
10868 			return -EINVAL;
10869 		}
10870 		if (env->subprog_info[i].has_tail_call) {
10871 			verbose(env, "tail_call is not allowed in subprogs without BTF\n");
10872 			return -EINVAL;
10873 		}
10874 	}
10875 	return 0;
10876 }
10877 
10878 /* The minimum supported BTF func info size */
10879 #define MIN_BPF_FUNCINFO_SIZE	8
10880 #define MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE	252
10881 
10882 static int check_btf_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
10883 			  const union bpf_attr *attr,
10884 			  bpfptr_t uattr)
10885 {
10886 	const struct btf_type *type, *func_proto, *ret_type;
10887 	u32 i, nfuncs, urec_size, min_size;
10888 	u32 krec_size = sizeof(struct bpf_func_info);
10889 	struct bpf_func_info *krecord;
10890 	struct bpf_func_info_aux *info_aux = NULL;
10891 	struct bpf_prog *prog;
10892 	const struct btf *btf;
10893 	bpfptr_t urecord;
10894 	u32 prev_offset = 0;
10895 	bool scalar_return;
10896 	int ret = -ENOMEM;
10897 
10898 	nfuncs = attr->func_info_cnt;
10899 	if (!nfuncs) {
10900 		if (check_abnormal_return(env))
10901 			return -EINVAL;
10902 		return 0;
10903 	}
10904 
10905 	if (nfuncs != env->subprog_cnt) {
10906 		verbose(env, "number of funcs in func_info doesn't match number of subprogs\n");
10907 		return -EINVAL;
10908 	}
10909 
10910 	urec_size = attr->func_info_rec_size;
10911 	if (urec_size < MIN_BPF_FUNCINFO_SIZE ||
10912 	    urec_size > MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE ||
10913 	    urec_size % sizeof(u32)) {
10914 		verbose(env, "invalid func info rec size %u\n", urec_size);
10915 		return -EINVAL;
10916 	}
10917 
10918 	prog = env->prog;
10919 	btf = prog->aux->btf;
10920 
10921 	urecord = make_bpfptr(attr->func_info, uattr.is_kernel);
10922 	min_size = min_t(u32, krec_size, urec_size);
10923 
10924 	krecord = kvcalloc(nfuncs, krec_size, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
10925 	if (!krecord)
10926 		return -ENOMEM;
10927 	info_aux = kcalloc(nfuncs, sizeof(*info_aux), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
10928 	if (!info_aux)
10929 		goto err_free;
10930 
10931 	for (i = 0; i < nfuncs; i++) {
10932 		ret = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(urecord, krec_size, urec_size);
10933 		if (ret) {
10934 			if (ret == -E2BIG) {
10935 				verbose(env, "nonzero tailing record in func info");
10936 				/* set the size kernel expects so loader can zero
10937 				 * out the rest of the record.
10938 				 */
10939 				if (copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr,
10940 							  offsetof(union bpf_attr, func_info_rec_size),
10941 							  &min_size, sizeof(min_size)))
10942 					ret = -EFAULT;
10943 			}
10944 			goto err_free;
10945 		}
10946 
10947 		if (copy_from_bpfptr(&krecord[i], urecord, min_size)) {
10948 			ret = -EFAULT;
10949 			goto err_free;
10950 		}
10951 
10952 		/* check insn_off */
10953 		ret = -EINVAL;
10954 		if (i == 0) {
10955 			if (krecord[i].insn_off) {
10956 				verbose(env,
10957 					"nonzero insn_off %u for the first func info record",
10958 					krecord[i].insn_off);
10959 				goto err_free;
10960 			}
10961 		} else if (krecord[i].insn_off <= prev_offset) {
10962 			verbose(env,
10963 				"same or smaller insn offset (%u) than previous func info record (%u)",
10964 				krecord[i].insn_off, prev_offset);
10965 			goto err_free;
10966 		}
10967 
10968 		if (env->subprog_info[i].start != krecord[i].insn_off) {
10969 			verbose(env, "func_info BTF section doesn't match subprog layout in BPF program\n");
10970 			goto err_free;
10971 		}
10972 
10973 		/* check type_id */
10974 		type = btf_type_by_id(btf, krecord[i].type_id);
10975 		if (!type || !btf_type_is_func(type)) {
10976 			verbose(env, "invalid type id %d in func info",
10977 				krecord[i].type_id);
10978 			goto err_free;
10979 		}
10980 		info_aux[i].linkage = BTF_INFO_VLEN(type->info);
10981 
10982 		func_proto = btf_type_by_id(btf, type->type);
10983 		if (unlikely(!func_proto || !btf_type_is_func_proto(func_proto)))
10984 			/* btf_func_check() already verified it during BTF load */
10985 			goto err_free;
10986 		ret_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, func_proto->type, NULL);
10987 		scalar_return =
10988 			btf_type_is_small_int(ret_type) || btf_is_any_enum(ret_type);
10989 		if (i && !scalar_return && env->subprog_info[i].has_ld_abs) {
10990 			verbose(env, "LD_ABS is only allowed in functions that return 'int'.\n");
10991 			goto err_free;
10992 		}
10993 		if (i && !scalar_return && env->subprog_info[i].has_tail_call) {
10994 			verbose(env, "tail_call is only allowed in functions that return 'int'.\n");
10995 			goto err_free;
10996 		}
10997 
10998 		prev_offset = krecord[i].insn_off;
10999 		bpfptr_add(&urecord, urec_size);
11000 	}
11001 
11002 	prog->aux->func_info = krecord;
11003 	prog->aux->func_info_cnt = nfuncs;
11004 	prog->aux->func_info_aux = info_aux;
11005 	return 0;
11006 
11007 err_free:
11008 	kvfree(krecord);
11009 	kfree(info_aux);
11010 	return ret;
11011 }
11012 
11013 static void adjust_btf_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
11014 {
11015 	struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux;
11016 	int i;
11017 
11018 	if (!aux->func_info)
11019 		return;
11020 
11021 	for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++)
11022 		aux->func_info[i].insn_off = env->subprog_info[i].start;
11023 }
11024 
11025 #define MIN_BPF_LINEINFO_SIZE	offsetofend(struct bpf_line_info, line_col)
11026 #define MAX_LINEINFO_REC_SIZE	MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE
11027 
11028 static int check_btf_line(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
11029 			  const union bpf_attr *attr,
11030 			  bpfptr_t uattr)
11031 {
11032 	u32 i, s, nr_linfo, ncopy, expected_size, rec_size, prev_offset = 0;
11033 	struct bpf_subprog_info *sub;
11034 	struct bpf_line_info *linfo;
11035 	struct bpf_prog *prog;
11036 	const struct btf *btf;
11037 	bpfptr_t ulinfo;
11038 	int err;
11039 
11040 	nr_linfo = attr->line_info_cnt;
11041 	if (!nr_linfo)
11042 		return 0;
11043 	if (nr_linfo > INT_MAX / sizeof(struct bpf_line_info))
11044 		return -EINVAL;
11045 
11046 	rec_size = attr->line_info_rec_size;
11047 	if (rec_size < MIN_BPF_LINEINFO_SIZE ||
11048 	    rec_size > MAX_LINEINFO_REC_SIZE ||
11049 	    rec_size & (sizeof(u32) - 1))
11050 		return -EINVAL;
11051 
11052 	/* Need to zero it in case the userspace may
11053 	 * pass in a smaller bpf_line_info object.
11054 	 */
11055 	linfo = kvcalloc(nr_linfo, sizeof(struct bpf_line_info),
11056 			 GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
11057 	if (!linfo)
11058 		return -ENOMEM;
11059 
11060 	prog = env->prog;
11061 	btf = prog->aux->btf;
11062 
11063 	s = 0;
11064 	sub = env->subprog_info;
11065 	ulinfo = make_bpfptr(attr->line_info, uattr.is_kernel);
11066 	expected_size = sizeof(struct bpf_line_info);
11067 	ncopy = min_t(u32, expected_size, rec_size);
11068 	for (i = 0; i < nr_linfo; i++) {
11069 		err = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(ulinfo, expected_size, rec_size);
11070 		if (err) {
11071 			if (err == -E2BIG) {
11072 				verbose(env, "nonzero tailing record in line_info");
11073 				if (copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr,
11074 							  offsetof(union bpf_attr, line_info_rec_size),
11075 							  &expected_size, sizeof(expected_size)))
11076 					err = -EFAULT;
11077 			}
11078 			goto err_free;
11079 		}
11080 
11081 		if (copy_from_bpfptr(&linfo[i], ulinfo, ncopy)) {
11082 			err = -EFAULT;
11083 			goto err_free;
11084 		}
11085 
11086 		/*
11087 		 * Check insn_off to ensure
11088 		 * 1) strictly increasing AND
11089 		 * 2) bounded by prog->len
11090 		 *
11091 		 * The linfo[0].insn_off == 0 check logically falls into
11092 		 * the later "missing bpf_line_info for func..." case
11093 		 * because the first linfo[0].insn_off must be the
11094 		 * first sub also and the first sub must have
11095 		 * subprog_info[0].start == 0.
11096 		 */
11097 		if ((i && linfo[i].insn_off <= prev_offset) ||
11098 		    linfo[i].insn_off >= prog->len) {
11099 			verbose(env, "Invalid line_info[%u].insn_off:%u (prev_offset:%u prog->len:%u)\n",
11100 				i, linfo[i].insn_off, prev_offset,
11101 				prog->len);
11102 			err = -EINVAL;
11103 			goto err_free;
11104 		}
11105 
11106 		if (!prog->insnsi[linfo[i].insn_off].code) {
11107 			verbose(env,
11108 				"Invalid insn code at line_info[%u].insn_off\n",
11109 				i);
11110 			err = -EINVAL;
11111 			goto err_free;
11112 		}
11113 
11114 		if (!btf_name_by_offset(btf, linfo[i].line_off) ||
11115 		    !btf_name_by_offset(btf, linfo[i].file_name_off)) {
11116 			verbose(env, "Invalid line_info[%u].line_off or .file_name_off\n", i);
11117 			err = -EINVAL;
11118 			goto err_free;
11119 		}
11120 
11121 		if (s != env->subprog_cnt) {
11122 			if (linfo[i].insn_off == sub[s].start) {
11123 				sub[s].linfo_idx = i;
11124 				s++;
11125 			} else if (sub[s].start < linfo[i].insn_off) {
11126 				verbose(env, "missing bpf_line_info for func#%u\n", s);
11127 				err = -EINVAL;
11128 				goto err_free;
11129 			}
11130 		}
11131 
11132 		prev_offset = linfo[i].insn_off;
11133 		bpfptr_add(&ulinfo, rec_size);
11134 	}
11135 
11136 	if (s != env->subprog_cnt) {
11137 		verbose(env, "missing bpf_line_info for %u funcs starting from func#%u\n",
11138 			env->subprog_cnt - s, s);
11139 		err = -EINVAL;
11140 		goto err_free;
11141 	}
11142 
11143 	prog->aux->linfo = linfo;
11144 	prog->aux->nr_linfo = nr_linfo;
11145 
11146 	return 0;
11147 
11148 err_free:
11149 	kvfree(linfo);
11150 	return err;
11151 }
11152 
11153 #define MIN_CORE_RELO_SIZE	sizeof(struct bpf_core_relo)
11154 #define MAX_CORE_RELO_SIZE	MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE
11155 
11156 static int check_core_relo(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
11157 			   const union bpf_attr *attr,
11158 			   bpfptr_t uattr)
11159 {
11160 	u32 i, nr_core_relo, ncopy, expected_size, rec_size;
11161 	struct bpf_core_relo core_relo = {};
11162 	struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
11163 	const struct btf *btf = prog->aux->btf;
11164 	struct bpf_core_ctx ctx = {
11165 		.log = &env->log,
11166 		.btf = btf,
11167 	};
11168 	bpfptr_t u_core_relo;
11169 	int err;
11170 
11171 	nr_core_relo = attr->core_relo_cnt;
11172 	if (!nr_core_relo)
11173 		return 0;
11174 	if (nr_core_relo > INT_MAX / sizeof(struct bpf_core_relo))
11175 		return -EINVAL;
11176 
11177 	rec_size = attr->core_relo_rec_size;
11178 	if (rec_size < MIN_CORE_RELO_SIZE ||
11179 	    rec_size > MAX_CORE_RELO_SIZE ||
11180 	    rec_size % sizeof(u32))
11181 		return -EINVAL;
11182 
11183 	u_core_relo = make_bpfptr(attr->core_relos, uattr.is_kernel);
11184 	expected_size = sizeof(struct bpf_core_relo);
11185 	ncopy = min_t(u32, expected_size, rec_size);
11186 
11187 	/* Unlike func_info and line_info, copy and apply each CO-RE
11188 	 * relocation record one at a time.
11189 	 */
11190 	for (i = 0; i < nr_core_relo; i++) {
11191 		/* future proofing when sizeof(bpf_core_relo) changes */
11192 		err = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(u_core_relo, expected_size, rec_size);
11193 		if (err) {
11194 			if (err == -E2BIG) {
11195 				verbose(env, "nonzero tailing record in core_relo");
11196 				if (copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr,
11197 							  offsetof(union bpf_attr, core_relo_rec_size),
11198 							  &expected_size, sizeof(expected_size)))
11199 					err = -EFAULT;
11200 			}
11201 			break;
11202 		}
11203 
11204 		if (copy_from_bpfptr(&core_relo, u_core_relo, ncopy)) {
11205 			err = -EFAULT;
11206 			break;
11207 		}
11208 
11209 		if (core_relo.insn_off % 8 || core_relo.insn_off / 8 >= prog->len) {
11210 			verbose(env, "Invalid core_relo[%u].insn_off:%u prog->len:%u\n",
11211 				i, core_relo.insn_off, prog->len);
11212 			err = -EINVAL;
11213 			break;
11214 		}
11215 
11216 		err = bpf_core_apply(&ctx, &core_relo, i,
11217 				     &prog->insnsi[core_relo.insn_off / 8]);
11218 		if (err)
11219 			break;
11220 		bpfptr_add(&u_core_relo, rec_size);
11221 	}
11222 	return err;
11223 }
11224 
11225 static int check_btf_info(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
11226 			  const union bpf_attr *attr,
11227 			  bpfptr_t uattr)
11228 {
11229 	struct btf *btf;
11230 	int err;
11231 
11232 	if (!attr->func_info_cnt && !attr->line_info_cnt) {
11233 		if (check_abnormal_return(env))
11234 			return -EINVAL;
11235 		return 0;
11236 	}
11237 
11238 	btf = btf_get_by_fd(attr->prog_btf_fd);
11239 	if (IS_ERR(btf))
11240 		return PTR_ERR(btf);
11241 	if (btf_is_kernel(btf)) {
11242 		btf_put(btf);
11243 		return -EACCES;
11244 	}
11245 	env->prog->aux->btf = btf;
11246 
11247 	err = check_btf_func(env, attr, uattr);
11248 	if (err)
11249 		return err;
11250 
11251 	err = check_btf_line(env, attr, uattr);
11252 	if (err)
11253 		return err;
11254 
11255 	err = check_core_relo(env, attr, uattr);
11256 	if (err)
11257 		return err;
11258 
11259 	return 0;
11260 }
11261 
11262 /* check %cur's range satisfies %old's */
11263 static bool range_within(struct bpf_reg_state *old,
11264 			 struct bpf_reg_state *cur)
11265 {
11266 	return old->umin_value <= cur->umin_value &&
11267 	       old->umax_value >= cur->umax_value &&
11268 	       old->smin_value <= cur->smin_value &&
11269 	       old->smax_value >= cur->smax_value &&
11270 	       old->u32_min_value <= cur->u32_min_value &&
11271 	       old->u32_max_value >= cur->u32_max_value &&
11272 	       old->s32_min_value <= cur->s32_min_value &&
11273 	       old->s32_max_value >= cur->s32_max_value;
11274 }
11275 
11276 /* If in the old state two registers had the same id, then they need to have
11277  * the same id in the new state as well.  But that id could be different from
11278  * the old state, so we need to track the mapping from old to new ids.
11279  * Once we have seen that, say, a reg with old id 5 had new id 9, any subsequent
11280  * regs with old id 5 must also have new id 9 for the new state to be safe.  But
11281  * regs with a different old id could still have new id 9, we don't care about
11282  * that.
11283  * So we look through our idmap to see if this old id has been seen before.  If
11284  * so, we require the new id to match; otherwise, we add the id pair to the map.
11285  */
11286 static bool check_ids(u32 old_id, u32 cur_id, struct bpf_id_pair *idmap)
11287 {
11288 	unsigned int i;
11289 
11290 	for (i = 0; i < BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE; i++) {
11291 		if (!idmap[i].old) {
11292 			/* Reached an empty slot; haven't seen this id before */
11293 			idmap[i].old = old_id;
11294 			idmap[i].cur = cur_id;
11295 			return true;
11296 		}
11297 		if (idmap[i].old == old_id)
11298 			return idmap[i].cur == cur_id;
11299 	}
11300 	/* We ran out of idmap slots, which should be impossible */
11301 	WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
11302 	return false;
11303 }
11304 
11305 static void clean_func_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
11306 			     struct bpf_func_state *st)
11307 {
11308 	enum bpf_reg_liveness live;
11309 	int i, j;
11310 
11311 	for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) {
11312 		live = st->regs[i].live;
11313 		/* liveness must not touch this register anymore */
11314 		st->regs[i].live |= REG_LIVE_DONE;
11315 		if (!(live & REG_LIVE_READ))
11316 			/* since the register is unused, clear its state
11317 			 * to make further comparison simpler
11318 			 */
11319 			__mark_reg_not_init(env, &st->regs[i]);
11320 	}
11321 
11322 	for (i = 0; i < st->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
11323 		live = st->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live;
11324 		/* liveness must not touch this stack slot anymore */
11325 		st->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_DONE;
11326 		if (!(live & REG_LIVE_READ)) {
11327 			__mark_reg_not_init(env, &st->stack[i].spilled_ptr);
11328 			for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++)
11329 				st->stack[i].slot_type[j] = STACK_INVALID;
11330 		}
11331 	}
11332 }
11333 
11334 static void clean_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
11335 				 struct bpf_verifier_state *st)
11336 {
11337 	int i;
11338 
11339 	if (st->frame[0]->regs[0].live & REG_LIVE_DONE)
11340 		/* all regs in this state in all frames were already marked */
11341 		return;
11342 
11343 	for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++)
11344 		clean_func_state(env, st->frame[i]);
11345 }
11346 
11347 /* the parentage chains form a tree.
11348  * the verifier states are added to state lists at given insn and
11349  * pushed into state stack for future exploration.
11350  * when the verifier reaches bpf_exit insn some of the verifer states
11351  * stored in the state lists have their final liveness state already,
11352  * but a lot of states will get revised from liveness point of view when
11353  * the verifier explores other branches.
11354  * Example:
11355  * 1: r0 = 1
11356  * 2: if r1 == 100 goto pc+1
11357  * 3: r0 = 2
11358  * 4: exit
11359  * when the verifier reaches exit insn the register r0 in the state list of
11360  * insn 2 will be seen as !REG_LIVE_READ. Then the verifier pops the other_branch
11361  * of insn 2 and goes exploring further. At the insn 4 it will walk the
11362  * parentage chain from insn 4 into insn 2 and will mark r0 as REG_LIVE_READ.
11363  *
11364  * Since the verifier pushes the branch states as it sees them while exploring
11365  * the program the condition of walking the branch instruction for the second
11366  * time means that all states below this branch were already explored and
11367  * their final liveness marks are already propagated.
11368  * Hence when the verifier completes the search of state list in is_state_visited()
11369  * we can call this clean_live_states() function to mark all liveness states
11370  * as REG_LIVE_DONE to indicate that 'parent' pointers of 'struct bpf_reg_state'
11371  * will not be used.
11372  * This function also clears the registers and stack for states that !READ
11373  * to simplify state merging.
11374  *
11375  * Important note here that walking the same branch instruction in the callee
11376  * doesn't meant that the states are DONE. The verifier has to compare
11377  * the callsites
11378  */
11379 static void clean_live_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn,
11380 			      struct bpf_verifier_state *cur)
11381 {
11382 	struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl;
11383 	int i;
11384 
11385 	sl = *explored_state(env, insn);
11386 	while (sl) {
11387 		if (sl->state.branches)
11388 			goto next;
11389 		if (sl->state.insn_idx != insn ||
11390 		    sl->state.curframe != cur->curframe)
11391 			goto next;
11392 		for (i = 0; i <= cur->curframe; i++)
11393 			if (sl->state.frame[i]->callsite != cur->frame[i]->callsite)
11394 				goto next;
11395 		clean_verifier_state(env, &sl->state);
11396 next:
11397 		sl = sl->next;
11398 	}
11399 }
11400 
11401 /* Returns true if (rold safe implies rcur safe) */
11402 static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold,
11403 		    struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, struct bpf_id_pair *idmap)
11404 {
11405 	bool equal;
11406 
11407 	if (!(rold->live & REG_LIVE_READ))
11408 		/* explored state didn't use this */
11409 		return true;
11410 
11411 	equal = memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, parent)) == 0;
11412 
11413 	if (rold->type == PTR_TO_STACK)
11414 		/* two stack pointers are equal only if they're pointing to
11415 		 * the same stack frame, since fp-8 in foo != fp-8 in bar
11416 		 */
11417 		return equal && rold->frameno == rcur->frameno;
11418 
11419 	if (equal)
11420 		return true;
11421 
11422 	if (rold->type == NOT_INIT)
11423 		/* explored state can't have used this */
11424 		return true;
11425 	if (rcur->type == NOT_INIT)
11426 		return false;
11427 	switch (base_type(rold->type)) {
11428 	case SCALAR_VALUE:
11429 		if (env->explore_alu_limits)
11430 			return false;
11431 		if (rcur->type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
11432 			if (!rold->precise && !rcur->precise)
11433 				return true;
11434 			/* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */
11435 			return range_within(rold, rcur) &&
11436 			       tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off);
11437 		} else {
11438 			/* We're trying to use a pointer in place of a scalar.
11439 			 * Even if the scalar was unbounded, this could lead to
11440 			 * pointer leaks because scalars are allowed to leak
11441 			 * while pointers are not. We could make this safe in
11442 			 * special cases if root is calling us, but it's
11443 			 * probably not worth the hassle.
11444 			 */
11445 			return false;
11446 		}
11447 	case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY:
11448 	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
11449 		/* a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE could be safe to use as a
11450 		 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL into the same map.
11451 		 * However, if the old PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL then got NULL-
11452 		 * checked, doing so could have affected others with the same
11453 		 * id, and we can't check for that because we lost the id when
11454 		 * we converted to a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE.
11455 		 */
11456 		if (type_may_be_null(rold->type)) {
11457 			if (!type_may_be_null(rcur->type))
11458 				return false;
11459 			if (memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)))
11460 				return false;
11461 			/* Check our ids match any regs they're supposed to */
11462 			return check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap);
11463 		}
11464 
11465 		/* If the new min/max/var_off satisfy the old ones and
11466 		 * everything else matches, we are OK.
11467 		 * 'id' is not compared, since it's only used for maps with
11468 		 * bpf_spin_lock inside map element and in such cases if
11469 		 * the rest of the prog is valid for one map element then
11470 		 * it's valid for all map elements regardless of the key
11471 		 * used in bpf_map_lookup()
11472 		 */
11473 		return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0 &&
11474 		       range_within(rold, rcur) &&
11475 		       tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off);
11476 	case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
11477 	case PTR_TO_PACKET:
11478 		if (rcur->type != rold->type)
11479 			return false;
11480 		/* We must have at least as much range as the old ptr
11481 		 * did, so that any accesses which were safe before are
11482 		 * still safe.  This is true even if old range < old off,
11483 		 * since someone could have accessed through (ptr - k), or
11484 		 * even done ptr -= k in a register, to get a safe access.
11485 		 */
11486 		if (rold->range > rcur->range)
11487 			return false;
11488 		/* If the offsets don't match, we can't trust our alignment;
11489 		 * nor can we be sure that we won't fall out of range.
11490 		 */
11491 		if (rold->off != rcur->off)
11492 			return false;
11493 		/* id relations must be preserved */
11494 		if (rold->id && !check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap))
11495 			return false;
11496 		/* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */
11497 		return range_within(rold, rcur) &&
11498 		       tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off);
11499 	case PTR_TO_CTX:
11500 	case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP:
11501 	case PTR_TO_PACKET_END:
11502 	case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS:
11503 	case PTR_TO_SOCKET:
11504 	case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON:
11505 	case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
11506 	case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK:
11507 		/* Only valid matches are exact, which memcmp() above
11508 		 * would have accepted
11509 		 */
11510 	default:
11511 		/* Don't know what's going on, just say it's not safe */
11512 		return false;
11513 	}
11514 
11515 	/* Shouldn't get here; if we do, say it's not safe */
11516 	WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
11517 	return false;
11518 }
11519 
11520 static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old,
11521 		      struct bpf_func_state *cur, struct bpf_id_pair *idmap)
11522 {
11523 	int i, spi;
11524 
11525 	/* walk slots of the explored stack and ignore any additional
11526 	 * slots in the current stack, since explored(safe) state
11527 	 * didn't use them
11528 	 */
11529 	for (i = 0; i < old->allocated_stack; i++) {
11530 		spi = i / BPF_REG_SIZE;
11531 
11532 		if (!(old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live & REG_LIVE_READ)) {
11533 			i += BPF_REG_SIZE - 1;
11534 			/* explored state didn't use this */
11535 			continue;
11536 		}
11537 
11538 		if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_INVALID)
11539 			continue;
11540 
11541 		/* explored stack has more populated slots than current stack
11542 		 * and these slots were used
11543 		 */
11544 		if (i >= cur->allocated_stack)
11545 			return false;
11546 
11547 		/* if old state was safe with misc data in the stack
11548 		 * it will be safe with zero-initialized stack.
11549 		 * The opposite is not true
11550 		 */
11551 		if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_MISC &&
11552 		    cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_ZERO)
11553 			continue;
11554 		if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] !=
11555 		    cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE])
11556 			/* Ex: old explored (safe) state has STACK_SPILL in
11557 			 * this stack slot, but current has STACK_MISC ->
11558 			 * this verifier states are not equivalent,
11559 			 * return false to continue verification of this path
11560 			 */
11561 			return false;
11562 		if (i % BPF_REG_SIZE != BPF_REG_SIZE - 1)
11563 			continue;
11564 		if (!is_spilled_reg(&old->stack[spi]))
11565 			continue;
11566 		if (!regsafe(env, &old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr,
11567 			     &cur->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, idmap))
11568 			/* when explored and current stack slot are both storing
11569 			 * spilled registers, check that stored pointers types
11570 			 * are the same as well.
11571 			 * Ex: explored safe path could have stored
11572 			 * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -8}
11573 			 * but current path has stored:
11574 			 * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -16}
11575 			 * such verifier states are not equivalent.
11576 			 * return false to continue verification of this path
11577 			 */
11578 			return false;
11579 	}
11580 	return true;
11581 }
11582 
11583 static bool refsafe(struct bpf_func_state *old, struct bpf_func_state *cur)
11584 {
11585 	if (old->acquired_refs != cur->acquired_refs)
11586 		return false;
11587 	return !memcmp(old->refs, cur->refs,
11588 		       sizeof(*old->refs) * old->acquired_refs);
11589 }
11590 
11591 /* compare two verifier states
11592  *
11593  * all states stored in state_list are known to be valid, since
11594  * verifier reached 'bpf_exit' instruction through them
11595  *
11596  * this function is called when verifier exploring different branches of
11597  * execution popped from the state stack. If it sees an old state that has
11598  * more strict register state and more strict stack state then this execution
11599  * branch doesn't need to be explored further, since verifier already
11600  * concluded that more strict state leads to valid finish.
11601  *
11602  * Therefore two states are equivalent if register state is more conservative
11603  * and explored stack state is more conservative than the current one.
11604  * Example:
11605  *       explored                   current
11606  * (slot1=INV slot2=MISC) == (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC)
11607  * (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC) != (slot1=INV slot2=MISC)
11608  *
11609  * In other words if current stack state (one being explored) has more
11610  * valid slots than old one that already passed validation, it means
11611  * the verifier can stop exploring and conclude that current state is valid too
11612  *
11613  * Similarly with registers. If explored state has register type as invalid
11614  * whereas register type in current state is meaningful, it means that
11615  * the current state will reach 'bpf_exit' instruction safely
11616  */
11617 static bool func_states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old,
11618 			      struct bpf_func_state *cur)
11619 {
11620 	int i;
11621 
11622 	memset(env->idmap_scratch, 0, sizeof(env->idmap_scratch));
11623 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
11624 		if (!regsafe(env, &old->regs[i], &cur->regs[i],
11625 			     env->idmap_scratch))
11626 			return false;
11627 
11628 	if (!stacksafe(env, old, cur, env->idmap_scratch))
11629 		return false;
11630 
11631 	if (!refsafe(old, cur))
11632 		return false;
11633 
11634 	return true;
11635 }
11636 
11637 static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
11638 			 struct bpf_verifier_state *old,
11639 			 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur)
11640 {
11641 	int i;
11642 
11643 	if (old->curframe != cur->curframe)
11644 		return false;
11645 
11646 	/* Verification state from speculative execution simulation
11647 	 * must never prune a non-speculative execution one.
11648 	 */
11649 	if (old->speculative && !cur->speculative)
11650 		return false;
11651 
11652 	if (old->active_spin_lock != cur->active_spin_lock)
11653 		return false;
11654 
11655 	/* for states to be equal callsites have to be the same
11656 	 * and all frame states need to be equivalent
11657 	 */
11658 	for (i = 0; i <= old->curframe; i++) {
11659 		if (old->frame[i]->callsite != cur->frame[i]->callsite)
11660 			return false;
11661 		if (!func_states_equal(env, old->frame[i], cur->frame[i]))
11662 			return false;
11663 	}
11664 	return true;
11665 }
11666 
11667 /* Return 0 if no propagation happened. Return negative error code if error
11668  * happened. Otherwise, return the propagated bit.
11669  */
11670 static int propagate_liveness_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
11671 				  struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
11672 				  struct bpf_reg_state *parent_reg)
11673 {
11674 	u8 parent_flag = parent_reg->live & REG_LIVE_READ;
11675 	u8 flag = reg->live & REG_LIVE_READ;
11676 	int err;
11677 
11678 	/* When comes here, read flags of PARENT_REG or REG could be any of
11679 	 * REG_LIVE_READ64, REG_LIVE_READ32, REG_LIVE_NONE. There is no need
11680 	 * of propagation if PARENT_REG has strongest REG_LIVE_READ64.
11681 	 */
11682 	if (parent_flag == REG_LIVE_READ64 ||
11683 	    /* Or if there is no read flag from REG. */
11684 	    !flag ||
11685 	    /* Or if the read flag from REG is the same as PARENT_REG. */
11686 	    parent_flag == flag)
11687 		return 0;
11688 
11689 	err = mark_reg_read(env, reg, parent_reg, flag);
11690 	if (err)
11691 		return err;
11692 
11693 	return flag;
11694 }
11695 
11696 /* A write screens off any subsequent reads; but write marks come from the
11697  * straight-line code between a state and its parent.  When we arrive at an
11698  * equivalent state (jump target or such) we didn't arrive by the straight-line
11699  * code, so read marks in the state must propagate to the parent regardless
11700  * of the state's write marks. That's what 'parent == state->parent' comparison
11701  * in mark_reg_read() is for.
11702  */
11703 static int propagate_liveness(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
11704 			      const struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate,
11705 			      struct bpf_verifier_state *vparent)
11706 {
11707 	struct bpf_reg_state *state_reg, *parent_reg;
11708 	struct bpf_func_state *state, *parent;
11709 	int i, frame, err = 0;
11710 
11711 	if (vparent->curframe != vstate->curframe) {
11712 		WARN(1, "propagate_live: parent frame %d current frame %d\n",
11713 		     vparent->curframe, vstate->curframe);
11714 		return -EFAULT;
11715 	}
11716 	/* Propagate read liveness of registers... */
11717 	BUILD_BUG_ON(BPF_REG_FP + 1 != MAX_BPF_REG);
11718 	for (frame = 0; frame <= vstate->curframe; frame++) {
11719 		parent = vparent->frame[frame];
11720 		state = vstate->frame[frame];
11721 		parent_reg = parent->regs;
11722 		state_reg = state->regs;
11723 		/* We don't need to worry about FP liveness, it's read-only */
11724 		for (i = frame < vstate->curframe ? BPF_REG_6 : 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) {
11725 			err = propagate_liveness_reg(env, &state_reg[i],
11726 						     &parent_reg[i]);
11727 			if (err < 0)
11728 				return err;
11729 			if (err == REG_LIVE_READ64)
11730 				mark_insn_zext(env, &parent_reg[i]);
11731 		}
11732 
11733 		/* Propagate stack slots. */
11734 		for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE &&
11735 			    i < parent->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
11736 			parent_reg = &parent->stack[i].spilled_ptr;
11737 			state_reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr;
11738 			err = propagate_liveness_reg(env, state_reg,
11739 						     parent_reg);
11740 			if (err < 0)
11741 				return err;
11742 		}
11743 	}
11744 	return 0;
11745 }
11746 
11747 /* find precise scalars in the previous equivalent state and
11748  * propagate them into the current state
11749  */
11750 static int propagate_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
11751 			       const struct bpf_verifier_state *old)
11752 {
11753 	struct bpf_reg_state *state_reg;
11754 	struct bpf_func_state *state;
11755 	int i, err = 0;
11756 
11757 	state = old->frame[old->curframe];
11758 	state_reg = state->regs;
11759 	for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++, state_reg++) {
11760 		if (state_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE ||
11761 		    !state_reg->precise)
11762 			continue;
11763 		if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2)
11764 			verbose(env, "propagating r%d\n", i);
11765 		err = mark_chain_precision(env, i);
11766 		if (err < 0)
11767 			return err;
11768 	}
11769 
11770 	for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
11771 		if (!is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[i]))
11772 			continue;
11773 		state_reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr;
11774 		if (state_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE ||
11775 		    !state_reg->precise)
11776 			continue;
11777 		if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2)
11778 			verbose(env, "propagating fp%d\n",
11779 				(-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE);
11780 		err = mark_chain_precision_stack(env, i);
11781 		if (err < 0)
11782 			return err;
11783 	}
11784 	return 0;
11785 }
11786 
11787 static bool states_maybe_looping(struct bpf_verifier_state *old,
11788 				 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur)
11789 {
11790 	struct bpf_func_state *fold, *fcur;
11791 	int i, fr = cur->curframe;
11792 
11793 	if (old->curframe != fr)
11794 		return false;
11795 
11796 	fold = old->frame[fr];
11797 	fcur = cur->frame[fr];
11798 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
11799 		if (memcmp(&fold->regs[i], &fcur->regs[i],
11800 			   offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, parent)))
11801 			return false;
11802 	return true;
11803 }
11804 
11805 
11806 static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
11807 {
11808 	struct bpf_verifier_state_list *new_sl;
11809 	struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl, **pprev;
11810 	struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state, *new;
11811 	int i, j, err, states_cnt = 0;
11812 	bool add_new_state = env->test_state_freq ? true : false;
11813 
11814 	cur->last_insn_idx = env->prev_insn_idx;
11815 	if (!env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].prune_point)
11816 		/* this 'insn_idx' instruction wasn't marked, so we will not
11817 		 * be doing state search here
11818 		 */
11819 		return 0;
11820 
11821 	/* bpf progs typically have pruning point every 4 instructions
11822 	 * http://vger.kernel.org/bpfconf2019.html#session-1
11823 	 * Do not add new state for future pruning if the verifier hasn't seen
11824 	 * at least 2 jumps and at least 8 instructions.
11825 	 * This heuristics helps decrease 'total_states' and 'peak_states' metric.
11826 	 * In tests that amounts to up to 50% reduction into total verifier
11827 	 * memory consumption and 20% verifier time speedup.
11828 	 */
11829 	if (env->jmps_processed - env->prev_jmps_processed >= 2 &&
11830 	    env->insn_processed - env->prev_insn_processed >= 8)
11831 		add_new_state = true;
11832 
11833 	pprev = explored_state(env, insn_idx);
11834 	sl = *pprev;
11835 
11836 	clean_live_states(env, insn_idx, cur);
11837 
11838 	while (sl) {
11839 		states_cnt++;
11840 		if (sl->state.insn_idx != insn_idx)
11841 			goto next;
11842 
11843 		if (sl->state.branches) {
11844 			struct bpf_func_state *frame = sl->state.frame[sl->state.curframe];
11845 
11846 			if (frame->in_async_callback_fn &&
11847 			    frame->async_entry_cnt != cur->frame[cur->curframe]->async_entry_cnt) {
11848 				/* Different async_entry_cnt means that the verifier is
11849 				 * processing another entry into async callback.
11850 				 * Seeing the same state is not an indication of infinite
11851 				 * loop or infinite recursion.
11852 				 * But finding the same state doesn't mean that it's safe
11853 				 * to stop processing the current state. The previous state
11854 				 * hasn't yet reached bpf_exit, since state.branches > 0.
11855 				 * Checking in_async_callback_fn alone is not enough either.
11856 				 * Since the verifier still needs to catch infinite loops
11857 				 * inside async callbacks.
11858 				 */
11859 			} else if (states_maybe_looping(&sl->state, cur) &&
11860 				   states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur)) {
11861 				verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; ");
11862 				verbose(env, "infinite loop detected at insn %d\n", insn_idx);
11863 				return -EINVAL;
11864 			}
11865 			/* if the verifier is processing a loop, avoid adding new state
11866 			 * too often, since different loop iterations have distinct
11867 			 * states and may not help future pruning.
11868 			 * This threshold shouldn't be too low to make sure that
11869 			 * a loop with large bound will be rejected quickly.
11870 			 * The most abusive loop will be:
11871 			 * r1 += 1
11872 			 * if r1 < 1000000 goto pc-2
11873 			 * 1M insn_procssed limit / 100 == 10k peak states.
11874 			 * This threshold shouldn't be too high either, since states
11875 			 * at the end of the loop are likely to be useful in pruning.
11876 			 */
11877 			if (env->jmps_processed - env->prev_jmps_processed < 20 &&
11878 			    env->insn_processed - env->prev_insn_processed < 100)
11879 				add_new_state = false;
11880 			goto miss;
11881 		}
11882 		if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur)) {
11883 			sl->hit_cnt++;
11884 			/* reached equivalent register/stack state,
11885 			 * prune the search.
11886 			 * Registers read by the continuation are read by us.
11887 			 * If we have any write marks in env->cur_state, they
11888 			 * will prevent corresponding reads in the continuation
11889 			 * from reaching our parent (an explored_state).  Our
11890 			 * own state will get the read marks recorded, but
11891 			 * they'll be immediately forgotten as we're pruning
11892 			 * this state and will pop a new one.
11893 			 */
11894 			err = propagate_liveness(env, &sl->state, cur);
11895 
11896 			/* if previous state reached the exit with precision and
11897 			 * current state is equivalent to it (except precsion marks)
11898 			 * the precision needs to be propagated back in
11899 			 * the current state.
11900 			 */
11901 			err = err ? : push_jmp_history(env, cur);
11902 			err = err ? : propagate_precision(env, &sl->state);
11903 			if (err)
11904 				return err;
11905 			return 1;
11906 		}
11907 miss:
11908 		/* when new state is not going to be added do not increase miss count.
11909 		 * Otherwise several loop iterations will remove the state
11910 		 * recorded earlier. The goal of these heuristics is to have
11911 		 * states from some iterations of the loop (some in the beginning
11912 		 * and some at the end) to help pruning.
11913 		 */
11914 		if (add_new_state)
11915 			sl->miss_cnt++;
11916 		/* heuristic to determine whether this state is beneficial
11917 		 * to keep checking from state equivalence point of view.
11918 		 * Higher numbers increase max_states_per_insn and verification time,
11919 		 * but do not meaningfully decrease insn_processed.
11920 		 */
11921 		if (sl->miss_cnt > sl->hit_cnt * 3 + 3) {
11922 			/* the state is unlikely to be useful. Remove it to
11923 			 * speed up verification
11924 			 */
11925 			*pprev = sl->next;
11926 			if (sl->state.frame[0]->regs[0].live & REG_LIVE_DONE) {
11927 				u32 br = sl->state.branches;
11928 
11929 				WARN_ONCE(br,
11930 					  "BUG live_done but branches_to_explore %d\n",
11931 					  br);
11932 				free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false);
11933 				kfree(sl);
11934 				env->peak_states--;
11935 			} else {
11936 				/* cannot free this state, since parentage chain may
11937 				 * walk it later. Add it for free_list instead to
11938 				 * be freed at the end of verification
11939 				 */
11940 				sl->next = env->free_list;
11941 				env->free_list = sl;
11942 			}
11943 			sl = *pprev;
11944 			continue;
11945 		}
11946 next:
11947 		pprev = &sl->next;
11948 		sl = *pprev;
11949 	}
11950 
11951 	if (env->max_states_per_insn < states_cnt)
11952 		env->max_states_per_insn = states_cnt;
11953 
11954 	if (!env->bpf_capable && states_cnt > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES)
11955 		return push_jmp_history(env, cur);
11956 
11957 	if (!add_new_state)
11958 		return push_jmp_history(env, cur);
11959 
11960 	/* There were no equivalent states, remember the current one.
11961 	 * Technically the current state is not proven to be safe yet,
11962 	 * but it will either reach outer most bpf_exit (which means it's safe)
11963 	 * or it will be rejected. When there are no loops the verifier won't be
11964 	 * seeing this tuple (frame[0].callsite, frame[1].callsite, .. insn_idx)
11965 	 * again on the way to bpf_exit.
11966 	 * When looping the sl->state.branches will be > 0 and this state
11967 	 * will not be considered for equivalence until branches == 0.
11968 	 */
11969 	new_sl = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list), GFP_KERNEL);
11970 	if (!new_sl)
11971 		return -ENOMEM;
11972 	env->total_states++;
11973 	env->peak_states++;
11974 	env->prev_jmps_processed = env->jmps_processed;
11975 	env->prev_insn_processed = env->insn_processed;
11976 
11977 	/* add new state to the head of linked list */
11978 	new = &new_sl->state;
11979 	err = copy_verifier_state(new, cur);
11980 	if (err) {
11981 		free_verifier_state(new, false);
11982 		kfree(new_sl);
11983 		return err;
11984 	}
11985 	new->insn_idx = insn_idx;
11986 	WARN_ONCE(new->branches != 1,
11987 		  "BUG is_state_visited:branches_to_explore=%d insn %d\n", new->branches, insn_idx);
11988 
11989 	cur->parent = new;
11990 	cur->first_insn_idx = insn_idx;
11991 	clear_jmp_history(cur);
11992 	new_sl->next = *explored_state(env, insn_idx);
11993 	*explored_state(env, insn_idx) = new_sl;
11994 	/* connect new state to parentage chain. Current frame needs all
11995 	 * registers connected. Only r6 - r9 of the callers are alive (pushed
11996 	 * to the stack implicitly by JITs) so in callers' frames connect just
11997 	 * r6 - r9 as an optimization. Callers will have r1 - r5 connected to
11998 	 * the state of the call instruction (with WRITTEN set), and r0 comes
11999 	 * from callee with its full parentage chain, anyway.
12000 	 */
12001 	/* clear write marks in current state: the writes we did are not writes
12002 	 * our child did, so they don't screen off its reads from us.
12003 	 * (There are no read marks in current state, because reads always mark
12004 	 * their parent and current state never has children yet.  Only
12005 	 * explored_states can get read marks.)
12006 	 */
12007 	for (j = 0; j <= cur->curframe; j++) {
12008 		for (i = j < cur->curframe ? BPF_REG_6 : 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++)
12009 			cur->frame[j]->regs[i].parent = &new->frame[j]->regs[i];
12010 		for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++)
12011 			cur->frame[j]->regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE;
12012 	}
12013 
12014 	/* all stack frames are accessible from callee, clear them all */
12015 	for (j = 0; j <= cur->curframe; j++) {
12016 		struct bpf_func_state *frame = cur->frame[j];
12017 		struct bpf_func_state *newframe = new->frame[j];
12018 
12019 		for (i = 0; i < frame->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
12020 			frame->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live = REG_LIVE_NONE;
12021 			frame->stack[i].spilled_ptr.parent =
12022 						&newframe->stack[i].spilled_ptr;
12023 		}
12024 	}
12025 	return 0;
12026 }
12027 
12028 /* Return true if it's OK to have the same insn return a different type. */
12029 static bool reg_type_mismatch_ok(enum bpf_reg_type type)
12030 {
12031 	switch (base_type(type)) {
12032 	case PTR_TO_CTX:
12033 	case PTR_TO_SOCKET:
12034 	case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON:
12035 	case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
12036 	case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK:
12037 	case PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
12038 		return false;
12039 	default:
12040 		return true;
12041 	}
12042 }
12043 
12044 /* If an instruction was previously used with particular pointer types, then we
12045  * need to be careful to avoid cases such as the below, where it may be ok
12046  * for one branch accessing the pointer, but not ok for the other branch:
12047  *
12048  * R1 = sock_ptr
12049  * goto X;
12050  * ...
12051  * R1 = some_other_valid_ptr;
12052  * goto X;
12053  * ...
12054  * R2 = *(u32 *)(R1 + 0);
12055  */
12056 static bool reg_type_mismatch(enum bpf_reg_type src, enum bpf_reg_type prev)
12057 {
12058 	return src != prev && (!reg_type_mismatch_ok(src) ||
12059 			       !reg_type_mismatch_ok(prev));
12060 }
12061 
12062 static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
12063 {
12064 	bool pop_log = !(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2);
12065 	struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state;
12066 	struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
12067 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs;
12068 	int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
12069 	bool do_print_state = false;
12070 	int prev_insn_idx = -1;
12071 
12072 	for (;;) {
12073 		struct bpf_insn *insn;
12074 		u8 class;
12075 		int err;
12076 
12077 		env->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx;
12078 		if (env->insn_idx >= insn_cnt) {
12079 			verbose(env, "invalid insn idx %d insn_cnt %d\n",
12080 				env->insn_idx, insn_cnt);
12081 			return -EFAULT;
12082 		}
12083 
12084 		insn = &insns[env->insn_idx];
12085 		class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
12086 
12087 		if (++env->insn_processed > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS) {
12088 			verbose(env,
12089 				"BPF program is too large. Processed %d insn\n",
12090 				env->insn_processed);
12091 			return -E2BIG;
12092 		}
12093 
12094 		err = is_state_visited(env, env->insn_idx);
12095 		if (err < 0)
12096 			return err;
12097 		if (err == 1) {
12098 			/* found equivalent state, can prune the search */
12099 			if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) {
12100 				if (do_print_state)
12101 					verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d%s: safe\n",
12102 						env->prev_insn_idx, env->insn_idx,
12103 						env->cur_state->speculative ?
12104 						" (speculative execution)" : "");
12105 				else
12106 					verbose(env, "%d: safe\n", env->insn_idx);
12107 			}
12108 			goto process_bpf_exit;
12109 		}
12110 
12111 		if (signal_pending(current))
12112 			return -EAGAIN;
12113 
12114 		if (need_resched())
12115 			cond_resched();
12116 
12117 		if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2 && do_print_state) {
12118 			verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d%s:",
12119 				env->prev_insn_idx, env->insn_idx,
12120 				env->cur_state->speculative ?
12121 				" (speculative execution)" : "");
12122 			print_verifier_state(env, state->frame[state->curframe], true);
12123 			do_print_state = false;
12124 		}
12125 
12126 		if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) {
12127 			const struct bpf_insn_cbs cbs = {
12128 				.cb_call	= disasm_kfunc_name,
12129 				.cb_print	= verbose,
12130 				.private_data	= env,
12131 			};
12132 
12133 			if (verifier_state_scratched(env))
12134 				print_insn_state(env, state->frame[state->curframe]);
12135 
12136 			verbose_linfo(env, env->insn_idx, "; ");
12137 			env->prev_log_len = env->log.len_used;
12138 			verbose(env, "%d: ", env->insn_idx);
12139 			print_bpf_insn(&cbs, insn, env->allow_ptr_leaks);
12140 			env->prev_insn_print_len = env->log.len_used - env->prev_log_len;
12141 			env->prev_log_len = env->log.len_used;
12142 		}
12143 
12144 		if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) {
12145 			err = bpf_prog_offload_verify_insn(env, env->insn_idx,
12146 							   env->prev_insn_idx);
12147 			if (err)
12148 				return err;
12149 		}
12150 
12151 		regs = cur_regs(env);
12152 		sanitize_mark_insn_seen(env);
12153 		prev_insn_idx = env->insn_idx;
12154 
12155 		if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
12156 			err = check_alu_op(env, insn);
12157 			if (err)
12158 				return err;
12159 
12160 		} else if (class == BPF_LDX) {
12161 			enum bpf_reg_type *prev_src_type, src_reg_type;
12162 
12163 			/* check for reserved fields is already done */
12164 
12165 			/* check src operand */
12166 			err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
12167 			if (err)
12168 				return err;
12169 
12170 			err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK);
12171 			if (err)
12172 				return err;
12173 
12174 			src_reg_type = regs[insn->src_reg].type;
12175 
12176 			/* check that memory (src_reg + off) is readable,
12177 			 * the state of dst_reg will be updated by this func
12178 			 */
12179 			err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->src_reg,
12180 					       insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code),
12181 					       BPF_READ, insn->dst_reg, false);
12182 			if (err)
12183 				return err;
12184 
12185 			prev_src_type = &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].ptr_type;
12186 
12187 			if (*prev_src_type == NOT_INIT) {
12188 				/* saw a valid insn
12189 				 * dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + off)
12190 				 * save type to validate intersecting paths
12191 				 */
12192 				*prev_src_type = src_reg_type;
12193 
12194 			} else if (reg_type_mismatch(src_reg_type, *prev_src_type)) {
12195 				/* ABuser program is trying to use the same insn
12196 				 * dst_reg = *(u32*) (src_reg + off)
12197 				 * with different pointer types:
12198 				 * src_reg == ctx in one branch and
12199 				 * src_reg == stack|map in some other branch.
12200 				 * Reject it.
12201 				 */
12202 				verbose(env, "same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n");
12203 				return -EINVAL;
12204 			}
12205 
12206 		} else if (class == BPF_STX) {
12207 			enum bpf_reg_type *prev_dst_type, dst_reg_type;
12208 
12209 			if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC) {
12210 				err = check_atomic(env, env->insn_idx, insn);
12211 				if (err)
12212 					return err;
12213 				env->insn_idx++;
12214 				continue;
12215 			}
12216 
12217 			if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0) {
12218 				verbose(env, "BPF_STX uses reserved fields\n");
12219 				return -EINVAL;
12220 			}
12221 
12222 			/* check src1 operand */
12223 			err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
12224 			if (err)
12225 				return err;
12226 			/* check src2 operand */
12227 			err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
12228 			if (err)
12229 				return err;
12230 
12231 			dst_reg_type = regs[insn->dst_reg].type;
12232 
12233 			/* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */
12234 			err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg,
12235 					       insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code),
12236 					       BPF_WRITE, insn->src_reg, false);
12237 			if (err)
12238 				return err;
12239 
12240 			prev_dst_type = &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].ptr_type;
12241 
12242 			if (*prev_dst_type == NOT_INIT) {
12243 				*prev_dst_type = dst_reg_type;
12244 			} else if (reg_type_mismatch(dst_reg_type, *prev_dst_type)) {
12245 				verbose(env, "same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n");
12246 				return -EINVAL;
12247 			}
12248 
12249 		} else if (class == BPF_ST) {
12250 			if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM ||
12251 			    insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
12252 				verbose(env, "BPF_ST uses reserved fields\n");
12253 				return -EINVAL;
12254 			}
12255 			/* check src operand */
12256 			err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
12257 			if (err)
12258 				return err;
12259 
12260 			if (is_ctx_reg(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
12261 				verbose(env, "BPF_ST stores into R%d %s is not allowed\n",
12262 					insn->dst_reg,
12263 					reg_type_str(env, reg_state(env, insn->dst_reg)->type));
12264 				return -EACCES;
12265 			}
12266 
12267 			/* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */
12268 			err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg,
12269 					       insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code),
12270 					       BPF_WRITE, -1, false);
12271 			if (err)
12272 				return err;
12273 
12274 		} else if (class == BPF_JMP || class == BPF_JMP32) {
12275 			u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
12276 
12277 			env->jmps_processed++;
12278 			if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
12279 				if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K ||
12280 				    (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL
12281 				     && insn->off != 0) ||
12282 				    (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 &&
12283 				     insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL &&
12284 				     insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) ||
12285 				    insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
12286 				    class == BPF_JMP32) {
12287 					verbose(env, "BPF_CALL uses reserved fields\n");
12288 					return -EINVAL;
12289 				}
12290 
12291 				if (env->cur_state->active_spin_lock &&
12292 				    (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL ||
12293 				     insn->imm != BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock)) {
12294 					verbose(env, "function calls are not allowed while holding a lock\n");
12295 					return -EINVAL;
12296 				}
12297 				if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
12298 					err = check_func_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx);
12299 				else if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL)
12300 					err = check_kfunc_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx);
12301 				else
12302 					err = check_helper_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx);
12303 				if (err)
12304 					return err;
12305 			} else if (opcode == BPF_JA) {
12306 				if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K ||
12307 				    insn->imm != 0 ||
12308 				    insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
12309 				    insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
12310 				    class == BPF_JMP32) {
12311 					verbose(env, "BPF_JA uses reserved fields\n");
12312 					return -EINVAL;
12313 				}
12314 
12315 				env->insn_idx += insn->off + 1;
12316 				continue;
12317 
12318 			} else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) {
12319 				if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K ||
12320 				    insn->imm != 0 ||
12321 				    insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
12322 				    insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
12323 				    class == BPF_JMP32) {
12324 					verbose(env, "BPF_EXIT uses reserved fields\n");
12325 					return -EINVAL;
12326 				}
12327 
12328 				if (env->cur_state->active_spin_lock) {
12329 					verbose(env, "bpf_spin_unlock is missing\n");
12330 					return -EINVAL;
12331 				}
12332 
12333 				if (state->curframe) {
12334 					/* exit from nested function */
12335 					err = prepare_func_exit(env, &env->insn_idx);
12336 					if (err)
12337 						return err;
12338 					do_print_state = true;
12339 					continue;
12340 				}
12341 
12342 				err = check_reference_leak(env);
12343 				if (err)
12344 					return err;
12345 
12346 				err = check_return_code(env);
12347 				if (err)
12348 					return err;
12349 process_bpf_exit:
12350 				mark_verifier_state_scratched(env);
12351 				update_branch_counts(env, env->cur_state);
12352 				err = pop_stack(env, &prev_insn_idx,
12353 						&env->insn_idx, pop_log);
12354 				if (err < 0) {
12355 					if (err != -ENOENT)
12356 						return err;
12357 					break;
12358 				} else {
12359 					do_print_state = true;
12360 					continue;
12361 				}
12362 			} else {
12363 				err = check_cond_jmp_op(env, insn, &env->insn_idx);
12364 				if (err)
12365 					return err;
12366 			}
12367 		} else if (class == BPF_LD) {
12368 			u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code);
12369 
12370 			if (mode == BPF_ABS || mode == BPF_IND) {
12371 				err = check_ld_abs(env, insn);
12372 				if (err)
12373 					return err;
12374 
12375 			} else if (mode == BPF_IMM) {
12376 				err = check_ld_imm(env, insn);
12377 				if (err)
12378 					return err;
12379 
12380 				env->insn_idx++;
12381 				sanitize_mark_insn_seen(env);
12382 			} else {
12383 				verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD mode\n");
12384 				return -EINVAL;
12385 			}
12386 		} else {
12387 			verbose(env, "unknown insn class %d\n", class);
12388 			return -EINVAL;
12389 		}
12390 
12391 		env->insn_idx++;
12392 	}
12393 
12394 	return 0;
12395 }
12396 
12397 static int find_btf_percpu_datasec(struct btf *btf)
12398 {
12399 	const struct btf_type *t;
12400 	const char *tname;
12401 	int i, n;
12402 
12403 	/*
12404 	 * Both vmlinux and module each have their own ".data..percpu"
12405 	 * DATASECs in BTF. So for module's case, we need to skip vmlinux BTF
12406 	 * types to look at only module's own BTF types.
12407 	 */
12408 	n = btf_nr_types(btf);
12409 	if (btf_is_module(btf))
12410 		i = btf_nr_types(btf_vmlinux);
12411 	else
12412 		i = 1;
12413 
12414 	for(; i < n; i++) {
12415 		t = btf_type_by_id(btf, i);
12416 		if (BTF_INFO_KIND(t->info) != BTF_KIND_DATASEC)
12417 			continue;
12418 
12419 		tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off);
12420 		if (!strcmp(tname, ".data..percpu"))
12421 			return i;
12422 	}
12423 
12424 	return -ENOENT;
12425 }
12426 
12427 /* replace pseudo btf_id with kernel symbol address */
12428 static int check_pseudo_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
12429 			       struct bpf_insn *insn,
12430 			       struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux)
12431 {
12432 	const struct btf_var_secinfo *vsi;
12433 	const struct btf_type *datasec;
12434 	struct btf_mod_pair *btf_mod;
12435 	const struct btf_type *t;
12436 	const char *sym_name;
12437 	bool percpu = false;
12438 	u32 type, id = insn->imm;
12439 	struct btf *btf;
12440 	s32 datasec_id;
12441 	u64 addr;
12442 	int i, btf_fd, err;
12443 
12444 	btf_fd = insn[1].imm;
12445 	if (btf_fd) {
12446 		btf = btf_get_by_fd(btf_fd);
12447 		if (IS_ERR(btf)) {
12448 			verbose(env, "invalid module BTF object FD specified.\n");
12449 			return -EINVAL;
12450 		}
12451 	} else {
12452 		if (!btf_vmlinux) {
12453 			verbose(env, "kernel is missing BTF, make sure CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF=y is specified in Kconfig.\n");
12454 			return -EINVAL;
12455 		}
12456 		btf = btf_vmlinux;
12457 		btf_get(btf);
12458 	}
12459 
12460 	t = btf_type_by_id(btf, id);
12461 	if (!t) {
12462 		verbose(env, "ldimm64 insn specifies invalid btf_id %d.\n", id);
12463 		err = -ENOENT;
12464 		goto err_put;
12465 	}
12466 
12467 	if (!btf_type_is_var(t)) {
12468 		verbose(env, "pseudo btf_id %d in ldimm64 isn't KIND_VAR.\n", id);
12469 		err = -EINVAL;
12470 		goto err_put;
12471 	}
12472 
12473 	sym_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off);
12474 	addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(sym_name);
12475 	if (!addr) {
12476 		verbose(env, "ldimm64 failed to find the address for kernel symbol '%s'.\n",
12477 			sym_name);
12478 		err = -ENOENT;
12479 		goto err_put;
12480 	}
12481 
12482 	datasec_id = find_btf_percpu_datasec(btf);
12483 	if (datasec_id > 0) {
12484 		datasec = btf_type_by_id(btf, datasec_id);
12485 		for_each_vsi(i, datasec, vsi) {
12486 			if (vsi->type == id) {
12487 				percpu = true;
12488 				break;
12489 			}
12490 		}
12491 	}
12492 
12493 	insn[0].imm = (u32)addr;
12494 	insn[1].imm = addr >> 32;
12495 
12496 	type = t->type;
12497 	t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, type, NULL);
12498 	if (percpu) {
12499 		aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU;
12500 		aux->btf_var.btf = btf;
12501 		aux->btf_var.btf_id = type;
12502 	} else if (!btf_type_is_struct(t)) {
12503 		const struct btf_type *ret;
12504 		const char *tname;
12505 		u32 tsize;
12506 
12507 		/* resolve the type size of ksym. */
12508 		ret = btf_resolve_size(btf, t, &tsize);
12509 		if (IS_ERR(ret)) {
12510 			tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off);
12511 			verbose(env, "ldimm64 unable to resolve the size of type '%s': %ld\n",
12512 				tname, PTR_ERR(ret));
12513 			err = -EINVAL;
12514 			goto err_put;
12515 		}
12516 		aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY;
12517 		aux->btf_var.mem_size = tsize;
12518 	} else {
12519 		aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID;
12520 		aux->btf_var.btf = btf;
12521 		aux->btf_var.btf_id = type;
12522 	}
12523 
12524 	/* check whether we recorded this BTF (and maybe module) already */
12525 	for (i = 0; i < env->used_btf_cnt; i++) {
12526 		if (env->used_btfs[i].btf == btf) {
12527 			btf_put(btf);
12528 			return 0;
12529 		}
12530 	}
12531 
12532 	if (env->used_btf_cnt >= MAX_USED_BTFS) {
12533 		err = -E2BIG;
12534 		goto err_put;
12535 	}
12536 
12537 	btf_mod = &env->used_btfs[env->used_btf_cnt];
12538 	btf_mod->btf = btf;
12539 	btf_mod->module = NULL;
12540 
12541 	/* if we reference variables from kernel module, bump its refcount */
12542 	if (btf_is_module(btf)) {
12543 		btf_mod->module = btf_try_get_module(btf);
12544 		if (!btf_mod->module) {
12545 			err = -ENXIO;
12546 			goto err_put;
12547 		}
12548 	}
12549 
12550 	env->used_btf_cnt++;
12551 
12552 	return 0;
12553 err_put:
12554 	btf_put(btf);
12555 	return err;
12556 }
12557 
12558 static int check_map_prealloc(struct bpf_map *map)
12559 {
12560 	return (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH &&
12561 		map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH &&
12562 		map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS) ||
12563 		!(map->map_flags & BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC);
12564 }
12565 
12566 static bool is_tracing_prog_type(enum bpf_prog_type type)
12567 {
12568 	switch (type) {
12569 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE:
12570 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT:
12571 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT:
12572 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT:
12573 		return true;
12574 	default:
12575 		return false;
12576 	}
12577 }
12578 
12579 static bool is_preallocated_map(struct bpf_map *map)
12580 {
12581 	if (!check_map_prealloc(map))
12582 		return false;
12583 	if (map->inner_map_meta && !check_map_prealloc(map->inner_map_meta))
12584 		return false;
12585 	return true;
12586 }
12587 
12588 static int check_map_prog_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
12589 					struct bpf_map *map,
12590 					struct bpf_prog *prog)
12591 
12592 {
12593 	enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(prog);
12594 	/*
12595 	 * Validate that trace type programs use preallocated hash maps.
12596 	 *
12597 	 * For programs attached to PERF events this is mandatory as the
12598 	 * perf NMI can hit any arbitrary code sequence.
12599 	 *
12600 	 * All other trace types using preallocated hash maps are unsafe as
12601 	 * well because tracepoint or kprobes can be inside locked regions
12602 	 * of the memory allocator or at a place where a recursion into the
12603 	 * memory allocator would see inconsistent state.
12604 	 *
12605 	 * On RT enabled kernels run-time allocation of all trace type
12606 	 * programs is strictly prohibited due to lock type constraints. On
12607 	 * !RT kernels it is allowed for backwards compatibility reasons for
12608 	 * now, but warnings are emitted so developers are made aware of
12609 	 * the unsafety and can fix their programs before this is enforced.
12610 	 */
12611 	if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type) && !is_preallocated_map(map)) {
12612 		if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT) {
12613 			verbose(env, "perf_event programs can only use preallocated hash map\n");
12614 			return -EINVAL;
12615 		}
12616 		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT)) {
12617 			verbose(env, "trace type programs can only use preallocated hash map\n");
12618 			return -EINVAL;
12619 		}
12620 		WARN_ONCE(1, "trace type BPF program uses run-time allocation\n");
12621 		verbose(env, "trace type programs with run-time allocated hash maps are unsafe. Switch to preallocated hash maps.\n");
12622 	}
12623 
12624 	if (map_value_has_spin_lock(map)) {
12625 		if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) {
12626 			verbose(env, "socket filter progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n");
12627 			return -EINVAL;
12628 		}
12629 
12630 		if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type)) {
12631 			verbose(env, "tracing progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n");
12632 			return -EINVAL;
12633 		}
12634 
12635 		if (prog->aux->sleepable) {
12636 			verbose(env, "sleepable progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n");
12637 			return -EINVAL;
12638 		}
12639 	}
12640 
12641 	if (map_value_has_timer(map)) {
12642 		if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type)) {
12643 			verbose(env, "tracing progs cannot use bpf_timer yet\n");
12644 			return -EINVAL;
12645 		}
12646 	}
12647 
12648 	if ((bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(prog->aux) || bpf_map_is_dev_bound(map)) &&
12649 	    !bpf_offload_prog_map_match(prog, map)) {
12650 		verbose(env, "offload device mismatch between prog and map\n");
12651 		return -EINVAL;
12652 	}
12653 
12654 	if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) {
12655 		verbose(env, "bpf_struct_ops map cannot be used in prog\n");
12656 		return -EINVAL;
12657 	}
12658 
12659 	if (prog->aux->sleepable)
12660 		switch (map->map_type) {
12661 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH:
12662 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_HASH:
12663 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY:
12664 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH:
12665 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY:
12666 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_PERCPU_HASH:
12667 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS:
12668 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS:
12669 			if (!is_preallocated_map(map)) {
12670 				verbose(env,
12671 					"Sleepable programs can only use preallocated maps\n");
12672 				return -EINVAL;
12673 			}
12674 			break;
12675 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF:
12676 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE:
12677 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE:
12678 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE:
12679 			break;
12680 		default:
12681 			verbose(env,
12682 				"Sleepable programs can only use array, hash, and ringbuf maps\n");
12683 			return -EINVAL;
12684 		}
12685 
12686 	return 0;
12687 }
12688 
12689 static bool bpf_map_is_cgroup_storage(struct bpf_map *map)
12690 {
12691 	return (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE ||
12692 		map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE);
12693 }
12694 
12695 /* find and rewrite pseudo imm in ld_imm64 instructions:
12696  *
12697  * 1. if it accesses map FD, replace it with actual map pointer.
12698  * 2. if it accesses btf_id of a VAR, replace it with pointer to the var.
12699  *
12700  * NOTE: btf_vmlinux is required for converting pseudo btf_id.
12701  */
12702 static int resolve_pseudo_ldimm64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
12703 {
12704 	struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
12705 	int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
12706 	int i, j, err;
12707 
12708 	err = bpf_prog_calc_tag(env->prog);
12709 	if (err)
12710 		return err;
12711 
12712 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
12713 		if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX &&
12714 		    (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0)) {
12715 			verbose(env, "BPF_LDX uses reserved fields\n");
12716 			return -EINVAL;
12717 		}
12718 
12719 		if (insn[0].code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) {
12720 			struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux;
12721 			struct bpf_map *map;
12722 			struct fd f;
12723 			u64 addr;
12724 			u32 fd;
12725 
12726 			if (i == insn_cnt - 1 || insn[1].code != 0 ||
12727 			    insn[1].dst_reg != 0 || insn[1].src_reg != 0 ||
12728 			    insn[1].off != 0) {
12729 				verbose(env, "invalid bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
12730 				return -EINVAL;
12731 			}
12732 
12733 			if (insn[0].src_reg == 0)
12734 				/* valid generic load 64-bit imm */
12735 				goto next_insn;
12736 
12737 			if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_BTF_ID) {
12738 				aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i];
12739 				err = check_pseudo_btf_id(env, insn, aux);
12740 				if (err)
12741 					return err;
12742 				goto next_insn;
12743 			}
12744 
12745 			if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) {
12746 				aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i];
12747 				aux->ptr_type = PTR_TO_FUNC;
12748 				goto next_insn;
12749 			}
12750 
12751 			/* In final convert_pseudo_ld_imm64() step, this is
12752 			 * converted into regular 64-bit imm load insn.
12753 			 */
12754 			switch (insn[0].src_reg) {
12755 			case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE:
12756 			case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE:
12757 				break;
12758 			case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD:
12759 			case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX:
12760 				if (insn[1].imm == 0)
12761 					break;
12762 				fallthrough;
12763 			default:
12764 				verbose(env, "unrecognized bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
12765 				return -EINVAL;
12766 			}
12767 
12768 			switch (insn[0].src_reg) {
12769 			case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE:
12770 			case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX:
12771 				if (bpfptr_is_null(env->fd_array)) {
12772 					verbose(env, "fd_idx without fd_array is invalid\n");
12773 					return -EPROTO;
12774 				}
12775 				if (copy_from_bpfptr_offset(&fd, env->fd_array,
12776 							    insn[0].imm * sizeof(fd),
12777 							    sizeof(fd)))
12778 					return -EFAULT;
12779 				break;
12780 			default:
12781 				fd = insn[0].imm;
12782 				break;
12783 			}
12784 
12785 			f = fdget(fd);
12786 			map = __bpf_map_get(f);
12787 			if (IS_ERR(map)) {
12788 				verbose(env, "fd %d is not pointing to valid bpf_map\n",
12789 					insn[0].imm);
12790 				return PTR_ERR(map);
12791 			}
12792 
12793 			err = check_map_prog_compatibility(env, map, env->prog);
12794 			if (err) {
12795 				fdput(f);
12796 				return err;
12797 			}
12798 
12799 			aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i];
12800 			if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD ||
12801 			    insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX) {
12802 				addr = (unsigned long)map;
12803 			} else {
12804 				u32 off = insn[1].imm;
12805 
12806 				if (off >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) {
12807 					verbose(env, "direct value offset of %u is not allowed\n", off);
12808 					fdput(f);
12809 					return -EINVAL;
12810 				}
12811 
12812 				if (!map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) {
12813 					verbose(env, "no direct value access support for this map type\n");
12814 					fdput(f);
12815 					return -EINVAL;
12816 				}
12817 
12818 				err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &addr, off);
12819 				if (err) {
12820 					verbose(env, "invalid access to map value pointer, value_size=%u off=%u\n",
12821 						map->value_size, off);
12822 					fdput(f);
12823 					return err;
12824 				}
12825 
12826 				aux->map_off = off;
12827 				addr += off;
12828 			}
12829 
12830 			insn[0].imm = (u32)addr;
12831 			insn[1].imm = addr >> 32;
12832 
12833 			/* check whether we recorded this map already */
12834 			for (j = 0; j < env->used_map_cnt; j++) {
12835 				if (env->used_maps[j] == map) {
12836 					aux->map_index = j;
12837 					fdput(f);
12838 					goto next_insn;
12839 				}
12840 			}
12841 
12842 			if (env->used_map_cnt >= MAX_USED_MAPS) {
12843 				fdput(f);
12844 				return -E2BIG;
12845 			}
12846 
12847 			/* hold the map. If the program is rejected by verifier,
12848 			 * the map will be released by release_maps() or it
12849 			 * will be used by the valid program until it's unloaded
12850 			 * and all maps are released in free_used_maps()
12851 			 */
12852 			bpf_map_inc(map);
12853 
12854 			aux->map_index = env->used_map_cnt;
12855 			env->used_maps[env->used_map_cnt++] = map;
12856 
12857 			if (bpf_map_is_cgroup_storage(map) &&
12858 			    bpf_cgroup_storage_assign(env->prog->aux, map)) {
12859 				verbose(env, "only one cgroup storage of each type is allowed\n");
12860 				fdput(f);
12861 				return -EBUSY;
12862 			}
12863 
12864 			fdput(f);
12865 next_insn:
12866 			insn++;
12867 			i++;
12868 			continue;
12869 		}
12870 
12871 		/* Basic sanity check before we invest more work here. */
12872 		if (!bpf_opcode_in_insntable(insn->code)) {
12873 			verbose(env, "unknown opcode %02x\n", insn->code);
12874 			return -EINVAL;
12875 		}
12876 	}
12877 
12878 	/* now all pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions load valid
12879 	 * 'struct bpf_map *' into a register instead of user map_fd.
12880 	 * These pointers will be used later by verifier to validate map access.
12881 	 */
12882 	return 0;
12883 }
12884 
12885 /* drop refcnt of maps used by the rejected program */
12886 static void release_maps(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
12887 {
12888 	__bpf_free_used_maps(env->prog->aux, env->used_maps,
12889 			     env->used_map_cnt);
12890 }
12891 
12892 /* drop refcnt of maps used by the rejected program */
12893 static void release_btfs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
12894 {
12895 	__bpf_free_used_btfs(env->prog->aux, env->used_btfs,
12896 			     env->used_btf_cnt);
12897 }
12898 
12899 /* convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic BPF_LD_IMM64 */
12900 static void convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
12901 {
12902 	struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
12903 	int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
12904 	int i;
12905 
12906 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
12907 		if (insn->code != (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW))
12908 			continue;
12909 		if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC)
12910 			continue;
12911 		insn->src_reg = 0;
12912 	}
12913 }
12914 
12915 /* single env->prog->insni[off] instruction was replaced with the range
12916  * insni[off, off + cnt).  Adjust corresponding insn_aux_data by copying
12917  * [0, off) and [off, end) to new locations, so the patched range stays zero
12918  */
12919 static void adjust_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
12920 				 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *new_data,
12921 				 struct bpf_prog *new_prog, u32 off, u32 cnt)
12922 {
12923 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *old_data = env->insn_aux_data;
12924 	struct bpf_insn *insn = new_prog->insnsi;
12925 	u32 old_seen = old_data[off].seen;
12926 	u32 prog_len;
12927 	int i;
12928 
12929 	/* aux info at OFF always needs adjustment, no matter fast path
12930 	 * (cnt == 1) is taken or not. There is no guarantee INSN at OFF is the
12931 	 * original insn at old prog.
12932 	 */
12933 	old_data[off].zext_dst = insn_has_def32(env, insn + off + cnt - 1);
12934 
12935 	if (cnt == 1)
12936 		return;
12937 	prog_len = new_prog->len;
12938 
12939 	memcpy(new_data, old_data, sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * off);
12940 	memcpy(new_data + off + cnt - 1, old_data + off,
12941 	       sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * (prog_len - off - cnt + 1));
12942 	for (i = off; i < off + cnt - 1; i++) {
12943 		/* Expand insni[off]'s seen count to the patched range. */
12944 		new_data[i].seen = old_seen;
12945 		new_data[i].zext_dst = insn_has_def32(env, insn + i);
12946 	}
12947 	env->insn_aux_data = new_data;
12948 	vfree(old_data);
12949 }
12950 
12951 static void adjust_subprog_starts(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 len)
12952 {
12953 	int i;
12954 
12955 	if (len == 1)
12956 		return;
12957 	/* NOTE: fake 'exit' subprog should be updated as well. */
12958 	for (i = 0; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
12959 		if (env->subprog_info[i].start <= off)
12960 			continue;
12961 		env->subprog_info[i].start += len - 1;
12962 	}
12963 }
12964 
12965 static void adjust_poke_descs(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 off, u32 len)
12966 {
12967 	struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *tab = prog->aux->poke_tab;
12968 	int i, sz = prog->aux->size_poke_tab;
12969 	struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *desc;
12970 
12971 	for (i = 0; i < sz; i++) {
12972 		desc = &tab[i];
12973 		if (desc->insn_idx <= off)
12974 			continue;
12975 		desc->insn_idx += len - 1;
12976 	}
12977 }
12978 
12979 static struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off,
12980 					    const struct bpf_insn *patch, u32 len)
12981 {
12982 	struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
12983 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *new_data = NULL;
12984 
12985 	if (len > 1) {
12986 		new_data = vzalloc(array_size(env->prog->len + len - 1,
12987 					      sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data)));
12988 		if (!new_data)
12989 			return NULL;
12990 	}
12991 
12992 	new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_single(env->prog, off, patch, len);
12993 	if (IS_ERR(new_prog)) {
12994 		if (PTR_ERR(new_prog) == -ERANGE)
12995 			verbose(env,
12996 				"insn %d cannot be patched due to 16-bit range\n",
12997 				env->insn_aux_data[off].orig_idx);
12998 		vfree(new_data);
12999 		return NULL;
13000 	}
13001 	adjust_insn_aux_data(env, new_data, new_prog, off, len);
13002 	adjust_subprog_starts(env, off, len);
13003 	adjust_poke_descs(new_prog, off, len);
13004 	return new_prog;
13005 }
13006 
13007 static int adjust_subprog_starts_after_remove(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
13008 					      u32 off, u32 cnt)
13009 {
13010 	int i, j;
13011 
13012 	/* find first prog starting at or after off (first to remove) */
13013 	for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++)
13014 		if (env->subprog_info[i].start >= off)
13015 			break;
13016 	/* find first prog starting at or after off + cnt (first to stay) */
13017 	for (j = i; j < env->subprog_cnt; j++)
13018 		if (env->subprog_info[j].start >= off + cnt)
13019 			break;
13020 	/* if j doesn't start exactly at off + cnt, we are just removing
13021 	 * the front of previous prog
13022 	 */
13023 	if (env->subprog_info[j].start != off + cnt)
13024 		j--;
13025 
13026 	if (j > i) {
13027 		struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux;
13028 		int move;
13029 
13030 		/* move fake 'exit' subprog as well */
13031 		move = env->subprog_cnt + 1 - j;
13032 
13033 		memmove(env->subprog_info + i,
13034 			env->subprog_info + j,
13035 			sizeof(*env->subprog_info) * move);
13036 		env->subprog_cnt -= j - i;
13037 
13038 		/* remove func_info */
13039 		if (aux->func_info) {
13040 			move = aux->func_info_cnt - j;
13041 
13042 			memmove(aux->func_info + i,
13043 				aux->func_info + j,
13044 				sizeof(*aux->func_info) * move);
13045 			aux->func_info_cnt -= j - i;
13046 			/* func_info->insn_off is set after all code rewrites,
13047 			 * in adjust_btf_func() - no need to adjust
13048 			 */
13049 		}
13050 	} else {
13051 		/* convert i from "first prog to remove" to "first to adjust" */
13052 		if (env->subprog_info[i].start == off)
13053 			i++;
13054 	}
13055 
13056 	/* update fake 'exit' subprog as well */
13057 	for (; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++)
13058 		env->subprog_info[i].start -= cnt;
13059 
13060 	return 0;
13061 }
13062 
13063 static int bpf_adj_linfo_after_remove(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off,
13064 				      u32 cnt)
13065 {
13066 	struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
13067 	u32 i, l_off, l_cnt, nr_linfo;
13068 	struct bpf_line_info *linfo;
13069 
13070 	nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo;
13071 	if (!nr_linfo)
13072 		return 0;
13073 
13074 	linfo = prog->aux->linfo;
13075 
13076 	/* find first line info to remove, count lines to be removed */
13077 	for (i = 0; i < nr_linfo; i++)
13078 		if (linfo[i].insn_off >= off)
13079 			break;
13080 
13081 	l_off = i;
13082 	l_cnt = 0;
13083 	for (; i < nr_linfo; i++)
13084 		if (linfo[i].insn_off < off + cnt)
13085 			l_cnt++;
13086 		else
13087 			break;
13088 
13089 	/* First live insn doesn't match first live linfo, it needs to "inherit"
13090 	 * last removed linfo.  prog is already modified, so prog->len == off
13091 	 * means no live instructions after (tail of the program was removed).
13092 	 */
13093 	if (prog->len != off && l_cnt &&
13094 	    (i == nr_linfo || linfo[i].insn_off != off + cnt)) {
13095 		l_cnt--;
13096 		linfo[--i].insn_off = off + cnt;
13097 	}
13098 
13099 	/* remove the line info which refer to the removed instructions */
13100 	if (l_cnt) {
13101 		memmove(linfo + l_off, linfo + i,
13102 			sizeof(*linfo) * (nr_linfo - i));
13103 
13104 		prog->aux->nr_linfo -= l_cnt;
13105 		nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo;
13106 	}
13107 
13108 	/* pull all linfo[i].insn_off >= off + cnt in by cnt */
13109 	for (i = l_off; i < nr_linfo; i++)
13110 		linfo[i].insn_off -= cnt;
13111 
13112 	/* fix up all subprogs (incl. 'exit') which start >= off */
13113 	for (i = 0; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++)
13114 		if (env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx > l_off) {
13115 			/* program may have started in the removed region but
13116 			 * may not be fully removed
13117 			 */
13118 			if (env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx >= l_off + l_cnt)
13119 				env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx -= l_cnt;
13120 			else
13121 				env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx = l_off;
13122 		}
13123 
13124 	return 0;
13125 }
13126 
13127 static int verifier_remove_insns(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 cnt)
13128 {
13129 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data;
13130 	unsigned int orig_prog_len = env->prog->len;
13131 	int err;
13132 
13133 	if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux))
13134 		bpf_prog_offload_remove_insns(env, off, cnt);
13135 
13136 	err = bpf_remove_insns(env->prog, off, cnt);
13137 	if (err)
13138 		return err;
13139 
13140 	err = adjust_subprog_starts_after_remove(env, off, cnt);
13141 	if (err)
13142 		return err;
13143 
13144 	err = bpf_adj_linfo_after_remove(env, off, cnt);
13145 	if (err)
13146 		return err;
13147 
13148 	memmove(aux_data + off,	aux_data + off + cnt,
13149 		sizeof(*aux_data) * (orig_prog_len - off - cnt));
13150 
13151 	return 0;
13152 }
13153 
13154 /* The verifier does more data flow analysis than llvm and will not
13155  * explore branches that are dead at run time. Malicious programs can
13156  * have dead code too. Therefore replace all dead at-run-time code
13157  * with 'ja -1'.
13158  *
13159  * Just nops are not optimal, e.g. if they would sit at the end of the
13160  * program and through another bug we would manage to jump there, then
13161  * we'd execute beyond program memory otherwise. Returning exception
13162  * code also wouldn't work since we can have subprogs where the dead
13163  * code could be located.
13164  */
13165 static void sanitize_dead_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
13166 {
13167 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data;
13168 	struct bpf_insn trap = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, -1);
13169 	struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
13170 	const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
13171 	int i;
13172 
13173 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) {
13174 		if (aux_data[i].seen)
13175 			continue;
13176 		memcpy(insn + i, &trap, sizeof(trap));
13177 		aux_data[i].zext_dst = false;
13178 	}
13179 }
13180 
13181 static bool insn_is_cond_jump(u8 code)
13182 {
13183 	u8 op;
13184 
13185 	if (BPF_CLASS(code) == BPF_JMP32)
13186 		return true;
13187 
13188 	if (BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP)
13189 		return false;
13190 
13191 	op = BPF_OP(code);
13192 	return op != BPF_JA && op != BPF_EXIT && op != BPF_CALL;
13193 }
13194 
13195 static void opt_hard_wire_dead_code_branches(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
13196 {
13197 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data;
13198 	struct bpf_insn ja = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0);
13199 	struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
13200 	const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
13201 	int i;
13202 
13203 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
13204 		if (!insn_is_cond_jump(insn->code))
13205 			continue;
13206 
13207 		if (!aux_data[i + 1].seen)
13208 			ja.off = insn->off;
13209 		else if (!aux_data[i + 1 + insn->off].seen)
13210 			ja.off = 0;
13211 		else
13212 			continue;
13213 
13214 		if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux))
13215 			bpf_prog_offload_replace_insn(env, i, &ja);
13216 
13217 		memcpy(insn, &ja, sizeof(ja));
13218 	}
13219 }
13220 
13221 static int opt_remove_dead_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
13222 {
13223 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data;
13224 	int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
13225 	int i, err;
13226 
13227 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) {
13228 		int j;
13229 
13230 		j = 0;
13231 		while (i + j < insn_cnt && !aux_data[i + j].seen)
13232 			j++;
13233 		if (!j)
13234 			continue;
13235 
13236 		err = verifier_remove_insns(env, i, j);
13237 		if (err)
13238 			return err;
13239 		insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
13240 	}
13241 
13242 	return 0;
13243 }
13244 
13245 static int opt_remove_nops(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
13246 {
13247 	const struct bpf_insn ja = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0);
13248 	struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
13249 	int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
13250 	int i, err;
13251 
13252 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) {
13253 		if (memcmp(&insn[i], &ja, sizeof(ja)))
13254 			continue;
13255 
13256 		err = verifier_remove_insns(env, i, 1);
13257 		if (err)
13258 			return err;
13259 		insn_cnt--;
13260 		i--;
13261 	}
13262 
13263 	return 0;
13264 }
13265 
13266 static int opt_subreg_zext_lo32_rnd_hi32(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
13267 					 const union bpf_attr *attr)
13268 {
13269 	struct bpf_insn *patch, zext_patch[2], rnd_hi32_patch[4];
13270 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = env->insn_aux_data;
13271 	int i, patch_len, delta = 0, len = env->prog->len;
13272 	struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
13273 	struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
13274 	bool rnd_hi32;
13275 
13276 	rnd_hi32 = attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_TEST_RND_HI32;
13277 	zext_patch[1] = BPF_ZEXT_REG(0);
13278 	rnd_hi32_patch[1] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_AX, 0);
13279 	rnd_hi32_patch[2] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_AX, 32);
13280 	rnd_hi32_patch[3] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, 0, BPF_REG_AX);
13281 	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
13282 		int adj_idx = i + delta;
13283 		struct bpf_insn insn;
13284 		int load_reg;
13285 
13286 		insn = insns[adj_idx];
13287 		load_reg = insn_def_regno(&insn);
13288 		if (!aux[adj_idx].zext_dst) {
13289 			u8 code, class;
13290 			u32 imm_rnd;
13291 
13292 			if (!rnd_hi32)
13293 				continue;
13294 
13295 			code = insn.code;
13296 			class = BPF_CLASS(code);
13297 			if (load_reg == -1)
13298 				continue;
13299 
13300 			/* NOTE: arg "reg" (the fourth one) is only used for
13301 			 *       BPF_STX + SRC_OP, so it is safe to pass NULL
13302 			 *       here.
13303 			 */
13304 			if (is_reg64(env, &insn, load_reg, NULL, DST_OP)) {
13305 				if (class == BPF_LD &&
13306 				    BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_IMM)
13307 					i++;
13308 				continue;
13309 			}
13310 
13311 			/* ctx load could be transformed into wider load. */
13312 			if (class == BPF_LDX &&
13313 			    aux[adj_idx].ptr_type == PTR_TO_CTX)
13314 				continue;
13315 
13316 			imm_rnd = get_random_int();
13317 			rnd_hi32_patch[0] = insn;
13318 			rnd_hi32_patch[1].imm = imm_rnd;
13319 			rnd_hi32_patch[3].dst_reg = load_reg;
13320 			patch = rnd_hi32_patch;
13321 			patch_len = 4;
13322 			goto apply_patch_buffer;
13323 		}
13324 
13325 		/* Add in an zero-extend instruction if a) the JIT has requested
13326 		 * it or b) it's a CMPXCHG.
13327 		 *
13328 		 * The latter is because: BPF_CMPXCHG always loads a value into
13329 		 * R0, therefore always zero-extends. However some archs'
13330 		 * equivalent instruction only does this load when the
13331 		 * comparison is successful. This detail of CMPXCHG is
13332 		 * orthogonal to the general zero-extension behaviour of the
13333 		 * CPU, so it's treated independently of bpf_jit_needs_zext.
13334 		 */
13335 		if (!bpf_jit_needs_zext() && !is_cmpxchg_insn(&insn))
13336 			continue;
13337 
13338 		if (WARN_ON(load_reg == -1)) {
13339 			verbose(env, "verifier bug. zext_dst is set, but no reg is defined\n");
13340 			return -EFAULT;
13341 		}
13342 
13343 		zext_patch[0] = insn;
13344 		zext_patch[1].dst_reg = load_reg;
13345 		zext_patch[1].src_reg = load_reg;
13346 		patch = zext_patch;
13347 		patch_len = 2;
13348 apply_patch_buffer:
13349 		new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, adj_idx, patch, patch_len);
13350 		if (!new_prog)
13351 			return -ENOMEM;
13352 		env->prog = new_prog;
13353 		insns = new_prog->insnsi;
13354 		aux = env->insn_aux_data;
13355 		delta += patch_len - 1;
13356 	}
13357 
13358 	return 0;
13359 }
13360 
13361 /* convert load instructions that access fields of a context type into a
13362  * sequence of instructions that access fields of the underlying structure:
13363  *     struct __sk_buff    -> struct sk_buff
13364  *     struct bpf_sock_ops -> struct sock
13365  */
13366 static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
13367 {
13368 	const struct bpf_verifier_ops *ops = env->ops;
13369 	int i, cnt, size, ctx_field_size, delta = 0;
13370 	const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
13371 	struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16], *insn;
13372 	u32 target_size, size_default, off;
13373 	struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
13374 	enum bpf_access_type type;
13375 	bool is_narrower_load;
13376 
13377 	if (ops->gen_prologue || env->seen_direct_write) {
13378 		if (!ops->gen_prologue) {
13379 			verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
13380 			return -EINVAL;
13381 		}
13382 		cnt = ops->gen_prologue(insn_buf, env->seen_direct_write,
13383 					env->prog);
13384 		if (cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) {
13385 			verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
13386 			return -EINVAL;
13387 		} else if (cnt) {
13388 			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, 0, insn_buf, cnt);
13389 			if (!new_prog)
13390 				return -ENOMEM;
13391 
13392 			env->prog = new_prog;
13393 			delta += cnt - 1;
13394 		}
13395 	}
13396 
13397 	if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux))
13398 		return 0;
13399 
13400 	insn = env->prog->insnsi + delta;
13401 
13402 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
13403 		bpf_convert_ctx_access_t convert_ctx_access;
13404 		bool ctx_access;
13405 
13406 		if (insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) ||
13407 		    insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) ||
13408 		    insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) ||
13409 		    insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW)) {
13410 			type = BPF_READ;
13411 			ctx_access = true;
13412 		} else if (insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) ||
13413 			   insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) ||
13414 			   insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) ||
13415 			   insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW) ||
13416 			   insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) ||
13417 			   insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) ||
13418 			   insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) ||
13419 			   insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW)) {
13420 			type = BPF_WRITE;
13421 			ctx_access = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX;
13422 		} else {
13423 			continue;
13424 		}
13425 
13426 		if (type == BPF_WRITE &&
13427 		    env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].sanitize_stack_spill) {
13428 			struct bpf_insn patch[] = {
13429 				*insn,
13430 				BPF_ST_NOSPEC(),
13431 			};
13432 
13433 			cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(patch);
13434 			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, patch, cnt);
13435 			if (!new_prog)
13436 				return -ENOMEM;
13437 
13438 			delta    += cnt - 1;
13439 			env->prog = new_prog;
13440 			insn      = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
13441 			continue;
13442 		}
13443 
13444 		if (!ctx_access)
13445 			continue;
13446 
13447 		switch ((int)env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ptr_type) {
13448 		case PTR_TO_CTX:
13449 			if (!ops->convert_ctx_access)
13450 				continue;
13451 			convert_ctx_access = ops->convert_ctx_access;
13452 			break;
13453 		case PTR_TO_SOCKET:
13454 		case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON:
13455 			convert_ctx_access = bpf_sock_convert_ctx_access;
13456 			break;
13457 		case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
13458 			convert_ctx_access = bpf_tcp_sock_convert_ctx_access;
13459 			break;
13460 		case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK:
13461 			convert_ctx_access = bpf_xdp_sock_convert_ctx_access;
13462 			break;
13463 		case PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
13464 		case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED:
13465 			if (type == BPF_READ) {
13466 				insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEM |
13467 					BPF_SIZE((insn)->code);
13468 				env->prog->aux->num_exentries++;
13469 			} else if (resolve_prog_type(env->prog) != BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) {
13470 				verbose(env, "Writes through BTF pointers are not allowed\n");
13471 				return -EINVAL;
13472 			}
13473 			continue;
13474 		default:
13475 			continue;
13476 		}
13477 
13478 		ctx_field_size = env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ctx_field_size;
13479 		size = BPF_LDST_BYTES(insn);
13480 
13481 		/* If the read access is a narrower load of the field,
13482 		 * convert to a 4/8-byte load, to minimum program type specific
13483 		 * convert_ctx_access changes. If conversion is successful,
13484 		 * we will apply proper mask to the result.
13485 		 */
13486 		is_narrower_load = size < ctx_field_size;
13487 		size_default = bpf_ctx_off_adjust_machine(ctx_field_size);
13488 		off = insn->off;
13489 		if (is_narrower_load) {
13490 			u8 size_code;
13491 
13492 			if (type == BPF_WRITE) {
13493 				verbose(env, "bpf verifier narrow ctx access misconfigured\n");
13494 				return -EINVAL;
13495 			}
13496 
13497 			size_code = BPF_H;
13498 			if (ctx_field_size == 4)
13499 				size_code = BPF_W;
13500 			else if (ctx_field_size == 8)
13501 				size_code = BPF_DW;
13502 
13503 			insn->off = off & ~(size_default - 1);
13504 			insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | size_code;
13505 		}
13506 
13507 		target_size = 0;
13508 		cnt = convert_ctx_access(type, insn, insn_buf, env->prog,
13509 					 &target_size);
13510 		if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf) ||
13511 		    (ctx_field_size && !target_size)) {
13512 			verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
13513 			return -EINVAL;
13514 		}
13515 
13516 		if (is_narrower_load && size < target_size) {
13517 			u8 shift = bpf_ctx_narrow_access_offset(
13518 				off, size, size_default) * 8;
13519 			if (shift && cnt + 1 >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) {
13520 				verbose(env, "bpf verifier narrow ctx load misconfigured\n");
13521 				return -EINVAL;
13522 			}
13523 			if (ctx_field_size <= 4) {
13524 				if (shift)
13525 					insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_RSH,
13526 									insn->dst_reg,
13527 									shift);
13528 				insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg,
13529 								(1 << size * 8) - 1);
13530 			} else {
13531 				if (shift)
13532 					insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH,
13533 									insn->dst_reg,
13534 									shift);
13535 				insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg,
13536 								(1ULL << size * 8) - 1);
13537 			}
13538 		}
13539 
13540 		new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
13541 		if (!new_prog)
13542 			return -ENOMEM;
13543 
13544 		delta += cnt - 1;
13545 
13546 		/* keep walking new program and skip insns we just inserted */
13547 		env->prog = new_prog;
13548 		insn      = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
13549 	}
13550 
13551 	return 0;
13552 }
13553 
13554 static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
13555 {
13556 	struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog, **func, *tmp;
13557 	int i, j, subprog_start, subprog_end = 0, len, subprog;
13558 	struct bpf_map *map_ptr;
13559 	struct bpf_insn *insn;
13560 	void *old_bpf_func;
13561 	int err, num_exentries;
13562 
13563 	if (env->subprog_cnt <= 1)
13564 		return 0;
13565 
13566 	for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) {
13567 		if (!bpf_pseudo_func(insn) && !bpf_pseudo_call(insn))
13568 			continue;
13569 
13570 		/* Upon error here we cannot fall back to interpreter but
13571 		 * need a hard reject of the program. Thus -EFAULT is
13572 		 * propagated in any case.
13573 		 */
13574 		subprog = find_subprog(env, i + insn->imm + 1);
13575 		if (subprog < 0) {
13576 			WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n",
13577 				  i + insn->imm + 1);
13578 			return -EFAULT;
13579 		}
13580 		/* temporarily remember subprog id inside insn instead of
13581 		 * aux_data, since next loop will split up all insns into funcs
13582 		 */
13583 		insn->off = subprog;
13584 		/* remember original imm in case JIT fails and fallback
13585 		 * to interpreter will be needed
13586 		 */
13587 		env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm = insn->imm;
13588 		/* point imm to __bpf_call_base+1 from JITs point of view */
13589 		insn->imm = 1;
13590 		if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn))
13591 			/* jit (e.g. x86_64) may emit fewer instructions
13592 			 * if it learns a u32 imm is the same as a u64 imm.
13593 			 * Force a non zero here.
13594 			 */
13595 			insn[1].imm = 1;
13596 	}
13597 
13598 	err = bpf_prog_alloc_jited_linfo(prog);
13599 	if (err)
13600 		goto out_undo_insn;
13601 
13602 	err = -ENOMEM;
13603 	func = kcalloc(env->subprog_cnt, sizeof(prog), GFP_KERNEL);
13604 	if (!func)
13605 		goto out_undo_insn;
13606 
13607 	for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
13608 		subprog_start = subprog_end;
13609 		subprog_end = env->subprog_info[i + 1].start;
13610 
13611 		len = subprog_end - subprog_start;
13612 		/* bpf_prog_run() doesn't call subprogs directly,
13613 		 * hence main prog stats include the runtime of subprogs.
13614 		 * subprogs don't have IDs and not reachable via prog_get_next_id
13615 		 * func[i]->stats will never be accessed and stays NULL
13616 		 */
13617 		func[i] = bpf_prog_alloc_no_stats(bpf_prog_size(len), GFP_USER);
13618 		if (!func[i])
13619 			goto out_free;
13620 		memcpy(func[i]->insnsi, &prog->insnsi[subprog_start],
13621 		       len * sizeof(struct bpf_insn));
13622 		func[i]->type = prog->type;
13623 		func[i]->len = len;
13624 		if (bpf_prog_calc_tag(func[i]))
13625 			goto out_free;
13626 		func[i]->is_func = 1;
13627 		func[i]->aux->func_idx = i;
13628 		/* Below members will be freed only at prog->aux */
13629 		func[i]->aux->btf = prog->aux->btf;
13630 		func[i]->aux->func_info = prog->aux->func_info;
13631 		func[i]->aux->poke_tab = prog->aux->poke_tab;
13632 		func[i]->aux->size_poke_tab = prog->aux->size_poke_tab;
13633 
13634 		for (j = 0; j < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; j++) {
13635 			struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *poke;
13636 
13637 			poke = &prog->aux->poke_tab[j];
13638 			if (poke->insn_idx < subprog_end &&
13639 			    poke->insn_idx >= subprog_start)
13640 				poke->aux = func[i]->aux;
13641 		}
13642 
13643 		/* Use bpf_prog_F_tag to indicate functions in stack traces.
13644 		 * Long term would need debug info to populate names
13645 		 */
13646 		func[i]->aux->name[0] = 'F';
13647 		func[i]->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth;
13648 		func[i]->jit_requested = 1;
13649 		func[i]->blinding_requested = prog->blinding_requested;
13650 		func[i]->aux->kfunc_tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab;
13651 		func[i]->aux->kfunc_btf_tab = prog->aux->kfunc_btf_tab;
13652 		func[i]->aux->linfo = prog->aux->linfo;
13653 		func[i]->aux->nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo;
13654 		func[i]->aux->jited_linfo = prog->aux->jited_linfo;
13655 		func[i]->aux->linfo_idx = env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx;
13656 		num_exentries = 0;
13657 		insn = func[i]->insnsi;
13658 		for (j = 0; j < func[i]->len; j++, insn++) {
13659 			if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX &&
13660 			    BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEM)
13661 				num_exentries++;
13662 		}
13663 		func[i]->aux->num_exentries = num_exentries;
13664 		func[i]->aux->tail_call_reachable = env->subprog_info[i].tail_call_reachable;
13665 		func[i] = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]);
13666 		if (!func[i]->jited) {
13667 			err = -ENOTSUPP;
13668 			goto out_free;
13669 		}
13670 		cond_resched();
13671 	}
13672 
13673 	/* at this point all bpf functions were successfully JITed
13674 	 * now populate all bpf_calls with correct addresses and
13675 	 * run last pass of JIT
13676 	 */
13677 	for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
13678 		insn = func[i]->insnsi;
13679 		for (j = 0; j < func[i]->len; j++, insn++) {
13680 			if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) {
13681 				subprog = insn->off;
13682 				insn[0].imm = (u32)(long)func[subprog]->bpf_func;
13683 				insn[1].imm = ((u64)(long)func[subprog]->bpf_func) >> 32;
13684 				continue;
13685 			}
13686 			if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn))
13687 				continue;
13688 			subprog = insn->off;
13689 			insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(func[subprog]->bpf_func);
13690 		}
13691 
13692 		/* we use the aux data to keep a list of the start addresses
13693 		 * of the JITed images for each function in the program
13694 		 *
13695 		 * for some architectures, such as powerpc64, the imm field
13696 		 * might not be large enough to hold the offset of the start
13697 		 * address of the callee's JITed image from __bpf_call_base
13698 		 *
13699 		 * in such cases, we can lookup the start address of a callee
13700 		 * by using its subprog id, available from the off field of
13701 		 * the call instruction, as an index for this list
13702 		 */
13703 		func[i]->aux->func = func;
13704 		func[i]->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt;
13705 	}
13706 	for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
13707 		old_bpf_func = func[i]->bpf_func;
13708 		tmp = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]);
13709 		if (tmp != func[i] || func[i]->bpf_func != old_bpf_func) {
13710 			verbose(env, "JIT doesn't support bpf-to-bpf calls\n");
13711 			err = -ENOTSUPP;
13712 			goto out_free;
13713 		}
13714 		cond_resched();
13715 	}
13716 
13717 	/* finally lock prog and jit images for all functions and
13718 	 * populate kallsysm
13719 	 */
13720 	for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
13721 		bpf_prog_lock_ro(func[i]);
13722 		bpf_prog_kallsyms_add(func[i]);
13723 	}
13724 
13725 	/* Last step: make now unused interpreter insns from main
13726 	 * prog consistent for later dump requests, so they can
13727 	 * later look the same as if they were interpreted only.
13728 	 */
13729 	for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) {
13730 		if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) {
13731 			insn[0].imm = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm;
13732 			insn[1].imm = insn->off;
13733 			insn->off = 0;
13734 			continue;
13735 		}
13736 		if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn))
13737 			continue;
13738 		insn->off = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm;
13739 		subprog = find_subprog(env, i + insn->off + 1);
13740 		insn->imm = subprog;
13741 	}
13742 
13743 	prog->jited = 1;
13744 	prog->bpf_func = func[0]->bpf_func;
13745 	prog->jited_len = func[0]->jited_len;
13746 	prog->aux->func = func;
13747 	prog->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt;
13748 	bpf_prog_jit_attempt_done(prog);
13749 	return 0;
13750 out_free:
13751 	/* We failed JIT'ing, so at this point we need to unregister poke
13752 	 * descriptors from subprogs, so that kernel is not attempting to
13753 	 * patch it anymore as we're freeing the subprog JIT memory.
13754 	 */
13755 	for (i = 0; i < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; i++) {
13756 		map_ptr = prog->aux->poke_tab[i].tail_call.map;
13757 		map_ptr->ops->map_poke_untrack(map_ptr, prog->aux);
13758 	}
13759 	/* At this point we're guaranteed that poke descriptors are not
13760 	 * live anymore. We can just unlink its descriptor table as it's
13761 	 * released with the main prog.
13762 	 */
13763 	for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
13764 		if (!func[i])
13765 			continue;
13766 		func[i]->aux->poke_tab = NULL;
13767 		bpf_jit_free(func[i]);
13768 	}
13769 	kfree(func);
13770 out_undo_insn:
13771 	/* cleanup main prog to be interpreted */
13772 	prog->jit_requested = 0;
13773 	prog->blinding_requested = 0;
13774 	for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) {
13775 		if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn))
13776 			continue;
13777 		insn->off = 0;
13778 		insn->imm = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm;
13779 	}
13780 	bpf_prog_jit_attempt_done(prog);
13781 	return err;
13782 }
13783 
13784 static int fixup_call_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
13785 {
13786 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON
13787 	struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
13788 	struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi;
13789 	bool has_kfunc_call = bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call(prog);
13790 	int i, depth;
13791 #endif
13792 	int err = 0;
13793 
13794 	if (env->prog->jit_requested &&
13795 	    !bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) {
13796 		err = jit_subprogs(env);
13797 		if (err == 0)
13798 			return 0;
13799 		if (err == -EFAULT)
13800 			return err;
13801 	}
13802 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON
13803 	if (has_kfunc_call) {
13804 		verbose(env, "calling kernel functions are not allowed in non-JITed programs\n");
13805 		return -EINVAL;
13806 	}
13807 	if (env->subprog_cnt > 1 && env->prog->aux->tail_call_reachable) {
13808 		/* When JIT fails the progs with bpf2bpf calls and tail_calls
13809 		 * have to be rejected, since interpreter doesn't support them yet.
13810 		 */
13811 		verbose(env, "tail_calls are not allowed in non-JITed programs with bpf-to-bpf calls\n");
13812 		return -EINVAL;
13813 	}
13814 	for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) {
13815 		if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) {
13816 			/* When JIT fails the progs with callback calls
13817 			 * have to be rejected, since interpreter doesn't support them yet.
13818 			 */
13819 			verbose(env, "callbacks are not allowed in non-JITed programs\n");
13820 			return -EINVAL;
13821 		}
13822 
13823 		if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn))
13824 			continue;
13825 		depth = get_callee_stack_depth(env, insn, i);
13826 		if (depth < 0)
13827 			return depth;
13828 		bpf_patch_call_args(insn, depth);
13829 	}
13830 	err = 0;
13831 #endif
13832 	return err;
13833 }
13834 
13835 static int fixup_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
13836 			    struct bpf_insn *insn)
13837 {
13838 	const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc;
13839 
13840 	if (!insn->imm) {
13841 		verbose(env, "invalid kernel function call not eliminated in verifier pass\n");
13842 		return -EINVAL;
13843 	}
13844 
13845 	/* insn->imm has the btf func_id. Replace it with
13846 	 * an address (relative to __bpf_base_call).
13847 	 */
13848 	desc = find_kfunc_desc(env->prog, insn->imm, insn->off);
13849 	if (!desc) {
13850 		verbose(env, "verifier internal error: kernel function descriptor not found for func_id %u\n",
13851 			insn->imm);
13852 		return -EFAULT;
13853 	}
13854 
13855 	insn->imm = desc->imm;
13856 
13857 	return 0;
13858 }
13859 
13860 /* Do various post-verification rewrites in a single program pass.
13861  * These rewrites simplify JIT and interpreter implementations.
13862  */
13863 static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
13864 {
13865 	struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
13866 	enum bpf_attach_type eatype = prog->expected_attach_type;
13867 	enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(prog);
13868 	struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi;
13869 	const struct bpf_func_proto *fn;
13870 	const int insn_cnt = prog->len;
13871 	const struct bpf_map_ops *ops;
13872 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux;
13873 	struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16];
13874 	struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
13875 	struct bpf_map *map_ptr;
13876 	int i, ret, cnt, delta = 0;
13877 
13878 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
13879 		/* Make divide-by-zero exceptions impossible. */
13880 		if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOD | BPF_X) ||
13881 		    insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_DIV | BPF_X) ||
13882 		    insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_MOD | BPF_X) ||
13883 		    insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_DIV | BPF_X)) {
13884 			bool is64 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64;
13885 			bool isdiv = BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_DIV;
13886 			struct bpf_insn *patchlet;
13887 			struct bpf_insn chk_and_div[] = {
13888 				/* [R,W]x div 0 -> 0 */
13889 				BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) |
13890 					     BPF_JNE | BPF_K, insn->src_reg,
13891 					     0, 2, 0),
13892 				BPF_ALU32_REG(BPF_XOR, insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg),
13893 				BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1),
13894 				*insn,
13895 			};
13896 			struct bpf_insn chk_and_mod[] = {
13897 				/* [R,W]x mod 0 -> [R,W]x */
13898 				BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) |
13899 					     BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, insn->src_reg,
13900 					     0, 1 + (is64 ? 0 : 1), 0),
13901 				*insn,
13902 				BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1),
13903 				BPF_MOV32_REG(insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg),
13904 			};
13905 
13906 			patchlet = isdiv ? chk_and_div : chk_and_mod;
13907 			cnt = isdiv ? ARRAY_SIZE(chk_and_div) :
13908 				      ARRAY_SIZE(chk_and_mod) - (is64 ? 2 : 0);
13909 
13910 			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, patchlet, cnt);
13911 			if (!new_prog)
13912 				return -ENOMEM;
13913 
13914 			delta    += cnt - 1;
13915 			env->prog = prog = new_prog;
13916 			insn      = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
13917 			continue;
13918 		}
13919 
13920 		/* Implement LD_ABS and LD_IND with a rewrite, if supported by the program type. */
13921 		if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LD &&
13922 		    (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS ||
13923 		     BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND)) {
13924 			cnt = env->ops->gen_ld_abs(insn, insn_buf);
13925 			if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) {
13926 				verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
13927 				return -EINVAL;
13928 			}
13929 
13930 			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
13931 			if (!new_prog)
13932 				return -ENOMEM;
13933 
13934 			delta    += cnt - 1;
13935 			env->prog = prog = new_prog;
13936 			insn      = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
13937 			continue;
13938 		}
13939 
13940 		/* Rewrite pointer arithmetic to mitigate speculation attacks. */
13941 		if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ADD | BPF_X) ||
13942 		    insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_SUB | BPF_X)) {
13943 			const u8 code_add = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ADD | BPF_X;
13944 			const u8 code_sub = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_SUB | BPF_X;
13945 			struct bpf_insn *patch = &insn_buf[0];
13946 			bool issrc, isneg, isimm;
13947 			u32 off_reg;
13948 
13949 			aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta];
13950 			if (!aux->alu_state ||
13951 			    aux->alu_state == BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER)
13952 				continue;
13953 
13954 			isneg = aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE;
13955 			issrc = (aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_SANITIZE) ==
13956 				BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC;
13957 			isimm = aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_IMMEDIATE;
13958 
13959 			off_reg = issrc ? insn->src_reg : insn->dst_reg;
13960 			if (isimm) {
13961 				*patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, aux->alu_limit);
13962 			} else {
13963 				if (isneg)
13964 					*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1);
13965 				*patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, aux->alu_limit);
13966 				*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg);
13967 				*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg);
13968 				*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_NEG, BPF_REG_AX, 0);
13969 				*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ARSH, BPF_REG_AX, 63);
13970 				*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg);
13971 			}
13972 			if (!issrc)
13973 				*patch++ = BPF_MOV64_REG(insn->dst_reg, insn->src_reg);
13974 			insn->src_reg = BPF_REG_AX;
13975 			if (isneg)
13976 				insn->code = insn->code == code_add ?
13977 					     code_sub : code_add;
13978 			*patch++ = *insn;
13979 			if (issrc && isneg && !isimm)
13980 				*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1);
13981 			cnt = patch - insn_buf;
13982 
13983 			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
13984 			if (!new_prog)
13985 				return -ENOMEM;
13986 
13987 			delta    += cnt - 1;
13988 			env->prog = prog = new_prog;
13989 			insn      = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
13990 			continue;
13991 		}
13992 
13993 		if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL))
13994 			continue;
13995 		if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
13996 			continue;
13997 		if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) {
13998 			ret = fixup_kfunc_call(env, insn);
13999 			if (ret)
14000 				return ret;
14001 			continue;
14002 		}
14003 
14004 		if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm)
14005 			prog->dst_needed = 1;
14006 		if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32)
14007 			bpf_user_rnd_init_once();
14008 		if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_override_return)
14009 			prog->kprobe_override = 1;
14010 		if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) {
14011 			/* If we tail call into other programs, we
14012 			 * cannot make any assumptions since they can
14013 			 * be replaced dynamically during runtime in
14014 			 * the program array.
14015 			 */
14016 			prog->cb_access = 1;
14017 			if (!allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(env))
14018 				prog->aux->stack_depth = MAX_BPF_STACK;
14019 			prog->aux->max_pkt_offset = MAX_PACKET_OFF;
14020 
14021 			/* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode to avoid
14022 			 * conditional branch in the interpreter for every normal
14023 			 * call and to prevent accidental JITing by JIT compiler
14024 			 * that doesn't support bpf_tail_call yet
14025 			 */
14026 			insn->imm = 0;
14027 			insn->code = BPF_JMP | BPF_TAIL_CALL;
14028 
14029 			aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta];
14030 			if (env->bpf_capable && !prog->blinding_requested &&
14031 			    prog->jit_requested &&
14032 			    !bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux) &&
14033 			    !bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux) &&
14034 			    !bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux)) {
14035 				struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor desc = {
14036 					.reason = BPF_POKE_REASON_TAIL_CALL,
14037 					.tail_call.map = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state),
14038 					.tail_call.key = bpf_map_key_immediate(aux),
14039 					.insn_idx = i + delta,
14040 				};
14041 
14042 				ret = bpf_jit_add_poke_descriptor(prog, &desc);
14043 				if (ret < 0) {
14044 					verbose(env, "adding tail call poke descriptor failed\n");
14045 					return ret;
14046 				}
14047 
14048 				insn->imm = ret + 1;
14049 				continue;
14050 			}
14051 
14052 			if (!bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux))
14053 				continue;
14054 
14055 			/* instead of changing every JIT dealing with tail_call
14056 			 * emit two extra insns:
14057 			 * if (index >= max_entries) goto out;
14058 			 * index &= array->index_mask;
14059 			 * to avoid out-of-bounds cpu speculation
14060 			 */
14061 			if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux)) {
14062 				verbose(env, "tail_call abusing map_ptr\n");
14063 				return -EINVAL;
14064 			}
14065 
14066 			map_ptr = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state);
14067 			insn_buf[0] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_3,
14068 						  map_ptr->max_entries, 2);
14069 			insn_buf[1] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_3,
14070 						    container_of(map_ptr,
14071 								 struct bpf_array,
14072 								 map)->index_mask);
14073 			insn_buf[2] = *insn;
14074 			cnt = 3;
14075 			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
14076 			if (!new_prog)
14077 				return -ENOMEM;
14078 
14079 			delta    += cnt - 1;
14080 			env->prog = prog = new_prog;
14081 			insn      = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
14082 			continue;
14083 		}
14084 
14085 		if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback) {
14086 			/* The verifier will process callback_fn as many times as necessary
14087 			 * with different maps and the register states prepared by
14088 			 * set_timer_callback_state will be accurate.
14089 			 *
14090 			 * The following use case is valid:
14091 			 *   map1 is shared by prog1, prog2, prog3.
14092 			 *   prog1 calls bpf_timer_init for some map1 elements
14093 			 *   prog2 calls bpf_timer_set_callback for some map1 elements.
14094 			 *     Those that were not bpf_timer_init-ed will return -EINVAL.
14095 			 *   prog3 calls bpf_timer_start for some map1 elements.
14096 			 *     Those that were not both bpf_timer_init-ed and
14097 			 *     bpf_timer_set_callback-ed will return -EINVAL.
14098 			 */
14099 			struct bpf_insn ld_addrs[2] = {
14100 				BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_3, (long)prog->aux),
14101 			};
14102 
14103 			insn_buf[0] = ld_addrs[0];
14104 			insn_buf[1] = ld_addrs[1];
14105 			insn_buf[2] = *insn;
14106 			cnt = 3;
14107 
14108 			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
14109 			if (!new_prog)
14110 				return -ENOMEM;
14111 
14112 			delta    += cnt - 1;
14113 			env->prog = prog = new_prog;
14114 			insn      = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
14115 			goto patch_call_imm;
14116 		}
14117 
14118 		if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_task_storage_get ||
14119 		    insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get ||
14120 		    insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get) {
14121 			if (env->prog->aux->sleepable)
14122 				insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_5, (__force __s32)GFP_KERNEL);
14123 			else
14124 				insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_5, (__force __s32)GFP_ATOMIC);
14125 			insn_buf[1] = *insn;
14126 			cnt = 2;
14127 
14128 			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
14129 			if (!new_prog)
14130 				return -ENOMEM;
14131 
14132 			delta += cnt - 1;
14133 			env->prog = prog = new_prog;
14134 			insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
14135 			goto patch_call_imm;
14136 		}
14137 
14138 		/* BPF_EMIT_CALL() assumptions in some of the map_gen_lookup
14139 		 * and other inlining handlers are currently limited to 64 bit
14140 		 * only.
14141 		 */
14142 		if (prog->jit_requested && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 &&
14143 		    (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem ||
14144 		     insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem ||
14145 		     insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem ||
14146 		     insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem   ||
14147 		     insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem    ||
14148 		     insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem   ||
14149 		     insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_redirect_map    ||
14150 		     insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem ||
14151 		     insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem)) {
14152 			aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta];
14153 			if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux))
14154 				goto patch_call_imm;
14155 
14156 			map_ptr = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state);
14157 			ops = map_ptr->ops;
14158 			if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem &&
14159 			    ops->map_gen_lookup) {
14160 				cnt = ops->map_gen_lookup(map_ptr, insn_buf);
14161 				if (cnt == -EOPNOTSUPP)
14162 					goto patch_map_ops_generic;
14163 				if (cnt <= 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) {
14164 					verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
14165 					return -EINVAL;
14166 				}
14167 
14168 				new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta,
14169 							       insn_buf, cnt);
14170 				if (!new_prog)
14171 					return -ENOMEM;
14172 
14173 				delta    += cnt - 1;
14174 				env->prog = prog = new_prog;
14175 				insn      = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
14176 				continue;
14177 			}
14178 
14179 			BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_lookup_elem,
14180 				     (void *(*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key))NULL));
14181 			BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_delete_elem,
14182 				     (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key))NULL));
14183 			BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_update_elem,
14184 				     (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value,
14185 					      u64 flags))NULL));
14186 			BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_push_elem,
14187 				     (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value,
14188 					      u64 flags))NULL));
14189 			BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_pop_elem,
14190 				     (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value))NULL));
14191 			BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_peek_elem,
14192 				     (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value))NULL));
14193 			BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_redirect,
14194 				     (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, u32 ifindex, u64 flags))NULL));
14195 			BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_for_each_callback,
14196 				     (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map,
14197 					      bpf_callback_t callback_fn,
14198 					      void *callback_ctx,
14199 					      u64 flags))NULL));
14200 			BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_lookup_percpu_elem,
14201 				     (void *(*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, u32 cpu))NULL));
14202 
14203 patch_map_ops_generic:
14204 			switch (insn->imm) {
14205 			case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem:
14206 				insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_lookup_elem);
14207 				continue;
14208 			case BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem:
14209 				insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_update_elem);
14210 				continue;
14211 			case BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem:
14212 				insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_delete_elem);
14213 				continue;
14214 			case BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem:
14215 				insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_push_elem);
14216 				continue;
14217 			case BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem:
14218 				insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_pop_elem);
14219 				continue;
14220 			case BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem:
14221 				insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_peek_elem);
14222 				continue;
14223 			case BPF_FUNC_redirect_map:
14224 				insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_redirect);
14225 				continue;
14226 			case BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem:
14227 				insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_for_each_callback);
14228 				continue;
14229 			case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem:
14230 				insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_lookup_percpu_elem);
14231 				continue;
14232 			}
14233 
14234 			goto patch_call_imm;
14235 		}
14236 
14237 		/* Implement bpf_jiffies64 inline. */
14238 		if (prog->jit_requested && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 &&
14239 		    insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_jiffies64) {
14240 			struct bpf_insn ld_jiffies_addr[2] = {
14241 				BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_0,
14242 					     (unsigned long)&jiffies),
14243 			};
14244 
14245 			insn_buf[0] = ld_jiffies_addr[0];
14246 			insn_buf[1] = ld_jiffies_addr[1];
14247 			insn_buf[2] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0,
14248 						  BPF_REG_0, 0);
14249 			cnt = 3;
14250 
14251 			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf,
14252 						       cnt);
14253 			if (!new_prog)
14254 				return -ENOMEM;
14255 
14256 			delta    += cnt - 1;
14257 			env->prog = prog = new_prog;
14258 			insn      = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
14259 			continue;
14260 		}
14261 
14262 		/* Implement bpf_get_func_arg inline. */
14263 		if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING &&
14264 		    insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_arg) {
14265 			/* Load nr_args from ctx - 8 */
14266 			insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -8);
14267 			insn_buf[1] = BPF_JMP32_REG(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_0, 6);
14268 			insn_buf[2] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_2, 3);
14269 			insn_buf[3] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1);
14270 			insn_buf[4] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2, 0);
14271 			insn_buf[5] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, 0);
14272 			insn_buf[6] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0);
14273 			insn_buf[7] = BPF_JMP_A(1);
14274 			insn_buf[8] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, -EINVAL);
14275 			cnt = 9;
14276 
14277 			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
14278 			if (!new_prog)
14279 				return -ENOMEM;
14280 
14281 			delta    += cnt - 1;
14282 			env->prog = prog = new_prog;
14283 			insn      = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
14284 			continue;
14285 		}
14286 
14287 		/* Implement bpf_get_func_ret inline. */
14288 		if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING &&
14289 		    insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_ret) {
14290 			if (eatype == BPF_TRACE_FEXIT ||
14291 			    eatype == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) {
14292 				/* Load nr_args from ctx - 8 */
14293 				insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -8);
14294 				insn_buf[1] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_0, 3);
14295 				insn_buf[2] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1);
14296 				insn_buf[3] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, 0);
14297 				insn_buf[4] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, 0);
14298 				insn_buf[5] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0);
14299 				cnt = 6;
14300 			} else {
14301 				insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, -EOPNOTSUPP);
14302 				cnt = 1;
14303 			}
14304 
14305 			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
14306 			if (!new_prog)
14307 				return -ENOMEM;
14308 
14309 			delta    += cnt - 1;
14310 			env->prog = prog = new_prog;
14311 			insn      = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
14312 			continue;
14313 		}
14314 
14315 		/* Implement get_func_arg_cnt inline. */
14316 		if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING &&
14317 		    insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_arg_cnt) {
14318 			/* Load nr_args from ctx - 8 */
14319 			insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -8);
14320 
14321 			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, 1);
14322 			if (!new_prog)
14323 				return -ENOMEM;
14324 
14325 			env->prog = prog = new_prog;
14326 			insn      = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
14327 			continue;
14328 		}
14329 
14330 		/* Implement bpf_get_func_ip inline. */
14331 		if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING &&
14332 		    insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_ip) {
14333 			/* Load IP address from ctx - 16 */
14334 			insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -16);
14335 
14336 			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, 1);
14337 			if (!new_prog)
14338 				return -ENOMEM;
14339 
14340 			env->prog = prog = new_prog;
14341 			insn      = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
14342 			continue;
14343 		}
14344 
14345 patch_call_imm:
14346 		fn = env->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm, env->prog);
14347 		/* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed
14348 		 * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions
14349 		 */
14350 		if (!fn->func) {
14351 			verbose(env,
14352 				"kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n",
14353 				func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm);
14354 			return -EFAULT;
14355 		}
14356 		insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base;
14357 	}
14358 
14359 	/* Since poke tab is now finalized, publish aux to tracker. */
14360 	for (i = 0; i < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; i++) {
14361 		map_ptr = prog->aux->poke_tab[i].tail_call.map;
14362 		if (!map_ptr->ops->map_poke_track ||
14363 		    !map_ptr->ops->map_poke_untrack ||
14364 		    !map_ptr->ops->map_poke_run) {
14365 			verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
14366 			return -EINVAL;
14367 		}
14368 
14369 		ret = map_ptr->ops->map_poke_track(map_ptr, prog->aux);
14370 		if (ret < 0) {
14371 			verbose(env, "tracking tail call prog failed\n");
14372 			return ret;
14373 		}
14374 	}
14375 
14376 	sort_kfunc_descs_by_imm(env->prog);
14377 
14378 	return 0;
14379 }
14380 
14381 static struct bpf_prog *inline_bpf_loop(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
14382 					int position,
14383 					s32 stack_base,
14384 					u32 callback_subprogno,
14385 					u32 *cnt)
14386 {
14387 	s32 r6_offset = stack_base + 0 * BPF_REG_SIZE;
14388 	s32 r7_offset = stack_base + 1 * BPF_REG_SIZE;
14389 	s32 r8_offset = stack_base + 2 * BPF_REG_SIZE;
14390 	int reg_loop_max = BPF_REG_6;
14391 	int reg_loop_cnt = BPF_REG_7;
14392 	int reg_loop_ctx = BPF_REG_8;
14393 
14394 	struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
14395 	u32 callback_start;
14396 	u32 call_insn_offset;
14397 	s32 callback_offset;
14398 
14399 	/* This represents an inlined version of bpf_iter.c:bpf_loop,
14400 	 * be careful to modify this code in sync.
14401 	 */
14402 	struct bpf_insn insn_buf[] = {
14403 		/* Return error and jump to the end of the patch if
14404 		 * expected number of iterations is too big.
14405 		 */
14406 		BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JLE, BPF_REG_1, BPF_MAX_LOOPS, 2),
14407 		BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_0, -E2BIG),
14408 		BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 16),
14409 		/* spill R6, R7, R8 to use these as loop vars */
14410 		BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_6, r6_offset),
14411 		BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_7, r7_offset),
14412 		BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_8, r8_offset),
14413 		/* initialize loop vars */
14414 		BPF_MOV64_REG(reg_loop_max, BPF_REG_1),
14415 		BPF_MOV32_IMM(reg_loop_cnt, 0),
14416 		BPF_MOV64_REG(reg_loop_ctx, BPF_REG_3),
14417 		/* loop header,
14418 		 * if reg_loop_cnt >= reg_loop_max skip the loop body
14419 		 */
14420 		BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGE, reg_loop_cnt, reg_loop_max, 5),
14421 		/* callback call,
14422 		 * correct callback offset would be set after patching
14423 		 */
14424 		BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, reg_loop_cnt),
14425 		BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, reg_loop_ctx),
14426 		BPF_CALL_REL(0),
14427 		/* increment loop counter */
14428 		BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, reg_loop_cnt, 1),
14429 		/* jump to loop header if callback returned 0 */
14430 		BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, -6),
14431 		/* return value of bpf_loop,
14432 		 * set R0 to the number of iterations
14433 		 */
14434 		BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, reg_loop_cnt),
14435 		/* restore original values of R6, R7, R8 */
14436 		BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_10, r6_offset),
14437 		BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_10, r7_offset),
14438 		BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_10, r8_offset),
14439 	};
14440 
14441 	*cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf);
14442 	new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, position, insn_buf, *cnt);
14443 	if (!new_prog)
14444 		return new_prog;
14445 
14446 	/* callback start is known only after patching */
14447 	callback_start = env->subprog_info[callback_subprogno].start;
14448 	/* Note: insn_buf[12] is an offset of BPF_CALL_REL instruction */
14449 	call_insn_offset = position + 12;
14450 	callback_offset = callback_start - call_insn_offset - 1;
14451 	new_prog->insnsi[call_insn_offset].imm = callback_offset;
14452 
14453 	return new_prog;
14454 }
14455 
14456 static bool is_bpf_loop_call(struct bpf_insn *insn)
14457 {
14458 	return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) &&
14459 		insn->src_reg == 0 &&
14460 		insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_loop;
14461 }
14462 
14463 /* For all sub-programs in the program (including main) check
14464  * insn_aux_data to see if there are bpf_loop calls that require
14465  * inlining. If such calls are found the calls are replaced with a
14466  * sequence of instructions produced by `inline_bpf_loop` function and
14467  * subprog stack_depth is increased by the size of 3 registers.
14468  * This stack space is used to spill values of the R6, R7, R8.  These
14469  * registers are used to store the loop bound, counter and context
14470  * variables.
14471  */
14472 static int optimize_bpf_loop(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
14473 {
14474 	struct bpf_subprog_info *subprogs = env->subprog_info;
14475 	int i, cur_subprog = 0, cnt, delta = 0;
14476 	struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
14477 	int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
14478 	u16 stack_depth = subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth;
14479 	u16 stack_depth_roundup = round_up(stack_depth, 8) - stack_depth;
14480 	u16 stack_depth_extra = 0;
14481 
14482 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
14483 		struct bpf_loop_inline_state *inline_state =
14484 			&env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].loop_inline_state;
14485 
14486 		if (is_bpf_loop_call(insn) && inline_state->fit_for_inline) {
14487 			struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
14488 
14489 			stack_depth_extra = BPF_REG_SIZE * 3 + stack_depth_roundup;
14490 			new_prog = inline_bpf_loop(env,
14491 						   i + delta,
14492 						   -(stack_depth + stack_depth_extra),
14493 						   inline_state->callback_subprogno,
14494 						   &cnt);
14495 			if (!new_prog)
14496 				return -ENOMEM;
14497 
14498 			delta     += cnt - 1;
14499 			env->prog  = new_prog;
14500 			insn       = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
14501 		}
14502 
14503 		if (subprogs[cur_subprog + 1].start == i + delta + 1) {
14504 			subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth += stack_depth_extra;
14505 			cur_subprog++;
14506 			stack_depth = subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth;
14507 			stack_depth_roundup = round_up(stack_depth, 8) - stack_depth;
14508 			stack_depth_extra = 0;
14509 		}
14510 	}
14511 
14512 	env->prog->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[0].stack_depth;
14513 
14514 	return 0;
14515 }
14516 
14517 static void free_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
14518 {
14519 	struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl, *sln;
14520 	int i;
14521 
14522 	sl = env->free_list;
14523 	while (sl) {
14524 		sln = sl->next;
14525 		free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false);
14526 		kfree(sl);
14527 		sl = sln;
14528 	}
14529 	env->free_list = NULL;
14530 
14531 	if (!env->explored_states)
14532 		return;
14533 
14534 	for (i = 0; i < state_htab_size(env); i++) {
14535 		sl = env->explored_states[i];
14536 
14537 		while (sl) {
14538 			sln = sl->next;
14539 			free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false);
14540 			kfree(sl);
14541 			sl = sln;
14542 		}
14543 		env->explored_states[i] = NULL;
14544 	}
14545 }
14546 
14547 static int do_check_common(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog)
14548 {
14549 	bool pop_log = !(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2);
14550 	struct bpf_verifier_state *state;
14551 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs;
14552 	int ret, i;
14553 
14554 	env->prev_linfo = NULL;
14555 	env->pass_cnt++;
14556 
14557 	state = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state), GFP_KERNEL);
14558 	if (!state)
14559 		return -ENOMEM;
14560 	state->curframe = 0;
14561 	state->speculative = false;
14562 	state->branches = 1;
14563 	state->frame[0] = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_func_state), GFP_KERNEL);
14564 	if (!state->frame[0]) {
14565 		kfree(state);
14566 		return -ENOMEM;
14567 	}
14568 	env->cur_state = state;
14569 	init_func_state(env, state->frame[0],
14570 			BPF_MAIN_FUNC /* callsite */,
14571 			0 /* frameno */,
14572 			subprog);
14573 
14574 	regs = state->frame[state->curframe]->regs;
14575 	if (subprog || env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) {
14576 		ret = btf_prepare_func_args(env, subprog, regs);
14577 		if (ret)
14578 			goto out;
14579 		for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) {
14580 			if (regs[i].type == PTR_TO_CTX)
14581 				mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, i);
14582 			else if (regs[i].type == SCALAR_VALUE)
14583 				mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, i);
14584 			else if (base_type(regs[i].type) == PTR_TO_MEM) {
14585 				const u32 mem_size = regs[i].mem_size;
14586 
14587 				mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, i);
14588 				regs[i].mem_size = mem_size;
14589 				regs[i].id = ++env->id_gen;
14590 			}
14591 		}
14592 	} else {
14593 		/* 1st arg to a function */
14594 		regs[BPF_REG_1].type = PTR_TO_CTX;
14595 		mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_1);
14596 		ret = btf_check_subprog_arg_match(env, subprog, regs);
14597 		if (ret == -EFAULT)
14598 			/* unlikely verifier bug. abort.
14599 			 * ret == 0 and ret < 0 are sadly acceptable for
14600 			 * main() function due to backward compatibility.
14601 			 * Like socket filter program may be written as:
14602 			 * int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx)
14603 			 * and never dereference that ctx in the program.
14604 			 * 'struct pt_regs' is a type mismatch for socket
14605 			 * filter that should be using 'struct __sk_buff'.
14606 			 */
14607 			goto out;
14608 	}
14609 
14610 	ret = do_check(env);
14611 out:
14612 	/* check for NULL is necessary, since cur_state can be freed inside
14613 	 * do_check() under memory pressure.
14614 	 */
14615 	if (env->cur_state) {
14616 		free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true);
14617 		env->cur_state = NULL;
14618 	}
14619 	while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false));
14620 	if (!ret && pop_log)
14621 		bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, 0);
14622 	free_states(env);
14623 	return ret;
14624 }
14625 
14626 /* Verify all global functions in a BPF program one by one based on their BTF.
14627  * All global functions must pass verification. Otherwise the whole program is rejected.
14628  * Consider:
14629  * int bar(int);
14630  * int foo(int f)
14631  * {
14632  *    return bar(f);
14633  * }
14634  * int bar(int b)
14635  * {
14636  *    ...
14637  * }
14638  * foo() will be verified first for R1=any_scalar_value. During verification it
14639  * will be assumed that bar() already verified successfully and call to bar()
14640  * from foo() will be checked for type match only. Later bar() will be verified
14641  * independently to check that it's safe for R1=any_scalar_value.
14642  */
14643 static int do_check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
14644 {
14645 	struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux;
14646 	int i, ret;
14647 
14648 	if (!aux->func_info)
14649 		return 0;
14650 
14651 	for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
14652 		if (aux->func_info_aux[i].linkage != BTF_FUNC_GLOBAL)
14653 			continue;
14654 		env->insn_idx = env->subprog_info[i].start;
14655 		WARN_ON_ONCE(env->insn_idx == 0);
14656 		ret = do_check_common(env, i);
14657 		if (ret) {
14658 			return ret;
14659 		} else if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) {
14660 			verbose(env,
14661 				"Func#%d is safe for any args that match its prototype\n",
14662 				i);
14663 		}
14664 	}
14665 	return 0;
14666 }
14667 
14668 static int do_check_main(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
14669 {
14670 	int ret;
14671 
14672 	env->insn_idx = 0;
14673 	ret = do_check_common(env, 0);
14674 	if (!ret)
14675 		env->prog->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[0].stack_depth;
14676 	return ret;
14677 }
14678 
14679 
14680 static void print_verification_stats(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
14681 {
14682 	int i;
14683 
14684 	if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_STATS) {
14685 		verbose(env, "verification time %lld usec\n",
14686 			div_u64(env->verification_time, 1000));
14687 		verbose(env, "stack depth ");
14688 		for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
14689 			u32 depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth;
14690 
14691 			verbose(env, "%d", depth);
14692 			if (i + 1 < env->subprog_cnt)
14693 				verbose(env, "+");
14694 		}
14695 		verbose(env, "\n");
14696 	}
14697 	verbose(env, "processed %d insns (limit %d) max_states_per_insn %d "
14698 		"total_states %d peak_states %d mark_read %d\n",
14699 		env->insn_processed, BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS,
14700 		env->max_states_per_insn, env->total_states,
14701 		env->peak_states, env->longest_mark_read_walk);
14702 }
14703 
14704 static int check_struct_ops_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
14705 {
14706 	const struct btf_type *t, *func_proto;
14707 	const struct bpf_struct_ops *st_ops;
14708 	const struct btf_member *member;
14709 	struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
14710 	u32 btf_id, member_idx;
14711 	const char *mname;
14712 
14713 	if (!prog->gpl_compatible) {
14714 		verbose(env, "struct ops programs must have a GPL compatible license\n");
14715 		return -EINVAL;
14716 	}
14717 
14718 	btf_id = prog->aux->attach_btf_id;
14719 	st_ops = bpf_struct_ops_find(btf_id);
14720 	if (!st_ops) {
14721 		verbose(env, "attach_btf_id %u is not a supported struct\n",
14722 			btf_id);
14723 		return -ENOTSUPP;
14724 	}
14725 
14726 	t = st_ops->type;
14727 	member_idx = prog->expected_attach_type;
14728 	if (member_idx >= btf_type_vlen(t)) {
14729 		verbose(env, "attach to invalid member idx %u of struct %s\n",
14730 			member_idx, st_ops->name);
14731 		return -EINVAL;
14732 	}
14733 
14734 	member = &btf_type_member(t)[member_idx];
14735 	mname = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, member->name_off);
14736 	func_proto = btf_type_resolve_func_ptr(btf_vmlinux, member->type,
14737 					       NULL);
14738 	if (!func_proto) {
14739 		verbose(env, "attach to invalid member %s(@idx %u) of struct %s\n",
14740 			mname, member_idx, st_ops->name);
14741 		return -EINVAL;
14742 	}
14743 
14744 	if (st_ops->check_member) {
14745 		int err = st_ops->check_member(t, member);
14746 
14747 		if (err) {
14748 			verbose(env, "attach to unsupported member %s of struct %s\n",
14749 				mname, st_ops->name);
14750 			return err;
14751 		}
14752 	}
14753 
14754 	prog->aux->attach_func_proto = func_proto;
14755 	prog->aux->attach_func_name = mname;
14756 	env->ops = st_ops->verifier_ops;
14757 
14758 	return 0;
14759 }
14760 #define SECURITY_PREFIX "security_"
14761 
14762 static int check_attach_modify_return(unsigned long addr, const char *func_name)
14763 {
14764 	if (within_error_injection_list(addr) ||
14765 	    !strncmp(SECURITY_PREFIX, func_name, sizeof(SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1))
14766 		return 0;
14767 
14768 	return -EINVAL;
14769 }
14770 
14771 /* list of non-sleepable functions that are otherwise on
14772  * ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION list
14773  */
14774 BTF_SET_START(btf_non_sleepable_error_inject)
14775 /* Three functions below can be called from sleepable and non-sleepable context.
14776  * Assume non-sleepable from bpf safety point of view.
14777  */
14778 BTF_ID(func, __filemap_add_folio)
14779 BTF_ID(func, should_fail_alloc_page)
14780 BTF_ID(func, should_failslab)
14781 BTF_SET_END(btf_non_sleepable_error_inject)
14782 
14783 static int check_non_sleepable_error_inject(u32 btf_id)
14784 {
14785 	return btf_id_set_contains(&btf_non_sleepable_error_inject, btf_id);
14786 }
14787 
14788 int bpf_check_attach_target(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
14789 			    const struct bpf_prog *prog,
14790 			    const struct bpf_prog *tgt_prog,
14791 			    u32 btf_id,
14792 			    struct bpf_attach_target_info *tgt_info)
14793 {
14794 	bool prog_extension = prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT;
14795 	const char prefix[] = "btf_trace_";
14796 	int ret = 0, subprog = -1, i;
14797 	const struct btf_type *t;
14798 	bool conservative = true;
14799 	const char *tname;
14800 	struct btf *btf;
14801 	long addr = 0;
14802 
14803 	if (!btf_id) {
14804 		bpf_log(log, "Tracing programs must provide btf_id\n");
14805 		return -EINVAL;
14806 	}
14807 	btf = tgt_prog ? tgt_prog->aux->btf : prog->aux->attach_btf;
14808 	if (!btf) {
14809 		bpf_log(log,
14810 			"FENTRY/FEXIT program can only be attached to another program annotated with BTF\n");
14811 		return -EINVAL;
14812 	}
14813 	t = btf_type_by_id(btf, btf_id);
14814 	if (!t) {
14815 		bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is invalid\n", btf_id);
14816 		return -EINVAL;
14817 	}
14818 	tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off);
14819 	if (!tname) {
14820 		bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u doesn't have a name\n", btf_id);
14821 		return -EINVAL;
14822 	}
14823 	if (tgt_prog) {
14824 		struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = tgt_prog->aux;
14825 
14826 		for (i = 0; i < aux->func_info_cnt; i++)
14827 			if (aux->func_info[i].type_id == btf_id) {
14828 				subprog = i;
14829 				break;
14830 			}
14831 		if (subprog == -1) {
14832 			bpf_log(log, "Subprog %s doesn't exist\n", tname);
14833 			return -EINVAL;
14834 		}
14835 		conservative = aux->func_info_aux[subprog].unreliable;
14836 		if (prog_extension) {
14837 			if (conservative) {
14838 				bpf_log(log,
14839 					"Cannot replace static functions\n");
14840 				return -EINVAL;
14841 			}
14842 			if (!prog->jit_requested) {
14843 				bpf_log(log,
14844 					"Extension programs should be JITed\n");
14845 				return -EINVAL;
14846 			}
14847 		}
14848 		if (!tgt_prog->jited) {
14849 			bpf_log(log, "Can attach to only JITed progs\n");
14850 			return -EINVAL;
14851 		}
14852 		if (tgt_prog->type == prog->type) {
14853 			/* Cannot fentry/fexit another fentry/fexit program.
14854 			 * Cannot attach program extension to another extension.
14855 			 * It's ok to attach fentry/fexit to extension program.
14856 			 */
14857 			bpf_log(log, "Cannot recursively attach\n");
14858 			return -EINVAL;
14859 		}
14860 		if (tgt_prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING &&
14861 		    prog_extension &&
14862 		    (tgt_prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FENTRY ||
14863 		     tgt_prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FEXIT)) {
14864 			/* Program extensions can extend all program types
14865 			 * except fentry/fexit. The reason is the following.
14866 			 * The fentry/fexit programs are used for performance
14867 			 * analysis, stats and can be attached to any program
14868 			 * type except themselves. When extension program is
14869 			 * replacing XDP function it is necessary to allow
14870 			 * performance analysis of all functions. Both original
14871 			 * XDP program and its program extension. Hence
14872 			 * attaching fentry/fexit to BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT is
14873 			 * allowed. If extending of fentry/fexit was allowed it
14874 			 * would be possible to create long call chain
14875 			 * fentry->extension->fentry->extension beyond
14876 			 * reasonable stack size. Hence extending fentry is not
14877 			 * allowed.
14878 			 */
14879 			bpf_log(log, "Cannot extend fentry/fexit\n");
14880 			return -EINVAL;
14881 		}
14882 	} else {
14883 		if (prog_extension) {
14884 			bpf_log(log, "Cannot replace kernel functions\n");
14885 			return -EINVAL;
14886 		}
14887 	}
14888 
14889 	switch (prog->expected_attach_type) {
14890 	case BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP:
14891 		if (tgt_prog) {
14892 			bpf_log(log,
14893 				"Only FENTRY/FEXIT progs are attachable to another BPF prog\n");
14894 			return -EINVAL;
14895 		}
14896 		if (!btf_type_is_typedef(t)) {
14897 			bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a typedef\n",
14898 				btf_id);
14899 			return -EINVAL;
14900 		}
14901 		if (strncmp(prefix, tname, sizeof(prefix) - 1)) {
14902 			bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u points to wrong type name %s\n",
14903 				btf_id, tname);
14904 			return -EINVAL;
14905 		}
14906 		tname += sizeof(prefix) - 1;
14907 		t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type);
14908 		if (!btf_type_is_ptr(t))
14909 			/* should never happen in valid vmlinux build */
14910 			return -EINVAL;
14911 		t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type);
14912 		if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t))
14913 			/* should never happen in valid vmlinux build */
14914 			return -EINVAL;
14915 
14916 		break;
14917 	case BPF_TRACE_ITER:
14918 		if (!btf_type_is_func(t)) {
14919 			bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a function\n",
14920 				btf_id);
14921 			return -EINVAL;
14922 		}
14923 		t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type);
14924 		if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t))
14925 			return -EINVAL;
14926 		ret = btf_distill_func_proto(log, btf, t, tname, &tgt_info->fmodel);
14927 		if (ret)
14928 			return ret;
14929 		break;
14930 	default:
14931 		if (!prog_extension)
14932 			return -EINVAL;
14933 		fallthrough;
14934 	case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN:
14935 	case BPF_LSM_MAC:
14936 	case BPF_LSM_CGROUP:
14937 	case BPF_TRACE_FENTRY:
14938 	case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT:
14939 		if (!btf_type_is_func(t)) {
14940 			bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a function\n",
14941 				btf_id);
14942 			return -EINVAL;
14943 		}
14944 		if (prog_extension &&
14945 		    btf_check_type_match(log, prog, btf, t))
14946 			return -EINVAL;
14947 		t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type);
14948 		if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t))
14949 			return -EINVAL;
14950 
14951 		if ((prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type || prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type) &&
14952 		    (!tgt_prog || prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type != tgt_prog->type ||
14953 		     prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type != tgt_prog->expected_attach_type))
14954 			return -EINVAL;
14955 
14956 		if (tgt_prog && conservative)
14957 			t = NULL;
14958 
14959 		ret = btf_distill_func_proto(log, btf, t, tname, &tgt_info->fmodel);
14960 		if (ret < 0)
14961 			return ret;
14962 
14963 		if (tgt_prog) {
14964 			if (subprog == 0)
14965 				addr = (long) tgt_prog->bpf_func;
14966 			else
14967 				addr = (long) tgt_prog->aux->func[subprog]->bpf_func;
14968 		} else {
14969 			addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(tname);
14970 			if (!addr) {
14971 				bpf_log(log,
14972 					"The address of function %s cannot be found\n",
14973 					tname);
14974 				return -ENOENT;
14975 			}
14976 		}
14977 
14978 		if (prog->aux->sleepable) {
14979 			ret = -EINVAL;
14980 			switch (prog->type) {
14981 			case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING:
14982 				/* fentry/fexit/fmod_ret progs can be sleepable only if they are
14983 				 * attached to ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION and are not in denylist.
14984 				 */
14985 				if (!check_non_sleepable_error_inject(btf_id) &&
14986 				    within_error_injection_list(addr))
14987 					ret = 0;
14988 				break;
14989 			case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM:
14990 				/* LSM progs check that they are attached to bpf_lsm_*() funcs.
14991 				 * Only some of them are sleepable.
14992 				 */
14993 				if (bpf_lsm_is_sleepable_hook(btf_id))
14994 					ret = 0;
14995 				break;
14996 			default:
14997 				break;
14998 			}
14999 			if (ret) {
15000 				bpf_log(log, "%s is not sleepable\n", tname);
15001 				return ret;
15002 			}
15003 		} else if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) {
15004 			if (tgt_prog) {
15005 				bpf_log(log, "can't modify return codes of BPF programs\n");
15006 				return -EINVAL;
15007 			}
15008 			ret = check_attach_modify_return(addr, tname);
15009 			if (ret) {
15010 				bpf_log(log, "%s() is not modifiable\n", tname);
15011 				return ret;
15012 			}
15013 		}
15014 
15015 		break;
15016 	}
15017 	tgt_info->tgt_addr = addr;
15018 	tgt_info->tgt_name = tname;
15019 	tgt_info->tgt_type = t;
15020 	return 0;
15021 }
15022 
15023 BTF_SET_START(btf_id_deny)
15024 BTF_ID_UNUSED
15025 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
15026 BTF_ID(func, migrate_disable)
15027 BTF_ID(func, migrate_enable)
15028 #endif
15029 #if !defined CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU && !defined CONFIG_TINY_RCU
15030 BTF_ID(func, rcu_read_unlock_strict)
15031 #endif
15032 BTF_SET_END(btf_id_deny)
15033 
15034 static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
15035 {
15036 	struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
15037 	struct bpf_prog *tgt_prog = prog->aux->dst_prog;
15038 	struct bpf_attach_target_info tgt_info = {};
15039 	u32 btf_id = prog->aux->attach_btf_id;
15040 	struct bpf_trampoline *tr;
15041 	int ret;
15042 	u64 key;
15043 
15044 	if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_SYSCALL) {
15045 		if (prog->aux->sleepable)
15046 			/* attach_btf_id checked to be zero already */
15047 			return 0;
15048 		verbose(env, "Syscall programs can only be sleepable\n");
15049 		return -EINVAL;
15050 	}
15051 
15052 	if (prog->aux->sleepable && prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING &&
15053 	    prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM && prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE) {
15054 		verbose(env, "Only fentry/fexit/fmod_ret, lsm, and kprobe/uprobe programs can be sleepable\n");
15055 		return -EINVAL;
15056 	}
15057 
15058 	if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS)
15059 		return check_struct_ops_btf_id(env);
15060 
15061 	if (prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING &&
15062 	    prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM &&
15063 	    prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT)
15064 		return 0;
15065 
15066 	ret = bpf_check_attach_target(&env->log, prog, tgt_prog, btf_id, &tgt_info);
15067 	if (ret)
15068 		return ret;
15069 
15070 	if (tgt_prog && prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) {
15071 		/* to make freplace equivalent to their targets, they need to
15072 		 * inherit env->ops and expected_attach_type for the rest of the
15073 		 * verification
15074 		 */
15075 		env->ops = bpf_verifier_ops[tgt_prog->type];
15076 		prog->expected_attach_type = tgt_prog->expected_attach_type;
15077 	}
15078 
15079 	/* store info about the attachment target that will be used later */
15080 	prog->aux->attach_func_proto = tgt_info.tgt_type;
15081 	prog->aux->attach_func_name = tgt_info.tgt_name;
15082 
15083 	if (tgt_prog) {
15084 		prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type = tgt_prog->type;
15085 		prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type = tgt_prog->expected_attach_type;
15086 	}
15087 
15088 	if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP) {
15089 		prog->aux->attach_btf_trace = true;
15090 		return 0;
15091 	} else if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_ITER) {
15092 		if (!bpf_iter_prog_supported(prog))
15093 			return -EINVAL;
15094 		return 0;
15095 	}
15096 
15097 	if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) {
15098 		ret = bpf_lsm_verify_prog(&env->log, prog);
15099 		if (ret < 0)
15100 			return ret;
15101 	} else if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING &&
15102 		   btf_id_set_contains(&btf_id_deny, btf_id)) {
15103 		return -EINVAL;
15104 	}
15105 
15106 	key = bpf_trampoline_compute_key(tgt_prog, prog->aux->attach_btf, btf_id);
15107 	tr = bpf_trampoline_get(key, &tgt_info);
15108 	if (!tr)
15109 		return -ENOMEM;
15110 
15111 	prog->aux->dst_trampoline = tr;
15112 	return 0;
15113 }
15114 
15115 struct btf *bpf_get_btf_vmlinux(void)
15116 {
15117 	if (!btf_vmlinux && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF)) {
15118 		mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
15119 		if (!btf_vmlinux)
15120 			btf_vmlinux = btf_parse_vmlinux();
15121 		mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
15122 	}
15123 	return btf_vmlinux;
15124 }
15125 
15126 int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr)
15127 {
15128 	u64 start_time = ktime_get_ns();
15129 	struct bpf_verifier_env *env;
15130 	struct bpf_verifier_log *log;
15131 	int i, len, ret = -EINVAL;
15132 	bool is_priv;
15133 
15134 	/* no program is valid */
15135 	if (ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_verifier_ops) == 0)
15136 		return -EINVAL;
15137 
15138 	/* 'struct bpf_verifier_env' can be global, but since it's not small,
15139 	 * allocate/free it every time bpf_check() is called
15140 	 */
15141 	env = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_env), GFP_KERNEL);
15142 	if (!env)
15143 		return -ENOMEM;
15144 	log = &env->log;
15145 
15146 	len = (*prog)->len;
15147 	env->insn_aux_data =
15148 		vzalloc(array_size(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data), len));
15149 	ret = -ENOMEM;
15150 	if (!env->insn_aux_data)
15151 		goto err_free_env;
15152 	for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
15153 		env->insn_aux_data[i].orig_idx = i;
15154 	env->prog = *prog;
15155 	env->ops = bpf_verifier_ops[env->prog->type];
15156 	env->fd_array = make_bpfptr(attr->fd_array, uattr.is_kernel);
15157 	is_priv = bpf_capable();
15158 
15159 	bpf_get_btf_vmlinux();
15160 
15161 	/* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */
15162 	if (!is_priv)
15163 		mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
15164 
15165 	if (attr->log_level || attr->log_buf || attr->log_size) {
15166 		/* user requested verbose verifier output
15167 		 * and supplied buffer to store the verification trace
15168 		 */
15169 		log->level = attr->log_level;
15170 		log->ubuf = (char __user *) (unsigned long) attr->log_buf;
15171 		log->len_total = attr->log_size;
15172 
15173 		/* log attributes have to be sane */
15174 		if (!bpf_verifier_log_attr_valid(log)) {
15175 			ret = -EINVAL;
15176 			goto err_unlock;
15177 		}
15178 	}
15179 
15180 	mark_verifier_state_clean(env);
15181 
15182 	if (IS_ERR(btf_vmlinux)) {
15183 		/* Either gcc or pahole or kernel are broken. */
15184 		verbose(env, "in-kernel BTF is malformed\n");
15185 		ret = PTR_ERR(btf_vmlinux);
15186 		goto skip_full_check;
15187 	}
15188 
15189 	env->strict_alignment = !!(attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT);
15190 	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS))
15191 		env->strict_alignment = true;
15192 	if (attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_ANY_ALIGNMENT)
15193 		env->strict_alignment = false;
15194 
15195 	env->allow_ptr_leaks = bpf_allow_ptr_leaks();
15196 	env->allow_uninit_stack = bpf_allow_uninit_stack();
15197 	env->allow_ptr_to_map_access = bpf_allow_ptr_to_map_access();
15198 	env->bypass_spec_v1 = bpf_bypass_spec_v1();
15199 	env->bypass_spec_v4 = bpf_bypass_spec_v4();
15200 	env->bpf_capable = bpf_capable();
15201 
15202 	if (is_priv)
15203 		env->test_state_freq = attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ;
15204 
15205 	env->explored_states = kvcalloc(state_htab_size(env),
15206 				       sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list *),
15207 				       GFP_USER);
15208 	ret = -ENOMEM;
15209 	if (!env->explored_states)
15210 		goto skip_full_check;
15211 
15212 	ret = add_subprog_and_kfunc(env);
15213 	if (ret < 0)
15214 		goto skip_full_check;
15215 
15216 	ret = check_subprogs(env);
15217 	if (ret < 0)
15218 		goto skip_full_check;
15219 
15220 	ret = check_btf_info(env, attr, uattr);
15221 	if (ret < 0)
15222 		goto skip_full_check;
15223 
15224 	ret = check_attach_btf_id(env);
15225 	if (ret)
15226 		goto skip_full_check;
15227 
15228 	ret = resolve_pseudo_ldimm64(env);
15229 	if (ret < 0)
15230 		goto skip_full_check;
15231 
15232 	if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) {
15233 		ret = bpf_prog_offload_verifier_prep(env->prog);
15234 		if (ret)
15235 			goto skip_full_check;
15236 	}
15237 
15238 	ret = check_cfg(env);
15239 	if (ret < 0)
15240 		goto skip_full_check;
15241 
15242 	ret = do_check_subprogs(env);
15243 	ret = ret ?: do_check_main(env);
15244 
15245 	if (ret == 0 && bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux))
15246 		ret = bpf_prog_offload_finalize(env);
15247 
15248 skip_full_check:
15249 	kvfree(env->explored_states);
15250 
15251 	if (ret == 0)
15252 		ret = check_max_stack_depth(env);
15253 
15254 	/* instruction rewrites happen after this point */
15255 	if (ret == 0)
15256 		ret = optimize_bpf_loop(env);
15257 
15258 	if (is_priv) {
15259 		if (ret == 0)
15260 			opt_hard_wire_dead_code_branches(env);
15261 		if (ret == 0)
15262 			ret = opt_remove_dead_code(env);
15263 		if (ret == 0)
15264 			ret = opt_remove_nops(env);
15265 	} else {
15266 		if (ret == 0)
15267 			sanitize_dead_code(env);
15268 	}
15269 
15270 	if (ret == 0)
15271 		/* program is valid, convert *(u32*)(ctx + off) accesses */
15272 		ret = convert_ctx_accesses(env);
15273 
15274 	if (ret == 0)
15275 		ret = do_misc_fixups(env);
15276 
15277 	/* do 32-bit optimization after insn patching has done so those patched
15278 	 * insns could be handled correctly.
15279 	 */
15280 	if (ret == 0 && !bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) {
15281 		ret = opt_subreg_zext_lo32_rnd_hi32(env, attr);
15282 		env->prog->aux->verifier_zext = bpf_jit_needs_zext() ? !ret
15283 								     : false;
15284 	}
15285 
15286 	if (ret == 0)
15287 		ret = fixup_call_args(env);
15288 
15289 	env->verification_time = ktime_get_ns() - start_time;
15290 	print_verification_stats(env);
15291 	env->prog->aux->verified_insns = env->insn_processed;
15292 
15293 	if (log->level && bpf_verifier_log_full(log))
15294 		ret = -ENOSPC;
15295 	if (log->level && !log->ubuf) {
15296 		ret = -EFAULT;
15297 		goto err_release_maps;
15298 	}
15299 
15300 	if (ret)
15301 		goto err_release_maps;
15302 
15303 	if (env->used_map_cnt) {
15304 		/* if program passed verifier, update used_maps in bpf_prog_info */
15305 		env->prog->aux->used_maps = kmalloc_array(env->used_map_cnt,
15306 							  sizeof(env->used_maps[0]),
15307 							  GFP_KERNEL);
15308 
15309 		if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps) {
15310 			ret = -ENOMEM;
15311 			goto err_release_maps;
15312 		}
15313 
15314 		memcpy(env->prog->aux->used_maps, env->used_maps,
15315 		       sizeof(env->used_maps[0]) * env->used_map_cnt);
15316 		env->prog->aux->used_map_cnt = env->used_map_cnt;
15317 	}
15318 	if (env->used_btf_cnt) {
15319 		/* if program passed verifier, update used_btfs in bpf_prog_aux */
15320 		env->prog->aux->used_btfs = kmalloc_array(env->used_btf_cnt,
15321 							  sizeof(env->used_btfs[0]),
15322 							  GFP_KERNEL);
15323 		if (!env->prog->aux->used_btfs) {
15324 			ret = -ENOMEM;
15325 			goto err_release_maps;
15326 		}
15327 
15328 		memcpy(env->prog->aux->used_btfs, env->used_btfs,
15329 		       sizeof(env->used_btfs[0]) * env->used_btf_cnt);
15330 		env->prog->aux->used_btf_cnt = env->used_btf_cnt;
15331 	}
15332 	if (env->used_map_cnt || env->used_btf_cnt) {
15333 		/* program is valid. Convert pseudo bpf_ld_imm64 into generic
15334 		 * bpf_ld_imm64 instructions
15335 		 */
15336 		convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(env);
15337 	}
15338 
15339 	adjust_btf_func(env);
15340 
15341 err_release_maps:
15342 	if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps)
15343 		/* if we didn't copy map pointers into bpf_prog_info, release
15344 		 * them now. Otherwise free_used_maps() will release them.
15345 		 */
15346 		release_maps(env);
15347 	if (!env->prog->aux->used_btfs)
15348 		release_btfs(env);
15349 
15350 	/* extension progs temporarily inherit the attach_type of their targets
15351 	   for verification purposes, so set it back to zero before returning
15352 	 */
15353 	if (env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT)
15354 		env->prog->expected_attach_type = 0;
15355 
15356 	*prog = env->prog;
15357 err_unlock:
15358 	if (!is_priv)
15359 		mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
15360 	vfree(env->insn_aux_data);
15361 err_free_env:
15362 	kfree(env);
15363 	return ret;
15364 }
15365