xref: /linux-6.15/kernel/bpf/verifier.c (revision 1ef22b68)
1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
2 /* Copyright (c) 2011-2014 PLUMgrid, http://plumgrid.com
3  * Copyright (c) 2016 Facebook
4  * Copyright (c) 2018 Covalent IO, Inc. http://covalent.io
5  */
6 #include <uapi/linux/btf.h>
7 #include <linux/bpf-cgroup.h>
8 #include <linux/kernel.h>
9 #include <linux/types.h>
10 #include <linux/slab.h>
11 #include <linux/bpf.h>
12 #include <linux/btf.h>
13 #include <linux/bpf_verifier.h>
14 #include <linux/filter.h>
15 #include <net/netlink.h>
16 #include <linux/file.h>
17 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
18 #include <linux/stringify.h>
19 #include <linux/bsearch.h>
20 #include <linux/sort.h>
21 #include <linux/perf_event.h>
22 #include <linux/ctype.h>
23 #include <linux/error-injection.h>
24 #include <linux/bpf_lsm.h>
25 #include <linux/btf_ids.h>
26 #include <linux/poison.h>
27 #include <linux/module.h>
28 
29 #include "disasm.h"
30 
31 static const struct bpf_verifier_ops * const bpf_verifier_ops[] = {
32 #define BPF_PROG_TYPE(_id, _name, prog_ctx_type, kern_ctx_type) \
33 	[_id] = & _name ## _verifier_ops,
34 #define BPF_MAP_TYPE(_id, _ops)
35 #define BPF_LINK_TYPE(_id, _name)
36 #include <linux/bpf_types.h>
37 #undef BPF_PROG_TYPE
38 #undef BPF_MAP_TYPE
39 #undef BPF_LINK_TYPE
40 };
41 
42 /* bpf_check() is a static code analyzer that walks eBPF program
43  * instruction by instruction and updates register/stack state.
44  * All paths of conditional branches are analyzed until 'bpf_exit' insn.
45  *
46  * The first pass is depth-first-search to check that the program is a DAG.
47  * It rejects the following programs:
48  * - larger than BPF_MAXINSNS insns
49  * - if loop is present (detected via back-edge)
50  * - unreachable insns exist (shouldn't be a forest. program = one function)
51  * - out of bounds or malformed jumps
52  * The second pass is all possible path descent from the 1st insn.
53  * Since it's analyzing all paths through the program, the length of the
54  * analysis is limited to 64k insn, which may be hit even if total number of
55  * insn is less then 4K, but there are too many branches that change stack/regs.
56  * Number of 'branches to be analyzed' is limited to 1k
57  *
58  * On entry to each instruction, each register has a type, and the instruction
59  * changes the types of the registers depending on instruction semantics.
60  * If instruction is BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_5), then type of R5 is
61  * copied to R1.
62  *
63  * All registers are 64-bit.
64  * R0 - return register
65  * R1-R5 argument passing registers
66  * R6-R9 callee saved registers
67  * R10 - frame pointer read-only
68  *
69  * At the start of BPF program the register R1 contains a pointer to bpf_context
70  * and has type PTR_TO_CTX.
71  *
72  * Verifier tracks arithmetic operations on pointers in case:
73  *    BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10),
74  *    BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -20),
75  * 1st insn copies R10 (which has FRAME_PTR) type into R1
76  * and 2nd arithmetic instruction is pattern matched to recognize
77  * that it wants to construct a pointer to some element within stack.
78  * So after 2nd insn, the register R1 has type PTR_TO_STACK
79  * (and -20 constant is saved for further stack bounds checking).
80  * Meaning that this reg is a pointer to stack plus known immediate constant.
81  *
82  * Most of the time the registers have SCALAR_VALUE type, which
83  * means the register has some value, but it's not a valid pointer.
84  * (like pointer plus pointer becomes SCALAR_VALUE type)
85  *
86  * When verifier sees load or store instructions the type of base register
87  * can be: PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_CTX, PTR_TO_STACK, PTR_TO_SOCKET. These are
88  * four pointer types recognized by check_mem_access() function.
89  *
90  * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE means that this register is pointing to 'map element value'
91  * and the range of [ptr, ptr + map's value_size) is accessible.
92  *
93  * registers used to pass values to function calls are checked against
94  * function argument constraints.
95  *
96  * ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY is one of such argument constraints.
97  * It means that the register type passed to this function must be
98  * PTR_TO_STACK and it will be used inside the function as
99  * 'pointer to map element key'
100  *
101  * For example the argument constraints for bpf_map_lookup_elem():
102  *   .ret_type = RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL,
103  *   .arg1_type = ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR,
104  *   .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY,
105  *
106  * ret_type says that this function returns 'pointer to map elem value or null'
107  * function expects 1st argument to be a const pointer to 'struct bpf_map' and
108  * 2nd argument should be a pointer to stack, which will be used inside
109  * the helper function as a pointer to map element key.
110  *
111  * On the kernel side the helper function looks like:
112  * u64 bpf_map_lookup_elem(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5)
113  * {
114  *    struct bpf_map *map = (struct bpf_map *) (unsigned long) r1;
115  *    void *key = (void *) (unsigned long) r2;
116  *    void *value;
117  *
118  *    here kernel can access 'key' and 'map' pointers safely, knowing that
119  *    [key, key + map->key_size) bytes are valid and were initialized on
120  *    the stack of eBPF program.
121  * }
122  *
123  * Corresponding eBPF program may look like:
124  *    BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),  // after this insn R2 type is FRAME_PTR
125  *    BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -4), // after this insn R2 type is PTR_TO_STACK
126  *    BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, map_fd),      // after this insn R1 type is CONST_PTR_TO_MAP
127  *    BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
128  * here verifier looks at prototype of map_lookup_elem() and sees:
129  * .arg1_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR and R1->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP, which is ok,
130  * Now verifier knows that this map has key of R1->map_ptr->key_size bytes
131  *
132  * Then .arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY and R2->type == PTR_TO_STACK, ok so far,
133  * Now verifier checks that [R2, R2 + map's key_size) are within stack limits
134  * and were initialized prior to this call.
135  * If it's ok, then verifier allows this BPF_CALL insn and looks at
136  * .ret_type which is RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, so it sets
137  * R0->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL which means bpf_map_lookup_elem() function
138  * returns either pointer to map value or NULL.
139  *
140  * When type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL passes through 'if (reg != 0) goto +off'
141  * insn, the register holding that pointer in the true branch changes state to
142  * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE and the same register changes state to CONST_IMM in the false
143  * branch. See check_cond_jmp_op().
144  *
145  * After the call R0 is set to return type of the function and registers R1-R5
146  * are set to NOT_INIT to indicate that they are no longer readable.
147  *
148  * The following reference types represent a potential reference to a kernel
149  * resource which, after first being allocated, must be checked and freed by
150  * the BPF program:
151  * - PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL, PTR_TO_SOCKET
152  *
153  * When the verifier sees a helper call return a reference type, it allocates a
154  * pointer id for the reference and stores it in the current function state.
155  * Similar to the way that PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL is converted into
156  * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL becomes PTR_TO_SOCKET when the type
157  * passes through a NULL-check conditional. For the branch wherein the state is
158  * changed to CONST_IMM, the verifier releases the reference.
159  *
160  * For each helper function that allocates a reference, such as
161  * bpf_sk_lookup_tcp(), there is a corresponding release function, such as
162  * bpf_sk_release(). When a reference type passes into the release function,
163  * the verifier also releases the reference. If any unchecked or unreleased
164  * reference remains at the end of the program, the verifier rejects it.
165  */
166 
167 /* verifier_state + insn_idx are pushed to stack when branch is encountered */
168 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem {
169 	/* verifer state is 'st'
170 	 * before processing instruction 'insn_idx'
171 	 * and after processing instruction 'prev_insn_idx'
172 	 */
173 	struct bpf_verifier_state st;
174 	int insn_idx;
175 	int prev_insn_idx;
176 	struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *next;
177 	/* length of verifier log at the time this state was pushed on stack */
178 	u32 log_pos;
179 };
180 
181 #define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ	8192
182 #define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES	64
183 
184 #define BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON	(1ULL << 63)
185 #define BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN	(1ULL << 62)
186 
187 #define BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV	1UL
188 #define BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON	((void *)((0xeB9FUL << 1) +	\
189 					  POISON_POINTER_DELTA))
190 #define BPF_MAP_PTR(X)		((struct bpf_map *)((X) & ~BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV))
191 
192 static int acquire_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx);
193 static int release_reference(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int ref_obj_id);
194 static void invalidate_non_owning_refs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env);
195 static bool in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(struct bpf_verifier_env *env);
196 static int ref_set_non_owning(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
197 			      struct bpf_reg_state *reg);
198 static void specialize_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
199 			     u32 func_id, u16 offset, unsigned long *addr);
200 
201 static bool bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux)
202 {
203 	return BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state) == BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON;
204 }
205 
206 static bool bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux)
207 {
208 	return aux->map_ptr_state & BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV;
209 }
210 
211 static void bpf_map_ptr_store(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux,
212 			      const struct bpf_map *map, bool unpriv)
213 {
214 	BUILD_BUG_ON((unsigned long)BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON & BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV);
215 	unpriv |= bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux);
216 	aux->map_ptr_state = (unsigned long)map |
217 			     (unpriv ? BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV : 0UL);
218 }
219 
220 static bool bpf_map_key_poisoned(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux)
221 {
222 	return aux->map_key_state & BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON;
223 }
224 
225 static bool bpf_map_key_unseen(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux)
226 {
227 	return !(aux->map_key_state & BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN);
228 }
229 
230 static u64 bpf_map_key_immediate(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux)
231 {
232 	return aux->map_key_state & ~(BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN | BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON);
233 }
234 
235 static void bpf_map_key_store(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, u64 state)
236 {
237 	bool poisoned = bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux);
238 
239 	aux->map_key_state = state | BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN |
240 			     (poisoned ? BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON : 0ULL);
241 }
242 
243 static bool bpf_pseudo_call(const struct bpf_insn *insn)
244 {
245 	return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) &&
246 	       insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL;
247 }
248 
249 static bool bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(const struct bpf_insn *insn)
250 {
251 	return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) &&
252 	       insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL;
253 }
254 
255 struct bpf_call_arg_meta {
256 	struct bpf_map *map_ptr;
257 	bool raw_mode;
258 	bool pkt_access;
259 	u8 release_regno;
260 	int regno;
261 	int access_size;
262 	int mem_size;
263 	u64 msize_max_value;
264 	int ref_obj_id;
265 	int dynptr_id;
266 	int map_uid;
267 	int func_id;
268 	struct btf *btf;
269 	u32 btf_id;
270 	struct btf *ret_btf;
271 	u32 ret_btf_id;
272 	u32 subprogno;
273 	struct btf_field *kptr_field;
274 };
275 
276 struct btf_and_id {
277 	struct btf *btf;
278 	u32 btf_id;
279 };
280 
281 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta {
282 	/* In parameters */
283 	struct btf *btf;
284 	u32 func_id;
285 	u32 kfunc_flags;
286 	const struct btf_type *func_proto;
287 	const char *func_name;
288 	/* Out parameters */
289 	u32 ref_obj_id;
290 	u8 release_regno;
291 	bool r0_rdonly;
292 	u32 ret_btf_id;
293 	u64 r0_size;
294 	u32 subprogno;
295 	struct {
296 		u64 value;
297 		bool found;
298 	} arg_constant;
299 	union {
300 		struct btf_and_id arg_obj_drop;
301 		struct btf_and_id arg_refcount_acquire;
302 	};
303 	struct {
304 		struct btf_field *field;
305 	} arg_list_head;
306 	struct {
307 		struct btf_field *field;
308 	} arg_rbtree_root;
309 	struct {
310 		enum bpf_dynptr_type type;
311 		u32 id;
312 		u32 ref_obj_id;
313 	} initialized_dynptr;
314 	struct {
315 		u8 spi;
316 		u8 frameno;
317 	} iter;
318 	u64 mem_size;
319 };
320 
321 struct btf *btf_vmlinux;
322 
323 static DEFINE_MUTEX(bpf_verifier_lock);
324 
325 static const struct bpf_line_info *
326 find_linfo(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 insn_off)
327 {
328 	const struct bpf_line_info *linfo;
329 	const struct bpf_prog *prog;
330 	u32 i, nr_linfo;
331 
332 	prog = env->prog;
333 	nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo;
334 
335 	if (!nr_linfo || insn_off >= prog->len)
336 		return NULL;
337 
338 	linfo = prog->aux->linfo;
339 	for (i = 1; i < nr_linfo; i++)
340 		if (insn_off < linfo[i].insn_off)
341 			break;
342 
343 	return &linfo[i - 1];
344 }
345 
346 __printf(2, 3) static void verbose(void *private_data, const char *fmt, ...)
347 {
348 	struct bpf_verifier_env *env = private_data;
349 	va_list args;
350 
351 	if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(&env->log))
352 		return;
353 
354 	va_start(args, fmt);
355 	bpf_verifier_vlog(&env->log, fmt, args);
356 	va_end(args);
357 }
358 
359 static const char *ltrim(const char *s)
360 {
361 	while (isspace(*s))
362 		s++;
363 
364 	return s;
365 }
366 
367 __printf(3, 4) static void verbose_linfo(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
368 					 u32 insn_off,
369 					 const char *prefix_fmt, ...)
370 {
371 	const struct bpf_line_info *linfo;
372 
373 	if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(&env->log))
374 		return;
375 
376 	linfo = find_linfo(env, insn_off);
377 	if (!linfo || linfo == env->prev_linfo)
378 		return;
379 
380 	if (prefix_fmt) {
381 		va_list args;
382 
383 		va_start(args, prefix_fmt);
384 		bpf_verifier_vlog(&env->log, prefix_fmt, args);
385 		va_end(args);
386 	}
387 
388 	verbose(env, "%s\n",
389 		ltrim(btf_name_by_offset(env->prog->aux->btf,
390 					 linfo->line_off)));
391 
392 	env->prev_linfo = linfo;
393 }
394 
395 static void verbose_invalid_scalar(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
396 				   struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
397 				   struct tnum *range, const char *ctx,
398 				   const char *reg_name)
399 {
400 	char tn_buf[48];
401 
402 	verbose(env, "At %s the register %s ", ctx, reg_name);
403 	if (!tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off)) {
404 		tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
405 		verbose(env, "has value %s", tn_buf);
406 	} else {
407 		verbose(env, "has unknown scalar value");
408 	}
409 	tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), *range);
410 	verbose(env, " should have been in %s\n", tn_buf);
411 }
412 
413 static bool type_is_pkt_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type)
414 {
415 	type = base_type(type);
416 	return type == PTR_TO_PACKET ||
417 	       type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META;
418 }
419 
420 static bool type_is_sk_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type)
421 {
422 	return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET ||
423 		type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON ||
424 		type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK ||
425 		type == PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK;
426 }
427 
428 static bool type_may_be_null(u32 type)
429 {
430 	return type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL;
431 }
432 
433 static bool reg_type_not_null(enum bpf_reg_type type)
434 {
435 	if (type_may_be_null(type))
436 		return false;
437 
438 	type = base_type(type);
439 	return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET ||
440 		type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK ||
441 		type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE ||
442 		type == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY ||
443 		type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON ||
444 		type == PTR_TO_MEM;
445 }
446 
447 static bool type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(u32 type)
448 {
449 	return base_type(type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID && type_flag(type) & MEM_ALLOC;
450 }
451 
452 static bool type_is_non_owning_ref(u32 type)
453 {
454 	return type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(type) && type_flag(type) & NON_OWN_REF;
455 }
456 
457 static struct btf_record *reg_btf_record(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
458 {
459 	struct btf_record *rec = NULL;
460 	struct btf_struct_meta *meta;
461 
462 	if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
463 		rec = reg->map_ptr->record;
464 	} else if (type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(reg->type)) {
465 		meta = btf_find_struct_meta(reg->btf, reg->btf_id);
466 		if (meta)
467 			rec = meta->record;
468 	}
469 	return rec;
470 }
471 
472 static bool reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
473 {
474 	return btf_record_has_field(reg_btf_record(reg), BPF_SPIN_LOCK);
475 }
476 
477 static bool type_is_rdonly_mem(u32 type)
478 {
479 	return type & MEM_RDONLY;
480 }
481 
482 static bool is_acquire_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id,
483 				const struct bpf_map *map)
484 {
485 	enum bpf_map_type map_type = map ? map->map_type : BPF_MAP_TYPE_UNSPEC;
486 
487 	if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_tcp ||
488 	    func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_udp ||
489 	    func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_lookup_tcp ||
490 	    func_id == BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve ||
491 	    func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg)
492 		return true;
493 
494 	if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem &&
495 	    (map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP ||
496 	     map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH))
497 		return true;
498 
499 	return false;
500 }
501 
502 static bool is_ptr_cast_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id)
503 {
504 	return func_id == BPF_FUNC_tcp_sock ||
505 		func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_fullsock ||
506 		func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_sock ||
507 		func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp6_sock ||
508 		func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_udp6_sock ||
509 		func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_mptcp_sock ||
510 		func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_timewait_sock ||
511 		func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_request_sock;
512 }
513 
514 static bool is_dynptr_ref_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id)
515 {
516 	return func_id == BPF_FUNC_dynptr_data;
517 }
518 
519 static bool is_callback_calling_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id)
520 {
521 	return func_id == BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem ||
522 	       func_id == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback ||
523 	       func_id == BPF_FUNC_find_vma ||
524 	       func_id == BPF_FUNC_loop ||
525 	       func_id == BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain;
526 }
527 
528 static bool is_storage_get_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id)
529 {
530 	return func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get ||
531 	       func_id == BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get ||
532 	       func_id == BPF_FUNC_task_storage_get ||
533 	       func_id == BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_get;
534 }
535 
536 static bool helper_multiple_ref_obj_use(enum bpf_func_id func_id,
537 					const struct bpf_map *map)
538 {
539 	int ref_obj_uses = 0;
540 
541 	if (is_ptr_cast_function(func_id))
542 		ref_obj_uses++;
543 	if (is_acquire_function(func_id, map))
544 		ref_obj_uses++;
545 	if (is_dynptr_ref_function(func_id))
546 		ref_obj_uses++;
547 
548 	return ref_obj_uses > 1;
549 }
550 
551 static bool is_cmpxchg_insn(const struct bpf_insn *insn)
552 {
553 	return BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX &&
554 	       BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC &&
555 	       insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG;
556 }
557 
558 /* string representation of 'enum bpf_reg_type'
559  *
560  * Note that reg_type_str() can not appear more than once in a single verbose()
561  * statement.
562  */
563 static const char *reg_type_str(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
564 				enum bpf_reg_type type)
565 {
566 	char postfix[16] = {0}, prefix[64] = {0};
567 	static const char * const str[] = {
568 		[NOT_INIT]		= "?",
569 		[SCALAR_VALUE]		= "scalar",
570 		[PTR_TO_CTX]		= "ctx",
571 		[CONST_PTR_TO_MAP]	= "map_ptr",
572 		[PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE]	= "map_value",
573 		[PTR_TO_STACK]		= "fp",
574 		[PTR_TO_PACKET]		= "pkt",
575 		[PTR_TO_PACKET_META]	= "pkt_meta",
576 		[PTR_TO_PACKET_END]	= "pkt_end",
577 		[PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS]	= "flow_keys",
578 		[PTR_TO_SOCKET]		= "sock",
579 		[PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON]	= "sock_common",
580 		[PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK]	= "tcp_sock",
581 		[PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER]	= "tp_buffer",
582 		[PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK]	= "xdp_sock",
583 		[PTR_TO_BTF_ID]		= "ptr_",
584 		[PTR_TO_MEM]		= "mem",
585 		[PTR_TO_BUF]		= "buf",
586 		[PTR_TO_FUNC]		= "func",
587 		[PTR_TO_MAP_KEY]	= "map_key",
588 		[CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR]	= "dynptr_ptr",
589 	};
590 
591 	if (type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL) {
592 		if (base_type(type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID)
593 			strncpy(postfix, "or_null_", 16);
594 		else
595 			strncpy(postfix, "_or_null", 16);
596 	}
597 
598 	snprintf(prefix, sizeof(prefix), "%s%s%s%s%s%s%s",
599 		 type & MEM_RDONLY ? "rdonly_" : "",
600 		 type & MEM_RINGBUF ? "ringbuf_" : "",
601 		 type & MEM_USER ? "user_" : "",
602 		 type & MEM_PERCPU ? "percpu_" : "",
603 		 type & MEM_RCU ? "rcu_" : "",
604 		 type & PTR_UNTRUSTED ? "untrusted_" : "",
605 		 type & PTR_TRUSTED ? "trusted_" : ""
606 	);
607 
608 	snprintf(env->tmp_str_buf, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN, "%s%s%s",
609 		 prefix, str[base_type(type)], postfix);
610 	return env->tmp_str_buf;
611 }
612 
613 static char slot_type_char[] = {
614 	[STACK_INVALID]	= '?',
615 	[STACK_SPILL]	= 'r',
616 	[STACK_MISC]	= 'm',
617 	[STACK_ZERO]	= '0',
618 	[STACK_DYNPTR]	= 'd',
619 	[STACK_ITER]	= 'i',
620 };
621 
622 static void print_liveness(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
623 			   enum bpf_reg_liveness live)
624 {
625 	if (live & (REG_LIVE_READ | REG_LIVE_WRITTEN | REG_LIVE_DONE))
626 	    verbose(env, "_");
627 	if (live & REG_LIVE_READ)
628 		verbose(env, "r");
629 	if (live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN)
630 		verbose(env, "w");
631 	if (live & REG_LIVE_DONE)
632 		verbose(env, "D");
633 }
634 
635 static int __get_spi(s32 off)
636 {
637 	return (-off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE;
638 }
639 
640 static struct bpf_func_state *func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
641 				   const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
642 {
643 	struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state;
644 
645 	return cur->frame[reg->frameno];
646 }
647 
648 static bool is_spi_bounds_valid(struct bpf_func_state *state, int spi, int nr_slots)
649 {
650        int allocated_slots = state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE;
651 
652        /* We need to check that slots between [spi - nr_slots + 1, spi] are
653 	* within [0, allocated_stack).
654 	*
655 	* Please note that the spi grows downwards. For example, a dynptr
656 	* takes the size of two stack slots; the first slot will be at
657 	* spi and the second slot will be at spi - 1.
658 	*/
659        return spi - nr_slots + 1 >= 0 && spi < allocated_slots;
660 }
661 
662 static int stack_slot_obj_get_spi(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
663 			          const char *obj_kind, int nr_slots)
664 {
665 	int off, spi;
666 
667 	if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
668 		verbose(env, "%s has to be at a constant offset\n", obj_kind);
669 		return -EINVAL;
670 	}
671 
672 	off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value;
673 	if (off % BPF_REG_SIZE) {
674 		verbose(env, "cannot pass in %s at an offset=%d\n", obj_kind, off);
675 		return -EINVAL;
676 	}
677 
678 	spi = __get_spi(off);
679 	if (spi + 1 < nr_slots) {
680 		verbose(env, "cannot pass in %s at an offset=%d\n", obj_kind, off);
681 		return -EINVAL;
682 	}
683 
684 	if (!is_spi_bounds_valid(func(env, reg), spi, nr_slots))
685 		return -ERANGE;
686 	return spi;
687 }
688 
689 static int dynptr_get_spi(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
690 {
691 	return stack_slot_obj_get_spi(env, reg, "dynptr", BPF_DYNPTR_NR_SLOTS);
692 }
693 
694 static int iter_get_spi(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int nr_slots)
695 {
696 	return stack_slot_obj_get_spi(env, reg, "iter", nr_slots);
697 }
698 
699 static const char *btf_type_name(const struct btf *btf, u32 id)
700 {
701 	return btf_name_by_offset(btf, btf_type_by_id(btf, id)->name_off);
702 }
703 
704 static const char *dynptr_type_str(enum bpf_dynptr_type type)
705 {
706 	switch (type) {
707 	case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL:
708 		return "local";
709 	case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF:
710 		return "ringbuf";
711 	case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB:
712 		return "skb";
713 	case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP:
714 		return "xdp";
715 	case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID:
716 		return "<invalid>";
717 	default:
718 		WARN_ONCE(1, "unknown dynptr type %d\n", type);
719 		return "<unknown>";
720 	}
721 }
722 
723 static const char *iter_type_str(const struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id)
724 {
725 	if (!btf || btf_id == 0)
726 		return "<invalid>";
727 
728 	/* we already validated that type is valid and has conforming name */
729 	return btf_type_name(btf, btf_id) + sizeof(ITER_PREFIX) - 1;
730 }
731 
732 static const char *iter_state_str(enum bpf_iter_state state)
733 {
734 	switch (state) {
735 	case BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE:
736 		return "active";
737 	case BPF_ITER_STATE_DRAINED:
738 		return "drained";
739 	case BPF_ITER_STATE_INVALID:
740 		return "<invalid>";
741 	default:
742 		WARN_ONCE(1, "unknown iter state %d\n", state);
743 		return "<unknown>";
744 	}
745 }
746 
747 static void mark_reg_scratched(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno)
748 {
749 	env->scratched_regs |= 1U << regno;
750 }
751 
752 static void mark_stack_slot_scratched(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 spi)
753 {
754 	env->scratched_stack_slots |= 1ULL << spi;
755 }
756 
757 static bool reg_scratched(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno)
758 {
759 	return (env->scratched_regs >> regno) & 1;
760 }
761 
762 static bool stack_slot_scratched(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u64 regno)
763 {
764 	return (env->scratched_stack_slots >> regno) & 1;
765 }
766 
767 static bool verifier_state_scratched(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
768 {
769 	return env->scratched_regs || env->scratched_stack_slots;
770 }
771 
772 static void mark_verifier_state_clean(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
773 {
774 	env->scratched_regs = 0U;
775 	env->scratched_stack_slots = 0ULL;
776 }
777 
778 /* Used for printing the entire verifier state. */
779 static void mark_verifier_state_scratched(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
780 {
781 	env->scratched_regs = ~0U;
782 	env->scratched_stack_slots = ~0ULL;
783 }
784 
785 static enum bpf_dynptr_type arg_to_dynptr_type(enum bpf_arg_type arg_type)
786 {
787 	switch (arg_type & DYNPTR_TYPE_FLAG_MASK) {
788 	case DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL:
789 		return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL;
790 	case DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF:
791 		return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF;
792 	case DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB:
793 		return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB;
794 	case DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP:
795 		return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP;
796 	default:
797 		return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID;
798 	}
799 }
800 
801 static enum bpf_type_flag get_dynptr_type_flag(enum bpf_dynptr_type type)
802 {
803 	switch (type) {
804 	case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL:
805 		return DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL;
806 	case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF:
807 		return DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF;
808 	case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB:
809 		return DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB;
810 	case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP:
811 		return DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP;
812 	default:
813 		return 0;
814 	}
815 }
816 
817 static bool dynptr_type_refcounted(enum bpf_dynptr_type type)
818 {
819 	return type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF;
820 }
821 
822 static void __mark_dynptr_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
823 			      enum bpf_dynptr_type type,
824 			      bool first_slot, int dynptr_id);
825 
826 static void __mark_reg_not_init(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
827 				struct bpf_reg_state *reg);
828 
829 static void mark_dynptr_stack_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
830 				   struct bpf_reg_state *sreg1,
831 				   struct bpf_reg_state *sreg2,
832 				   enum bpf_dynptr_type type)
833 {
834 	int id = ++env->id_gen;
835 
836 	__mark_dynptr_reg(sreg1, type, true, id);
837 	__mark_dynptr_reg(sreg2, type, false, id);
838 }
839 
840 static void mark_dynptr_cb_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
841 			       struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
842 			       enum bpf_dynptr_type type)
843 {
844 	__mark_dynptr_reg(reg, type, true, ++env->id_gen);
845 }
846 
847 static int destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
848 				        struct bpf_func_state *state, int spi);
849 
850 static int mark_stack_slots_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
851 				   enum bpf_arg_type arg_type, int insn_idx, int clone_ref_obj_id)
852 {
853 	struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
854 	enum bpf_dynptr_type type;
855 	int spi, i, err;
856 
857 	spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg);
858 	if (spi < 0)
859 		return spi;
860 
861 	/* We cannot assume both spi and spi - 1 belong to the same dynptr,
862 	 * hence we need to call destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot twice for both,
863 	 * to ensure that for the following example:
864 	 *	[d1][d1][d2][d2]
865 	 * spi    3   2   1   0
866 	 * So marking spi = 2 should lead to destruction of both d1 and d2. In
867 	 * case they do belong to same dynptr, second call won't see slot_type
868 	 * as STACK_DYNPTR and will simply skip destruction.
869 	 */
870 	err = destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(env, state, spi);
871 	if (err)
872 		return err;
873 	err = destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(env, state, spi - 1);
874 	if (err)
875 		return err;
876 
877 	for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
878 		state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_DYNPTR;
879 		state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] = STACK_DYNPTR;
880 	}
881 
882 	type = arg_to_dynptr_type(arg_type);
883 	if (type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID)
884 		return -EINVAL;
885 
886 	mark_dynptr_stack_regs(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr,
887 			       &state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr, type);
888 
889 	if (dynptr_type_refcounted(type)) {
890 		/* The id is used to track proper releasing */
891 		int id;
892 
893 		if (clone_ref_obj_id)
894 			id = clone_ref_obj_id;
895 		else
896 			id = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx);
897 
898 		if (id < 0)
899 			return id;
900 
901 		state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id = id;
902 		state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id = id;
903 	}
904 
905 	state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
906 	state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
907 
908 	return 0;
909 }
910 
911 static void invalidate_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *state, int spi)
912 {
913 	int i;
914 
915 	for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
916 		state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID;
917 		state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID;
918 	}
919 
920 	__mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr);
921 	__mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr);
922 
923 	/* Why do we need to set REG_LIVE_WRITTEN for STACK_INVALID slot?
924 	 *
925 	 * While we don't allow reading STACK_INVALID, it is still possible to
926 	 * do <8 byte writes marking some but not all slots as STACK_MISC. Then,
927 	 * helpers or insns can do partial read of that part without failing,
928 	 * but check_stack_range_initialized, check_stack_read_var_off, and
929 	 * check_stack_read_fixed_off will do mark_reg_read for all 8-bytes of
930 	 * the slot conservatively. Hence we need to prevent those liveness
931 	 * marking walks.
932 	 *
933 	 * This was not a problem before because STACK_INVALID is only set by
934 	 * default (where the default reg state has its reg->parent as NULL), or
935 	 * in clean_live_states after REG_LIVE_DONE (at which point
936 	 * mark_reg_read won't walk reg->parent chain), but not randomly during
937 	 * verifier state exploration (like we did above). Hence, for our case
938 	 * parentage chain will still be live (i.e. reg->parent may be
939 	 * non-NULL), while earlier reg->parent was NULL, so we need
940 	 * REG_LIVE_WRITTEN to screen off read marker propagation when it is
941 	 * done later on reads or by mark_dynptr_read as well to unnecessary
942 	 * mark registers in verifier state.
943 	 */
944 	state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
945 	state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
946 }
947 
948 static int unmark_stack_slots_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
949 {
950 	struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
951 	int spi, ref_obj_id, i;
952 
953 	spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg);
954 	if (spi < 0)
955 		return spi;
956 
957 	if (!dynptr_type_refcounted(state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type)) {
958 		invalidate_dynptr(env, state, spi);
959 		return 0;
960 	}
961 
962 	ref_obj_id = state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id;
963 
964 	/* If the dynptr has a ref_obj_id, then we need to invalidate
965 	 * two things:
966 	 *
967 	 * 1) Any dynptrs with a matching ref_obj_id (clones)
968 	 * 2) Any slices derived from this dynptr.
969 	 */
970 
971 	/* Invalidate any slices associated with this dynptr */
972 	WARN_ON_ONCE(release_reference(env, ref_obj_id));
973 
974 	/* Invalidate any dynptr clones */
975 	for (i = 1; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
976 		if (state->stack[i].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id != ref_obj_id)
977 			continue;
978 
979 		/* it should always be the case that if the ref obj id
980 		 * matches then the stack slot also belongs to a
981 		 * dynptr
982 		 */
983 		if (state->stack[i].slot_type[0] != STACK_DYNPTR) {
984 			verbose(env, "verifier internal error: misconfigured ref_obj_id\n");
985 			return -EFAULT;
986 		}
987 		if (state->stack[i].spilled_ptr.dynptr.first_slot)
988 			invalidate_dynptr(env, state, i);
989 	}
990 
991 	return 0;
992 }
993 
994 static void __mark_reg_unknown(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
995 			       struct bpf_reg_state *reg);
996 
997 static void mark_reg_invalid(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
998 {
999 	if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
1000 		__mark_reg_not_init(env, reg);
1001 	else
1002 		__mark_reg_unknown(env, reg);
1003 }
1004 
1005 static int destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1006 				        struct bpf_func_state *state, int spi)
1007 {
1008 	struct bpf_func_state *fstate;
1009 	struct bpf_reg_state *dreg;
1010 	int i, dynptr_id;
1011 
1012 	/* We always ensure that STACK_DYNPTR is never set partially,
1013 	 * hence just checking for slot_type[0] is enough. This is
1014 	 * different for STACK_SPILL, where it may be only set for
1015 	 * 1 byte, so code has to use is_spilled_reg.
1016 	 */
1017 	if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] != STACK_DYNPTR)
1018 		return 0;
1019 
1020 	/* Reposition spi to first slot */
1021 	if (!state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.first_slot)
1022 		spi = spi + 1;
1023 
1024 	if (dynptr_type_refcounted(state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type)) {
1025 		verbose(env, "cannot overwrite referenced dynptr\n");
1026 		return -EINVAL;
1027 	}
1028 
1029 	mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi);
1030 	mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi - 1);
1031 
1032 	/* Writing partially to one dynptr stack slot destroys both. */
1033 	for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
1034 		state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID;
1035 		state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID;
1036 	}
1037 
1038 	dynptr_id = state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.id;
1039 	/* Invalidate any slices associated with this dynptr */
1040 	bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, fstate, dreg, ({
1041 		/* Dynptr slices are only PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL and PTR_TO_MEM */
1042 		if (dreg->type != (PTR_TO_MEM | PTR_MAYBE_NULL) && dreg->type != PTR_TO_MEM)
1043 			continue;
1044 		if (dreg->dynptr_id == dynptr_id)
1045 			mark_reg_invalid(env, dreg);
1046 	}));
1047 
1048 	/* Do not release reference state, we are destroying dynptr on stack,
1049 	 * not using some helper to release it. Just reset register.
1050 	 */
1051 	__mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr);
1052 	__mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr);
1053 
1054 	/* Same reason as unmark_stack_slots_dynptr above */
1055 	state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
1056 	state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
1057 
1058 	return 0;
1059 }
1060 
1061 static bool is_dynptr_reg_valid_uninit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1062 {
1063 	int spi;
1064 
1065 	if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR)
1066 		return false;
1067 
1068 	spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg);
1069 
1070 	/* -ERANGE (i.e. spi not falling into allocated stack slots) isn't an
1071 	 * error because this just means the stack state hasn't been updated yet.
1072 	 * We will do check_mem_access to check and update stack bounds later.
1073 	 */
1074 	if (spi < 0 && spi != -ERANGE)
1075 		return false;
1076 
1077 	/* We don't need to check if the stack slots are marked by previous
1078 	 * dynptr initializations because we allow overwriting existing unreferenced
1079 	 * STACK_DYNPTR slots, see mark_stack_slots_dynptr which calls
1080 	 * destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot to ensure dynptr objects at the slots we are
1081 	 * touching are completely destructed before we reinitialize them for a new
1082 	 * one. For referenced ones, destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot returns an error early
1083 	 * instead of delaying it until the end where the user will get "Unreleased
1084 	 * reference" error.
1085 	 */
1086 	return true;
1087 }
1088 
1089 static bool is_dynptr_reg_valid_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1090 {
1091 	struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
1092 	int i, spi;
1093 
1094 	/* This already represents first slot of initialized bpf_dynptr.
1095 	 *
1096 	 * CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR already has fixed and var_off as 0 due to
1097 	 * check_func_arg_reg_off's logic, so we don't need to check its
1098 	 * offset and alignment.
1099 	 */
1100 	if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR)
1101 		return true;
1102 
1103 	spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg);
1104 	if (spi < 0)
1105 		return false;
1106 	if (!state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.first_slot)
1107 		return false;
1108 
1109 	for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
1110 		if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] != STACK_DYNPTR ||
1111 		    state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] != STACK_DYNPTR)
1112 			return false;
1113 	}
1114 
1115 	return true;
1116 }
1117 
1118 static bool is_dynptr_type_expected(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
1119 				    enum bpf_arg_type arg_type)
1120 {
1121 	struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
1122 	enum bpf_dynptr_type dynptr_type;
1123 	int spi;
1124 
1125 	/* ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR takes any type of dynptr */
1126 	if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR)
1127 		return true;
1128 
1129 	dynptr_type = arg_to_dynptr_type(arg_type);
1130 	if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) {
1131 		return reg->dynptr.type == dynptr_type;
1132 	} else {
1133 		spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg);
1134 		if (spi < 0)
1135 			return false;
1136 		return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type == dynptr_type;
1137 	}
1138 }
1139 
1140 static void __mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg);
1141 
1142 static int mark_stack_slots_iter(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1143 				 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int insn_idx,
1144 				 struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id, int nr_slots)
1145 {
1146 	struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
1147 	int spi, i, j, id;
1148 
1149 	spi = iter_get_spi(env, reg, nr_slots);
1150 	if (spi < 0)
1151 		return spi;
1152 
1153 	id = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx);
1154 	if (id < 0)
1155 		return id;
1156 
1157 	for (i = 0; i < nr_slots; i++) {
1158 		struct bpf_stack_state *slot = &state->stack[spi - i];
1159 		struct bpf_reg_state *st = &slot->spilled_ptr;
1160 
1161 		__mark_reg_known_zero(st);
1162 		st->type = PTR_TO_STACK; /* we don't have dedicated reg type */
1163 		st->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
1164 		st->ref_obj_id = i == 0 ? id : 0;
1165 		st->iter.btf = btf;
1166 		st->iter.btf_id = btf_id;
1167 		st->iter.state = BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE;
1168 		st->iter.depth = 0;
1169 
1170 		for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++)
1171 			slot->slot_type[j] = STACK_ITER;
1172 
1173 		mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi - i);
1174 	}
1175 
1176 	return 0;
1177 }
1178 
1179 static int unmark_stack_slots_iter(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1180 				   struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int nr_slots)
1181 {
1182 	struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
1183 	int spi, i, j;
1184 
1185 	spi = iter_get_spi(env, reg, nr_slots);
1186 	if (spi < 0)
1187 		return spi;
1188 
1189 	for (i = 0; i < nr_slots; i++) {
1190 		struct bpf_stack_state *slot = &state->stack[spi - i];
1191 		struct bpf_reg_state *st = &slot->spilled_ptr;
1192 
1193 		if (i == 0)
1194 			WARN_ON_ONCE(release_reference(env, st->ref_obj_id));
1195 
1196 		__mark_reg_not_init(env, st);
1197 
1198 		/* see unmark_stack_slots_dynptr() for why we need to set REG_LIVE_WRITTEN */
1199 		st->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
1200 
1201 		for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++)
1202 			slot->slot_type[j] = STACK_INVALID;
1203 
1204 		mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi - i);
1205 	}
1206 
1207 	return 0;
1208 }
1209 
1210 static bool is_iter_reg_valid_uninit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1211 				     struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int nr_slots)
1212 {
1213 	struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
1214 	int spi, i, j;
1215 
1216 	/* For -ERANGE (i.e. spi not falling into allocated stack slots), we
1217 	 * will do check_mem_access to check and update stack bounds later, so
1218 	 * return true for that case.
1219 	 */
1220 	spi = iter_get_spi(env, reg, nr_slots);
1221 	if (spi == -ERANGE)
1222 		return true;
1223 	if (spi < 0)
1224 		return false;
1225 
1226 	for (i = 0; i < nr_slots; i++) {
1227 		struct bpf_stack_state *slot = &state->stack[spi - i];
1228 
1229 		for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++)
1230 			if (slot->slot_type[j] == STACK_ITER)
1231 				return false;
1232 	}
1233 
1234 	return true;
1235 }
1236 
1237 static bool is_iter_reg_valid_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
1238 				   struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id, int nr_slots)
1239 {
1240 	struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
1241 	int spi, i, j;
1242 
1243 	spi = iter_get_spi(env, reg, nr_slots);
1244 	if (spi < 0)
1245 		return false;
1246 
1247 	for (i = 0; i < nr_slots; i++) {
1248 		struct bpf_stack_state *slot = &state->stack[spi - i];
1249 		struct bpf_reg_state *st = &slot->spilled_ptr;
1250 
1251 		/* only main (first) slot has ref_obj_id set */
1252 		if (i == 0 && !st->ref_obj_id)
1253 			return false;
1254 		if (i != 0 && st->ref_obj_id)
1255 			return false;
1256 		if (st->iter.btf != btf || st->iter.btf_id != btf_id)
1257 			return false;
1258 
1259 		for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++)
1260 			if (slot->slot_type[j] != STACK_ITER)
1261 				return false;
1262 	}
1263 
1264 	return true;
1265 }
1266 
1267 /* Check if given stack slot is "special":
1268  *   - spilled register state (STACK_SPILL);
1269  *   - dynptr state (STACK_DYNPTR);
1270  *   - iter state (STACK_ITER).
1271  */
1272 static bool is_stack_slot_special(const struct bpf_stack_state *stack)
1273 {
1274 	enum bpf_stack_slot_type type = stack->slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE - 1];
1275 
1276 	switch (type) {
1277 	case STACK_SPILL:
1278 	case STACK_DYNPTR:
1279 	case STACK_ITER:
1280 		return true;
1281 	case STACK_INVALID:
1282 	case STACK_MISC:
1283 	case STACK_ZERO:
1284 		return false;
1285 	default:
1286 		WARN_ONCE(1, "unknown stack slot type %d\n", type);
1287 		return true;
1288 	}
1289 }
1290 
1291 /* The reg state of a pointer or a bounded scalar was saved when
1292  * it was spilled to the stack.
1293  */
1294 static bool is_spilled_reg(const struct bpf_stack_state *stack)
1295 {
1296 	return stack->slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE - 1] == STACK_SPILL;
1297 }
1298 
1299 static bool is_spilled_scalar_reg(const struct bpf_stack_state *stack)
1300 {
1301 	return stack->slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE - 1] == STACK_SPILL &&
1302 	       stack->spilled_ptr.type == SCALAR_VALUE;
1303 }
1304 
1305 static void scrub_spilled_slot(u8 *stype)
1306 {
1307 	if (*stype != STACK_INVALID)
1308 		*stype = STACK_MISC;
1309 }
1310 
1311 static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1312 				 const struct bpf_func_state *state,
1313 				 bool print_all)
1314 {
1315 	const struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
1316 	enum bpf_reg_type t;
1317 	int i;
1318 
1319 	if (state->frameno)
1320 		verbose(env, " frame%d:", state->frameno);
1321 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) {
1322 		reg = &state->regs[i];
1323 		t = reg->type;
1324 		if (t == NOT_INIT)
1325 			continue;
1326 		if (!print_all && !reg_scratched(env, i))
1327 			continue;
1328 		verbose(env, " R%d", i);
1329 		print_liveness(env, reg->live);
1330 		verbose(env, "=");
1331 		if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->precise)
1332 			verbose(env, "P");
1333 		if ((t == SCALAR_VALUE || t == PTR_TO_STACK) &&
1334 		    tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
1335 			/* reg->off should be 0 for SCALAR_VALUE */
1336 			verbose(env, "%s", t == SCALAR_VALUE ? "" : reg_type_str(env, t));
1337 			verbose(env, "%lld", reg->var_off.value + reg->off);
1338 		} else {
1339 			const char *sep = "";
1340 
1341 			verbose(env, "%s", reg_type_str(env, t));
1342 			if (base_type(t) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID)
1343 				verbose(env, "%s", btf_type_name(reg->btf, reg->btf_id));
1344 			verbose(env, "(");
1345 /*
1346  * _a stands for append, was shortened to avoid multiline statements below.
1347  * This macro is used to output a comma separated list of attributes.
1348  */
1349 #define verbose_a(fmt, ...) ({ verbose(env, "%s" fmt, sep, __VA_ARGS__); sep = ","; })
1350 
1351 			if (reg->id)
1352 				verbose_a("id=%d", reg->id);
1353 			if (reg->ref_obj_id)
1354 				verbose_a("ref_obj_id=%d", reg->ref_obj_id);
1355 			if (type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type))
1356 				verbose_a("%s", "non_own_ref");
1357 			if (t != SCALAR_VALUE)
1358 				verbose_a("off=%d", reg->off);
1359 			if (type_is_pkt_pointer(t))
1360 				verbose_a("r=%d", reg->range);
1361 			else if (base_type(t) == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP ||
1362 				 base_type(t) == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY ||
1363 				 base_type(t) == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE)
1364 				verbose_a("ks=%d,vs=%d",
1365 					  reg->map_ptr->key_size,
1366 					  reg->map_ptr->value_size);
1367 			if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
1368 				/* Typically an immediate SCALAR_VALUE, but
1369 				 * could be a pointer whose offset is too big
1370 				 * for reg->off
1371 				 */
1372 				verbose_a("imm=%llx", reg->var_off.value);
1373 			} else {
1374 				if (reg->smin_value != reg->umin_value &&
1375 				    reg->smin_value != S64_MIN)
1376 					verbose_a("smin=%lld", (long long)reg->smin_value);
1377 				if (reg->smax_value != reg->umax_value &&
1378 				    reg->smax_value != S64_MAX)
1379 					verbose_a("smax=%lld", (long long)reg->smax_value);
1380 				if (reg->umin_value != 0)
1381 					verbose_a("umin=%llu", (unsigned long long)reg->umin_value);
1382 				if (reg->umax_value != U64_MAX)
1383 					verbose_a("umax=%llu", (unsigned long long)reg->umax_value);
1384 				if (!tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off)) {
1385 					char tn_buf[48];
1386 
1387 					tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
1388 					verbose_a("var_off=%s", tn_buf);
1389 				}
1390 				if (reg->s32_min_value != reg->smin_value &&
1391 				    reg->s32_min_value != S32_MIN)
1392 					verbose_a("s32_min=%d", (int)(reg->s32_min_value));
1393 				if (reg->s32_max_value != reg->smax_value &&
1394 				    reg->s32_max_value != S32_MAX)
1395 					verbose_a("s32_max=%d", (int)(reg->s32_max_value));
1396 				if (reg->u32_min_value != reg->umin_value &&
1397 				    reg->u32_min_value != U32_MIN)
1398 					verbose_a("u32_min=%d", (int)(reg->u32_min_value));
1399 				if (reg->u32_max_value != reg->umax_value &&
1400 				    reg->u32_max_value != U32_MAX)
1401 					verbose_a("u32_max=%d", (int)(reg->u32_max_value));
1402 			}
1403 #undef verbose_a
1404 
1405 			verbose(env, ")");
1406 		}
1407 	}
1408 	for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
1409 		char types_buf[BPF_REG_SIZE + 1];
1410 		bool valid = false;
1411 		int j;
1412 
1413 		for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) {
1414 			if (state->stack[i].slot_type[j] != STACK_INVALID)
1415 				valid = true;
1416 			types_buf[j] = slot_type_char[state->stack[i].slot_type[j]];
1417 		}
1418 		types_buf[BPF_REG_SIZE] = 0;
1419 		if (!valid)
1420 			continue;
1421 		if (!print_all && !stack_slot_scratched(env, i))
1422 			continue;
1423 		switch (state->stack[i].slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE - 1]) {
1424 		case STACK_SPILL:
1425 			reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr;
1426 			t = reg->type;
1427 
1428 			verbose(env, " fp%d", (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE);
1429 			print_liveness(env, reg->live);
1430 			verbose(env, "=%s", t == SCALAR_VALUE ? "" : reg_type_str(env, t));
1431 			if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->precise)
1432 				verbose(env, "P");
1433 			if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_is_const(reg->var_off))
1434 				verbose(env, "%lld", reg->var_off.value + reg->off);
1435 			break;
1436 		case STACK_DYNPTR:
1437 			i += BPF_DYNPTR_NR_SLOTS - 1;
1438 			reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr;
1439 
1440 			verbose(env, " fp%d", (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE);
1441 			print_liveness(env, reg->live);
1442 			verbose(env, "=dynptr_%s", dynptr_type_str(reg->dynptr.type));
1443 			if (reg->ref_obj_id)
1444 				verbose(env, "(ref_id=%d)", reg->ref_obj_id);
1445 			break;
1446 		case STACK_ITER:
1447 			/* only main slot has ref_obj_id set; skip others */
1448 			reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr;
1449 			if (!reg->ref_obj_id)
1450 				continue;
1451 
1452 			verbose(env, " fp%d", (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE);
1453 			print_liveness(env, reg->live);
1454 			verbose(env, "=iter_%s(ref_id=%d,state=%s,depth=%u)",
1455 				iter_type_str(reg->iter.btf, reg->iter.btf_id),
1456 				reg->ref_obj_id, iter_state_str(reg->iter.state),
1457 				reg->iter.depth);
1458 			break;
1459 		case STACK_MISC:
1460 		case STACK_ZERO:
1461 		default:
1462 			reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr;
1463 
1464 			for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++)
1465 				types_buf[j] = slot_type_char[state->stack[i].slot_type[j]];
1466 			types_buf[BPF_REG_SIZE] = 0;
1467 
1468 			verbose(env, " fp%d", (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE);
1469 			print_liveness(env, reg->live);
1470 			verbose(env, "=%s", types_buf);
1471 			break;
1472 		}
1473 	}
1474 	if (state->acquired_refs && state->refs[0].id) {
1475 		verbose(env, " refs=%d", state->refs[0].id);
1476 		for (i = 1; i < state->acquired_refs; i++)
1477 			if (state->refs[i].id)
1478 				verbose(env, ",%d", state->refs[i].id);
1479 	}
1480 	if (state->in_callback_fn)
1481 		verbose(env, " cb");
1482 	if (state->in_async_callback_fn)
1483 		verbose(env, " async_cb");
1484 	verbose(env, "\n");
1485 	mark_verifier_state_clean(env);
1486 }
1487 
1488 static inline u32 vlog_alignment(u32 pos)
1489 {
1490 	return round_up(max(pos + BPF_LOG_MIN_ALIGNMENT / 2, BPF_LOG_ALIGNMENT),
1491 			BPF_LOG_MIN_ALIGNMENT) - pos - 1;
1492 }
1493 
1494 static void print_insn_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1495 			     const struct bpf_func_state *state)
1496 {
1497 	if (env->prev_log_pos && env->prev_log_pos == env->log.end_pos) {
1498 		/* remove new line character */
1499 		bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, env->prev_log_pos - 1);
1500 		verbose(env, "%*c;", vlog_alignment(env->prev_insn_print_pos), ' ');
1501 	} else {
1502 		verbose(env, "%d:", env->insn_idx);
1503 	}
1504 	print_verifier_state(env, state, false);
1505 }
1506 
1507 /* copy array src of length n * size bytes to dst. dst is reallocated if it's too
1508  * small to hold src. This is different from krealloc since we don't want to preserve
1509  * the contents of dst.
1510  *
1511  * Leaves dst untouched if src is NULL or length is zero. Returns NULL if memory could
1512  * not be allocated.
1513  */
1514 static void *copy_array(void *dst, const void *src, size_t n, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
1515 {
1516 	size_t alloc_bytes;
1517 	void *orig = dst;
1518 	size_t bytes;
1519 
1520 	if (ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(src))
1521 		goto out;
1522 
1523 	if (unlikely(check_mul_overflow(n, size, &bytes)))
1524 		return NULL;
1525 
1526 	alloc_bytes = max(ksize(orig), kmalloc_size_roundup(bytes));
1527 	dst = krealloc(orig, alloc_bytes, flags);
1528 	if (!dst) {
1529 		kfree(orig);
1530 		return NULL;
1531 	}
1532 
1533 	memcpy(dst, src, bytes);
1534 out:
1535 	return dst ? dst : ZERO_SIZE_PTR;
1536 }
1537 
1538 /* resize an array from old_n items to new_n items. the array is reallocated if it's too
1539  * small to hold new_n items. new items are zeroed out if the array grows.
1540  *
1541  * Contrary to krealloc_array, does not free arr if new_n is zero.
1542  */
1543 static void *realloc_array(void *arr, size_t old_n, size_t new_n, size_t size)
1544 {
1545 	size_t alloc_size;
1546 	void *new_arr;
1547 
1548 	if (!new_n || old_n == new_n)
1549 		goto out;
1550 
1551 	alloc_size = kmalloc_size_roundup(size_mul(new_n, size));
1552 	new_arr = krealloc(arr, alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
1553 	if (!new_arr) {
1554 		kfree(arr);
1555 		return NULL;
1556 	}
1557 	arr = new_arr;
1558 
1559 	if (new_n > old_n)
1560 		memset(arr + old_n * size, 0, (new_n - old_n) * size);
1561 
1562 out:
1563 	return arr ? arr : ZERO_SIZE_PTR;
1564 }
1565 
1566 static int copy_reference_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, const struct bpf_func_state *src)
1567 {
1568 	dst->refs = copy_array(dst->refs, src->refs, src->acquired_refs,
1569 			       sizeof(struct bpf_reference_state), GFP_KERNEL);
1570 	if (!dst->refs)
1571 		return -ENOMEM;
1572 
1573 	dst->acquired_refs = src->acquired_refs;
1574 	return 0;
1575 }
1576 
1577 static int copy_stack_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, const struct bpf_func_state *src)
1578 {
1579 	size_t n = src->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE;
1580 
1581 	dst->stack = copy_array(dst->stack, src->stack, n, sizeof(struct bpf_stack_state),
1582 				GFP_KERNEL);
1583 	if (!dst->stack)
1584 		return -ENOMEM;
1585 
1586 	dst->allocated_stack = src->allocated_stack;
1587 	return 0;
1588 }
1589 
1590 static int resize_reference_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, size_t n)
1591 {
1592 	state->refs = realloc_array(state->refs, state->acquired_refs, n,
1593 				    sizeof(struct bpf_reference_state));
1594 	if (!state->refs)
1595 		return -ENOMEM;
1596 
1597 	state->acquired_refs = n;
1598 	return 0;
1599 }
1600 
1601 static int grow_stack_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, int size)
1602 {
1603 	size_t old_n = state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE, n = size / BPF_REG_SIZE;
1604 
1605 	if (old_n >= n)
1606 		return 0;
1607 
1608 	state->stack = realloc_array(state->stack, old_n, n, sizeof(struct bpf_stack_state));
1609 	if (!state->stack)
1610 		return -ENOMEM;
1611 
1612 	state->allocated_stack = size;
1613 	return 0;
1614 }
1615 
1616 /* Acquire a pointer id from the env and update the state->refs to include
1617  * this new pointer reference.
1618  * On success, returns a valid pointer id to associate with the register
1619  * On failure, returns a negative errno.
1620  */
1621 static int acquire_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
1622 {
1623 	struct bpf_func_state *state = cur_func(env);
1624 	int new_ofs = state->acquired_refs;
1625 	int id, err;
1626 
1627 	err = resize_reference_state(state, state->acquired_refs + 1);
1628 	if (err)
1629 		return err;
1630 	id = ++env->id_gen;
1631 	state->refs[new_ofs].id = id;
1632 	state->refs[new_ofs].insn_idx = insn_idx;
1633 	state->refs[new_ofs].callback_ref = state->in_callback_fn ? state->frameno : 0;
1634 
1635 	return id;
1636 }
1637 
1638 /* release function corresponding to acquire_reference_state(). Idempotent. */
1639 static int release_reference_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, int ptr_id)
1640 {
1641 	int i, last_idx;
1642 
1643 	last_idx = state->acquired_refs - 1;
1644 	for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) {
1645 		if (state->refs[i].id == ptr_id) {
1646 			/* Cannot release caller references in callbacks */
1647 			if (state->in_callback_fn && state->refs[i].callback_ref != state->frameno)
1648 				return -EINVAL;
1649 			if (last_idx && i != last_idx)
1650 				memcpy(&state->refs[i], &state->refs[last_idx],
1651 				       sizeof(*state->refs));
1652 			memset(&state->refs[last_idx], 0, sizeof(*state->refs));
1653 			state->acquired_refs--;
1654 			return 0;
1655 		}
1656 	}
1657 	return -EINVAL;
1658 }
1659 
1660 static void free_func_state(struct bpf_func_state *state)
1661 {
1662 	if (!state)
1663 		return;
1664 	kfree(state->refs);
1665 	kfree(state->stack);
1666 	kfree(state);
1667 }
1668 
1669 static void clear_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_state *state)
1670 {
1671 	kfree(state->jmp_history);
1672 	state->jmp_history = NULL;
1673 	state->jmp_history_cnt = 0;
1674 }
1675 
1676 static void free_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state,
1677 				bool free_self)
1678 {
1679 	int i;
1680 
1681 	for (i = 0; i <= state->curframe; i++) {
1682 		free_func_state(state->frame[i]);
1683 		state->frame[i] = NULL;
1684 	}
1685 	clear_jmp_history(state);
1686 	if (free_self)
1687 		kfree(state);
1688 }
1689 
1690 /* copy verifier state from src to dst growing dst stack space
1691  * when necessary to accommodate larger src stack
1692  */
1693 static int copy_func_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst,
1694 			   const struct bpf_func_state *src)
1695 {
1696 	int err;
1697 
1698 	memcpy(dst, src, offsetof(struct bpf_func_state, acquired_refs));
1699 	err = copy_reference_state(dst, src);
1700 	if (err)
1701 		return err;
1702 	return copy_stack_state(dst, src);
1703 }
1704 
1705 static int copy_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *dst_state,
1706 			       const struct bpf_verifier_state *src)
1707 {
1708 	struct bpf_func_state *dst;
1709 	int i, err;
1710 
1711 	dst_state->jmp_history = copy_array(dst_state->jmp_history, src->jmp_history,
1712 					    src->jmp_history_cnt, sizeof(struct bpf_idx_pair),
1713 					    GFP_USER);
1714 	if (!dst_state->jmp_history)
1715 		return -ENOMEM;
1716 	dst_state->jmp_history_cnt = src->jmp_history_cnt;
1717 
1718 	/* if dst has more stack frames then src frame, free them */
1719 	for (i = src->curframe + 1; i <= dst_state->curframe; i++) {
1720 		free_func_state(dst_state->frame[i]);
1721 		dst_state->frame[i] = NULL;
1722 	}
1723 	dst_state->speculative = src->speculative;
1724 	dst_state->active_rcu_lock = src->active_rcu_lock;
1725 	dst_state->curframe = src->curframe;
1726 	dst_state->active_lock.ptr = src->active_lock.ptr;
1727 	dst_state->active_lock.id = src->active_lock.id;
1728 	dst_state->branches = src->branches;
1729 	dst_state->parent = src->parent;
1730 	dst_state->first_insn_idx = src->first_insn_idx;
1731 	dst_state->last_insn_idx = src->last_insn_idx;
1732 	for (i = 0; i <= src->curframe; i++) {
1733 		dst = dst_state->frame[i];
1734 		if (!dst) {
1735 			dst = kzalloc(sizeof(*dst), GFP_KERNEL);
1736 			if (!dst)
1737 				return -ENOMEM;
1738 			dst_state->frame[i] = dst;
1739 		}
1740 		err = copy_func_state(dst, src->frame[i]);
1741 		if (err)
1742 			return err;
1743 	}
1744 	return 0;
1745 }
1746 
1747 static void update_branch_counts(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st)
1748 {
1749 	while (st) {
1750 		u32 br = --st->branches;
1751 
1752 		/* WARN_ON(br > 1) technically makes sense here,
1753 		 * but see comment in push_stack(), hence:
1754 		 */
1755 		WARN_ONCE((int)br < 0,
1756 			  "BUG update_branch_counts:branches_to_explore=%d\n",
1757 			  br);
1758 		if (br)
1759 			break;
1760 		st = st->parent;
1761 	}
1762 }
1763 
1764 static int pop_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *prev_insn_idx,
1765 		     int *insn_idx, bool pop_log)
1766 {
1767 	struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state;
1768 	struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem, *head = env->head;
1769 	int err;
1770 
1771 	if (env->head == NULL)
1772 		return -ENOENT;
1773 
1774 	if (cur) {
1775 		err = copy_verifier_state(cur, &head->st);
1776 		if (err)
1777 			return err;
1778 	}
1779 	if (pop_log)
1780 		bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, head->log_pos);
1781 	if (insn_idx)
1782 		*insn_idx = head->insn_idx;
1783 	if (prev_insn_idx)
1784 		*prev_insn_idx = head->prev_insn_idx;
1785 	elem = head->next;
1786 	free_verifier_state(&head->st, false);
1787 	kfree(head);
1788 	env->head = elem;
1789 	env->stack_size--;
1790 	return 0;
1791 }
1792 
1793 static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1794 					     int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx,
1795 					     bool speculative)
1796 {
1797 	struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state;
1798 	struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem;
1799 	int err;
1800 
1801 	elem = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem), GFP_KERNEL);
1802 	if (!elem)
1803 		goto err;
1804 
1805 	elem->insn_idx = insn_idx;
1806 	elem->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx;
1807 	elem->next = env->head;
1808 	elem->log_pos = env->log.end_pos;
1809 	env->head = elem;
1810 	env->stack_size++;
1811 	err = copy_verifier_state(&elem->st, cur);
1812 	if (err)
1813 		goto err;
1814 	elem->st.speculative |= speculative;
1815 	if (env->stack_size > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ) {
1816 		verbose(env, "The sequence of %d jumps is too complex.\n",
1817 			env->stack_size);
1818 		goto err;
1819 	}
1820 	if (elem->st.parent) {
1821 		++elem->st.parent->branches;
1822 		/* WARN_ON(branches > 2) technically makes sense here,
1823 		 * but
1824 		 * 1. speculative states will bump 'branches' for non-branch
1825 		 * instructions
1826 		 * 2. is_state_visited() heuristics may decide not to create
1827 		 * a new state for a sequence of branches and all such current
1828 		 * and cloned states will be pointing to a single parent state
1829 		 * which might have large 'branches' count.
1830 		 */
1831 	}
1832 	return &elem->st;
1833 err:
1834 	free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true);
1835 	env->cur_state = NULL;
1836 	/* pop all elements and return */
1837 	while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false));
1838 	return NULL;
1839 }
1840 
1841 #define CALLER_SAVED_REGS 6
1842 static const int caller_saved[CALLER_SAVED_REGS] = {
1843 	BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_5
1844 };
1845 
1846 /* This helper doesn't clear reg->id */
1847 static void ___mark_reg_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm)
1848 {
1849 	reg->var_off = tnum_const(imm);
1850 	reg->smin_value = (s64)imm;
1851 	reg->smax_value = (s64)imm;
1852 	reg->umin_value = imm;
1853 	reg->umax_value = imm;
1854 
1855 	reg->s32_min_value = (s32)imm;
1856 	reg->s32_max_value = (s32)imm;
1857 	reg->u32_min_value = (u32)imm;
1858 	reg->u32_max_value = (u32)imm;
1859 }
1860 
1861 /* Mark the unknown part of a register (variable offset or scalar value) as
1862  * known to have the value @imm.
1863  */
1864 static void __mark_reg_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm)
1865 {
1866 	/* Clear off and union(map_ptr, range) */
1867 	memset(((u8 *)reg) + sizeof(reg->type), 0,
1868 	       offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off) - sizeof(reg->type));
1869 	reg->id = 0;
1870 	reg->ref_obj_id = 0;
1871 	___mark_reg_known(reg, imm);
1872 }
1873 
1874 static void __mark_reg32_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm)
1875 {
1876 	reg->var_off = tnum_const_subreg(reg->var_off, imm);
1877 	reg->s32_min_value = (s32)imm;
1878 	reg->s32_max_value = (s32)imm;
1879 	reg->u32_min_value = (u32)imm;
1880 	reg->u32_max_value = (u32)imm;
1881 }
1882 
1883 /* Mark the 'variable offset' part of a register as zero.  This should be
1884  * used only on registers holding a pointer type.
1885  */
1886 static void __mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1887 {
1888 	__mark_reg_known(reg, 0);
1889 }
1890 
1891 static void __mark_reg_const_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1892 {
1893 	__mark_reg_known(reg, 0);
1894 	reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE;
1895 }
1896 
1897 static void mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1898 				struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
1899 {
1900 	if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) {
1901 		verbose(env, "mark_reg_known_zero(regs, %u)\n", regno);
1902 		/* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs */
1903 		for (regno = 0; regno < MAX_BPF_REG; regno++)
1904 			__mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno);
1905 		return;
1906 	}
1907 	__mark_reg_known_zero(regs + regno);
1908 }
1909 
1910 static void __mark_dynptr_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, enum bpf_dynptr_type type,
1911 			      bool first_slot, int dynptr_id)
1912 {
1913 	/* reg->type has no meaning for STACK_DYNPTR, but when we set reg for
1914 	 * callback arguments, it does need to be CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, so simply
1915 	 * set it unconditionally as it is ignored for STACK_DYNPTR anyway.
1916 	 */
1917 	__mark_reg_known_zero(reg);
1918 	reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR;
1919 	/* Give each dynptr a unique id to uniquely associate slices to it. */
1920 	reg->id = dynptr_id;
1921 	reg->dynptr.type = type;
1922 	reg->dynptr.first_slot = first_slot;
1923 }
1924 
1925 static void mark_ptr_not_null_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1926 {
1927 	if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
1928 		const struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr;
1929 
1930 		if (map->inner_map_meta) {
1931 			reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
1932 			reg->map_ptr = map->inner_map_meta;
1933 			/* transfer reg's id which is unique for every map_lookup_elem
1934 			 * as UID of the inner map.
1935 			 */
1936 			if (btf_record_has_field(map->inner_map_meta->record, BPF_TIMER))
1937 				reg->map_uid = reg->id;
1938 		} else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP) {
1939 			reg->type = PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK;
1940 		} else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP ||
1941 			   map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH) {
1942 			reg->type = PTR_TO_SOCKET;
1943 		} else {
1944 			reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE;
1945 		}
1946 		return;
1947 	}
1948 
1949 	reg->type &= ~PTR_MAYBE_NULL;
1950 }
1951 
1952 static void mark_reg_graph_node(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno,
1953 				struct btf_field_graph_root *ds_head)
1954 {
1955 	__mark_reg_known_zero(&regs[regno]);
1956 	regs[regno].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC;
1957 	regs[regno].btf = ds_head->btf;
1958 	regs[regno].btf_id = ds_head->value_btf_id;
1959 	regs[regno].off = ds_head->node_offset;
1960 }
1961 
1962 static bool reg_is_pkt_pointer(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1963 {
1964 	return type_is_pkt_pointer(reg->type);
1965 }
1966 
1967 static bool reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1968 {
1969 	return reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg) ||
1970 	       reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END;
1971 }
1972 
1973 static bool reg_is_dynptr_slice_pkt(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1974 {
1975 	return base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_MEM &&
1976 		(reg->type & DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB || reg->type & DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP);
1977 }
1978 
1979 /* Unmodified PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END] register from ctx access. */
1980 static bool reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
1981 				    enum bpf_reg_type which)
1982 {
1983 	/* The register can already have a range from prior markings.
1984 	 * This is fine as long as it hasn't been advanced from its
1985 	 * origin.
1986 	 */
1987 	return reg->type == which &&
1988 	       reg->id == 0 &&
1989 	       reg->off == 0 &&
1990 	       tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0);
1991 }
1992 
1993 /* Reset the min/max bounds of a register */
1994 static void __mark_reg_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1995 {
1996 	reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
1997 	reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
1998 	reg->umin_value = 0;
1999 	reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
2000 
2001 	reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
2002 	reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
2003 	reg->u32_min_value = 0;
2004 	reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX;
2005 }
2006 
2007 static void __mark_reg64_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2008 {
2009 	reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
2010 	reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
2011 	reg->umin_value = 0;
2012 	reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
2013 }
2014 
2015 static void __mark_reg32_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2016 {
2017 	reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
2018 	reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
2019 	reg->u32_min_value = 0;
2020 	reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX;
2021 }
2022 
2023 static void __update_reg32_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2024 {
2025 	struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off);
2026 
2027 	/* min signed is max(sign bit) | min(other bits) */
2028 	reg->s32_min_value = max_t(s32, reg->s32_min_value,
2029 			var32_off.value | (var32_off.mask & S32_MIN));
2030 	/* max signed is min(sign bit) | max(other bits) */
2031 	reg->s32_max_value = min_t(s32, reg->s32_max_value,
2032 			var32_off.value | (var32_off.mask & S32_MAX));
2033 	reg->u32_min_value = max_t(u32, reg->u32_min_value, (u32)var32_off.value);
2034 	reg->u32_max_value = min(reg->u32_max_value,
2035 				 (u32)(var32_off.value | var32_off.mask));
2036 }
2037 
2038 static void __update_reg64_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2039 {
2040 	/* min signed is max(sign bit) | min(other bits) */
2041 	reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, reg->smin_value,
2042 				reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask & S64_MIN));
2043 	/* max signed is min(sign bit) | max(other bits) */
2044 	reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, reg->smax_value,
2045 				reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask & S64_MAX));
2046 	reg->umin_value = max(reg->umin_value, reg->var_off.value);
2047 	reg->umax_value = min(reg->umax_value,
2048 			      reg->var_off.value | reg->var_off.mask);
2049 }
2050 
2051 static void __update_reg_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2052 {
2053 	__update_reg32_bounds(reg);
2054 	__update_reg64_bounds(reg);
2055 }
2056 
2057 /* Uses signed min/max values to inform unsigned, and vice-versa */
2058 static void __reg32_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2059 {
2060 	/* Learn sign from signed bounds.
2061 	 * If we cannot cross the sign boundary, then signed and unsigned bounds
2062 	 * are the same, so combine.  This works even in the negative case, e.g.
2063 	 * -3 s<= x s<= -1 implies 0xf...fd u<= x u<= 0xf...ff.
2064 	 */
2065 	if (reg->s32_min_value >= 0 || reg->s32_max_value < 0) {
2066 		reg->s32_min_value = reg->u32_min_value =
2067 			max_t(u32, reg->s32_min_value, reg->u32_min_value);
2068 		reg->s32_max_value = reg->u32_max_value =
2069 			min_t(u32, reg->s32_max_value, reg->u32_max_value);
2070 		return;
2071 	}
2072 	/* Learn sign from unsigned bounds.  Signed bounds cross the sign
2073 	 * boundary, so we must be careful.
2074 	 */
2075 	if ((s32)reg->u32_max_value >= 0) {
2076 		/* Positive.  We can't learn anything from the smin, but smax
2077 		 * is positive, hence safe.
2078 		 */
2079 		reg->s32_min_value = reg->u32_min_value;
2080 		reg->s32_max_value = reg->u32_max_value =
2081 			min_t(u32, reg->s32_max_value, reg->u32_max_value);
2082 	} else if ((s32)reg->u32_min_value < 0) {
2083 		/* Negative.  We can't learn anything from the smax, but smin
2084 		 * is negative, hence safe.
2085 		 */
2086 		reg->s32_min_value = reg->u32_min_value =
2087 			max_t(u32, reg->s32_min_value, reg->u32_min_value);
2088 		reg->s32_max_value = reg->u32_max_value;
2089 	}
2090 }
2091 
2092 static void __reg64_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2093 {
2094 	/* Learn sign from signed bounds.
2095 	 * If we cannot cross the sign boundary, then signed and unsigned bounds
2096 	 * are the same, so combine.  This works even in the negative case, e.g.
2097 	 * -3 s<= x s<= -1 implies 0xf...fd u<= x u<= 0xf...ff.
2098 	 */
2099 	if (reg->smin_value >= 0 || reg->smax_value < 0) {
2100 		reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->smin_value,
2101 							  reg->umin_value);
2102 		reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->smax_value,
2103 							  reg->umax_value);
2104 		return;
2105 	}
2106 	/* Learn sign from unsigned bounds.  Signed bounds cross the sign
2107 	 * boundary, so we must be careful.
2108 	 */
2109 	if ((s64)reg->umax_value >= 0) {
2110 		/* Positive.  We can't learn anything from the smin, but smax
2111 		 * is positive, hence safe.
2112 		 */
2113 		reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value;
2114 		reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->smax_value,
2115 							  reg->umax_value);
2116 	} else if ((s64)reg->umin_value < 0) {
2117 		/* Negative.  We can't learn anything from the smax, but smin
2118 		 * is negative, hence safe.
2119 		 */
2120 		reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->smin_value,
2121 							  reg->umin_value);
2122 		reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value;
2123 	}
2124 }
2125 
2126 static void __reg_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2127 {
2128 	__reg32_deduce_bounds(reg);
2129 	__reg64_deduce_bounds(reg);
2130 }
2131 
2132 /* Attempts to improve var_off based on unsigned min/max information */
2133 static void __reg_bound_offset(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2134 {
2135 	struct tnum var64_off = tnum_intersect(reg->var_off,
2136 					       tnum_range(reg->umin_value,
2137 							  reg->umax_value));
2138 	struct tnum var32_off = tnum_intersect(tnum_subreg(var64_off),
2139 					       tnum_range(reg->u32_min_value,
2140 							  reg->u32_max_value));
2141 
2142 	reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(var64_off), var32_off);
2143 }
2144 
2145 static void reg_bounds_sync(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2146 {
2147 	/* We might have learned new bounds from the var_off. */
2148 	__update_reg_bounds(reg);
2149 	/* We might have learned something about the sign bit. */
2150 	__reg_deduce_bounds(reg);
2151 	/* We might have learned some bits from the bounds. */
2152 	__reg_bound_offset(reg);
2153 	/* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds
2154 	 * slightly, e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc),
2155 	 * then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax.
2156 	 */
2157 	__update_reg_bounds(reg);
2158 }
2159 
2160 static bool __reg32_bound_s64(s32 a)
2161 {
2162 	return a >= 0 && a <= S32_MAX;
2163 }
2164 
2165 static void __reg_assign_32_into_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2166 {
2167 	reg->umin_value = reg->u32_min_value;
2168 	reg->umax_value = reg->u32_max_value;
2169 
2170 	/* Attempt to pull 32-bit signed bounds into 64-bit bounds but must
2171 	 * be positive otherwise set to worse case bounds and refine later
2172 	 * from tnum.
2173 	 */
2174 	if (__reg32_bound_s64(reg->s32_min_value) &&
2175 	    __reg32_bound_s64(reg->s32_max_value)) {
2176 		reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value;
2177 		reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value;
2178 	} else {
2179 		reg->smin_value = 0;
2180 		reg->smax_value = U32_MAX;
2181 	}
2182 }
2183 
2184 static void __reg_combine_32_into_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2185 {
2186 	/* special case when 64-bit register has upper 32-bit register
2187 	 * zeroed. Typically happens after zext or <<32, >>32 sequence
2188 	 * allowing us to use 32-bit bounds directly,
2189 	 */
2190 	if (tnum_equals_const(tnum_clear_subreg(reg->var_off), 0)) {
2191 		__reg_assign_32_into_64(reg);
2192 	} else {
2193 		/* Otherwise the best we can do is push lower 32bit known and
2194 		 * unknown bits into register (var_off set from jmp logic)
2195 		 * then learn as much as possible from the 64-bit tnum
2196 		 * known and unknown bits. The previous smin/smax bounds are
2197 		 * invalid here because of jmp32 compare so mark them unknown
2198 		 * so they do not impact tnum bounds calculation.
2199 		 */
2200 		__mark_reg64_unbounded(reg);
2201 	}
2202 	reg_bounds_sync(reg);
2203 }
2204 
2205 static bool __reg64_bound_s32(s64 a)
2206 {
2207 	return a >= S32_MIN && a <= S32_MAX;
2208 }
2209 
2210 static bool __reg64_bound_u32(u64 a)
2211 {
2212 	return a >= U32_MIN && a <= U32_MAX;
2213 }
2214 
2215 static void __reg_combine_64_into_32(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2216 {
2217 	__mark_reg32_unbounded(reg);
2218 	if (__reg64_bound_s32(reg->smin_value) && __reg64_bound_s32(reg->smax_value)) {
2219 		reg->s32_min_value = (s32)reg->smin_value;
2220 		reg->s32_max_value = (s32)reg->smax_value;
2221 	}
2222 	if (__reg64_bound_u32(reg->umin_value) && __reg64_bound_u32(reg->umax_value)) {
2223 		reg->u32_min_value = (u32)reg->umin_value;
2224 		reg->u32_max_value = (u32)reg->umax_value;
2225 	}
2226 	reg_bounds_sync(reg);
2227 }
2228 
2229 /* Mark a register as having a completely unknown (scalar) value. */
2230 static void __mark_reg_unknown(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
2231 			       struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2232 {
2233 	/*
2234 	 * Clear type, off, and union(map_ptr, range) and
2235 	 * padding between 'type' and union
2236 	 */
2237 	memset(reg, 0, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off));
2238 	reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE;
2239 	reg->id = 0;
2240 	reg->ref_obj_id = 0;
2241 	reg->var_off = tnum_unknown;
2242 	reg->frameno = 0;
2243 	reg->precise = !env->bpf_capable;
2244 	__mark_reg_unbounded(reg);
2245 }
2246 
2247 static void mark_reg_unknown(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
2248 			     struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
2249 {
2250 	if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) {
2251 		verbose(env, "mark_reg_unknown(regs, %u)\n", regno);
2252 		/* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs except FP */
2253 		for (regno = 0; regno < BPF_REG_FP; regno++)
2254 			__mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno);
2255 		return;
2256 	}
2257 	__mark_reg_unknown(env, regs + regno);
2258 }
2259 
2260 static void __mark_reg_not_init(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
2261 				struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2262 {
2263 	__mark_reg_unknown(env, reg);
2264 	reg->type = NOT_INIT;
2265 }
2266 
2267 static void mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
2268 			      struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
2269 {
2270 	if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) {
2271 		verbose(env, "mark_reg_not_init(regs, %u)\n", regno);
2272 		/* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs except FP */
2273 		for (regno = 0; regno < BPF_REG_FP; regno++)
2274 			__mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno);
2275 		return;
2276 	}
2277 	__mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno);
2278 }
2279 
2280 static void mark_btf_ld_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
2281 			    struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno,
2282 			    enum bpf_reg_type reg_type,
2283 			    struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id,
2284 			    enum bpf_type_flag flag)
2285 {
2286 	if (reg_type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
2287 		mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, regno);
2288 		return;
2289 	}
2290 	mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, regno);
2291 	regs[regno].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | flag;
2292 	regs[regno].btf = btf;
2293 	regs[regno].btf_id = btf_id;
2294 }
2295 
2296 #define DEF_NOT_SUBREG	(0)
2297 static void init_reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
2298 			   struct bpf_func_state *state)
2299 {
2300 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
2301 	int i;
2302 
2303 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) {
2304 		mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, i);
2305 		regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE;
2306 		regs[i].parent = NULL;
2307 		regs[i].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG;
2308 	}
2309 
2310 	/* frame pointer */
2311 	regs[BPF_REG_FP].type = PTR_TO_STACK;
2312 	mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_FP);
2313 	regs[BPF_REG_FP].frameno = state->frameno;
2314 }
2315 
2316 #define BPF_MAIN_FUNC (-1)
2317 static void init_func_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
2318 			    struct bpf_func_state *state,
2319 			    int callsite, int frameno, int subprogno)
2320 {
2321 	state->callsite = callsite;
2322 	state->frameno = frameno;
2323 	state->subprogno = subprogno;
2324 	state->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 0);
2325 	init_reg_state(env, state);
2326 	mark_verifier_state_scratched(env);
2327 }
2328 
2329 /* Similar to push_stack(), but for async callbacks */
2330 static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_async_cb(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
2331 						int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx,
2332 						int subprog)
2333 {
2334 	struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem;
2335 	struct bpf_func_state *frame;
2336 
2337 	elem = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem), GFP_KERNEL);
2338 	if (!elem)
2339 		goto err;
2340 
2341 	elem->insn_idx = insn_idx;
2342 	elem->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx;
2343 	elem->next = env->head;
2344 	elem->log_pos = env->log.end_pos;
2345 	env->head = elem;
2346 	env->stack_size++;
2347 	if (env->stack_size > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ) {
2348 		verbose(env,
2349 			"The sequence of %d jumps is too complex for async cb.\n",
2350 			env->stack_size);
2351 		goto err;
2352 	}
2353 	/* Unlike push_stack() do not copy_verifier_state().
2354 	 * The caller state doesn't matter.
2355 	 * This is async callback. It starts in a fresh stack.
2356 	 * Initialize it similar to do_check_common().
2357 	 */
2358 	elem->st.branches = 1;
2359 	frame = kzalloc(sizeof(*frame), GFP_KERNEL);
2360 	if (!frame)
2361 		goto err;
2362 	init_func_state(env, frame,
2363 			BPF_MAIN_FUNC /* callsite */,
2364 			0 /* frameno within this callchain */,
2365 			subprog /* subprog number within this prog */);
2366 	elem->st.frame[0] = frame;
2367 	return &elem->st;
2368 err:
2369 	free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true);
2370 	env->cur_state = NULL;
2371 	/* pop all elements and return */
2372 	while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false));
2373 	return NULL;
2374 }
2375 
2376 
2377 enum reg_arg_type {
2378 	SRC_OP,		/* register is used as source operand */
2379 	DST_OP,		/* register is used as destination operand */
2380 	DST_OP_NO_MARK	/* same as above, check only, don't mark */
2381 };
2382 
2383 static int cmp_subprogs(const void *a, const void *b)
2384 {
2385 	return ((struct bpf_subprog_info *)a)->start -
2386 	       ((struct bpf_subprog_info *)b)->start;
2387 }
2388 
2389 static int find_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off)
2390 {
2391 	struct bpf_subprog_info *p;
2392 
2393 	p = bsearch(&off, env->subprog_info, env->subprog_cnt,
2394 		    sizeof(env->subprog_info[0]), cmp_subprogs);
2395 	if (!p)
2396 		return -ENOENT;
2397 	return p - env->subprog_info;
2398 
2399 }
2400 
2401 static int add_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off)
2402 {
2403 	int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
2404 	int ret;
2405 
2406 	if (off >= insn_cnt || off < 0) {
2407 		verbose(env, "call to invalid destination\n");
2408 		return -EINVAL;
2409 	}
2410 	ret = find_subprog(env, off);
2411 	if (ret >= 0)
2412 		return ret;
2413 	if (env->subprog_cnt >= BPF_MAX_SUBPROGS) {
2414 		verbose(env, "too many subprograms\n");
2415 		return -E2BIG;
2416 	}
2417 	/* determine subprog starts. The end is one before the next starts */
2418 	env->subprog_info[env->subprog_cnt++].start = off;
2419 	sort(env->subprog_info, env->subprog_cnt,
2420 	     sizeof(env->subprog_info[0]), cmp_subprogs, NULL);
2421 	return env->subprog_cnt - 1;
2422 }
2423 
2424 #define MAX_KFUNC_DESCS 256
2425 #define MAX_KFUNC_BTFS	256
2426 
2427 struct bpf_kfunc_desc {
2428 	struct btf_func_model func_model;
2429 	u32 func_id;
2430 	s32 imm;
2431 	u16 offset;
2432 	unsigned long addr;
2433 };
2434 
2435 struct bpf_kfunc_btf {
2436 	struct btf *btf;
2437 	struct module *module;
2438 	u16 offset;
2439 };
2440 
2441 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab {
2442 	/* Sorted by func_id (BTF ID) and offset (fd_array offset) during
2443 	 * verification. JITs do lookups by bpf_insn, where func_id may not be
2444 	 * available, therefore at the end of verification do_misc_fixups()
2445 	 * sorts this by imm and offset.
2446 	 */
2447 	struct bpf_kfunc_desc descs[MAX_KFUNC_DESCS];
2448 	u32 nr_descs;
2449 };
2450 
2451 struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab {
2452 	struct bpf_kfunc_btf descs[MAX_KFUNC_BTFS];
2453 	u32 nr_descs;
2454 };
2455 
2456 static int kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id_off(const void *a, const void *b)
2457 {
2458 	const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d0 = a;
2459 	const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d1 = b;
2460 
2461 	/* func_id is not greater than BTF_MAX_TYPE */
2462 	return d0->func_id - d1->func_id ?: d0->offset - d1->offset;
2463 }
2464 
2465 static int kfunc_btf_cmp_by_off(const void *a, const void *b)
2466 {
2467 	const struct bpf_kfunc_btf *d0 = a;
2468 	const struct bpf_kfunc_btf *d1 = b;
2469 
2470 	return d0->offset - d1->offset;
2471 }
2472 
2473 static const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *
2474 find_kfunc_desc(const struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 func_id, u16 offset)
2475 {
2476 	struct bpf_kfunc_desc desc = {
2477 		.func_id = func_id,
2478 		.offset = offset,
2479 	};
2480 	struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab;
2481 
2482 	tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab;
2483 	return bsearch(&desc, tab->descs, tab->nr_descs,
2484 		       sizeof(tab->descs[0]), kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id_off);
2485 }
2486 
2487 int bpf_get_kfunc_addr(const struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 func_id,
2488 		       u16 btf_fd_idx, u8 **func_addr)
2489 {
2490 	const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc;
2491 
2492 	desc = find_kfunc_desc(prog, func_id, btf_fd_idx);
2493 	if (!desc)
2494 		return -EFAULT;
2495 
2496 	*func_addr = (u8 *)desc->addr;
2497 	return 0;
2498 }
2499 
2500 static struct btf *__find_kfunc_desc_btf(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
2501 					 s16 offset)
2502 {
2503 	struct bpf_kfunc_btf kf_btf = { .offset = offset };
2504 	struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab *tab;
2505 	struct bpf_kfunc_btf *b;
2506 	struct module *mod;
2507 	struct btf *btf;
2508 	int btf_fd;
2509 
2510 	tab = env->prog->aux->kfunc_btf_tab;
2511 	b = bsearch(&kf_btf, tab->descs, tab->nr_descs,
2512 		    sizeof(tab->descs[0]), kfunc_btf_cmp_by_off);
2513 	if (!b) {
2514 		if (tab->nr_descs == MAX_KFUNC_BTFS) {
2515 			verbose(env, "too many different module BTFs\n");
2516 			return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG);
2517 		}
2518 
2519 		if (bpfptr_is_null(env->fd_array)) {
2520 			verbose(env, "kfunc offset > 0 without fd_array is invalid\n");
2521 			return ERR_PTR(-EPROTO);
2522 		}
2523 
2524 		if (copy_from_bpfptr_offset(&btf_fd, env->fd_array,
2525 					    offset * sizeof(btf_fd),
2526 					    sizeof(btf_fd)))
2527 			return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
2528 
2529 		btf = btf_get_by_fd(btf_fd);
2530 		if (IS_ERR(btf)) {
2531 			verbose(env, "invalid module BTF fd specified\n");
2532 			return btf;
2533 		}
2534 
2535 		if (!btf_is_module(btf)) {
2536 			verbose(env, "BTF fd for kfunc is not a module BTF\n");
2537 			btf_put(btf);
2538 			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
2539 		}
2540 
2541 		mod = btf_try_get_module(btf);
2542 		if (!mod) {
2543 			btf_put(btf);
2544 			return ERR_PTR(-ENXIO);
2545 		}
2546 
2547 		b = &tab->descs[tab->nr_descs++];
2548 		b->btf = btf;
2549 		b->module = mod;
2550 		b->offset = offset;
2551 
2552 		sort(tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, sizeof(tab->descs[0]),
2553 		     kfunc_btf_cmp_by_off, NULL);
2554 	}
2555 	return b->btf;
2556 }
2557 
2558 void bpf_free_kfunc_btf_tab(struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab *tab)
2559 {
2560 	if (!tab)
2561 		return;
2562 
2563 	while (tab->nr_descs--) {
2564 		module_put(tab->descs[tab->nr_descs].module);
2565 		btf_put(tab->descs[tab->nr_descs].btf);
2566 	}
2567 	kfree(tab);
2568 }
2569 
2570 static struct btf *find_kfunc_desc_btf(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, s16 offset)
2571 {
2572 	if (offset) {
2573 		if (offset < 0) {
2574 			/* In the future, this can be allowed to increase limit
2575 			 * of fd index into fd_array, interpreted as u16.
2576 			 */
2577 			verbose(env, "negative offset disallowed for kernel module function call\n");
2578 			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
2579 		}
2580 
2581 		return __find_kfunc_desc_btf(env, offset);
2582 	}
2583 	return btf_vmlinux ?: ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
2584 }
2585 
2586 static int add_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 func_id, s16 offset)
2587 {
2588 	const struct btf_type *func, *func_proto;
2589 	struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab *btf_tab;
2590 	struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab;
2591 	struct bpf_prog_aux *prog_aux;
2592 	struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc;
2593 	const char *func_name;
2594 	struct btf *desc_btf;
2595 	unsigned long call_imm;
2596 	unsigned long addr;
2597 	int err;
2598 
2599 	prog_aux = env->prog->aux;
2600 	tab = prog_aux->kfunc_tab;
2601 	btf_tab = prog_aux->kfunc_btf_tab;
2602 	if (!tab) {
2603 		if (!btf_vmlinux) {
2604 			verbose(env, "calling kernel function is not supported without CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF\n");
2605 			return -ENOTSUPP;
2606 		}
2607 
2608 		if (!env->prog->jit_requested) {
2609 			verbose(env, "JIT is required for calling kernel function\n");
2610 			return -ENOTSUPP;
2611 		}
2612 
2613 		if (!bpf_jit_supports_kfunc_call()) {
2614 			verbose(env, "JIT does not support calling kernel function\n");
2615 			return -ENOTSUPP;
2616 		}
2617 
2618 		if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible) {
2619 			verbose(env, "cannot call kernel function from non-GPL compatible program\n");
2620 			return -EINVAL;
2621 		}
2622 
2623 		tab = kzalloc(sizeof(*tab), GFP_KERNEL);
2624 		if (!tab)
2625 			return -ENOMEM;
2626 		prog_aux->kfunc_tab = tab;
2627 	}
2628 
2629 	/* func_id == 0 is always invalid, but instead of returning an error, be
2630 	 * conservative and wait until the code elimination pass before returning
2631 	 * error, so that invalid calls that get pruned out can be in BPF programs
2632 	 * loaded from userspace.  It is also required that offset be untouched
2633 	 * for such calls.
2634 	 */
2635 	if (!func_id && !offset)
2636 		return 0;
2637 
2638 	if (!btf_tab && offset) {
2639 		btf_tab = kzalloc(sizeof(*btf_tab), GFP_KERNEL);
2640 		if (!btf_tab)
2641 			return -ENOMEM;
2642 		prog_aux->kfunc_btf_tab = btf_tab;
2643 	}
2644 
2645 	desc_btf = find_kfunc_desc_btf(env, offset);
2646 	if (IS_ERR(desc_btf)) {
2647 		verbose(env, "failed to find BTF for kernel function\n");
2648 		return PTR_ERR(desc_btf);
2649 	}
2650 
2651 	if (find_kfunc_desc(env->prog, func_id, offset))
2652 		return 0;
2653 
2654 	if (tab->nr_descs == MAX_KFUNC_DESCS) {
2655 		verbose(env, "too many different kernel function calls\n");
2656 		return -E2BIG;
2657 	}
2658 
2659 	func = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, func_id);
2660 	if (!func || !btf_type_is_func(func)) {
2661 		verbose(env, "kernel btf_id %u is not a function\n",
2662 			func_id);
2663 		return -EINVAL;
2664 	}
2665 	func_proto = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, func->type);
2666 	if (!func_proto || !btf_type_is_func_proto(func_proto)) {
2667 		verbose(env, "kernel function btf_id %u does not have a valid func_proto\n",
2668 			func_id);
2669 		return -EINVAL;
2670 	}
2671 
2672 	func_name = btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf, func->name_off);
2673 	addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(func_name);
2674 	if (!addr) {
2675 		verbose(env, "cannot find address for kernel function %s\n",
2676 			func_name);
2677 		return -EINVAL;
2678 	}
2679 	specialize_kfunc(env, func_id, offset, &addr);
2680 
2681 	if (bpf_jit_supports_far_kfunc_call()) {
2682 		call_imm = func_id;
2683 	} else {
2684 		call_imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(addr);
2685 		/* Check whether the relative offset overflows desc->imm */
2686 		if ((unsigned long)(s32)call_imm != call_imm) {
2687 			verbose(env, "address of kernel function %s is out of range\n",
2688 				func_name);
2689 			return -EINVAL;
2690 		}
2691 	}
2692 
2693 	if (bpf_dev_bound_kfunc_id(func_id)) {
2694 		err = bpf_dev_bound_kfunc_check(&env->log, prog_aux);
2695 		if (err)
2696 			return err;
2697 	}
2698 
2699 	desc = &tab->descs[tab->nr_descs++];
2700 	desc->func_id = func_id;
2701 	desc->imm = call_imm;
2702 	desc->offset = offset;
2703 	desc->addr = addr;
2704 	err = btf_distill_func_proto(&env->log, desc_btf,
2705 				     func_proto, func_name,
2706 				     &desc->func_model);
2707 	if (!err)
2708 		sort(tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, sizeof(tab->descs[0]),
2709 		     kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id_off, NULL);
2710 	return err;
2711 }
2712 
2713 static int kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm_off(const void *a, const void *b)
2714 {
2715 	const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d0 = a;
2716 	const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d1 = b;
2717 
2718 	if (d0->imm != d1->imm)
2719 		return d0->imm < d1->imm ? -1 : 1;
2720 	if (d0->offset != d1->offset)
2721 		return d0->offset < d1->offset ? -1 : 1;
2722 	return 0;
2723 }
2724 
2725 static void sort_kfunc_descs_by_imm_off(struct bpf_prog *prog)
2726 {
2727 	struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab;
2728 
2729 	tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab;
2730 	if (!tab)
2731 		return;
2732 
2733 	sort(tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, sizeof(tab->descs[0]),
2734 	     kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm_off, NULL);
2735 }
2736 
2737 bool bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call(const struct bpf_prog *prog)
2738 {
2739 	return !!prog->aux->kfunc_tab;
2740 }
2741 
2742 const struct btf_func_model *
2743 bpf_jit_find_kfunc_model(const struct bpf_prog *prog,
2744 			 const struct bpf_insn *insn)
2745 {
2746 	const struct bpf_kfunc_desc desc = {
2747 		.imm = insn->imm,
2748 		.offset = insn->off,
2749 	};
2750 	const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *res;
2751 	struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab;
2752 
2753 	tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab;
2754 	res = bsearch(&desc, tab->descs, tab->nr_descs,
2755 		      sizeof(tab->descs[0]), kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm_off);
2756 
2757 	return res ? &res->func_model : NULL;
2758 }
2759 
2760 static int add_subprog_and_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
2761 {
2762 	struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info;
2763 	struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
2764 	int i, ret, insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
2765 
2766 	/* Add entry function. */
2767 	ret = add_subprog(env, 0);
2768 	if (ret)
2769 		return ret;
2770 
2771 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
2772 		if (!bpf_pseudo_func(insn) && !bpf_pseudo_call(insn) &&
2773 		    !bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn))
2774 			continue;
2775 
2776 		if (!env->bpf_capable) {
2777 			verbose(env, "loading/calling other bpf or kernel functions are allowed for CAP_BPF and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n");
2778 			return -EPERM;
2779 		}
2780 
2781 		if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn) || bpf_pseudo_call(insn))
2782 			ret = add_subprog(env, i + insn->imm + 1);
2783 		else
2784 			ret = add_kfunc_call(env, insn->imm, insn->off);
2785 
2786 		if (ret < 0)
2787 			return ret;
2788 	}
2789 
2790 	/* Add a fake 'exit' subprog which could simplify subprog iteration
2791 	 * logic. 'subprog_cnt' should not be increased.
2792 	 */
2793 	subprog[env->subprog_cnt].start = insn_cnt;
2794 
2795 	if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2)
2796 		for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++)
2797 			verbose(env, "func#%d @%d\n", i, subprog[i].start);
2798 
2799 	return 0;
2800 }
2801 
2802 static int check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
2803 {
2804 	int i, subprog_start, subprog_end, off, cur_subprog = 0;
2805 	struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info;
2806 	struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
2807 	int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
2808 
2809 	/* now check that all jumps are within the same subprog */
2810 	subprog_start = subprog[cur_subprog].start;
2811 	subprog_end = subprog[cur_subprog + 1].start;
2812 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) {
2813 		u8 code = insn[i].code;
2814 
2815 		if (code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) &&
2816 		    insn[i].src_reg == 0 &&
2817 		    insn[i].imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call)
2818 			subprog[cur_subprog].has_tail_call = true;
2819 		if (BPF_CLASS(code) == BPF_LD &&
2820 		    (BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_ABS || BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_IND))
2821 			subprog[cur_subprog].has_ld_abs = true;
2822 		if (BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP && BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP32)
2823 			goto next;
2824 		if (BPF_OP(code) == BPF_EXIT || BPF_OP(code) == BPF_CALL)
2825 			goto next;
2826 		off = i + insn[i].off + 1;
2827 		if (off < subprog_start || off >= subprog_end) {
2828 			verbose(env, "jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", i, off);
2829 			return -EINVAL;
2830 		}
2831 next:
2832 		if (i == subprog_end - 1) {
2833 			/* to avoid fall-through from one subprog into another
2834 			 * the last insn of the subprog should be either exit
2835 			 * or unconditional jump back
2836 			 */
2837 			if (code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT) &&
2838 			    code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_JA)) {
2839 				verbose(env, "last insn is not an exit or jmp\n");
2840 				return -EINVAL;
2841 			}
2842 			subprog_start = subprog_end;
2843 			cur_subprog++;
2844 			if (cur_subprog < env->subprog_cnt)
2845 				subprog_end = subprog[cur_subprog + 1].start;
2846 		}
2847 	}
2848 	return 0;
2849 }
2850 
2851 /* Parentage chain of this register (or stack slot) should take care of all
2852  * issues like callee-saved registers, stack slot allocation time, etc.
2853  */
2854 static int mark_reg_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
2855 			 const struct bpf_reg_state *state,
2856 			 struct bpf_reg_state *parent, u8 flag)
2857 {
2858 	bool writes = parent == state->parent; /* Observe write marks */
2859 	int cnt = 0;
2860 
2861 	while (parent) {
2862 		/* if read wasn't screened by an earlier write ... */
2863 		if (writes && state->live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN)
2864 			break;
2865 		if (parent->live & REG_LIVE_DONE) {
2866 			verbose(env, "verifier BUG type %s var_off %lld off %d\n",
2867 				reg_type_str(env, parent->type),
2868 				parent->var_off.value, parent->off);
2869 			return -EFAULT;
2870 		}
2871 		/* The first condition is more likely to be true than the
2872 		 * second, checked it first.
2873 		 */
2874 		if ((parent->live & REG_LIVE_READ) == flag ||
2875 		    parent->live & REG_LIVE_READ64)
2876 			/* The parentage chain never changes and
2877 			 * this parent was already marked as LIVE_READ.
2878 			 * There is no need to keep walking the chain again and
2879 			 * keep re-marking all parents as LIVE_READ.
2880 			 * This case happens when the same register is read
2881 			 * multiple times without writes into it in-between.
2882 			 * Also, if parent has the stronger REG_LIVE_READ64 set,
2883 			 * then no need to set the weak REG_LIVE_READ32.
2884 			 */
2885 			break;
2886 		/* ... then we depend on parent's value */
2887 		parent->live |= flag;
2888 		/* REG_LIVE_READ64 overrides REG_LIVE_READ32. */
2889 		if (flag == REG_LIVE_READ64)
2890 			parent->live &= ~REG_LIVE_READ32;
2891 		state = parent;
2892 		parent = state->parent;
2893 		writes = true;
2894 		cnt++;
2895 	}
2896 
2897 	if (env->longest_mark_read_walk < cnt)
2898 		env->longest_mark_read_walk = cnt;
2899 	return 0;
2900 }
2901 
2902 static int mark_dynptr_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2903 {
2904 	struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
2905 	int spi, ret;
2906 
2907 	/* For CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, it must have already been done by
2908 	 * check_reg_arg in check_helper_call and mark_btf_func_reg_size in
2909 	 * check_kfunc_call.
2910 	 */
2911 	if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR)
2912 		return 0;
2913 	spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg);
2914 	if (spi < 0)
2915 		return spi;
2916 	/* Caller ensures dynptr is valid and initialized, which means spi is in
2917 	 * bounds and spi is the first dynptr slot. Simply mark stack slot as
2918 	 * read.
2919 	 */
2920 	ret = mark_reg_read(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr,
2921 			    state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.parent, REG_LIVE_READ64);
2922 	if (ret)
2923 		return ret;
2924 	return mark_reg_read(env, &state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr,
2925 			     state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.parent, REG_LIVE_READ64);
2926 }
2927 
2928 static int mark_iter_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
2929 			  int spi, int nr_slots)
2930 {
2931 	struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
2932 	int err, i;
2933 
2934 	for (i = 0; i < nr_slots; i++) {
2935 		struct bpf_reg_state *st = &state->stack[spi - i].spilled_ptr;
2936 
2937 		err = mark_reg_read(env, st, st->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64);
2938 		if (err)
2939 			return err;
2940 
2941 		mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi - i);
2942 	}
2943 
2944 	return 0;
2945 }
2946 
2947 /* This function is supposed to be used by the following 32-bit optimization
2948  * code only. It returns TRUE if the source or destination register operates
2949  * on 64-bit, otherwise return FALSE.
2950  */
2951 static bool is_reg64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
2952 		     u32 regno, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, enum reg_arg_type t)
2953 {
2954 	u8 code, class, op;
2955 
2956 	code = insn->code;
2957 	class = BPF_CLASS(code);
2958 	op = BPF_OP(code);
2959 	if (class == BPF_JMP) {
2960 		/* BPF_EXIT for "main" will reach here. Return TRUE
2961 		 * conservatively.
2962 		 */
2963 		if (op == BPF_EXIT)
2964 			return true;
2965 		if (op == BPF_CALL) {
2966 			/* BPF to BPF call will reach here because of marking
2967 			 * caller saved clobber with DST_OP_NO_MARK for which we
2968 			 * don't care the register def because they are anyway
2969 			 * marked as NOT_INIT already.
2970 			 */
2971 			if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
2972 				return false;
2973 			/* Helper call will reach here because of arg type
2974 			 * check, conservatively return TRUE.
2975 			 */
2976 			if (t == SRC_OP)
2977 				return true;
2978 
2979 			return false;
2980 		}
2981 	}
2982 
2983 	if (class == BPF_ALU64 || class == BPF_JMP ||
2984 	    /* BPF_END always use BPF_ALU class. */
2985 	    (class == BPF_ALU && op == BPF_END && insn->imm == 64))
2986 		return true;
2987 
2988 	if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_JMP32)
2989 		return false;
2990 
2991 	if (class == BPF_LDX) {
2992 		if (t != SRC_OP)
2993 			return BPF_SIZE(code) == BPF_DW;
2994 		/* LDX source must be ptr. */
2995 		return true;
2996 	}
2997 
2998 	if (class == BPF_STX) {
2999 		/* BPF_STX (including atomic variants) has multiple source
3000 		 * operands, one of which is a ptr. Check whether the caller is
3001 		 * asking about it.
3002 		 */
3003 		if (t == SRC_OP && reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE)
3004 			return true;
3005 		return BPF_SIZE(code) == BPF_DW;
3006 	}
3007 
3008 	if (class == BPF_LD) {
3009 		u8 mode = BPF_MODE(code);
3010 
3011 		/* LD_IMM64 */
3012 		if (mode == BPF_IMM)
3013 			return true;
3014 
3015 		/* Both LD_IND and LD_ABS return 32-bit data. */
3016 		if (t != SRC_OP)
3017 			return  false;
3018 
3019 		/* Implicit ctx ptr. */
3020 		if (regno == BPF_REG_6)
3021 			return true;
3022 
3023 		/* Explicit source could be any width. */
3024 		return true;
3025 	}
3026 
3027 	if (class == BPF_ST)
3028 		/* The only source register for BPF_ST is a ptr. */
3029 		return true;
3030 
3031 	/* Conservatively return true at default. */
3032 	return true;
3033 }
3034 
3035 /* Return the regno defined by the insn, or -1. */
3036 static int insn_def_regno(const struct bpf_insn *insn)
3037 {
3038 	switch (BPF_CLASS(insn->code)) {
3039 	case BPF_JMP:
3040 	case BPF_JMP32:
3041 	case BPF_ST:
3042 		return -1;
3043 	case BPF_STX:
3044 		if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC &&
3045 		    (insn->imm & BPF_FETCH)) {
3046 			if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG)
3047 				return BPF_REG_0;
3048 			else
3049 				return insn->src_reg;
3050 		} else {
3051 			return -1;
3052 		}
3053 	default:
3054 		return insn->dst_reg;
3055 	}
3056 }
3057 
3058 /* Return TRUE if INSN has defined any 32-bit value explicitly. */
3059 static bool insn_has_def32(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
3060 {
3061 	int dst_reg = insn_def_regno(insn);
3062 
3063 	if (dst_reg == -1)
3064 		return false;
3065 
3066 	return !is_reg64(env, insn, dst_reg, NULL, DST_OP);
3067 }
3068 
3069 static void mark_insn_zext(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
3070 			   struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
3071 {
3072 	s32 def_idx = reg->subreg_def;
3073 
3074 	if (def_idx == DEF_NOT_SUBREG)
3075 		return;
3076 
3077 	env->insn_aux_data[def_idx - 1].zext_dst = true;
3078 	/* The dst will be zero extended, so won't be sub-register anymore. */
3079 	reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG;
3080 }
3081 
3082 static int check_reg_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
3083 			 enum reg_arg_type t)
3084 {
3085 	struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
3086 	struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
3087 	struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi + env->insn_idx;
3088 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg, *regs = state->regs;
3089 	bool rw64;
3090 
3091 	if (regno >= MAX_BPF_REG) {
3092 		verbose(env, "R%d is invalid\n", regno);
3093 		return -EINVAL;
3094 	}
3095 
3096 	mark_reg_scratched(env, regno);
3097 
3098 	reg = &regs[regno];
3099 	rw64 = is_reg64(env, insn, regno, reg, t);
3100 	if (t == SRC_OP) {
3101 		/* check whether register used as source operand can be read */
3102 		if (reg->type == NOT_INIT) {
3103 			verbose(env, "R%d !read_ok\n", regno);
3104 			return -EACCES;
3105 		}
3106 		/* We don't need to worry about FP liveness because it's read-only */
3107 		if (regno == BPF_REG_FP)
3108 			return 0;
3109 
3110 		if (rw64)
3111 			mark_insn_zext(env, reg);
3112 
3113 		return mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent,
3114 				     rw64 ? REG_LIVE_READ64 : REG_LIVE_READ32);
3115 	} else {
3116 		/* check whether register used as dest operand can be written to */
3117 		if (regno == BPF_REG_FP) {
3118 			verbose(env, "frame pointer is read only\n");
3119 			return -EACCES;
3120 		}
3121 		reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
3122 		reg->subreg_def = rw64 ? DEF_NOT_SUBREG : env->insn_idx + 1;
3123 		if (t == DST_OP)
3124 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, regno);
3125 	}
3126 	return 0;
3127 }
3128 
3129 static void mark_jmp_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx)
3130 {
3131 	env->insn_aux_data[idx].jmp_point = true;
3132 }
3133 
3134 static bool is_jmp_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
3135 {
3136 	return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].jmp_point;
3137 }
3138 
3139 /* for any branch, call, exit record the history of jmps in the given state */
3140 static int push_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
3141 			    struct bpf_verifier_state *cur)
3142 {
3143 	u32 cnt = cur->jmp_history_cnt;
3144 	struct bpf_idx_pair *p;
3145 	size_t alloc_size;
3146 
3147 	if (!is_jmp_point(env, env->insn_idx))
3148 		return 0;
3149 
3150 	cnt++;
3151 	alloc_size = kmalloc_size_roundup(size_mul(cnt, sizeof(*p)));
3152 	p = krealloc(cur->jmp_history, alloc_size, GFP_USER);
3153 	if (!p)
3154 		return -ENOMEM;
3155 	p[cnt - 1].idx = env->insn_idx;
3156 	p[cnt - 1].prev_idx = env->prev_insn_idx;
3157 	cur->jmp_history = p;
3158 	cur->jmp_history_cnt = cnt;
3159 	return 0;
3160 }
3161 
3162 /* Backtrack one insn at a time. If idx is not at the top of recorded
3163  * history then previous instruction came from straight line execution.
3164  */
3165 static int get_prev_insn_idx(struct bpf_verifier_state *st, int i,
3166 			     u32 *history)
3167 {
3168 	u32 cnt = *history;
3169 
3170 	if (cnt && st->jmp_history[cnt - 1].idx == i) {
3171 		i = st->jmp_history[cnt - 1].prev_idx;
3172 		(*history)--;
3173 	} else {
3174 		i--;
3175 	}
3176 	return i;
3177 }
3178 
3179 static const char *disasm_kfunc_name(void *data, const struct bpf_insn *insn)
3180 {
3181 	const struct btf_type *func;
3182 	struct btf *desc_btf;
3183 
3184 	if (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL)
3185 		return NULL;
3186 
3187 	desc_btf = find_kfunc_desc_btf(data, insn->off);
3188 	if (IS_ERR(desc_btf))
3189 		return "<error>";
3190 
3191 	func = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, insn->imm);
3192 	return btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf, func->name_off);
3193 }
3194 
3195 static inline void bt_init(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame)
3196 {
3197 	bt->frame = frame;
3198 }
3199 
3200 static inline void bt_reset(struct backtrack_state *bt)
3201 {
3202 	struct bpf_verifier_env *env = bt->env;
3203 
3204 	memset(bt, 0, sizeof(*bt));
3205 	bt->env = env;
3206 }
3207 
3208 static inline u32 bt_empty(struct backtrack_state *bt)
3209 {
3210 	u64 mask = 0;
3211 	int i;
3212 
3213 	for (i = 0; i <= bt->frame; i++)
3214 		mask |= bt->reg_masks[i] | bt->stack_masks[i];
3215 
3216 	return mask == 0;
3217 }
3218 
3219 static inline int bt_subprog_enter(struct backtrack_state *bt)
3220 {
3221 	if (bt->frame == MAX_CALL_FRAMES - 1) {
3222 		verbose(bt->env, "BUG subprog enter from frame %d\n", bt->frame);
3223 		WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug");
3224 		return -EFAULT;
3225 	}
3226 	bt->frame++;
3227 	return 0;
3228 }
3229 
3230 static inline int bt_subprog_exit(struct backtrack_state *bt)
3231 {
3232 	if (bt->frame == 0) {
3233 		verbose(bt->env, "BUG subprog exit from frame 0\n");
3234 		WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug");
3235 		return -EFAULT;
3236 	}
3237 	bt->frame--;
3238 	return 0;
3239 }
3240 
3241 static inline void bt_set_frame_reg(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame, u32 reg)
3242 {
3243 	bt->reg_masks[frame] |= 1 << reg;
3244 }
3245 
3246 static inline void bt_clear_frame_reg(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame, u32 reg)
3247 {
3248 	bt->reg_masks[frame] &= ~(1 << reg);
3249 }
3250 
3251 static inline void bt_set_reg(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 reg)
3252 {
3253 	bt_set_frame_reg(bt, bt->frame, reg);
3254 }
3255 
3256 static inline void bt_clear_reg(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 reg)
3257 {
3258 	bt_clear_frame_reg(bt, bt->frame, reg);
3259 }
3260 
3261 static inline void bt_set_frame_slot(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame, u32 slot)
3262 {
3263 	bt->stack_masks[frame] |= 1ull << slot;
3264 }
3265 
3266 static inline void bt_clear_frame_slot(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame, u32 slot)
3267 {
3268 	bt->stack_masks[frame] &= ~(1ull << slot);
3269 }
3270 
3271 static inline void bt_set_slot(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 slot)
3272 {
3273 	bt_set_frame_slot(bt, bt->frame, slot);
3274 }
3275 
3276 static inline void bt_clear_slot(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 slot)
3277 {
3278 	bt_clear_frame_slot(bt, bt->frame, slot);
3279 }
3280 
3281 static inline u32 bt_frame_reg_mask(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame)
3282 {
3283 	return bt->reg_masks[frame];
3284 }
3285 
3286 static inline u32 bt_reg_mask(struct backtrack_state *bt)
3287 {
3288 	return bt->reg_masks[bt->frame];
3289 }
3290 
3291 static inline u64 bt_frame_stack_mask(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame)
3292 {
3293 	return bt->stack_masks[frame];
3294 }
3295 
3296 static inline u64 bt_stack_mask(struct backtrack_state *bt)
3297 {
3298 	return bt->stack_masks[bt->frame];
3299 }
3300 
3301 static inline bool bt_is_reg_set(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 reg)
3302 {
3303 	return bt->reg_masks[bt->frame] & (1 << reg);
3304 }
3305 
3306 static inline bool bt_is_slot_set(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 slot)
3307 {
3308 	return bt->stack_masks[bt->frame] & (1ull << slot);
3309 }
3310 
3311 /* format registers bitmask, e.g., "r0,r2,r4" for 0x15 mask */
3312 static void fmt_reg_mask(char *buf, ssize_t buf_sz, u32 reg_mask)
3313 {
3314 	DECLARE_BITMAP(mask, 64);
3315 	bool first = true;
3316 	int i, n;
3317 
3318 	buf[0] = '\0';
3319 
3320 	bitmap_from_u64(mask, reg_mask);
3321 	for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) {
3322 		n = snprintf(buf, buf_sz, "%sr%d", first ? "" : ",", i);
3323 		first = false;
3324 		buf += n;
3325 		buf_sz -= n;
3326 		if (buf_sz < 0)
3327 			break;
3328 	}
3329 }
3330 /* format stack slots bitmask, e.g., "-8,-24,-40" for 0x15 mask */
3331 static void fmt_stack_mask(char *buf, ssize_t buf_sz, u64 stack_mask)
3332 {
3333 	DECLARE_BITMAP(mask, 64);
3334 	bool first = true;
3335 	int i, n;
3336 
3337 	buf[0] = '\0';
3338 
3339 	bitmap_from_u64(mask, stack_mask);
3340 	for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 64) {
3341 		n = snprintf(buf, buf_sz, "%s%d", first ? "" : ",", -(i + 1) * 8);
3342 		first = false;
3343 		buf += n;
3344 		buf_sz -= n;
3345 		if (buf_sz < 0)
3346 			break;
3347 	}
3348 }
3349 
3350 /* For given verifier state backtrack_insn() is called from the last insn to
3351  * the first insn. Its purpose is to compute a bitmask of registers and
3352  * stack slots that needs precision in the parent verifier state.
3353  */
3354 static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx,
3355 			  struct backtrack_state *bt)
3356 {
3357 	const struct bpf_insn_cbs cbs = {
3358 		.cb_call	= disasm_kfunc_name,
3359 		.cb_print	= verbose,
3360 		.private_data	= env,
3361 	};
3362 	struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi + idx;
3363 	u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
3364 	u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
3365 	u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code);
3366 	u32 dreg = insn->dst_reg;
3367 	u32 sreg = insn->src_reg;
3368 	u32 spi;
3369 
3370 	if (insn->code == 0)
3371 		return 0;
3372 	if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) {
3373 		fmt_reg_mask(env->tmp_str_buf, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN, bt_reg_mask(bt));
3374 		verbose(env, "mark_precise: frame%d: regs=%s ",
3375 			bt->frame, env->tmp_str_buf);
3376 		fmt_stack_mask(env->tmp_str_buf, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN, bt_stack_mask(bt));
3377 		verbose(env, "stack=%s before ", env->tmp_str_buf);
3378 		verbose(env, "%d: ", idx);
3379 		print_bpf_insn(&cbs, insn, env->allow_ptr_leaks);
3380 	}
3381 
3382 	if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
3383 		if (!bt_is_reg_set(bt, dreg))
3384 			return 0;
3385 		if (opcode == BPF_MOV) {
3386 			if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
3387 				/* dreg = sreg
3388 				 * dreg needs precision after this insn
3389 				 * sreg needs precision before this insn
3390 				 */
3391 				bt_clear_reg(bt, dreg);
3392 				bt_set_reg(bt, sreg);
3393 			} else {
3394 				/* dreg = K
3395 				 * dreg needs precision after this insn.
3396 				 * Corresponding register is already marked
3397 				 * as precise=true in this verifier state.
3398 				 * No further markings in parent are necessary
3399 				 */
3400 				bt_clear_reg(bt, dreg);
3401 			}
3402 		} else {
3403 			if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
3404 				/* dreg += sreg
3405 				 * both dreg and sreg need precision
3406 				 * before this insn
3407 				 */
3408 				bt_set_reg(bt, sreg);
3409 			} /* else dreg += K
3410 			   * dreg still needs precision before this insn
3411 			   */
3412 		}
3413 	} else if (class == BPF_LDX) {
3414 		if (!bt_is_reg_set(bt, dreg))
3415 			return 0;
3416 		bt_clear_reg(bt, dreg);
3417 
3418 		/* scalars can only be spilled into stack w/o losing precision.
3419 		 * Load from any other memory can be zero extended.
3420 		 * The desire to keep that precision is already indicated
3421 		 * by 'precise' mark in corresponding register of this state.
3422 		 * No further tracking necessary.
3423 		 */
3424 		if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_FP)
3425 			return 0;
3426 
3427 		/* dreg = *(u64 *)[fp - off] was a fill from the stack.
3428 		 * that [fp - off] slot contains scalar that needs to be
3429 		 * tracked with precision
3430 		 */
3431 		spi = (-insn->off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE;
3432 		if (spi >= 64) {
3433 			verbose(env, "BUG spi %d\n", spi);
3434 			WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug");
3435 			return -EFAULT;
3436 		}
3437 		bt_set_slot(bt, spi);
3438 	} else if (class == BPF_STX || class == BPF_ST) {
3439 		if (bt_is_reg_set(bt, dreg))
3440 			/* stx & st shouldn't be using _scalar_ dst_reg
3441 			 * to access memory. It means backtracking
3442 			 * encountered a case of pointer subtraction.
3443 			 */
3444 			return -ENOTSUPP;
3445 		/* scalars can only be spilled into stack */
3446 		if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_FP)
3447 			return 0;
3448 		spi = (-insn->off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE;
3449 		if (spi >= 64) {
3450 			verbose(env, "BUG spi %d\n", spi);
3451 			WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug");
3452 			return -EFAULT;
3453 		}
3454 		if (!bt_is_slot_set(bt, spi))
3455 			return 0;
3456 		bt_clear_slot(bt, spi);
3457 		if (class == BPF_STX)
3458 			bt_set_reg(bt, sreg);
3459 	} else if (class == BPF_JMP || class == BPF_JMP32) {
3460 		if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
3461 			if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
3462 				return -ENOTSUPP;
3463 			/* BPF helpers that invoke callback subprogs are
3464 			 * equivalent to BPF_PSEUDO_CALL above
3465 			 */
3466 			if (insn->src_reg == 0 && is_callback_calling_function(insn->imm))
3467 				return -ENOTSUPP;
3468 			/* kfunc with imm==0 is invalid and fixup_kfunc_call will
3469 			 * catch this error later. Make backtracking conservative
3470 			 * with ENOTSUPP.
3471 			 */
3472 			if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL && insn->imm == 0)
3473 				return -ENOTSUPP;
3474 			/* regular helper call sets R0 */
3475 			bt_clear_reg(bt, BPF_REG_0);
3476 			if (bt_reg_mask(bt) & BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) {
3477 				/* if backtracing was looking for registers R1-R5
3478 				 * they should have been found already.
3479 				 */
3480 				verbose(env, "BUG regs %x\n", bt_reg_mask(bt));
3481 				WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug");
3482 				return -EFAULT;
3483 			}
3484 		} else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) {
3485 			return -ENOTSUPP;
3486 		} else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
3487 			if (!bt_is_reg_set(bt, dreg) && !bt_is_reg_set(bt, sreg))
3488 				return 0;
3489 			/* dreg <cond> sreg
3490 			 * Both dreg and sreg need precision before
3491 			 * this insn. If only sreg was marked precise
3492 			 * before it would be equally necessary to
3493 			 * propagate it to dreg.
3494 			 */
3495 			bt_set_reg(bt, dreg);
3496 			bt_set_reg(bt, sreg);
3497 			 /* else dreg <cond> K
3498 			  * Only dreg still needs precision before
3499 			  * this insn, so for the K-based conditional
3500 			  * there is nothing new to be marked.
3501 			  */
3502 		}
3503 	} else if (class == BPF_LD) {
3504 		if (!bt_is_reg_set(bt, dreg))
3505 			return 0;
3506 		bt_clear_reg(bt, dreg);
3507 		/* It's ld_imm64 or ld_abs or ld_ind.
3508 		 * For ld_imm64 no further tracking of precision
3509 		 * into parent is necessary
3510 		 */
3511 		if (mode == BPF_IND || mode == BPF_ABS)
3512 			/* to be analyzed */
3513 			return -ENOTSUPP;
3514 	}
3515 	return 0;
3516 }
3517 
3518 /* the scalar precision tracking algorithm:
3519  * . at the start all registers have precise=false.
3520  * . scalar ranges are tracked as normal through alu and jmp insns.
3521  * . once precise value of the scalar register is used in:
3522  *   .  ptr + scalar alu
3523  *   . if (scalar cond K|scalar)
3524  *   .  helper_call(.., scalar, ...) where ARG_CONST is expected
3525  *   backtrack through the verifier states and mark all registers and
3526  *   stack slots with spilled constants that these scalar regisers
3527  *   should be precise.
3528  * . during state pruning two registers (or spilled stack slots)
3529  *   are equivalent if both are not precise.
3530  *
3531  * Note the verifier cannot simply walk register parentage chain,
3532  * since many different registers and stack slots could have been
3533  * used to compute single precise scalar.
3534  *
3535  * The approach of starting with precise=true for all registers and then
3536  * backtrack to mark a register as not precise when the verifier detects
3537  * that program doesn't care about specific value (e.g., when helper
3538  * takes register as ARG_ANYTHING parameter) is not safe.
3539  *
3540  * It's ok to walk single parentage chain of the verifier states.
3541  * It's possible that this backtracking will go all the way till 1st insn.
3542  * All other branches will be explored for needing precision later.
3543  *
3544  * The backtracking needs to deal with cases like:
3545  *   R8=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=1952,imm=0) R9_w=map_value(id=0,off=40,ks=4,vs=1952,imm=0)
3546  * r9 -= r8
3547  * r5 = r9
3548  * if r5 > 0x79f goto pc+7
3549  *    R5_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=1951,var_off=(0x0; 0x7ff))
3550  * r5 += 1
3551  * ...
3552  * call bpf_perf_event_output#25
3553  *   where .arg5_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO
3554  *
3555  * and this case:
3556  * r6 = 1
3557  * call foo // uses callee's r6 inside to compute r0
3558  * r0 += r6
3559  * if r0 == 0 goto
3560  *
3561  * to track above reg_mask/stack_mask needs to be independent for each frame.
3562  *
3563  * Also if parent's curframe > frame where backtracking started,
3564  * the verifier need to mark registers in both frames, otherwise callees
3565  * may incorrectly prune callers. This is similar to
3566  * commit 7640ead93924 ("bpf: verifier: make sure callees don't prune with caller differences")
3567  *
3568  * For now backtracking falls back into conservative marking.
3569  */
3570 static void mark_all_scalars_precise(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
3571 				     struct bpf_verifier_state *st)
3572 {
3573 	struct bpf_func_state *func;
3574 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
3575 	int i, j;
3576 
3577 	if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) {
3578 		verbose(env, "mark_precise: frame%d: falling back to forcing all scalars precise\n",
3579 			st->curframe);
3580 	}
3581 
3582 	/* big hammer: mark all scalars precise in this path.
3583 	 * pop_stack may still get !precise scalars.
3584 	 * We also skip current state and go straight to first parent state,
3585 	 * because precision markings in current non-checkpointed state are
3586 	 * not needed. See why in the comment in __mark_chain_precision below.
3587 	 */
3588 	for (st = st->parent; st; st = st->parent) {
3589 		for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) {
3590 			func = st->frame[i];
3591 			for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_FP; j++) {
3592 				reg = &func->regs[j];
3593 				if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || reg->precise)
3594 					continue;
3595 				reg->precise = true;
3596 				if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) {
3597 					verbose(env, "force_precise: frame%d: forcing r%d to be precise\n",
3598 						i, j);
3599 				}
3600 			}
3601 			for (j = 0; j < func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) {
3602 				if (!is_spilled_reg(&func->stack[j]))
3603 					continue;
3604 				reg = &func->stack[j].spilled_ptr;
3605 				if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || reg->precise)
3606 					continue;
3607 				reg->precise = true;
3608 				if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) {
3609 					verbose(env, "force_precise: frame%d: forcing fp%d to be precise\n",
3610 						i, -(j + 1) * 8);
3611 				}
3612 			}
3613 		}
3614 	}
3615 }
3616 
3617 static void mark_all_scalars_imprecise(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st)
3618 {
3619 	struct bpf_func_state *func;
3620 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
3621 	int i, j;
3622 
3623 	for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) {
3624 		func = st->frame[i];
3625 		for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_FP; j++) {
3626 			reg = &func->regs[j];
3627 			if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE)
3628 				continue;
3629 			reg->precise = false;
3630 		}
3631 		for (j = 0; j < func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) {
3632 			if (!is_spilled_reg(&func->stack[j]))
3633 				continue;
3634 			reg = &func->stack[j].spilled_ptr;
3635 			if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE)
3636 				continue;
3637 			reg->precise = false;
3638 		}
3639 	}
3640 }
3641 
3642 /*
3643  * __mark_chain_precision() backtracks BPF program instruction sequence and
3644  * chain of verifier states making sure that register *regno* (if regno >= 0)
3645  * and/or stack slot *spi* (if spi >= 0) are marked as precisely tracked
3646  * SCALARS, as well as any other registers and slots that contribute to
3647  * a tracked state of given registers/stack slots, depending on specific BPF
3648  * assembly instructions (see backtrack_insns() for exact instruction handling
3649  * logic). This backtracking relies on recorded jmp_history and is able to
3650  * traverse entire chain of parent states. This process ends only when all the
3651  * necessary registers/slots and their transitive dependencies are marked as
3652  * precise.
3653  *
3654  * One important and subtle aspect is that precise marks *do not matter* in
3655  * the currently verified state (current state). It is important to understand
3656  * why this is the case.
3657  *
3658  * First, note that current state is the state that is not yet "checkpointed",
3659  * i.e., it is not yet put into env->explored_states, and it has no children
3660  * states as well. It's ephemeral, and can end up either a) being discarded if
3661  * compatible explored state is found at some point or BPF_EXIT instruction is
3662  * reached or b) checkpointed and put into env->explored_states, branching out
3663  * into one or more children states.
3664  *
3665  * In the former case, precise markings in current state are completely
3666  * ignored by state comparison code (see regsafe() for details). Only
3667  * checkpointed ("old") state precise markings are important, and if old
3668  * state's register/slot is precise, regsafe() assumes current state's
3669  * register/slot as precise and checks value ranges exactly and precisely. If
3670  * states turn out to be compatible, current state's necessary precise
3671  * markings and any required parent states' precise markings are enforced
3672  * after the fact with propagate_precision() logic, after the fact. But it's
3673  * important to realize that in this case, even after marking current state
3674  * registers/slots as precise, we immediately discard current state. So what
3675  * actually matters is any of the precise markings propagated into current
3676  * state's parent states, which are always checkpointed (due to b) case above).
3677  * As such, for scenario a) it doesn't matter if current state has precise
3678  * markings set or not.
3679  *
3680  * Now, for the scenario b), checkpointing and forking into child(ren)
3681  * state(s). Note that before current state gets to checkpointing step, any
3682  * processed instruction always assumes precise SCALAR register/slot
3683  * knowledge: if precise value or range is useful to prune jump branch, BPF
3684  * verifier takes this opportunity enthusiastically. Similarly, when
3685  * register's value is used to calculate offset or memory address, exact
3686  * knowledge of SCALAR range is assumed, checked, and enforced. So, similar to
3687  * what we mentioned above about state comparison ignoring precise markings
3688  * during state comparison, BPF verifier ignores and also assumes precise
3689  * markings *at will* during instruction verification process. But as verifier
3690  * assumes precision, it also propagates any precision dependencies across
3691  * parent states, which are not yet finalized, so can be further restricted
3692  * based on new knowledge gained from restrictions enforced by their children
3693  * states. This is so that once those parent states are finalized, i.e., when
3694  * they have no more active children state, state comparison logic in
3695  * is_state_visited() would enforce strict and precise SCALAR ranges, if
3696  * required for correctness.
3697  *
3698  * To build a bit more intuition, note also that once a state is checkpointed,
3699  * the path we took to get to that state is not important. This is crucial
3700  * property for state pruning. When state is checkpointed and finalized at
3701  * some instruction index, it can be correctly and safely used to "short
3702  * circuit" any *compatible* state that reaches exactly the same instruction
3703  * index. I.e., if we jumped to that instruction from a completely different
3704  * code path than original finalized state was derived from, it doesn't
3705  * matter, current state can be discarded because from that instruction
3706  * forward having a compatible state will ensure we will safely reach the
3707  * exit. States describe preconditions for further exploration, but completely
3708  * forget the history of how we got here.
3709  *
3710  * This also means that even if we needed precise SCALAR range to get to
3711  * finalized state, but from that point forward *that same* SCALAR register is
3712  * never used in a precise context (i.e., it's precise value is not needed for
3713  * correctness), it's correct and safe to mark such register as "imprecise"
3714  * (i.e., precise marking set to false). This is what we rely on when we do
3715  * not set precise marking in current state. If no child state requires
3716  * precision for any given SCALAR register, it's safe to dictate that it can
3717  * be imprecise. If any child state does require this register to be precise,
3718  * we'll mark it precise later retroactively during precise markings
3719  * propagation from child state to parent states.
3720  *
3721  * Skipping precise marking setting in current state is a mild version of
3722  * relying on the above observation. But we can utilize this property even
3723  * more aggressively by proactively forgetting any precise marking in the
3724  * current state (which we inherited from the parent state), right before we
3725  * checkpoint it and branch off into new child state. This is done by
3726  * mark_all_scalars_imprecise() to hopefully get more permissive and generic
3727  * finalized states which help in short circuiting more future states.
3728  */
3729 static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int frame, int regno,
3730 				  int spi)
3731 {
3732 	struct backtrack_state *bt = &env->bt;
3733 	struct bpf_verifier_state *st = env->cur_state;
3734 	int first_idx = st->first_insn_idx;
3735 	int last_idx = env->insn_idx;
3736 	struct bpf_func_state *func;
3737 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
3738 	bool skip_first = true;
3739 	int i, fr, err;
3740 
3741 	if (!env->bpf_capable)
3742 		return 0;
3743 
3744 	/* set frame number from which we are starting to backtrack */
3745 	bt_init(bt, frame);
3746 
3747 	/* Do sanity checks against current state of register and/or stack
3748 	 * slot, but don't set precise flag in current state, as precision
3749 	 * tracking in the current state is unnecessary.
3750 	 */
3751 	func = st->frame[frame];
3752 	if (regno >= 0) {
3753 		reg = &func->regs[regno];
3754 		if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
3755 			WARN_ONCE(1, "backtracing misuse");
3756 			return -EFAULT;
3757 		}
3758 		bt_set_reg(bt, regno);
3759 	}
3760 
3761 	while (spi >= 0) {
3762 		if (!is_spilled_scalar_reg(&func->stack[spi]))
3763 			break;
3764 		bt_set_slot(bt, spi);
3765 		break;
3766 	}
3767 
3768 	if (bt_empty(bt))
3769 		return 0;
3770 
3771 	for (;;) {
3772 		DECLARE_BITMAP(mask, 64);
3773 		u32 history = st->jmp_history_cnt;
3774 
3775 		if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) {
3776 			verbose(env, "mark_precise: frame%d: last_idx %d first_idx %d\n",
3777 				bt->frame, last_idx, first_idx);
3778 		}
3779 
3780 		if (last_idx < 0) {
3781 			/* we are at the entry into subprog, which
3782 			 * is expected for global funcs, but only if
3783 			 * requested precise registers are R1-R5
3784 			 * (which are global func's input arguments)
3785 			 */
3786 			if (st->curframe == 0 &&
3787 			    st->frame[0]->subprogno > 0 &&
3788 			    st->frame[0]->callsite == BPF_MAIN_FUNC &&
3789 			    bt_stack_mask(bt) == 0 &&
3790 			    (bt_reg_mask(bt) & ~BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) == 0) {
3791 				bitmap_from_u64(mask, bt_reg_mask(bt));
3792 				for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) {
3793 					reg = &st->frame[0]->regs[i];
3794 					if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
3795 						bt_clear_reg(bt, i);
3796 						continue;
3797 					}
3798 					reg->precise = true;
3799 				}
3800 				return 0;
3801 			}
3802 
3803 			verbose(env, "BUG backtracking func entry subprog %d reg_mask %x stack_mask %llx\n",
3804 				st->frame[0]->subprogno, bt_reg_mask(bt), bt_stack_mask(bt));
3805 			WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug");
3806 			return -EFAULT;
3807 		}
3808 
3809 		for (i = last_idx;;) {
3810 			if (skip_first) {
3811 				err = 0;
3812 				skip_first = false;
3813 			} else {
3814 				err = backtrack_insn(env, i, bt);
3815 			}
3816 			if (err == -ENOTSUPP) {
3817 				mark_all_scalars_precise(env, st);
3818 				bt_reset(bt);
3819 				return 0;
3820 			} else if (err) {
3821 				return err;
3822 			}
3823 			if (bt_empty(bt))
3824 				/* Found assignment(s) into tracked register in this state.
3825 				 * Since this state is already marked, just return.
3826 				 * Nothing to be tracked further in the parent state.
3827 				 */
3828 				return 0;
3829 			if (i == first_idx)
3830 				break;
3831 			i = get_prev_insn_idx(st, i, &history);
3832 			if (i >= env->prog->len) {
3833 				/* This can happen if backtracking reached insn 0
3834 				 * and there are still reg_mask or stack_mask
3835 				 * to backtrack.
3836 				 * It means the backtracking missed the spot where
3837 				 * particular register was initialized with a constant.
3838 				 */
3839 				verbose(env, "BUG backtracking idx %d\n", i);
3840 				WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug");
3841 				return -EFAULT;
3842 			}
3843 		}
3844 		st = st->parent;
3845 		if (!st)
3846 			break;
3847 
3848 		for (fr = bt->frame; fr >= 0; fr--) {
3849 			func = st->frame[fr];
3850 			bitmap_from_u64(mask, bt_frame_reg_mask(bt, fr));
3851 			for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) {
3852 				reg = &func->regs[i];
3853 				if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
3854 					bt_clear_frame_reg(bt, fr, i);
3855 					continue;
3856 				}
3857 				if (reg->precise)
3858 					bt_clear_frame_reg(bt, fr, i);
3859 				else
3860 					reg->precise = true;
3861 			}
3862 
3863 			bitmap_from_u64(mask, bt_frame_stack_mask(bt, fr));
3864 			for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 64) {
3865 				if (i >= func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE) {
3866 					/* the sequence of instructions:
3867 					 * 2: (bf) r3 = r10
3868 					 * 3: (7b) *(u64 *)(r3 -8) = r0
3869 					 * 4: (79) r4 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8)
3870 					 * doesn't contain jmps. It's backtracked
3871 					 * as a single block.
3872 					 * During backtracking insn 3 is not recognized as
3873 					 * stack access, so at the end of backtracking
3874 					 * stack slot fp-8 is still marked in stack_mask.
3875 					 * However the parent state may not have accessed
3876 					 * fp-8 and it's "unallocated" stack space.
3877 					 * In such case fallback to conservative.
3878 					 */
3879 					mark_all_scalars_precise(env, st);
3880 					bt_reset(bt);
3881 					return 0;
3882 				}
3883 
3884 				if (!is_spilled_scalar_reg(&func->stack[i])) {
3885 					bt_clear_frame_slot(bt, fr, i);
3886 					continue;
3887 				}
3888 				reg = &func->stack[i].spilled_ptr;
3889 				if (reg->precise)
3890 					bt_clear_frame_slot(bt, fr, i);
3891 				else
3892 					reg->precise = true;
3893 			}
3894 			if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) {
3895 				fmt_reg_mask(env->tmp_str_buf, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN,
3896 					     bt_frame_reg_mask(bt, fr));
3897 				verbose(env, "mark_precise: frame%d: parent state regs=%s ",
3898 					fr, env->tmp_str_buf);
3899 				fmt_stack_mask(env->tmp_str_buf, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN,
3900 					       bt_frame_stack_mask(bt, fr));
3901 				verbose(env, "stack=%s: ", env->tmp_str_buf);
3902 				print_verifier_state(env, func, true);
3903 			}
3904 		}
3905 
3906 		if (bt_empty(bt))
3907 			break;
3908 
3909 		last_idx = st->last_insn_idx;
3910 		first_idx = st->first_insn_idx;
3911 	}
3912 	return 0;
3913 }
3914 
3915 int mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
3916 {
3917 	return __mark_chain_precision(env, env->cur_state->curframe, regno, -1);
3918 }
3919 
3920 static int mark_chain_precision_frame(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int frame, int regno)
3921 {
3922 	return __mark_chain_precision(env, frame, regno, -1);
3923 }
3924 
3925 static int mark_chain_precision_stack_frame(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int frame, int spi)
3926 {
3927 	return __mark_chain_precision(env, frame, -1, spi);
3928 }
3929 
3930 static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type)
3931 {
3932 	switch (base_type(type)) {
3933 	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
3934 	case PTR_TO_STACK:
3935 	case PTR_TO_CTX:
3936 	case PTR_TO_PACKET:
3937 	case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
3938 	case PTR_TO_PACKET_END:
3939 	case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS:
3940 	case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP:
3941 	case PTR_TO_SOCKET:
3942 	case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON:
3943 	case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
3944 	case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK:
3945 	case PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
3946 	case PTR_TO_BUF:
3947 	case PTR_TO_MEM:
3948 	case PTR_TO_FUNC:
3949 	case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY:
3950 		return true;
3951 	default:
3952 		return false;
3953 	}
3954 }
3955 
3956 /* Does this register contain a constant zero? */
3957 static bool register_is_null(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
3958 {
3959 	return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0);
3960 }
3961 
3962 static bool register_is_const(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
3963 {
3964 	return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_is_const(reg->var_off);
3965 }
3966 
3967 static bool __is_scalar_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
3968 {
3969 	return tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off) &&
3970 	       reg->smin_value == S64_MIN && reg->smax_value == S64_MAX &&
3971 	       reg->umin_value == 0 && reg->umax_value == U64_MAX &&
3972 	       reg->s32_min_value == S32_MIN && reg->s32_max_value == S32_MAX &&
3973 	       reg->u32_min_value == 0 && reg->u32_max_value == U32_MAX;
3974 }
3975 
3976 static bool register_is_bounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
3977 {
3978 	return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && !__is_scalar_unbounded(reg);
3979 }
3980 
3981 static bool __is_pointer_value(bool allow_ptr_leaks,
3982 			       const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
3983 {
3984 	if (allow_ptr_leaks)
3985 		return false;
3986 
3987 	return reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE;
3988 }
3989 
3990 /* Copy src state preserving dst->parent and dst->live fields */
3991 static void copy_register_state(struct bpf_reg_state *dst, const struct bpf_reg_state *src)
3992 {
3993 	struct bpf_reg_state *parent = dst->parent;
3994 	enum bpf_reg_liveness live = dst->live;
3995 
3996 	*dst = *src;
3997 	dst->parent = parent;
3998 	dst->live = live;
3999 }
4000 
4001 static void save_register_state(struct bpf_func_state *state,
4002 				int spi, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
4003 				int size)
4004 {
4005 	int i;
4006 
4007 	copy_register_state(&state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, reg);
4008 	if (size == BPF_REG_SIZE)
4009 		state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
4010 
4011 	for (i = BPF_REG_SIZE; i > BPF_REG_SIZE - size; i--)
4012 		state->stack[spi].slot_type[i - 1] = STACK_SPILL;
4013 
4014 	/* size < 8 bytes spill */
4015 	for (; i; i--)
4016 		scrub_spilled_slot(&state->stack[spi].slot_type[i - 1]);
4017 }
4018 
4019 static bool is_bpf_st_mem(struct bpf_insn *insn)
4020 {
4021 	return BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ST && BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM;
4022 }
4023 
4024 /* check_stack_{read,write}_fixed_off functions track spill/fill of registers,
4025  * stack boundary and alignment are checked in check_mem_access()
4026  */
4027 static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
4028 				       /* stack frame we're writing to */
4029 				       struct bpf_func_state *state,
4030 				       int off, int size, int value_regno,
4031 				       int insn_idx)
4032 {
4033 	struct bpf_func_state *cur; /* state of the current function */
4034 	int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE, err;
4035 	struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx];
4036 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = NULL;
4037 	u32 dst_reg = insn->dst_reg;
4038 
4039 	err = grow_stack_state(state, round_up(slot + 1, BPF_REG_SIZE));
4040 	if (err)
4041 		return err;
4042 	/* caller checked that off % size == 0 and -MAX_BPF_STACK <= off < 0,
4043 	 * so it's aligned access and [off, off + size) are within stack limits
4044 	 */
4045 	if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks &&
4046 	    state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL &&
4047 	    size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
4048 		verbose(env, "attempt to corrupt spilled pointer on stack\n");
4049 		return -EACCES;
4050 	}
4051 
4052 	cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe];
4053 	if (value_regno >= 0)
4054 		reg = &cur->regs[value_regno];
4055 	if (!env->bypass_spec_v4) {
4056 		bool sanitize = reg && is_spillable_regtype(reg->type);
4057 
4058 		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
4059 			u8 type = state->stack[spi].slot_type[i];
4060 
4061 			if (type != STACK_MISC && type != STACK_ZERO) {
4062 				sanitize = true;
4063 				break;
4064 			}
4065 		}
4066 
4067 		if (sanitize)
4068 			env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].sanitize_stack_spill = true;
4069 	}
4070 
4071 	err = destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(env, state, spi);
4072 	if (err)
4073 		return err;
4074 
4075 	mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi);
4076 	if (reg && !(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && register_is_bounded(reg) &&
4077 	    !register_is_null(reg) && env->bpf_capable) {
4078 		if (dst_reg != BPF_REG_FP) {
4079 			/* The backtracking logic can only recognize explicit
4080 			 * stack slot address like [fp - 8]. Other spill of
4081 			 * scalar via different register has to be conservative.
4082 			 * Backtrack from here and mark all registers as precise
4083 			 * that contributed into 'reg' being a constant.
4084 			 */
4085 			err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno);
4086 			if (err)
4087 				return err;
4088 		}
4089 		save_register_state(state, spi, reg, size);
4090 	} else if (!reg && !(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && is_bpf_st_mem(insn) &&
4091 		   insn->imm != 0 && env->bpf_capable) {
4092 		struct bpf_reg_state fake_reg = {};
4093 
4094 		__mark_reg_known(&fake_reg, (u32)insn->imm);
4095 		fake_reg.type = SCALAR_VALUE;
4096 		save_register_state(state, spi, &fake_reg, size);
4097 	} else if (reg && is_spillable_regtype(reg->type)) {
4098 		/* register containing pointer is being spilled into stack */
4099 		if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
4100 			verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; ");
4101 			verbose(env, "invalid size of register spill\n");
4102 			return -EACCES;
4103 		}
4104 		if (state != cur && reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
4105 			verbose(env, "cannot spill pointers to stack into stack frame of the caller\n");
4106 			return -EINVAL;
4107 		}
4108 		save_register_state(state, spi, reg, size);
4109 	} else {
4110 		u8 type = STACK_MISC;
4111 
4112 		/* regular write of data into stack destroys any spilled ptr */
4113 		state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type = NOT_INIT;
4114 		/* Mark slots as STACK_MISC if they belonged to spilled ptr/dynptr/iter. */
4115 		if (is_stack_slot_special(&state->stack[spi]))
4116 			for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++)
4117 				scrub_spilled_slot(&state->stack[spi].slot_type[i]);
4118 
4119 		/* only mark the slot as written if all 8 bytes were written
4120 		 * otherwise read propagation may incorrectly stop too soon
4121 		 * when stack slots are partially written.
4122 		 * This heuristic means that read propagation will be
4123 		 * conservative, since it will add reg_live_read marks
4124 		 * to stack slots all the way to first state when programs
4125 		 * writes+reads less than 8 bytes
4126 		 */
4127 		if (size == BPF_REG_SIZE)
4128 			state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
4129 
4130 		/* when we zero initialize stack slots mark them as such */
4131 		if ((reg && register_is_null(reg)) ||
4132 		    (!reg && is_bpf_st_mem(insn) && insn->imm == 0)) {
4133 			/* backtracking doesn't work for STACK_ZERO yet. */
4134 			err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno);
4135 			if (err)
4136 				return err;
4137 			type = STACK_ZERO;
4138 		}
4139 
4140 		/* Mark slots affected by this stack write. */
4141 		for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
4142 			state->stack[spi].slot_type[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] =
4143 				type;
4144 	}
4145 	return 0;
4146 }
4147 
4148 /* Write the stack: 'stack[ptr_regno + off] = value_regno'. 'ptr_regno' is
4149  * known to contain a variable offset.
4150  * This function checks whether the write is permitted and conservatively
4151  * tracks the effects of the write, considering that each stack slot in the
4152  * dynamic range is potentially written to.
4153  *
4154  * 'off' includes 'regno->off'.
4155  * 'value_regno' can be -1, meaning that an unknown value is being written to
4156  * the stack.
4157  *
4158  * Spilled pointers in range are not marked as written because we don't know
4159  * what's going to be actually written. This means that read propagation for
4160  * future reads cannot be terminated by this write.
4161  *
4162  * For privileged programs, uninitialized stack slots are considered
4163  * initialized by this write (even though we don't know exactly what offsets
4164  * are going to be written to). The idea is that we don't want the verifier to
4165  * reject future reads that access slots written to through variable offsets.
4166  */
4167 static int check_stack_write_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
4168 				     /* func where register points to */
4169 				     struct bpf_func_state *state,
4170 				     int ptr_regno, int off, int size,
4171 				     int value_regno, int insn_idx)
4172 {
4173 	struct bpf_func_state *cur; /* state of the current function */
4174 	int min_off, max_off;
4175 	int i, err;
4176 	struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, *value_reg = NULL;
4177 	struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx];
4178 	bool writing_zero = false;
4179 	/* set if the fact that we're writing a zero is used to let any
4180 	 * stack slots remain STACK_ZERO
4181 	 */
4182 	bool zero_used = false;
4183 
4184 	cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe];
4185 	ptr_reg = &cur->regs[ptr_regno];
4186 	min_off = ptr_reg->smin_value + off;
4187 	max_off = ptr_reg->smax_value + off + size;
4188 	if (value_regno >= 0)
4189 		value_reg = &cur->regs[value_regno];
4190 	if ((value_reg && register_is_null(value_reg)) ||
4191 	    (!value_reg && is_bpf_st_mem(insn) && insn->imm == 0))
4192 		writing_zero = true;
4193 
4194 	err = grow_stack_state(state, round_up(-min_off, BPF_REG_SIZE));
4195 	if (err)
4196 		return err;
4197 
4198 	for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) {
4199 		int spi;
4200 
4201 		spi = __get_spi(i);
4202 		err = destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(env, state, spi);
4203 		if (err)
4204 			return err;
4205 	}
4206 
4207 	/* Variable offset writes destroy any spilled pointers in range. */
4208 	for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) {
4209 		u8 new_type, *stype;
4210 		int slot, spi;
4211 
4212 		slot = -i - 1;
4213 		spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE;
4214 		stype = &state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE];
4215 		mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi);
4216 
4217 		if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && *stype != STACK_MISC && *stype != STACK_ZERO) {
4218 			/* Reject the write if range we may write to has not
4219 			 * been initialized beforehand. If we didn't reject
4220 			 * here, the ptr status would be erased below (even
4221 			 * though not all slots are actually overwritten),
4222 			 * possibly opening the door to leaks.
4223 			 *
4224 			 * We do however catch STACK_INVALID case below, and
4225 			 * only allow reading possibly uninitialized memory
4226 			 * later for CAP_PERFMON, as the write may not happen to
4227 			 * that slot.
4228 			 */
4229 			verbose(env, "spilled ptr in range of var-offset stack write; insn %d, ptr off: %d",
4230 				insn_idx, i);
4231 			return -EINVAL;
4232 		}
4233 
4234 		/* Erase all spilled pointers. */
4235 		state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type = NOT_INIT;
4236 
4237 		/* Update the slot type. */
4238 		new_type = STACK_MISC;
4239 		if (writing_zero && *stype == STACK_ZERO) {
4240 			new_type = STACK_ZERO;
4241 			zero_used = true;
4242 		}
4243 		/* If the slot is STACK_INVALID, we check whether it's OK to
4244 		 * pretend that it will be initialized by this write. The slot
4245 		 * might not actually be written to, and so if we mark it as
4246 		 * initialized future reads might leak uninitialized memory.
4247 		 * For privileged programs, we will accept such reads to slots
4248 		 * that may or may not be written because, if we're reject
4249 		 * them, the error would be too confusing.
4250 		 */
4251 		if (*stype == STACK_INVALID && !env->allow_uninit_stack) {
4252 			verbose(env, "uninit stack in range of var-offset write prohibited for !root; insn %d, off: %d",
4253 					insn_idx, i);
4254 			return -EINVAL;
4255 		}
4256 		*stype = new_type;
4257 	}
4258 	if (zero_used) {
4259 		/* backtracking doesn't work for STACK_ZERO yet. */
4260 		err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno);
4261 		if (err)
4262 			return err;
4263 	}
4264 	return 0;
4265 }
4266 
4267 /* When register 'dst_regno' is assigned some values from stack[min_off,
4268  * max_off), we set the register's type according to the types of the
4269  * respective stack slots. If all the stack values are known to be zeros, then
4270  * so is the destination reg. Otherwise, the register is considered to be
4271  * SCALAR. This function does not deal with register filling; the caller must
4272  * ensure that all spilled registers in the stack range have been marked as
4273  * read.
4274  */
4275 static void mark_reg_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
4276 				/* func where src register points to */
4277 				struct bpf_func_state *ptr_state,
4278 				int min_off, int max_off, int dst_regno)
4279 {
4280 	struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
4281 	struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
4282 	int i, slot, spi;
4283 	u8 *stype;
4284 	int zeros = 0;
4285 
4286 	for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) {
4287 		slot = -i - 1;
4288 		spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE;
4289 		mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi);
4290 		stype = ptr_state->stack[spi].slot_type;
4291 		if (stype[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE] != STACK_ZERO)
4292 			break;
4293 		zeros++;
4294 	}
4295 	if (zeros == max_off - min_off) {
4296 		/* any access_size read into register is zero extended,
4297 		 * so the whole register == const_zero
4298 		 */
4299 		__mark_reg_const_zero(&state->regs[dst_regno]);
4300 		/* backtracking doesn't support STACK_ZERO yet,
4301 		 * so mark it precise here, so that later
4302 		 * backtracking can stop here.
4303 		 * Backtracking may not need this if this register
4304 		 * doesn't participate in pointer adjustment.
4305 		 * Forward propagation of precise flag is not
4306 		 * necessary either. This mark is only to stop
4307 		 * backtracking. Any register that contributed
4308 		 * to const 0 was marked precise before spill.
4309 		 */
4310 		state->regs[dst_regno].precise = true;
4311 	} else {
4312 		/* have read misc data from the stack */
4313 		mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, dst_regno);
4314 	}
4315 	state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
4316 }
4317 
4318 /* Read the stack at 'off' and put the results into the register indicated by
4319  * 'dst_regno'. It handles reg filling if the addressed stack slot is a
4320  * spilled reg.
4321  *
4322  * 'dst_regno' can be -1, meaning that the read value is not going to a
4323  * register.
4324  *
4325  * The access is assumed to be within the current stack bounds.
4326  */
4327 static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
4328 				      /* func where src register points to */
4329 				      struct bpf_func_state *reg_state,
4330 				      int off, int size, int dst_regno)
4331 {
4332 	struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
4333 	struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
4334 	int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE;
4335 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
4336 	u8 *stype, type;
4337 
4338 	stype = reg_state->stack[spi].slot_type;
4339 	reg = &reg_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr;
4340 
4341 	mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi);
4342 
4343 	if (is_spilled_reg(&reg_state->stack[spi])) {
4344 		u8 spill_size = 1;
4345 
4346 		for (i = BPF_REG_SIZE - 1; i > 0 && stype[i - 1] == STACK_SPILL; i--)
4347 			spill_size++;
4348 
4349 		if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE || spill_size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
4350 			if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
4351 				verbose_linfo(env, env->insn_idx, "; ");
4352 				verbose(env, "invalid size of register fill\n");
4353 				return -EACCES;
4354 			}
4355 
4356 			mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64);
4357 			if (dst_regno < 0)
4358 				return 0;
4359 
4360 			if (!(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && size == spill_size) {
4361 				/* The earlier check_reg_arg() has decided the
4362 				 * subreg_def for this insn.  Save it first.
4363 				 */
4364 				s32 subreg_def = state->regs[dst_regno].subreg_def;
4365 
4366 				copy_register_state(&state->regs[dst_regno], reg);
4367 				state->regs[dst_regno].subreg_def = subreg_def;
4368 			} else {
4369 				for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
4370 					type = stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE];
4371 					if (type == STACK_SPILL)
4372 						continue;
4373 					if (type == STACK_MISC)
4374 						continue;
4375 					if (type == STACK_INVALID && env->allow_uninit_stack)
4376 						continue;
4377 					verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
4378 						off, i, size);
4379 					return -EACCES;
4380 				}
4381 				mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, dst_regno);
4382 			}
4383 			state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
4384 			return 0;
4385 		}
4386 
4387 		if (dst_regno >= 0) {
4388 			/* restore register state from stack */
4389 			copy_register_state(&state->regs[dst_regno], reg);
4390 			/* mark reg as written since spilled pointer state likely
4391 			 * has its liveness marks cleared by is_state_visited()
4392 			 * which resets stack/reg liveness for state transitions
4393 			 */
4394 			state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
4395 		} else if (__is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, reg)) {
4396 			/* If dst_regno==-1, the caller is asking us whether
4397 			 * it is acceptable to use this value as a SCALAR_VALUE
4398 			 * (e.g. for XADD).
4399 			 * We must not allow unprivileged callers to do that
4400 			 * with spilled pointers.
4401 			 */
4402 			verbose(env, "leaking pointer from stack off %d\n",
4403 				off);
4404 			return -EACCES;
4405 		}
4406 		mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64);
4407 	} else {
4408 		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
4409 			type = stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE];
4410 			if (type == STACK_MISC)
4411 				continue;
4412 			if (type == STACK_ZERO)
4413 				continue;
4414 			if (type == STACK_INVALID && env->allow_uninit_stack)
4415 				continue;
4416 			verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
4417 				off, i, size);
4418 			return -EACCES;
4419 		}
4420 		mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64);
4421 		if (dst_regno >= 0)
4422 			mark_reg_stack_read(env, reg_state, off, off + size, dst_regno);
4423 	}
4424 	return 0;
4425 }
4426 
4427 enum bpf_access_src {
4428 	ACCESS_DIRECT = 1,  /* the access is performed by an instruction */
4429 	ACCESS_HELPER = 2,  /* the access is performed by a helper */
4430 };
4431 
4432 static int check_stack_range_initialized(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
4433 					 int regno, int off, int access_size,
4434 					 bool zero_size_allowed,
4435 					 enum bpf_access_src type,
4436 					 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta);
4437 
4438 static struct bpf_reg_state *reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
4439 {
4440 	return cur_regs(env) + regno;
4441 }
4442 
4443 /* Read the stack at 'ptr_regno + off' and put the result into the register
4444  * 'dst_regno'.
4445  * 'off' includes the pointer register's fixed offset(i.e. 'ptr_regno.off'),
4446  * but not its variable offset.
4447  * 'size' is assumed to be <= reg size and the access is assumed to be aligned.
4448  *
4449  * As opposed to check_stack_read_fixed_off, this function doesn't deal with
4450  * filling registers (i.e. reads of spilled register cannot be detected when
4451  * the offset is not fixed). We conservatively mark 'dst_regno' as containing
4452  * SCALAR_VALUE. That's why we assert that the 'ptr_regno' has a variable
4453  * offset; for a fixed offset check_stack_read_fixed_off should be used
4454  * instead.
4455  */
4456 static int check_stack_read_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
4457 				    int ptr_regno, int off, int size, int dst_regno)
4458 {
4459 	/* The state of the source register. */
4460 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno);
4461 	struct bpf_func_state *ptr_state = func(env, reg);
4462 	int err;
4463 	int min_off, max_off;
4464 
4465 	/* Note that we pass a NULL meta, so raw access will not be permitted.
4466 	 */
4467 	err = check_stack_range_initialized(env, ptr_regno, off, size,
4468 					    false, ACCESS_DIRECT, NULL);
4469 	if (err)
4470 		return err;
4471 
4472 	min_off = reg->smin_value + off;
4473 	max_off = reg->smax_value + off;
4474 	mark_reg_stack_read(env, ptr_state, min_off, max_off + size, dst_regno);
4475 	return 0;
4476 }
4477 
4478 /* check_stack_read dispatches to check_stack_read_fixed_off or
4479  * check_stack_read_var_off.
4480  *
4481  * The caller must ensure that the offset falls within the allocated stack
4482  * bounds.
4483  *
4484  * 'dst_regno' is a register which will receive the value from the stack. It
4485  * can be -1, meaning that the read value is not going to a register.
4486  */
4487 static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
4488 			    int ptr_regno, int off, int size,
4489 			    int dst_regno)
4490 {
4491 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno);
4492 	struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
4493 	int err;
4494 	/* Some accesses are only permitted with a static offset. */
4495 	bool var_off = !tnum_is_const(reg->var_off);
4496 
4497 	/* The offset is required to be static when reads don't go to a
4498 	 * register, in order to not leak pointers (see
4499 	 * check_stack_read_fixed_off).
4500 	 */
4501 	if (dst_regno < 0 && var_off) {
4502 		char tn_buf[48];
4503 
4504 		tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
4505 		verbose(env, "variable offset stack pointer cannot be passed into helper function; var_off=%s off=%d size=%d\n",
4506 			tn_buf, off, size);
4507 		return -EACCES;
4508 	}
4509 	/* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for simplicity
4510 	 * since it requires corresponding support in Spectre masking for stack
4511 	 * ALU. See also retrieve_ptr_limit(). The check in
4512 	 * check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic() called by
4513 	 * adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() prevents users from creating stack pointers
4514 	 * with variable offsets, therefore no check is required here. Further,
4515 	 * just checking it here would be insufficient as speculative stack
4516 	 * writes could still lead to unsafe speculative behaviour.
4517 	 */
4518 	if (!var_off) {
4519 		off += reg->var_off.value;
4520 		err = check_stack_read_fixed_off(env, state, off, size,
4521 						 dst_regno);
4522 	} else {
4523 		/* Variable offset stack reads need more conservative handling
4524 		 * than fixed offset ones. Note that dst_regno >= 0 on this
4525 		 * branch.
4526 		 */
4527 		err = check_stack_read_var_off(env, ptr_regno, off, size,
4528 					       dst_regno);
4529 	}
4530 	return err;
4531 }
4532 
4533 
4534 /* check_stack_write dispatches to check_stack_write_fixed_off or
4535  * check_stack_write_var_off.
4536  *
4537  * 'ptr_regno' is the register used as a pointer into the stack.
4538  * 'off' includes 'ptr_regno->off', but not its variable offset (if any).
4539  * 'value_regno' is the register whose value we're writing to the stack. It can
4540  * be -1, meaning that we're not writing from a register.
4541  *
4542  * The caller must ensure that the offset falls within the maximum stack size.
4543  */
4544 static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
4545 			     int ptr_regno, int off, int size,
4546 			     int value_regno, int insn_idx)
4547 {
4548 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno);
4549 	struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
4550 	int err;
4551 
4552 	if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
4553 		off += reg->var_off.value;
4554 		err = check_stack_write_fixed_off(env, state, off, size,
4555 						  value_regno, insn_idx);
4556 	} else {
4557 		/* Variable offset stack reads need more conservative handling
4558 		 * than fixed offset ones.
4559 		 */
4560 		err = check_stack_write_var_off(env, state,
4561 						ptr_regno, off, size,
4562 						value_regno, insn_idx);
4563 	}
4564 	return err;
4565 }
4566 
4567 static int check_map_access_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
4568 				 int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type)
4569 {
4570 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
4571 	struct bpf_map *map = regs[regno].map_ptr;
4572 	u32 cap = bpf_map_flags_to_cap(map);
4573 
4574 	if (type == BPF_WRITE && !(cap & BPF_MAP_CAN_WRITE)) {
4575 		verbose(env, "write into map forbidden, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n",
4576 			map->value_size, off, size);
4577 		return -EACCES;
4578 	}
4579 
4580 	if (type == BPF_READ && !(cap & BPF_MAP_CAN_READ)) {
4581 		verbose(env, "read from map forbidden, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n",
4582 			map->value_size, off, size);
4583 		return -EACCES;
4584 	}
4585 
4586 	return 0;
4587 }
4588 
4589 /* check read/write into memory region (e.g., map value, ringbuf sample, etc) */
4590 static int __check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
4591 			      int off, int size, u32 mem_size,
4592 			      bool zero_size_allowed)
4593 {
4594 	bool size_ok = size > 0 || (size == 0 && zero_size_allowed);
4595 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
4596 
4597 	if (off >= 0 && size_ok && (u64)off + size <= mem_size)
4598 		return 0;
4599 
4600 	reg = &cur_regs(env)[regno];
4601 	switch (reg->type) {
4602 	case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY:
4603 		verbose(env, "invalid access to map key, key_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n",
4604 			mem_size, off, size);
4605 		break;
4606 	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
4607 		verbose(env, "invalid access to map value, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n",
4608 			mem_size, off, size);
4609 		break;
4610 	case PTR_TO_PACKET:
4611 	case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
4612 	case PTR_TO_PACKET_END:
4613 		verbose(env, "invalid access to packet, off=%d size=%d, R%d(id=%d,off=%d,r=%d)\n",
4614 			off, size, regno, reg->id, off, mem_size);
4615 		break;
4616 	case PTR_TO_MEM:
4617 	default:
4618 		verbose(env, "invalid access to memory, mem_size=%u off=%d size=%d\n",
4619 			mem_size, off, size);
4620 	}
4621 
4622 	return -EACCES;
4623 }
4624 
4625 /* check read/write into a memory region with possible variable offset */
4626 static int check_mem_region_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
4627 				   int off, int size, u32 mem_size,
4628 				   bool zero_size_allowed)
4629 {
4630 	struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
4631 	struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
4632 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno];
4633 	int err;
4634 
4635 	/* We may have adjusted the register pointing to memory region, so we
4636 	 * need to try adding each of min_value and max_value to off
4637 	 * to make sure our theoretical access will be safe.
4638 	 *
4639 	 * The minimum value is only important with signed
4640 	 * comparisons where we can't assume the floor of a
4641 	 * value is 0.  If we are using signed variables for our
4642 	 * index'es we need to make sure that whatever we use
4643 	 * will have a set floor within our range.
4644 	 */
4645 	if (reg->smin_value < 0 &&
4646 	    (reg->smin_value == S64_MIN ||
4647 	     (off + reg->smin_value != (s64)(s32)(off + reg->smin_value)) ||
4648 	      reg->smin_value + off < 0)) {
4649 		verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n",
4650 			regno);
4651 		return -EACCES;
4652 	}
4653 	err = __check_mem_access(env, regno, reg->smin_value + off, size,
4654 				 mem_size, zero_size_allowed);
4655 	if (err) {
4656 		verbose(env, "R%d min value is outside of the allowed memory range\n",
4657 			regno);
4658 		return err;
4659 	}
4660 
4661 	/* If we haven't set a max value then we need to bail since we can't be
4662 	 * sure we won't do bad things.
4663 	 * If reg->umax_value + off could overflow, treat that as unbounded too.
4664 	 */
4665 	if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) {
4666 		verbose(env, "R%d unbounded memory access, make sure to bounds check any such access\n",
4667 			regno);
4668 		return -EACCES;
4669 	}
4670 	err = __check_mem_access(env, regno, reg->umax_value + off, size,
4671 				 mem_size, zero_size_allowed);
4672 	if (err) {
4673 		verbose(env, "R%d max value is outside of the allowed memory range\n",
4674 			regno);
4675 		return err;
4676 	}
4677 
4678 	return 0;
4679 }
4680 
4681 static int __check_ptr_off_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
4682 			       const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno,
4683 			       bool fixed_off_ok)
4684 {
4685 	/* Access to this pointer-typed register or passing it to a helper
4686 	 * is only allowed in its original, unmodified form.
4687 	 */
4688 
4689 	if (reg->off < 0) {
4690 		verbose(env, "negative offset %s ptr R%d off=%d disallowed\n",
4691 			reg_type_str(env, reg->type), regno, reg->off);
4692 		return -EACCES;
4693 	}
4694 
4695 	if (!fixed_off_ok && reg->off) {
4696 		verbose(env, "dereference of modified %s ptr R%d off=%d disallowed\n",
4697 			reg_type_str(env, reg->type), regno, reg->off);
4698 		return -EACCES;
4699 	}
4700 
4701 	if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) {
4702 		char tn_buf[48];
4703 
4704 		tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
4705 		verbose(env, "variable %s access var_off=%s disallowed\n",
4706 			reg_type_str(env, reg->type), tn_buf);
4707 		return -EACCES;
4708 	}
4709 
4710 	return 0;
4711 }
4712 
4713 int check_ptr_off_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
4714 		      const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno)
4715 {
4716 	return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, false);
4717 }
4718 
4719 static int map_kptr_match_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
4720 			       struct btf_field *kptr_field,
4721 			       struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno)
4722 {
4723 	const char *targ_name = btf_type_name(kptr_field->kptr.btf, kptr_field->kptr.btf_id);
4724 	int perm_flags = PTR_MAYBE_NULL | PTR_TRUSTED | MEM_RCU;
4725 	const char *reg_name = "";
4726 
4727 	/* Only unreferenced case accepts untrusted pointers */
4728 	if (kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_UNREF)
4729 		perm_flags |= PTR_UNTRUSTED;
4730 
4731 	if (base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID || (type_flag(reg->type) & ~perm_flags))
4732 		goto bad_type;
4733 
4734 	if (!btf_is_kernel(reg->btf)) {
4735 		verbose(env, "R%d must point to kernel BTF\n", regno);
4736 		return -EINVAL;
4737 	}
4738 	/* We need to verify reg->type and reg->btf, before accessing reg->btf */
4739 	reg_name = btf_type_name(reg->btf, reg->btf_id);
4740 
4741 	/* For ref_ptr case, release function check should ensure we get one
4742 	 * referenced PTR_TO_BTF_ID, and that its fixed offset is 0. For the
4743 	 * normal store of unreferenced kptr, we must ensure var_off is zero.
4744 	 * Since ref_ptr cannot be accessed directly by BPF insns, checks for
4745 	 * reg->off and reg->ref_obj_id are not needed here.
4746 	 */
4747 	if (__check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, true))
4748 		return -EACCES;
4749 
4750 	/* A full type match is needed, as BTF can be vmlinux or module BTF, and
4751 	 * we also need to take into account the reg->off.
4752 	 *
4753 	 * We want to support cases like:
4754 	 *
4755 	 * struct foo {
4756 	 *         struct bar br;
4757 	 *         struct baz bz;
4758 	 * };
4759 	 *
4760 	 * struct foo *v;
4761 	 * v = func();	      // PTR_TO_BTF_ID
4762 	 * val->foo = v;      // reg->off is zero, btf and btf_id match type
4763 	 * val->bar = &v->br; // reg->off is still zero, but we need to retry with
4764 	 *                    // first member type of struct after comparison fails
4765 	 * val->baz = &v->bz; // reg->off is non-zero, so struct needs to be walked
4766 	 *                    // to match type
4767 	 *
4768 	 * In the kptr_ref case, check_func_arg_reg_off already ensures reg->off
4769 	 * is zero. We must also ensure that btf_struct_ids_match does not walk
4770 	 * the struct to match type against first member of struct, i.e. reject
4771 	 * second case from above. Hence, when type is BPF_KPTR_REF, we set
4772 	 * strict mode to true for type match.
4773 	 */
4774 	if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg->btf, reg->btf_id, reg->off,
4775 				  kptr_field->kptr.btf, kptr_field->kptr.btf_id,
4776 				  kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_REF))
4777 		goto bad_type;
4778 	return 0;
4779 bad_type:
4780 	verbose(env, "invalid kptr access, R%d type=%s%s ", regno,
4781 		reg_type_str(env, reg->type), reg_name);
4782 	verbose(env, "expected=%s%s", reg_type_str(env, PTR_TO_BTF_ID), targ_name);
4783 	if (kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_UNREF)
4784 		verbose(env, " or %s%s\n", reg_type_str(env, PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED),
4785 			targ_name);
4786 	else
4787 		verbose(env, "\n");
4788 	return -EINVAL;
4789 }
4790 
4791 /* The non-sleepable programs and sleepable programs with explicit bpf_rcu_read_lock()
4792  * can dereference RCU protected pointers and result is PTR_TRUSTED.
4793  */
4794 static bool in_rcu_cs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
4795 {
4796 	return env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock || !env->prog->aux->sleepable;
4797 }
4798 
4799 /* Once GCC supports btf_type_tag the following mechanism will be replaced with tag check */
4800 BTF_SET_START(rcu_protected_types)
4801 BTF_ID(struct, prog_test_ref_kfunc)
4802 BTF_ID(struct, cgroup)
4803 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_cpumask)
4804 BTF_ID(struct, task_struct)
4805 BTF_SET_END(rcu_protected_types)
4806 
4807 static bool rcu_protected_object(const struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id)
4808 {
4809 	if (!btf_is_kernel(btf))
4810 		return false;
4811 	return btf_id_set_contains(&rcu_protected_types, btf_id);
4812 }
4813 
4814 static bool rcu_safe_kptr(const struct btf_field *field)
4815 {
4816 	const struct btf_field_kptr *kptr = &field->kptr;
4817 
4818 	return field->type == BPF_KPTR_REF && rcu_protected_object(kptr->btf, kptr->btf_id);
4819 }
4820 
4821 static int check_map_kptr_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
4822 				 int value_regno, int insn_idx,
4823 				 struct btf_field *kptr_field)
4824 {
4825 	struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx];
4826 	int class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
4827 	struct bpf_reg_state *val_reg;
4828 
4829 	/* Things we already checked for in check_map_access and caller:
4830 	 *  - Reject cases where variable offset may touch kptr
4831 	 *  - size of access (must be BPF_DW)
4832 	 *  - tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)
4833 	 *  - kptr_field->offset == off + reg->var_off.value
4834 	 */
4835 	/* Only BPF_[LDX,STX,ST] | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW is supported */
4836 	if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) {
4837 		verbose(env, "kptr in map can only be accessed using BPF_MEM instruction mode\n");
4838 		return -EACCES;
4839 	}
4840 
4841 	/* We only allow loading referenced kptr, since it will be marked as
4842 	 * untrusted, similar to unreferenced kptr.
4843 	 */
4844 	if (class != BPF_LDX && kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_REF) {
4845 		verbose(env, "store to referenced kptr disallowed\n");
4846 		return -EACCES;
4847 	}
4848 
4849 	if (class == BPF_LDX) {
4850 		val_reg = reg_state(env, value_regno);
4851 		/* We can simply mark the value_regno receiving the pointer
4852 		 * value from map as PTR_TO_BTF_ID, with the correct type.
4853 		 */
4854 		mark_btf_ld_reg(env, cur_regs(env), value_regno, PTR_TO_BTF_ID, kptr_field->kptr.btf,
4855 				kptr_field->kptr.btf_id,
4856 				rcu_safe_kptr(kptr_field) && in_rcu_cs(env) ?
4857 				PTR_MAYBE_NULL | MEM_RCU :
4858 				PTR_MAYBE_NULL | PTR_UNTRUSTED);
4859 		/* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg */
4860 		val_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
4861 	} else if (class == BPF_STX) {
4862 		val_reg = reg_state(env, value_regno);
4863 		if (!register_is_null(val_reg) &&
4864 		    map_kptr_match_type(env, kptr_field, val_reg, value_regno))
4865 			return -EACCES;
4866 	} else if (class == BPF_ST) {
4867 		if (insn->imm) {
4868 			verbose(env, "BPF_ST imm must be 0 when storing to kptr at off=%u\n",
4869 				kptr_field->offset);
4870 			return -EACCES;
4871 		}
4872 	} else {
4873 		verbose(env, "kptr in map can only be accessed using BPF_LDX/BPF_STX/BPF_ST\n");
4874 		return -EACCES;
4875 	}
4876 	return 0;
4877 }
4878 
4879 /* check read/write into a map element with possible variable offset */
4880 static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
4881 			    int off, int size, bool zero_size_allowed,
4882 			    enum bpf_access_src src)
4883 {
4884 	struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
4885 	struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
4886 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno];
4887 	struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr;
4888 	struct btf_record *rec;
4889 	int err, i;
4890 
4891 	err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size, map->value_size,
4892 				      zero_size_allowed);
4893 	if (err)
4894 		return err;
4895 
4896 	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(map->record))
4897 		return 0;
4898 	rec = map->record;
4899 	for (i = 0; i < rec->cnt; i++) {
4900 		struct btf_field *field = &rec->fields[i];
4901 		u32 p = field->offset;
4902 
4903 		/* If any part of a field  can be touched by load/store, reject
4904 		 * this program. To check that [x1, x2) overlaps with [y1, y2),
4905 		 * it is sufficient to check x1 < y2 && y1 < x2.
4906 		 */
4907 		if (reg->smin_value + off < p + btf_field_type_size(field->type) &&
4908 		    p < reg->umax_value + off + size) {
4909 			switch (field->type) {
4910 			case BPF_KPTR_UNREF:
4911 			case BPF_KPTR_REF:
4912 				if (src != ACCESS_DIRECT) {
4913 					verbose(env, "kptr cannot be accessed indirectly by helper\n");
4914 					return -EACCES;
4915 				}
4916 				if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
4917 					verbose(env, "kptr access cannot have variable offset\n");
4918 					return -EACCES;
4919 				}
4920 				if (p != off + reg->var_off.value) {
4921 					verbose(env, "kptr access misaligned expected=%u off=%llu\n",
4922 						p, off + reg->var_off.value);
4923 					return -EACCES;
4924 				}
4925 				if (size != bpf_size_to_bytes(BPF_DW)) {
4926 					verbose(env, "kptr access size must be BPF_DW\n");
4927 					return -EACCES;
4928 				}
4929 				break;
4930 			default:
4931 				verbose(env, "%s cannot be accessed directly by load/store\n",
4932 					btf_field_type_name(field->type));
4933 				return -EACCES;
4934 			}
4935 		}
4936 	}
4937 	return 0;
4938 }
4939 
4940 #define MAX_PACKET_OFF 0xffff
4941 
4942 static bool may_access_direct_pkt_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
4943 				       const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,
4944 				       enum bpf_access_type t)
4945 {
4946 	enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog);
4947 
4948 	switch (prog_type) {
4949 	/* Program types only with direct read access go here! */
4950 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN:
4951 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_OUT:
4952 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_SEG6LOCAL:
4953 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT:
4954 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR:
4955 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB:
4956 		if (t == BPF_WRITE)
4957 			return false;
4958 		fallthrough;
4959 
4960 	/* Program types with direct read + write access go here! */
4961 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS:
4962 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT:
4963 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP:
4964 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT:
4965 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_SKB:
4966 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_MSG:
4967 		if (meta)
4968 			return meta->pkt_access;
4969 
4970 		env->seen_direct_write = true;
4971 		return true;
4972 
4973 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT:
4974 		if (t == BPF_WRITE)
4975 			env->seen_direct_write = true;
4976 
4977 		return true;
4978 
4979 	default:
4980 		return false;
4981 	}
4982 }
4983 
4984 static int check_packet_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
4985 			       int size, bool zero_size_allowed)
4986 {
4987 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
4988 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &regs[regno];
4989 	int err;
4990 
4991 	/* We may have added a variable offset to the packet pointer; but any
4992 	 * reg->range we have comes after that.  We are only checking the fixed
4993 	 * offset.
4994 	 */
4995 
4996 	/* We don't allow negative numbers, because we aren't tracking enough
4997 	 * detail to prove they're safe.
4998 	 */
4999 	if (reg->smin_value < 0) {
5000 		verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n",
5001 			regno);
5002 		return -EACCES;
5003 	}
5004 
5005 	err = reg->range < 0 ? -EINVAL :
5006 	      __check_mem_access(env, regno, off, size, reg->range,
5007 				 zero_size_allowed);
5008 	if (err) {
5009 		verbose(env, "R%d offset is outside of the packet\n", regno);
5010 		return err;
5011 	}
5012 
5013 	/* __check_mem_access has made sure "off + size - 1" is within u16.
5014 	 * reg->umax_value can't be bigger than MAX_PACKET_OFF which is 0xffff,
5015 	 * otherwise find_good_pkt_pointers would have refused to set range info
5016 	 * that __check_mem_access would have rejected this pkt access.
5017 	 * Therefore, "off + reg->umax_value + size - 1" won't overflow u32.
5018 	 */
5019 	env->prog->aux->max_pkt_offset =
5020 		max_t(u32, env->prog->aux->max_pkt_offset,
5021 		      off + reg->umax_value + size - 1);
5022 
5023 	return err;
5024 }
5025 
5026 /* check access to 'struct bpf_context' fields.  Supports fixed offsets only */
5027 static int check_ctx_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, int off, int size,
5028 			    enum bpf_access_type t, enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type,
5029 			    struct btf **btf, u32 *btf_id)
5030 {
5031 	struct bpf_insn_access_aux info = {
5032 		.reg_type = *reg_type,
5033 		.log = &env->log,
5034 	};
5035 
5036 	if (env->ops->is_valid_access &&
5037 	    env->ops->is_valid_access(off, size, t, env->prog, &info)) {
5038 		/* A non zero info.ctx_field_size indicates that this field is a
5039 		 * candidate for later verifier transformation to load the whole
5040 		 * field and then apply a mask when accessed with a narrower
5041 		 * access than actual ctx access size. A zero info.ctx_field_size
5042 		 * will only allow for whole field access and rejects any other
5043 		 * type of narrower access.
5044 		 */
5045 		*reg_type = info.reg_type;
5046 
5047 		if (base_type(*reg_type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) {
5048 			*btf = info.btf;
5049 			*btf_id = info.btf_id;
5050 		} else {
5051 			env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ctx_field_size = info.ctx_field_size;
5052 		}
5053 		/* remember the offset of last byte accessed in ctx */
5054 		if (env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset < off + size)
5055 			env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset = off + size;
5056 		return 0;
5057 	}
5058 
5059 	verbose(env, "invalid bpf_context access off=%d size=%d\n", off, size);
5060 	return -EACCES;
5061 }
5062 
5063 static int check_flow_keys_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off,
5064 				  int size)
5065 {
5066 	if (size < 0 || off < 0 ||
5067 	    (u64)off + size > sizeof(struct bpf_flow_keys)) {
5068 		verbose(env, "invalid access to flow keys off=%d size=%d\n",
5069 			off, size);
5070 		return -EACCES;
5071 	}
5072 	return 0;
5073 }
5074 
5075 static int check_sock_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx,
5076 			     u32 regno, int off, int size,
5077 			     enum bpf_access_type t)
5078 {
5079 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
5080 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &regs[regno];
5081 	struct bpf_insn_access_aux info = {};
5082 	bool valid;
5083 
5084 	if (reg->smin_value < 0) {
5085 		verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n",
5086 			regno);
5087 		return -EACCES;
5088 	}
5089 
5090 	switch (reg->type) {
5091 	case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON:
5092 		valid = bpf_sock_common_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info);
5093 		break;
5094 	case PTR_TO_SOCKET:
5095 		valid = bpf_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info);
5096 		break;
5097 	case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
5098 		valid = bpf_tcp_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info);
5099 		break;
5100 	case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK:
5101 		valid = bpf_xdp_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info);
5102 		break;
5103 	default:
5104 		valid = false;
5105 	}
5106 
5107 
5108 	if (valid) {
5109 		env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ctx_field_size =
5110 			info.ctx_field_size;
5111 		return 0;
5112 	}
5113 
5114 	verbose(env, "R%d invalid %s access off=%d size=%d\n",
5115 		regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type), off, size);
5116 
5117 	return -EACCES;
5118 }
5119 
5120 static bool is_pointer_value(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
5121 {
5122 	return __is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, reg_state(env, regno));
5123 }
5124 
5125 static bool is_ctx_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
5126 {
5127 	const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
5128 
5129 	return reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX;
5130 }
5131 
5132 static bool is_sk_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
5133 {
5134 	const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
5135 
5136 	return type_is_sk_pointer(reg->type);
5137 }
5138 
5139 static bool is_pkt_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
5140 {
5141 	const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
5142 
5143 	return type_is_pkt_pointer(reg->type);
5144 }
5145 
5146 static bool is_flow_key_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
5147 {
5148 	const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
5149 
5150 	/* Separate to is_ctx_reg() since we still want to allow BPF_ST here. */
5151 	return reg->type == PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS;
5152 }
5153 
5154 static bool is_trusted_reg(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
5155 {
5156 	/* A referenced register is always trusted. */
5157 	if (reg->ref_obj_id)
5158 		return true;
5159 
5160 	/* If a register is not referenced, it is trusted if it has the
5161 	 * MEM_ALLOC or PTR_TRUSTED type modifiers, and no others. Some of the
5162 	 * other type modifiers may be safe, but we elect to take an opt-in
5163 	 * approach here as some (e.g. PTR_UNTRUSTED and PTR_MAYBE_NULL) are
5164 	 * not.
5165 	 *
5166 	 * Eventually, we should make PTR_TRUSTED the single source of truth
5167 	 * for whether a register is trusted.
5168 	 */
5169 	return type_flag(reg->type) & BPF_REG_TRUSTED_MODIFIERS &&
5170 	       !bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg->type);
5171 }
5172 
5173 static bool is_rcu_reg(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
5174 {
5175 	return reg->type & MEM_RCU;
5176 }
5177 
5178 static void clear_trusted_flags(enum bpf_type_flag *flag)
5179 {
5180 	*flag &= ~(BPF_REG_TRUSTED_MODIFIERS | MEM_RCU);
5181 }
5182 
5183 static int check_pkt_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5184 				   const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
5185 				   int off, int size, bool strict)
5186 {
5187 	struct tnum reg_off;
5188 	int ip_align;
5189 
5190 	/* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */
5191 	if (!strict || size == 1)
5192 		return 0;
5193 
5194 	/* For platforms that do not have a Kconfig enabling
5195 	 * CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS the value of
5196 	 * NET_IP_ALIGN is universally set to '2'.  And on platforms
5197 	 * that do set CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS, we get
5198 	 * to this code only in strict mode where we want to emulate
5199 	 * the NET_IP_ALIGN==2 checking.  Therefore use an
5200 	 * unconditional IP align value of '2'.
5201 	 */
5202 	ip_align = 2;
5203 
5204 	reg_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, tnum_const(ip_align + reg->off + off));
5205 	if (!tnum_is_aligned(reg_off, size)) {
5206 		char tn_buf[48];
5207 
5208 		tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
5209 		verbose(env,
5210 			"misaligned packet access off %d+%s+%d+%d size %d\n",
5211 			ip_align, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size);
5212 		return -EACCES;
5213 	}
5214 
5215 	return 0;
5216 }
5217 
5218 static int check_generic_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5219 				       const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
5220 				       const char *pointer_desc,
5221 				       int off, int size, bool strict)
5222 {
5223 	struct tnum reg_off;
5224 
5225 	/* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */
5226 	if (!strict || size == 1)
5227 		return 0;
5228 
5229 	reg_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, tnum_const(reg->off + off));
5230 	if (!tnum_is_aligned(reg_off, size)) {
5231 		char tn_buf[48];
5232 
5233 		tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
5234 		verbose(env, "misaligned %saccess off %s+%d+%d size %d\n",
5235 			pointer_desc, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size);
5236 		return -EACCES;
5237 	}
5238 
5239 	return 0;
5240 }
5241 
5242 static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5243 			       const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int off,
5244 			       int size, bool strict_alignment_once)
5245 {
5246 	bool strict = env->strict_alignment || strict_alignment_once;
5247 	const char *pointer_desc = "";
5248 
5249 	switch (reg->type) {
5250 	case PTR_TO_PACKET:
5251 	case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
5252 		/* Special case, because of NET_IP_ALIGN. Given metadata sits
5253 		 * right in front, treat it the very same way.
5254 		 */
5255 		return check_pkt_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size, strict);
5256 	case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS:
5257 		pointer_desc = "flow keys ";
5258 		break;
5259 	case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY:
5260 		pointer_desc = "key ";
5261 		break;
5262 	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
5263 		pointer_desc = "value ";
5264 		break;
5265 	case PTR_TO_CTX:
5266 		pointer_desc = "context ";
5267 		break;
5268 	case PTR_TO_STACK:
5269 		pointer_desc = "stack ";
5270 		/* The stack spill tracking logic in check_stack_write_fixed_off()
5271 		 * and check_stack_read_fixed_off() relies on stack accesses being
5272 		 * aligned.
5273 		 */
5274 		strict = true;
5275 		break;
5276 	case PTR_TO_SOCKET:
5277 		pointer_desc = "sock ";
5278 		break;
5279 	case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON:
5280 		pointer_desc = "sock_common ";
5281 		break;
5282 	case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
5283 		pointer_desc = "tcp_sock ";
5284 		break;
5285 	case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK:
5286 		pointer_desc = "xdp_sock ";
5287 		break;
5288 	default:
5289 		break;
5290 	}
5291 	return check_generic_ptr_alignment(env, reg, pointer_desc, off, size,
5292 					   strict);
5293 }
5294 
5295 static int update_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5296 			      const struct bpf_func_state *func,
5297 			      int off)
5298 {
5299 	u16 stack = env->subprog_info[func->subprogno].stack_depth;
5300 
5301 	if (stack >= -off)
5302 		return 0;
5303 
5304 	/* update known max for given subprogram */
5305 	env->subprog_info[func->subprogno].stack_depth = -off;
5306 	return 0;
5307 }
5308 
5309 /* starting from main bpf function walk all instructions of the function
5310  * and recursively walk all callees that given function can call.
5311  * Ignore jump and exit insns.
5312  * Since recursion is prevented by check_cfg() this algorithm
5313  * only needs a local stack of MAX_CALL_FRAMES to remember callsites
5314  */
5315 static int check_max_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
5316 {
5317 	int depth = 0, frame = 0, idx = 0, i = 0, subprog_end;
5318 	struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info;
5319 	struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
5320 	bool tail_call_reachable = false;
5321 	int ret_insn[MAX_CALL_FRAMES];
5322 	int ret_prog[MAX_CALL_FRAMES];
5323 	int j;
5324 
5325 process_func:
5326 	/* protect against potential stack overflow that might happen when
5327 	 * bpf2bpf calls get combined with tailcalls. Limit the caller's stack
5328 	 * depth for such case down to 256 so that the worst case scenario
5329 	 * would result in 8k stack size (32 which is tailcall limit * 256 =
5330 	 * 8k).
5331 	 *
5332 	 * To get the idea what might happen, see an example:
5333 	 * func1 -> sub rsp, 128
5334 	 *  subfunc1 -> sub rsp, 256
5335 	 *  tailcall1 -> add rsp, 256
5336 	 *   func2 -> sub rsp, 192 (total stack size = 128 + 192 = 320)
5337 	 *   subfunc2 -> sub rsp, 64
5338 	 *   subfunc22 -> sub rsp, 128
5339 	 *   tailcall2 -> add rsp, 128
5340 	 *    func3 -> sub rsp, 32 (total stack size 128 + 192 + 64 + 32 = 416)
5341 	 *
5342 	 * tailcall will unwind the current stack frame but it will not get rid
5343 	 * of caller's stack as shown on the example above.
5344 	 */
5345 	if (idx && subprog[idx].has_tail_call && depth >= 256) {
5346 		verbose(env,
5347 			"tail_calls are not allowed when call stack of previous frames is %d bytes. Too large\n",
5348 			depth);
5349 		return -EACCES;
5350 	}
5351 	/* round up to 32-bytes, since this is granularity
5352 	 * of interpreter stack size
5353 	 */
5354 	depth += round_up(max_t(u32, subprog[idx].stack_depth, 1), 32);
5355 	if (depth > MAX_BPF_STACK) {
5356 		verbose(env, "combined stack size of %d calls is %d. Too large\n",
5357 			frame + 1, depth);
5358 		return -EACCES;
5359 	}
5360 continue_func:
5361 	subprog_end = subprog[idx + 1].start;
5362 	for (; i < subprog_end; i++) {
5363 		int next_insn;
5364 
5365 		if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn + i) && !bpf_pseudo_func(insn + i))
5366 			continue;
5367 		/* remember insn and function to return to */
5368 		ret_insn[frame] = i + 1;
5369 		ret_prog[frame] = idx;
5370 
5371 		/* find the callee */
5372 		next_insn = i + insn[i].imm + 1;
5373 		idx = find_subprog(env, next_insn);
5374 		if (idx < 0) {
5375 			WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n",
5376 				  next_insn);
5377 			return -EFAULT;
5378 		}
5379 		if (subprog[idx].is_async_cb) {
5380 			if (subprog[idx].has_tail_call) {
5381 				verbose(env, "verifier bug. subprog has tail_call and async cb\n");
5382 				return -EFAULT;
5383 			}
5384 			 /* async callbacks don't increase bpf prog stack size */
5385 			continue;
5386 		}
5387 		i = next_insn;
5388 
5389 		if (subprog[idx].has_tail_call)
5390 			tail_call_reachable = true;
5391 
5392 		frame++;
5393 		if (frame >= MAX_CALL_FRAMES) {
5394 			verbose(env, "the call stack of %d frames is too deep !\n",
5395 				frame);
5396 			return -E2BIG;
5397 		}
5398 		goto process_func;
5399 	}
5400 	/* if tail call got detected across bpf2bpf calls then mark each of the
5401 	 * currently present subprog frames as tail call reachable subprogs;
5402 	 * this info will be utilized by JIT so that we will be preserving the
5403 	 * tail call counter throughout bpf2bpf calls combined with tailcalls
5404 	 */
5405 	if (tail_call_reachable)
5406 		for (j = 0; j < frame; j++)
5407 			subprog[ret_prog[j]].tail_call_reachable = true;
5408 	if (subprog[0].tail_call_reachable)
5409 		env->prog->aux->tail_call_reachable = true;
5410 
5411 	/* end of for() loop means the last insn of the 'subprog'
5412 	 * was reached. Doesn't matter whether it was JA or EXIT
5413 	 */
5414 	if (frame == 0)
5415 		return 0;
5416 	depth -= round_up(max_t(u32, subprog[idx].stack_depth, 1), 32);
5417 	frame--;
5418 	i = ret_insn[frame];
5419 	idx = ret_prog[frame];
5420 	goto continue_func;
5421 }
5422 
5423 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON
5424 static int get_callee_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5425 				  const struct bpf_insn *insn, int idx)
5426 {
5427 	int start = idx + insn->imm + 1, subprog;
5428 
5429 	subprog = find_subprog(env, start);
5430 	if (subprog < 0) {
5431 		WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n",
5432 			  start);
5433 		return -EFAULT;
5434 	}
5435 	return env->subprog_info[subprog].stack_depth;
5436 }
5437 #endif
5438 
5439 static int __check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5440 				 const char *buf_info,
5441 				 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
5442 				 int regno, int off, int size)
5443 {
5444 	if (off < 0) {
5445 		verbose(env,
5446 			"R%d invalid %s buffer access: off=%d, size=%d\n",
5447 			regno, buf_info, off, size);
5448 		return -EACCES;
5449 	}
5450 	if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) {
5451 		char tn_buf[48];
5452 
5453 		tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
5454 		verbose(env,
5455 			"R%d invalid variable buffer offset: off=%d, var_off=%s\n",
5456 			regno, off, tn_buf);
5457 		return -EACCES;
5458 	}
5459 
5460 	return 0;
5461 }
5462 
5463 static int check_tp_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5464 				  const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
5465 				  int regno, int off, int size)
5466 {
5467 	int err;
5468 
5469 	err = __check_buffer_access(env, "tracepoint", reg, regno, off, size);
5470 	if (err)
5471 		return err;
5472 
5473 	if (off + size > env->prog->aux->max_tp_access)
5474 		env->prog->aux->max_tp_access = off + size;
5475 
5476 	return 0;
5477 }
5478 
5479 static int check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5480 			       const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
5481 			       int regno, int off, int size,
5482 			       bool zero_size_allowed,
5483 			       u32 *max_access)
5484 {
5485 	const char *buf_info = type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type) ? "rdonly" : "rdwr";
5486 	int err;
5487 
5488 	err = __check_buffer_access(env, buf_info, reg, regno, off, size);
5489 	if (err)
5490 		return err;
5491 
5492 	if (off + size > *max_access)
5493 		*max_access = off + size;
5494 
5495 	return 0;
5496 }
5497 
5498 /* BPF architecture zero extends alu32 ops into 64-bit registesr */
5499 static void zext_32_to_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
5500 {
5501 	reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off);
5502 	__reg_assign_32_into_64(reg);
5503 }
5504 
5505 /* truncate register to smaller size (in bytes)
5506  * must be called with size < BPF_REG_SIZE
5507  */
5508 static void coerce_reg_to_size(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size)
5509 {
5510 	u64 mask;
5511 
5512 	/* clear high bits in bit representation */
5513 	reg->var_off = tnum_cast(reg->var_off, size);
5514 
5515 	/* fix arithmetic bounds */
5516 	mask = ((u64)1 << (size * 8)) - 1;
5517 	if ((reg->umin_value & ~mask) == (reg->umax_value & ~mask)) {
5518 		reg->umin_value &= mask;
5519 		reg->umax_value &= mask;
5520 	} else {
5521 		reg->umin_value = 0;
5522 		reg->umax_value = mask;
5523 	}
5524 	reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value;
5525 	reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value;
5526 
5527 	/* If size is smaller than 32bit register the 32bit register
5528 	 * values are also truncated so we push 64-bit bounds into
5529 	 * 32-bit bounds. Above were truncated < 32-bits already.
5530 	 */
5531 	if (size >= 4)
5532 		return;
5533 	__reg_combine_64_into_32(reg);
5534 }
5535 
5536 static bool bpf_map_is_rdonly(const struct bpf_map *map)
5537 {
5538 	/* A map is considered read-only if the following condition are true:
5539 	 *
5540 	 * 1) BPF program side cannot change any of the map content. The
5541 	 *    BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG flag is throughout the lifetime of a map
5542 	 *    and was set at map creation time.
5543 	 * 2) The map value(s) have been initialized from user space by a
5544 	 *    loader and then "frozen", such that no new map update/delete
5545 	 *    operations from syscall side are possible for the rest of
5546 	 *    the map's lifetime from that point onwards.
5547 	 * 3) Any parallel/pending map update/delete operations from syscall
5548 	 *    side have been completed. Only after that point, it's safe to
5549 	 *    assume that map value(s) are immutable.
5550 	 */
5551 	return (map->map_flags & BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG) &&
5552 	       READ_ONCE(map->frozen) &&
5553 	       !bpf_map_write_active(map);
5554 }
5555 
5556 static int bpf_map_direct_read(struct bpf_map *map, int off, int size, u64 *val)
5557 {
5558 	void *ptr;
5559 	u64 addr;
5560 	int err;
5561 
5562 	err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &addr, off);
5563 	if (err)
5564 		return err;
5565 	ptr = (void *)(long)addr + off;
5566 
5567 	switch (size) {
5568 	case sizeof(u8):
5569 		*val = (u64)*(u8 *)ptr;
5570 		break;
5571 	case sizeof(u16):
5572 		*val = (u64)*(u16 *)ptr;
5573 		break;
5574 	case sizeof(u32):
5575 		*val = (u64)*(u32 *)ptr;
5576 		break;
5577 	case sizeof(u64):
5578 		*val = *(u64 *)ptr;
5579 		break;
5580 	default:
5581 		return -EINVAL;
5582 	}
5583 	return 0;
5584 }
5585 
5586 #define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(__type)  __PASTE(__type, __safe_rcu)
5587 #define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(__type)  __PASTE(__type, __safe_rcu_or_null)
5588 #define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(__type)  __PASTE(__type, __safe_trusted)
5589 
5590 /*
5591  * Allow list few fields as RCU trusted or full trusted.
5592  * This logic doesn't allow mix tagging and will be removed once GCC supports
5593  * btf_type_tag.
5594  */
5595 
5596 /* RCU trusted: these fields are trusted in RCU CS and never NULL */
5597 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct task_struct) {
5598 	const cpumask_t *cpus_ptr;
5599 	struct css_set __rcu *cgroups;
5600 	struct task_struct __rcu *real_parent;
5601 	struct task_struct *group_leader;
5602 };
5603 
5604 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct cgroup) {
5605 	/* cgrp->kn is always accessible as documented in kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c */
5606 	struct kernfs_node *kn;
5607 };
5608 
5609 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct css_set) {
5610 	struct cgroup *dfl_cgrp;
5611 };
5612 
5613 /* RCU trusted: these fields are trusted in RCU CS and can be NULL */
5614 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct mm_struct) {
5615 	struct file __rcu *exe_file;
5616 };
5617 
5618 /* skb->sk, req->sk are not RCU protected, but we mark them as such
5619  * because bpf prog accessible sockets are SOCK_RCU_FREE.
5620  */
5621 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct sk_buff) {
5622 	struct sock *sk;
5623 };
5624 
5625 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct request_sock) {
5626 	struct sock *sk;
5627 };
5628 
5629 /* full trusted: these fields are trusted even outside of RCU CS and never NULL */
5630 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct bpf_iter_meta) {
5631 	struct seq_file *seq;
5632 };
5633 
5634 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct bpf_iter__task) {
5635 	struct bpf_iter_meta *meta;
5636 	struct task_struct *task;
5637 };
5638 
5639 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct linux_binprm) {
5640 	struct file *file;
5641 };
5642 
5643 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct file) {
5644 	struct inode *f_inode;
5645 };
5646 
5647 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct dentry) {
5648 	/* no negative dentry-s in places where bpf can see it */
5649 	struct inode *d_inode;
5650 };
5651 
5652 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct socket) {
5653 	struct sock *sk;
5654 };
5655 
5656 static bool type_is_rcu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5657 			struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
5658 			const char *field_name, u32 btf_id)
5659 {
5660 	BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct task_struct));
5661 	BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct cgroup));
5662 	BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct css_set));
5663 
5664 	return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, field_name, btf_id, "__safe_rcu");
5665 }
5666 
5667 static bool type_is_rcu_or_null(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5668 				struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
5669 				const char *field_name, u32 btf_id)
5670 {
5671 	BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct mm_struct));
5672 	BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct sk_buff));
5673 	BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct request_sock));
5674 
5675 	return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, field_name, btf_id, "__safe_rcu_or_null");
5676 }
5677 
5678 static bool type_is_trusted(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5679 			    struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
5680 			    const char *field_name, u32 btf_id)
5681 {
5682 	BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct bpf_iter_meta));
5683 	BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct bpf_iter__task));
5684 	BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct linux_binprm));
5685 	BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct file));
5686 	BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct dentry));
5687 	BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct socket));
5688 
5689 	return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, field_name, btf_id, "__safe_trusted");
5690 }
5691 
5692 static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5693 				   struct bpf_reg_state *regs,
5694 				   int regno, int off, int size,
5695 				   enum bpf_access_type atype,
5696 				   int value_regno)
5697 {
5698 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno;
5699 	const struct btf_type *t = btf_type_by_id(reg->btf, reg->btf_id);
5700 	const char *tname = btf_name_by_offset(reg->btf, t->name_off);
5701 	const char *field_name = NULL;
5702 	enum bpf_type_flag flag = 0;
5703 	u32 btf_id = 0;
5704 	int ret;
5705 
5706 	if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
5707 		verbose(env,
5708 			"'struct %s' access is allowed only to CAP_PERFMON and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n",
5709 			tname);
5710 		return -EPERM;
5711 	}
5712 	if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible && btf_is_kernel(reg->btf)) {
5713 		verbose(env,
5714 			"Cannot access kernel 'struct %s' from non-GPL compatible program\n",
5715 			tname);
5716 		return -EINVAL;
5717 	}
5718 	if (off < 0) {
5719 		verbose(env,
5720 			"R%d is ptr_%s invalid negative access: off=%d\n",
5721 			regno, tname, off);
5722 		return -EACCES;
5723 	}
5724 	if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) {
5725 		char tn_buf[48];
5726 
5727 		tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
5728 		verbose(env,
5729 			"R%d is ptr_%s invalid variable offset: off=%d, var_off=%s\n",
5730 			regno, tname, off, tn_buf);
5731 		return -EACCES;
5732 	}
5733 
5734 	if (reg->type & MEM_USER) {
5735 		verbose(env,
5736 			"R%d is ptr_%s access user memory: off=%d\n",
5737 			regno, tname, off);
5738 		return -EACCES;
5739 	}
5740 
5741 	if (reg->type & MEM_PERCPU) {
5742 		verbose(env,
5743 			"R%d is ptr_%s access percpu memory: off=%d\n",
5744 			regno, tname, off);
5745 		return -EACCES;
5746 	}
5747 
5748 	if (env->ops->btf_struct_access && !type_is_alloc(reg->type) && atype == BPF_WRITE) {
5749 		if (!btf_is_kernel(reg->btf)) {
5750 			verbose(env, "verifier internal error: reg->btf must be kernel btf\n");
5751 			return -EFAULT;
5752 		}
5753 		ret = env->ops->btf_struct_access(&env->log, reg, off, size);
5754 	} else {
5755 		/* Writes are permitted with default btf_struct_access for
5756 		 * program allocated objects (which always have ref_obj_id > 0),
5757 		 * but not for untrusted PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC.
5758 		 */
5759 		if (atype != BPF_READ && reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) {
5760 			verbose(env, "only read is supported\n");
5761 			return -EACCES;
5762 		}
5763 
5764 		if (type_is_alloc(reg->type) && !type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type) &&
5765 		    !reg->ref_obj_id) {
5766 			verbose(env, "verifier internal error: ref_obj_id for allocated object must be non-zero\n");
5767 			return -EFAULT;
5768 		}
5769 
5770 		ret = btf_struct_access(&env->log, reg, off, size, atype, &btf_id, &flag, &field_name);
5771 	}
5772 
5773 	if (ret < 0)
5774 		return ret;
5775 
5776 	if (ret != PTR_TO_BTF_ID) {
5777 		/* just mark; */
5778 
5779 	} else if (type_flag(reg->type) & PTR_UNTRUSTED) {
5780 		/* If this is an untrusted pointer, all pointers formed by walking it
5781 		 * also inherit the untrusted flag.
5782 		 */
5783 		flag = PTR_UNTRUSTED;
5784 
5785 	} else if (is_trusted_reg(reg) || is_rcu_reg(reg)) {
5786 		/* By default any pointer obtained from walking a trusted pointer is no
5787 		 * longer trusted, unless the field being accessed has explicitly been
5788 		 * marked as inheriting its parent's state of trust (either full or RCU).
5789 		 * For example:
5790 		 * 'cgroups' pointer is untrusted if task->cgroups dereference
5791 		 * happened in a sleepable program outside of bpf_rcu_read_lock()
5792 		 * section. In a non-sleepable program it's trusted while in RCU CS (aka MEM_RCU).
5793 		 * Note bpf_rcu_read_unlock() converts MEM_RCU pointers to PTR_UNTRUSTED.
5794 		 *
5795 		 * A regular RCU-protected pointer with __rcu tag can also be deemed
5796 		 * trusted if we are in an RCU CS. Such pointer can be NULL.
5797 		 */
5798 		if (type_is_trusted(env, reg, field_name, btf_id)) {
5799 			flag |= PTR_TRUSTED;
5800 		} else if (in_rcu_cs(env) && !type_may_be_null(reg->type)) {
5801 			if (type_is_rcu(env, reg, field_name, btf_id)) {
5802 				/* ignore __rcu tag and mark it MEM_RCU */
5803 				flag |= MEM_RCU;
5804 			} else if (flag & MEM_RCU ||
5805 				   type_is_rcu_or_null(env, reg, field_name, btf_id)) {
5806 				/* __rcu tagged pointers can be NULL */
5807 				flag |= MEM_RCU | PTR_MAYBE_NULL;
5808 			} else if (flag & (MEM_PERCPU | MEM_USER)) {
5809 				/* keep as-is */
5810 			} else {
5811 				/* walking unknown pointers yields old deprecated PTR_TO_BTF_ID */
5812 				clear_trusted_flags(&flag);
5813 			}
5814 		} else {
5815 			/*
5816 			 * If not in RCU CS or MEM_RCU pointer can be NULL then
5817 			 * aggressively mark as untrusted otherwise such
5818 			 * pointers will be plain PTR_TO_BTF_ID without flags
5819 			 * and will be allowed to be passed into helpers for
5820 			 * compat reasons.
5821 			 */
5822 			flag = PTR_UNTRUSTED;
5823 		}
5824 	} else {
5825 		/* Old compat. Deprecated */
5826 		clear_trusted_flags(&flag);
5827 	}
5828 
5829 	if (atype == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
5830 		mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, reg->btf, btf_id, flag);
5831 
5832 	return 0;
5833 }
5834 
5835 static int check_ptr_to_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5836 				   struct bpf_reg_state *regs,
5837 				   int regno, int off, int size,
5838 				   enum bpf_access_type atype,
5839 				   int value_regno)
5840 {
5841 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno;
5842 	struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr;
5843 	struct bpf_reg_state map_reg;
5844 	enum bpf_type_flag flag = 0;
5845 	const struct btf_type *t;
5846 	const char *tname;
5847 	u32 btf_id;
5848 	int ret;
5849 
5850 	if (!btf_vmlinux) {
5851 		verbose(env, "map_ptr access not supported without CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF\n");
5852 		return -ENOTSUPP;
5853 	}
5854 
5855 	if (!map->ops->map_btf_id || !*map->ops->map_btf_id) {
5856 		verbose(env, "map_ptr access not supported for map type %d\n",
5857 			map->map_type);
5858 		return -ENOTSUPP;
5859 	}
5860 
5861 	t = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, *map->ops->map_btf_id);
5862 	tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, t->name_off);
5863 
5864 	if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
5865 		verbose(env,
5866 			"'struct %s' access is allowed only to CAP_PERFMON and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n",
5867 			tname);
5868 		return -EPERM;
5869 	}
5870 
5871 	if (off < 0) {
5872 		verbose(env, "R%d is %s invalid negative access: off=%d\n",
5873 			regno, tname, off);
5874 		return -EACCES;
5875 	}
5876 
5877 	if (atype != BPF_READ) {
5878 		verbose(env, "only read from %s is supported\n", tname);
5879 		return -EACCES;
5880 	}
5881 
5882 	/* Simulate access to a PTR_TO_BTF_ID */
5883 	memset(&map_reg, 0, sizeof(map_reg));
5884 	mark_btf_ld_reg(env, &map_reg, 0, PTR_TO_BTF_ID, btf_vmlinux, *map->ops->map_btf_id, 0);
5885 	ret = btf_struct_access(&env->log, &map_reg, off, size, atype, &btf_id, &flag, NULL);
5886 	if (ret < 0)
5887 		return ret;
5888 
5889 	if (value_regno >= 0)
5890 		mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, btf_vmlinux, btf_id, flag);
5891 
5892 	return 0;
5893 }
5894 
5895 /* Check that the stack access at the given offset is within bounds. The
5896  * maximum valid offset is -1.
5897  *
5898  * The minimum valid offset is -MAX_BPF_STACK for writes, and
5899  * -state->allocated_stack for reads.
5900  */
5901 static int check_stack_slot_within_bounds(int off,
5902 					  struct bpf_func_state *state,
5903 					  enum bpf_access_type t)
5904 {
5905 	int min_valid_off;
5906 
5907 	if (t == BPF_WRITE)
5908 		min_valid_off = -MAX_BPF_STACK;
5909 	else
5910 		min_valid_off = -state->allocated_stack;
5911 
5912 	if (off < min_valid_off || off > -1)
5913 		return -EACCES;
5914 	return 0;
5915 }
5916 
5917 /* Check that the stack access at 'regno + off' falls within the maximum stack
5918  * bounds.
5919  *
5920  * 'off' includes `regno->offset`, but not its dynamic part (if any).
5921  */
5922 static int check_stack_access_within_bounds(
5923 		struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5924 		int regno, int off, int access_size,
5925 		enum bpf_access_src src, enum bpf_access_type type)
5926 {
5927 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
5928 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno;
5929 	struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
5930 	int min_off, max_off;
5931 	int err;
5932 	char *err_extra;
5933 
5934 	if (src == ACCESS_HELPER)
5935 		/* We don't know if helpers are reading or writing (or both). */
5936 		err_extra = " indirect access to";
5937 	else if (type == BPF_READ)
5938 		err_extra = " read from";
5939 	else
5940 		err_extra = " write to";
5941 
5942 	if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
5943 		min_off = reg->var_off.value + off;
5944 		if (access_size > 0)
5945 			max_off = min_off + access_size - 1;
5946 		else
5947 			max_off = min_off;
5948 	} else {
5949 		if (reg->smax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF ||
5950 		    reg->smin_value <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) {
5951 			verbose(env, "invalid unbounded variable-offset%s stack R%d\n",
5952 				err_extra, regno);
5953 			return -EACCES;
5954 		}
5955 		min_off = reg->smin_value + off;
5956 		if (access_size > 0)
5957 			max_off = reg->smax_value + off + access_size - 1;
5958 		else
5959 			max_off = min_off;
5960 	}
5961 
5962 	err = check_stack_slot_within_bounds(min_off, state, type);
5963 	if (!err)
5964 		err = check_stack_slot_within_bounds(max_off, state, type);
5965 
5966 	if (err) {
5967 		if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
5968 			verbose(env, "invalid%s stack R%d off=%d size=%d\n",
5969 				err_extra, regno, off, access_size);
5970 		} else {
5971 			char tn_buf[48];
5972 
5973 			tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
5974 			verbose(env, "invalid variable-offset%s stack R%d var_off=%s size=%d\n",
5975 				err_extra, regno, tn_buf, access_size);
5976 		}
5977 	}
5978 	return err;
5979 }
5980 
5981 /* check whether memory at (regno + off) is accessible for t = (read | write)
5982  * if t==write, value_regno is a register which value is stored into memory
5983  * if t==read, value_regno is a register which will receive the value from memory
5984  * if t==write && value_regno==-1, some unknown value is stored into memory
5985  * if t==read && value_regno==-1, don't care what we read from memory
5986  */
5987 static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regno,
5988 			    int off, int bpf_size, enum bpf_access_type t,
5989 			    int value_regno, bool strict_alignment_once)
5990 {
5991 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
5992 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno;
5993 	struct bpf_func_state *state;
5994 	int size, err = 0;
5995 
5996 	size = bpf_size_to_bytes(bpf_size);
5997 	if (size < 0)
5998 		return size;
5999 
6000 	/* alignment checks will add in reg->off themselves */
6001 	err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size, strict_alignment_once);
6002 	if (err)
6003 		return err;
6004 
6005 	/* for access checks, reg->off is just part of off */
6006 	off += reg->off;
6007 
6008 	if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY) {
6009 		if (t == BPF_WRITE) {
6010 			verbose(env, "write to change key R%d not allowed\n", regno);
6011 			return -EACCES;
6012 		}
6013 
6014 		err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size,
6015 					      reg->map_ptr->key_size, false);
6016 		if (err)
6017 			return err;
6018 		if (value_regno >= 0)
6019 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
6020 	} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
6021 		struct btf_field *kptr_field = NULL;
6022 
6023 		if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
6024 		    is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
6025 			verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into map\n", value_regno);
6026 			return -EACCES;
6027 		}
6028 		err = check_map_access_type(env, regno, off, size, t);
6029 		if (err)
6030 			return err;
6031 		err = check_map_access(env, regno, off, size, false, ACCESS_DIRECT);
6032 		if (err)
6033 			return err;
6034 		if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off))
6035 			kptr_field = btf_record_find(reg->map_ptr->record,
6036 						     off + reg->var_off.value, BPF_KPTR);
6037 		if (kptr_field) {
6038 			err = check_map_kptr_access(env, regno, value_regno, insn_idx, kptr_field);
6039 		} else if (t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) {
6040 			struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr;
6041 
6042 			/* if map is read-only, track its contents as scalars */
6043 			if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) &&
6044 			    bpf_map_is_rdonly(map) &&
6045 			    map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) {
6046 				int map_off = off + reg->var_off.value;
6047 				u64 val = 0;
6048 
6049 				err = bpf_map_direct_read(map, map_off, size,
6050 							  &val);
6051 				if (err)
6052 					return err;
6053 
6054 				regs[value_regno].type = SCALAR_VALUE;
6055 				__mark_reg_known(&regs[value_regno], val);
6056 			} else {
6057 				mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
6058 			}
6059 		}
6060 	} else if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_MEM) {
6061 		bool rdonly_mem = type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type);
6062 
6063 		if (type_may_be_null(reg->type)) {
6064 			verbose(env, "R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n", regno,
6065 				reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
6066 			return -EACCES;
6067 		}
6068 
6069 		if (t == BPF_WRITE && rdonly_mem) {
6070 			verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n",
6071 				regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
6072 			return -EACCES;
6073 		}
6074 
6075 		if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
6076 		    is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
6077 			verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", value_regno);
6078 			return -EACCES;
6079 		}
6080 
6081 		err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size,
6082 					      reg->mem_size, false);
6083 		if (!err && value_regno >= 0 && (t == BPF_READ || rdonly_mem))
6084 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
6085 	} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX) {
6086 		enum bpf_reg_type reg_type = SCALAR_VALUE;
6087 		struct btf *btf = NULL;
6088 		u32 btf_id = 0;
6089 
6090 		if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
6091 		    is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
6092 			verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into ctx\n", value_regno);
6093 			return -EACCES;
6094 		}
6095 
6096 		err = check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno);
6097 		if (err < 0)
6098 			return err;
6099 
6100 		err = check_ctx_access(env, insn_idx, off, size, t, &reg_type, &btf,
6101 				       &btf_id);
6102 		if (err)
6103 			verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; ");
6104 		if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) {
6105 			/* ctx access returns either a scalar, or a
6106 			 * PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END]. In the latter
6107 			 * case, we know the offset is zero.
6108 			 */
6109 			if (reg_type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
6110 				mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
6111 			} else {
6112 				mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs,
6113 						    value_regno);
6114 				if (type_may_be_null(reg_type))
6115 					regs[value_regno].id = ++env->id_gen;
6116 				/* A load of ctx field could have different
6117 				 * actual load size with the one encoded in the
6118 				 * insn. When the dst is PTR, it is for sure not
6119 				 * a sub-register.
6120 				 */
6121 				regs[value_regno].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG;
6122 				if (base_type(reg_type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) {
6123 					regs[value_regno].btf = btf;
6124 					regs[value_regno].btf_id = btf_id;
6125 				}
6126 			}
6127 			regs[value_regno].type = reg_type;
6128 		}
6129 
6130 	} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
6131 		/* Basic bounds checks. */
6132 		err = check_stack_access_within_bounds(env, regno, off, size, ACCESS_DIRECT, t);
6133 		if (err)
6134 			return err;
6135 
6136 		state = func(env, reg);
6137 		err = update_stack_depth(env, state, off);
6138 		if (err)
6139 			return err;
6140 
6141 		if (t == BPF_READ)
6142 			err = check_stack_read(env, regno, off, size,
6143 					       value_regno);
6144 		else
6145 			err = check_stack_write(env, regno, off, size,
6146 						value_regno, insn_idx);
6147 	} else if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg)) {
6148 		if (t == BPF_WRITE && !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, t)) {
6149 			verbose(env, "cannot write into packet\n");
6150 			return -EACCES;
6151 		}
6152 		if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
6153 		    is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
6154 			verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into packet\n",
6155 				value_regno);
6156 			return -EACCES;
6157 		}
6158 		err = check_packet_access(env, regno, off, size, false);
6159 		if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
6160 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
6161 	} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS) {
6162 		if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
6163 		    is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
6164 			verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into flow keys\n",
6165 				value_regno);
6166 			return -EACCES;
6167 		}
6168 
6169 		err = check_flow_keys_access(env, off, size);
6170 		if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
6171 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
6172 	} else if (type_is_sk_pointer(reg->type)) {
6173 		if (t == BPF_WRITE) {
6174 			verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n",
6175 				regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
6176 			return -EACCES;
6177 		}
6178 		err = check_sock_access(env, insn_idx, regno, off, size, t);
6179 		if (!err && value_regno >= 0)
6180 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
6181 	} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER) {
6182 		err = check_tp_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, off, size);
6183 		if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
6184 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
6185 	} else if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID &&
6186 		   !type_may_be_null(reg->type)) {
6187 		err = check_ptr_to_btf_access(env, regs, regno, off, size, t,
6188 					      value_regno);
6189 	} else if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP) {
6190 		err = check_ptr_to_map_access(env, regs, regno, off, size, t,
6191 					      value_regno);
6192 	} else if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BUF) {
6193 		bool rdonly_mem = type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type);
6194 		u32 *max_access;
6195 
6196 		if (rdonly_mem) {
6197 			if (t == BPF_WRITE) {
6198 				verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n",
6199 					regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
6200 				return -EACCES;
6201 			}
6202 			max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdonly_access;
6203 		} else {
6204 			max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdwr_access;
6205 		}
6206 
6207 		err = check_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, off, size, false,
6208 					  max_access);
6209 
6210 		if (!err && value_regno >= 0 && (rdonly_mem || t == BPF_READ))
6211 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
6212 	} else {
6213 		verbose(env, "R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n", regno,
6214 			reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
6215 		return -EACCES;
6216 	}
6217 
6218 	if (!err && size < BPF_REG_SIZE && value_regno >= 0 && t == BPF_READ &&
6219 	    regs[value_regno].type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
6220 		/* b/h/w load zero-extends, mark upper bits as known 0 */
6221 		coerce_reg_to_size(&regs[value_regno], size);
6222 	}
6223 	return err;
6224 }
6225 
6226 static int check_atomic(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_insn *insn)
6227 {
6228 	int load_reg;
6229 	int err;
6230 
6231 	switch (insn->imm) {
6232 	case BPF_ADD:
6233 	case BPF_ADD | BPF_FETCH:
6234 	case BPF_AND:
6235 	case BPF_AND | BPF_FETCH:
6236 	case BPF_OR:
6237 	case BPF_OR | BPF_FETCH:
6238 	case BPF_XOR:
6239 	case BPF_XOR | BPF_FETCH:
6240 	case BPF_XCHG:
6241 	case BPF_CMPXCHG:
6242 		break;
6243 	default:
6244 		verbose(env, "BPF_ATOMIC uses invalid atomic opcode %02x\n", insn->imm);
6245 		return -EINVAL;
6246 	}
6247 
6248 	if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_W && BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) {
6249 		verbose(env, "invalid atomic operand size\n");
6250 		return -EINVAL;
6251 	}
6252 
6253 	/* check src1 operand */
6254 	err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
6255 	if (err)
6256 		return err;
6257 
6258 	/* check src2 operand */
6259 	err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
6260 	if (err)
6261 		return err;
6262 
6263 	if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG) {
6264 		/* Check comparison of R0 with memory location */
6265 		const u32 aux_reg = BPF_REG_0;
6266 
6267 		err = check_reg_arg(env, aux_reg, SRC_OP);
6268 		if (err)
6269 			return err;
6270 
6271 		if (is_pointer_value(env, aux_reg)) {
6272 			verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", aux_reg);
6273 			return -EACCES;
6274 		}
6275 	}
6276 
6277 	if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
6278 		verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", insn->src_reg);
6279 		return -EACCES;
6280 	}
6281 
6282 	if (is_ctx_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) ||
6283 	    is_pkt_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) ||
6284 	    is_flow_key_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) ||
6285 	    is_sk_reg(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
6286 		verbose(env, "BPF_ATOMIC stores into R%d %s is not allowed\n",
6287 			insn->dst_reg,
6288 			reg_type_str(env, reg_state(env, insn->dst_reg)->type));
6289 		return -EACCES;
6290 	}
6291 
6292 	if (insn->imm & BPF_FETCH) {
6293 		if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG)
6294 			load_reg = BPF_REG_0;
6295 		else
6296 			load_reg = insn->src_reg;
6297 
6298 		/* check and record load of old value */
6299 		err = check_reg_arg(env, load_reg, DST_OP);
6300 		if (err)
6301 			return err;
6302 	} else {
6303 		/* This instruction accesses a memory location but doesn't
6304 		 * actually load it into a register.
6305 		 */
6306 		load_reg = -1;
6307 	}
6308 
6309 	/* Check whether we can read the memory, with second call for fetch
6310 	 * case to simulate the register fill.
6311 	 */
6312 	err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
6313 			       BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, -1, true);
6314 	if (!err && load_reg >= 0)
6315 		err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
6316 				       BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, load_reg,
6317 				       true);
6318 	if (err)
6319 		return err;
6320 
6321 	/* Check whether we can write into the same memory. */
6322 	err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
6323 			       BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1, true);
6324 	if (err)
6325 		return err;
6326 
6327 	return 0;
6328 }
6329 
6330 /* When register 'regno' is used to read the stack (either directly or through
6331  * a helper function) make sure that it's within stack boundary and, depending
6332  * on the access type, that all elements of the stack are initialized.
6333  *
6334  * 'off' includes 'regno->off', but not its dynamic part (if any).
6335  *
6336  * All registers that have been spilled on the stack in the slots within the
6337  * read offsets are marked as read.
6338  */
6339 static int check_stack_range_initialized(
6340 		struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int off,
6341 		int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed,
6342 		enum bpf_access_src type, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
6343 {
6344 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
6345 	struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
6346 	int err, min_off, max_off, i, j, slot, spi;
6347 	char *err_extra = type == ACCESS_HELPER ? " indirect" : "";
6348 	enum bpf_access_type bounds_check_type;
6349 	/* Some accesses can write anything into the stack, others are
6350 	 * read-only.
6351 	 */
6352 	bool clobber = false;
6353 
6354 	if (access_size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed) {
6355 		verbose(env, "invalid zero-sized read\n");
6356 		return -EACCES;
6357 	}
6358 
6359 	if (type == ACCESS_HELPER) {
6360 		/* The bounds checks for writes are more permissive than for
6361 		 * reads. However, if raw_mode is not set, we'll do extra
6362 		 * checks below.
6363 		 */
6364 		bounds_check_type = BPF_WRITE;
6365 		clobber = true;
6366 	} else {
6367 		bounds_check_type = BPF_READ;
6368 	}
6369 	err = check_stack_access_within_bounds(env, regno, off, access_size,
6370 					       type, bounds_check_type);
6371 	if (err)
6372 		return err;
6373 
6374 
6375 	if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
6376 		min_off = max_off = reg->var_off.value + off;
6377 	} else {
6378 		/* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for
6379 		 * simplicity since it requires corresponding support in
6380 		 * Spectre masking for stack ALU.
6381 		 * See also retrieve_ptr_limit().
6382 		 */
6383 		if (!env->bypass_spec_v1) {
6384 			char tn_buf[48];
6385 
6386 			tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
6387 			verbose(env, "R%d%s variable offset stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n",
6388 				regno, err_extra, tn_buf);
6389 			return -EACCES;
6390 		}
6391 		/* Only initialized buffer on stack is allowed to be accessed
6392 		 * with variable offset. With uninitialized buffer it's hard to
6393 		 * guarantee that whole memory is marked as initialized on
6394 		 * helper return since specific bounds are unknown what may
6395 		 * cause uninitialized stack leaking.
6396 		 */
6397 		if (meta && meta->raw_mode)
6398 			meta = NULL;
6399 
6400 		min_off = reg->smin_value + off;
6401 		max_off = reg->smax_value + off;
6402 	}
6403 
6404 	if (meta && meta->raw_mode) {
6405 		/* Ensure we won't be overwriting dynptrs when simulating byte
6406 		 * by byte access in check_helper_call using meta.access_size.
6407 		 * This would be a problem if we have a helper in the future
6408 		 * which takes:
6409 		 *
6410 		 *	helper(uninit_mem, len, dynptr)
6411 		 *
6412 		 * Now, uninint_mem may overlap with dynptr pointer. Hence, it
6413 		 * may end up writing to dynptr itself when touching memory from
6414 		 * arg 1. This can be relaxed on a case by case basis for known
6415 		 * safe cases, but reject due to the possibilitiy of aliasing by
6416 		 * default.
6417 		 */
6418 		for (i = min_off; i < max_off + access_size; i++) {
6419 			int stack_off = -i - 1;
6420 
6421 			spi = __get_spi(i);
6422 			/* raw_mode may write past allocated_stack */
6423 			if (state->allocated_stack <= stack_off)
6424 				continue;
6425 			if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[stack_off % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_DYNPTR) {
6426 				verbose(env, "potential write to dynptr at off=%d disallowed\n", i);
6427 				return -EACCES;
6428 			}
6429 		}
6430 		meta->access_size = access_size;
6431 		meta->regno = regno;
6432 		return 0;
6433 	}
6434 
6435 	for (i = min_off; i < max_off + access_size; i++) {
6436 		u8 *stype;
6437 
6438 		slot = -i - 1;
6439 		spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE;
6440 		if (state->allocated_stack <= slot)
6441 			goto err;
6442 		stype = &state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE];
6443 		if (*stype == STACK_MISC)
6444 			goto mark;
6445 		if ((*stype == STACK_ZERO) ||
6446 		    (*stype == STACK_INVALID && env->allow_uninit_stack)) {
6447 			if (clobber) {
6448 				/* helper can write anything into the stack */
6449 				*stype = STACK_MISC;
6450 			}
6451 			goto mark;
6452 		}
6453 
6454 		if (is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[spi]) &&
6455 		    (state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type == SCALAR_VALUE ||
6456 		     env->allow_ptr_leaks)) {
6457 			if (clobber) {
6458 				__mark_reg_unknown(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr);
6459 				for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++)
6460 					scrub_spilled_slot(&state->stack[spi].slot_type[j]);
6461 			}
6462 			goto mark;
6463 		}
6464 
6465 err:
6466 		if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
6467 			verbose(env, "invalid%s read from stack R%d off %d+%d size %d\n",
6468 				err_extra, regno, min_off, i - min_off, access_size);
6469 		} else {
6470 			char tn_buf[48];
6471 
6472 			tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
6473 			verbose(env, "invalid%s read from stack R%d var_off %s+%d size %d\n",
6474 				err_extra, regno, tn_buf, i - min_off, access_size);
6475 		}
6476 		return -EACCES;
6477 mark:
6478 		/* reading any byte out of 8-byte 'spill_slot' will cause
6479 		 * the whole slot to be marked as 'read'
6480 		 */
6481 		mark_reg_read(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr,
6482 			      state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.parent,
6483 			      REG_LIVE_READ64);
6484 		/* We do not set REG_LIVE_WRITTEN for stack slot, as we can not
6485 		 * be sure that whether stack slot is written to or not. Hence,
6486 		 * we must still conservatively propagate reads upwards even if
6487 		 * helper may write to the entire memory range.
6488 		 */
6489 	}
6490 	return update_stack_depth(env, state, min_off);
6491 }
6492 
6493 static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
6494 				   int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed,
6495 				   struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
6496 {
6497 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = &regs[regno];
6498 	u32 *max_access;
6499 
6500 	switch (base_type(reg->type)) {
6501 	case PTR_TO_PACKET:
6502 	case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
6503 		return check_packet_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size,
6504 					   zero_size_allowed);
6505 	case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY:
6506 		if (meta && meta->raw_mode) {
6507 			verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", regno,
6508 				reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
6509 			return -EACCES;
6510 		}
6511 		return check_mem_region_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size,
6512 					       reg->map_ptr->key_size, false);
6513 	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
6514 		if (check_map_access_type(env, regno, reg->off, access_size,
6515 					  meta && meta->raw_mode ? BPF_WRITE :
6516 					  BPF_READ))
6517 			return -EACCES;
6518 		return check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size,
6519 					zero_size_allowed, ACCESS_HELPER);
6520 	case PTR_TO_MEM:
6521 		if (type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type)) {
6522 			if (meta && meta->raw_mode) {
6523 				verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", regno,
6524 					reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
6525 				return -EACCES;
6526 			}
6527 		}
6528 		return check_mem_region_access(env, regno, reg->off,
6529 					       access_size, reg->mem_size,
6530 					       zero_size_allowed);
6531 	case PTR_TO_BUF:
6532 		if (type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type)) {
6533 			if (meta && meta->raw_mode) {
6534 				verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", regno,
6535 					reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
6536 				return -EACCES;
6537 			}
6538 
6539 			max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdonly_access;
6540 		} else {
6541 			max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdwr_access;
6542 		}
6543 		return check_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, reg->off,
6544 					   access_size, zero_size_allowed,
6545 					   max_access);
6546 	case PTR_TO_STACK:
6547 		return check_stack_range_initialized(
6548 				env,
6549 				regno, reg->off, access_size,
6550 				zero_size_allowed, ACCESS_HELPER, meta);
6551 	case PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
6552 		return check_ptr_to_btf_access(env, regs, regno, reg->off,
6553 					       access_size, BPF_READ, -1);
6554 	case PTR_TO_CTX:
6555 		/* in case the function doesn't know how to access the context,
6556 		 * (because we are in a program of type SYSCALL for example), we
6557 		 * can not statically check its size.
6558 		 * Dynamically check it now.
6559 		 */
6560 		if (!env->ops->convert_ctx_access) {
6561 			enum bpf_access_type atype = meta && meta->raw_mode ? BPF_WRITE : BPF_READ;
6562 			int offset = access_size - 1;
6563 
6564 			/* Allow zero-byte read from PTR_TO_CTX */
6565 			if (access_size == 0)
6566 				return zero_size_allowed ? 0 : -EACCES;
6567 
6568 			return check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, regno, offset, BPF_B,
6569 						atype, -1, false);
6570 		}
6571 
6572 		fallthrough;
6573 	default: /* scalar_value or invalid ptr */
6574 		/* Allow zero-byte read from NULL, regardless of pointer type */
6575 		if (zero_size_allowed && access_size == 0 &&
6576 		    register_is_null(reg))
6577 			return 0;
6578 
6579 		verbose(env, "R%d type=%s ", regno,
6580 			reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
6581 		verbose(env, "expected=%s\n", reg_type_str(env, PTR_TO_STACK));
6582 		return -EACCES;
6583 	}
6584 }
6585 
6586 static int check_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
6587 			      struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno,
6588 			      bool zero_size_allowed,
6589 			      struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
6590 {
6591 	int err;
6592 
6593 	/* This is used to refine r0 return value bounds for helpers
6594 	 * that enforce this value as an upper bound on return values.
6595 	 * See do_refine_retval_range() for helpers that can refine
6596 	 * the return value. C type of helper is u32 so we pull register
6597 	 * bound from umax_value however, if negative verifier errors
6598 	 * out. Only upper bounds can be learned because retval is an
6599 	 * int type and negative retvals are allowed.
6600 	 */
6601 	meta->msize_max_value = reg->umax_value;
6602 
6603 	/* The register is SCALAR_VALUE; the access check
6604 	 * happens using its boundaries.
6605 	 */
6606 	if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off))
6607 		/* For unprivileged variable accesses, disable raw
6608 		 * mode so that the program is required to
6609 		 * initialize all the memory that the helper could
6610 		 * just partially fill up.
6611 		 */
6612 		meta = NULL;
6613 
6614 	if (reg->smin_value < 0) {
6615 		verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned or 'var &= const'\n",
6616 			regno);
6617 		return -EACCES;
6618 	}
6619 
6620 	if (reg->umin_value == 0) {
6621 		err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1, 0,
6622 					      zero_size_allowed,
6623 					      meta);
6624 		if (err)
6625 			return err;
6626 	}
6627 
6628 	if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ) {
6629 		verbose(env, "R%d unbounded memory access, use 'var &= const' or 'if (var < const)'\n",
6630 			regno);
6631 		return -EACCES;
6632 	}
6633 	err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1,
6634 				      reg->umax_value,
6635 				      zero_size_allowed, meta);
6636 	if (!err)
6637 		err = mark_chain_precision(env, regno);
6638 	return err;
6639 }
6640 
6641 int check_mem_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
6642 		   u32 regno, u32 mem_size)
6643 {
6644 	bool may_be_null = type_may_be_null(reg->type);
6645 	struct bpf_reg_state saved_reg;
6646 	struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta;
6647 	int err;
6648 
6649 	if (register_is_null(reg))
6650 		return 0;
6651 
6652 	memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta));
6653 	/* Assuming that the register contains a value check if the memory
6654 	 * access is safe. Temporarily save and restore the register's state as
6655 	 * the conversion shouldn't be visible to a caller.
6656 	 */
6657 	if (may_be_null) {
6658 		saved_reg = *reg;
6659 		mark_ptr_not_null_reg(reg);
6660 	}
6661 
6662 	err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, mem_size, true, &meta);
6663 	/* Check access for BPF_WRITE */
6664 	meta.raw_mode = true;
6665 	err = err ?: check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, mem_size, true, &meta);
6666 
6667 	if (may_be_null)
6668 		*reg = saved_reg;
6669 
6670 	return err;
6671 }
6672 
6673 static int check_kfunc_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
6674 				    u32 regno)
6675 {
6676 	struct bpf_reg_state *mem_reg = &cur_regs(env)[regno - 1];
6677 	bool may_be_null = type_may_be_null(mem_reg->type);
6678 	struct bpf_reg_state saved_reg;
6679 	struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta;
6680 	int err;
6681 
6682 	WARN_ON_ONCE(regno < BPF_REG_2 || regno > BPF_REG_5);
6683 
6684 	memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta));
6685 
6686 	if (may_be_null) {
6687 		saved_reg = *mem_reg;
6688 		mark_ptr_not_null_reg(mem_reg);
6689 	}
6690 
6691 	err = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, true, &meta);
6692 	/* Check access for BPF_WRITE */
6693 	meta.raw_mode = true;
6694 	err = err ?: check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, true, &meta);
6695 
6696 	if (may_be_null)
6697 		*mem_reg = saved_reg;
6698 	return err;
6699 }
6700 
6701 /* Implementation details:
6702  * bpf_map_lookup returns PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL.
6703  * bpf_obj_new returns PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_MAYBE_NULL.
6704  * Two bpf_map_lookups (even with the same key) will have different reg->id.
6705  * Two separate bpf_obj_new will also have different reg->id.
6706  * For traditional PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE or PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC, the verifier
6707  * clears reg->id after value_or_null->value transition, since the verifier only
6708  * cares about the range of access to valid map value pointer and doesn't care
6709  * about actual address of the map element.
6710  * For maps with 'struct bpf_spin_lock' inside map value the verifier keeps
6711  * reg->id > 0 after value_or_null->value transition. By doing so
6712  * two bpf_map_lookups will be considered two different pointers that
6713  * point to different bpf_spin_locks. Likewise for pointers to allocated objects
6714  * returned from bpf_obj_new.
6715  * The verifier allows taking only one bpf_spin_lock at a time to avoid
6716  * dead-locks.
6717  * Since only one bpf_spin_lock is allowed the checks are simpler than
6718  * reg_is_refcounted() logic. The verifier needs to remember only
6719  * one spin_lock instead of array of acquired_refs.
6720  * cur_state->active_lock remembers which map value element or allocated
6721  * object got locked and clears it after bpf_spin_unlock.
6722  */
6723 static int process_spin_lock(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
6724 			     bool is_lock)
6725 {
6726 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = &regs[regno];
6727 	struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state;
6728 	bool is_const = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off);
6729 	u64 val = reg->var_off.value;
6730 	struct bpf_map *map = NULL;
6731 	struct btf *btf = NULL;
6732 	struct btf_record *rec;
6733 
6734 	if (!is_const) {
6735 		verbose(env,
6736 			"R%d doesn't have constant offset. bpf_spin_lock has to be at the constant offset\n",
6737 			regno);
6738 		return -EINVAL;
6739 	}
6740 	if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
6741 		map = reg->map_ptr;
6742 		if (!map->btf) {
6743 			verbose(env,
6744 				"map '%s' has to have BTF in order to use bpf_spin_lock\n",
6745 				map->name);
6746 			return -EINVAL;
6747 		}
6748 	} else {
6749 		btf = reg->btf;
6750 	}
6751 
6752 	rec = reg_btf_record(reg);
6753 	if (!btf_record_has_field(rec, BPF_SPIN_LOCK)) {
6754 		verbose(env, "%s '%s' has no valid bpf_spin_lock\n", map ? "map" : "local",
6755 			map ? map->name : "kptr");
6756 		return -EINVAL;
6757 	}
6758 	if (rec->spin_lock_off != val + reg->off) {
6759 		verbose(env, "off %lld doesn't point to 'struct bpf_spin_lock' that is at %d\n",
6760 			val + reg->off, rec->spin_lock_off);
6761 		return -EINVAL;
6762 	}
6763 	if (is_lock) {
6764 		if (cur->active_lock.ptr) {
6765 			verbose(env,
6766 				"Locking two bpf_spin_locks are not allowed\n");
6767 			return -EINVAL;
6768 		}
6769 		if (map)
6770 			cur->active_lock.ptr = map;
6771 		else
6772 			cur->active_lock.ptr = btf;
6773 		cur->active_lock.id = reg->id;
6774 	} else {
6775 		void *ptr;
6776 
6777 		if (map)
6778 			ptr = map;
6779 		else
6780 			ptr = btf;
6781 
6782 		if (!cur->active_lock.ptr) {
6783 			verbose(env, "bpf_spin_unlock without taking a lock\n");
6784 			return -EINVAL;
6785 		}
6786 		if (cur->active_lock.ptr != ptr ||
6787 		    cur->active_lock.id != reg->id) {
6788 			verbose(env, "bpf_spin_unlock of different lock\n");
6789 			return -EINVAL;
6790 		}
6791 
6792 		invalidate_non_owning_refs(env);
6793 
6794 		cur->active_lock.ptr = NULL;
6795 		cur->active_lock.id = 0;
6796 	}
6797 	return 0;
6798 }
6799 
6800 static int process_timer_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
6801 			      struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
6802 {
6803 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = &regs[regno];
6804 	bool is_const = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off);
6805 	struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr;
6806 	u64 val = reg->var_off.value;
6807 
6808 	if (!is_const) {
6809 		verbose(env,
6810 			"R%d doesn't have constant offset. bpf_timer has to be at the constant offset\n",
6811 			regno);
6812 		return -EINVAL;
6813 	}
6814 	if (!map->btf) {
6815 		verbose(env, "map '%s' has to have BTF in order to use bpf_timer\n",
6816 			map->name);
6817 		return -EINVAL;
6818 	}
6819 	if (!btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_TIMER)) {
6820 		verbose(env, "map '%s' has no valid bpf_timer\n", map->name);
6821 		return -EINVAL;
6822 	}
6823 	if (map->record->timer_off != val + reg->off) {
6824 		verbose(env, "off %lld doesn't point to 'struct bpf_timer' that is at %d\n",
6825 			val + reg->off, map->record->timer_off);
6826 		return -EINVAL;
6827 	}
6828 	if (meta->map_ptr) {
6829 		verbose(env, "verifier bug. Two map pointers in a timer helper\n");
6830 		return -EFAULT;
6831 	}
6832 	meta->map_uid = reg->map_uid;
6833 	meta->map_ptr = map;
6834 	return 0;
6835 }
6836 
6837 static int process_kptr_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
6838 			     struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
6839 {
6840 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = &regs[regno];
6841 	struct bpf_map *map_ptr = reg->map_ptr;
6842 	struct btf_field *kptr_field;
6843 	u32 kptr_off;
6844 
6845 	if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
6846 		verbose(env,
6847 			"R%d doesn't have constant offset. kptr has to be at the constant offset\n",
6848 			regno);
6849 		return -EINVAL;
6850 	}
6851 	if (!map_ptr->btf) {
6852 		verbose(env, "map '%s' has to have BTF in order to use bpf_kptr_xchg\n",
6853 			map_ptr->name);
6854 		return -EINVAL;
6855 	}
6856 	if (!btf_record_has_field(map_ptr->record, BPF_KPTR)) {
6857 		verbose(env, "map '%s' has no valid kptr\n", map_ptr->name);
6858 		return -EINVAL;
6859 	}
6860 
6861 	meta->map_ptr = map_ptr;
6862 	kptr_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value;
6863 	kptr_field = btf_record_find(map_ptr->record, kptr_off, BPF_KPTR);
6864 	if (!kptr_field) {
6865 		verbose(env, "off=%d doesn't point to kptr\n", kptr_off);
6866 		return -EACCES;
6867 	}
6868 	if (kptr_field->type != BPF_KPTR_REF) {
6869 		verbose(env, "off=%d kptr isn't referenced kptr\n", kptr_off);
6870 		return -EACCES;
6871 	}
6872 	meta->kptr_field = kptr_field;
6873 	return 0;
6874 }
6875 
6876 /* There are two register types representing a bpf_dynptr, one is PTR_TO_STACK
6877  * which points to a stack slot, and the other is CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR.
6878  *
6879  * In both cases we deal with the first 8 bytes, but need to mark the next 8
6880  * bytes as STACK_DYNPTR in case of PTR_TO_STACK. In case of
6881  * CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, we are guaranteed to get the beginning of the object.
6882  *
6883  * Mutability of bpf_dynptr is at two levels, one is at the level of struct
6884  * bpf_dynptr itself, i.e. whether the helper is receiving a pointer to struct
6885  * bpf_dynptr or pointer to const struct bpf_dynptr. In the former case, it can
6886  * mutate the view of the dynptr and also possibly destroy it. In the latter
6887  * case, it cannot mutate the bpf_dynptr itself but it can still mutate the
6888  * memory that dynptr points to.
6889  *
6890  * The verifier will keep track both levels of mutation (bpf_dynptr's in
6891  * reg->type and the memory's in reg->dynptr.type), but there is no support for
6892  * readonly dynptr view yet, hence only the first case is tracked and checked.
6893  *
6894  * This is consistent with how C applies the const modifier to a struct object,
6895  * where the pointer itself inside bpf_dynptr becomes const but not what it
6896  * points to.
6897  *
6898  * Helpers which do not mutate the bpf_dynptr set MEM_RDONLY in their argument
6899  * type, and declare it as 'const struct bpf_dynptr *' in their prototype.
6900  */
6901 static int process_dynptr_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int insn_idx,
6902 			       enum bpf_arg_type arg_type, int clone_ref_obj_id)
6903 {
6904 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = &regs[regno];
6905 	int err;
6906 
6907 	/* MEM_UNINIT and MEM_RDONLY are exclusive, when applied to an
6908 	 * ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR (or ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR | DYNPTR_TYPE_*):
6909 	 */
6910 	if ((arg_type & (MEM_UNINIT | MEM_RDONLY)) == (MEM_UNINIT | MEM_RDONLY)) {
6911 		verbose(env, "verifier internal error: misconfigured dynptr helper type flags\n");
6912 		return -EFAULT;
6913 	}
6914 
6915 	/*  MEM_UNINIT - Points to memory that is an appropriate candidate for
6916 	 *		 constructing a mutable bpf_dynptr object.
6917 	 *
6918 	 *		 Currently, this is only possible with PTR_TO_STACK
6919 	 *		 pointing to a region of at least 16 bytes which doesn't
6920 	 *		 contain an existing bpf_dynptr.
6921 	 *
6922 	 *  MEM_RDONLY - Points to a initialized bpf_dynptr that will not be
6923 	 *		 mutated or destroyed. However, the memory it points to
6924 	 *		 may be mutated.
6925 	 *
6926 	 *  None       - Points to a initialized dynptr that can be mutated and
6927 	 *		 destroyed, including mutation of the memory it points
6928 	 *		 to.
6929 	 */
6930 	if (arg_type & MEM_UNINIT) {
6931 		int i;
6932 
6933 		if (!is_dynptr_reg_valid_uninit(env, reg)) {
6934 			verbose(env, "Dynptr has to be an uninitialized dynptr\n");
6935 			return -EINVAL;
6936 		}
6937 
6938 		/* we write BPF_DW bits (8 bytes) at a time */
6939 		for (i = 0; i < BPF_DYNPTR_SIZE; i += 8) {
6940 			err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, regno,
6941 					       i, BPF_DW, BPF_WRITE, -1, false);
6942 			if (err)
6943 				return err;
6944 		}
6945 
6946 		err = mark_stack_slots_dynptr(env, reg, arg_type, insn_idx, clone_ref_obj_id);
6947 	} else /* MEM_RDONLY and None case from above */ {
6948 		/* For the reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK case, bpf_dynptr is never const */
6949 		if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR && !(arg_type & MEM_RDONLY)) {
6950 			verbose(env, "cannot pass pointer to const bpf_dynptr, the helper mutates it\n");
6951 			return -EINVAL;
6952 		}
6953 
6954 		if (!is_dynptr_reg_valid_init(env, reg)) {
6955 			verbose(env,
6956 				"Expected an initialized dynptr as arg #%d\n",
6957 				regno);
6958 			return -EINVAL;
6959 		}
6960 
6961 		/* Fold modifiers (in this case, MEM_RDONLY) when checking expected type */
6962 		if (!is_dynptr_type_expected(env, reg, arg_type & ~MEM_RDONLY)) {
6963 			verbose(env,
6964 				"Expected a dynptr of type %s as arg #%d\n",
6965 				dynptr_type_str(arg_to_dynptr_type(arg_type)), regno);
6966 			return -EINVAL;
6967 		}
6968 
6969 		err = mark_dynptr_read(env, reg);
6970 	}
6971 	return err;
6972 }
6973 
6974 static u32 iter_ref_obj_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int spi)
6975 {
6976 	struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
6977 
6978 	return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id;
6979 }
6980 
6981 static bool is_iter_kfunc(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
6982 {
6983 	return meta->kfunc_flags & (KF_ITER_NEW | KF_ITER_NEXT | KF_ITER_DESTROY);
6984 }
6985 
6986 static bool is_iter_new_kfunc(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
6987 {
6988 	return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_ITER_NEW;
6989 }
6990 
6991 static bool is_iter_next_kfunc(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
6992 {
6993 	return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_ITER_NEXT;
6994 }
6995 
6996 static bool is_iter_destroy_kfunc(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
6997 {
6998 	return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_ITER_DESTROY;
6999 }
7000 
7001 static bool is_kfunc_arg_iter(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, int arg)
7002 {
7003 	/* btf_check_iter_kfuncs() guarantees that first argument of any iter
7004 	 * kfunc is iter state pointer
7005 	 */
7006 	return arg == 0 && is_iter_kfunc(meta);
7007 }
7008 
7009 static int process_iter_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int insn_idx,
7010 			    struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
7011 {
7012 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = &regs[regno];
7013 	const struct btf_type *t;
7014 	const struct btf_param *arg;
7015 	int spi, err, i, nr_slots;
7016 	u32 btf_id;
7017 
7018 	/* btf_check_iter_kfuncs() ensures we don't need to validate anything here */
7019 	arg = &btf_params(meta->func_proto)[0];
7020 	t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(meta->btf, arg->type, NULL);	/* PTR */
7021 	t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(meta->btf, t->type, &btf_id);	/* STRUCT */
7022 	nr_slots = t->size / BPF_REG_SIZE;
7023 
7024 	if (is_iter_new_kfunc(meta)) {
7025 		/* bpf_iter_<type>_new() expects pointer to uninit iter state */
7026 		if (!is_iter_reg_valid_uninit(env, reg, nr_slots)) {
7027 			verbose(env, "expected uninitialized iter_%s as arg #%d\n",
7028 				iter_type_str(meta->btf, btf_id), regno);
7029 			return -EINVAL;
7030 		}
7031 
7032 		for (i = 0; i < nr_slots * 8; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) {
7033 			err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, regno,
7034 					       i, BPF_DW, BPF_WRITE, -1, false);
7035 			if (err)
7036 				return err;
7037 		}
7038 
7039 		err = mark_stack_slots_iter(env, reg, insn_idx, meta->btf, btf_id, nr_slots);
7040 		if (err)
7041 			return err;
7042 	} else {
7043 		/* iter_next() or iter_destroy() expect initialized iter state*/
7044 		if (!is_iter_reg_valid_init(env, reg, meta->btf, btf_id, nr_slots)) {
7045 			verbose(env, "expected an initialized iter_%s as arg #%d\n",
7046 				iter_type_str(meta->btf, btf_id), regno);
7047 			return -EINVAL;
7048 		}
7049 
7050 		spi = iter_get_spi(env, reg, nr_slots);
7051 		if (spi < 0)
7052 			return spi;
7053 
7054 		err = mark_iter_read(env, reg, spi, nr_slots);
7055 		if (err)
7056 			return err;
7057 
7058 		/* remember meta->iter info for process_iter_next_call() */
7059 		meta->iter.spi = spi;
7060 		meta->iter.frameno = reg->frameno;
7061 		meta->ref_obj_id = iter_ref_obj_id(env, reg, spi);
7062 
7063 		if (is_iter_destroy_kfunc(meta)) {
7064 			err = unmark_stack_slots_iter(env, reg, nr_slots);
7065 			if (err)
7066 				return err;
7067 		}
7068 	}
7069 
7070 	return 0;
7071 }
7072 
7073 /* process_iter_next_call() is called when verifier gets to iterator's next
7074  * "method" (e.g., bpf_iter_num_next() for numbers iterator) call. We'll refer
7075  * to it as just "iter_next()" in comments below.
7076  *
7077  * BPF verifier relies on a crucial contract for any iter_next()
7078  * implementation: it should *eventually* return NULL, and once that happens
7079  * it should keep returning NULL. That is, once iterator exhausts elements to
7080  * iterate, it should never reset or spuriously return new elements.
7081  *
7082  * With the assumption of such contract, process_iter_next_call() simulates
7083  * a fork in the verifier state to validate loop logic correctness and safety
7084  * without having to simulate infinite amount of iterations.
7085  *
7086  * In current state, we first assume that iter_next() returned NULL and
7087  * iterator state is set to DRAINED (BPF_ITER_STATE_DRAINED). In such
7088  * conditions we should not form an infinite loop and should eventually reach
7089  * exit.
7090  *
7091  * Besides that, we also fork current state and enqueue it for later
7092  * verification. In a forked state we keep iterator state as ACTIVE
7093  * (BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE) and assume non-NULL return from iter_next(). We
7094  * also bump iteration depth to prevent erroneous infinite loop detection
7095  * later on (see iter_active_depths_differ() comment for details). In this
7096  * state we assume that we'll eventually loop back to another iter_next()
7097  * calls (it could be in exactly same location or in some other instruction,
7098  * it doesn't matter, we don't make any unnecessary assumptions about this,
7099  * everything revolves around iterator state in a stack slot, not which
7100  * instruction is calling iter_next()). When that happens, we either will come
7101  * to iter_next() with equivalent state and can conclude that next iteration
7102  * will proceed in exactly the same way as we just verified, so it's safe to
7103  * assume that loop converges. If not, we'll go on another iteration
7104  * simulation with a different input state, until all possible starting states
7105  * are validated or we reach maximum number of instructions limit.
7106  *
7107  * This way, we will either exhaustively discover all possible input states
7108  * that iterator loop can start with and eventually will converge, or we'll
7109  * effectively regress into bounded loop simulation logic and either reach
7110  * maximum number of instructions if loop is not provably convergent, or there
7111  * is some statically known limit on number of iterations (e.g., if there is
7112  * an explicit `if n > 100 then break;` statement somewhere in the loop).
7113  *
7114  * One very subtle but very important aspect is that we *always* simulate NULL
7115  * condition first (as the current state) before we simulate non-NULL case.
7116  * This has to do with intricacies of scalar precision tracking. By simulating
7117  * "exit condition" of iter_next() returning NULL first, we make sure all the
7118  * relevant precision marks *that will be set **after** we exit iterator loop*
7119  * are propagated backwards to common parent state of NULL and non-NULL
7120  * branches. Thanks to that, state equivalence checks done later in forked
7121  * state, when reaching iter_next() for ACTIVE iterator, can assume that
7122  * precision marks are finalized and won't change. Because simulating another
7123  * ACTIVE iterator iteration won't change them (because given same input
7124  * states we'll end up with exactly same output states which we are currently
7125  * comparing; and verification after the loop already propagated back what
7126  * needs to be **additionally** tracked as precise). It's subtle, grok
7127  * precision tracking for more intuitive understanding.
7128  */
7129 static int process_iter_next_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx,
7130 				  struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
7131 {
7132 	struct bpf_verifier_state *cur_st = env->cur_state, *queued_st;
7133 	struct bpf_func_state *cur_fr = cur_st->frame[cur_st->curframe], *queued_fr;
7134 	struct bpf_reg_state *cur_iter, *queued_iter;
7135 	int iter_frameno = meta->iter.frameno;
7136 	int iter_spi = meta->iter.spi;
7137 
7138 	BTF_TYPE_EMIT(struct bpf_iter);
7139 
7140 	cur_iter = &env->cur_state->frame[iter_frameno]->stack[iter_spi].spilled_ptr;
7141 
7142 	if (cur_iter->iter.state != BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE &&
7143 	    cur_iter->iter.state != BPF_ITER_STATE_DRAINED) {
7144 		verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected iterator state %d (%s)\n",
7145 			cur_iter->iter.state, iter_state_str(cur_iter->iter.state));
7146 		return -EFAULT;
7147 	}
7148 
7149 	if (cur_iter->iter.state == BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE) {
7150 		/* branch out active iter state */
7151 		queued_st = push_stack(env, insn_idx + 1, insn_idx, false);
7152 		if (!queued_st)
7153 			return -ENOMEM;
7154 
7155 		queued_iter = &queued_st->frame[iter_frameno]->stack[iter_spi].spilled_ptr;
7156 		queued_iter->iter.state = BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE;
7157 		queued_iter->iter.depth++;
7158 
7159 		queued_fr = queued_st->frame[queued_st->curframe];
7160 		mark_ptr_not_null_reg(&queued_fr->regs[BPF_REG_0]);
7161 	}
7162 
7163 	/* switch to DRAINED state, but keep the depth unchanged */
7164 	/* mark current iter state as drained and assume returned NULL */
7165 	cur_iter->iter.state = BPF_ITER_STATE_DRAINED;
7166 	__mark_reg_const_zero(&cur_fr->regs[BPF_REG_0]);
7167 
7168 	return 0;
7169 }
7170 
7171 static bool arg_type_is_mem_size(enum bpf_arg_type type)
7172 {
7173 	return type == ARG_CONST_SIZE ||
7174 	       type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO;
7175 }
7176 
7177 static bool arg_type_is_release(enum bpf_arg_type type)
7178 {
7179 	return type & OBJ_RELEASE;
7180 }
7181 
7182 static bool arg_type_is_dynptr(enum bpf_arg_type type)
7183 {
7184 	return base_type(type) == ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR;
7185 }
7186 
7187 static int int_ptr_type_to_size(enum bpf_arg_type type)
7188 {
7189 	if (type == ARG_PTR_TO_INT)
7190 		return sizeof(u32);
7191 	else if (type == ARG_PTR_TO_LONG)
7192 		return sizeof(u64);
7193 
7194 	return -EINVAL;
7195 }
7196 
7197 static int resolve_map_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
7198 				 const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,
7199 				 enum bpf_arg_type *arg_type)
7200 {
7201 	if (!meta->map_ptr) {
7202 		/* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */
7203 		verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->type\n");
7204 		return -EACCES;
7205 	}
7206 
7207 	switch (meta->map_ptr->map_type) {
7208 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP:
7209 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH:
7210 		if (*arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
7211 			*arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_SOCK_COMMON;
7212 		} else {
7213 			verbose(env, "invalid arg_type for sockmap/sockhash\n");
7214 			return -EINVAL;
7215 		}
7216 		break;
7217 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER:
7218 		if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem)
7219 			*arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE;
7220 		break;
7221 	default:
7222 		break;
7223 	}
7224 	return 0;
7225 }
7226 
7227 struct bpf_reg_types {
7228 	const enum bpf_reg_type types[10];
7229 	u32 *btf_id;
7230 };
7231 
7232 static const struct bpf_reg_types sock_types = {
7233 	.types = {
7234 		PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON,
7235 		PTR_TO_SOCKET,
7236 		PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK,
7237 		PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK,
7238 	},
7239 };
7240 
7241 #ifdef CONFIG_NET
7242 static const struct bpf_reg_types btf_id_sock_common_types = {
7243 	.types = {
7244 		PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON,
7245 		PTR_TO_SOCKET,
7246 		PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK,
7247 		PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK,
7248 		PTR_TO_BTF_ID,
7249 		PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED,
7250 	},
7251 	.btf_id = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_SOCK_COMMON],
7252 };
7253 #endif
7254 
7255 static const struct bpf_reg_types mem_types = {
7256 	.types = {
7257 		PTR_TO_STACK,
7258 		PTR_TO_PACKET,
7259 		PTR_TO_PACKET_META,
7260 		PTR_TO_MAP_KEY,
7261 		PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE,
7262 		PTR_TO_MEM,
7263 		PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RINGBUF,
7264 		PTR_TO_BUF,
7265 		PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED,
7266 	},
7267 };
7268 
7269 static const struct bpf_reg_types int_ptr_types = {
7270 	.types = {
7271 		PTR_TO_STACK,
7272 		PTR_TO_PACKET,
7273 		PTR_TO_PACKET_META,
7274 		PTR_TO_MAP_KEY,
7275 		PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE,
7276 	},
7277 };
7278 
7279 static const struct bpf_reg_types spin_lock_types = {
7280 	.types = {
7281 		PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE,
7282 		PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC,
7283 	}
7284 };
7285 
7286 static const struct bpf_reg_types fullsock_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_SOCKET } };
7287 static const struct bpf_reg_types scalar_types = { .types = { SCALAR_VALUE } };
7288 static const struct bpf_reg_types context_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_CTX } };
7289 static const struct bpf_reg_types ringbuf_mem_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RINGBUF } };
7290 static const struct bpf_reg_types const_map_ptr_types = { .types = { CONST_PTR_TO_MAP } };
7291 static const struct bpf_reg_types btf_ptr_types = {
7292 	.types = {
7293 		PTR_TO_BTF_ID,
7294 		PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED,
7295 		PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_RCU,
7296 	},
7297 };
7298 static const struct bpf_reg_types percpu_btf_ptr_types = {
7299 	.types = {
7300 		PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU,
7301 		PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU | PTR_TRUSTED,
7302 	}
7303 };
7304 static const struct bpf_reg_types func_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_FUNC } };
7305 static const struct bpf_reg_types stack_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_STACK } };
7306 static const struct bpf_reg_types const_str_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE } };
7307 static const struct bpf_reg_types timer_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE } };
7308 static const struct bpf_reg_types kptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE } };
7309 static const struct bpf_reg_types dynptr_types = {
7310 	.types = {
7311 		PTR_TO_STACK,
7312 		CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR,
7313 	}
7314 };
7315 
7316 static const struct bpf_reg_types *compatible_reg_types[__BPF_ARG_TYPE_MAX] = {
7317 	[ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY]		= &mem_types,
7318 	[ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE]		= &mem_types,
7319 	[ARG_CONST_SIZE]		= &scalar_types,
7320 	[ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO]	= &scalar_types,
7321 	[ARG_CONST_ALLOC_SIZE_OR_ZERO]	= &scalar_types,
7322 	[ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR]		= &const_map_ptr_types,
7323 	[ARG_PTR_TO_CTX]		= &context_types,
7324 	[ARG_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON]	= &sock_types,
7325 #ifdef CONFIG_NET
7326 	[ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_SOCK_COMMON]	= &btf_id_sock_common_types,
7327 #endif
7328 	[ARG_PTR_TO_SOCKET]		= &fullsock_types,
7329 	[ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID]		= &btf_ptr_types,
7330 	[ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK]		= &spin_lock_types,
7331 	[ARG_PTR_TO_MEM]		= &mem_types,
7332 	[ARG_PTR_TO_RINGBUF_MEM]	= &ringbuf_mem_types,
7333 	[ARG_PTR_TO_INT]		= &int_ptr_types,
7334 	[ARG_PTR_TO_LONG]		= &int_ptr_types,
7335 	[ARG_PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID]	= &percpu_btf_ptr_types,
7336 	[ARG_PTR_TO_FUNC]		= &func_ptr_types,
7337 	[ARG_PTR_TO_STACK]		= &stack_ptr_types,
7338 	[ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR]		= &const_str_ptr_types,
7339 	[ARG_PTR_TO_TIMER]		= &timer_types,
7340 	[ARG_PTR_TO_KPTR]		= &kptr_types,
7341 	[ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR]		= &dynptr_types,
7342 };
7343 
7344 static int check_reg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
7345 			  enum bpf_arg_type arg_type,
7346 			  const u32 *arg_btf_id,
7347 			  struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
7348 {
7349 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = &regs[regno];
7350 	enum bpf_reg_type expected, type = reg->type;
7351 	const struct bpf_reg_types *compatible;
7352 	int i, j;
7353 
7354 	compatible = compatible_reg_types[base_type(arg_type)];
7355 	if (!compatible) {
7356 		verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unsupported arg type %d\n", arg_type);
7357 		return -EFAULT;
7358 	}
7359 
7360 	/* ARG_PTR_TO_MEM + RDONLY is compatible with PTR_TO_MEM and PTR_TO_MEM + RDONLY,
7361 	 * but ARG_PTR_TO_MEM is compatible only with PTR_TO_MEM and NOT with PTR_TO_MEM + RDONLY
7362 	 *
7363 	 * Same for MAYBE_NULL:
7364 	 *
7365 	 * ARG_PTR_TO_MEM + MAYBE_NULL is compatible with PTR_TO_MEM and PTR_TO_MEM + MAYBE_NULL,
7366 	 * but ARG_PTR_TO_MEM is compatible only with PTR_TO_MEM but NOT with PTR_TO_MEM + MAYBE_NULL
7367 	 *
7368 	 * Therefore we fold these flags depending on the arg_type before comparison.
7369 	 */
7370 	if (arg_type & MEM_RDONLY)
7371 		type &= ~MEM_RDONLY;
7372 	if (arg_type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL)
7373 		type &= ~PTR_MAYBE_NULL;
7374 
7375 	if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg && type & MEM_ALLOC)
7376 		type &= ~MEM_ALLOC;
7377 
7378 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(compatible->types); i++) {
7379 		expected = compatible->types[i];
7380 		if (expected == NOT_INIT)
7381 			break;
7382 
7383 		if (type == expected)
7384 			goto found;
7385 	}
7386 
7387 	verbose(env, "R%d type=%s expected=", regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
7388 	for (j = 0; j + 1 < i; j++)
7389 		verbose(env, "%s, ", reg_type_str(env, compatible->types[j]));
7390 	verbose(env, "%s\n", reg_type_str(env, compatible->types[j]));
7391 	return -EACCES;
7392 
7393 found:
7394 	if (base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID)
7395 		return 0;
7396 
7397 	if (compatible == &mem_types) {
7398 		if (!(arg_type & MEM_RDONLY)) {
7399 			verbose(env,
7400 				"%s() may write into memory pointed by R%d type=%s\n",
7401 				func_id_name(meta->func_id),
7402 				regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
7403 			return -EACCES;
7404 		}
7405 		return 0;
7406 	}
7407 
7408 	switch ((int)reg->type) {
7409 	case PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
7410 	case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED:
7411 	case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_RCU:
7412 	case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_MAYBE_NULL:
7413 	case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_MAYBE_NULL | MEM_RCU:
7414 	{
7415 		/* For bpf_sk_release, it needs to match against first member
7416 		 * 'struct sock_common', hence make an exception for it. This
7417 		 * allows bpf_sk_release to work for multiple socket types.
7418 		 */
7419 		bool strict_type_match = arg_type_is_release(arg_type) &&
7420 					 meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_release;
7421 
7422 		if (type_may_be_null(reg->type) &&
7423 		    (!type_may_be_null(arg_type) || arg_type_is_release(arg_type))) {
7424 			verbose(env, "Possibly NULL pointer passed to helper arg%d\n", regno);
7425 			return -EACCES;
7426 		}
7427 
7428 		if (!arg_btf_id) {
7429 			if (!compatible->btf_id) {
7430 				verbose(env, "verifier internal error: missing arg compatible BTF ID\n");
7431 				return -EFAULT;
7432 			}
7433 			arg_btf_id = compatible->btf_id;
7434 		}
7435 
7436 		if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) {
7437 			if (map_kptr_match_type(env, meta->kptr_field, reg, regno))
7438 				return -EACCES;
7439 		} else {
7440 			if (arg_btf_id == BPF_PTR_POISON) {
7441 				verbose(env, "verifier internal error:");
7442 				verbose(env, "R%d has non-overwritten BPF_PTR_POISON type\n",
7443 					regno);
7444 				return -EACCES;
7445 			}
7446 
7447 			if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg->btf, reg->btf_id, reg->off,
7448 						  btf_vmlinux, *arg_btf_id,
7449 						  strict_type_match)) {
7450 				verbose(env, "R%d is of type %s but %s is expected\n",
7451 					regno, btf_type_name(reg->btf, reg->btf_id),
7452 					btf_type_name(btf_vmlinux, *arg_btf_id));
7453 				return -EACCES;
7454 			}
7455 		}
7456 		break;
7457 	}
7458 	case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC:
7459 		if (meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_spin_lock && meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock &&
7460 		    meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) {
7461 			verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unimplemented handling of MEM_ALLOC\n");
7462 			return -EFAULT;
7463 		}
7464 		/* Handled by helper specific checks */
7465 		break;
7466 	case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU:
7467 	case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU | PTR_TRUSTED:
7468 		/* Handled by helper specific checks */
7469 		break;
7470 	default:
7471 		verbose(env, "verifier internal error: invalid PTR_TO_BTF_ID register for type match\n");
7472 		return -EFAULT;
7473 	}
7474 	return 0;
7475 }
7476 
7477 static struct btf_field *
7478 reg_find_field_offset(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, s32 off, u32 fields)
7479 {
7480 	struct btf_field *field;
7481 	struct btf_record *rec;
7482 
7483 	rec = reg_btf_record(reg);
7484 	if (!rec)
7485 		return NULL;
7486 
7487 	field = btf_record_find(rec, off, fields);
7488 	if (!field)
7489 		return NULL;
7490 
7491 	return field;
7492 }
7493 
7494 int check_func_arg_reg_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
7495 			   const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno,
7496 			   enum bpf_arg_type arg_type)
7497 {
7498 	u32 type = reg->type;
7499 
7500 	/* When referenced register is passed to release function, its fixed
7501 	 * offset must be 0.
7502 	 *
7503 	 * We will check arg_type_is_release reg has ref_obj_id when storing
7504 	 * meta->release_regno.
7505 	 */
7506 	if (arg_type_is_release(arg_type)) {
7507 		/* ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR with OBJ_RELEASE is a bit special, as it
7508 		 * may not directly point to the object being released, but to
7509 		 * dynptr pointing to such object, which might be at some offset
7510 		 * on the stack. In that case, we simply to fallback to the
7511 		 * default handling.
7512 		 */
7513 		if (arg_type_is_dynptr(arg_type) && type == PTR_TO_STACK)
7514 			return 0;
7515 
7516 		if ((type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(type) || type_is_non_owning_ref(type)) && reg->off) {
7517 			if (reg_find_field_offset(reg, reg->off, BPF_GRAPH_NODE_OR_ROOT))
7518 				return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, true);
7519 
7520 			verbose(env, "R%d must have zero offset when passed to release func\n",
7521 				regno);
7522 			verbose(env, "No graph node or root found at R%d type:%s off:%d\n", regno,
7523 				btf_type_name(reg->btf, reg->btf_id), reg->off);
7524 			return -EINVAL;
7525 		}
7526 
7527 		/* Doing check_ptr_off_reg check for the offset will catch this
7528 		 * because fixed_off_ok is false, but checking here allows us
7529 		 * to give the user a better error message.
7530 		 */
7531 		if (reg->off) {
7532 			verbose(env, "R%d must have zero offset when passed to release func or trusted arg to kfunc\n",
7533 				regno);
7534 			return -EINVAL;
7535 		}
7536 		return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, false);
7537 	}
7538 
7539 	switch (type) {
7540 	/* Pointer types where both fixed and variable offset is explicitly allowed: */
7541 	case PTR_TO_STACK:
7542 	case PTR_TO_PACKET:
7543 	case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
7544 	case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY:
7545 	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
7546 	case PTR_TO_MEM:
7547 	case PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY:
7548 	case PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RINGBUF:
7549 	case PTR_TO_BUF:
7550 	case PTR_TO_BUF | MEM_RDONLY:
7551 	case SCALAR_VALUE:
7552 		return 0;
7553 	/* All the rest must be rejected, except PTR_TO_BTF_ID which allows
7554 	 * fixed offset.
7555 	 */
7556 	case PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
7557 	case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC:
7558 	case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED:
7559 	case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_RCU:
7560 	case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | NON_OWN_REF:
7561 		/* When referenced PTR_TO_BTF_ID is passed to release function,
7562 		 * its fixed offset must be 0. In the other cases, fixed offset
7563 		 * can be non-zero. This was already checked above. So pass
7564 		 * fixed_off_ok as true to allow fixed offset for all other
7565 		 * cases. var_off always must be 0 for PTR_TO_BTF_ID, hence we
7566 		 * still need to do checks instead of returning.
7567 		 */
7568 		return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, true);
7569 	default:
7570 		return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, false);
7571 	}
7572 }
7573 
7574 static struct bpf_reg_state *get_dynptr_arg_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
7575 						const struct bpf_func_proto *fn,
7576 						struct bpf_reg_state *regs)
7577 {
7578 	struct bpf_reg_state *state = NULL;
7579 	int i;
7580 
7581 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS; i++)
7582 		if (arg_type_is_dynptr(fn->arg_type[i])) {
7583 			if (state) {
7584 				verbose(env, "verifier internal error: multiple dynptr args\n");
7585 				return NULL;
7586 			}
7587 			state = &regs[BPF_REG_1 + i];
7588 		}
7589 
7590 	if (!state)
7591 		verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no dynptr arg found\n");
7592 
7593 	return state;
7594 }
7595 
7596 static int dynptr_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
7597 {
7598 	struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
7599 	int spi;
7600 
7601 	if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR)
7602 		return reg->id;
7603 	spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg);
7604 	if (spi < 0)
7605 		return spi;
7606 	return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.id;
7607 }
7608 
7609 static int dynptr_ref_obj_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
7610 {
7611 	struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
7612 	int spi;
7613 
7614 	if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR)
7615 		return reg->ref_obj_id;
7616 	spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg);
7617 	if (spi < 0)
7618 		return spi;
7619 	return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id;
7620 }
7621 
7622 static enum bpf_dynptr_type dynptr_get_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
7623 					    struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
7624 {
7625 	struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
7626 	int spi;
7627 
7628 	if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR)
7629 		return reg->dynptr.type;
7630 
7631 	spi = __get_spi(reg->off);
7632 	if (spi < 0) {
7633 		verbose(env, "verifier internal error: invalid spi when querying dynptr type\n");
7634 		return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID;
7635 	}
7636 
7637 	return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type;
7638 }
7639 
7640 static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg,
7641 			  struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,
7642 			  const struct bpf_func_proto *fn,
7643 			  int insn_idx)
7644 {
7645 	u32 regno = BPF_REG_1 + arg;
7646 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = &regs[regno];
7647 	enum bpf_arg_type arg_type = fn->arg_type[arg];
7648 	enum bpf_reg_type type = reg->type;
7649 	u32 *arg_btf_id = NULL;
7650 	int err = 0;
7651 
7652 	if (arg_type == ARG_DONTCARE)
7653 		return 0;
7654 
7655 	err = check_reg_arg(env, regno, SRC_OP);
7656 	if (err)
7657 		return err;
7658 
7659 	if (arg_type == ARG_ANYTHING) {
7660 		if (is_pointer_value(env, regno)) {
7661 			verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into helper function\n",
7662 				regno);
7663 			return -EACCES;
7664 		}
7665 		return 0;
7666 	}
7667 
7668 	if (type_is_pkt_pointer(type) &&
7669 	    !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, meta, BPF_READ)) {
7670 		verbose(env, "helper access to the packet is not allowed\n");
7671 		return -EACCES;
7672 	}
7673 
7674 	if (base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
7675 		err = resolve_map_arg_type(env, meta, &arg_type);
7676 		if (err)
7677 			return err;
7678 	}
7679 
7680 	if (register_is_null(reg) && type_may_be_null(arg_type))
7681 		/* A NULL register has a SCALAR_VALUE type, so skip
7682 		 * type checking.
7683 		 */
7684 		goto skip_type_check;
7685 
7686 	/* arg_btf_id and arg_size are in a union. */
7687 	if (base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID ||
7688 	    base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK)
7689 		arg_btf_id = fn->arg_btf_id[arg];
7690 
7691 	err = check_reg_type(env, regno, arg_type, arg_btf_id, meta);
7692 	if (err)
7693 		return err;
7694 
7695 	err = check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, regno, arg_type);
7696 	if (err)
7697 		return err;
7698 
7699 skip_type_check:
7700 	if (arg_type_is_release(arg_type)) {
7701 		if (arg_type_is_dynptr(arg_type)) {
7702 			struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
7703 			int spi;
7704 
7705 			/* Only dynptr created on stack can be released, thus
7706 			 * the get_spi and stack state checks for spilled_ptr
7707 			 * should only be done before process_dynptr_func for
7708 			 * PTR_TO_STACK.
7709 			 */
7710 			if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
7711 				spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg);
7712 				if (spi < 0 || !state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id) {
7713 					verbose(env, "arg %d is an unacquired reference\n", regno);
7714 					return -EINVAL;
7715 				}
7716 			} else {
7717 				verbose(env, "cannot release unowned const bpf_dynptr\n");
7718 				return -EINVAL;
7719 			}
7720 		} else if (!reg->ref_obj_id && !register_is_null(reg)) {
7721 			verbose(env, "R%d must be referenced when passed to release function\n",
7722 				regno);
7723 			return -EINVAL;
7724 		}
7725 		if (meta->release_regno) {
7726 			verbose(env, "verifier internal error: more than one release argument\n");
7727 			return -EFAULT;
7728 		}
7729 		meta->release_regno = regno;
7730 	}
7731 
7732 	if (reg->ref_obj_id) {
7733 		if (meta->ref_obj_id) {
7734 			verbose(env, "verifier internal error: more than one arg with ref_obj_id R%d %u %u\n",
7735 				regno, reg->ref_obj_id,
7736 				meta->ref_obj_id);
7737 			return -EFAULT;
7738 		}
7739 		meta->ref_obj_id = reg->ref_obj_id;
7740 	}
7741 
7742 	switch (base_type(arg_type)) {
7743 	case ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR:
7744 		/* bpf_map_xxx(map_ptr) call: remember that map_ptr */
7745 		if (meta->map_ptr) {
7746 			/* Use map_uid (which is unique id of inner map) to reject:
7747 			 * inner_map1 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(outer_map, key1)
7748 			 * inner_map2 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(outer_map, key2)
7749 			 * if (inner_map1 && inner_map2) {
7750 			 *     timer = bpf_map_lookup_elem(inner_map1);
7751 			 *     if (timer)
7752 			 *         // mismatch would have been allowed
7753 			 *         bpf_timer_init(timer, inner_map2);
7754 			 * }
7755 			 *
7756 			 * Comparing map_ptr is enough to distinguish normal and outer maps.
7757 			 */
7758 			if (meta->map_ptr != reg->map_ptr ||
7759 			    meta->map_uid != reg->map_uid) {
7760 				verbose(env,
7761 					"timer pointer in R1 map_uid=%d doesn't match map pointer in R2 map_uid=%d\n",
7762 					meta->map_uid, reg->map_uid);
7763 				return -EINVAL;
7764 			}
7765 		}
7766 		meta->map_ptr = reg->map_ptr;
7767 		meta->map_uid = reg->map_uid;
7768 		break;
7769 	case ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY:
7770 		/* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., key) call:
7771 		 * check that [key, key + map->key_size) are within
7772 		 * stack limits and initialized
7773 		 */
7774 		if (!meta->map_ptr) {
7775 			/* in function declaration map_ptr must come before
7776 			 * map_key, so that it's verified and known before
7777 			 * we have to check map_key here. Otherwise it means
7778 			 * that kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier
7779 			 */
7780 			verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->key\n");
7781 			return -EACCES;
7782 		}
7783 		err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno,
7784 					      meta->map_ptr->key_size, false,
7785 					      NULL);
7786 		break;
7787 	case ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
7788 		if (type_may_be_null(arg_type) && register_is_null(reg))
7789 			return 0;
7790 
7791 		/* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., value) call:
7792 		 * check [value, value + map->value_size) validity
7793 		 */
7794 		if (!meta->map_ptr) {
7795 			/* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */
7796 			verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->value\n");
7797 			return -EACCES;
7798 		}
7799 		meta->raw_mode = arg_type & MEM_UNINIT;
7800 		err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno,
7801 					      meta->map_ptr->value_size, false,
7802 					      meta);
7803 		break;
7804 	case ARG_PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID:
7805 		if (!reg->btf_id) {
7806 			verbose(env, "Helper has invalid btf_id in R%d\n", regno);
7807 			return -EACCES;
7808 		}
7809 		meta->ret_btf = reg->btf;
7810 		meta->ret_btf_id = reg->btf_id;
7811 		break;
7812 	case ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK:
7813 		if (in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(env)) {
7814 			verbose(env, "can't spin_{lock,unlock} in rbtree cb\n");
7815 			return -EACCES;
7816 		}
7817 		if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_spin_lock) {
7818 			err = process_spin_lock(env, regno, true);
7819 			if (err)
7820 				return err;
7821 		} else if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock) {
7822 			err = process_spin_lock(env, regno, false);
7823 			if (err)
7824 				return err;
7825 		} else {
7826 			verbose(env, "verifier internal error\n");
7827 			return -EFAULT;
7828 		}
7829 		break;
7830 	case ARG_PTR_TO_TIMER:
7831 		err = process_timer_func(env, regno, meta);
7832 		if (err)
7833 			return err;
7834 		break;
7835 	case ARG_PTR_TO_FUNC:
7836 		meta->subprogno = reg->subprogno;
7837 		break;
7838 	case ARG_PTR_TO_MEM:
7839 		/* The access to this pointer is only checked when we hit the
7840 		 * next is_mem_size argument below.
7841 		 */
7842 		meta->raw_mode = arg_type & MEM_UNINIT;
7843 		if (arg_type & MEM_FIXED_SIZE) {
7844 			err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno,
7845 						      fn->arg_size[arg], false,
7846 						      meta);
7847 		}
7848 		break;
7849 	case ARG_CONST_SIZE:
7850 		err = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, false, meta);
7851 		break;
7852 	case ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO:
7853 		err = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, true, meta);
7854 		break;
7855 	case ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR:
7856 		err = process_dynptr_func(env, regno, insn_idx, arg_type, 0);
7857 		if (err)
7858 			return err;
7859 		break;
7860 	case ARG_CONST_ALLOC_SIZE_OR_ZERO:
7861 		if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
7862 			verbose(env, "R%d is not a known constant'\n",
7863 				regno);
7864 			return -EACCES;
7865 		}
7866 		meta->mem_size = reg->var_off.value;
7867 		err = mark_chain_precision(env, regno);
7868 		if (err)
7869 			return err;
7870 		break;
7871 	case ARG_PTR_TO_INT:
7872 	case ARG_PTR_TO_LONG:
7873 	{
7874 		int size = int_ptr_type_to_size(arg_type);
7875 
7876 		err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, size, false, meta);
7877 		if (err)
7878 			return err;
7879 		err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, 0, size, true);
7880 		break;
7881 	}
7882 	case ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR:
7883 	{
7884 		struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr;
7885 		int map_off;
7886 		u64 map_addr;
7887 		char *str_ptr;
7888 
7889 		if (!bpf_map_is_rdonly(map)) {
7890 			verbose(env, "R%d does not point to a readonly map'\n", regno);
7891 			return -EACCES;
7892 		}
7893 
7894 		if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
7895 			verbose(env, "R%d is not a constant address'\n", regno);
7896 			return -EACCES;
7897 		}
7898 
7899 		if (!map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) {
7900 			verbose(env, "no direct value access support for this map type\n");
7901 			return -EACCES;
7902 		}
7903 
7904 		err = check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off,
7905 				       map->value_size - reg->off, false,
7906 				       ACCESS_HELPER);
7907 		if (err)
7908 			return err;
7909 
7910 		map_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value;
7911 		err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &map_addr, map_off);
7912 		if (err) {
7913 			verbose(env, "direct value access on string failed\n");
7914 			return err;
7915 		}
7916 
7917 		str_ptr = (char *)(long)(map_addr);
7918 		if (!strnchr(str_ptr + map_off, map->value_size - map_off, 0)) {
7919 			verbose(env, "string is not zero-terminated\n");
7920 			return -EINVAL;
7921 		}
7922 		break;
7923 	}
7924 	case ARG_PTR_TO_KPTR:
7925 		err = process_kptr_func(env, regno, meta);
7926 		if (err)
7927 			return err;
7928 		break;
7929 	}
7930 
7931 	return err;
7932 }
7933 
7934 static bool may_update_sockmap(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id)
7935 {
7936 	enum bpf_attach_type eatype = env->prog->expected_attach_type;
7937 	enum bpf_prog_type type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog);
7938 
7939 	if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem)
7940 		return false;
7941 
7942 	/* It's not possible to get access to a locked struct sock in these
7943 	 * contexts, so updating is safe.
7944 	 */
7945 	switch (type) {
7946 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING:
7947 		if (eatype == BPF_TRACE_ITER)
7948 			return true;
7949 		break;
7950 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER:
7951 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS:
7952 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT:
7953 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP:
7954 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT:
7955 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR:
7956 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP:
7957 		return true;
7958 	default:
7959 		break;
7960 	}
7961 
7962 	verbose(env, "cannot update sockmap in this context\n");
7963 	return false;
7964 }
7965 
7966 static bool allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
7967 {
7968 	return env->prog->jit_requested &&
7969 	       bpf_jit_supports_subprog_tailcalls();
7970 }
7971 
7972 static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
7973 					struct bpf_map *map, int func_id)
7974 {
7975 	if (!map)
7976 		return 0;
7977 
7978 	/* We need a two way check, first is from map perspective ... */
7979 	switch (map->map_type) {
7980 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY:
7981 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call)
7982 			goto error;
7983 		break;
7984 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY:
7985 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read &&
7986 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output &&
7987 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_output &&
7988 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read_value &&
7989 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_xdp_output)
7990 			goto error;
7991 		break;
7992 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF:
7993 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_output &&
7994 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve &&
7995 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_query &&
7996 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve_dynptr &&
7997 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_submit_dynptr &&
7998 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_discard_dynptr)
7999 			goto error;
8000 		break;
8001 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF:
8002 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain)
8003 			goto error;
8004 		break;
8005 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE:
8006 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stackid)
8007 			goto error;
8008 		break;
8009 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY:
8010 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup &&
8011 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup)
8012 			goto error;
8013 		break;
8014 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE:
8015 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE:
8016 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage)
8017 			goto error;
8018 		break;
8019 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP:
8020 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP_HASH:
8021 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map &&
8022 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem)
8023 			goto error;
8024 		break;
8025 	/* Restrict bpf side of cpumap and xskmap, open when use-cases
8026 	 * appear.
8027 	 */
8028 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP:
8029 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map)
8030 			goto error;
8031 		break;
8032 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP:
8033 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map &&
8034 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem)
8035 			goto error;
8036 		break;
8037 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS:
8038 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS:
8039 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem)
8040 			goto error;
8041 		break;
8042 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP:
8043 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map &&
8044 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update &&
8045 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem &&
8046 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_map &&
8047 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport &&
8048 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem &&
8049 		    !may_update_sockmap(env, func_id))
8050 			goto error;
8051 		break;
8052 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH:
8053 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_hash &&
8054 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_hash_update &&
8055 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem &&
8056 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_hash &&
8057 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport &&
8058 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem &&
8059 		    !may_update_sockmap(env, func_id))
8060 			goto error;
8061 		break;
8062 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY:
8063 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport)
8064 			goto error;
8065 		break;
8066 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE:
8067 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK:
8068 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem &&
8069 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem &&
8070 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem)
8071 			goto error;
8072 		break;
8073 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE:
8074 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get &&
8075 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_delete &&
8076 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg)
8077 			goto error;
8078 		break;
8079 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE:
8080 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get &&
8081 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_delete &&
8082 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg)
8083 			goto error;
8084 		break;
8085 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE:
8086 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_task_storage_get &&
8087 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_task_storage_delete &&
8088 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg)
8089 			goto error;
8090 		break;
8091 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE:
8092 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_get &&
8093 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_delete &&
8094 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg)
8095 			goto error;
8096 		break;
8097 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER:
8098 		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem &&
8099 		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem)
8100 			goto error;
8101 		break;
8102 	default:
8103 		break;
8104 	}
8105 
8106 	/* ... and second from the function itself. */
8107 	switch (func_id) {
8108 	case BPF_FUNC_tail_call:
8109 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY)
8110 			goto error;
8111 		if (env->subprog_cnt > 1 && !allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(env)) {
8112 			verbose(env, "tail_calls are not allowed in non-JITed programs with bpf-to-bpf calls\n");
8113 			return -EINVAL;
8114 		}
8115 		break;
8116 	case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read:
8117 	case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output:
8118 	case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read_value:
8119 	case BPF_FUNC_skb_output:
8120 	case BPF_FUNC_xdp_output:
8121 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY)
8122 			goto error;
8123 		break;
8124 	case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_output:
8125 	case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve:
8126 	case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_query:
8127 	case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve_dynptr:
8128 	case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_submit_dynptr:
8129 	case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_discard_dynptr:
8130 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF)
8131 			goto error;
8132 		break;
8133 	case BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain:
8134 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF)
8135 			goto error;
8136 		break;
8137 	case BPF_FUNC_get_stackid:
8138 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE)
8139 			goto error;
8140 		break;
8141 	case BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup:
8142 	case BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup:
8143 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY)
8144 			goto error;
8145 		break;
8146 	case BPF_FUNC_redirect_map:
8147 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP &&
8148 		    map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP_HASH &&
8149 		    map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP &&
8150 		    map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP)
8151 			goto error;
8152 		break;
8153 	case BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map:
8154 	case BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_map:
8155 	case BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update:
8156 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP)
8157 			goto error;
8158 		break;
8159 	case BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_hash:
8160 	case BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_hash:
8161 	case BPF_FUNC_sock_hash_update:
8162 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH)
8163 			goto error;
8164 		break;
8165 	case BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage:
8166 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE &&
8167 		    map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE)
8168 			goto error;
8169 		break;
8170 	case BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport:
8171 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY &&
8172 		    map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP &&
8173 		    map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH)
8174 			goto error;
8175 		break;
8176 	case BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem:
8177 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE &&
8178 		    map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK)
8179 			goto error;
8180 		break;
8181 	case BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem:
8182 	case BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem:
8183 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE &&
8184 		    map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK &&
8185 		    map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER)
8186 			goto error;
8187 		break;
8188 	case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem:
8189 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY &&
8190 		    map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH &&
8191 		    map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_PERCPU_HASH)
8192 			goto error;
8193 		break;
8194 	case BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get:
8195 	case BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_delete:
8196 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE)
8197 			goto error;
8198 		break;
8199 	case BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get:
8200 	case BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_delete:
8201 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE)
8202 			goto error;
8203 		break;
8204 	case BPF_FUNC_task_storage_get:
8205 	case BPF_FUNC_task_storage_delete:
8206 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE)
8207 			goto error;
8208 		break;
8209 	case BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_get:
8210 	case BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_delete:
8211 		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE)
8212 			goto error;
8213 		break;
8214 	default:
8215 		break;
8216 	}
8217 
8218 	return 0;
8219 error:
8220 	verbose(env, "cannot pass map_type %d into func %s#%d\n",
8221 		map->map_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
8222 	return -EINVAL;
8223 }
8224 
8225 static bool check_raw_mode_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn)
8226 {
8227 	int count = 0;
8228 
8229 	if (fn->arg1_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
8230 		count++;
8231 	if (fn->arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
8232 		count++;
8233 	if (fn->arg3_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
8234 		count++;
8235 	if (fn->arg4_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
8236 		count++;
8237 	if (fn->arg5_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
8238 		count++;
8239 
8240 	/* We only support one arg being in raw mode at the moment,
8241 	 * which is sufficient for the helper functions we have
8242 	 * right now.
8243 	 */
8244 	return count <= 1;
8245 }
8246 
8247 static bool check_args_pair_invalid(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, int arg)
8248 {
8249 	bool is_fixed = fn->arg_type[arg] & MEM_FIXED_SIZE;
8250 	bool has_size = fn->arg_size[arg] != 0;
8251 	bool is_next_size = false;
8252 
8253 	if (arg + 1 < ARRAY_SIZE(fn->arg_type))
8254 		is_next_size = arg_type_is_mem_size(fn->arg_type[arg + 1]);
8255 
8256 	if (base_type(fn->arg_type[arg]) != ARG_PTR_TO_MEM)
8257 		return is_next_size;
8258 
8259 	return has_size == is_next_size || is_next_size == is_fixed;
8260 }
8261 
8262 static bool check_arg_pair_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn)
8263 {
8264 	/* bpf_xxx(..., buf, len) call will access 'len'
8265 	 * bytes from memory 'buf'. Both arg types need
8266 	 * to be paired, so make sure there's no buggy
8267 	 * helper function specification.
8268 	 */
8269 	if (arg_type_is_mem_size(fn->arg1_type) ||
8270 	    check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 0) ||
8271 	    check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 1) ||
8272 	    check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 2) ||
8273 	    check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 3) ||
8274 	    check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 4))
8275 		return false;
8276 
8277 	return true;
8278 }
8279 
8280 static bool check_btf_id_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn)
8281 {
8282 	int i;
8283 
8284 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(fn->arg_type); i++) {
8285 		if (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) == ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID)
8286 			return !!fn->arg_btf_id[i];
8287 		if (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) == ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK)
8288 			return fn->arg_btf_id[i] == BPF_PTR_POISON;
8289 		if (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) != ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID && fn->arg_btf_id[i] &&
8290 		    /* arg_btf_id and arg_size are in a union. */
8291 		    (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) != ARG_PTR_TO_MEM ||
8292 		     !(fn->arg_type[i] & MEM_FIXED_SIZE)))
8293 			return false;
8294 	}
8295 
8296 	return true;
8297 }
8298 
8299 static int check_func_proto(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, int func_id)
8300 {
8301 	return check_raw_mode_ok(fn) &&
8302 	       check_arg_pair_ok(fn) &&
8303 	       check_btf_id_ok(fn) ? 0 : -EINVAL;
8304 }
8305 
8306 /* Packet data might have moved, any old PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END]
8307  * are now invalid, so turn them into unknown SCALAR_VALUE.
8308  *
8309  * This also applies to dynptr slices belonging to skb and xdp dynptrs,
8310  * since these slices point to packet data.
8311  */
8312 static void clear_all_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
8313 {
8314 	struct bpf_func_state *state;
8315 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
8316 
8317 	bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, state, reg, ({
8318 		if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(reg) || reg_is_dynptr_slice_pkt(reg))
8319 			mark_reg_invalid(env, reg);
8320 	}));
8321 }
8322 
8323 enum {
8324 	AT_PKT_END = -1,
8325 	BEYOND_PKT_END = -2,
8326 };
8327 
8328 static void mark_pkt_end(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, int regn, bool range_open)
8329 {
8330 	struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
8331 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regn];
8332 
8333 	if (reg->type != PTR_TO_PACKET)
8334 		/* PTR_TO_PACKET_META is not supported yet */
8335 		return;
8336 
8337 	/* The 'reg' is pkt > pkt_end or pkt >= pkt_end.
8338 	 * How far beyond pkt_end it goes is unknown.
8339 	 * if (!range_open) it's the case of pkt >= pkt_end
8340 	 * if (range_open) it's the case of pkt > pkt_end
8341 	 * hence this pointer is at least 1 byte bigger than pkt_end
8342 	 */
8343 	if (range_open)
8344 		reg->range = BEYOND_PKT_END;
8345 	else
8346 		reg->range = AT_PKT_END;
8347 }
8348 
8349 /* The pointer with the specified id has released its reference to kernel
8350  * resources. Identify all copies of the same pointer and clear the reference.
8351  */
8352 static int release_reference(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
8353 			     int ref_obj_id)
8354 {
8355 	struct bpf_func_state *state;
8356 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
8357 	int err;
8358 
8359 	err = release_reference_state(cur_func(env), ref_obj_id);
8360 	if (err)
8361 		return err;
8362 
8363 	bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, state, reg, ({
8364 		if (reg->ref_obj_id == ref_obj_id)
8365 			mark_reg_invalid(env, reg);
8366 	}));
8367 
8368 	return 0;
8369 }
8370 
8371 static void invalidate_non_owning_refs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
8372 {
8373 	struct bpf_func_state *unused;
8374 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
8375 
8376 	bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, unused, reg, ({
8377 		if (type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type))
8378 			mark_reg_invalid(env, reg);
8379 	}));
8380 }
8381 
8382 static void clear_caller_saved_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
8383 				    struct bpf_reg_state *regs)
8384 {
8385 	int i;
8386 
8387 	/* after the call registers r0 - r5 were scratched */
8388 	for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) {
8389 		mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]);
8390 		check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK);
8391 	}
8392 }
8393 
8394 typedef int (*set_callee_state_fn)(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
8395 				   struct bpf_func_state *caller,
8396 				   struct bpf_func_state *callee,
8397 				   int insn_idx);
8398 
8399 static int set_callee_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
8400 			    struct bpf_func_state *caller,
8401 			    struct bpf_func_state *callee, int insn_idx);
8402 
8403 static bool is_callback_calling_kfunc(u32 btf_id);
8404 
8405 static int __check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
8406 			     int *insn_idx, int subprog,
8407 			     set_callee_state_fn set_callee_state_cb)
8408 {
8409 	struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state;
8410 	struct bpf_func_info_aux *func_info_aux;
8411 	struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee;
8412 	int err;
8413 	bool is_global = false;
8414 
8415 	if (state->curframe + 1 >= MAX_CALL_FRAMES) {
8416 		verbose(env, "the call stack of %d frames is too deep\n",
8417 			state->curframe + 2);
8418 		return -E2BIG;
8419 	}
8420 
8421 	caller = state->frame[state->curframe];
8422 	if (state->frame[state->curframe + 1]) {
8423 		verbose(env, "verifier bug. Frame %d already allocated\n",
8424 			state->curframe + 1);
8425 		return -EFAULT;
8426 	}
8427 
8428 	func_info_aux = env->prog->aux->func_info_aux;
8429 	if (func_info_aux)
8430 		is_global = func_info_aux[subprog].linkage == BTF_FUNC_GLOBAL;
8431 	err = btf_check_subprog_call(env, subprog, caller->regs);
8432 	if (err == -EFAULT)
8433 		return err;
8434 	if (is_global) {
8435 		if (err) {
8436 			verbose(env, "Caller passes invalid args into func#%d\n",
8437 				subprog);
8438 			return err;
8439 		} else {
8440 			if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL)
8441 				verbose(env,
8442 					"Func#%d is global and valid. Skipping.\n",
8443 					subprog);
8444 			clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs);
8445 
8446 			/* All global functions return a 64-bit SCALAR_VALUE */
8447 			mark_reg_unknown(env, caller->regs, BPF_REG_0);
8448 			caller->regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG;
8449 
8450 			/* continue with next insn after call */
8451 			return 0;
8452 		}
8453 	}
8454 
8455 	/* set_callee_state is used for direct subprog calls, but we are
8456 	 * interested in validating only BPF helpers that can call subprogs as
8457 	 * callbacks
8458 	 */
8459 	if (set_callee_state_cb != set_callee_state) {
8460 		if (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) &&
8461 		    !is_callback_calling_kfunc(insn->imm)) {
8462 			verbose(env, "verifier bug: kfunc %s#%d not marked as callback-calling\n",
8463 				func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm);
8464 			return -EFAULT;
8465 		} else if (!bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) &&
8466 			   !is_callback_calling_function(insn->imm)) { /* helper */
8467 			verbose(env, "verifier bug: helper %s#%d not marked as callback-calling\n",
8468 				func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm);
8469 			return -EFAULT;
8470 		}
8471 	}
8472 
8473 	if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) &&
8474 	    insn->src_reg == 0 &&
8475 	    insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback) {
8476 		struct bpf_verifier_state *async_cb;
8477 
8478 		/* there is no real recursion here. timer callbacks are async */
8479 		env->subprog_info[subprog].is_async_cb = true;
8480 		async_cb = push_async_cb(env, env->subprog_info[subprog].start,
8481 					 *insn_idx, subprog);
8482 		if (!async_cb)
8483 			return -EFAULT;
8484 		callee = async_cb->frame[0];
8485 		callee->async_entry_cnt = caller->async_entry_cnt + 1;
8486 
8487 		/* Convert bpf_timer_set_callback() args into timer callback args */
8488 		err = set_callee_state_cb(env, caller, callee, *insn_idx);
8489 		if (err)
8490 			return err;
8491 
8492 		clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs);
8493 		mark_reg_unknown(env, caller->regs, BPF_REG_0);
8494 		caller->regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG;
8495 		/* continue with next insn after call */
8496 		return 0;
8497 	}
8498 
8499 	callee = kzalloc(sizeof(*callee), GFP_KERNEL);
8500 	if (!callee)
8501 		return -ENOMEM;
8502 	state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = callee;
8503 
8504 	/* callee cannot access r0, r6 - r9 for reading and has to write
8505 	 * into its own stack before reading from it.
8506 	 * callee can read/write into caller's stack
8507 	 */
8508 	init_func_state(env, callee,
8509 			/* remember the callsite, it will be used by bpf_exit */
8510 			*insn_idx /* callsite */,
8511 			state->curframe + 1 /* frameno within this callchain */,
8512 			subprog /* subprog number within this prog */);
8513 
8514 	/* Transfer references to the callee */
8515 	err = copy_reference_state(callee, caller);
8516 	if (err)
8517 		goto err_out;
8518 
8519 	err = set_callee_state_cb(env, caller, callee, *insn_idx);
8520 	if (err)
8521 		goto err_out;
8522 
8523 	clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs);
8524 
8525 	/* only increment it after check_reg_arg() finished */
8526 	state->curframe++;
8527 
8528 	/* and go analyze first insn of the callee */
8529 	*insn_idx = env->subprog_info[subprog].start - 1;
8530 
8531 	if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) {
8532 		verbose(env, "caller:\n");
8533 		print_verifier_state(env, caller, true);
8534 		verbose(env, "callee:\n");
8535 		print_verifier_state(env, callee, true);
8536 	}
8537 	return 0;
8538 
8539 err_out:
8540 	free_func_state(callee);
8541 	state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = NULL;
8542 	return err;
8543 }
8544 
8545 int map_set_for_each_callback_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
8546 				   struct bpf_func_state *caller,
8547 				   struct bpf_func_state *callee)
8548 {
8549 	/* bpf_for_each_map_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *callback_fn,
8550 	 *      void *callback_ctx, u64 flags);
8551 	 * callback_fn(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value,
8552 	 *      void *callback_ctx);
8553 	 */
8554 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_1] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1];
8555 
8556 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].type = PTR_TO_MAP_KEY;
8557 	__mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]);
8558 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr;
8559 
8560 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE;
8561 	__mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]);
8562 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr;
8563 
8564 	/* pointer to stack or null */
8565 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_4] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_3];
8566 
8567 	/* unused */
8568 	__mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]);
8569 	return 0;
8570 }
8571 
8572 static int set_callee_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
8573 			    struct bpf_func_state *caller,
8574 			    struct bpf_func_state *callee, int insn_idx)
8575 {
8576 	int i;
8577 
8578 	/* copy r1 - r5 args that callee can access.  The copy includes parent
8579 	 * pointers, which connects us up to the liveness chain
8580 	 */
8581 	for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++)
8582 		callee->regs[i] = caller->regs[i];
8583 	return 0;
8584 }
8585 
8586 static int check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
8587 			   int *insn_idx)
8588 {
8589 	int subprog, target_insn;
8590 
8591 	target_insn = *insn_idx + insn->imm + 1;
8592 	subprog = find_subprog(env, target_insn);
8593 	if (subprog < 0) {
8594 		verbose(env, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n",
8595 			target_insn);
8596 		return -EFAULT;
8597 	}
8598 
8599 	return __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx, subprog, set_callee_state);
8600 }
8601 
8602 static int set_map_elem_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
8603 				       struct bpf_func_state *caller,
8604 				       struct bpf_func_state *callee,
8605 				       int insn_idx)
8606 {
8607 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx];
8608 	struct bpf_map *map;
8609 	int err;
8610 
8611 	if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(insn_aux)) {
8612 		verbose(env, "tail_call abusing map_ptr\n");
8613 		return -EINVAL;
8614 	}
8615 
8616 	map = BPF_MAP_PTR(insn_aux->map_ptr_state);
8617 	if (!map->ops->map_set_for_each_callback_args ||
8618 	    !map->ops->map_for_each_callback) {
8619 		verbose(env, "callback function not allowed for map\n");
8620 		return -ENOTSUPP;
8621 	}
8622 
8623 	err = map->ops->map_set_for_each_callback_args(env, caller, callee);
8624 	if (err)
8625 		return err;
8626 
8627 	callee->in_callback_fn = true;
8628 	callee->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 1);
8629 	return 0;
8630 }
8631 
8632 static int set_loop_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
8633 				   struct bpf_func_state *caller,
8634 				   struct bpf_func_state *callee,
8635 				   int insn_idx)
8636 {
8637 	/* bpf_loop(u32 nr_loops, void *callback_fn, void *callback_ctx,
8638 	 *	    u64 flags);
8639 	 * callback_fn(u32 index, void *callback_ctx);
8640 	 */
8641 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_1].type = SCALAR_VALUE;
8642 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_2] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_3];
8643 
8644 	/* unused */
8645 	__mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]);
8646 	__mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]);
8647 	__mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]);
8648 
8649 	callee->in_callback_fn = true;
8650 	callee->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 1);
8651 	return 0;
8652 }
8653 
8654 static int set_timer_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
8655 				    struct bpf_func_state *caller,
8656 				    struct bpf_func_state *callee,
8657 				    int insn_idx)
8658 {
8659 	struct bpf_map *map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr;
8660 
8661 	/* bpf_timer_set_callback(struct bpf_timer *timer, void *callback_fn);
8662 	 * callback_fn(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value);
8663 	 */
8664 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_1].type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
8665 	__mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_1]);
8666 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr = map_ptr;
8667 
8668 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].type = PTR_TO_MAP_KEY;
8669 	__mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]);
8670 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].map_ptr = map_ptr;
8671 
8672 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE;
8673 	__mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]);
8674 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].map_ptr = map_ptr;
8675 
8676 	/* unused */
8677 	__mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]);
8678 	__mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]);
8679 	callee->in_async_callback_fn = true;
8680 	callee->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 1);
8681 	return 0;
8682 }
8683 
8684 static int set_find_vma_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
8685 				       struct bpf_func_state *caller,
8686 				       struct bpf_func_state *callee,
8687 				       int insn_idx)
8688 {
8689 	/* bpf_find_vma(struct task_struct *task, u64 addr,
8690 	 *               void *callback_fn, void *callback_ctx, u64 flags)
8691 	 * (callback_fn)(struct task_struct *task,
8692 	 *               struct vm_area_struct *vma, void *callback_ctx);
8693 	 */
8694 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_1] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1];
8695 
8696 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID;
8697 	__mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]);
8698 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].btf =  btf_vmlinux;
8699 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].btf_id = btf_tracing_ids[BTF_TRACING_TYPE_VMA],
8700 
8701 	/* pointer to stack or null */
8702 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_3] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_4];
8703 
8704 	/* unused */
8705 	__mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]);
8706 	__mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]);
8707 	callee->in_callback_fn = true;
8708 	callee->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 1);
8709 	return 0;
8710 }
8711 
8712 static int set_user_ringbuf_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
8713 					   struct bpf_func_state *caller,
8714 					   struct bpf_func_state *callee,
8715 					   int insn_idx)
8716 {
8717 	/* bpf_user_ringbuf_drain(struct bpf_map *map, void *callback_fn, void
8718 	 *			  callback_ctx, u64 flags);
8719 	 * callback_fn(const struct bpf_dynptr_t* dynptr, void *callback_ctx);
8720 	 */
8721 	__mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_0]);
8722 	mark_dynptr_cb_reg(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_1], BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL);
8723 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_2] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_3];
8724 
8725 	/* unused */
8726 	__mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]);
8727 	__mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]);
8728 	__mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]);
8729 
8730 	callee->in_callback_fn = true;
8731 	callee->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 1);
8732 	return 0;
8733 }
8734 
8735 static int set_rbtree_add_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
8736 					 struct bpf_func_state *caller,
8737 					 struct bpf_func_state *callee,
8738 					 int insn_idx)
8739 {
8740 	/* void bpf_rbtree_add_impl(struct bpf_rb_root *root, struct bpf_rb_node *node,
8741 	 *                     bool (less)(struct bpf_rb_node *a, const struct bpf_rb_node *b));
8742 	 *
8743 	 * 'struct bpf_rb_node *node' arg to bpf_rbtree_add_impl is the same PTR_TO_BTF_ID w/ offset
8744 	 * that 'less' callback args will be receiving. However, 'node' arg was release_reference'd
8745 	 * by this point, so look at 'root'
8746 	 */
8747 	struct btf_field *field;
8748 
8749 	field = reg_find_field_offset(&caller->regs[BPF_REG_1], caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].off,
8750 				      BPF_RB_ROOT);
8751 	if (!field || !field->graph_root.value_btf_id)
8752 		return -EFAULT;
8753 
8754 	mark_reg_graph_node(callee->regs, BPF_REG_1, &field->graph_root);
8755 	ref_set_non_owning(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_1]);
8756 	mark_reg_graph_node(callee->regs, BPF_REG_2, &field->graph_root);
8757 	ref_set_non_owning(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]);
8758 
8759 	__mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]);
8760 	__mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]);
8761 	__mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]);
8762 	callee->in_callback_fn = true;
8763 	callee->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 1);
8764 	return 0;
8765 }
8766 
8767 static bool is_rbtree_lock_required_kfunc(u32 btf_id);
8768 
8769 /* Are we currently verifying the callback for a rbtree helper that must
8770  * be called with lock held? If so, no need to complain about unreleased
8771  * lock
8772  */
8773 static bool in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
8774 {
8775 	struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state;
8776 	struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
8777 	struct bpf_func_state *callee;
8778 	int kfunc_btf_id;
8779 
8780 	if (!state->curframe)
8781 		return false;
8782 
8783 	callee = state->frame[state->curframe];
8784 
8785 	if (!callee->in_callback_fn)
8786 		return false;
8787 
8788 	kfunc_btf_id = insn[callee->callsite].imm;
8789 	return is_rbtree_lock_required_kfunc(kfunc_btf_id);
8790 }
8791 
8792 static int prepare_func_exit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *insn_idx)
8793 {
8794 	struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state;
8795 	struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee;
8796 	struct bpf_reg_state *r0;
8797 	int err;
8798 
8799 	callee = state->frame[state->curframe];
8800 	r0 = &callee->regs[BPF_REG_0];
8801 	if (r0->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
8802 		/* technically it's ok to return caller's stack pointer
8803 		 * (or caller's caller's pointer) back to the caller,
8804 		 * since these pointers are valid. Only current stack
8805 		 * pointer will be invalid as soon as function exits,
8806 		 * but let's be conservative
8807 		 */
8808 		verbose(env, "cannot return stack pointer to the caller\n");
8809 		return -EINVAL;
8810 	}
8811 
8812 	caller = state->frame[state->curframe - 1];
8813 	if (callee->in_callback_fn) {
8814 		/* enforce R0 return value range [0, 1]. */
8815 		struct tnum range = callee->callback_ret_range;
8816 
8817 		if (r0->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
8818 			verbose(env, "R0 not a scalar value\n");
8819 			return -EACCES;
8820 		}
8821 		if (!tnum_in(range, r0->var_off)) {
8822 			verbose_invalid_scalar(env, r0, &range, "callback return", "R0");
8823 			return -EINVAL;
8824 		}
8825 	} else {
8826 		/* return to the caller whatever r0 had in the callee */
8827 		caller->regs[BPF_REG_0] = *r0;
8828 	}
8829 
8830 	/* callback_fn frame should have released its own additions to parent's
8831 	 * reference state at this point, or check_reference_leak would
8832 	 * complain, hence it must be the same as the caller. There is no need
8833 	 * to copy it back.
8834 	 */
8835 	if (!callee->in_callback_fn) {
8836 		/* Transfer references to the caller */
8837 		err = copy_reference_state(caller, callee);
8838 		if (err)
8839 			return err;
8840 	}
8841 
8842 	*insn_idx = callee->callsite + 1;
8843 	if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) {
8844 		verbose(env, "returning from callee:\n");
8845 		print_verifier_state(env, callee, true);
8846 		verbose(env, "to caller at %d:\n", *insn_idx);
8847 		print_verifier_state(env, caller, true);
8848 	}
8849 	/* clear everything in the callee */
8850 	free_func_state(callee);
8851 	state->frame[state->curframe--] = NULL;
8852 	return 0;
8853 }
8854 
8855 static void do_refine_retval_range(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, int ret_type,
8856 				   int func_id,
8857 				   struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
8858 {
8859 	struct bpf_reg_state *ret_reg = &regs[BPF_REG_0];
8860 
8861 	if (ret_type != RET_INTEGER ||
8862 	    (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stack &&
8863 	     func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_task_stack &&
8864 	     func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_str &&
8865 	     func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel_str &&
8866 	     func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_user_str))
8867 		return;
8868 
8869 	ret_reg->smax_value = meta->msize_max_value;
8870 	ret_reg->s32_max_value = meta->msize_max_value;
8871 	ret_reg->smin_value = -MAX_ERRNO;
8872 	ret_reg->s32_min_value = -MAX_ERRNO;
8873 	reg_bounds_sync(ret_reg);
8874 }
8875 
8876 static int
8877 record_func_map(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,
8878 		int func_id, int insn_idx)
8879 {
8880 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx];
8881 	struct bpf_map *map = meta->map_ptr;
8882 
8883 	if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call &&
8884 	    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem &&
8885 	    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem &&
8886 	    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem &&
8887 	    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem &&
8888 	    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem &&
8889 	    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem &&
8890 	    func_id != BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem &&
8891 	    func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map &&
8892 	    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem)
8893 		return 0;
8894 
8895 	if (map == NULL) {
8896 		verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n");
8897 		return -EINVAL;
8898 	}
8899 
8900 	/* In case of read-only, some additional restrictions
8901 	 * need to be applied in order to prevent altering the
8902 	 * state of the map from program side.
8903 	 */
8904 	if ((map->map_flags & BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG) &&
8905 	    (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem ||
8906 	     func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem ||
8907 	     func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem ||
8908 	     func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem)) {
8909 		verbose(env, "write into map forbidden\n");
8910 		return -EACCES;
8911 	}
8912 
8913 	if (!BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state))
8914 		bpf_map_ptr_store(aux, meta->map_ptr,
8915 				  !meta->map_ptr->bypass_spec_v1);
8916 	else if (BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state) != meta->map_ptr)
8917 		bpf_map_ptr_store(aux, BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON,
8918 				  !meta->map_ptr->bypass_spec_v1);
8919 	return 0;
8920 }
8921 
8922 static int
8923 record_func_key(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,
8924 		int func_id, int insn_idx)
8925 {
8926 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx];
8927 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg;
8928 	struct bpf_map *map = meta->map_ptr;
8929 	u64 val, max;
8930 	int err;
8931 
8932 	if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call)
8933 		return 0;
8934 	if (!map || map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY) {
8935 		verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n");
8936 		return -EINVAL;
8937 	}
8938 
8939 	reg = &regs[BPF_REG_3];
8940 	val = reg->var_off.value;
8941 	max = map->max_entries;
8942 
8943 	if (!(register_is_const(reg) && val < max)) {
8944 		bpf_map_key_store(aux, BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON);
8945 		return 0;
8946 	}
8947 
8948 	err = mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_3);
8949 	if (err)
8950 		return err;
8951 	if (bpf_map_key_unseen(aux))
8952 		bpf_map_key_store(aux, val);
8953 	else if (!bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux) &&
8954 		  bpf_map_key_immediate(aux) != val)
8955 		bpf_map_key_store(aux, BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON);
8956 	return 0;
8957 }
8958 
8959 static int check_reference_leak(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
8960 {
8961 	struct bpf_func_state *state = cur_func(env);
8962 	bool refs_lingering = false;
8963 	int i;
8964 
8965 	if (state->frameno && !state->in_callback_fn)
8966 		return 0;
8967 
8968 	for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) {
8969 		if (state->in_callback_fn && state->refs[i].callback_ref != state->frameno)
8970 			continue;
8971 		verbose(env, "Unreleased reference id=%d alloc_insn=%d\n",
8972 			state->refs[i].id, state->refs[i].insn_idx);
8973 		refs_lingering = true;
8974 	}
8975 	return refs_lingering ? -EINVAL : 0;
8976 }
8977 
8978 static int check_bpf_snprintf_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
8979 				   struct bpf_reg_state *regs)
8980 {
8981 	struct bpf_reg_state *fmt_reg = &regs[BPF_REG_3];
8982 	struct bpf_reg_state *data_len_reg = &regs[BPF_REG_5];
8983 	struct bpf_map *fmt_map = fmt_reg->map_ptr;
8984 	struct bpf_bprintf_data data = {};
8985 	int err, fmt_map_off, num_args;
8986 	u64 fmt_addr;
8987 	char *fmt;
8988 
8989 	/* data must be an array of u64 */
8990 	if (data_len_reg->var_off.value % 8)
8991 		return -EINVAL;
8992 	num_args = data_len_reg->var_off.value / 8;
8993 
8994 	/* fmt being ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR guarantees that var_off is const
8995 	 * and map_direct_value_addr is set.
8996 	 */
8997 	fmt_map_off = fmt_reg->off + fmt_reg->var_off.value;
8998 	err = fmt_map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(fmt_map, &fmt_addr,
8999 						  fmt_map_off);
9000 	if (err) {
9001 		verbose(env, "verifier bug\n");
9002 		return -EFAULT;
9003 	}
9004 	fmt = (char *)(long)fmt_addr + fmt_map_off;
9005 
9006 	/* We are also guaranteed that fmt+fmt_map_off is NULL terminated, we
9007 	 * can focus on validating the format specifiers.
9008 	 */
9009 	err = bpf_bprintf_prepare(fmt, UINT_MAX, NULL, num_args, &data);
9010 	if (err < 0)
9011 		verbose(env, "Invalid format string\n");
9012 
9013 	return err;
9014 }
9015 
9016 static int check_get_func_ip(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
9017 {
9018 	enum bpf_prog_type type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog);
9019 	int func_id = BPF_FUNC_get_func_ip;
9020 
9021 	if (type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING) {
9022 		if (!bpf_prog_has_trampoline(env->prog)) {
9023 			verbose(env, "func %s#%d supported only for fentry/fexit/fmod_ret programs\n",
9024 				func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
9025 			return -ENOTSUPP;
9026 		}
9027 		return 0;
9028 	} else if (type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE) {
9029 		return 0;
9030 	}
9031 
9032 	verbose(env, "func %s#%d not supported for program type %d\n",
9033 		func_id_name(func_id), func_id, type);
9034 	return -ENOTSUPP;
9035 }
9036 
9037 static struct bpf_insn_aux_data *cur_aux(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
9038 {
9039 	return &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx];
9040 }
9041 
9042 static bool loop_flag_is_zero(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
9043 {
9044 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
9045 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &regs[BPF_REG_4];
9046 	bool reg_is_null = register_is_null(reg);
9047 
9048 	if (reg_is_null)
9049 		mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_4);
9050 
9051 	return reg_is_null;
9052 }
9053 
9054 static void update_loop_inline_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 subprogno)
9055 {
9056 	struct bpf_loop_inline_state *state = &cur_aux(env)->loop_inline_state;
9057 
9058 	if (!state->initialized) {
9059 		state->initialized = 1;
9060 		state->fit_for_inline = loop_flag_is_zero(env);
9061 		state->callback_subprogno = subprogno;
9062 		return;
9063 	}
9064 
9065 	if (!state->fit_for_inline)
9066 		return;
9067 
9068 	state->fit_for_inline = (loop_flag_is_zero(env) &&
9069 				 state->callback_subprogno == subprogno);
9070 }
9071 
9072 static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
9073 			     int *insn_idx_p)
9074 {
9075 	enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog);
9076 	const struct bpf_func_proto *fn = NULL;
9077 	enum bpf_return_type ret_type;
9078 	enum bpf_type_flag ret_flag;
9079 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs;
9080 	struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta;
9081 	int insn_idx = *insn_idx_p;
9082 	bool changes_data;
9083 	int i, err, func_id;
9084 
9085 	/* find function prototype */
9086 	func_id = insn->imm;
9087 	if (func_id < 0 || func_id >= __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID) {
9088 		verbose(env, "invalid func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id),
9089 			func_id);
9090 		return -EINVAL;
9091 	}
9092 
9093 	if (env->ops->get_func_proto)
9094 		fn = env->ops->get_func_proto(func_id, env->prog);
9095 	if (!fn) {
9096 		verbose(env, "unknown func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id),
9097 			func_id);
9098 		return -EINVAL;
9099 	}
9100 
9101 	/* eBPF programs must be GPL compatible to use GPL-ed functions */
9102 	if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible && fn->gpl_only) {
9103 		verbose(env, "cannot call GPL-restricted function from non-GPL compatible program\n");
9104 		return -EINVAL;
9105 	}
9106 
9107 	if (fn->allowed && !fn->allowed(env->prog)) {
9108 		verbose(env, "helper call is not allowed in probe\n");
9109 		return -EINVAL;
9110 	}
9111 
9112 	if (!env->prog->aux->sleepable && fn->might_sleep) {
9113 		verbose(env, "helper call might sleep in a non-sleepable prog\n");
9114 		return -EINVAL;
9115 	}
9116 
9117 	/* With LD_ABS/IND some JITs save/restore skb from r1. */
9118 	changes_data = bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(fn->func);
9119 	if (changes_data && fn->arg1_type != ARG_PTR_TO_CTX) {
9120 		verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d: r1 != ctx\n",
9121 			func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
9122 		return -EINVAL;
9123 	}
9124 
9125 	memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta));
9126 	meta.pkt_access = fn->pkt_access;
9127 
9128 	err = check_func_proto(fn, func_id);
9129 	if (err) {
9130 		verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n",
9131 			func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
9132 		return err;
9133 	}
9134 
9135 	if (env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock) {
9136 		if (fn->might_sleep) {
9137 			verbose(env, "sleepable helper %s#%d in rcu_read_lock region\n",
9138 				func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
9139 			return -EINVAL;
9140 		}
9141 
9142 		if (env->prog->aux->sleepable && is_storage_get_function(func_id))
9143 			env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].storage_get_func_atomic = true;
9144 	}
9145 
9146 	meta.func_id = func_id;
9147 	/* check args */
9148 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS; i++) {
9149 		err = check_func_arg(env, i, &meta, fn, insn_idx);
9150 		if (err)
9151 			return err;
9152 	}
9153 
9154 	err = record_func_map(env, &meta, func_id, insn_idx);
9155 	if (err)
9156 		return err;
9157 
9158 	err = record_func_key(env, &meta, func_id, insn_idx);
9159 	if (err)
9160 		return err;
9161 
9162 	/* Mark slots with STACK_MISC in case of raw mode, stack offset
9163 	 * is inferred from register state.
9164 	 */
9165 	for (i = 0; i < meta.access_size; i++) {
9166 		err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, meta.regno, i, BPF_B,
9167 				       BPF_WRITE, -1, false);
9168 		if (err)
9169 			return err;
9170 	}
9171 
9172 	regs = cur_regs(env);
9173 
9174 	if (meta.release_regno) {
9175 		err = -EINVAL;
9176 		/* This can only be set for PTR_TO_STACK, as CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR cannot
9177 		 * be released by any dynptr helper. Hence, unmark_stack_slots_dynptr
9178 		 * is safe to do directly.
9179 		 */
9180 		if (arg_type_is_dynptr(fn->arg_type[meta.release_regno - BPF_REG_1])) {
9181 			if (regs[meta.release_regno].type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) {
9182 				verbose(env, "verifier internal error: CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR cannot be released\n");
9183 				return -EFAULT;
9184 			}
9185 			err = unmark_stack_slots_dynptr(env, &regs[meta.release_regno]);
9186 		} else if (meta.ref_obj_id) {
9187 			err = release_reference(env, meta.ref_obj_id);
9188 		} else if (register_is_null(&regs[meta.release_regno])) {
9189 			/* meta.ref_obj_id can only be 0 if register that is meant to be
9190 			 * released is NULL, which must be > R0.
9191 			 */
9192 			err = 0;
9193 		}
9194 		if (err) {
9195 			verbose(env, "func %s#%d reference has not been acquired before\n",
9196 				func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
9197 			return err;
9198 		}
9199 	}
9200 
9201 	switch (func_id) {
9202 	case BPF_FUNC_tail_call:
9203 		err = check_reference_leak(env);
9204 		if (err) {
9205 			verbose(env, "tail_call would lead to reference leak\n");
9206 			return err;
9207 		}
9208 		break;
9209 	case BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage:
9210 		/* check that flags argument in get_local_storage(map, flags) is 0,
9211 		 * this is required because get_local_storage() can't return an error.
9212 		 */
9213 		if (!register_is_null(&regs[BPF_REG_2])) {
9214 			verbose(env, "get_local_storage() doesn't support non-zero flags\n");
9215 			return -EINVAL;
9216 		}
9217 		break;
9218 	case BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem:
9219 		err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno,
9220 					set_map_elem_callback_state);
9221 		break;
9222 	case BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback:
9223 		err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno,
9224 					set_timer_callback_state);
9225 		break;
9226 	case BPF_FUNC_find_vma:
9227 		err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno,
9228 					set_find_vma_callback_state);
9229 		break;
9230 	case BPF_FUNC_snprintf:
9231 		err = check_bpf_snprintf_call(env, regs);
9232 		break;
9233 	case BPF_FUNC_loop:
9234 		update_loop_inline_state(env, meta.subprogno);
9235 		err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno,
9236 					set_loop_callback_state);
9237 		break;
9238 	case BPF_FUNC_dynptr_from_mem:
9239 		if (regs[BPF_REG_1].type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
9240 			verbose(env, "Unsupported reg type %s for bpf_dynptr_from_mem data\n",
9241 				reg_type_str(env, regs[BPF_REG_1].type));
9242 			return -EACCES;
9243 		}
9244 		break;
9245 	case BPF_FUNC_set_retval:
9246 		if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM &&
9247 		    env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_LSM_CGROUP) {
9248 			if (!env->prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) {
9249 				/* Make sure programs that attach to void
9250 				 * hooks don't try to modify return value.
9251 				 */
9252 				verbose(env, "BPF_LSM_CGROUP that attach to void LSM hooks can't modify return value!\n");
9253 				return -EINVAL;
9254 			}
9255 		}
9256 		break;
9257 	case BPF_FUNC_dynptr_data:
9258 	{
9259 		struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
9260 		int id, ref_obj_id;
9261 
9262 		reg = get_dynptr_arg_reg(env, fn, regs);
9263 		if (!reg)
9264 			return -EFAULT;
9265 
9266 
9267 		if (meta.dynptr_id) {
9268 			verbose(env, "verifier internal error: meta.dynptr_id already set\n");
9269 			return -EFAULT;
9270 		}
9271 		if (meta.ref_obj_id) {
9272 			verbose(env, "verifier internal error: meta.ref_obj_id already set\n");
9273 			return -EFAULT;
9274 		}
9275 
9276 		id = dynptr_id(env, reg);
9277 		if (id < 0) {
9278 			verbose(env, "verifier internal error: failed to obtain dynptr id\n");
9279 			return id;
9280 		}
9281 
9282 		ref_obj_id = dynptr_ref_obj_id(env, reg);
9283 		if (ref_obj_id < 0) {
9284 			verbose(env, "verifier internal error: failed to obtain dynptr ref_obj_id\n");
9285 			return ref_obj_id;
9286 		}
9287 
9288 		meta.dynptr_id = id;
9289 		meta.ref_obj_id = ref_obj_id;
9290 
9291 		break;
9292 	}
9293 	case BPF_FUNC_dynptr_write:
9294 	{
9295 		enum bpf_dynptr_type dynptr_type;
9296 		struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
9297 
9298 		reg = get_dynptr_arg_reg(env, fn, regs);
9299 		if (!reg)
9300 			return -EFAULT;
9301 
9302 		dynptr_type = dynptr_get_type(env, reg);
9303 		if (dynptr_type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID)
9304 			return -EFAULT;
9305 
9306 		if (dynptr_type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB)
9307 			/* this will trigger clear_all_pkt_pointers(), which will
9308 			 * invalidate all dynptr slices associated with the skb
9309 			 */
9310 			changes_data = true;
9311 
9312 		break;
9313 	}
9314 	case BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain:
9315 		err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno,
9316 					set_user_ringbuf_callback_state);
9317 		break;
9318 	}
9319 
9320 	if (err)
9321 		return err;
9322 
9323 	/* reset caller saved regs */
9324 	for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) {
9325 		mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]);
9326 		check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK);
9327 	}
9328 
9329 	/* helper call returns 64-bit value. */
9330 	regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG;
9331 
9332 	/* update return register (already marked as written above) */
9333 	ret_type = fn->ret_type;
9334 	ret_flag = type_flag(ret_type);
9335 
9336 	switch (base_type(ret_type)) {
9337 	case RET_INTEGER:
9338 		/* sets type to SCALAR_VALUE */
9339 		mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
9340 		break;
9341 	case RET_VOID:
9342 		regs[BPF_REG_0].type = NOT_INIT;
9343 		break;
9344 	case RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
9345 		/* There is no offset yet applied, variable or fixed */
9346 		mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
9347 		/* remember map_ptr, so that check_map_access()
9348 		 * can check 'value_size' boundary of memory access
9349 		 * to map element returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem()
9350 		 */
9351 		if (meta.map_ptr == NULL) {
9352 			verbose(env,
9353 				"kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n");
9354 			return -EINVAL;
9355 		}
9356 		regs[BPF_REG_0].map_ptr = meta.map_ptr;
9357 		regs[BPF_REG_0].map_uid = meta.map_uid;
9358 		regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE | ret_flag;
9359 		if (!type_may_be_null(ret_type) &&
9360 		    btf_record_has_field(meta.map_ptr->record, BPF_SPIN_LOCK)) {
9361 			regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen;
9362 		}
9363 		break;
9364 	case RET_PTR_TO_SOCKET:
9365 		mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
9366 		regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_SOCKET | ret_flag;
9367 		break;
9368 	case RET_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON:
9369 		mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
9370 		regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON | ret_flag;
9371 		break;
9372 	case RET_PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
9373 		mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
9374 		regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK | ret_flag;
9375 		break;
9376 	case RET_PTR_TO_MEM:
9377 		mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
9378 		regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM | ret_flag;
9379 		regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = meta.mem_size;
9380 		break;
9381 	case RET_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_BTF_ID:
9382 	{
9383 		const struct btf_type *t;
9384 
9385 		mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
9386 		t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(meta.ret_btf, meta.ret_btf_id, NULL);
9387 		if (!btf_type_is_struct(t)) {
9388 			u32 tsize;
9389 			const struct btf_type *ret;
9390 			const char *tname;
9391 
9392 			/* resolve the type size of ksym. */
9393 			ret = btf_resolve_size(meta.ret_btf, t, &tsize);
9394 			if (IS_ERR(ret)) {
9395 				tname = btf_name_by_offset(meta.ret_btf, t->name_off);
9396 				verbose(env, "unable to resolve the size of type '%s': %ld\n",
9397 					tname, PTR_ERR(ret));
9398 				return -EINVAL;
9399 			}
9400 			regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM | ret_flag;
9401 			regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = tsize;
9402 		} else {
9403 			/* MEM_RDONLY may be carried from ret_flag, but it
9404 			 * doesn't apply on PTR_TO_BTF_ID. Fold it, otherwise
9405 			 * it will confuse the check of PTR_TO_BTF_ID in
9406 			 * check_mem_access().
9407 			 */
9408 			ret_flag &= ~MEM_RDONLY;
9409 
9410 			regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | ret_flag;
9411 			regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = meta.ret_btf;
9412 			regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta.ret_btf_id;
9413 		}
9414 		break;
9415 	}
9416 	case RET_PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
9417 	{
9418 		struct btf *ret_btf;
9419 		int ret_btf_id;
9420 
9421 		mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
9422 		regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | ret_flag;
9423 		if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) {
9424 			ret_btf = meta.kptr_field->kptr.btf;
9425 			ret_btf_id = meta.kptr_field->kptr.btf_id;
9426 			if (!btf_is_kernel(ret_btf))
9427 				regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_ALLOC;
9428 		} else {
9429 			if (fn->ret_btf_id == BPF_PTR_POISON) {
9430 				verbose(env, "verifier internal error:");
9431 				verbose(env, "func %s has non-overwritten BPF_PTR_POISON return type\n",
9432 					func_id_name(func_id));
9433 				return -EINVAL;
9434 			}
9435 			ret_btf = btf_vmlinux;
9436 			ret_btf_id = *fn->ret_btf_id;
9437 		}
9438 		if (ret_btf_id == 0) {
9439 			verbose(env, "invalid return type %u of func %s#%d\n",
9440 				base_type(ret_type), func_id_name(func_id),
9441 				func_id);
9442 			return -EINVAL;
9443 		}
9444 		regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = ret_btf;
9445 		regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ret_btf_id;
9446 		break;
9447 	}
9448 	default:
9449 		verbose(env, "unknown return type %u of func %s#%d\n",
9450 			base_type(ret_type), func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
9451 		return -EINVAL;
9452 	}
9453 
9454 	if (type_may_be_null(regs[BPF_REG_0].type))
9455 		regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen;
9456 
9457 	if (helper_multiple_ref_obj_use(func_id, meta.map_ptr)) {
9458 		verbose(env, "verifier internal error: func %s#%d sets ref_obj_id more than once\n",
9459 			func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
9460 		return -EFAULT;
9461 	}
9462 
9463 	if (is_dynptr_ref_function(func_id))
9464 		regs[BPF_REG_0].dynptr_id = meta.dynptr_id;
9465 
9466 	if (is_ptr_cast_function(func_id) || is_dynptr_ref_function(func_id)) {
9467 		/* For release_reference() */
9468 		regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = meta.ref_obj_id;
9469 	} else if (is_acquire_function(func_id, meta.map_ptr)) {
9470 		int id = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx);
9471 
9472 		if (id < 0)
9473 			return id;
9474 		/* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg() */
9475 		regs[BPF_REG_0].id = id;
9476 		/* For release_reference() */
9477 		regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = id;
9478 	}
9479 
9480 	do_refine_retval_range(regs, fn->ret_type, func_id, &meta);
9481 
9482 	err = check_map_func_compatibility(env, meta.map_ptr, func_id);
9483 	if (err)
9484 		return err;
9485 
9486 	if ((func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stack ||
9487 	     func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_task_stack) &&
9488 	    !env->prog->has_callchain_buf) {
9489 		const char *err_str;
9490 
9491 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
9492 		err = get_callchain_buffers(sysctl_perf_event_max_stack);
9493 		err_str = "cannot get callchain buffer for func %s#%d\n";
9494 #else
9495 		err = -ENOTSUPP;
9496 		err_str = "func %s#%d not supported without CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS\n";
9497 #endif
9498 		if (err) {
9499 			verbose(env, err_str, func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
9500 			return err;
9501 		}
9502 
9503 		env->prog->has_callchain_buf = true;
9504 	}
9505 
9506 	if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stackid || func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stack)
9507 		env->prog->call_get_stack = true;
9508 
9509 	if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_func_ip) {
9510 		if (check_get_func_ip(env))
9511 			return -ENOTSUPP;
9512 		env->prog->call_get_func_ip = true;
9513 	}
9514 
9515 	if (changes_data)
9516 		clear_all_pkt_pointers(env);
9517 	return 0;
9518 }
9519 
9520 /* mark_btf_func_reg_size() is used when the reg size is determined by
9521  * the BTF func_proto's return value size and argument.
9522  */
9523 static void mark_btf_func_reg_size(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
9524 				   size_t reg_size)
9525 {
9526 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &cur_regs(env)[regno];
9527 
9528 	if (regno == BPF_REG_0) {
9529 		/* Function return value */
9530 		reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
9531 		reg->subreg_def = reg_size == sizeof(u64) ?
9532 			DEF_NOT_SUBREG : env->insn_idx + 1;
9533 	} else {
9534 		/* Function argument */
9535 		if (reg_size == sizeof(u64)) {
9536 			mark_insn_zext(env, reg);
9537 			mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64);
9538 		} else {
9539 			mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ32);
9540 		}
9541 	}
9542 }
9543 
9544 static bool is_kfunc_acquire(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
9545 {
9546 	return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_ACQUIRE;
9547 }
9548 
9549 static bool is_kfunc_ret_null(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
9550 {
9551 	return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_RET_NULL;
9552 }
9553 
9554 static bool is_kfunc_release(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
9555 {
9556 	return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_RELEASE;
9557 }
9558 
9559 static bool is_kfunc_trusted_args(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
9560 {
9561 	return (meta->kfunc_flags & KF_TRUSTED_ARGS) || is_kfunc_release(meta);
9562 }
9563 
9564 static bool is_kfunc_sleepable(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
9565 {
9566 	return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_SLEEPABLE;
9567 }
9568 
9569 static bool is_kfunc_destructive(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
9570 {
9571 	return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_DESTRUCTIVE;
9572 }
9573 
9574 static bool is_kfunc_rcu(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
9575 {
9576 	return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_RCU;
9577 }
9578 
9579 static bool __kfunc_param_match_suffix(const struct btf *btf,
9580 				       const struct btf_param *arg,
9581 				       const char *suffix)
9582 {
9583 	int suffix_len = strlen(suffix), len;
9584 	const char *param_name;
9585 
9586 	/* In the future, this can be ported to use BTF tagging */
9587 	param_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf, arg->name_off);
9588 	if (str_is_empty(param_name))
9589 		return false;
9590 	len = strlen(param_name);
9591 	if (len < suffix_len)
9592 		return false;
9593 	param_name += len - suffix_len;
9594 	return !strncmp(param_name, suffix, suffix_len);
9595 }
9596 
9597 static bool is_kfunc_arg_mem_size(const struct btf *btf,
9598 				  const struct btf_param *arg,
9599 				  const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
9600 {
9601 	const struct btf_type *t;
9602 
9603 	t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, arg->type, NULL);
9604 	if (!btf_type_is_scalar(t) || reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE)
9605 		return false;
9606 
9607 	return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__sz");
9608 }
9609 
9610 static bool is_kfunc_arg_const_mem_size(const struct btf *btf,
9611 					const struct btf_param *arg,
9612 					const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
9613 {
9614 	const struct btf_type *t;
9615 
9616 	t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, arg->type, NULL);
9617 	if (!btf_type_is_scalar(t) || reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE)
9618 		return false;
9619 
9620 	return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__szk");
9621 }
9622 
9623 static bool is_kfunc_arg_constant(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg)
9624 {
9625 	return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__k");
9626 }
9627 
9628 static bool is_kfunc_arg_ignore(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg)
9629 {
9630 	return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__ign");
9631 }
9632 
9633 static bool is_kfunc_arg_alloc_obj(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg)
9634 {
9635 	return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__alloc");
9636 }
9637 
9638 static bool is_kfunc_arg_uninit(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg)
9639 {
9640 	return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__uninit");
9641 }
9642 
9643 static bool is_kfunc_arg_refcounted_kptr(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg)
9644 {
9645 	return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__refcounted_kptr");
9646 }
9647 
9648 static bool is_kfunc_arg_scalar_with_name(const struct btf *btf,
9649 					  const struct btf_param *arg,
9650 					  const char *name)
9651 {
9652 	int len, target_len = strlen(name);
9653 	const char *param_name;
9654 
9655 	param_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf, arg->name_off);
9656 	if (str_is_empty(param_name))
9657 		return false;
9658 	len = strlen(param_name);
9659 	if (len != target_len)
9660 		return false;
9661 	if (strcmp(param_name, name))
9662 		return false;
9663 
9664 	return true;
9665 }
9666 
9667 enum {
9668 	KF_ARG_DYNPTR_ID,
9669 	KF_ARG_LIST_HEAD_ID,
9670 	KF_ARG_LIST_NODE_ID,
9671 	KF_ARG_RB_ROOT_ID,
9672 	KF_ARG_RB_NODE_ID,
9673 };
9674 
9675 BTF_ID_LIST(kf_arg_btf_ids)
9676 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_dynptr_kern)
9677 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_list_head)
9678 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_list_node)
9679 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_rb_root)
9680 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_rb_node)
9681 
9682 static bool __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(const struct btf *btf,
9683 				    const struct btf_param *arg, int type)
9684 {
9685 	const struct btf_type *t;
9686 	u32 res_id;
9687 
9688 	t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, arg->type, NULL);
9689 	if (!t)
9690 		return false;
9691 	if (!btf_type_is_ptr(t))
9692 		return false;
9693 	t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, t->type, &res_id);
9694 	if (!t)
9695 		return false;
9696 	return btf_types_are_same(btf, res_id, btf_vmlinux, kf_arg_btf_ids[type]);
9697 }
9698 
9699 static bool is_kfunc_arg_dynptr(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg)
9700 {
9701 	return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_DYNPTR_ID);
9702 }
9703 
9704 static bool is_kfunc_arg_list_head(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg)
9705 {
9706 	return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_LIST_HEAD_ID);
9707 }
9708 
9709 static bool is_kfunc_arg_list_node(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg)
9710 {
9711 	return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_LIST_NODE_ID);
9712 }
9713 
9714 static bool is_kfunc_arg_rbtree_root(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg)
9715 {
9716 	return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_RB_ROOT_ID);
9717 }
9718 
9719 static bool is_kfunc_arg_rbtree_node(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg)
9720 {
9721 	return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_RB_NODE_ID);
9722 }
9723 
9724 static bool is_kfunc_arg_callback(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struct btf *btf,
9725 				  const struct btf_param *arg)
9726 {
9727 	const struct btf_type *t;
9728 
9729 	t = btf_type_resolve_func_ptr(btf, arg->type, NULL);
9730 	if (!t)
9731 		return false;
9732 
9733 	return true;
9734 }
9735 
9736 /* Returns true if struct is composed of scalars, 4 levels of nesting allowed */
9737 static bool __btf_type_is_scalar_struct(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
9738 					const struct btf *btf,
9739 					const struct btf_type *t, int rec)
9740 {
9741 	const struct btf_type *member_type;
9742 	const struct btf_member *member;
9743 	u32 i;
9744 
9745 	if (!btf_type_is_struct(t))
9746 		return false;
9747 
9748 	for_each_member(i, t, member) {
9749 		const struct btf_array *array;
9750 
9751 		member_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, member->type, NULL);
9752 		if (btf_type_is_struct(member_type)) {
9753 			if (rec >= 3) {
9754 				verbose(env, "max struct nesting depth exceeded\n");
9755 				return false;
9756 			}
9757 			if (!__btf_type_is_scalar_struct(env, btf, member_type, rec + 1))
9758 				return false;
9759 			continue;
9760 		}
9761 		if (btf_type_is_array(member_type)) {
9762 			array = btf_array(member_type);
9763 			if (!array->nelems)
9764 				return false;
9765 			member_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, array->type, NULL);
9766 			if (!btf_type_is_scalar(member_type))
9767 				return false;
9768 			continue;
9769 		}
9770 		if (!btf_type_is_scalar(member_type))
9771 			return false;
9772 	}
9773 	return true;
9774 }
9775 
9776 
9777 static u32 *reg2btf_ids[__BPF_REG_TYPE_MAX] = {
9778 #ifdef CONFIG_NET
9779 	[PTR_TO_SOCKET] = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_SOCK],
9780 	[PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON] = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_SOCK_COMMON],
9781 	[PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK] = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_TCP],
9782 #endif
9783 };
9784 
9785 enum kfunc_ptr_arg_type {
9786 	KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX,
9787 	KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID,    /* Allocated object */
9788 	KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR, /* Refcounted local kptr */
9789 	KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR,
9790 	KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ITER,
9791 	KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD,
9792 	KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_NODE,
9793 	KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID,	       /* Also covers reg2btf_ids conversions */
9794 	KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM,
9795 	KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE,	       /* Size derived from next argument, skip it */
9796 	KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CALLBACK,
9797 	KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_ROOT,
9798 	KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_NODE,
9799 };
9800 
9801 enum special_kfunc_type {
9802 	KF_bpf_obj_new_impl,
9803 	KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl,
9804 	KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl,
9805 	KF_bpf_list_push_front_impl,
9806 	KF_bpf_list_push_back_impl,
9807 	KF_bpf_list_pop_front,
9808 	KF_bpf_list_pop_back,
9809 	KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx,
9810 	KF_bpf_rdonly_cast,
9811 	KF_bpf_rcu_read_lock,
9812 	KF_bpf_rcu_read_unlock,
9813 	KF_bpf_rbtree_remove,
9814 	KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl,
9815 	KF_bpf_rbtree_first,
9816 	KF_bpf_dynptr_from_skb,
9817 	KF_bpf_dynptr_from_xdp,
9818 	KF_bpf_dynptr_slice,
9819 	KF_bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr,
9820 	KF_bpf_dynptr_clone,
9821 };
9822 
9823 BTF_SET_START(special_kfunc_set)
9824 BTF_ID(func, bpf_obj_new_impl)
9825 BTF_ID(func, bpf_obj_drop_impl)
9826 BTF_ID(func, bpf_refcount_acquire_impl)
9827 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_push_front_impl)
9828 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_push_back_impl)
9829 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_pop_front)
9830 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_pop_back)
9831 BTF_ID(func, bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx)
9832 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rdonly_cast)
9833 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_remove)
9834 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_add_impl)
9835 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_first)
9836 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_from_skb)
9837 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_from_xdp)
9838 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_slice)
9839 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr)
9840 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_clone)
9841 BTF_SET_END(special_kfunc_set)
9842 
9843 BTF_ID_LIST(special_kfunc_list)
9844 BTF_ID(func, bpf_obj_new_impl)
9845 BTF_ID(func, bpf_obj_drop_impl)
9846 BTF_ID(func, bpf_refcount_acquire_impl)
9847 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_push_front_impl)
9848 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_push_back_impl)
9849 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_pop_front)
9850 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_pop_back)
9851 BTF_ID(func, bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx)
9852 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rdonly_cast)
9853 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rcu_read_lock)
9854 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rcu_read_unlock)
9855 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_remove)
9856 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_add_impl)
9857 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_first)
9858 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_from_skb)
9859 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_from_xdp)
9860 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_slice)
9861 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr)
9862 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_clone)
9863 
9864 static bool is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_lock(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
9865 {
9866 	return meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rcu_read_lock];
9867 }
9868 
9869 static bool is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_unlock(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
9870 {
9871 	return meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rcu_read_unlock];
9872 }
9873 
9874 static enum kfunc_ptr_arg_type
9875 get_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
9876 		       struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta,
9877 		       const struct btf_type *t, const struct btf_type *ref_t,
9878 		       const char *ref_tname, const struct btf_param *args,
9879 		       int argno, int nargs)
9880 {
9881 	u32 regno = argno + 1;
9882 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
9883 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &regs[regno];
9884 	bool arg_mem_size = false;
9885 
9886 	if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx])
9887 		return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX;
9888 
9889 	/* In this function, we verify the kfunc's BTF as per the argument type,
9890 	 * leaving the rest of the verification with respect to the register
9891 	 * type to our caller. When a set of conditions hold in the BTF type of
9892 	 * arguments, we resolve it to a known kfunc_ptr_arg_type.
9893 	 */
9894 	if (btf_get_prog_ctx_type(&env->log, meta->btf, t, resolve_prog_type(env->prog), argno))
9895 		return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX;
9896 
9897 	if (is_kfunc_arg_alloc_obj(meta->btf, &args[argno]))
9898 		return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID;
9899 
9900 	if (is_kfunc_arg_refcounted_kptr(meta->btf, &args[argno]))
9901 		return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR;
9902 
9903 	if (is_kfunc_arg_dynptr(meta->btf, &args[argno]))
9904 		return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR;
9905 
9906 	if (is_kfunc_arg_iter(meta, argno))
9907 		return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ITER;
9908 
9909 	if (is_kfunc_arg_list_head(meta->btf, &args[argno]))
9910 		return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD;
9911 
9912 	if (is_kfunc_arg_list_node(meta->btf, &args[argno]))
9913 		return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_NODE;
9914 
9915 	if (is_kfunc_arg_rbtree_root(meta->btf, &args[argno]))
9916 		return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_ROOT;
9917 
9918 	if (is_kfunc_arg_rbtree_node(meta->btf, &args[argno]))
9919 		return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_NODE;
9920 
9921 	if ((base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID || reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)])) {
9922 		if (!btf_type_is_struct(ref_t)) {
9923 			verbose(env, "kernel function %s args#%d pointer type %s %s is not supported\n",
9924 				meta->func_name, argno, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname);
9925 			return -EINVAL;
9926 		}
9927 		return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID;
9928 	}
9929 
9930 	if (is_kfunc_arg_callback(env, meta->btf, &args[argno]))
9931 		return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CALLBACK;
9932 
9933 
9934 	if (argno + 1 < nargs &&
9935 	    (is_kfunc_arg_mem_size(meta->btf, &args[argno + 1], &regs[regno + 1]) ||
9936 	     is_kfunc_arg_const_mem_size(meta->btf, &args[argno + 1], &regs[regno + 1])))
9937 		arg_mem_size = true;
9938 
9939 	/* This is the catch all argument type of register types supported by
9940 	 * check_helper_mem_access. However, we only allow when argument type is
9941 	 * pointer to scalar, or struct composed (recursively) of scalars. When
9942 	 * arg_mem_size is true, the pointer can be void *.
9943 	 */
9944 	if (!btf_type_is_scalar(ref_t) && !__btf_type_is_scalar_struct(env, meta->btf, ref_t, 0) &&
9945 	    (arg_mem_size ? !btf_type_is_void(ref_t) : 1)) {
9946 		verbose(env, "arg#%d pointer type %s %s must point to %sscalar, or struct with scalar\n",
9947 			argno, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname, arg_mem_size ? "void, " : "");
9948 		return -EINVAL;
9949 	}
9950 	return arg_mem_size ? KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE : KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM;
9951 }
9952 
9953 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
9954 					struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
9955 					const struct btf_type *ref_t,
9956 					const char *ref_tname, u32 ref_id,
9957 					struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta,
9958 					int argno)
9959 {
9960 	const struct btf_type *reg_ref_t;
9961 	bool strict_type_match = false;
9962 	const struct btf *reg_btf;
9963 	const char *reg_ref_tname;
9964 	u32 reg_ref_id;
9965 
9966 	if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) {
9967 		reg_btf = reg->btf;
9968 		reg_ref_id = reg->btf_id;
9969 	} else {
9970 		reg_btf = btf_vmlinux;
9971 		reg_ref_id = *reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)];
9972 	}
9973 
9974 	/* Enforce strict type matching for calls to kfuncs that are acquiring
9975 	 * or releasing a reference, or are no-cast aliases. We do _not_
9976 	 * enforce strict matching for plain KF_TRUSTED_ARGS kfuncs by default,
9977 	 * as we want to enable BPF programs to pass types that are bitwise
9978 	 * equivalent without forcing them to explicitly cast with something
9979 	 * like bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx().
9980 	 *
9981 	 * For example, say we had a type like the following:
9982 	 *
9983 	 * struct bpf_cpumask {
9984 	 *	cpumask_t cpumask;
9985 	 *	refcount_t usage;
9986 	 * };
9987 	 *
9988 	 * Note that as specified in <linux/cpumask.h>, cpumask_t is typedef'ed
9989 	 * to a struct cpumask, so it would be safe to pass a struct
9990 	 * bpf_cpumask * to a kfunc expecting a struct cpumask *.
9991 	 *
9992 	 * The philosophy here is similar to how we allow scalars of different
9993 	 * types to be passed to kfuncs as long as the size is the same. The
9994 	 * only difference here is that we're simply allowing
9995 	 * btf_struct_ids_match() to walk the struct at the 0th offset, and
9996 	 * resolve types.
9997 	 */
9998 	if (is_kfunc_acquire(meta) ||
9999 	    (is_kfunc_release(meta) && reg->ref_obj_id) ||
10000 	    btf_type_ids_nocast_alias(&env->log, reg_btf, reg_ref_id, meta->btf, ref_id))
10001 		strict_type_match = true;
10002 
10003 	WARN_ON_ONCE(is_kfunc_trusted_args(meta) && reg->off);
10004 
10005 	reg_ref_t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(reg_btf, reg_ref_id, &reg_ref_id);
10006 	reg_ref_tname = btf_name_by_offset(reg_btf, reg_ref_t->name_off);
10007 	if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg_btf, reg_ref_id, reg->off, meta->btf, ref_id, strict_type_match)) {
10008 		verbose(env, "kernel function %s args#%d expected pointer to %s %s but R%d has a pointer to %s %s\n",
10009 			meta->func_name, argno, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname, argno + 1,
10010 			btf_type_str(reg_ref_t), reg_ref_tname);
10011 		return -EINVAL;
10012 	}
10013 	return 0;
10014 }
10015 
10016 static int ref_set_non_owning(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
10017 {
10018 	struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state;
10019 
10020 	if (!state->active_lock.ptr) {
10021 		verbose(env, "verifier internal error: ref_set_non_owning w/o active lock\n");
10022 		return -EFAULT;
10023 	}
10024 
10025 	if (type_flag(reg->type) & NON_OWN_REF) {
10026 		verbose(env, "verifier internal error: NON_OWN_REF already set\n");
10027 		return -EFAULT;
10028 	}
10029 
10030 	reg->type |= NON_OWN_REF;
10031 	return 0;
10032 }
10033 
10034 static int ref_convert_owning_non_owning(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 ref_obj_id)
10035 {
10036 	struct bpf_func_state *state, *unused;
10037 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
10038 	int i;
10039 
10040 	state = cur_func(env);
10041 
10042 	if (!ref_obj_id) {
10043 		verbose(env, "verifier internal error: ref_obj_id is zero for "
10044 			     "owning -> non-owning conversion\n");
10045 		return -EFAULT;
10046 	}
10047 
10048 	for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) {
10049 		if (state->refs[i].id != ref_obj_id)
10050 			continue;
10051 
10052 		/* Clear ref_obj_id here so release_reference doesn't clobber
10053 		 * the whole reg
10054 		 */
10055 		bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, unused, reg, ({
10056 			if (reg->ref_obj_id == ref_obj_id) {
10057 				reg->ref_obj_id = 0;
10058 				ref_set_non_owning(env, reg);
10059 			}
10060 		}));
10061 		return 0;
10062 	}
10063 
10064 	verbose(env, "verifier internal error: ref state missing for ref_obj_id\n");
10065 	return -EFAULT;
10066 }
10067 
10068 /* Implementation details:
10069  *
10070  * Each register points to some region of memory, which we define as an
10071  * allocation. Each allocation may embed a bpf_spin_lock which protects any
10072  * special BPF objects (bpf_list_head, bpf_rb_root, etc.) part of the same
10073  * allocation. The lock and the data it protects are colocated in the same
10074  * memory region.
10075  *
10076  * Hence, everytime a register holds a pointer value pointing to such
10077  * allocation, the verifier preserves a unique reg->id for it.
10078  *
10079  * The verifier remembers the lock 'ptr' and the lock 'id' whenever
10080  * bpf_spin_lock is called.
10081  *
10082  * To enable this, lock state in the verifier captures two values:
10083  *	active_lock.ptr = Register's type specific pointer
10084  *	active_lock.id  = A unique ID for each register pointer value
10085  *
10086  * Currently, PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE and PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC are the two
10087  * supported register types.
10088  *
10089  * The active_lock.ptr in case of map values is the reg->map_ptr, and in case of
10090  * allocated objects is the reg->btf pointer.
10091  *
10092  * The active_lock.id is non-unique for maps supporting direct_value_addr, as we
10093  * can establish the provenance of the map value statically for each distinct
10094  * lookup into such maps. They always contain a single map value hence unique
10095  * IDs for each pseudo load pessimizes the algorithm and rejects valid programs.
10096  *
10097  * So, in case of global variables, they use array maps with max_entries = 1,
10098  * hence their active_lock.ptr becomes map_ptr and id = 0 (since they all point
10099  * into the same map value as max_entries is 1, as described above).
10100  *
10101  * In case of inner map lookups, the inner map pointer has same map_ptr as the
10102  * outer map pointer (in verifier context), but each lookup into an inner map
10103  * assigns a fresh reg->id to the lookup, so while lookups into distinct inner
10104  * maps from the same outer map share the same map_ptr as active_lock.ptr, they
10105  * will get different reg->id assigned to each lookup, hence different
10106  * active_lock.id.
10107  *
10108  * In case of allocated objects, active_lock.ptr is the reg->btf, and the
10109  * reg->id is a unique ID preserved after the NULL pointer check on the pointer
10110  * returned from bpf_obj_new. Each allocation receives a new reg->id.
10111  */
10112 static int check_reg_allocation_locked(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
10113 {
10114 	void *ptr;
10115 	u32 id;
10116 
10117 	switch ((int)reg->type) {
10118 	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
10119 		ptr = reg->map_ptr;
10120 		break;
10121 	case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC:
10122 		ptr = reg->btf;
10123 		break;
10124 	default:
10125 		verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unknown reg type for lock check\n");
10126 		return -EFAULT;
10127 	}
10128 	id = reg->id;
10129 
10130 	if (!env->cur_state->active_lock.ptr)
10131 		return -EINVAL;
10132 	if (env->cur_state->active_lock.ptr != ptr ||
10133 	    env->cur_state->active_lock.id != id) {
10134 		verbose(env, "held lock and object are not in the same allocation\n");
10135 		return -EINVAL;
10136 	}
10137 	return 0;
10138 }
10139 
10140 static bool is_bpf_list_api_kfunc(u32 btf_id)
10141 {
10142 	return btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_front_impl] ||
10143 	       btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_back_impl] ||
10144 	       btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_pop_front] ||
10145 	       btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_pop_back];
10146 }
10147 
10148 static bool is_bpf_rbtree_api_kfunc(u32 btf_id)
10149 {
10150 	return btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl] ||
10151 	       btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_remove] ||
10152 	       btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_first];
10153 }
10154 
10155 static bool is_bpf_graph_api_kfunc(u32 btf_id)
10156 {
10157 	return is_bpf_list_api_kfunc(btf_id) || is_bpf_rbtree_api_kfunc(btf_id) ||
10158 	       btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl];
10159 }
10160 
10161 static bool is_callback_calling_kfunc(u32 btf_id)
10162 {
10163 	return btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl];
10164 }
10165 
10166 static bool is_rbtree_lock_required_kfunc(u32 btf_id)
10167 {
10168 	return is_bpf_rbtree_api_kfunc(btf_id);
10169 }
10170 
10171 static bool check_kfunc_is_graph_root_api(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
10172 					  enum btf_field_type head_field_type,
10173 					  u32 kfunc_btf_id)
10174 {
10175 	bool ret;
10176 
10177 	switch (head_field_type) {
10178 	case BPF_LIST_HEAD:
10179 		ret = is_bpf_list_api_kfunc(kfunc_btf_id);
10180 		break;
10181 	case BPF_RB_ROOT:
10182 		ret = is_bpf_rbtree_api_kfunc(kfunc_btf_id);
10183 		break;
10184 	default:
10185 		verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected graph root argument type %s\n",
10186 			btf_field_type_name(head_field_type));
10187 		return false;
10188 	}
10189 
10190 	if (!ret)
10191 		verbose(env, "verifier internal error: %s head arg for unknown kfunc\n",
10192 			btf_field_type_name(head_field_type));
10193 	return ret;
10194 }
10195 
10196 static bool check_kfunc_is_graph_node_api(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
10197 					  enum btf_field_type node_field_type,
10198 					  u32 kfunc_btf_id)
10199 {
10200 	bool ret;
10201 
10202 	switch (node_field_type) {
10203 	case BPF_LIST_NODE:
10204 		ret = (kfunc_btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_front_impl] ||
10205 		       kfunc_btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_back_impl]);
10206 		break;
10207 	case BPF_RB_NODE:
10208 		ret = (kfunc_btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_remove] ||
10209 		       kfunc_btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]);
10210 		break;
10211 	default:
10212 		verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected graph node argument type %s\n",
10213 			btf_field_type_name(node_field_type));
10214 		return false;
10215 	}
10216 
10217 	if (!ret)
10218 		verbose(env, "verifier internal error: %s node arg for unknown kfunc\n",
10219 			btf_field_type_name(node_field_type));
10220 	return ret;
10221 }
10222 
10223 static int
10224 __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_root(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
10225 				   struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno,
10226 				   struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta,
10227 				   enum btf_field_type head_field_type,
10228 				   struct btf_field **head_field)
10229 {
10230 	const char *head_type_name;
10231 	struct btf_field *field;
10232 	struct btf_record *rec;
10233 	u32 head_off;
10234 
10235 	if (meta->btf != btf_vmlinux) {
10236 		verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected btf mismatch in kfunc call\n");
10237 		return -EFAULT;
10238 	}
10239 
10240 	if (!check_kfunc_is_graph_root_api(env, head_field_type, meta->func_id))
10241 		return -EFAULT;
10242 
10243 	head_type_name = btf_field_type_name(head_field_type);
10244 	if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
10245 		verbose(env,
10246 			"R%d doesn't have constant offset. %s has to be at the constant offset\n",
10247 			regno, head_type_name);
10248 		return -EINVAL;
10249 	}
10250 
10251 	rec = reg_btf_record(reg);
10252 	head_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value;
10253 	field = btf_record_find(rec, head_off, head_field_type);
10254 	if (!field) {
10255 		verbose(env, "%s not found at offset=%u\n", head_type_name, head_off);
10256 		return -EINVAL;
10257 	}
10258 
10259 	/* All functions require bpf_list_head to be protected using a bpf_spin_lock */
10260 	if (check_reg_allocation_locked(env, reg)) {
10261 		verbose(env, "bpf_spin_lock at off=%d must be held for %s\n",
10262 			rec->spin_lock_off, head_type_name);
10263 		return -EINVAL;
10264 	}
10265 
10266 	if (*head_field) {
10267 		verbose(env, "verifier internal error: repeating %s arg\n", head_type_name);
10268 		return -EFAULT;
10269 	}
10270 	*head_field = field;
10271 	return 0;
10272 }
10273 
10274 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_head(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
10275 					   struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno,
10276 					   struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
10277 {
10278 	return __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_root(env, reg, regno, meta, BPF_LIST_HEAD,
10279 							  &meta->arg_list_head.field);
10280 }
10281 
10282 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_rbtree_root(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
10283 					     struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno,
10284 					     struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
10285 {
10286 	return __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_root(env, reg, regno, meta, BPF_RB_ROOT,
10287 							  &meta->arg_rbtree_root.field);
10288 }
10289 
10290 static int
10291 __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_node(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
10292 				   struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno,
10293 				   struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta,
10294 				   enum btf_field_type head_field_type,
10295 				   enum btf_field_type node_field_type,
10296 				   struct btf_field **node_field)
10297 {
10298 	const char *node_type_name;
10299 	const struct btf_type *et, *t;
10300 	struct btf_field *field;
10301 	u32 node_off;
10302 
10303 	if (meta->btf != btf_vmlinux) {
10304 		verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected btf mismatch in kfunc call\n");
10305 		return -EFAULT;
10306 	}
10307 
10308 	if (!check_kfunc_is_graph_node_api(env, node_field_type, meta->func_id))
10309 		return -EFAULT;
10310 
10311 	node_type_name = btf_field_type_name(node_field_type);
10312 	if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
10313 		verbose(env,
10314 			"R%d doesn't have constant offset. %s has to be at the constant offset\n",
10315 			regno, node_type_name);
10316 		return -EINVAL;
10317 	}
10318 
10319 	node_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value;
10320 	field = reg_find_field_offset(reg, node_off, node_field_type);
10321 	if (!field || field->offset != node_off) {
10322 		verbose(env, "%s not found at offset=%u\n", node_type_name, node_off);
10323 		return -EINVAL;
10324 	}
10325 
10326 	field = *node_field;
10327 
10328 	et = btf_type_by_id(field->graph_root.btf, field->graph_root.value_btf_id);
10329 	t = btf_type_by_id(reg->btf, reg->btf_id);
10330 	if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg->btf, reg->btf_id, 0, field->graph_root.btf,
10331 				  field->graph_root.value_btf_id, true)) {
10332 		verbose(env, "operation on %s expects arg#1 %s at offset=%d "
10333 			"in struct %s, but arg is at offset=%d in struct %s\n",
10334 			btf_field_type_name(head_field_type),
10335 			btf_field_type_name(node_field_type),
10336 			field->graph_root.node_offset,
10337 			btf_name_by_offset(field->graph_root.btf, et->name_off),
10338 			node_off, btf_name_by_offset(reg->btf, t->name_off));
10339 		return -EINVAL;
10340 	}
10341 
10342 	if (node_off != field->graph_root.node_offset) {
10343 		verbose(env, "arg#1 offset=%d, but expected %s at offset=%d in struct %s\n",
10344 			node_off, btf_field_type_name(node_field_type),
10345 			field->graph_root.node_offset,
10346 			btf_name_by_offset(field->graph_root.btf, et->name_off));
10347 		return -EINVAL;
10348 	}
10349 
10350 	return 0;
10351 }
10352 
10353 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_node(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
10354 					   struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno,
10355 					   struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
10356 {
10357 	return __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_node(env, reg, regno, meta,
10358 						  BPF_LIST_HEAD, BPF_LIST_NODE,
10359 						  &meta->arg_list_head.field);
10360 }
10361 
10362 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_rbtree_node(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
10363 					     struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno,
10364 					     struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
10365 {
10366 	return __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_node(env, reg, regno, meta,
10367 						  BPF_RB_ROOT, BPF_RB_NODE,
10368 						  &meta->arg_rbtree_root.field);
10369 }
10370 
10371 static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta,
10372 			    int insn_idx)
10373 {
10374 	const char *func_name = meta->func_name, *ref_tname;
10375 	const struct btf *btf = meta->btf;
10376 	const struct btf_param *args;
10377 	struct btf_record *rec;
10378 	u32 i, nargs;
10379 	int ret;
10380 
10381 	args = (const struct btf_param *)(meta->func_proto + 1);
10382 	nargs = btf_type_vlen(meta->func_proto);
10383 	if (nargs > MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS) {
10384 		verbose(env, "Function %s has %d > %d args\n", func_name, nargs,
10385 			MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS);
10386 		return -EINVAL;
10387 	}
10388 
10389 	/* Check that BTF function arguments match actual types that the
10390 	 * verifier sees.
10391 	 */
10392 	for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) {
10393 		struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = &regs[i + 1];
10394 		const struct btf_type *t, *ref_t, *resolve_ret;
10395 		enum bpf_arg_type arg_type = ARG_DONTCARE;
10396 		u32 regno = i + 1, ref_id, type_size;
10397 		bool is_ret_buf_sz = false;
10398 		int kf_arg_type;
10399 
10400 		t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, args[i].type, NULL);
10401 
10402 		if (is_kfunc_arg_ignore(btf, &args[i]))
10403 			continue;
10404 
10405 		if (btf_type_is_scalar(t)) {
10406 			if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
10407 				verbose(env, "R%d is not a scalar\n", regno);
10408 				return -EINVAL;
10409 			}
10410 
10411 			if (is_kfunc_arg_constant(meta->btf, &args[i])) {
10412 				if (meta->arg_constant.found) {
10413 					verbose(env, "verifier internal error: only one constant argument permitted\n");
10414 					return -EFAULT;
10415 				}
10416 				if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
10417 					verbose(env, "R%d must be a known constant\n", regno);
10418 					return -EINVAL;
10419 				}
10420 				ret = mark_chain_precision(env, regno);
10421 				if (ret < 0)
10422 					return ret;
10423 				meta->arg_constant.found = true;
10424 				meta->arg_constant.value = reg->var_off.value;
10425 			} else if (is_kfunc_arg_scalar_with_name(btf, &args[i], "rdonly_buf_size")) {
10426 				meta->r0_rdonly = true;
10427 				is_ret_buf_sz = true;
10428 			} else if (is_kfunc_arg_scalar_with_name(btf, &args[i], "rdwr_buf_size")) {
10429 				is_ret_buf_sz = true;
10430 			}
10431 
10432 			if (is_ret_buf_sz) {
10433 				if (meta->r0_size) {
10434 					verbose(env, "2 or more rdonly/rdwr_buf_size parameters for kfunc");
10435 					return -EINVAL;
10436 				}
10437 
10438 				if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
10439 					verbose(env, "R%d is not a const\n", regno);
10440 					return -EINVAL;
10441 				}
10442 
10443 				meta->r0_size = reg->var_off.value;
10444 				ret = mark_chain_precision(env, regno);
10445 				if (ret)
10446 					return ret;
10447 			}
10448 			continue;
10449 		}
10450 
10451 		if (!btf_type_is_ptr(t)) {
10452 			verbose(env, "Unrecognized arg#%d type %s\n", i, btf_type_str(t));
10453 			return -EINVAL;
10454 		}
10455 
10456 		if ((is_kfunc_trusted_args(meta) || is_kfunc_rcu(meta)) &&
10457 		    (register_is_null(reg) || type_may_be_null(reg->type))) {
10458 			verbose(env, "Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg%d\n", i);
10459 			return -EACCES;
10460 		}
10461 
10462 		if (reg->ref_obj_id) {
10463 			if (is_kfunc_release(meta) && meta->ref_obj_id) {
10464 				verbose(env, "verifier internal error: more than one arg with ref_obj_id R%d %u %u\n",
10465 					regno, reg->ref_obj_id,
10466 					meta->ref_obj_id);
10467 				return -EFAULT;
10468 			}
10469 			meta->ref_obj_id = reg->ref_obj_id;
10470 			if (is_kfunc_release(meta))
10471 				meta->release_regno = regno;
10472 		}
10473 
10474 		ref_t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, t->type, &ref_id);
10475 		ref_tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, ref_t->name_off);
10476 
10477 		kf_arg_type = get_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(env, meta, t, ref_t, ref_tname, args, i, nargs);
10478 		if (kf_arg_type < 0)
10479 			return kf_arg_type;
10480 
10481 		switch (kf_arg_type) {
10482 		case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID:
10483 		case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
10484 			if (!is_kfunc_trusted_args(meta) && !is_kfunc_rcu(meta))
10485 				break;
10486 
10487 			if (!is_trusted_reg(reg)) {
10488 				if (!is_kfunc_rcu(meta)) {
10489 					verbose(env, "R%d must be referenced or trusted\n", regno);
10490 					return -EINVAL;
10491 				}
10492 				if (!is_rcu_reg(reg)) {
10493 					verbose(env, "R%d must be a rcu pointer\n", regno);
10494 					return -EINVAL;
10495 				}
10496 			}
10497 
10498 			fallthrough;
10499 		case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX:
10500 			/* Trusted arguments have the same offset checks as release arguments */
10501 			arg_type |= OBJ_RELEASE;
10502 			break;
10503 		case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR:
10504 		case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ITER:
10505 		case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD:
10506 		case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_NODE:
10507 		case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_ROOT:
10508 		case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_NODE:
10509 		case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM:
10510 		case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE:
10511 		case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CALLBACK:
10512 		case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR:
10513 			/* Trusted by default */
10514 			break;
10515 		default:
10516 			WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
10517 			return -EFAULT;
10518 		}
10519 
10520 		if (is_kfunc_release(meta) && reg->ref_obj_id)
10521 			arg_type |= OBJ_RELEASE;
10522 		ret = check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, regno, arg_type);
10523 		if (ret < 0)
10524 			return ret;
10525 
10526 		switch (kf_arg_type) {
10527 		case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX:
10528 			if (reg->type != PTR_TO_CTX) {
10529 				verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to ctx, but got %s\n", i, btf_type_str(t));
10530 				return -EINVAL;
10531 			}
10532 
10533 			if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx]) {
10534 				ret = get_kern_ctx_btf_id(&env->log, resolve_prog_type(env->prog));
10535 				if (ret < 0)
10536 					return -EINVAL;
10537 				meta->ret_btf_id  = ret;
10538 			}
10539 			break;
10540 		case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID:
10541 			if (reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) {
10542 				verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to allocated object\n", i);
10543 				return -EINVAL;
10544 			}
10545 			if (!reg->ref_obj_id) {
10546 				verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n");
10547 				return -EINVAL;
10548 			}
10549 			if (meta->btf == btf_vmlinux &&
10550 			    meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl]) {
10551 				meta->arg_obj_drop.btf = reg->btf;
10552 				meta->arg_obj_drop.btf_id = reg->btf_id;
10553 			}
10554 			break;
10555 		case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR:
10556 		{
10557 			enum bpf_arg_type dynptr_arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR;
10558 			int clone_ref_obj_id = 0;
10559 
10560 			if (reg->type != PTR_TO_STACK &&
10561 			    reg->type != CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) {
10562 				verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to stack or dynptr_ptr\n", i);
10563 				return -EINVAL;
10564 			}
10565 
10566 			if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR)
10567 				dynptr_arg_type |= MEM_RDONLY;
10568 
10569 			if (is_kfunc_arg_uninit(btf, &args[i]))
10570 				dynptr_arg_type |= MEM_UNINIT;
10571 
10572 			if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_from_skb]) {
10573 				dynptr_arg_type |= DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB;
10574 			} else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_from_xdp]) {
10575 				dynptr_arg_type |= DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP;
10576 			} else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_clone] &&
10577 				   (dynptr_arg_type & MEM_UNINIT)) {
10578 				enum bpf_dynptr_type parent_type = meta->initialized_dynptr.type;
10579 
10580 				if (parent_type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID) {
10581 					verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no dynptr type for parent of clone\n");
10582 					return -EFAULT;
10583 				}
10584 
10585 				dynptr_arg_type |= (unsigned int)get_dynptr_type_flag(parent_type);
10586 				clone_ref_obj_id = meta->initialized_dynptr.ref_obj_id;
10587 				if (dynptr_type_refcounted(parent_type) && !clone_ref_obj_id) {
10588 					verbose(env, "verifier internal error: missing ref obj id for parent of clone\n");
10589 					return -EFAULT;
10590 				}
10591 			}
10592 
10593 			ret = process_dynptr_func(env, regno, insn_idx, dynptr_arg_type, clone_ref_obj_id);
10594 			if (ret < 0)
10595 				return ret;
10596 
10597 			if (!(dynptr_arg_type & MEM_UNINIT)) {
10598 				int id = dynptr_id(env, reg);
10599 
10600 				if (id < 0) {
10601 					verbose(env, "verifier internal error: failed to obtain dynptr id\n");
10602 					return id;
10603 				}
10604 				meta->initialized_dynptr.id = id;
10605 				meta->initialized_dynptr.type = dynptr_get_type(env, reg);
10606 				meta->initialized_dynptr.ref_obj_id = dynptr_ref_obj_id(env, reg);
10607 			}
10608 
10609 			break;
10610 		}
10611 		case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ITER:
10612 			ret = process_iter_arg(env, regno, insn_idx, meta);
10613 			if (ret < 0)
10614 				return ret;
10615 			break;
10616 		case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD:
10617 			if (reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE &&
10618 			    reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) {
10619 				verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to map value or allocated object\n", i);
10620 				return -EINVAL;
10621 			}
10622 			if (reg->type == (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC) && !reg->ref_obj_id) {
10623 				verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n");
10624 				return -EINVAL;
10625 			}
10626 			ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_head(env, reg, regno, meta);
10627 			if (ret < 0)
10628 				return ret;
10629 			break;
10630 		case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_ROOT:
10631 			if (reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE &&
10632 			    reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) {
10633 				verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to map value or allocated object\n", i);
10634 				return -EINVAL;
10635 			}
10636 			if (reg->type == (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC) && !reg->ref_obj_id) {
10637 				verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n");
10638 				return -EINVAL;
10639 			}
10640 			ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_rbtree_root(env, reg, regno, meta);
10641 			if (ret < 0)
10642 				return ret;
10643 			break;
10644 		case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_NODE:
10645 			if (reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) {
10646 				verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to allocated object\n", i);
10647 				return -EINVAL;
10648 			}
10649 			if (!reg->ref_obj_id) {
10650 				verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n");
10651 				return -EINVAL;
10652 			}
10653 			ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_node(env, reg, regno, meta);
10654 			if (ret < 0)
10655 				return ret;
10656 			break;
10657 		case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_NODE:
10658 			if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_remove]) {
10659 				if (!type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type) || reg->ref_obj_id) {
10660 					verbose(env, "rbtree_remove node input must be non-owning ref\n");
10661 					return -EINVAL;
10662 				}
10663 				if (in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(env)) {
10664 					verbose(env, "rbtree_remove not allowed in rbtree cb\n");
10665 					return -EINVAL;
10666 				}
10667 			} else {
10668 				if (reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) {
10669 					verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to allocated object\n", i);
10670 					return -EINVAL;
10671 				}
10672 				if (!reg->ref_obj_id) {
10673 					verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n");
10674 					return -EINVAL;
10675 				}
10676 			}
10677 
10678 			ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_rbtree_node(env, reg, regno, meta);
10679 			if (ret < 0)
10680 				return ret;
10681 			break;
10682 		case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
10683 			/* Only base_type is checked, further checks are done here */
10684 			if ((base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID ||
10685 			     (bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg->type) && !is_rcu_reg(reg))) &&
10686 			    !reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)]) {
10687 				verbose(env, "arg#%d is %s ", i, reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
10688 				verbose(env, "expected %s or socket\n",
10689 					reg_type_str(env, base_type(reg->type) |
10690 							  (type_flag(reg->type) & BPF_REG_TRUSTED_MODIFIERS)));
10691 				return -EINVAL;
10692 			}
10693 			ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_btf_id(env, reg, ref_t, ref_tname, ref_id, meta, i);
10694 			if (ret < 0)
10695 				return ret;
10696 			break;
10697 		case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM:
10698 			resolve_ret = btf_resolve_size(btf, ref_t, &type_size);
10699 			if (IS_ERR(resolve_ret)) {
10700 				verbose(env, "arg#%d reference type('%s %s') size cannot be determined: %ld\n",
10701 					i, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname, PTR_ERR(resolve_ret));
10702 				return -EINVAL;
10703 			}
10704 			ret = check_mem_reg(env, reg, regno, type_size);
10705 			if (ret < 0)
10706 				return ret;
10707 			break;
10708 		case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE:
10709 		{
10710 			struct bpf_reg_state *size_reg = &regs[regno + 1];
10711 			const struct btf_param *size_arg = &args[i + 1];
10712 
10713 			ret = check_kfunc_mem_size_reg(env, size_reg, regno + 1);
10714 			if (ret < 0) {
10715 				verbose(env, "arg#%d arg#%d memory, len pair leads to invalid memory access\n", i, i + 1);
10716 				return ret;
10717 			}
10718 
10719 			if (is_kfunc_arg_const_mem_size(meta->btf, size_arg, size_reg)) {
10720 				if (meta->arg_constant.found) {
10721 					verbose(env, "verifier internal error: only one constant argument permitted\n");
10722 					return -EFAULT;
10723 				}
10724 				if (!tnum_is_const(size_reg->var_off)) {
10725 					verbose(env, "R%d must be a known constant\n", regno + 1);
10726 					return -EINVAL;
10727 				}
10728 				meta->arg_constant.found = true;
10729 				meta->arg_constant.value = size_reg->var_off.value;
10730 			}
10731 
10732 			/* Skip next '__sz' or '__szk' argument */
10733 			i++;
10734 			break;
10735 		}
10736 		case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CALLBACK:
10737 			meta->subprogno = reg->subprogno;
10738 			break;
10739 		case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR:
10740 			if (!type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(reg->type) && !type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type)) {
10741 				verbose(env, "arg#%d is neither owning or non-owning ref\n", i);
10742 				return -EINVAL;
10743 			}
10744 
10745 			rec = reg_btf_record(reg);
10746 			if (!rec) {
10747 				verbose(env, "verifier internal error: Couldn't find btf_record\n");
10748 				return -EFAULT;
10749 			}
10750 
10751 			if (rec->refcount_off < 0) {
10752 				verbose(env, "arg#%d doesn't point to a type with bpf_refcount field\n", i);
10753 				return -EINVAL;
10754 			}
10755 			if (rec->refcount_off >= 0) {
10756 				verbose(env, "bpf_refcount_acquire calls are disabled for now\n");
10757 				return -EINVAL;
10758 			}
10759 			meta->arg_refcount_acquire.btf = reg->btf;
10760 			meta->arg_refcount_acquire.btf_id = reg->btf_id;
10761 			break;
10762 		}
10763 	}
10764 
10765 	if (is_kfunc_release(meta) && !meta->release_regno) {
10766 		verbose(env, "release kernel function %s expects refcounted PTR_TO_BTF_ID\n",
10767 			func_name);
10768 		return -EINVAL;
10769 	}
10770 
10771 	return 0;
10772 }
10773 
10774 static int fetch_kfunc_meta(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
10775 			    struct bpf_insn *insn,
10776 			    struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta,
10777 			    const char **kfunc_name)
10778 {
10779 	const struct btf_type *func, *func_proto;
10780 	u32 func_id, *kfunc_flags;
10781 	const char *func_name;
10782 	struct btf *desc_btf;
10783 
10784 	if (kfunc_name)
10785 		*kfunc_name = NULL;
10786 
10787 	if (!insn->imm)
10788 		return -EINVAL;
10789 
10790 	desc_btf = find_kfunc_desc_btf(env, insn->off);
10791 	if (IS_ERR(desc_btf))
10792 		return PTR_ERR(desc_btf);
10793 
10794 	func_id = insn->imm;
10795 	func = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, func_id);
10796 	func_name = btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf, func->name_off);
10797 	if (kfunc_name)
10798 		*kfunc_name = func_name;
10799 	func_proto = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, func->type);
10800 
10801 	kfunc_flags = btf_kfunc_id_set_contains(desc_btf, resolve_prog_type(env->prog), func_id);
10802 	if (!kfunc_flags) {
10803 		return -EACCES;
10804 	}
10805 
10806 	memset(meta, 0, sizeof(*meta));
10807 	meta->btf = desc_btf;
10808 	meta->func_id = func_id;
10809 	meta->kfunc_flags = *kfunc_flags;
10810 	meta->func_proto = func_proto;
10811 	meta->func_name = func_name;
10812 
10813 	return 0;
10814 }
10815 
10816 static int check_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
10817 			    int *insn_idx_p)
10818 {
10819 	const struct btf_type *t, *ptr_type;
10820 	u32 i, nargs, ptr_type_id, release_ref_obj_id;
10821 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
10822 	const char *func_name, *ptr_type_name;
10823 	bool sleepable, rcu_lock, rcu_unlock;
10824 	struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta meta;
10825 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux;
10826 	int err, insn_idx = *insn_idx_p;
10827 	const struct btf_param *args;
10828 	const struct btf_type *ret_t;
10829 	struct btf *desc_btf;
10830 
10831 	/* skip for now, but return error when we find this in fixup_kfunc_call */
10832 	if (!insn->imm)
10833 		return 0;
10834 
10835 	err = fetch_kfunc_meta(env, insn, &meta, &func_name);
10836 	if (err == -EACCES && func_name)
10837 		verbose(env, "calling kernel function %s is not allowed\n", func_name);
10838 	if (err)
10839 		return err;
10840 	desc_btf = meta.btf;
10841 	insn_aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx];
10842 
10843 	insn_aux->is_iter_next = is_iter_next_kfunc(&meta);
10844 
10845 	if (is_kfunc_destructive(&meta) && !capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT)) {
10846 		verbose(env, "destructive kfunc calls require CAP_SYS_BOOT capability\n");
10847 		return -EACCES;
10848 	}
10849 
10850 	sleepable = is_kfunc_sleepable(&meta);
10851 	if (sleepable && !env->prog->aux->sleepable) {
10852 		verbose(env, "program must be sleepable to call sleepable kfunc %s\n", func_name);
10853 		return -EACCES;
10854 	}
10855 
10856 	rcu_lock = is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_lock(&meta);
10857 	rcu_unlock = is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_unlock(&meta);
10858 
10859 	if (env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock) {
10860 		struct bpf_func_state *state;
10861 		struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
10862 
10863 		if (rcu_lock) {
10864 			verbose(env, "nested rcu read lock (kernel function %s)\n", func_name);
10865 			return -EINVAL;
10866 		} else if (rcu_unlock) {
10867 			bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, state, reg, ({
10868 				if (reg->type & MEM_RCU) {
10869 					reg->type &= ~(MEM_RCU | PTR_MAYBE_NULL);
10870 					reg->type |= PTR_UNTRUSTED;
10871 				}
10872 			}));
10873 			env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock = false;
10874 		} else if (sleepable) {
10875 			verbose(env, "kernel func %s is sleepable within rcu_read_lock region\n", func_name);
10876 			return -EACCES;
10877 		}
10878 	} else if (rcu_lock) {
10879 		env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock = true;
10880 	} else if (rcu_unlock) {
10881 		verbose(env, "unmatched rcu read unlock (kernel function %s)\n", func_name);
10882 		return -EINVAL;
10883 	}
10884 
10885 	/* Check the arguments */
10886 	err = check_kfunc_args(env, &meta, insn_idx);
10887 	if (err < 0)
10888 		return err;
10889 	/* In case of release function, we get register number of refcounted
10890 	 * PTR_TO_BTF_ID in bpf_kfunc_arg_meta, do the release now.
10891 	 */
10892 	if (meta.release_regno) {
10893 		err = release_reference(env, regs[meta.release_regno].ref_obj_id);
10894 		if (err) {
10895 			verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d reference has not been acquired before\n",
10896 				func_name, meta.func_id);
10897 			return err;
10898 		}
10899 	}
10900 
10901 	if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_front_impl] ||
10902 	    meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_back_impl] ||
10903 	    meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]) {
10904 		release_ref_obj_id = regs[BPF_REG_2].ref_obj_id;
10905 		insn_aux->insert_off = regs[BPF_REG_2].off;
10906 		err = ref_convert_owning_non_owning(env, release_ref_obj_id);
10907 		if (err) {
10908 			verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d conversion of owning ref to non-owning failed\n",
10909 				func_name, meta.func_id);
10910 			return err;
10911 		}
10912 
10913 		err = release_reference(env, release_ref_obj_id);
10914 		if (err) {
10915 			verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d reference has not been acquired before\n",
10916 				func_name, meta.func_id);
10917 			return err;
10918 		}
10919 	}
10920 
10921 	if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]) {
10922 		err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno,
10923 					set_rbtree_add_callback_state);
10924 		if (err) {
10925 			verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d failed callback verification\n",
10926 				func_name, meta.func_id);
10927 			return err;
10928 		}
10929 	}
10930 
10931 	for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++)
10932 		mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]);
10933 
10934 	/* Check return type */
10935 	t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(desc_btf, meta.func_proto->type, NULL);
10936 
10937 	if (is_kfunc_acquire(&meta) && !btf_type_is_struct_ptr(meta.btf, t)) {
10938 		/* Only exception is bpf_obj_new_impl */
10939 		if (meta.btf != btf_vmlinux ||
10940 		    (meta.func_id != special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_new_impl] &&
10941 		     meta.func_id != special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl])) {
10942 			verbose(env, "acquire kernel function does not return PTR_TO_BTF_ID\n");
10943 			return -EINVAL;
10944 		}
10945 	}
10946 
10947 	if (btf_type_is_scalar(t)) {
10948 		mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
10949 		mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, BPF_REG_0, t->size);
10950 	} else if (btf_type_is_ptr(t)) {
10951 		ptr_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(desc_btf, t->type, &ptr_type_id);
10952 
10953 		if (meta.btf == btf_vmlinux && btf_id_set_contains(&special_kfunc_set, meta.func_id)) {
10954 			if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_new_impl]) {
10955 				struct btf *ret_btf;
10956 				u32 ret_btf_id;
10957 
10958 				if (unlikely(!bpf_global_ma_set))
10959 					return -ENOMEM;
10960 
10961 				if (((u64)(u32)meta.arg_constant.value) != meta.arg_constant.value) {
10962 					verbose(env, "local type ID argument must be in range [0, U32_MAX]\n");
10963 					return -EINVAL;
10964 				}
10965 
10966 				ret_btf = env->prog->aux->btf;
10967 				ret_btf_id = meta.arg_constant.value;
10968 
10969 				/* This may be NULL due to user not supplying a BTF */
10970 				if (!ret_btf) {
10971 					verbose(env, "bpf_obj_new requires prog BTF\n");
10972 					return -EINVAL;
10973 				}
10974 
10975 				ret_t = btf_type_by_id(ret_btf, ret_btf_id);
10976 				if (!ret_t || !__btf_type_is_struct(ret_t)) {
10977 					verbose(env, "bpf_obj_new type ID argument must be of a struct\n");
10978 					return -EINVAL;
10979 				}
10980 
10981 				mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
10982 				regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC;
10983 				regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = ret_btf;
10984 				regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ret_btf_id;
10985 
10986 				insn_aux->obj_new_size = ret_t->size;
10987 				insn_aux->kptr_struct_meta =
10988 					btf_find_struct_meta(ret_btf, ret_btf_id);
10989 			} else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl]) {
10990 				mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
10991 				regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC;
10992 				regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = meta.arg_refcount_acquire.btf;
10993 				regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta.arg_refcount_acquire.btf_id;
10994 
10995 				insn_aux->kptr_struct_meta =
10996 					btf_find_struct_meta(meta.arg_refcount_acquire.btf,
10997 							     meta.arg_refcount_acquire.btf_id);
10998 			} else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_pop_front] ||
10999 				   meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_pop_back]) {
11000 				struct btf_field *field = meta.arg_list_head.field;
11001 
11002 				mark_reg_graph_node(regs, BPF_REG_0, &field->graph_root);
11003 			} else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_remove] ||
11004 				   meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_first]) {
11005 				struct btf_field *field = meta.arg_rbtree_root.field;
11006 
11007 				mark_reg_graph_node(regs, BPF_REG_0, &field->graph_root);
11008 			} else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx]) {
11009 				mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
11010 				regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED;
11011 				regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = desc_btf;
11012 				regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta.ret_btf_id;
11013 			} else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rdonly_cast]) {
11014 				ret_t = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, meta.arg_constant.value);
11015 				if (!ret_t || !btf_type_is_struct(ret_t)) {
11016 					verbose(env,
11017 						"kfunc bpf_rdonly_cast type ID argument must be of a struct\n");
11018 					return -EINVAL;
11019 				}
11020 
11021 				mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
11022 				regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED;
11023 				regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = desc_btf;
11024 				regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta.arg_constant.value;
11025 			} else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_slice] ||
11026 				   meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr]) {
11027 				enum bpf_type_flag type_flag = get_dynptr_type_flag(meta.initialized_dynptr.type);
11028 
11029 				mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
11030 
11031 				if (!meta.arg_constant.found) {
11032 					verbose(env, "verifier internal error: bpf_dynptr_slice(_rdwr) no constant size\n");
11033 					return -EFAULT;
11034 				}
11035 
11036 				regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = meta.arg_constant.value;
11037 
11038 				/* PTR_MAYBE_NULL will be added when is_kfunc_ret_null is checked */
11039 				regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM | type_flag;
11040 
11041 				if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_slice]) {
11042 					regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_RDONLY;
11043 				} else {
11044 					/* this will set env->seen_direct_write to true */
11045 					if (!may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, BPF_WRITE)) {
11046 						verbose(env, "the prog does not allow writes to packet data\n");
11047 						return -EINVAL;
11048 					}
11049 				}
11050 
11051 				if (!meta.initialized_dynptr.id) {
11052 					verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no dynptr id\n");
11053 					return -EFAULT;
11054 				}
11055 				regs[BPF_REG_0].dynptr_id = meta.initialized_dynptr.id;
11056 
11057 				/* we don't need to set BPF_REG_0's ref obj id
11058 				 * because packet slices are not refcounted (see
11059 				 * dynptr_type_refcounted)
11060 				 */
11061 			} else {
11062 				verbose(env, "kernel function %s unhandled dynamic return type\n",
11063 					meta.func_name);
11064 				return -EFAULT;
11065 			}
11066 		} else if (!__btf_type_is_struct(ptr_type)) {
11067 			if (!meta.r0_size) {
11068 				__u32 sz;
11069 
11070 				if (!IS_ERR(btf_resolve_size(desc_btf, ptr_type, &sz))) {
11071 					meta.r0_size = sz;
11072 					meta.r0_rdonly = true;
11073 				}
11074 			}
11075 			if (!meta.r0_size) {
11076 				ptr_type_name = btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf,
11077 								   ptr_type->name_off);
11078 				verbose(env,
11079 					"kernel function %s returns pointer type %s %s is not supported\n",
11080 					func_name,
11081 					btf_type_str(ptr_type),
11082 					ptr_type_name);
11083 				return -EINVAL;
11084 			}
11085 
11086 			mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
11087 			regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM;
11088 			regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = meta.r0_size;
11089 
11090 			if (meta.r0_rdonly)
11091 				regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_RDONLY;
11092 
11093 			/* Ensures we don't access the memory after a release_reference() */
11094 			if (meta.ref_obj_id)
11095 				regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = meta.ref_obj_id;
11096 		} else {
11097 			mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
11098 			regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = desc_btf;
11099 			regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID;
11100 			regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ptr_type_id;
11101 		}
11102 
11103 		if (is_kfunc_ret_null(&meta)) {
11104 			regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= PTR_MAYBE_NULL;
11105 			/* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg, see 93c230e3f5bd6 */
11106 			regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen;
11107 		}
11108 		mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, BPF_REG_0, sizeof(void *));
11109 		if (is_kfunc_acquire(&meta)) {
11110 			int id = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx);
11111 
11112 			if (id < 0)
11113 				return id;
11114 			if (is_kfunc_ret_null(&meta))
11115 				regs[BPF_REG_0].id = id;
11116 			regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = id;
11117 		} else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_first]) {
11118 			ref_set_non_owning(env, &regs[BPF_REG_0]);
11119 		}
11120 
11121 		if (reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(&regs[BPF_REG_0]) && !regs[BPF_REG_0].id)
11122 			regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen;
11123 	} else if (btf_type_is_void(t)) {
11124 		if (meta.btf == btf_vmlinux && btf_id_set_contains(&special_kfunc_set, meta.func_id)) {
11125 			if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl]) {
11126 				insn_aux->kptr_struct_meta =
11127 					btf_find_struct_meta(meta.arg_obj_drop.btf,
11128 							     meta.arg_obj_drop.btf_id);
11129 			}
11130 		}
11131 	}
11132 
11133 	nargs = btf_type_vlen(meta.func_proto);
11134 	args = (const struct btf_param *)(meta.func_proto + 1);
11135 	for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) {
11136 		u32 regno = i + 1;
11137 
11138 		t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(desc_btf, args[i].type, NULL);
11139 		if (btf_type_is_ptr(t))
11140 			mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, regno, sizeof(void *));
11141 		else
11142 			/* scalar. ensured by btf_check_kfunc_arg_match() */
11143 			mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, regno, t->size);
11144 	}
11145 
11146 	if (is_iter_next_kfunc(&meta)) {
11147 		err = process_iter_next_call(env, insn_idx, &meta);
11148 		if (err)
11149 			return err;
11150 	}
11151 
11152 	return 0;
11153 }
11154 
11155 static bool signed_add_overflows(s64 a, s64 b)
11156 {
11157 	/* Do the add in u64, where overflow is well-defined */
11158 	s64 res = (s64)((u64)a + (u64)b);
11159 
11160 	if (b < 0)
11161 		return res > a;
11162 	return res < a;
11163 }
11164 
11165 static bool signed_add32_overflows(s32 a, s32 b)
11166 {
11167 	/* Do the add in u32, where overflow is well-defined */
11168 	s32 res = (s32)((u32)a + (u32)b);
11169 
11170 	if (b < 0)
11171 		return res > a;
11172 	return res < a;
11173 }
11174 
11175 static bool signed_sub_overflows(s64 a, s64 b)
11176 {
11177 	/* Do the sub in u64, where overflow is well-defined */
11178 	s64 res = (s64)((u64)a - (u64)b);
11179 
11180 	if (b < 0)
11181 		return res < a;
11182 	return res > a;
11183 }
11184 
11185 static bool signed_sub32_overflows(s32 a, s32 b)
11186 {
11187 	/* Do the sub in u32, where overflow is well-defined */
11188 	s32 res = (s32)((u32)a - (u32)b);
11189 
11190 	if (b < 0)
11191 		return res < a;
11192 	return res > a;
11193 }
11194 
11195 static bool check_reg_sane_offset(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
11196 				  const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
11197 				  enum bpf_reg_type type)
11198 {
11199 	bool known = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off);
11200 	s64 val = reg->var_off.value;
11201 	s64 smin = reg->smin_value;
11202 
11203 	if (known && (val >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || val <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF)) {
11204 		verbose(env, "math between %s pointer and %lld is not allowed\n",
11205 			reg_type_str(env, type), val);
11206 		return false;
11207 	}
11208 
11209 	if (reg->off >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || reg->off <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) {
11210 		verbose(env, "%s pointer offset %d is not allowed\n",
11211 			reg_type_str(env, type), reg->off);
11212 		return false;
11213 	}
11214 
11215 	if (smin == S64_MIN) {
11216 		verbose(env, "math between %s pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed\n",
11217 			reg_type_str(env, type));
11218 		return false;
11219 	}
11220 
11221 	if (smin >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || smin <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) {
11222 		verbose(env, "value %lld makes %s pointer be out of bounds\n",
11223 			smin, reg_type_str(env, type));
11224 		return false;
11225 	}
11226 
11227 	return true;
11228 }
11229 
11230 enum {
11231 	REASON_BOUNDS	= -1,
11232 	REASON_TYPE	= -2,
11233 	REASON_PATHS	= -3,
11234 	REASON_LIMIT	= -4,
11235 	REASON_STACK	= -5,
11236 };
11237 
11238 static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
11239 			      u32 *alu_limit, bool mask_to_left)
11240 {
11241 	u32 max = 0, ptr_limit = 0;
11242 
11243 	switch (ptr_reg->type) {
11244 	case PTR_TO_STACK:
11245 		/* Offset 0 is out-of-bounds, but acceptable start for the
11246 		 * left direction, see BPF_REG_FP. Also, unknown scalar
11247 		 * offset where we would need to deal with min/max bounds is
11248 		 * currently prohibited for unprivileged.
11249 		 */
11250 		max = MAX_BPF_STACK + mask_to_left;
11251 		ptr_limit = -(ptr_reg->var_off.value + ptr_reg->off);
11252 		break;
11253 	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
11254 		max = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size;
11255 		ptr_limit = (mask_to_left ?
11256 			     ptr_reg->smin_value :
11257 			     ptr_reg->umax_value) + ptr_reg->off;
11258 		break;
11259 	default:
11260 		return REASON_TYPE;
11261 	}
11262 
11263 	if (ptr_limit >= max)
11264 		return REASON_LIMIT;
11265 	*alu_limit = ptr_limit;
11266 	return 0;
11267 }
11268 
11269 static bool can_skip_alu_sanitation(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
11270 				    const struct bpf_insn *insn)
11271 {
11272 	return env->bypass_spec_v1 || BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K;
11273 }
11274 
11275 static int update_alu_sanitation_state(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux,
11276 				       u32 alu_state, u32 alu_limit)
11277 {
11278 	/* If we arrived here from different branches with different
11279 	 * state or limits to sanitize, then this won't work.
11280 	 */
11281 	if (aux->alu_state &&
11282 	    (aux->alu_state != alu_state ||
11283 	     aux->alu_limit != alu_limit))
11284 		return REASON_PATHS;
11285 
11286 	/* Corresponding fixup done in do_misc_fixups(). */
11287 	aux->alu_state = alu_state;
11288 	aux->alu_limit = alu_limit;
11289 	return 0;
11290 }
11291 
11292 static int sanitize_val_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
11293 			    struct bpf_insn *insn)
11294 {
11295 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env);
11296 
11297 	if (can_skip_alu_sanitation(env, insn))
11298 		return 0;
11299 
11300 	return update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER, 0);
11301 }
11302 
11303 static bool sanitize_needed(u8 opcode)
11304 {
11305 	return opcode == BPF_ADD || opcode == BPF_SUB;
11306 }
11307 
11308 struct bpf_sanitize_info {
11309 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data aux;
11310 	bool mask_to_left;
11311 };
11312 
11313 static struct bpf_verifier_state *
11314 sanitize_speculative_path(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
11315 			  const struct bpf_insn *insn,
11316 			  u32 next_idx, u32 curr_idx)
11317 {
11318 	struct bpf_verifier_state *branch;
11319 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs;
11320 
11321 	branch = push_stack(env, next_idx, curr_idx, true);
11322 	if (branch && insn) {
11323 		regs = branch->frame[branch->curframe]->regs;
11324 		if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
11325 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
11326 		} else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
11327 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
11328 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->src_reg);
11329 		}
11330 	}
11331 	return branch;
11332 }
11333 
11334 static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
11335 			    struct bpf_insn *insn,
11336 			    const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
11337 			    const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg,
11338 			    struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
11339 			    struct bpf_sanitize_info *info,
11340 			    const bool commit_window)
11341 {
11342 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = commit_window ? cur_aux(env) : &info->aux;
11343 	struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
11344 	bool off_is_imm = tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off);
11345 	bool off_is_neg = off_reg->smin_value < 0;
11346 	bool ptr_is_dst_reg = ptr_reg == dst_reg;
11347 	u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
11348 	u32 alu_state, alu_limit;
11349 	struct bpf_reg_state tmp;
11350 	bool ret;
11351 	int err;
11352 
11353 	if (can_skip_alu_sanitation(env, insn))
11354 		return 0;
11355 
11356 	/* We already marked aux for masking from non-speculative
11357 	 * paths, thus we got here in the first place. We only care
11358 	 * to explore bad access from here.
11359 	 */
11360 	if (vstate->speculative)
11361 		goto do_sim;
11362 
11363 	if (!commit_window) {
11364 		if (!tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off) &&
11365 		    (off_reg->smin_value < 0) != (off_reg->smax_value < 0))
11366 			return REASON_BOUNDS;
11367 
11368 		info->mask_to_left = (opcode == BPF_ADD &&  off_is_neg) ||
11369 				     (opcode == BPF_SUB && !off_is_neg);
11370 	}
11371 
11372 	err = retrieve_ptr_limit(ptr_reg, &alu_limit, info->mask_to_left);
11373 	if (err < 0)
11374 		return err;
11375 
11376 	if (commit_window) {
11377 		/* In commit phase we narrow the masking window based on
11378 		 * the observed pointer move after the simulated operation.
11379 		 */
11380 		alu_state = info->aux.alu_state;
11381 		alu_limit = abs(info->aux.alu_limit - alu_limit);
11382 	} else {
11383 		alu_state  = off_is_neg ? BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE : 0;
11384 		alu_state |= off_is_imm ? BPF_ALU_IMMEDIATE : 0;
11385 		alu_state |= ptr_is_dst_reg ?
11386 			     BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC : BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST;
11387 
11388 		/* Limit pruning on unknown scalars to enable deep search for
11389 		 * potential masking differences from other program paths.
11390 		 */
11391 		if (!off_is_imm)
11392 			env->explore_alu_limits = true;
11393 	}
11394 
11395 	err = update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, alu_state, alu_limit);
11396 	if (err < 0)
11397 		return err;
11398 do_sim:
11399 	/* If we're in commit phase, we're done here given we already
11400 	 * pushed the truncated dst_reg into the speculative verification
11401 	 * stack.
11402 	 *
11403 	 * Also, when register is a known constant, we rewrite register-based
11404 	 * operation to immediate-based, and thus do not need masking (and as
11405 	 * a consequence, do not need to simulate the zero-truncation either).
11406 	 */
11407 	if (commit_window || off_is_imm)
11408 		return 0;
11409 
11410 	/* Simulate and find potential out-of-bounds access under
11411 	 * speculative execution from truncation as a result of
11412 	 * masking when off was not within expected range. If off
11413 	 * sits in dst, then we temporarily need to move ptr there
11414 	 * to simulate dst (== 0) +/-= ptr. Needed, for example,
11415 	 * for cases where we use K-based arithmetic in one direction
11416 	 * and truncated reg-based in the other in order to explore
11417 	 * bad access.
11418 	 */
11419 	if (!ptr_is_dst_reg) {
11420 		tmp = *dst_reg;
11421 		copy_register_state(dst_reg, ptr_reg);
11422 	}
11423 	ret = sanitize_speculative_path(env, NULL, env->insn_idx + 1,
11424 					env->insn_idx);
11425 	if (!ptr_is_dst_reg && ret)
11426 		*dst_reg = tmp;
11427 	return !ret ? REASON_STACK : 0;
11428 }
11429 
11430 static void sanitize_mark_insn_seen(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
11431 {
11432 	struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
11433 
11434 	/* If we simulate paths under speculation, we don't update the
11435 	 * insn as 'seen' such that when we verify unreachable paths in
11436 	 * the non-speculative domain, sanitize_dead_code() can still
11437 	 * rewrite/sanitize them.
11438 	 */
11439 	if (!vstate->speculative)
11440 		env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = env->pass_cnt;
11441 }
11442 
11443 static int sanitize_err(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
11444 			const struct bpf_insn *insn, int reason,
11445 			const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg,
11446 			const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg)
11447 {
11448 	static const char *err = "pointer arithmetic with it prohibited for !root";
11449 	const char *op = BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_ADD ? "add" : "sub";
11450 	u32 dst = insn->dst_reg, src = insn->src_reg;
11451 
11452 	switch (reason) {
11453 	case REASON_BOUNDS:
11454 		verbose(env, "R%d has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds, %s\n",
11455 			off_reg == dst_reg ? dst : src, err);
11456 		break;
11457 	case REASON_TYPE:
11458 		verbose(env, "R%d has pointer with unsupported alu operation, %s\n",
11459 			off_reg == dst_reg ? src : dst, err);
11460 		break;
11461 	case REASON_PATHS:
11462 		verbose(env, "R%d tried to %s from different maps, paths or scalars, %s\n",
11463 			dst, op, err);
11464 		break;
11465 	case REASON_LIMIT:
11466 		verbose(env, "R%d tried to %s beyond pointer bounds, %s\n",
11467 			dst, op, err);
11468 		break;
11469 	case REASON_STACK:
11470 		verbose(env, "R%d could not be pushed for speculative verification, %s\n",
11471 			dst, err);
11472 		break;
11473 	default:
11474 		verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unknown reason (%d)\n",
11475 			reason);
11476 		break;
11477 	}
11478 
11479 	return -EACCES;
11480 }
11481 
11482 /* check that stack access falls within stack limits and that 'reg' doesn't
11483  * have a variable offset.
11484  *
11485  * Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for simplicity since it
11486  * requires corresponding support in Spectre masking for stack ALU.  See also
11487  * retrieve_ptr_limit().
11488  *
11489  *
11490  * 'off' includes 'reg->off'.
11491  */
11492 static int check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic(
11493 				struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
11494 				int regno,
11495 				const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
11496 				int off)
11497 {
11498 	if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
11499 		char tn_buf[48];
11500 
11501 		tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
11502 		verbose(env, "R%d variable stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s off=%d\n",
11503 			regno, tn_buf, off);
11504 		return -EACCES;
11505 	}
11506 
11507 	if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK) {
11508 		verbose(env, "R%d stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, "
11509 			"prohibited for !root; off=%d\n", regno, off);
11510 		return -EACCES;
11511 	}
11512 
11513 	return 0;
11514 }
11515 
11516 static int sanitize_check_bounds(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
11517 				 const struct bpf_insn *insn,
11518 				 const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg)
11519 {
11520 	u32 dst = insn->dst_reg;
11521 
11522 	/* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds
11523 	 * in order to be able to sanitize access later on.
11524 	 */
11525 	if (env->bypass_spec_v1)
11526 		return 0;
11527 
11528 	switch (dst_reg->type) {
11529 	case PTR_TO_STACK:
11530 		if (check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic(env, dst, dst_reg,
11531 					dst_reg->off + dst_reg->var_off.value))
11532 			return -EACCES;
11533 		break;
11534 	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
11535 		if (check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1, false, ACCESS_HELPER)) {
11536 			verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, "
11537 				"prohibited for !root\n", dst);
11538 			return -EACCES;
11539 		}
11540 		break;
11541 	default:
11542 		break;
11543 	}
11544 
11545 	return 0;
11546 }
11547 
11548 /* Handles arithmetic on a pointer and a scalar: computes new min/max and var_off.
11549  * Caller should also handle BPF_MOV case separately.
11550  * If we return -EACCES, caller may want to try again treating pointer as a
11551  * scalar.  So we only emit a diagnostic if !env->allow_ptr_leaks.
11552  */
11553 static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
11554 				   struct bpf_insn *insn,
11555 				   const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
11556 				   const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg)
11557 {
11558 	struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
11559 	struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
11560 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *dst_reg;
11561 	bool known = tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off);
11562 	s64 smin_val = off_reg->smin_value, smax_val = off_reg->smax_value,
11563 	    smin_ptr = ptr_reg->smin_value, smax_ptr = ptr_reg->smax_value;
11564 	u64 umin_val = off_reg->umin_value, umax_val = off_reg->umax_value,
11565 	    umin_ptr = ptr_reg->umin_value, umax_ptr = ptr_reg->umax_value;
11566 	struct bpf_sanitize_info info = {};
11567 	u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
11568 	u32 dst = insn->dst_reg;
11569 	int ret;
11570 
11571 	dst_reg = &regs[dst];
11572 
11573 	if ((known && (smin_val != smax_val || umin_val != umax_val)) ||
11574 	    smin_val > smax_val || umin_val > umax_val) {
11575 		/* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds derived from
11576 		 * e.g. dead branches.
11577 		 */
11578 		__mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg);
11579 		return 0;
11580 	}
11581 
11582 	if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) {
11583 		/* 32-bit ALU ops on pointers produce (meaningless) scalars */
11584 		if (opcode == BPF_SUB && env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
11585 			__mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg);
11586 			return 0;
11587 		}
11588 
11589 		verbose(env,
11590 			"R%d 32-bit pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
11591 			dst);
11592 		return -EACCES;
11593 	}
11594 
11595 	if (ptr_reg->type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL) {
11596 		verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited, null-check it first\n",
11597 			dst, reg_type_str(env, ptr_reg->type));
11598 		return -EACCES;
11599 	}
11600 
11601 	switch (base_type(ptr_reg->type)) {
11602 	case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP:
11603 		/* smin_val represents the known value */
11604 		if (known && smin_val == 0 && opcode == BPF_ADD)
11605 			break;
11606 		fallthrough;
11607 	case PTR_TO_PACKET_END:
11608 	case PTR_TO_SOCKET:
11609 	case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON:
11610 	case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
11611 	case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK:
11612 		verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited\n",
11613 			dst, reg_type_str(env, ptr_reg->type));
11614 		return -EACCES;
11615 	default:
11616 		break;
11617 	}
11618 
11619 	/* In case of 'scalar += pointer', dst_reg inherits pointer type and id.
11620 	 * The id may be overwritten later if we create a new variable offset.
11621 	 */
11622 	dst_reg->type = ptr_reg->type;
11623 	dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id;
11624 
11625 	if (!check_reg_sane_offset(env, off_reg, ptr_reg->type) ||
11626 	    !check_reg_sane_offset(env, ptr_reg, ptr_reg->type))
11627 		return -EINVAL;
11628 
11629 	/* pointer types do not carry 32-bit bounds at the moment. */
11630 	__mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg);
11631 
11632 	if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) {
11633 		ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg,
11634 				       &info, false);
11635 		if (ret < 0)
11636 			return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg);
11637 	}
11638 
11639 	switch (opcode) {
11640 	case BPF_ADD:
11641 		/* We can take a fixed offset as long as it doesn't overflow
11642 		 * the s32 'off' field
11643 		 */
11644 		if (known && (ptr_reg->off + smin_val ==
11645 			      (s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off + smin_val))) {
11646 			/* pointer += K.  Accumulate it into fixed offset */
11647 			dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr;
11648 			dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr;
11649 			dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr;
11650 			dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr;
11651 			dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off;
11652 			dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off + smin_val;
11653 			dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw;
11654 			break;
11655 		}
11656 		/* A new variable offset is created.  Note that off_reg->off
11657 		 * == 0, since it's a scalar.
11658 		 * dst_reg gets the pointer type and since some positive
11659 		 * integer value was added to the pointer, give it a new 'id'
11660 		 * if it's a PTR_TO_PACKET.
11661 		 * this creates a new 'base' pointer, off_reg (variable) gets
11662 		 * added into the variable offset, and we copy the fixed offset
11663 		 * from ptr_reg.
11664 		 */
11665 		if (signed_add_overflows(smin_ptr, smin_val) ||
11666 		    signed_add_overflows(smax_ptr, smax_val)) {
11667 			dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
11668 			dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
11669 		} else {
11670 			dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr + smin_val;
11671 			dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr + smax_val;
11672 		}
11673 		if (umin_ptr + umin_val < umin_ptr ||
11674 		    umax_ptr + umax_val < umax_ptr) {
11675 			dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
11676 			dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
11677 		} else {
11678 			dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr + umin_val;
11679 			dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr + umax_val;
11680 		}
11681 		dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off);
11682 		dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off;
11683 		dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw;
11684 		if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) {
11685 			dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
11686 			/* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */
11687 			memset(&dst_reg->raw, 0, sizeof(dst_reg->raw));
11688 		}
11689 		break;
11690 	case BPF_SUB:
11691 		if (dst_reg == off_reg) {
11692 			/* scalar -= pointer.  Creates an unknown scalar */
11693 			verbose(env, "R%d tried to subtract pointer from scalar\n",
11694 				dst);
11695 			return -EACCES;
11696 		}
11697 		/* We don't allow subtraction from FP, because (according to
11698 		 * test_verifier.c test "invalid fp arithmetic", JITs might not
11699 		 * be able to deal with it.
11700 		 */
11701 		if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
11702 			verbose(env, "R%d subtraction from stack pointer prohibited\n",
11703 				dst);
11704 			return -EACCES;
11705 		}
11706 		if (known && (ptr_reg->off - smin_val ==
11707 			      (s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off - smin_val))) {
11708 			/* pointer -= K.  Subtract it from fixed offset */
11709 			dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr;
11710 			dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr;
11711 			dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr;
11712 			dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr;
11713 			dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off;
11714 			dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id;
11715 			dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off - smin_val;
11716 			dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw;
11717 			break;
11718 		}
11719 		/* A new variable offset is created.  If the subtrahend is known
11720 		 * nonnegative, then any reg->range we had before is still good.
11721 		 */
11722 		if (signed_sub_overflows(smin_ptr, smax_val) ||
11723 		    signed_sub_overflows(smax_ptr, smin_val)) {
11724 			/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
11725 			dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
11726 			dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
11727 		} else {
11728 			dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr - smax_val;
11729 			dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr - smin_val;
11730 		}
11731 		if (umin_ptr < umax_val) {
11732 			/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
11733 			dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
11734 			dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
11735 		} else {
11736 			/* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */
11737 			dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr - umax_val;
11738 			dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr - umin_val;
11739 		}
11740 		dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off);
11741 		dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off;
11742 		dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw;
11743 		if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) {
11744 			dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
11745 			/* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */
11746 			if (smin_val < 0)
11747 				memset(&dst_reg->raw, 0, sizeof(dst_reg->raw));
11748 		}
11749 		break;
11750 	case BPF_AND:
11751 	case BPF_OR:
11752 	case BPF_XOR:
11753 		/* bitwise ops on pointers are troublesome, prohibit. */
11754 		verbose(env, "R%d bitwise operator %s on pointer prohibited\n",
11755 			dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
11756 		return -EACCES;
11757 	default:
11758 		/* other operators (e.g. MUL,LSH) produce non-pointer results */
11759 		verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic with %s operator prohibited\n",
11760 			dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
11761 		return -EACCES;
11762 	}
11763 
11764 	if (!check_reg_sane_offset(env, dst_reg, ptr_reg->type))
11765 		return -EINVAL;
11766 	reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg);
11767 	if (sanitize_check_bounds(env, insn, dst_reg) < 0)
11768 		return -EACCES;
11769 	if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) {
11770 		ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, dst_reg, off_reg, dst_reg,
11771 				       &info, true);
11772 		if (ret < 0)
11773 			return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg);
11774 	}
11775 
11776 	return 0;
11777 }
11778 
11779 static void scalar32_min_max_add(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
11780 				 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
11781 {
11782 	s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value;
11783 	s32 smax_val = src_reg->s32_max_value;
11784 	u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value;
11785 	u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value;
11786 
11787 	if (signed_add32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_min_value, smin_val) ||
11788 	    signed_add32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_max_value, smax_val)) {
11789 		dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
11790 		dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
11791 	} else {
11792 		dst_reg->s32_min_value += smin_val;
11793 		dst_reg->s32_max_value += smax_val;
11794 	}
11795 	if (dst_reg->u32_min_value + umin_val < umin_val ||
11796 	    dst_reg->u32_max_value + umax_val < umax_val) {
11797 		dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0;
11798 		dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX;
11799 	} else {
11800 		dst_reg->u32_min_value += umin_val;
11801 		dst_reg->u32_max_value += umax_val;
11802 	}
11803 }
11804 
11805 static void scalar_min_max_add(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
11806 			       struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
11807 {
11808 	s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value;
11809 	s64 smax_val = src_reg->smax_value;
11810 	u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value;
11811 	u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value;
11812 
11813 	if (signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smin_val) ||
11814 	    signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smax_val)) {
11815 		dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
11816 		dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
11817 	} else {
11818 		dst_reg->smin_value += smin_val;
11819 		dst_reg->smax_value += smax_val;
11820 	}
11821 	if (dst_reg->umin_value + umin_val < umin_val ||
11822 	    dst_reg->umax_value + umax_val < umax_val) {
11823 		dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
11824 		dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
11825 	} else {
11826 		dst_reg->umin_value += umin_val;
11827 		dst_reg->umax_value += umax_val;
11828 	}
11829 }
11830 
11831 static void scalar32_min_max_sub(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
11832 				 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
11833 {
11834 	s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value;
11835 	s32 smax_val = src_reg->s32_max_value;
11836 	u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value;
11837 	u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value;
11838 
11839 	if (signed_sub32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_min_value, smax_val) ||
11840 	    signed_sub32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_max_value, smin_val)) {
11841 		/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
11842 		dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
11843 		dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
11844 	} else {
11845 		dst_reg->s32_min_value -= smax_val;
11846 		dst_reg->s32_max_value -= smin_val;
11847 	}
11848 	if (dst_reg->u32_min_value < umax_val) {
11849 		/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
11850 		dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0;
11851 		dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX;
11852 	} else {
11853 		/* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */
11854 		dst_reg->u32_min_value -= umax_val;
11855 		dst_reg->u32_max_value -= umin_val;
11856 	}
11857 }
11858 
11859 static void scalar_min_max_sub(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
11860 			       struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
11861 {
11862 	s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value;
11863 	s64 smax_val = src_reg->smax_value;
11864 	u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value;
11865 	u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value;
11866 
11867 	if (signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smax_val) ||
11868 	    signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smin_val)) {
11869 		/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
11870 		dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
11871 		dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
11872 	} else {
11873 		dst_reg->smin_value -= smax_val;
11874 		dst_reg->smax_value -= smin_val;
11875 	}
11876 	if (dst_reg->umin_value < umax_val) {
11877 		/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
11878 		dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
11879 		dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
11880 	} else {
11881 		/* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */
11882 		dst_reg->umin_value -= umax_val;
11883 		dst_reg->umax_value -= umin_val;
11884 	}
11885 }
11886 
11887 static void scalar32_min_max_mul(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
11888 				 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
11889 {
11890 	s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value;
11891 	u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value;
11892 	u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value;
11893 
11894 	if (smin_val < 0 || dst_reg->s32_min_value < 0) {
11895 		/* Ain't nobody got time to multiply that sign */
11896 		__mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg);
11897 		return;
11898 	}
11899 	/* Both values are positive, so we can work with unsigned and
11900 	 * copy the result to signed (unless it exceeds S32_MAX).
11901 	 */
11902 	if (umax_val > U16_MAX || dst_reg->u32_max_value > U16_MAX) {
11903 		/* Potential overflow, we know nothing */
11904 		__mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg);
11905 		return;
11906 	}
11907 	dst_reg->u32_min_value *= umin_val;
11908 	dst_reg->u32_max_value *= umax_val;
11909 	if (dst_reg->u32_max_value > S32_MAX) {
11910 		/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
11911 		dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
11912 		dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
11913 	} else {
11914 		dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value;
11915 		dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value;
11916 	}
11917 }
11918 
11919 static void scalar_min_max_mul(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
11920 			       struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
11921 {
11922 	s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value;
11923 	u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value;
11924 	u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value;
11925 
11926 	if (smin_val < 0 || dst_reg->smin_value < 0) {
11927 		/* Ain't nobody got time to multiply that sign */
11928 		__mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg);
11929 		return;
11930 	}
11931 	/* Both values are positive, so we can work with unsigned and
11932 	 * copy the result to signed (unless it exceeds S64_MAX).
11933 	 */
11934 	if (umax_val > U32_MAX || dst_reg->umax_value > U32_MAX) {
11935 		/* Potential overflow, we know nothing */
11936 		__mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg);
11937 		return;
11938 	}
11939 	dst_reg->umin_value *= umin_val;
11940 	dst_reg->umax_value *= umax_val;
11941 	if (dst_reg->umax_value > S64_MAX) {
11942 		/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
11943 		dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
11944 		dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
11945 	} else {
11946 		dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
11947 		dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
11948 	}
11949 }
11950 
11951 static void scalar32_min_max_and(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
11952 				 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
11953 {
11954 	bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off);
11955 	bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off);
11956 	struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off);
11957 	s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value;
11958 	u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value;
11959 
11960 	if (src_known && dst_known) {
11961 		__mark_reg32_known(dst_reg, var32_off.value);
11962 		return;
11963 	}
11964 
11965 	/* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently
11966 	 * bitwise.  Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima.
11967 	 */
11968 	dst_reg->u32_min_value = var32_off.value;
11969 	dst_reg->u32_max_value = min(dst_reg->u32_max_value, umax_val);
11970 	if (dst_reg->s32_min_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) {
11971 		/* Lose signed bounds when ANDing negative numbers,
11972 		 * ain't nobody got time for that.
11973 		 */
11974 		dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
11975 		dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
11976 	} else {
11977 		/* ANDing two positives gives a positive, so safe to
11978 		 * cast result into s64.
11979 		 */
11980 		dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value;
11981 		dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value;
11982 	}
11983 }
11984 
11985 static void scalar_min_max_and(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
11986 			       struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
11987 {
11988 	bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off);
11989 	bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off);
11990 	s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value;
11991 	u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value;
11992 
11993 	if (src_known && dst_known) {
11994 		__mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value);
11995 		return;
11996 	}
11997 
11998 	/* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently
11999 	 * bitwise.  Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima.
12000 	 */
12001 	dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value;
12002 	dst_reg->umax_value = min(dst_reg->umax_value, umax_val);
12003 	if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) {
12004 		/* Lose signed bounds when ANDing negative numbers,
12005 		 * ain't nobody got time for that.
12006 		 */
12007 		dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
12008 		dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
12009 	} else {
12010 		/* ANDing two positives gives a positive, so safe to
12011 		 * cast result into s64.
12012 		 */
12013 		dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
12014 		dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
12015 	}
12016 	/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
12017 	__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
12018 }
12019 
12020 static void scalar32_min_max_or(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
12021 				struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
12022 {
12023 	bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off);
12024 	bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off);
12025 	struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off);
12026 	s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value;
12027 	u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value;
12028 
12029 	if (src_known && dst_known) {
12030 		__mark_reg32_known(dst_reg, var32_off.value);
12031 		return;
12032 	}
12033 
12034 	/* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the
12035 	 * maximum of the operands' minima
12036 	 */
12037 	dst_reg->u32_min_value = max(dst_reg->u32_min_value, umin_val);
12038 	dst_reg->u32_max_value = var32_off.value | var32_off.mask;
12039 	if (dst_reg->s32_min_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) {
12040 		/* Lose signed bounds when ORing negative numbers,
12041 		 * ain't nobody got time for that.
12042 		 */
12043 		dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
12044 		dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
12045 	} else {
12046 		/* ORing two positives gives a positive, so safe to
12047 		 * cast result into s64.
12048 		 */
12049 		dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value;
12050 		dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value;
12051 	}
12052 }
12053 
12054 static void scalar_min_max_or(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
12055 			      struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
12056 {
12057 	bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off);
12058 	bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off);
12059 	s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value;
12060 	u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value;
12061 
12062 	if (src_known && dst_known) {
12063 		__mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value);
12064 		return;
12065 	}
12066 
12067 	/* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the
12068 	 * maximum of the operands' minima
12069 	 */
12070 	dst_reg->umin_value = max(dst_reg->umin_value, umin_val);
12071 	dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value | dst_reg->var_off.mask;
12072 	if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) {
12073 		/* Lose signed bounds when ORing negative numbers,
12074 		 * ain't nobody got time for that.
12075 		 */
12076 		dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
12077 		dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
12078 	} else {
12079 		/* ORing two positives gives a positive, so safe to
12080 		 * cast result into s64.
12081 		 */
12082 		dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
12083 		dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
12084 	}
12085 	/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
12086 	__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
12087 }
12088 
12089 static void scalar32_min_max_xor(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
12090 				 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
12091 {
12092 	bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off);
12093 	bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off);
12094 	struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off);
12095 	s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value;
12096 
12097 	if (src_known && dst_known) {
12098 		__mark_reg32_known(dst_reg, var32_off.value);
12099 		return;
12100 	}
12101 
12102 	/* We get both minimum and maximum from the var32_off. */
12103 	dst_reg->u32_min_value = var32_off.value;
12104 	dst_reg->u32_max_value = var32_off.value | var32_off.mask;
12105 
12106 	if (dst_reg->s32_min_value >= 0 && smin_val >= 0) {
12107 		/* XORing two positive sign numbers gives a positive,
12108 		 * so safe to cast u32 result into s32.
12109 		 */
12110 		dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value;
12111 		dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value;
12112 	} else {
12113 		dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
12114 		dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
12115 	}
12116 }
12117 
12118 static void scalar_min_max_xor(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
12119 			       struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
12120 {
12121 	bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off);
12122 	bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off);
12123 	s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value;
12124 
12125 	if (src_known && dst_known) {
12126 		/* dst_reg->var_off.value has been updated earlier */
12127 		__mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value);
12128 		return;
12129 	}
12130 
12131 	/* We get both minimum and maximum from the var_off. */
12132 	dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value;
12133 	dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value | dst_reg->var_off.mask;
12134 
12135 	if (dst_reg->smin_value >= 0 && smin_val >= 0) {
12136 		/* XORing two positive sign numbers gives a positive,
12137 		 * so safe to cast u64 result into s64.
12138 		 */
12139 		dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
12140 		dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
12141 	} else {
12142 		dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
12143 		dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
12144 	}
12145 
12146 	__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
12147 }
12148 
12149 static void __scalar32_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
12150 				   u64 umin_val, u64 umax_val)
12151 {
12152 	/* We lose all sign bit information (except what we can pick
12153 	 * up from var_off)
12154 	 */
12155 	dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
12156 	dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
12157 	/* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */
12158 	if (umax_val > 31 || dst_reg->u32_max_value > 1ULL << (31 - umax_val)) {
12159 		dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0;
12160 		dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX;
12161 	} else {
12162 		dst_reg->u32_min_value <<= umin_val;
12163 		dst_reg->u32_max_value <<= umax_val;
12164 	}
12165 }
12166 
12167 static void scalar32_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
12168 				 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
12169 {
12170 	u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value;
12171 	u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value;
12172 	/* u32 alu operation will zext upper bits */
12173 	struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off);
12174 
12175 	__scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val);
12176 	dst_reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(tnum_lshift(subreg, umin_val));
12177 	/* Not required but being careful mark reg64 bounds as unknown so
12178 	 * that we are forced to pick them up from tnum and zext later and
12179 	 * if some path skips this step we are still safe.
12180 	 */
12181 	__mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg);
12182 	__update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg);
12183 }
12184 
12185 static void __scalar64_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
12186 				   u64 umin_val, u64 umax_val)
12187 {
12188 	/* Special case <<32 because it is a common compiler pattern to sign
12189 	 * extend subreg by doing <<32 s>>32. In this case if 32bit bounds are
12190 	 * positive we know this shift will also be positive so we can track
12191 	 * bounds correctly. Otherwise we lose all sign bit information except
12192 	 * what we can pick up from var_off. Perhaps we can generalize this
12193 	 * later to shifts of any length.
12194 	 */
12195 	if (umin_val == 32 && umax_val == 32 && dst_reg->s32_max_value >= 0)
12196 		dst_reg->smax_value = (s64)dst_reg->s32_max_value << 32;
12197 	else
12198 		dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
12199 
12200 	if (umin_val == 32 && umax_val == 32 && dst_reg->s32_min_value >= 0)
12201 		dst_reg->smin_value = (s64)dst_reg->s32_min_value << 32;
12202 	else
12203 		dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
12204 
12205 	/* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */
12206 	if (dst_reg->umax_value > 1ULL << (63 - umax_val)) {
12207 		dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
12208 		dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
12209 	} else {
12210 		dst_reg->umin_value <<= umin_val;
12211 		dst_reg->umax_value <<= umax_val;
12212 	}
12213 }
12214 
12215 static void scalar_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
12216 			       struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
12217 {
12218 	u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value;
12219 	u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value;
12220 
12221 	/* scalar64 calc uses 32bit unshifted bounds so must be called first */
12222 	__scalar64_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val);
12223 	__scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val);
12224 
12225 	dst_reg->var_off = tnum_lshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val);
12226 	/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
12227 	__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
12228 }
12229 
12230 static void scalar32_min_max_rsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
12231 				 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
12232 {
12233 	struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off);
12234 	u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value;
12235 	u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value;
12236 
12237 	/* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift.  If the value in dst_reg might
12238 	 * be negative, then either:
12239 	 * 1) src_reg might be zero, so the sign bit of the result is
12240 	 *    unknown, so we lose our signed bounds
12241 	 * 2) it's known negative, thus the unsigned bounds capture the
12242 	 *    signed bounds
12243 	 * 3) the signed bounds cross zero, so they tell us nothing
12244 	 *    about the result
12245 	 * If the value in dst_reg is known nonnegative, then again the
12246 	 * unsigned bounds capture the signed bounds.
12247 	 * Thus, in all cases it suffices to blow away our signed bounds
12248 	 * and rely on inferring new ones from the unsigned bounds and
12249 	 * var_off of the result.
12250 	 */
12251 	dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
12252 	dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
12253 
12254 	dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(subreg, umin_val);
12255 	dst_reg->u32_min_value >>= umax_val;
12256 	dst_reg->u32_max_value >>= umin_val;
12257 
12258 	__mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg);
12259 	__update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg);
12260 }
12261 
12262 static void scalar_min_max_rsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
12263 			       struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
12264 {
12265 	u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value;
12266 	u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value;
12267 
12268 	/* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift.  If the value in dst_reg might
12269 	 * be negative, then either:
12270 	 * 1) src_reg might be zero, so the sign bit of the result is
12271 	 *    unknown, so we lose our signed bounds
12272 	 * 2) it's known negative, thus the unsigned bounds capture the
12273 	 *    signed bounds
12274 	 * 3) the signed bounds cross zero, so they tell us nothing
12275 	 *    about the result
12276 	 * If the value in dst_reg is known nonnegative, then again the
12277 	 * unsigned bounds capture the signed bounds.
12278 	 * Thus, in all cases it suffices to blow away our signed bounds
12279 	 * and rely on inferring new ones from the unsigned bounds and
12280 	 * var_off of the result.
12281 	 */
12282 	dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
12283 	dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
12284 	dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val);
12285 	dst_reg->umin_value >>= umax_val;
12286 	dst_reg->umax_value >>= umin_val;
12287 
12288 	/* Its not easy to operate on alu32 bounds here because it depends
12289 	 * on bits being shifted in. Take easy way out and mark unbounded
12290 	 * so we can recalculate later from tnum.
12291 	 */
12292 	__mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg);
12293 	__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
12294 }
12295 
12296 static void scalar32_min_max_arsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
12297 				  struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
12298 {
12299 	u64 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value;
12300 
12301 	/* Upon reaching here, src_known is true and
12302 	 * umax_val is equal to umin_val.
12303 	 */
12304 	dst_reg->s32_min_value = (u32)(((s32)dst_reg->s32_min_value) >> umin_val);
12305 	dst_reg->s32_max_value = (u32)(((s32)dst_reg->s32_max_value) >> umin_val);
12306 
12307 	dst_reg->var_off = tnum_arshift(tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off), umin_val, 32);
12308 
12309 	/* blow away the dst_reg umin_value/umax_value and rely on
12310 	 * dst_reg var_off to refine the result.
12311 	 */
12312 	dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0;
12313 	dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX;
12314 
12315 	__mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg);
12316 	__update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg);
12317 }
12318 
12319 static void scalar_min_max_arsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
12320 				struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
12321 {
12322 	u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value;
12323 
12324 	/* Upon reaching here, src_known is true and umax_val is equal
12325 	 * to umin_val.
12326 	 */
12327 	dst_reg->smin_value >>= umin_val;
12328 	dst_reg->smax_value >>= umin_val;
12329 
12330 	dst_reg->var_off = tnum_arshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val, 64);
12331 
12332 	/* blow away the dst_reg umin_value/umax_value and rely on
12333 	 * dst_reg var_off to refine the result.
12334 	 */
12335 	dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
12336 	dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
12337 
12338 	/* Its not easy to operate on alu32 bounds here because it depends
12339 	 * on bits being shifted in from upper 32-bits. Take easy way out
12340 	 * and mark unbounded so we can recalculate later from tnum.
12341 	 */
12342 	__mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg);
12343 	__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
12344 }
12345 
12346 /* WARNING: This function does calculations on 64-bit values, but the actual
12347  * execution may occur on 32-bit values. Therefore, things like bitshifts
12348  * need extra checks in the 32-bit case.
12349  */
12350 static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
12351 				      struct bpf_insn *insn,
12352 				      struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
12353 				      struct bpf_reg_state src_reg)
12354 {
12355 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
12356 	u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
12357 	bool src_known;
12358 	s64 smin_val, smax_val;
12359 	u64 umin_val, umax_val;
12360 	s32 s32_min_val, s32_max_val;
12361 	u32 u32_min_val, u32_max_val;
12362 	u64 insn_bitness = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) ? 64 : 32;
12363 	bool alu32 = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64);
12364 	int ret;
12365 
12366 	smin_val = src_reg.smin_value;
12367 	smax_val = src_reg.smax_value;
12368 	umin_val = src_reg.umin_value;
12369 	umax_val = src_reg.umax_value;
12370 
12371 	s32_min_val = src_reg.s32_min_value;
12372 	s32_max_val = src_reg.s32_max_value;
12373 	u32_min_val = src_reg.u32_min_value;
12374 	u32_max_val = src_reg.u32_max_value;
12375 
12376 	if (alu32) {
12377 		src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg.var_off);
12378 		if ((src_known &&
12379 		     (s32_min_val != s32_max_val || u32_min_val != u32_max_val)) ||
12380 		    s32_min_val > s32_max_val || u32_min_val > u32_max_val) {
12381 			/* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds
12382 			 * derived from e.g. dead branches.
12383 			 */
12384 			__mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg);
12385 			return 0;
12386 		}
12387 	} else {
12388 		src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg.var_off);
12389 		if ((src_known &&
12390 		     (smin_val != smax_val || umin_val != umax_val)) ||
12391 		    smin_val > smax_val || umin_val > umax_val) {
12392 			/* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds
12393 			 * derived from e.g. dead branches.
12394 			 */
12395 			__mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg);
12396 			return 0;
12397 		}
12398 	}
12399 
12400 	if (!src_known &&
12401 	    opcode != BPF_ADD && opcode != BPF_SUB && opcode != BPF_AND) {
12402 		__mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg);
12403 		return 0;
12404 	}
12405 
12406 	if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) {
12407 		ret = sanitize_val_alu(env, insn);
12408 		if (ret < 0)
12409 			return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, NULL, NULL);
12410 	}
12411 
12412 	/* Calculate sign/unsigned bounds and tnum for alu32 and alu64 bit ops.
12413 	 * There are two classes of instructions: The first class we track both
12414 	 * alu32 and alu64 sign/unsigned bounds independently this provides the
12415 	 * greatest amount of precision when alu operations are mixed with jmp32
12416 	 * operations. These operations are BPF_ADD, BPF_SUB, BPF_MUL, BPF_ADD,
12417 	 * and BPF_OR. This is possible because these ops have fairly easy to
12418 	 * understand and calculate behavior in both 32-bit and 64-bit alu ops.
12419 	 * See alu32 verifier tests for examples. The second class of
12420 	 * operations, BPF_LSH, BPF_RSH, and BPF_ARSH, however are not so easy
12421 	 * with regards to tracking sign/unsigned bounds because the bits may
12422 	 * cross subreg boundaries in the alu64 case. When this happens we mark
12423 	 * the reg unbounded in the subreg bound space and use the resulting
12424 	 * tnum to calculate an approximation of the sign/unsigned bounds.
12425 	 */
12426 	switch (opcode) {
12427 	case BPF_ADD:
12428 		scalar32_min_max_add(dst_reg, &src_reg);
12429 		scalar_min_max_add(dst_reg, &src_reg);
12430 		dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
12431 		break;
12432 	case BPF_SUB:
12433 		scalar32_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &src_reg);
12434 		scalar_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &src_reg);
12435 		dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
12436 		break;
12437 	case BPF_MUL:
12438 		dst_reg->var_off = tnum_mul(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
12439 		scalar32_min_max_mul(dst_reg, &src_reg);
12440 		scalar_min_max_mul(dst_reg, &src_reg);
12441 		break;
12442 	case BPF_AND:
12443 		dst_reg->var_off = tnum_and(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
12444 		scalar32_min_max_and(dst_reg, &src_reg);
12445 		scalar_min_max_and(dst_reg, &src_reg);
12446 		break;
12447 	case BPF_OR:
12448 		dst_reg->var_off = tnum_or(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
12449 		scalar32_min_max_or(dst_reg, &src_reg);
12450 		scalar_min_max_or(dst_reg, &src_reg);
12451 		break;
12452 	case BPF_XOR:
12453 		dst_reg->var_off = tnum_xor(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
12454 		scalar32_min_max_xor(dst_reg, &src_reg);
12455 		scalar_min_max_xor(dst_reg, &src_reg);
12456 		break;
12457 	case BPF_LSH:
12458 		if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) {
12459 			/* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined.
12460 			 * This includes shifts by a negative number.
12461 			 */
12462 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
12463 			break;
12464 		}
12465 		if (alu32)
12466 			scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, &src_reg);
12467 		else
12468 			scalar_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, &src_reg);
12469 		break;
12470 	case BPF_RSH:
12471 		if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) {
12472 			/* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined.
12473 			 * This includes shifts by a negative number.
12474 			 */
12475 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
12476 			break;
12477 		}
12478 		if (alu32)
12479 			scalar32_min_max_rsh(dst_reg, &src_reg);
12480 		else
12481 			scalar_min_max_rsh(dst_reg, &src_reg);
12482 		break;
12483 	case BPF_ARSH:
12484 		if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) {
12485 			/* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined.
12486 			 * This includes shifts by a negative number.
12487 			 */
12488 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
12489 			break;
12490 		}
12491 		if (alu32)
12492 			scalar32_min_max_arsh(dst_reg, &src_reg);
12493 		else
12494 			scalar_min_max_arsh(dst_reg, &src_reg);
12495 		break;
12496 	default:
12497 		mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
12498 		break;
12499 	}
12500 
12501 	/* ALU32 ops are zero extended into 64bit register */
12502 	if (alu32)
12503 		zext_32_to_64(dst_reg);
12504 	reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg);
12505 	return 0;
12506 }
12507 
12508 /* Handles ALU ops other than BPF_END, BPF_NEG and BPF_MOV: computes new min/max
12509  * and var_off.
12510  */
12511 static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
12512 				   struct bpf_insn *insn)
12513 {
12514 	struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
12515 	struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
12516 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *dst_reg, *src_reg;
12517 	struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, off_reg = {0};
12518 	u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
12519 	int err;
12520 
12521 	dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
12522 	src_reg = NULL;
12523 	if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE)
12524 		ptr_reg = dst_reg;
12525 	else
12526 		/* Make sure ID is cleared otherwise dst_reg min/max could be
12527 		 * incorrectly propagated into other registers by find_equal_scalars()
12528 		 */
12529 		dst_reg->id = 0;
12530 	if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
12531 		src_reg = &regs[insn->src_reg];
12532 		if (src_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
12533 			if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
12534 				/* Combining two pointers by any ALU op yields
12535 				 * an arbitrary scalar. Disallow all math except
12536 				 * pointer subtraction
12537 				 */
12538 				if (opcode == BPF_SUB && env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
12539 					mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
12540 					return 0;
12541 				}
12542 				verbose(env, "R%d pointer %s pointer prohibited\n",
12543 					insn->dst_reg,
12544 					bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
12545 				return -EACCES;
12546 			} else {
12547 				/* scalar += pointer
12548 				 * This is legal, but we have to reverse our
12549 				 * src/dest handling in computing the range
12550 				 */
12551 				err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->dst_reg);
12552 				if (err)
12553 					return err;
12554 				return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn,
12555 							       src_reg, dst_reg);
12556 			}
12557 		} else if (ptr_reg) {
12558 			/* pointer += scalar */
12559 			err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg);
12560 			if (err)
12561 				return err;
12562 			return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn,
12563 						       dst_reg, src_reg);
12564 		} else if (dst_reg->precise) {
12565 			/* if dst_reg is precise, src_reg should be precise as well */
12566 			err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg);
12567 			if (err)
12568 				return err;
12569 		}
12570 	} else {
12571 		/* Pretend the src is a reg with a known value, since we only
12572 		 * need to be able to read from this state.
12573 		 */
12574 		off_reg.type = SCALAR_VALUE;
12575 		__mark_reg_known(&off_reg, insn->imm);
12576 		src_reg = &off_reg;
12577 		if (ptr_reg) /* pointer += K */
12578 			return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn,
12579 						       ptr_reg, src_reg);
12580 	}
12581 
12582 	/* Got here implies adding two SCALAR_VALUEs */
12583 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ptr_reg)) {
12584 		print_verifier_state(env, state, true);
12585 		verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected ptr_reg\n");
12586 		return -EINVAL;
12587 	}
12588 	if (WARN_ON(!src_reg)) {
12589 		print_verifier_state(env, state, true);
12590 		verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no src_reg\n");
12591 		return -EINVAL;
12592 	}
12593 	return adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(env, insn, dst_reg, *src_reg);
12594 }
12595 
12596 /* check validity of 32-bit and 64-bit arithmetic operations */
12597 static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
12598 {
12599 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
12600 	u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
12601 	int err;
12602 
12603 	if (opcode == BPF_END || opcode == BPF_NEG) {
12604 		if (opcode == BPF_NEG) {
12605 			if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K ||
12606 			    insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
12607 			    insn->off != 0 || insn->imm != 0) {
12608 				verbose(env, "BPF_NEG uses reserved fields\n");
12609 				return -EINVAL;
12610 			}
12611 		} else {
12612 			if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 ||
12613 			    (insn->imm != 16 && insn->imm != 32 && insn->imm != 64) ||
12614 			    BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
12615 				verbose(env, "BPF_END uses reserved fields\n");
12616 				return -EINVAL;
12617 			}
12618 		}
12619 
12620 		/* check src operand */
12621 		err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
12622 		if (err)
12623 			return err;
12624 
12625 		if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
12626 			verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
12627 				insn->dst_reg);
12628 			return -EACCES;
12629 		}
12630 
12631 		/* check dest operand */
12632 		err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
12633 		if (err)
12634 			return err;
12635 
12636 	} else if (opcode == BPF_MOV) {
12637 
12638 		if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
12639 			if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) {
12640 				verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
12641 				return -EINVAL;
12642 			}
12643 
12644 			/* check src operand */
12645 			err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
12646 			if (err)
12647 				return err;
12648 		} else {
12649 			if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) {
12650 				verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
12651 				return -EINVAL;
12652 			}
12653 		}
12654 
12655 		/* check dest operand, mark as required later */
12656 		err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK);
12657 		if (err)
12658 			return err;
12659 
12660 		if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
12661 			struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg = regs + insn->src_reg;
12662 			struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg = regs + insn->dst_reg;
12663 
12664 			if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
12665 				/* case: R1 = R2
12666 				 * copy register state to dest reg
12667 				 */
12668 				if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && !src_reg->id)
12669 					/* Assign src and dst registers the same ID
12670 					 * that will be used by find_equal_scalars()
12671 					 * to propagate min/max range.
12672 					 */
12673 					src_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
12674 				copy_register_state(dst_reg, src_reg);
12675 				dst_reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
12676 				dst_reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG;
12677 			} else {
12678 				/* R1 = (u32) R2 */
12679 				if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
12680 					verbose(env,
12681 						"R%d partial copy of pointer\n",
12682 						insn->src_reg);
12683 					return -EACCES;
12684 				} else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
12685 					bool is_src_reg_u32 = src_reg->umax_value <= U32_MAX;
12686 
12687 					if (is_src_reg_u32 && !src_reg->id)
12688 						src_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
12689 					copy_register_state(dst_reg, src_reg);
12690 					/* Make sure ID is cleared if src_reg is not in u32 range otherwise
12691 					 * dst_reg min/max could be incorrectly
12692 					 * propagated into src_reg by find_equal_scalars()
12693 					 */
12694 					if (!is_src_reg_u32)
12695 						dst_reg->id = 0;
12696 					dst_reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
12697 					dst_reg->subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1;
12698 				} else {
12699 					mark_reg_unknown(env, regs,
12700 							 insn->dst_reg);
12701 				}
12702 				zext_32_to_64(dst_reg);
12703 				reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg);
12704 			}
12705 		} else {
12706 			/* case: R = imm
12707 			 * remember the value we stored into this reg
12708 			 */
12709 			/* clear any state __mark_reg_known doesn't set */
12710 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
12711 			regs[insn->dst_reg].type = SCALAR_VALUE;
12712 			if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
12713 				__mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg,
12714 						 insn->imm);
12715 			} else {
12716 				__mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg,
12717 						 (u32)insn->imm);
12718 			}
12719 		}
12720 
12721 	} else if (opcode > BPF_END) {
12722 		verbose(env, "invalid BPF_ALU opcode %x\n", opcode);
12723 		return -EINVAL;
12724 
12725 	} else {	/* all other ALU ops: and, sub, xor, add, ... */
12726 
12727 		if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
12728 			if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) {
12729 				verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
12730 				return -EINVAL;
12731 			}
12732 			/* check src1 operand */
12733 			err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
12734 			if (err)
12735 				return err;
12736 		} else {
12737 			if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) {
12738 				verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
12739 				return -EINVAL;
12740 			}
12741 		}
12742 
12743 		/* check src2 operand */
12744 		err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
12745 		if (err)
12746 			return err;
12747 
12748 		if ((opcode == BPF_MOD || opcode == BPF_DIV) &&
12749 		    BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && insn->imm == 0) {
12750 			verbose(env, "div by zero\n");
12751 			return -EINVAL;
12752 		}
12753 
12754 		if ((opcode == BPF_LSH || opcode == BPF_RSH ||
12755 		     opcode == BPF_ARSH) && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
12756 			int size = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 ? 64 : 32;
12757 
12758 			if (insn->imm < 0 || insn->imm >= size) {
12759 				verbose(env, "invalid shift %d\n", insn->imm);
12760 				return -EINVAL;
12761 			}
12762 		}
12763 
12764 		/* check dest operand */
12765 		err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK);
12766 		if (err)
12767 			return err;
12768 
12769 		return adjust_reg_min_max_vals(env, insn);
12770 	}
12771 
12772 	return 0;
12773 }
12774 
12775 static void find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate,
12776 				   struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
12777 				   enum bpf_reg_type type,
12778 				   bool range_right_open)
12779 {
12780 	struct bpf_func_state *state;
12781 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
12782 	int new_range;
12783 
12784 	if (dst_reg->off < 0 ||
12785 	    (dst_reg->off == 0 && range_right_open))
12786 		/* This doesn't give us any range */
12787 		return;
12788 
12789 	if (dst_reg->umax_value > MAX_PACKET_OFF ||
12790 	    dst_reg->umax_value + dst_reg->off > MAX_PACKET_OFF)
12791 		/* Risk of overflow.  For instance, ptr + (1<<63) may be less
12792 		 * than pkt_end, but that's because it's also less than pkt.
12793 		 */
12794 		return;
12795 
12796 	new_range = dst_reg->off;
12797 	if (range_right_open)
12798 		new_range++;
12799 
12800 	/* Examples for register markings:
12801 	 *
12802 	 * pkt_data in dst register:
12803 	 *
12804 	 *   r2 = r3;
12805 	 *   r2 += 8;
12806 	 *   if (r2 > pkt_end) goto <handle exception>
12807 	 *   <access okay>
12808 	 *
12809 	 *   r2 = r3;
12810 	 *   r2 += 8;
12811 	 *   if (r2 < pkt_end) goto <access okay>
12812 	 *   <handle exception>
12813 	 *
12814 	 *   Where:
12815 	 *     r2 == dst_reg, pkt_end == src_reg
12816 	 *     r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0)
12817 	 *     r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0)
12818 	 *
12819 	 * pkt_data in src register:
12820 	 *
12821 	 *   r2 = r3;
12822 	 *   r2 += 8;
12823 	 *   if (pkt_end >= r2) goto <access okay>
12824 	 *   <handle exception>
12825 	 *
12826 	 *   r2 = r3;
12827 	 *   r2 += 8;
12828 	 *   if (pkt_end <= r2) goto <handle exception>
12829 	 *   <access okay>
12830 	 *
12831 	 *   Where:
12832 	 *     pkt_end == dst_reg, r2 == src_reg
12833 	 *     r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0)
12834 	 *     r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0)
12835 	 *
12836 	 * Find register r3 and mark its range as r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8)
12837 	 * or r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8-1), so that range of bytes [r3, r3 + 8)
12838 	 * and [r3, r3 + 8-1) respectively is safe to access depending on
12839 	 * the check.
12840 	 */
12841 
12842 	/* If our ids match, then we must have the same max_value.  And we
12843 	 * don't care about the other reg's fixed offset, since if it's too big
12844 	 * the range won't allow anything.
12845 	 * dst_reg->off is known < MAX_PACKET_OFF, therefore it fits in a u16.
12846 	 */
12847 	bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(vstate, state, reg, ({
12848 		if (reg->type == type && reg->id == dst_reg->id)
12849 			/* keep the maximum range already checked */
12850 			reg->range = max(reg->range, new_range);
12851 	}));
12852 }
12853 
12854 static int is_branch32_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 val, u8 opcode)
12855 {
12856 	struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off);
12857 	s32 sval = (s32)val;
12858 
12859 	switch (opcode) {
12860 	case BPF_JEQ:
12861 		if (tnum_is_const(subreg))
12862 			return !!tnum_equals_const(subreg, val);
12863 		else if (val < reg->u32_min_value || val > reg->u32_max_value)
12864 			return 0;
12865 		break;
12866 	case BPF_JNE:
12867 		if (tnum_is_const(subreg))
12868 			return !tnum_equals_const(subreg, val);
12869 		else if (val < reg->u32_min_value || val > reg->u32_max_value)
12870 			return 1;
12871 		break;
12872 	case BPF_JSET:
12873 		if ((~subreg.mask & subreg.value) & val)
12874 			return 1;
12875 		if (!((subreg.mask | subreg.value) & val))
12876 			return 0;
12877 		break;
12878 	case BPF_JGT:
12879 		if (reg->u32_min_value > val)
12880 			return 1;
12881 		else if (reg->u32_max_value <= val)
12882 			return 0;
12883 		break;
12884 	case BPF_JSGT:
12885 		if (reg->s32_min_value > sval)
12886 			return 1;
12887 		else if (reg->s32_max_value <= sval)
12888 			return 0;
12889 		break;
12890 	case BPF_JLT:
12891 		if (reg->u32_max_value < val)
12892 			return 1;
12893 		else if (reg->u32_min_value >= val)
12894 			return 0;
12895 		break;
12896 	case BPF_JSLT:
12897 		if (reg->s32_max_value < sval)
12898 			return 1;
12899 		else if (reg->s32_min_value >= sval)
12900 			return 0;
12901 		break;
12902 	case BPF_JGE:
12903 		if (reg->u32_min_value >= val)
12904 			return 1;
12905 		else if (reg->u32_max_value < val)
12906 			return 0;
12907 		break;
12908 	case BPF_JSGE:
12909 		if (reg->s32_min_value >= sval)
12910 			return 1;
12911 		else if (reg->s32_max_value < sval)
12912 			return 0;
12913 		break;
12914 	case BPF_JLE:
12915 		if (reg->u32_max_value <= val)
12916 			return 1;
12917 		else if (reg->u32_min_value > val)
12918 			return 0;
12919 		break;
12920 	case BPF_JSLE:
12921 		if (reg->s32_max_value <= sval)
12922 			return 1;
12923 		else if (reg->s32_min_value > sval)
12924 			return 0;
12925 		break;
12926 	}
12927 
12928 	return -1;
12929 }
12930 
12931 
12932 static int is_branch64_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 val, u8 opcode)
12933 {
12934 	s64 sval = (s64)val;
12935 
12936 	switch (opcode) {
12937 	case BPF_JEQ:
12938 		if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off))
12939 			return !!tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, val);
12940 		else if (val < reg->umin_value || val > reg->umax_value)
12941 			return 0;
12942 		break;
12943 	case BPF_JNE:
12944 		if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off))
12945 			return !tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, val);
12946 		else if (val < reg->umin_value || val > reg->umax_value)
12947 			return 1;
12948 		break;
12949 	case BPF_JSET:
12950 		if ((~reg->var_off.mask & reg->var_off.value) & val)
12951 			return 1;
12952 		if (!((reg->var_off.mask | reg->var_off.value) & val))
12953 			return 0;
12954 		break;
12955 	case BPF_JGT:
12956 		if (reg->umin_value > val)
12957 			return 1;
12958 		else if (reg->umax_value <= val)
12959 			return 0;
12960 		break;
12961 	case BPF_JSGT:
12962 		if (reg->smin_value > sval)
12963 			return 1;
12964 		else if (reg->smax_value <= sval)
12965 			return 0;
12966 		break;
12967 	case BPF_JLT:
12968 		if (reg->umax_value < val)
12969 			return 1;
12970 		else if (reg->umin_value >= val)
12971 			return 0;
12972 		break;
12973 	case BPF_JSLT:
12974 		if (reg->smax_value < sval)
12975 			return 1;
12976 		else if (reg->smin_value >= sval)
12977 			return 0;
12978 		break;
12979 	case BPF_JGE:
12980 		if (reg->umin_value >= val)
12981 			return 1;
12982 		else if (reg->umax_value < val)
12983 			return 0;
12984 		break;
12985 	case BPF_JSGE:
12986 		if (reg->smin_value >= sval)
12987 			return 1;
12988 		else if (reg->smax_value < sval)
12989 			return 0;
12990 		break;
12991 	case BPF_JLE:
12992 		if (reg->umax_value <= val)
12993 			return 1;
12994 		else if (reg->umin_value > val)
12995 			return 0;
12996 		break;
12997 	case BPF_JSLE:
12998 		if (reg->smax_value <= sval)
12999 			return 1;
13000 		else if (reg->smin_value > sval)
13001 			return 0;
13002 		break;
13003 	}
13004 
13005 	return -1;
13006 }
13007 
13008 /* compute branch direction of the expression "if (reg opcode val) goto target;"
13009  * and return:
13010  *  1 - branch will be taken and "goto target" will be executed
13011  *  0 - branch will not be taken and fall-through to next insn
13012  * -1 - unknown. Example: "if (reg < 5)" is unknown when register value
13013  *      range [0,10]
13014  */
13015 static int is_branch_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 val, u8 opcode,
13016 			   bool is_jmp32)
13017 {
13018 	if (__is_pointer_value(false, reg)) {
13019 		if (!reg_type_not_null(reg->type))
13020 			return -1;
13021 
13022 		/* If pointer is valid tests against zero will fail so we can
13023 		 * use this to direct branch taken.
13024 		 */
13025 		if (val != 0)
13026 			return -1;
13027 
13028 		switch (opcode) {
13029 		case BPF_JEQ:
13030 			return 0;
13031 		case BPF_JNE:
13032 			return 1;
13033 		default:
13034 			return -1;
13035 		}
13036 	}
13037 
13038 	if (is_jmp32)
13039 		return is_branch32_taken(reg, val, opcode);
13040 	return is_branch64_taken(reg, val, opcode);
13041 }
13042 
13043 static int flip_opcode(u32 opcode)
13044 {
13045 	/* How can we transform "a <op> b" into "b <op> a"? */
13046 	static const u8 opcode_flip[16] = {
13047 		/* these stay the same */
13048 		[BPF_JEQ  >> 4] = BPF_JEQ,
13049 		[BPF_JNE  >> 4] = BPF_JNE,
13050 		[BPF_JSET >> 4] = BPF_JSET,
13051 		/* these swap "lesser" and "greater" (L and G in the opcodes) */
13052 		[BPF_JGE  >> 4] = BPF_JLE,
13053 		[BPF_JGT  >> 4] = BPF_JLT,
13054 		[BPF_JLE  >> 4] = BPF_JGE,
13055 		[BPF_JLT  >> 4] = BPF_JGT,
13056 		[BPF_JSGE >> 4] = BPF_JSLE,
13057 		[BPF_JSGT >> 4] = BPF_JSLT,
13058 		[BPF_JSLE >> 4] = BPF_JSGE,
13059 		[BPF_JSLT >> 4] = BPF_JSGT
13060 	};
13061 	return opcode_flip[opcode >> 4];
13062 }
13063 
13064 static int is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
13065 				   struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg,
13066 				   u8 opcode)
13067 {
13068 	struct bpf_reg_state *pkt;
13069 
13070 	if (src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) {
13071 		pkt = dst_reg;
13072 	} else if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) {
13073 		pkt = src_reg;
13074 		opcode = flip_opcode(opcode);
13075 	} else {
13076 		return -1;
13077 	}
13078 
13079 	if (pkt->range >= 0)
13080 		return -1;
13081 
13082 	switch (opcode) {
13083 	case BPF_JLE:
13084 		/* pkt <= pkt_end */
13085 		fallthrough;
13086 	case BPF_JGT:
13087 		/* pkt > pkt_end */
13088 		if (pkt->range == BEYOND_PKT_END)
13089 			/* pkt has at last one extra byte beyond pkt_end */
13090 			return opcode == BPF_JGT;
13091 		break;
13092 	case BPF_JLT:
13093 		/* pkt < pkt_end */
13094 		fallthrough;
13095 	case BPF_JGE:
13096 		/* pkt >= pkt_end */
13097 		if (pkt->range == BEYOND_PKT_END || pkt->range == AT_PKT_END)
13098 			return opcode == BPF_JGE;
13099 		break;
13100 	}
13101 	return -1;
13102 }
13103 
13104 /* Adjusts the register min/max values in the case that the dst_reg is the
13105  * variable register that we are working on, and src_reg is a constant or we're
13106  * simply doing a BPF_K check.
13107  * In JEQ/JNE cases we also adjust the var_off values.
13108  */
13109 static void reg_set_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg,
13110 			    struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg,
13111 			    u64 val, u32 val32,
13112 			    u8 opcode, bool is_jmp32)
13113 {
13114 	struct tnum false_32off = tnum_subreg(false_reg->var_off);
13115 	struct tnum false_64off = false_reg->var_off;
13116 	struct tnum true_32off = tnum_subreg(true_reg->var_off);
13117 	struct tnum true_64off = true_reg->var_off;
13118 	s64 sval = (s64)val;
13119 	s32 sval32 = (s32)val32;
13120 
13121 	/* If the dst_reg is a pointer, we can't learn anything about its
13122 	 * variable offset from the compare (unless src_reg were a pointer into
13123 	 * the same object, but we don't bother with that.
13124 	 * Since false_reg and true_reg have the same type by construction, we
13125 	 * only need to check one of them for pointerness.
13126 	 */
13127 	if (__is_pointer_value(false, false_reg))
13128 		return;
13129 
13130 	switch (opcode) {
13131 	/* JEQ/JNE comparison doesn't change the register equivalence.
13132 	 *
13133 	 * r1 = r2;
13134 	 * if (r1 == 42) goto label;
13135 	 * ...
13136 	 * label: // here both r1 and r2 are known to be 42.
13137 	 *
13138 	 * Hence when marking register as known preserve it's ID.
13139 	 */
13140 	case BPF_JEQ:
13141 		if (is_jmp32) {
13142 			__mark_reg32_known(true_reg, val32);
13143 			true_32off = tnum_subreg(true_reg->var_off);
13144 		} else {
13145 			___mark_reg_known(true_reg, val);
13146 			true_64off = true_reg->var_off;
13147 		}
13148 		break;
13149 	case BPF_JNE:
13150 		if (is_jmp32) {
13151 			__mark_reg32_known(false_reg, val32);
13152 			false_32off = tnum_subreg(false_reg->var_off);
13153 		} else {
13154 			___mark_reg_known(false_reg, val);
13155 			false_64off = false_reg->var_off;
13156 		}
13157 		break;
13158 	case BPF_JSET:
13159 		if (is_jmp32) {
13160 			false_32off = tnum_and(false_32off, tnum_const(~val32));
13161 			if (is_power_of_2(val32))
13162 				true_32off = tnum_or(true_32off,
13163 						     tnum_const(val32));
13164 		} else {
13165 			false_64off = tnum_and(false_64off, tnum_const(~val));
13166 			if (is_power_of_2(val))
13167 				true_64off = tnum_or(true_64off,
13168 						     tnum_const(val));
13169 		}
13170 		break;
13171 	case BPF_JGE:
13172 	case BPF_JGT:
13173 	{
13174 		if (is_jmp32) {
13175 			u32 false_umax = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val32  : val32 - 1;
13176 			u32 true_umin = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val32 + 1 : val32;
13177 
13178 			false_reg->u32_max_value = min(false_reg->u32_max_value,
13179 						       false_umax);
13180 			true_reg->u32_min_value = max(true_reg->u32_min_value,
13181 						      true_umin);
13182 		} else {
13183 			u64 false_umax = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val    : val - 1;
13184 			u64 true_umin = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val + 1 : val;
13185 
13186 			false_reg->umax_value = min(false_reg->umax_value, false_umax);
13187 			true_reg->umin_value = max(true_reg->umin_value, true_umin);
13188 		}
13189 		break;
13190 	}
13191 	case BPF_JSGE:
13192 	case BPF_JSGT:
13193 	{
13194 		if (is_jmp32) {
13195 			s32 false_smax = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval32    : sval32 - 1;
13196 			s32 true_smin = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval32 + 1 : sval32;
13197 
13198 			false_reg->s32_max_value = min(false_reg->s32_max_value, false_smax);
13199 			true_reg->s32_min_value = max(true_reg->s32_min_value, true_smin);
13200 		} else {
13201 			s64 false_smax = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval    : sval - 1;
13202 			s64 true_smin = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval + 1 : sval;
13203 
13204 			false_reg->smax_value = min(false_reg->smax_value, false_smax);
13205 			true_reg->smin_value = max(true_reg->smin_value, true_smin);
13206 		}
13207 		break;
13208 	}
13209 	case BPF_JLE:
13210 	case BPF_JLT:
13211 	{
13212 		if (is_jmp32) {
13213 			u32 false_umin = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val32  : val32 + 1;
13214 			u32 true_umax = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val32 - 1 : val32;
13215 
13216 			false_reg->u32_min_value = max(false_reg->u32_min_value,
13217 						       false_umin);
13218 			true_reg->u32_max_value = min(true_reg->u32_max_value,
13219 						      true_umax);
13220 		} else {
13221 			u64 false_umin = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val    : val + 1;
13222 			u64 true_umax = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val - 1 : val;
13223 
13224 			false_reg->umin_value = max(false_reg->umin_value, false_umin);
13225 			true_reg->umax_value = min(true_reg->umax_value, true_umax);
13226 		}
13227 		break;
13228 	}
13229 	case BPF_JSLE:
13230 	case BPF_JSLT:
13231 	{
13232 		if (is_jmp32) {
13233 			s32 false_smin = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval32    : sval32 + 1;
13234 			s32 true_smax = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval32 - 1 : sval32;
13235 
13236 			false_reg->s32_min_value = max(false_reg->s32_min_value, false_smin);
13237 			true_reg->s32_max_value = min(true_reg->s32_max_value, true_smax);
13238 		} else {
13239 			s64 false_smin = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval    : sval + 1;
13240 			s64 true_smax = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval - 1 : sval;
13241 
13242 			false_reg->smin_value = max(false_reg->smin_value, false_smin);
13243 			true_reg->smax_value = min(true_reg->smax_value, true_smax);
13244 		}
13245 		break;
13246 	}
13247 	default:
13248 		return;
13249 	}
13250 
13251 	if (is_jmp32) {
13252 		false_reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(false_64off),
13253 					     tnum_subreg(false_32off));
13254 		true_reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(true_64off),
13255 					    tnum_subreg(true_32off));
13256 		__reg_combine_32_into_64(false_reg);
13257 		__reg_combine_32_into_64(true_reg);
13258 	} else {
13259 		false_reg->var_off = false_64off;
13260 		true_reg->var_off = true_64off;
13261 		__reg_combine_64_into_32(false_reg);
13262 		__reg_combine_64_into_32(true_reg);
13263 	}
13264 }
13265 
13266 /* Same as above, but for the case that dst_reg holds a constant and src_reg is
13267  * the variable reg.
13268  */
13269 static void reg_set_min_max_inv(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg,
13270 				struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg,
13271 				u64 val, u32 val32,
13272 				u8 opcode, bool is_jmp32)
13273 {
13274 	opcode = flip_opcode(opcode);
13275 	/* This uses zero as "not present in table"; luckily the zero opcode,
13276 	 * BPF_JA, can't get here.
13277 	 */
13278 	if (opcode)
13279 		reg_set_min_max(true_reg, false_reg, val, val32, opcode, is_jmp32);
13280 }
13281 
13282 /* Regs are known to be equal, so intersect their min/max/var_off */
13283 static void __reg_combine_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg,
13284 				  struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg)
13285 {
13286 	src_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->umin_value = max(src_reg->umin_value,
13287 							dst_reg->umin_value);
13288 	src_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->umax_value = min(src_reg->umax_value,
13289 							dst_reg->umax_value);
13290 	src_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->smin_value = max(src_reg->smin_value,
13291 							dst_reg->smin_value);
13292 	src_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->smax_value = min(src_reg->smax_value,
13293 							dst_reg->smax_value);
13294 	src_reg->var_off = dst_reg->var_off = tnum_intersect(src_reg->var_off,
13295 							     dst_reg->var_off);
13296 	reg_bounds_sync(src_reg);
13297 	reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg);
13298 }
13299 
13300 static void reg_combine_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *true_src,
13301 				struct bpf_reg_state *true_dst,
13302 				struct bpf_reg_state *false_src,
13303 				struct bpf_reg_state *false_dst,
13304 				u8 opcode)
13305 {
13306 	switch (opcode) {
13307 	case BPF_JEQ:
13308 		__reg_combine_min_max(true_src, true_dst);
13309 		break;
13310 	case BPF_JNE:
13311 		__reg_combine_min_max(false_src, false_dst);
13312 		break;
13313 	}
13314 }
13315 
13316 static void mark_ptr_or_null_reg(struct bpf_func_state *state,
13317 				 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 id,
13318 				 bool is_null)
13319 {
13320 	if (type_may_be_null(reg->type) && reg->id == id &&
13321 	    (is_rcu_reg(reg) || !WARN_ON_ONCE(!reg->id))) {
13322 		/* Old offset (both fixed and variable parts) should have been
13323 		 * known-zero, because we don't allow pointer arithmetic on
13324 		 * pointers that might be NULL. If we see this happening, don't
13325 		 * convert the register.
13326 		 *
13327 		 * But in some cases, some helpers that return local kptrs
13328 		 * advance offset for the returned pointer. In those cases, it
13329 		 * is fine to expect to see reg->off.
13330 		 */
13331 		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(reg->smin_value || reg->smax_value || !tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0)))
13332 			return;
13333 		if (!(type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(reg->type) || type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type)) &&
13334 		    WARN_ON_ONCE(reg->off))
13335 			return;
13336 
13337 		if (is_null) {
13338 			reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE;
13339 			/* We don't need id and ref_obj_id from this point
13340 			 * onwards anymore, thus we should better reset it,
13341 			 * so that state pruning has chances to take effect.
13342 			 */
13343 			reg->id = 0;
13344 			reg->ref_obj_id = 0;
13345 
13346 			return;
13347 		}
13348 
13349 		mark_ptr_not_null_reg(reg);
13350 
13351 		if (!reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(reg)) {
13352 			/* For not-NULL ptr, reg->ref_obj_id will be reset
13353 			 * in release_reference().
13354 			 *
13355 			 * reg->id is still used by spin_lock ptr. Other
13356 			 * than spin_lock ptr type, reg->id can be reset.
13357 			 */
13358 			reg->id = 0;
13359 		}
13360 	}
13361 }
13362 
13363 /* The logic is similar to find_good_pkt_pointers(), both could eventually
13364  * be folded together at some point.
13365  */
13366 static void mark_ptr_or_null_regs(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, u32 regno,
13367 				  bool is_null)
13368 {
13369 	struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
13370 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg;
13371 	u32 ref_obj_id = regs[regno].ref_obj_id;
13372 	u32 id = regs[regno].id;
13373 
13374 	if (ref_obj_id && ref_obj_id == id && is_null)
13375 		/* regs[regno] is in the " == NULL" branch.
13376 		 * No one could have freed the reference state before
13377 		 * doing the NULL check.
13378 		 */
13379 		WARN_ON_ONCE(release_reference_state(state, id));
13380 
13381 	bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(vstate, state, reg, ({
13382 		mark_ptr_or_null_reg(state, reg, id, is_null);
13383 	}));
13384 }
13385 
13386 static bool try_match_pkt_pointers(const struct bpf_insn *insn,
13387 				   struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
13388 				   struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg,
13389 				   struct bpf_verifier_state *this_branch,
13390 				   struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch)
13391 {
13392 	if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_X)
13393 		return false;
13394 
13395 	/* Pointers are always 64-bit. */
13396 	if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP32)
13397 		return false;
13398 
13399 	switch (BPF_OP(insn->code)) {
13400 	case BPF_JGT:
13401 		if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
13402 		     src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) ||
13403 		    (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META &&
13404 		     reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) {
13405 			/* pkt_data' > pkt_end, pkt_meta' > pkt_data */
13406 			find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg,
13407 					       dst_reg->type, false);
13408 			mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, true);
13409 		} else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END &&
13410 			    src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) ||
13411 			   (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) &&
13412 			    src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) {
13413 			/* pkt_end > pkt_data', pkt_data > pkt_meta' */
13414 			find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, src_reg,
13415 					       src_reg->type, true);
13416 			mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->src_reg, false);
13417 		} else {
13418 			return false;
13419 		}
13420 		break;
13421 	case BPF_JLT:
13422 		if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
13423 		     src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) ||
13424 		    (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META &&
13425 		     reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) {
13426 			/* pkt_data' < pkt_end, pkt_meta' < pkt_data */
13427 			find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg,
13428 					       dst_reg->type, true);
13429 			mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, false);
13430 		} else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END &&
13431 			    src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) ||
13432 			   (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) &&
13433 			    src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) {
13434 			/* pkt_end < pkt_data', pkt_data > pkt_meta' */
13435 			find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, src_reg,
13436 					       src_reg->type, false);
13437 			mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->src_reg, true);
13438 		} else {
13439 			return false;
13440 		}
13441 		break;
13442 	case BPF_JGE:
13443 		if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
13444 		     src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) ||
13445 		    (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META &&
13446 		     reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) {
13447 			/* pkt_data' >= pkt_end, pkt_meta' >= pkt_data */
13448 			find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg,
13449 					       dst_reg->type, true);
13450 			mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, false);
13451 		} else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END &&
13452 			    src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) ||
13453 			   (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) &&
13454 			    src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) {
13455 			/* pkt_end >= pkt_data', pkt_data >= pkt_meta' */
13456 			find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, src_reg,
13457 					       src_reg->type, false);
13458 			mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->src_reg, true);
13459 		} else {
13460 			return false;
13461 		}
13462 		break;
13463 	case BPF_JLE:
13464 		if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
13465 		     src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) ||
13466 		    (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META &&
13467 		     reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) {
13468 			/* pkt_data' <= pkt_end, pkt_meta' <= pkt_data */
13469 			find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg,
13470 					       dst_reg->type, false);
13471 			mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, true);
13472 		} else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END &&
13473 			    src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) ||
13474 			   (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) &&
13475 			    src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) {
13476 			/* pkt_end <= pkt_data', pkt_data <= pkt_meta' */
13477 			find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, src_reg,
13478 					       src_reg->type, true);
13479 			mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->src_reg, false);
13480 		} else {
13481 			return false;
13482 		}
13483 		break;
13484 	default:
13485 		return false;
13486 	}
13487 
13488 	return true;
13489 }
13490 
13491 static void find_equal_scalars(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate,
13492 			       struct bpf_reg_state *known_reg)
13493 {
13494 	struct bpf_func_state *state;
13495 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
13496 
13497 	bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(vstate, state, reg, ({
13498 		if (reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->id == known_reg->id)
13499 			copy_register_state(reg, known_reg);
13500 	}));
13501 }
13502 
13503 static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
13504 			     struct bpf_insn *insn, int *insn_idx)
13505 {
13506 	struct bpf_verifier_state *this_branch = env->cur_state;
13507 	struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch;
13508 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]->regs;
13509 	struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, *other_branch_regs, *src_reg = NULL;
13510 	struct bpf_reg_state *eq_branch_regs;
13511 	u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
13512 	bool is_jmp32;
13513 	int pred = -1;
13514 	int err;
13515 
13516 	/* Only conditional jumps are expected to reach here. */
13517 	if (opcode == BPF_JA || opcode > BPF_JSLE) {
13518 		verbose(env, "invalid BPF_JMP/JMP32 opcode %x\n", opcode);
13519 		return -EINVAL;
13520 	}
13521 
13522 	if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
13523 		if (insn->imm != 0) {
13524 			verbose(env, "BPF_JMP/JMP32 uses reserved fields\n");
13525 			return -EINVAL;
13526 		}
13527 
13528 		/* check src1 operand */
13529 		err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
13530 		if (err)
13531 			return err;
13532 
13533 		if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
13534 			verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n",
13535 				insn->src_reg);
13536 			return -EACCES;
13537 		}
13538 		src_reg = &regs[insn->src_reg];
13539 	} else {
13540 		if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
13541 			verbose(env, "BPF_JMP/JMP32 uses reserved fields\n");
13542 			return -EINVAL;
13543 		}
13544 	}
13545 
13546 	/* check src2 operand */
13547 	err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
13548 	if (err)
13549 		return err;
13550 
13551 	dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
13552 	is_jmp32 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP32;
13553 
13554 	if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
13555 		pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, insn->imm, opcode, is_jmp32);
13556 	} else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE &&
13557 		   is_jmp32 && tnum_is_const(tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off))) {
13558 		pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg,
13559 				       tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off).value,
13560 				       opcode,
13561 				       is_jmp32);
13562 	} else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE &&
13563 		   !is_jmp32 && tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off)) {
13564 		pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg,
13565 				       src_reg->var_off.value,
13566 				       opcode,
13567 				       is_jmp32);
13568 	} else if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE &&
13569 		   is_jmp32 && tnum_is_const(tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off))) {
13570 		pred = is_branch_taken(src_reg,
13571 				       tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off).value,
13572 				       flip_opcode(opcode),
13573 				       is_jmp32);
13574 	} else if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE &&
13575 		   !is_jmp32 && tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off)) {
13576 		pred = is_branch_taken(src_reg,
13577 				       dst_reg->var_off.value,
13578 				       flip_opcode(opcode),
13579 				       is_jmp32);
13580 	} else if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(dst_reg) &&
13581 		   reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(src_reg) &&
13582 		   !is_jmp32) {
13583 		pred = is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken(dst_reg, src_reg, opcode);
13584 	}
13585 
13586 	if (pred >= 0) {
13587 		/* If we get here with a dst_reg pointer type it is because
13588 		 * above is_branch_taken() special cased the 0 comparison.
13589 		 */
13590 		if (!__is_pointer_value(false, dst_reg))
13591 			err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->dst_reg);
13592 		if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && !err &&
13593 		    !__is_pointer_value(false, src_reg))
13594 			err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg);
13595 		if (err)
13596 			return err;
13597 	}
13598 
13599 	if (pred == 1) {
13600 		/* Only follow the goto, ignore fall-through. If needed, push
13601 		 * the fall-through branch for simulation under speculative
13602 		 * execution.
13603 		 */
13604 		if (!env->bypass_spec_v1 &&
13605 		    !sanitize_speculative_path(env, insn, *insn_idx + 1,
13606 					       *insn_idx))
13607 			return -EFAULT;
13608 		*insn_idx += insn->off;
13609 		return 0;
13610 	} else if (pred == 0) {
13611 		/* Only follow the fall-through branch, since that's where the
13612 		 * program will go. If needed, push the goto branch for
13613 		 * simulation under speculative execution.
13614 		 */
13615 		if (!env->bypass_spec_v1 &&
13616 		    !sanitize_speculative_path(env, insn,
13617 					       *insn_idx + insn->off + 1,
13618 					       *insn_idx))
13619 			return -EFAULT;
13620 		return 0;
13621 	}
13622 
13623 	other_branch = push_stack(env, *insn_idx + insn->off + 1, *insn_idx,
13624 				  false);
13625 	if (!other_branch)
13626 		return -EFAULT;
13627 	other_branch_regs = other_branch->frame[other_branch->curframe]->regs;
13628 
13629 	/* detect if we are comparing against a constant value so we can adjust
13630 	 * our min/max values for our dst register.
13631 	 * this is only legit if both are scalars (or pointers to the same
13632 	 * object, I suppose, see the PTR_MAYBE_NULL related if block below),
13633 	 * because otherwise the different base pointers mean the offsets aren't
13634 	 * comparable.
13635 	 */
13636 	if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
13637 		struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg = &regs[insn->src_reg];
13638 
13639 		if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE &&
13640 		    src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
13641 			if (tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off) ||
13642 			    (is_jmp32 &&
13643 			     tnum_is_const(tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off))))
13644 				reg_set_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg],
13645 						dst_reg,
13646 						src_reg->var_off.value,
13647 						tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off).value,
13648 						opcode, is_jmp32);
13649 			else if (tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off) ||
13650 				 (is_jmp32 &&
13651 				  tnum_is_const(tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off))))
13652 				reg_set_min_max_inv(&other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg],
13653 						    src_reg,
13654 						    dst_reg->var_off.value,
13655 						    tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off).value,
13656 						    opcode, is_jmp32);
13657 			else if (!is_jmp32 &&
13658 				 (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE))
13659 				/* Comparing for equality, we can combine knowledge */
13660 				reg_combine_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg],
13661 						    &other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg],
13662 						    src_reg, dst_reg, opcode);
13663 			if (src_reg->id &&
13664 			    !WARN_ON_ONCE(src_reg->id != other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg].id)) {
13665 				find_equal_scalars(this_branch, src_reg);
13666 				find_equal_scalars(other_branch, &other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg]);
13667 			}
13668 
13669 		}
13670 	} else if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
13671 		reg_set_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg],
13672 					dst_reg, insn->imm, (u32)insn->imm,
13673 					opcode, is_jmp32);
13674 	}
13675 
13676 	if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && dst_reg->id &&
13677 	    !WARN_ON_ONCE(dst_reg->id != other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg].id)) {
13678 		find_equal_scalars(this_branch, dst_reg);
13679 		find_equal_scalars(other_branch, &other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg]);
13680 	}
13681 
13682 	/* if one pointer register is compared to another pointer
13683 	 * register check if PTR_MAYBE_NULL could be lifted.
13684 	 * E.g. register A - maybe null
13685 	 *      register B - not null
13686 	 * for JNE A, B, ... - A is not null in the false branch;
13687 	 * for JEQ A, B, ... - A is not null in the true branch.
13688 	 *
13689 	 * Since PTR_TO_BTF_ID points to a kernel struct that does
13690 	 * not need to be null checked by the BPF program, i.e.,
13691 	 * could be null even without PTR_MAYBE_NULL marking, so
13692 	 * only propagate nullness when neither reg is that type.
13693 	 */
13694 	if (!is_jmp32 && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X &&
13695 	    __is_pointer_value(false, src_reg) && __is_pointer_value(false, dst_reg) &&
13696 	    type_may_be_null(src_reg->type) != type_may_be_null(dst_reg->type) &&
13697 	    base_type(src_reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID &&
13698 	    base_type(dst_reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID) {
13699 		eq_branch_regs = NULL;
13700 		switch (opcode) {
13701 		case BPF_JEQ:
13702 			eq_branch_regs = other_branch_regs;
13703 			break;
13704 		case BPF_JNE:
13705 			eq_branch_regs = regs;
13706 			break;
13707 		default:
13708 			/* do nothing */
13709 			break;
13710 		}
13711 		if (eq_branch_regs) {
13712 			if (type_may_be_null(src_reg->type))
13713 				mark_ptr_not_null_reg(&eq_branch_regs[insn->src_reg]);
13714 			else
13715 				mark_ptr_not_null_reg(&eq_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg]);
13716 		}
13717 	}
13718 
13719 	/* detect if R == 0 where R is returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem().
13720 	 * NOTE: these optimizations below are related with pointer comparison
13721 	 *       which will never be JMP32.
13722 	 */
13723 	if (!is_jmp32 && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K &&
13724 	    insn->imm == 0 && (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE) &&
13725 	    type_may_be_null(dst_reg->type)) {
13726 		/* Mark all identical registers in each branch as either
13727 		 * safe or unknown depending R == 0 or R != 0 conditional.
13728 		 */
13729 		mark_ptr_or_null_regs(this_branch, insn->dst_reg,
13730 				      opcode == BPF_JNE);
13731 		mark_ptr_or_null_regs(other_branch, insn->dst_reg,
13732 				      opcode == BPF_JEQ);
13733 	} else if (!try_match_pkt_pointers(insn, dst_reg, &regs[insn->src_reg],
13734 					   this_branch, other_branch) &&
13735 		   is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
13736 		verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n",
13737 			insn->dst_reg);
13738 		return -EACCES;
13739 	}
13740 	if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL)
13741 		print_insn_state(env, this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]);
13742 	return 0;
13743 }
13744 
13745 /* verify BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */
13746 static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
13747 {
13748 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env);
13749 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
13750 	struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg;
13751 	struct bpf_map *map;
13752 	int err;
13753 
13754 	if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) {
13755 		verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD_IMM insn\n");
13756 		return -EINVAL;
13757 	}
13758 	if (insn->off != 0) {
13759 		verbose(env, "BPF_LD_IMM64 uses reserved fields\n");
13760 		return -EINVAL;
13761 	}
13762 
13763 	err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
13764 	if (err)
13765 		return err;
13766 
13767 	dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
13768 	if (insn->src_reg == 0) {
13769 		u64 imm = ((u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32) | (u32)insn->imm;
13770 
13771 		dst_reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE;
13772 		__mark_reg_known(&regs[insn->dst_reg], imm);
13773 		return 0;
13774 	}
13775 
13776 	/* All special src_reg cases are listed below. From this point onwards
13777 	 * we either succeed and assign a corresponding dst_reg->type after
13778 	 * zeroing the offset, or fail and reject the program.
13779 	 */
13780 	mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
13781 
13782 	if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_BTF_ID) {
13783 		dst_reg->type = aux->btf_var.reg_type;
13784 		switch (base_type(dst_reg->type)) {
13785 		case PTR_TO_MEM:
13786 			dst_reg->mem_size = aux->btf_var.mem_size;
13787 			break;
13788 		case PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
13789 			dst_reg->btf = aux->btf_var.btf;
13790 			dst_reg->btf_id = aux->btf_var.btf_id;
13791 			break;
13792 		default:
13793 			verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
13794 			return -EFAULT;
13795 		}
13796 		return 0;
13797 	}
13798 
13799 	if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) {
13800 		struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux;
13801 		u32 subprogno = find_subprog(env,
13802 					     env->insn_idx + insn->imm + 1);
13803 
13804 		if (!aux->func_info) {
13805 			verbose(env, "missing btf func_info\n");
13806 			return -EINVAL;
13807 		}
13808 		if (aux->func_info_aux[subprogno].linkage != BTF_FUNC_STATIC) {
13809 			verbose(env, "callback function not static\n");
13810 			return -EINVAL;
13811 		}
13812 
13813 		dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_FUNC;
13814 		dst_reg->subprogno = subprogno;
13815 		return 0;
13816 	}
13817 
13818 	map = env->used_maps[aux->map_index];
13819 	dst_reg->map_ptr = map;
13820 
13821 	if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE ||
13822 	    insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE) {
13823 		dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE;
13824 		dst_reg->off = aux->map_off;
13825 		WARN_ON_ONCE(map->max_entries != 1);
13826 		/* We want reg->id to be same (0) as map_value is not distinct */
13827 	} else if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD ||
13828 		   insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX) {
13829 		dst_reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
13830 	} else {
13831 		verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
13832 		return -EINVAL;
13833 	}
13834 
13835 	return 0;
13836 }
13837 
13838 static bool may_access_skb(enum bpf_prog_type type)
13839 {
13840 	switch (type) {
13841 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER:
13842 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS:
13843 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT:
13844 		return true;
13845 	default:
13846 		return false;
13847 	}
13848 }
13849 
13850 /* verify safety of LD_ABS|LD_IND instructions:
13851  * - they can only appear in the programs where ctx == skb
13852  * - since they are wrappers of function calls, they scratch R1-R5 registers,
13853  *   preserve R6-R9, and store return value into R0
13854  *
13855  * Implicit input:
13856  *   ctx == skb == R6 == CTX
13857  *
13858  * Explicit input:
13859  *   SRC == any register
13860  *   IMM == 32-bit immediate
13861  *
13862  * Output:
13863  *   R0 - 8/16/32-bit skb data converted to cpu endianness
13864  */
13865 static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
13866 {
13867 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
13868 	static const int ctx_reg = BPF_REG_6;
13869 	u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code);
13870 	int i, err;
13871 
13872 	if (!may_access_skb(resolve_prog_type(env->prog))) {
13873 		verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] instructions not allowed for this program type\n");
13874 		return -EINVAL;
13875 	}
13876 
13877 	if (!env->ops->gen_ld_abs) {
13878 		verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
13879 		return -EINVAL;
13880 	}
13881 
13882 	if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 ||
13883 	    BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW ||
13884 	    (mode == BPF_ABS && insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0)) {
13885 		verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] uses reserved fields\n");
13886 		return -EINVAL;
13887 	}
13888 
13889 	/* check whether implicit source operand (register R6) is readable */
13890 	err = check_reg_arg(env, ctx_reg, SRC_OP);
13891 	if (err)
13892 		return err;
13893 
13894 	/* Disallow usage of BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] with reference tracking, as
13895 	 * gen_ld_abs() may terminate the program at runtime, leading to
13896 	 * reference leak.
13897 	 */
13898 	err = check_reference_leak(env);
13899 	if (err) {
13900 		verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] cannot be mixed with socket references\n");
13901 		return err;
13902 	}
13903 
13904 	if (env->cur_state->active_lock.ptr) {
13905 		verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] cannot be used inside bpf_spin_lock-ed region\n");
13906 		return -EINVAL;
13907 	}
13908 
13909 	if (env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock) {
13910 		verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] cannot be used inside bpf_rcu_read_lock-ed region\n");
13911 		return -EINVAL;
13912 	}
13913 
13914 	if (regs[ctx_reg].type != PTR_TO_CTX) {
13915 		verbose(env,
13916 			"at the time of BPF_LD_ABS|IND R6 != pointer to skb\n");
13917 		return -EINVAL;
13918 	}
13919 
13920 	if (mode == BPF_IND) {
13921 		/* check explicit source operand */
13922 		err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
13923 		if (err)
13924 			return err;
13925 	}
13926 
13927 	err = check_ptr_off_reg(env, &regs[ctx_reg], ctx_reg);
13928 	if (err < 0)
13929 		return err;
13930 
13931 	/* reset caller saved regs to unreadable */
13932 	for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) {
13933 		mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]);
13934 		check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK);
13935 	}
13936 
13937 	/* mark destination R0 register as readable, since it contains
13938 	 * the value fetched from the packet.
13939 	 * Already marked as written above.
13940 	 */
13941 	mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
13942 	/* ld_abs load up to 32-bit skb data. */
13943 	regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1;
13944 	return 0;
13945 }
13946 
13947 static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
13948 {
13949 	struct tnum enforce_attach_type_range = tnum_unknown;
13950 	const struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
13951 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
13952 	struct tnum range = tnum_range(0, 1);
13953 	enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog);
13954 	int err;
13955 	struct bpf_func_state *frame = env->cur_state->frame[0];
13956 	const bool is_subprog = frame->subprogno;
13957 
13958 	/* LSM and struct_ops func-ptr's return type could be "void" */
13959 	if (!is_subprog) {
13960 		switch (prog_type) {
13961 		case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM:
13962 			if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_LSM_CGROUP)
13963 				/* See below, can be 0 or 0-1 depending on hook. */
13964 				break;
13965 			fallthrough;
13966 		case BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS:
13967 			if (!prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type)
13968 				return 0;
13969 			break;
13970 		default:
13971 			break;
13972 		}
13973 	}
13974 
13975 	/* eBPF calling convention is such that R0 is used
13976 	 * to return the value from eBPF program.
13977 	 * Make sure that it's readable at this time
13978 	 * of bpf_exit, which means that program wrote
13979 	 * something into it earlier
13980 	 */
13981 	err = check_reg_arg(env, BPF_REG_0, SRC_OP);
13982 	if (err)
13983 		return err;
13984 
13985 	if (is_pointer_value(env, BPF_REG_0)) {
13986 		verbose(env, "R0 leaks addr as return value\n");
13987 		return -EACCES;
13988 	}
13989 
13990 	reg = cur_regs(env) + BPF_REG_0;
13991 
13992 	if (frame->in_async_callback_fn) {
13993 		/* enforce return zero from async callbacks like timer */
13994 		if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
13995 			verbose(env, "In async callback the register R0 is not a known value (%s)\n",
13996 				reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
13997 			return -EINVAL;
13998 		}
13999 
14000 		if (!tnum_in(tnum_const(0), reg->var_off)) {
14001 			verbose_invalid_scalar(env, reg, &range, "async callback", "R0");
14002 			return -EINVAL;
14003 		}
14004 		return 0;
14005 	}
14006 
14007 	if (is_subprog) {
14008 		if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
14009 			verbose(env, "At subprogram exit the register R0 is not a scalar value (%s)\n",
14010 				reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
14011 			return -EINVAL;
14012 		}
14013 		return 0;
14014 	}
14015 
14016 	switch (prog_type) {
14017 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR:
14018 		if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UDP4_RECVMSG ||
14019 		    env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UDP6_RECVMSG ||
14020 		    env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETPEERNAME ||
14021 		    env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETPEERNAME ||
14022 		    env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETSOCKNAME ||
14023 		    env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETSOCKNAME)
14024 			range = tnum_range(1, 1);
14025 		if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_BIND ||
14026 		    env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_BIND)
14027 			range = tnum_range(0, 3);
14028 		break;
14029 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB:
14030 		if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET_EGRESS) {
14031 			range = tnum_range(0, 3);
14032 			enforce_attach_type_range = tnum_range(2, 3);
14033 		}
14034 		break;
14035 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK:
14036 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS:
14037 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_DEVICE:
14038 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SYSCTL:
14039 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT:
14040 		break;
14041 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT:
14042 		if (!env->prog->aux->attach_btf_id)
14043 			return 0;
14044 		range = tnum_const(0);
14045 		break;
14046 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING:
14047 		switch (env->prog->expected_attach_type) {
14048 		case BPF_TRACE_FENTRY:
14049 		case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT:
14050 			range = tnum_const(0);
14051 			break;
14052 		case BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP:
14053 		case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN:
14054 			return 0;
14055 		case BPF_TRACE_ITER:
14056 			break;
14057 		default:
14058 			return -ENOTSUPP;
14059 		}
14060 		break;
14061 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP:
14062 		range = tnum_range(SK_DROP, SK_PASS);
14063 		break;
14064 
14065 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM:
14066 		if (env->prog->expected_attach_type != BPF_LSM_CGROUP) {
14067 			/* Regular BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM programs can return
14068 			 * any value.
14069 			 */
14070 			return 0;
14071 		}
14072 		if (!env->prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) {
14073 			/* Make sure programs that attach to void
14074 			 * hooks don't try to modify return value.
14075 			 */
14076 			range = tnum_range(1, 1);
14077 		}
14078 		break;
14079 
14080 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_NETFILTER:
14081 		range = tnum_range(NF_DROP, NF_ACCEPT);
14082 		break;
14083 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT:
14084 		/* freplace program can return anything as its return value
14085 		 * depends on the to-be-replaced kernel func or bpf program.
14086 		 */
14087 	default:
14088 		return 0;
14089 	}
14090 
14091 	if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
14092 		verbose(env, "At program exit the register R0 is not a known value (%s)\n",
14093 			reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
14094 		return -EINVAL;
14095 	}
14096 
14097 	if (!tnum_in(range, reg->var_off)) {
14098 		verbose_invalid_scalar(env, reg, &range, "program exit", "R0");
14099 		if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_LSM_CGROUP &&
14100 		    prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM &&
14101 		    !prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type)
14102 			verbose(env, "Note, BPF_LSM_CGROUP that attach to void LSM hooks can't modify return value!\n");
14103 		return -EINVAL;
14104 	}
14105 
14106 	if (!tnum_is_unknown(enforce_attach_type_range) &&
14107 	    tnum_in(enforce_attach_type_range, reg->var_off))
14108 		env->prog->enforce_expected_attach_type = 1;
14109 	return 0;
14110 }
14111 
14112 /* non-recursive DFS pseudo code
14113  * 1  procedure DFS-iterative(G,v):
14114  * 2      label v as discovered
14115  * 3      let S be a stack
14116  * 4      S.push(v)
14117  * 5      while S is not empty
14118  * 6            t <- S.peek()
14119  * 7            if t is what we're looking for:
14120  * 8                return t
14121  * 9            for all edges e in G.adjacentEdges(t) do
14122  * 10               if edge e is already labelled
14123  * 11                   continue with the next edge
14124  * 12               w <- G.adjacentVertex(t,e)
14125  * 13               if vertex w is not discovered and not explored
14126  * 14                   label e as tree-edge
14127  * 15                   label w as discovered
14128  * 16                   S.push(w)
14129  * 17                   continue at 5
14130  * 18               else if vertex w is discovered
14131  * 19                   label e as back-edge
14132  * 20               else
14133  * 21                   // vertex w is explored
14134  * 22                   label e as forward- or cross-edge
14135  * 23           label t as explored
14136  * 24           S.pop()
14137  *
14138  * convention:
14139  * 0x10 - discovered
14140  * 0x11 - discovered and fall-through edge labelled
14141  * 0x12 - discovered and fall-through and branch edges labelled
14142  * 0x20 - explored
14143  */
14144 
14145 enum {
14146 	DISCOVERED = 0x10,
14147 	EXPLORED = 0x20,
14148 	FALLTHROUGH = 1,
14149 	BRANCH = 2,
14150 };
14151 
14152 static u32 state_htab_size(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
14153 {
14154 	return env->prog->len;
14155 }
14156 
14157 static struct bpf_verifier_state_list **explored_state(
14158 					struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
14159 					int idx)
14160 {
14161 	struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state;
14162 	struct bpf_func_state *state = cur->frame[cur->curframe];
14163 
14164 	return &env->explored_states[(idx ^ state->callsite) % state_htab_size(env)];
14165 }
14166 
14167 static void mark_prune_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx)
14168 {
14169 	env->insn_aux_data[idx].prune_point = true;
14170 }
14171 
14172 static bool is_prune_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
14173 {
14174 	return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].prune_point;
14175 }
14176 
14177 static void mark_force_checkpoint(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx)
14178 {
14179 	env->insn_aux_data[idx].force_checkpoint = true;
14180 }
14181 
14182 static bool is_force_checkpoint(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
14183 {
14184 	return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].force_checkpoint;
14185 }
14186 
14187 
14188 enum {
14189 	DONE_EXPLORING = 0,
14190 	KEEP_EXPLORING = 1,
14191 };
14192 
14193 /* t, w, e - match pseudo-code above:
14194  * t - index of current instruction
14195  * w - next instruction
14196  * e - edge
14197  */
14198 static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
14199 		     bool loop_ok)
14200 {
14201 	int *insn_stack = env->cfg.insn_stack;
14202 	int *insn_state = env->cfg.insn_state;
14203 
14204 	if (e == FALLTHROUGH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | FALLTHROUGH))
14205 		return DONE_EXPLORING;
14206 
14207 	if (e == BRANCH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | BRANCH))
14208 		return DONE_EXPLORING;
14209 
14210 	if (w < 0 || w >= env->prog->len) {
14211 		verbose_linfo(env, t, "%d: ", t);
14212 		verbose(env, "jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", t, w);
14213 		return -EINVAL;
14214 	}
14215 
14216 	if (e == BRANCH) {
14217 		/* mark branch target for state pruning */
14218 		mark_prune_point(env, w);
14219 		mark_jmp_point(env, w);
14220 	}
14221 
14222 	if (insn_state[w] == 0) {
14223 		/* tree-edge */
14224 		insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e;
14225 		insn_state[w] = DISCOVERED;
14226 		if (env->cfg.cur_stack >= env->prog->len)
14227 			return -E2BIG;
14228 		insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack++] = w;
14229 		return KEEP_EXPLORING;
14230 	} else if ((insn_state[w] & 0xF0) == DISCOVERED) {
14231 		if (loop_ok && env->bpf_capable)
14232 			return DONE_EXPLORING;
14233 		verbose_linfo(env, t, "%d: ", t);
14234 		verbose_linfo(env, w, "%d: ", w);
14235 		verbose(env, "back-edge from insn %d to %d\n", t, w);
14236 		return -EINVAL;
14237 	} else if (insn_state[w] == EXPLORED) {
14238 		/* forward- or cross-edge */
14239 		insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e;
14240 	} else {
14241 		verbose(env, "insn state internal bug\n");
14242 		return -EFAULT;
14243 	}
14244 	return DONE_EXPLORING;
14245 }
14246 
14247 static int visit_func_call_insn(int t, struct bpf_insn *insns,
14248 				struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
14249 				bool visit_callee)
14250 {
14251 	int ret;
14252 
14253 	ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, false);
14254 	if (ret)
14255 		return ret;
14256 
14257 	mark_prune_point(env, t + 1);
14258 	/* when we exit from subprog, we need to record non-linear history */
14259 	mark_jmp_point(env, t + 1);
14260 
14261 	if (visit_callee) {
14262 		mark_prune_point(env, t);
14263 		ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].imm + 1, BRANCH, env,
14264 				/* It's ok to allow recursion from CFG point of
14265 				 * view. __check_func_call() will do the actual
14266 				 * check.
14267 				 */
14268 				bpf_pseudo_func(insns + t));
14269 	}
14270 	return ret;
14271 }
14272 
14273 /* Visits the instruction at index t and returns one of the following:
14274  *  < 0 - an error occurred
14275  *  DONE_EXPLORING - the instruction was fully explored
14276  *  KEEP_EXPLORING - there is still work to be done before it is fully explored
14277  */
14278 static int visit_insn(int t, struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
14279 {
14280 	struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi, *insn = &insns[t];
14281 	int ret;
14282 
14283 	if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn))
14284 		return visit_func_call_insn(t, insns, env, true);
14285 
14286 	/* All non-branch instructions have a single fall-through edge. */
14287 	if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_JMP &&
14288 	    BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_JMP32)
14289 		return push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, false);
14290 
14291 	switch (BPF_OP(insn->code)) {
14292 	case BPF_EXIT:
14293 		return DONE_EXPLORING;
14294 
14295 	case BPF_CALL:
14296 		if (insn->src_reg == 0 && insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback)
14297 			/* Mark this call insn as a prune point to trigger
14298 			 * is_state_visited() check before call itself is
14299 			 * processed by __check_func_call(). Otherwise new
14300 			 * async state will be pushed for further exploration.
14301 			 */
14302 			mark_prune_point(env, t);
14303 		if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) {
14304 			struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta meta;
14305 
14306 			ret = fetch_kfunc_meta(env, insn, &meta, NULL);
14307 			if (ret == 0 && is_iter_next_kfunc(&meta)) {
14308 				mark_prune_point(env, t);
14309 				/* Checking and saving state checkpoints at iter_next() call
14310 				 * is crucial for fast convergence of open-coded iterator loop
14311 				 * logic, so we need to force it. If we don't do that,
14312 				 * is_state_visited() might skip saving a checkpoint, causing
14313 				 * unnecessarily long sequence of not checkpointed
14314 				 * instructions and jumps, leading to exhaustion of jump
14315 				 * history buffer, and potentially other undesired outcomes.
14316 				 * It is expected that with correct open-coded iterators
14317 				 * convergence will happen quickly, so we don't run a risk of
14318 				 * exhausting memory.
14319 				 */
14320 				mark_force_checkpoint(env, t);
14321 			}
14322 		}
14323 		return visit_func_call_insn(t, insns, env, insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL);
14324 
14325 	case BPF_JA:
14326 		if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K)
14327 			return -EINVAL;
14328 
14329 		/* unconditional jump with single edge */
14330 		ret = push_insn(t, t + insn->off + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env,
14331 				true);
14332 		if (ret)
14333 			return ret;
14334 
14335 		mark_prune_point(env, t + insn->off + 1);
14336 		mark_jmp_point(env, t + insn->off + 1);
14337 
14338 		return ret;
14339 
14340 	default:
14341 		/* conditional jump with two edges */
14342 		mark_prune_point(env, t);
14343 
14344 		ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, true);
14345 		if (ret)
14346 			return ret;
14347 
14348 		return push_insn(t, t + insn->off + 1, BRANCH, env, true);
14349 	}
14350 }
14351 
14352 /* non-recursive depth-first-search to detect loops in BPF program
14353  * loop == back-edge in directed graph
14354  */
14355 static int check_cfg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
14356 {
14357 	int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
14358 	int *insn_stack, *insn_state;
14359 	int ret = 0;
14360 	int i;
14361 
14362 	insn_state = env->cfg.insn_state = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
14363 	if (!insn_state)
14364 		return -ENOMEM;
14365 
14366 	insn_stack = env->cfg.insn_stack = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
14367 	if (!insn_stack) {
14368 		kvfree(insn_state);
14369 		return -ENOMEM;
14370 	}
14371 
14372 	insn_state[0] = DISCOVERED; /* mark 1st insn as discovered */
14373 	insn_stack[0] = 0; /* 0 is the first instruction */
14374 	env->cfg.cur_stack = 1;
14375 
14376 	while (env->cfg.cur_stack > 0) {
14377 		int t = insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack - 1];
14378 
14379 		ret = visit_insn(t, env);
14380 		switch (ret) {
14381 		case DONE_EXPLORING:
14382 			insn_state[t] = EXPLORED;
14383 			env->cfg.cur_stack--;
14384 			break;
14385 		case KEEP_EXPLORING:
14386 			break;
14387 		default:
14388 			if (ret > 0) {
14389 				verbose(env, "visit_insn internal bug\n");
14390 				ret = -EFAULT;
14391 			}
14392 			goto err_free;
14393 		}
14394 	}
14395 
14396 	if (env->cfg.cur_stack < 0) {
14397 		verbose(env, "pop stack internal bug\n");
14398 		ret = -EFAULT;
14399 		goto err_free;
14400 	}
14401 
14402 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) {
14403 		if (insn_state[i] != EXPLORED) {
14404 			verbose(env, "unreachable insn %d\n", i);
14405 			ret = -EINVAL;
14406 			goto err_free;
14407 		}
14408 	}
14409 	ret = 0; /* cfg looks good */
14410 
14411 err_free:
14412 	kvfree(insn_state);
14413 	kvfree(insn_stack);
14414 	env->cfg.insn_state = env->cfg.insn_stack = NULL;
14415 	return ret;
14416 }
14417 
14418 static int check_abnormal_return(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
14419 {
14420 	int i;
14421 
14422 	for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
14423 		if (env->subprog_info[i].has_ld_abs) {
14424 			verbose(env, "LD_ABS is not allowed in subprogs without BTF\n");
14425 			return -EINVAL;
14426 		}
14427 		if (env->subprog_info[i].has_tail_call) {
14428 			verbose(env, "tail_call is not allowed in subprogs without BTF\n");
14429 			return -EINVAL;
14430 		}
14431 	}
14432 	return 0;
14433 }
14434 
14435 /* The minimum supported BTF func info size */
14436 #define MIN_BPF_FUNCINFO_SIZE	8
14437 #define MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE	252
14438 
14439 static int check_btf_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
14440 			  const union bpf_attr *attr,
14441 			  bpfptr_t uattr)
14442 {
14443 	const struct btf_type *type, *func_proto, *ret_type;
14444 	u32 i, nfuncs, urec_size, min_size;
14445 	u32 krec_size = sizeof(struct bpf_func_info);
14446 	struct bpf_func_info *krecord;
14447 	struct bpf_func_info_aux *info_aux = NULL;
14448 	struct bpf_prog *prog;
14449 	const struct btf *btf;
14450 	bpfptr_t urecord;
14451 	u32 prev_offset = 0;
14452 	bool scalar_return;
14453 	int ret = -ENOMEM;
14454 
14455 	nfuncs = attr->func_info_cnt;
14456 	if (!nfuncs) {
14457 		if (check_abnormal_return(env))
14458 			return -EINVAL;
14459 		return 0;
14460 	}
14461 
14462 	if (nfuncs != env->subprog_cnt) {
14463 		verbose(env, "number of funcs in func_info doesn't match number of subprogs\n");
14464 		return -EINVAL;
14465 	}
14466 
14467 	urec_size = attr->func_info_rec_size;
14468 	if (urec_size < MIN_BPF_FUNCINFO_SIZE ||
14469 	    urec_size > MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE ||
14470 	    urec_size % sizeof(u32)) {
14471 		verbose(env, "invalid func info rec size %u\n", urec_size);
14472 		return -EINVAL;
14473 	}
14474 
14475 	prog = env->prog;
14476 	btf = prog->aux->btf;
14477 
14478 	urecord = make_bpfptr(attr->func_info, uattr.is_kernel);
14479 	min_size = min_t(u32, krec_size, urec_size);
14480 
14481 	krecord = kvcalloc(nfuncs, krec_size, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
14482 	if (!krecord)
14483 		return -ENOMEM;
14484 	info_aux = kcalloc(nfuncs, sizeof(*info_aux), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
14485 	if (!info_aux)
14486 		goto err_free;
14487 
14488 	for (i = 0; i < nfuncs; i++) {
14489 		ret = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(urecord, krec_size, urec_size);
14490 		if (ret) {
14491 			if (ret == -E2BIG) {
14492 				verbose(env, "nonzero tailing record in func info");
14493 				/* set the size kernel expects so loader can zero
14494 				 * out the rest of the record.
14495 				 */
14496 				if (copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr,
14497 							  offsetof(union bpf_attr, func_info_rec_size),
14498 							  &min_size, sizeof(min_size)))
14499 					ret = -EFAULT;
14500 			}
14501 			goto err_free;
14502 		}
14503 
14504 		if (copy_from_bpfptr(&krecord[i], urecord, min_size)) {
14505 			ret = -EFAULT;
14506 			goto err_free;
14507 		}
14508 
14509 		/* check insn_off */
14510 		ret = -EINVAL;
14511 		if (i == 0) {
14512 			if (krecord[i].insn_off) {
14513 				verbose(env,
14514 					"nonzero insn_off %u for the first func info record",
14515 					krecord[i].insn_off);
14516 				goto err_free;
14517 			}
14518 		} else if (krecord[i].insn_off <= prev_offset) {
14519 			verbose(env,
14520 				"same or smaller insn offset (%u) than previous func info record (%u)",
14521 				krecord[i].insn_off, prev_offset);
14522 			goto err_free;
14523 		}
14524 
14525 		if (env->subprog_info[i].start != krecord[i].insn_off) {
14526 			verbose(env, "func_info BTF section doesn't match subprog layout in BPF program\n");
14527 			goto err_free;
14528 		}
14529 
14530 		/* check type_id */
14531 		type = btf_type_by_id(btf, krecord[i].type_id);
14532 		if (!type || !btf_type_is_func(type)) {
14533 			verbose(env, "invalid type id %d in func info",
14534 				krecord[i].type_id);
14535 			goto err_free;
14536 		}
14537 		info_aux[i].linkage = BTF_INFO_VLEN(type->info);
14538 
14539 		func_proto = btf_type_by_id(btf, type->type);
14540 		if (unlikely(!func_proto || !btf_type_is_func_proto(func_proto)))
14541 			/* btf_func_check() already verified it during BTF load */
14542 			goto err_free;
14543 		ret_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, func_proto->type, NULL);
14544 		scalar_return =
14545 			btf_type_is_small_int(ret_type) || btf_is_any_enum(ret_type);
14546 		if (i && !scalar_return && env->subprog_info[i].has_ld_abs) {
14547 			verbose(env, "LD_ABS is only allowed in functions that return 'int'.\n");
14548 			goto err_free;
14549 		}
14550 		if (i && !scalar_return && env->subprog_info[i].has_tail_call) {
14551 			verbose(env, "tail_call is only allowed in functions that return 'int'.\n");
14552 			goto err_free;
14553 		}
14554 
14555 		prev_offset = krecord[i].insn_off;
14556 		bpfptr_add(&urecord, urec_size);
14557 	}
14558 
14559 	prog->aux->func_info = krecord;
14560 	prog->aux->func_info_cnt = nfuncs;
14561 	prog->aux->func_info_aux = info_aux;
14562 	return 0;
14563 
14564 err_free:
14565 	kvfree(krecord);
14566 	kfree(info_aux);
14567 	return ret;
14568 }
14569 
14570 static void adjust_btf_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
14571 {
14572 	struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux;
14573 	int i;
14574 
14575 	if (!aux->func_info)
14576 		return;
14577 
14578 	for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++)
14579 		aux->func_info[i].insn_off = env->subprog_info[i].start;
14580 }
14581 
14582 #define MIN_BPF_LINEINFO_SIZE	offsetofend(struct bpf_line_info, line_col)
14583 #define MAX_LINEINFO_REC_SIZE	MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE
14584 
14585 static int check_btf_line(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
14586 			  const union bpf_attr *attr,
14587 			  bpfptr_t uattr)
14588 {
14589 	u32 i, s, nr_linfo, ncopy, expected_size, rec_size, prev_offset = 0;
14590 	struct bpf_subprog_info *sub;
14591 	struct bpf_line_info *linfo;
14592 	struct bpf_prog *prog;
14593 	const struct btf *btf;
14594 	bpfptr_t ulinfo;
14595 	int err;
14596 
14597 	nr_linfo = attr->line_info_cnt;
14598 	if (!nr_linfo)
14599 		return 0;
14600 	if (nr_linfo > INT_MAX / sizeof(struct bpf_line_info))
14601 		return -EINVAL;
14602 
14603 	rec_size = attr->line_info_rec_size;
14604 	if (rec_size < MIN_BPF_LINEINFO_SIZE ||
14605 	    rec_size > MAX_LINEINFO_REC_SIZE ||
14606 	    rec_size & (sizeof(u32) - 1))
14607 		return -EINVAL;
14608 
14609 	/* Need to zero it in case the userspace may
14610 	 * pass in a smaller bpf_line_info object.
14611 	 */
14612 	linfo = kvcalloc(nr_linfo, sizeof(struct bpf_line_info),
14613 			 GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
14614 	if (!linfo)
14615 		return -ENOMEM;
14616 
14617 	prog = env->prog;
14618 	btf = prog->aux->btf;
14619 
14620 	s = 0;
14621 	sub = env->subprog_info;
14622 	ulinfo = make_bpfptr(attr->line_info, uattr.is_kernel);
14623 	expected_size = sizeof(struct bpf_line_info);
14624 	ncopy = min_t(u32, expected_size, rec_size);
14625 	for (i = 0; i < nr_linfo; i++) {
14626 		err = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(ulinfo, expected_size, rec_size);
14627 		if (err) {
14628 			if (err == -E2BIG) {
14629 				verbose(env, "nonzero tailing record in line_info");
14630 				if (copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr,
14631 							  offsetof(union bpf_attr, line_info_rec_size),
14632 							  &expected_size, sizeof(expected_size)))
14633 					err = -EFAULT;
14634 			}
14635 			goto err_free;
14636 		}
14637 
14638 		if (copy_from_bpfptr(&linfo[i], ulinfo, ncopy)) {
14639 			err = -EFAULT;
14640 			goto err_free;
14641 		}
14642 
14643 		/*
14644 		 * Check insn_off to ensure
14645 		 * 1) strictly increasing AND
14646 		 * 2) bounded by prog->len
14647 		 *
14648 		 * The linfo[0].insn_off == 0 check logically falls into
14649 		 * the later "missing bpf_line_info for func..." case
14650 		 * because the first linfo[0].insn_off must be the
14651 		 * first sub also and the first sub must have
14652 		 * subprog_info[0].start == 0.
14653 		 */
14654 		if ((i && linfo[i].insn_off <= prev_offset) ||
14655 		    linfo[i].insn_off >= prog->len) {
14656 			verbose(env, "Invalid line_info[%u].insn_off:%u (prev_offset:%u prog->len:%u)\n",
14657 				i, linfo[i].insn_off, prev_offset,
14658 				prog->len);
14659 			err = -EINVAL;
14660 			goto err_free;
14661 		}
14662 
14663 		if (!prog->insnsi[linfo[i].insn_off].code) {
14664 			verbose(env,
14665 				"Invalid insn code at line_info[%u].insn_off\n",
14666 				i);
14667 			err = -EINVAL;
14668 			goto err_free;
14669 		}
14670 
14671 		if (!btf_name_by_offset(btf, linfo[i].line_off) ||
14672 		    !btf_name_by_offset(btf, linfo[i].file_name_off)) {
14673 			verbose(env, "Invalid line_info[%u].line_off or .file_name_off\n", i);
14674 			err = -EINVAL;
14675 			goto err_free;
14676 		}
14677 
14678 		if (s != env->subprog_cnt) {
14679 			if (linfo[i].insn_off == sub[s].start) {
14680 				sub[s].linfo_idx = i;
14681 				s++;
14682 			} else if (sub[s].start < linfo[i].insn_off) {
14683 				verbose(env, "missing bpf_line_info for func#%u\n", s);
14684 				err = -EINVAL;
14685 				goto err_free;
14686 			}
14687 		}
14688 
14689 		prev_offset = linfo[i].insn_off;
14690 		bpfptr_add(&ulinfo, rec_size);
14691 	}
14692 
14693 	if (s != env->subprog_cnt) {
14694 		verbose(env, "missing bpf_line_info for %u funcs starting from func#%u\n",
14695 			env->subprog_cnt - s, s);
14696 		err = -EINVAL;
14697 		goto err_free;
14698 	}
14699 
14700 	prog->aux->linfo = linfo;
14701 	prog->aux->nr_linfo = nr_linfo;
14702 
14703 	return 0;
14704 
14705 err_free:
14706 	kvfree(linfo);
14707 	return err;
14708 }
14709 
14710 #define MIN_CORE_RELO_SIZE	sizeof(struct bpf_core_relo)
14711 #define MAX_CORE_RELO_SIZE	MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE
14712 
14713 static int check_core_relo(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
14714 			   const union bpf_attr *attr,
14715 			   bpfptr_t uattr)
14716 {
14717 	u32 i, nr_core_relo, ncopy, expected_size, rec_size;
14718 	struct bpf_core_relo core_relo = {};
14719 	struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
14720 	const struct btf *btf = prog->aux->btf;
14721 	struct bpf_core_ctx ctx = {
14722 		.log = &env->log,
14723 		.btf = btf,
14724 	};
14725 	bpfptr_t u_core_relo;
14726 	int err;
14727 
14728 	nr_core_relo = attr->core_relo_cnt;
14729 	if (!nr_core_relo)
14730 		return 0;
14731 	if (nr_core_relo > INT_MAX / sizeof(struct bpf_core_relo))
14732 		return -EINVAL;
14733 
14734 	rec_size = attr->core_relo_rec_size;
14735 	if (rec_size < MIN_CORE_RELO_SIZE ||
14736 	    rec_size > MAX_CORE_RELO_SIZE ||
14737 	    rec_size % sizeof(u32))
14738 		return -EINVAL;
14739 
14740 	u_core_relo = make_bpfptr(attr->core_relos, uattr.is_kernel);
14741 	expected_size = sizeof(struct bpf_core_relo);
14742 	ncopy = min_t(u32, expected_size, rec_size);
14743 
14744 	/* Unlike func_info and line_info, copy and apply each CO-RE
14745 	 * relocation record one at a time.
14746 	 */
14747 	for (i = 0; i < nr_core_relo; i++) {
14748 		/* future proofing when sizeof(bpf_core_relo) changes */
14749 		err = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(u_core_relo, expected_size, rec_size);
14750 		if (err) {
14751 			if (err == -E2BIG) {
14752 				verbose(env, "nonzero tailing record in core_relo");
14753 				if (copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr,
14754 							  offsetof(union bpf_attr, core_relo_rec_size),
14755 							  &expected_size, sizeof(expected_size)))
14756 					err = -EFAULT;
14757 			}
14758 			break;
14759 		}
14760 
14761 		if (copy_from_bpfptr(&core_relo, u_core_relo, ncopy)) {
14762 			err = -EFAULT;
14763 			break;
14764 		}
14765 
14766 		if (core_relo.insn_off % 8 || core_relo.insn_off / 8 >= prog->len) {
14767 			verbose(env, "Invalid core_relo[%u].insn_off:%u prog->len:%u\n",
14768 				i, core_relo.insn_off, prog->len);
14769 			err = -EINVAL;
14770 			break;
14771 		}
14772 
14773 		err = bpf_core_apply(&ctx, &core_relo, i,
14774 				     &prog->insnsi[core_relo.insn_off / 8]);
14775 		if (err)
14776 			break;
14777 		bpfptr_add(&u_core_relo, rec_size);
14778 	}
14779 	return err;
14780 }
14781 
14782 static int check_btf_info(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
14783 			  const union bpf_attr *attr,
14784 			  bpfptr_t uattr)
14785 {
14786 	struct btf *btf;
14787 	int err;
14788 
14789 	if (!attr->func_info_cnt && !attr->line_info_cnt) {
14790 		if (check_abnormal_return(env))
14791 			return -EINVAL;
14792 		return 0;
14793 	}
14794 
14795 	btf = btf_get_by_fd(attr->prog_btf_fd);
14796 	if (IS_ERR(btf))
14797 		return PTR_ERR(btf);
14798 	if (btf_is_kernel(btf)) {
14799 		btf_put(btf);
14800 		return -EACCES;
14801 	}
14802 	env->prog->aux->btf = btf;
14803 
14804 	err = check_btf_func(env, attr, uattr);
14805 	if (err)
14806 		return err;
14807 
14808 	err = check_btf_line(env, attr, uattr);
14809 	if (err)
14810 		return err;
14811 
14812 	err = check_core_relo(env, attr, uattr);
14813 	if (err)
14814 		return err;
14815 
14816 	return 0;
14817 }
14818 
14819 /* check %cur's range satisfies %old's */
14820 static bool range_within(struct bpf_reg_state *old,
14821 			 struct bpf_reg_state *cur)
14822 {
14823 	return old->umin_value <= cur->umin_value &&
14824 	       old->umax_value >= cur->umax_value &&
14825 	       old->smin_value <= cur->smin_value &&
14826 	       old->smax_value >= cur->smax_value &&
14827 	       old->u32_min_value <= cur->u32_min_value &&
14828 	       old->u32_max_value >= cur->u32_max_value &&
14829 	       old->s32_min_value <= cur->s32_min_value &&
14830 	       old->s32_max_value >= cur->s32_max_value;
14831 }
14832 
14833 /* If in the old state two registers had the same id, then they need to have
14834  * the same id in the new state as well.  But that id could be different from
14835  * the old state, so we need to track the mapping from old to new ids.
14836  * Once we have seen that, say, a reg with old id 5 had new id 9, any subsequent
14837  * regs with old id 5 must also have new id 9 for the new state to be safe.  But
14838  * regs with a different old id could still have new id 9, we don't care about
14839  * that.
14840  * So we look through our idmap to see if this old id has been seen before.  If
14841  * so, we require the new id to match; otherwise, we add the id pair to the map.
14842  */
14843 static bool check_ids(u32 old_id, u32 cur_id, struct bpf_id_pair *idmap)
14844 {
14845 	unsigned int i;
14846 
14847 	/* either both IDs should be set or both should be zero */
14848 	if (!!old_id != !!cur_id)
14849 		return false;
14850 
14851 	if (old_id == 0) /* cur_id == 0 as well */
14852 		return true;
14853 
14854 	for (i = 0; i < BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE; i++) {
14855 		if (!idmap[i].old) {
14856 			/* Reached an empty slot; haven't seen this id before */
14857 			idmap[i].old = old_id;
14858 			idmap[i].cur = cur_id;
14859 			return true;
14860 		}
14861 		if (idmap[i].old == old_id)
14862 			return idmap[i].cur == cur_id;
14863 	}
14864 	/* We ran out of idmap slots, which should be impossible */
14865 	WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
14866 	return false;
14867 }
14868 
14869 static void clean_func_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
14870 			     struct bpf_func_state *st)
14871 {
14872 	enum bpf_reg_liveness live;
14873 	int i, j;
14874 
14875 	for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) {
14876 		live = st->regs[i].live;
14877 		/* liveness must not touch this register anymore */
14878 		st->regs[i].live |= REG_LIVE_DONE;
14879 		if (!(live & REG_LIVE_READ))
14880 			/* since the register is unused, clear its state
14881 			 * to make further comparison simpler
14882 			 */
14883 			__mark_reg_not_init(env, &st->regs[i]);
14884 	}
14885 
14886 	for (i = 0; i < st->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
14887 		live = st->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live;
14888 		/* liveness must not touch this stack slot anymore */
14889 		st->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_DONE;
14890 		if (!(live & REG_LIVE_READ)) {
14891 			__mark_reg_not_init(env, &st->stack[i].spilled_ptr);
14892 			for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++)
14893 				st->stack[i].slot_type[j] = STACK_INVALID;
14894 		}
14895 	}
14896 }
14897 
14898 static void clean_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
14899 				 struct bpf_verifier_state *st)
14900 {
14901 	int i;
14902 
14903 	if (st->frame[0]->regs[0].live & REG_LIVE_DONE)
14904 		/* all regs in this state in all frames were already marked */
14905 		return;
14906 
14907 	for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++)
14908 		clean_func_state(env, st->frame[i]);
14909 }
14910 
14911 /* the parentage chains form a tree.
14912  * the verifier states are added to state lists at given insn and
14913  * pushed into state stack for future exploration.
14914  * when the verifier reaches bpf_exit insn some of the verifer states
14915  * stored in the state lists have their final liveness state already,
14916  * but a lot of states will get revised from liveness point of view when
14917  * the verifier explores other branches.
14918  * Example:
14919  * 1: r0 = 1
14920  * 2: if r1 == 100 goto pc+1
14921  * 3: r0 = 2
14922  * 4: exit
14923  * when the verifier reaches exit insn the register r0 in the state list of
14924  * insn 2 will be seen as !REG_LIVE_READ. Then the verifier pops the other_branch
14925  * of insn 2 and goes exploring further. At the insn 4 it will walk the
14926  * parentage chain from insn 4 into insn 2 and will mark r0 as REG_LIVE_READ.
14927  *
14928  * Since the verifier pushes the branch states as it sees them while exploring
14929  * the program the condition of walking the branch instruction for the second
14930  * time means that all states below this branch were already explored and
14931  * their final liveness marks are already propagated.
14932  * Hence when the verifier completes the search of state list in is_state_visited()
14933  * we can call this clean_live_states() function to mark all liveness states
14934  * as REG_LIVE_DONE to indicate that 'parent' pointers of 'struct bpf_reg_state'
14935  * will not be used.
14936  * This function also clears the registers and stack for states that !READ
14937  * to simplify state merging.
14938  *
14939  * Important note here that walking the same branch instruction in the callee
14940  * doesn't meant that the states are DONE. The verifier has to compare
14941  * the callsites
14942  */
14943 static void clean_live_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn,
14944 			      struct bpf_verifier_state *cur)
14945 {
14946 	struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl;
14947 	int i;
14948 
14949 	sl = *explored_state(env, insn);
14950 	while (sl) {
14951 		if (sl->state.branches)
14952 			goto next;
14953 		if (sl->state.insn_idx != insn ||
14954 		    sl->state.curframe != cur->curframe)
14955 			goto next;
14956 		for (i = 0; i <= cur->curframe; i++)
14957 			if (sl->state.frame[i]->callsite != cur->frame[i]->callsite)
14958 				goto next;
14959 		clean_verifier_state(env, &sl->state);
14960 next:
14961 		sl = sl->next;
14962 	}
14963 }
14964 
14965 static bool regs_exact(const struct bpf_reg_state *rold,
14966 		       const struct bpf_reg_state *rcur,
14967 		       struct bpf_id_pair *idmap)
14968 {
14969 	return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0 &&
14970 	       check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap) &&
14971 	       check_ids(rold->ref_obj_id, rcur->ref_obj_id, idmap);
14972 }
14973 
14974 /* Returns true if (rold safe implies rcur safe) */
14975 static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold,
14976 		    struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, struct bpf_id_pair *idmap)
14977 {
14978 	if (!(rold->live & REG_LIVE_READ))
14979 		/* explored state didn't use this */
14980 		return true;
14981 	if (rold->type == NOT_INIT)
14982 		/* explored state can't have used this */
14983 		return true;
14984 	if (rcur->type == NOT_INIT)
14985 		return false;
14986 
14987 	/* Enforce that register types have to match exactly, including their
14988 	 * modifiers (like PTR_MAYBE_NULL, MEM_RDONLY, etc), as a general
14989 	 * rule.
14990 	 *
14991 	 * One can make a point that using a pointer register as unbounded
14992 	 * SCALAR would be technically acceptable, but this could lead to
14993 	 * pointer leaks because scalars are allowed to leak while pointers
14994 	 * are not. We could make this safe in special cases if root is
14995 	 * calling us, but it's probably not worth the hassle.
14996 	 *
14997 	 * Also, register types that are *not* MAYBE_NULL could technically be
14998 	 * safe to use as their MAYBE_NULL variants (e.g., PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE
14999 	 * is safe to be used as PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, provided both point
15000 	 * to the same map).
15001 	 * However, if the old MAYBE_NULL register then got NULL checked,
15002 	 * doing so could have affected others with the same id, and we can't
15003 	 * check for that because we lost the id when we converted to
15004 	 * a non-MAYBE_NULL variant.
15005 	 * So, as a general rule we don't allow mixing MAYBE_NULL and
15006 	 * non-MAYBE_NULL registers as well.
15007 	 */
15008 	if (rold->type != rcur->type)
15009 		return false;
15010 
15011 	switch (base_type(rold->type)) {
15012 	case SCALAR_VALUE:
15013 		if (regs_exact(rold, rcur, idmap))
15014 			return true;
15015 		if (env->explore_alu_limits)
15016 			return false;
15017 		if (!rold->precise)
15018 			return true;
15019 		/* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */
15020 		return range_within(rold, rcur) &&
15021 		       tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off);
15022 	case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY:
15023 	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
15024 	case PTR_TO_MEM:
15025 	case PTR_TO_BUF:
15026 	case PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER:
15027 		/* If the new min/max/var_off satisfy the old ones and
15028 		 * everything else matches, we are OK.
15029 		 */
15030 		return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off)) == 0 &&
15031 		       range_within(rold, rcur) &&
15032 		       tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off) &&
15033 		       check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap) &&
15034 		       check_ids(rold->ref_obj_id, rcur->ref_obj_id, idmap);
15035 	case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
15036 	case PTR_TO_PACKET:
15037 		/* We must have at least as much range as the old ptr
15038 		 * did, so that any accesses which were safe before are
15039 		 * still safe.  This is true even if old range < old off,
15040 		 * since someone could have accessed through (ptr - k), or
15041 		 * even done ptr -= k in a register, to get a safe access.
15042 		 */
15043 		if (rold->range > rcur->range)
15044 			return false;
15045 		/* If the offsets don't match, we can't trust our alignment;
15046 		 * nor can we be sure that we won't fall out of range.
15047 		 */
15048 		if (rold->off != rcur->off)
15049 			return false;
15050 		/* id relations must be preserved */
15051 		if (!check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap))
15052 			return false;
15053 		/* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */
15054 		return range_within(rold, rcur) &&
15055 		       tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off);
15056 	case PTR_TO_STACK:
15057 		/* two stack pointers are equal only if they're pointing to
15058 		 * the same stack frame, since fp-8 in foo != fp-8 in bar
15059 		 */
15060 		return regs_exact(rold, rcur, idmap) && rold->frameno == rcur->frameno;
15061 	default:
15062 		return regs_exact(rold, rcur, idmap);
15063 	}
15064 }
15065 
15066 static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old,
15067 		      struct bpf_func_state *cur, struct bpf_id_pair *idmap)
15068 {
15069 	int i, spi;
15070 
15071 	/* walk slots of the explored stack and ignore any additional
15072 	 * slots in the current stack, since explored(safe) state
15073 	 * didn't use them
15074 	 */
15075 	for (i = 0; i < old->allocated_stack; i++) {
15076 		struct bpf_reg_state *old_reg, *cur_reg;
15077 
15078 		spi = i / BPF_REG_SIZE;
15079 
15080 		if (!(old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live & REG_LIVE_READ)) {
15081 			i += BPF_REG_SIZE - 1;
15082 			/* explored state didn't use this */
15083 			continue;
15084 		}
15085 
15086 		if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_INVALID)
15087 			continue;
15088 
15089 		if (env->allow_uninit_stack &&
15090 		    old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_MISC)
15091 			continue;
15092 
15093 		/* explored stack has more populated slots than current stack
15094 		 * and these slots were used
15095 		 */
15096 		if (i >= cur->allocated_stack)
15097 			return false;
15098 
15099 		/* if old state was safe with misc data in the stack
15100 		 * it will be safe with zero-initialized stack.
15101 		 * The opposite is not true
15102 		 */
15103 		if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_MISC &&
15104 		    cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_ZERO)
15105 			continue;
15106 		if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] !=
15107 		    cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE])
15108 			/* Ex: old explored (safe) state has STACK_SPILL in
15109 			 * this stack slot, but current has STACK_MISC ->
15110 			 * this verifier states are not equivalent,
15111 			 * return false to continue verification of this path
15112 			 */
15113 			return false;
15114 		if (i % BPF_REG_SIZE != BPF_REG_SIZE - 1)
15115 			continue;
15116 		/* Both old and cur are having same slot_type */
15117 		switch (old->stack[spi].slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE - 1]) {
15118 		case STACK_SPILL:
15119 			/* when explored and current stack slot are both storing
15120 			 * spilled registers, check that stored pointers types
15121 			 * are the same as well.
15122 			 * Ex: explored safe path could have stored
15123 			 * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -8}
15124 			 * but current path has stored:
15125 			 * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -16}
15126 			 * such verifier states are not equivalent.
15127 			 * return false to continue verification of this path
15128 			 */
15129 			if (!regsafe(env, &old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr,
15130 				     &cur->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, idmap))
15131 				return false;
15132 			break;
15133 		case STACK_DYNPTR:
15134 			old_reg = &old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr;
15135 			cur_reg = &cur->stack[spi].spilled_ptr;
15136 			if (old_reg->dynptr.type != cur_reg->dynptr.type ||
15137 			    old_reg->dynptr.first_slot != cur_reg->dynptr.first_slot ||
15138 			    !check_ids(old_reg->ref_obj_id, cur_reg->ref_obj_id, idmap))
15139 				return false;
15140 			break;
15141 		case STACK_ITER:
15142 			old_reg = &old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr;
15143 			cur_reg = &cur->stack[spi].spilled_ptr;
15144 			/* iter.depth is not compared between states as it
15145 			 * doesn't matter for correctness and would otherwise
15146 			 * prevent convergence; we maintain it only to prevent
15147 			 * infinite loop check triggering, see
15148 			 * iter_active_depths_differ()
15149 			 */
15150 			if (old_reg->iter.btf != cur_reg->iter.btf ||
15151 			    old_reg->iter.btf_id != cur_reg->iter.btf_id ||
15152 			    old_reg->iter.state != cur_reg->iter.state ||
15153 			    /* ignore {old_reg,cur_reg}->iter.depth, see above */
15154 			    !check_ids(old_reg->ref_obj_id, cur_reg->ref_obj_id, idmap))
15155 				return false;
15156 			break;
15157 		case STACK_MISC:
15158 		case STACK_ZERO:
15159 		case STACK_INVALID:
15160 			continue;
15161 		/* Ensure that new unhandled slot types return false by default */
15162 		default:
15163 			return false;
15164 		}
15165 	}
15166 	return true;
15167 }
15168 
15169 static bool refsafe(struct bpf_func_state *old, struct bpf_func_state *cur,
15170 		    struct bpf_id_pair *idmap)
15171 {
15172 	int i;
15173 
15174 	if (old->acquired_refs != cur->acquired_refs)
15175 		return false;
15176 
15177 	for (i = 0; i < old->acquired_refs; i++) {
15178 		if (!check_ids(old->refs[i].id, cur->refs[i].id, idmap))
15179 			return false;
15180 	}
15181 
15182 	return true;
15183 }
15184 
15185 /* compare two verifier states
15186  *
15187  * all states stored in state_list are known to be valid, since
15188  * verifier reached 'bpf_exit' instruction through them
15189  *
15190  * this function is called when verifier exploring different branches of
15191  * execution popped from the state stack. If it sees an old state that has
15192  * more strict register state and more strict stack state then this execution
15193  * branch doesn't need to be explored further, since verifier already
15194  * concluded that more strict state leads to valid finish.
15195  *
15196  * Therefore two states are equivalent if register state is more conservative
15197  * and explored stack state is more conservative than the current one.
15198  * Example:
15199  *       explored                   current
15200  * (slot1=INV slot2=MISC) == (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC)
15201  * (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC) != (slot1=INV slot2=MISC)
15202  *
15203  * In other words if current stack state (one being explored) has more
15204  * valid slots than old one that already passed validation, it means
15205  * the verifier can stop exploring and conclude that current state is valid too
15206  *
15207  * Similarly with registers. If explored state has register type as invalid
15208  * whereas register type in current state is meaningful, it means that
15209  * the current state will reach 'bpf_exit' instruction safely
15210  */
15211 static bool func_states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old,
15212 			      struct bpf_func_state *cur)
15213 {
15214 	int i;
15215 
15216 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
15217 		if (!regsafe(env, &old->regs[i], &cur->regs[i],
15218 			     env->idmap_scratch))
15219 			return false;
15220 
15221 	if (!stacksafe(env, old, cur, env->idmap_scratch))
15222 		return false;
15223 
15224 	if (!refsafe(old, cur, env->idmap_scratch))
15225 		return false;
15226 
15227 	return true;
15228 }
15229 
15230 static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
15231 			 struct bpf_verifier_state *old,
15232 			 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur)
15233 {
15234 	int i;
15235 
15236 	if (old->curframe != cur->curframe)
15237 		return false;
15238 
15239 	memset(env->idmap_scratch, 0, sizeof(env->idmap_scratch));
15240 
15241 	/* Verification state from speculative execution simulation
15242 	 * must never prune a non-speculative execution one.
15243 	 */
15244 	if (old->speculative && !cur->speculative)
15245 		return false;
15246 
15247 	if (old->active_lock.ptr != cur->active_lock.ptr)
15248 		return false;
15249 
15250 	/* Old and cur active_lock's have to be either both present
15251 	 * or both absent.
15252 	 */
15253 	if (!!old->active_lock.id != !!cur->active_lock.id)
15254 		return false;
15255 
15256 	if (old->active_lock.id &&
15257 	    !check_ids(old->active_lock.id, cur->active_lock.id, env->idmap_scratch))
15258 		return false;
15259 
15260 	if (old->active_rcu_lock != cur->active_rcu_lock)
15261 		return false;
15262 
15263 	/* for states to be equal callsites have to be the same
15264 	 * and all frame states need to be equivalent
15265 	 */
15266 	for (i = 0; i <= old->curframe; i++) {
15267 		if (old->frame[i]->callsite != cur->frame[i]->callsite)
15268 			return false;
15269 		if (!func_states_equal(env, old->frame[i], cur->frame[i]))
15270 			return false;
15271 	}
15272 	return true;
15273 }
15274 
15275 /* Return 0 if no propagation happened. Return negative error code if error
15276  * happened. Otherwise, return the propagated bit.
15277  */
15278 static int propagate_liveness_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
15279 				  struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
15280 				  struct bpf_reg_state *parent_reg)
15281 {
15282 	u8 parent_flag = parent_reg->live & REG_LIVE_READ;
15283 	u8 flag = reg->live & REG_LIVE_READ;
15284 	int err;
15285 
15286 	/* When comes here, read flags of PARENT_REG or REG could be any of
15287 	 * REG_LIVE_READ64, REG_LIVE_READ32, REG_LIVE_NONE. There is no need
15288 	 * of propagation if PARENT_REG has strongest REG_LIVE_READ64.
15289 	 */
15290 	if (parent_flag == REG_LIVE_READ64 ||
15291 	    /* Or if there is no read flag from REG. */
15292 	    !flag ||
15293 	    /* Or if the read flag from REG is the same as PARENT_REG. */
15294 	    parent_flag == flag)
15295 		return 0;
15296 
15297 	err = mark_reg_read(env, reg, parent_reg, flag);
15298 	if (err)
15299 		return err;
15300 
15301 	return flag;
15302 }
15303 
15304 /* A write screens off any subsequent reads; but write marks come from the
15305  * straight-line code between a state and its parent.  When we arrive at an
15306  * equivalent state (jump target or such) we didn't arrive by the straight-line
15307  * code, so read marks in the state must propagate to the parent regardless
15308  * of the state's write marks. That's what 'parent == state->parent' comparison
15309  * in mark_reg_read() is for.
15310  */
15311 static int propagate_liveness(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
15312 			      const struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate,
15313 			      struct bpf_verifier_state *vparent)
15314 {
15315 	struct bpf_reg_state *state_reg, *parent_reg;
15316 	struct bpf_func_state *state, *parent;
15317 	int i, frame, err = 0;
15318 
15319 	if (vparent->curframe != vstate->curframe) {
15320 		WARN(1, "propagate_live: parent frame %d current frame %d\n",
15321 		     vparent->curframe, vstate->curframe);
15322 		return -EFAULT;
15323 	}
15324 	/* Propagate read liveness of registers... */
15325 	BUILD_BUG_ON(BPF_REG_FP + 1 != MAX_BPF_REG);
15326 	for (frame = 0; frame <= vstate->curframe; frame++) {
15327 		parent = vparent->frame[frame];
15328 		state = vstate->frame[frame];
15329 		parent_reg = parent->regs;
15330 		state_reg = state->regs;
15331 		/* We don't need to worry about FP liveness, it's read-only */
15332 		for (i = frame < vstate->curframe ? BPF_REG_6 : 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) {
15333 			err = propagate_liveness_reg(env, &state_reg[i],
15334 						     &parent_reg[i]);
15335 			if (err < 0)
15336 				return err;
15337 			if (err == REG_LIVE_READ64)
15338 				mark_insn_zext(env, &parent_reg[i]);
15339 		}
15340 
15341 		/* Propagate stack slots. */
15342 		for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE &&
15343 			    i < parent->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
15344 			parent_reg = &parent->stack[i].spilled_ptr;
15345 			state_reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr;
15346 			err = propagate_liveness_reg(env, state_reg,
15347 						     parent_reg);
15348 			if (err < 0)
15349 				return err;
15350 		}
15351 	}
15352 	return 0;
15353 }
15354 
15355 /* find precise scalars in the previous equivalent state and
15356  * propagate them into the current state
15357  */
15358 static int propagate_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
15359 			       const struct bpf_verifier_state *old)
15360 {
15361 	struct bpf_reg_state *state_reg;
15362 	struct bpf_func_state *state;
15363 	int i, err = 0, fr;
15364 
15365 	for (fr = old->curframe; fr >= 0; fr--) {
15366 		state = old->frame[fr];
15367 		state_reg = state->regs;
15368 		for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++, state_reg++) {
15369 			if (state_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE ||
15370 			    !state_reg->precise ||
15371 			    !(state_reg->live & REG_LIVE_READ))
15372 				continue;
15373 			if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2)
15374 				verbose(env, "frame %d: propagating r%d\n", fr, i);
15375 			err = mark_chain_precision_frame(env, fr, i);
15376 			if (err < 0)
15377 				return err;
15378 		}
15379 
15380 		for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
15381 			if (!is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[i]))
15382 				continue;
15383 			state_reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr;
15384 			if (state_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE ||
15385 			    !state_reg->precise ||
15386 			    !(state_reg->live & REG_LIVE_READ))
15387 				continue;
15388 			if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2)
15389 				verbose(env, "frame %d: propagating fp%d\n",
15390 					fr, (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE);
15391 			err = mark_chain_precision_stack_frame(env, fr, i);
15392 			if (err < 0)
15393 				return err;
15394 		}
15395 	}
15396 	return 0;
15397 }
15398 
15399 static bool states_maybe_looping(struct bpf_verifier_state *old,
15400 				 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur)
15401 {
15402 	struct bpf_func_state *fold, *fcur;
15403 	int i, fr = cur->curframe;
15404 
15405 	if (old->curframe != fr)
15406 		return false;
15407 
15408 	fold = old->frame[fr];
15409 	fcur = cur->frame[fr];
15410 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
15411 		if (memcmp(&fold->regs[i], &fcur->regs[i],
15412 			   offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, parent)))
15413 			return false;
15414 	return true;
15415 }
15416 
15417 static bool is_iter_next_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
15418 {
15419 	return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].is_iter_next;
15420 }
15421 
15422 /* is_state_visited() handles iter_next() (see process_iter_next_call() for
15423  * terminology) calls specially: as opposed to bounded BPF loops, it *expects*
15424  * states to match, which otherwise would look like an infinite loop. So while
15425  * iter_next() calls are taken care of, we still need to be careful and
15426  * prevent erroneous and too eager declaration of "ininite loop", when
15427  * iterators are involved.
15428  *
15429  * Here's a situation in pseudo-BPF assembly form:
15430  *
15431  *   0: again:                          ; set up iter_next() call args
15432  *   1:   r1 = &it                      ; <CHECKPOINT HERE>
15433  *   2:   call bpf_iter_num_next        ; this is iter_next() call
15434  *   3:   if r0 == 0 goto done
15435  *   4:   ... something useful here ...
15436  *   5:   goto again                    ; another iteration
15437  *   6: done:
15438  *   7:   r1 = &it
15439  *   8:   call bpf_iter_num_destroy     ; clean up iter state
15440  *   9:   exit
15441  *
15442  * This is a typical loop. Let's assume that we have a prune point at 1:,
15443  * before we get to `call bpf_iter_num_next` (e.g., because of that `goto
15444  * again`, assuming other heuristics don't get in a way).
15445  *
15446  * When we first time come to 1:, let's say we have some state X. We proceed
15447  * to 2:, fork states, enqueue ACTIVE, validate NULL case successfully, exit.
15448  * Now we come back to validate that forked ACTIVE state. We proceed through
15449  * 3-5, come to goto, jump to 1:. Let's assume our state didn't change, so we
15450  * are converging. But the problem is that we don't know that yet, as this
15451  * convergence has to happen at iter_next() call site only. So if nothing is
15452  * done, at 1: verifier will use bounded loop logic and declare infinite
15453  * looping (and would be *technically* correct, if not for iterator's
15454  * "eventual sticky NULL" contract, see process_iter_next_call()). But we
15455  * don't want that. So what we do in process_iter_next_call() when we go on
15456  * another ACTIVE iteration, we bump slot->iter.depth, to mark that it's
15457  * a different iteration. So when we suspect an infinite loop, we additionally
15458  * check if any of the *ACTIVE* iterator states depths differ. If yes, we
15459  * pretend we are not looping and wait for next iter_next() call.
15460  *
15461  * This only applies to ACTIVE state. In DRAINED state we don't expect to
15462  * loop, because that would actually mean infinite loop, as DRAINED state is
15463  * "sticky", and so we'll keep returning into the same instruction with the
15464  * same state (at least in one of possible code paths).
15465  *
15466  * This approach allows to keep infinite loop heuristic even in the face of
15467  * active iterator. E.g., C snippet below is and will be detected as
15468  * inifintely looping:
15469  *
15470  *   struct bpf_iter_num it;
15471  *   int *p, x;
15472  *
15473  *   bpf_iter_num_new(&it, 0, 10);
15474  *   while ((p = bpf_iter_num_next(&t))) {
15475  *       x = p;
15476  *       while (x--) {} // <<-- infinite loop here
15477  *   }
15478  *
15479  */
15480 static bool iter_active_depths_differ(struct bpf_verifier_state *old, struct bpf_verifier_state *cur)
15481 {
15482 	struct bpf_reg_state *slot, *cur_slot;
15483 	struct bpf_func_state *state;
15484 	int i, fr;
15485 
15486 	for (fr = old->curframe; fr >= 0; fr--) {
15487 		state = old->frame[fr];
15488 		for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
15489 			if (state->stack[i].slot_type[0] != STACK_ITER)
15490 				continue;
15491 
15492 			slot = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr;
15493 			if (slot->iter.state != BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE)
15494 				continue;
15495 
15496 			cur_slot = &cur->frame[fr]->stack[i].spilled_ptr;
15497 			if (cur_slot->iter.depth != slot->iter.depth)
15498 				return true;
15499 		}
15500 	}
15501 	return false;
15502 }
15503 
15504 static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
15505 {
15506 	struct bpf_verifier_state_list *new_sl;
15507 	struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl, **pprev;
15508 	struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state, *new;
15509 	int i, j, err, states_cnt = 0;
15510 	bool force_new_state = env->test_state_freq || is_force_checkpoint(env, insn_idx);
15511 	bool add_new_state = force_new_state;
15512 
15513 	/* bpf progs typically have pruning point every 4 instructions
15514 	 * http://vger.kernel.org/bpfconf2019.html#session-1
15515 	 * Do not add new state for future pruning if the verifier hasn't seen
15516 	 * at least 2 jumps and at least 8 instructions.
15517 	 * This heuristics helps decrease 'total_states' and 'peak_states' metric.
15518 	 * In tests that amounts to up to 50% reduction into total verifier
15519 	 * memory consumption and 20% verifier time speedup.
15520 	 */
15521 	if (env->jmps_processed - env->prev_jmps_processed >= 2 &&
15522 	    env->insn_processed - env->prev_insn_processed >= 8)
15523 		add_new_state = true;
15524 
15525 	pprev = explored_state(env, insn_idx);
15526 	sl = *pprev;
15527 
15528 	clean_live_states(env, insn_idx, cur);
15529 
15530 	while (sl) {
15531 		states_cnt++;
15532 		if (sl->state.insn_idx != insn_idx)
15533 			goto next;
15534 
15535 		if (sl->state.branches) {
15536 			struct bpf_func_state *frame = sl->state.frame[sl->state.curframe];
15537 
15538 			if (frame->in_async_callback_fn &&
15539 			    frame->async_entry_cnt != cur->frame[cur->curframe]->async_entry_cnt) {
15540 				/* Different async_entry_cnt means that the verifier is
15541 				 * processing another entry into async callback.
15542 				 * Seeing the same state is not an indication of infinite
15543 				 * loop or infinite recursion.
15544 				 * But finding the same state doesn't mean that it's safe
15545 				 * to stop processing the current state. The previous state
15546 				 * hasn't yet reached bpf_exit, since state.branches > 0.
15547 				 * Checking in_async_callback_fn alone is not enough either.
15548 				 * Since the verifier still needs to catch infinite loops
15549 				 * inside async callbacks.
15550 				 */
15551 				goto skip_inf_loop_check;
15552 			}
15553 			/* BPF open-coded iterators loop detection is special.
15554 			 * states_maybe_looping() logic is too simplistic in detecting
15555 			 * states that *might* be equivalent, because it doesn't know
15556 			 * about ID remapping, so don't even perform it.
15557 			 * See process_iter_next_call() and iter_active_depths_differ()
15558 			 * for overview of the logic. When current and one of parent
15559 			 * states are detected as equivalent, it's a good thing: we prove
15560 			 * convergence and can stop simulating further iterations.
15561 			 * It's safe to assume that iterator loop will finish, taking into
15562 			 * account iter_next() contract of eventually returning
15563 			 * sticky NULL result.
15564 			 */
15565 			if (is_iter_next_insn(env, insn_idx)) {
15566 				if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur)) {
15567 					struct bpf_func_state *cur_frame;
15568 					struct bpf_reg_state *iter_state, *iter_reg;
15569 					int spi;
15570 
15571 					cur_frame = cur->frame[cur->curframe];
15572 					/* btf_check_iter_kfuncs() enforces that
15573 					 * iter state pointer is always the first arg
15574 					 */
15575 					iter_reg = &cur_frame->regs[BPF_REG_1];
15576 					/* current state is valid due to states_equal(),
15577 					 * so we can assume valid iter and reg state,
15578 					 * no need for extra (re-)validations
15579 					 */
15580 					spi = __get_spi(iter_reg->off + iter_reg->var_off.value);
15581 					iter_state = &func(env, iter_reg)->stack[spi].spilled_ptr;
15582 					if (iter_state->iter.state == BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE)
15583 						goto hit;
15584 				}
15585 				goto skip_inf_loop_check;
15586 			}
15587 			/* attempt to detect infinite loop to avoid unnecessary doomed work */
15588 			if (states_maybe_looping(&sl->state, cur) &&
15589 			    states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur) &&
15590 			    !iter_active_depths_differ(&sl->state, cur)) {
15591 				verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; ");
15592 				verbose(env, "infinite loop detected at insn %d\n", insn_idx);
15593 				return -EINVAL;
15594 			}
15595 			/* if the verifier is processing a loop, avoid adding new state
15596 			 * too often, since different loop iterations have distinct
15597 			 * states and may not help future pruning.
15598 			 * This threshold shouldn't be too low to make sure that
15599 			 * a loop with large bound will be rejected quickly.
15600 			 * The most abusive loop will be:
15601 			 * r1 += 1
15602 			 * if r1 < 1000000 goto pc-2
15603 			 * 1M insn_procssed limit / 100 == 10k peak states.
15604 			 * This threshold shouldn't be too high either, since states
15605 			 * at the end of the loop are likely to be useful in pruning.
15606 			 */
15607 skip_inf_loop_check:
15608 			if (!force_new_state &&
15609 			    env->jmps_processed - env->prev_jmps_processed < 20 &&
15610 			    env->insn_processed - env->prev_insn_processed < 100)
15611 				add_new_state = false;
15612 			goto miss;
15613 		}
15614 		if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur)) {
15615 hit:
15616 			sl->hit_cnt++;
15617 			/* reached equivalent register/stack state,
15618 			 * prune the search.
15619 			 * Registers read by the continuation are read by us.
15620 			 * If we have any write marks in env->cur_state, they
15621 			 * will prevent corresponding reads in the continuation
15622 			 * from reaching our parent (an explored_state).  Our
15623 			 * own state will get the read marks recorded, but
15624 			 * they'll be immediately forgotten as we're pruning
15625 			 * this state and will pop a new one.
15626 			 */
15627 			err = propagate_liveness(env, &sl->state, cur);
15628 
15629 			/* if previous state reached the exit with precision and
15630 			 * current state is equivalent to it (except precsion marks)
15631 			 * the precision needs to be propagated back in
15632 			 * the current state.
15633 			 */
15634 			err = err ? : push_jmp_history(env, cur);
15635 			err = err ? : propagate_precision(env, &sl->state);
15636 			if (err)
15637 				return err;
15638 			return 1;
15639 		}
15640 miss:
15641 		/* when new state is not going to be added do not increase miss count.
15642 		 * Otherwise several loop iterations will remove the state
15643 		 * recorded earlier. The goal of these heuristics is to have
15644 		 * states from some iterations of the loop (some in the beginning
15645 		 * and some at the end) to help pruning.
15646 		 */
15647 		if (add_new_state)
15648 			sl->miss_cnt++;
15649 		/* heuristic to determine whether this state is beneficial
15650 		 * to keep checking from state equivalence point of view.
15651 		 * Higher numbers increase max_states_per_insn and verification time,
15652 		 * but do not meaningfully decrease insn_processed.
15653 		 */
15654 		if (sl->miss_cnt > sl->hit_cnt * 3 + 3) {
15655 			/* the state is unlikely to be useful. Remove it to
15656 			 * speed up verification
15657 			 */
15658 			*pprev = sl->next;
15659 			if (sl->state.frame[0]->regs[0].live & REG_LIVE_DONE) {
15660 				u32 br = sl->state.branches;
15661 
15662 				WARN_ONCE(br,
15663 					  "BUG live_done but branches_to_explore %d\n",
15664 					  br);
15665 				free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false);
15666 				kfree(sl);
15667 				env->peak_states--;
15668 			} else {
15669 				/* cannot free this state, since parentage chain may
15670 				 * walk it later. Add it for free_list instead to
15671 				 * be freed at the end of verification
15672 				 */
15673 				sl->next = env->free_list;
15674 				env->free_list = sl;
15675 			}
15676 			sl = *pprev;
15677 			continue;
15678 		}
15679 next:
15680 		pprev = &sl->next;
15681 		sl = *pprev;
15682 	}
15683 
15684 	if (env->max_states_per_insn < states_cnt)
15685 		env->max_states_per_insn = states_cnt;
15686 
15687 	if (!env->bpf_capable && states_cnt > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES)
15688 		return 0;
15689 
15690 	if (!add_new_state)
15691 		return 0;
15692 
15693 	/* There were no equivalent states, remember the current one.
15694 	 * Technically the current state is not proven to be safe yet,
15695 	 * but it will either reach outer most bpf_exit (which means it's safe)
15696 	 * or it will be rejected. When there are no loops the verifier won't be
15697 	 * seeing this tuple (frame[0].callsite, frame[1].callsite, .. insn_idx)
15698 	 * again on the way to bpf_exit.
15699 	 * When looping the sl->state.branches will be > 0 and this state
15700 	 * will not be considered for equivalence until branches == 0.
15701 	 */
15702 	new_sl = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list), GFP_KERNEL);
15703 	if (!new_sl)
15704 		return -ENOMEM;
15705 	env->total_states++;
15706 	env->peak_states++;
15707 	env->prev_jmps_processed = env->jmps_processed;
15708 	env->prev_insn_processed = env->insn_processed;
15709 
15710 	/* forget precise markings we inherited, see __mark_chain_precision */
15711 	if (env->bpf_capable)
15712 		mark_all_scalars_imprecise(env, cur);
15713 
15714 	/* add new state to the head of linked list */
15715 	new = &new_sl->state;
15716 	err = copy_verifier_state(new, cur);
15717 	if (err) {
15718 		free_verifier_state(new, false);
15719 		kfree(new_sl);
15720 		return err;
15721 	}
15722 	new->insn_idx = insn_idx;
15723 	WARN_ONCE(new->branches != 1,
15724 		  "BUG is_state_visited:branches_to_explore=%d insn %d\n", new->branches, insn_idx);
15725 
15726 	cur->parent = new;
15727 	cur->first_insn_idx = insn_idx;
15728 	clear_jmp_history(cur);
15729 	new_sl->next = *explored_state(env, insn_idx);
15730 	*explored_state(env, insn_idx) = new_sl;
15731 	/* connect new state to parentage chain. Current frame needs all
15732 	 * registers connected. Only r6 - r9 of the callers are alive (pushed
15733 	 * to the stack implicitly by JITs) so in callers' frames connect just
15734 	 * r6 - r9 as an optimization. Callers will have r1 - r5 connected to
15735 	 * the state of the call instruction (with WRITTEN set), and r0 comes
15736 	 * from callee with its full parentage chain, anyway.
15737 	 */
15738 	/* clear write marks in current state: the writes we did are not writes
15739 	 * our child did, so they don't screen off its reads from us.
15740 	 * (There are no read marks in current state, because reads always mark
15741 	 * their parent and current state never has children yet.  Only
15742 	 * explored_states can get read marks.)
15743 	 */
15744 	for (j = 0; j <= cur->curframe; j++) {
15745 		for (i = j < cur->curframe ? BPF_REG_6 : 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++)
15746 			cur->frame[j]->regs[i].parent = &new->frame[j]->regs[i];
15747 		for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++)
15748 			cur->frame[j]->regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE;
15749 	}
15750 
15751 	/* all stack frames are accessible from callee, clear them all */
15752 	for (j = 0; j <= cur->curframe; j++) {
15753 		struct bpf_func_state *frame = cur->frame[j];
15754 		struct bpf_func_state *newframe = new->frame[j];
15755 
15756 		for (i = 0; i < frame->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
15757 			frame->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live = REG_LIVE_NONE;
15758 			frame->stack[i].spilled_ptr.parent =
15759 						&newframe->stack[i].spilled_ptr;
15760 		}
15761 	}
15762 	return 0;
15763 }
15764 
15765 /* Return true if it's OK to have the same insn return a different type. */
15766 static bool reg_type_mismatch_ok(enum bpf_reg_type type)
15767 {
15768 	switch (base_type(type)) {
15769 	case PTR_TO_CTX:
15770 	case PTR_TO_SOCKET:
15771 	case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON:
15772 	case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
15773 	case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK:
15774 	case PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
15775 		return false;
15776 	default:
15777 		return true;
15778 	}
15779 }
15780 
15781 /* If an instruction was previously used with particular pointer types, then we
15782  * need to be careful to avoid cases such as the below, where it may be ok
15783  * for one branch accessing the pointer, but not ok for the other branch:
15784  *
15785  * R1 = sock_ptr
15786  * goto X;
15787  * ...
15788  * R1 = some_other_valid_ptr;
15789  * goto X;
15790  * ...
15791  * R2 = *(u32 *)(R1 + 0);
15792  */
15793 static bool reg_type_mismatch(enum bpf_reg_type src, enum bpf_reg_type prev)
15794 {
15795 	return src != prev && (!reg_type_mismatch_ok(src) ||
15796 			       !reg_type_mismatch_ok(prev));
15797 }
15798 
15799 static int save_aux_ptr_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, enum bpf_reg_type type,
15800 			     bool allow_trust_missmatch)
15801 {
15802 	enum bpf_reg_type *prev_type = &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].ptr_type;
15803 
15804 	if (*prev_type == NOT_INIT) {
15805 		/* Saw a valid insn
15806 		 * dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + off)
15807 		 * save type to validate intersecting paths
15808 		 */
15809 		*prev_type = type;
15810 	} else if (reg_type_mismatch(type, *prev_type)) {
15811 		/* Abuser program is trying to use the same insn
15812 		 * dst_reg = *(u32*) (src_reg + off)
15813 		 * with different pointer types:
15814 		 * src_reg == ctx in one branch and
15815 		 * src_reg == stack|map in some other branch.
15816 		 * Reject it.
15817 		 */
15818 		if (allow_trust_missmatch &&
15819 		    base_type(type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID &&
15820 		    base_type(*prev_type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) {
15821 			/*
15822 			 * Have to support a use case when one path through
15823 			 * the program yields TRUSTED pointer while another
15824 			 * is UNTRUSTED. Fallback to UNTRUSTED to generate
15825 			 * BPF_PROBE_MEM.
15826 			 */
15827 			*prev_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED;
15828 		} else {
15829 			verbose(env, "same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n");
15830 			return -EINVAL;
15831 		}
15832 	}
15833 
15834 	return 0;
15835 }
15836 
15837 static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
15838 {
15839 	bool pop_log = !(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2);
15840 	struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state;
15841 	struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
15842 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs;
15843 	int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
15844 	bool do_print_state = false;
15845 	int prev_insn_idx = -1;
15846 
15847 	for (;;) {
15848 		struct bpf_insn *insn;
15849 		u8 class;
15850 		int err;
15851 
15852 		env->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx;
15853 		if (env->insn_idx >= insn_cnt) {
15854 			verbose(env, "invalid insn idx %d insn_cnt %d\n",
15855 				env->insn_idx, insn_cnt);
15856 			return -EFAULT;
15857 		}
15858 
15859 		insn = &insns[env->insn_idx];
15860 		class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
15861 
15862 		if (++env->insn_processed > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS) {
15863 			verbose(env,
15864 				"BPF program is too large. Processed %d insn\n",
15865 				env->insn_processed);
15866 			return -E2BIG;
15867 		}
15868 
15869 		state->last_insn_idx = env->prev_insn_idx;
15870 
15871 		if (is_prune_point(env, env->insn_idx)) {
15872 			err = is_state_visited(env, env->insn_idx);
15873 			if (err < 0)
15874 				return err;
15875 			if (err == 1) {
15876 				/* found equivalent state, can prune the search */
15877 				if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) {
15878 					if (do_print_state)
15879 						verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d%s: safe\n",
15880 							env->prev_insn_idx, env->insn_idx,
15881 							env->cur_state->speculative ?
15882 							" (speculative execution)" : "");
15883 					else
15884 						verbose(env, "%d: safe\n", env->insn_idx);
15885 				}
15886 				goto process_bpf_exit;
15887 			}
15888 		}
15889 
15890 		if (is_jmp_point(env, env->insn_idx)) {
15891 			err = push_jmp_history(env, state);
15892 			if (err)
15893 				return err;
15894 		}
15895 
15896 		if (signal_pending(current))
15897 			return -EAGAIN;
15898 
15899 		if (need_resched())
15900 			cond_resched();
15901 
15902 		if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2 && do_print_state) {
15903 			verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d%s:",
15904 				env->prev_insn_idx, env->insn_idx,
15905 				env->cur_state->speculative ?
15906 				" (speculative execution)" : "");
15907 			print_verifier_state(env, state->frame[state->curframe], true);
15908 			do_print_state = false;
15909 		}
15910 
15911 		if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) {
15912 			const struct bpf_insn_cbs cbs = {
15913 				.cb_call	= disasm_kfunc_name,
15914 				.cb_print	= verbose,
15915 				.private_data	= env,
15916 			};
15917 
15918 			if (verifier_state_scratched(env))
15919 				print_insn_state(env, state->frame[state->curframe]);
15920 
15921 			verbose_linfo(env, env->insn_idx, "; ");
15922 			env->prev_log_pos = env->log.end_pos;
15923 			verbose(env, "%d: ", env->insn_idx);
15924 			print_bpf_insn(&cbs, insn, env->allow_ptr_leaks);
15925 			env->prev_insn_print_pos = env->log.end_pos - env->prev_log_pos;
15926 			env->prev_log_pos = env->log.end_pos;
15927 		}
15928 
15929 		if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) {
15930 			err = bpf_prog_offload_verify_insn(env, env->insn_idx,
15931 							   env->prev_insn_idx);
15932 			if (err)
15933 				return err;
15934 		}
15935 
15936 		regs = cur_regs(env);
15937 		sanitize_mark_insn_seen(env);
15938 		prev_insn_idx = env->insn_idx;
15939 
15940 		if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
15941 			err = check_alu_op(env, insn);
15942 			if (err)
15943 				return err;
15944 
15945 		} else if (class == BPF_LDX) {
15946 			enum bpf_reg_type src_reg_type;
15947 
15948 			/* check for reserved fields is already done */
15949 
15950 			/* check src operand */
15951 			err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
15952 			if (err)
15953 				return err;
15954 
15955 			err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK);
15956 			if (err)
15957 				return err;
15958 
15959 			src_reg_type = regs[insn->src_reg].type;
15960 
15961 			/* check that memory (src_reg + off) is readable,
15962 			 * the state of dst_reg will be updated by this func
15963 			 */
15964 			err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->src_reg,
15965 					       insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code),
15966 					       BPF_READ, insn->dst_reg, false);
15967 			if (err)
15968 				return err;
15969 
15970 			err = save_aux_ptr_type(env, src_reg_type, true);
15971 			if (err)
15972 				return err;
15973 		} else if (class == BPF_STX) {
15974 			enum bpf_reg_type dst_reg_type;
15975 
15976 			if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC) {
15977 				err = check_atomic(env, env->insn_idx, insn);
15978 				if (err)
15979 					return err;
15980 				env->insn_idx++;
15981 				continue;
15982 			}
15983 
15984 			if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0) {
15985 				verbose(env, "BPF_STX uses reserved fields\n");
15986 				return -EINVAL;
15987 			}
15988 
15989 			/* check src1 operand */
15990 			err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
15991 			if (err)
15992 				return err;
15993 			/* check src2 operand */
15994 			err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
15995 			if (err)
15996 				return err;
15997 
15998 			dst_reg_type = regs[insn->dst_reg].type;
15999 
16000 			/* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */
16001 			err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg,
16002 					       insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code),
16003 					       BPF_WRITE, insn->src_reg, false);
16004 			if (err)
16005 				return err;
16006 
16007 			err = save_aux_ptr_type(env, dst_reg_type, false);
16008 			if (err)
16009 				return err;
16010 		} else if (class == BPF_ST) {
16011 			enum bpf_reg_type dst_reg_type;
16012 
16013 			if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM ||
16014 			    insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
16015 				verbose(env, "BPF_ST uses reserved fields\n");
16016 				return -EINVAL;
16017 			}
16018 			/* check src operand */
16019 			err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
16020 			if (err)
16021 				return err;
16022 
16023 			dst_reg_type = regs[insn->dst_reg].type;
16024 
16025 			/* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */
16026 			err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg,
16027 					       insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code),
16028 					       BPF_WRITE, -1, false);
16029 			if (err)
16030 				return err;
16031 
16032 			err = save_aux_ptr_type(env, dst_reg_type, false);
16033 			if (err)
16034 				return err;
16035 		} else if (class == BPF_JMP || class == BPF_JMP32) {
16036 			u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
16037 
16038 			env->jmps_processed++;
16039 			if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
16040 				if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K ||
16041 				    (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL
16042 				     && insn->off != 0) ||
16043 				    (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 &&
16044 				     insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL &&
16045 				     insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) ||
16046 				    insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
16047 				    class == BPF_JMP32) {
16048 					verbose(env, "BPF_CALL uses reserved fields\n");
16049 					return -EINVAL;
16050 				}
16051 
16052 				if (env->cur_state->active_lock.ptr) {
16053 					if ((insn->src_reg == BPF_REG_0 && insn->imm != BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock) ||
16054 					    (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) ||
16055 					    (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL &&
16056 					     (insn->off != 0 || !is_bpf_graph_api_kfunc(insn->imm)))) {
16057 						verbose(env, "function calls are not allowed while holding a lock\n");
16058 						return -EINVAL;
16059 					}
16060 				}
16061 				if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
16062 					err = check_func_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx);
16063 				else if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL)
16064 					err = check_kfunc_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx);
16065 				else
16066 					err = check_helper_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx);
16067 				if (err)
16068 					return err;
16069 
16070 				mark_reg_scratched(env, BPF_REG_0);
16071 			} else if (opcode == BPF_JA) {
16072 				if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K ||
16073 				    insn->imm != 0 ||
16074 				    insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
16075 				    insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
16076 				    class == BPF_JMP32) {
16077 					verbose(env, "BPF_JA uses reserved fields\n");
16078 					return -EINVAL;
16079 				}
16080 
16081 				env->insn_idx += insn->off + 1;
16082 				continue;
16083 
16084 			} else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) {
16085 				if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K ||
16086 				    insn->imm != 0 ||
16087 				    insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
16088 				    insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
16089 				    class == BPF_JMP32) {
16090 					verbose(env, "BPF_EXIT uses reserved fields\n");
16091 					return -EINVAL;
16092 				}
16093 
16094 				if (env->cur_state->active_lock.ptr &&
16095 				    !in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(env)) {
16096 					verbose(env, "bpf_spin_unlock is missing\n");
16097 					return -EINVAL;
16098 				}
16099 
16100 				if (env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock) {
16101 					verbose(env, "bpf_rcu_read_unlock is missing\n");
16102 					return -EINVAL;
16103 				}
16104 
16105 				/* We must do check_reference_leak here before
16106 				 * prepare_func_exit to handle the case when
16107 				 * state->curframe > 0, it may be a callback
16108 				 * function, for which reference_state must
16109 				 * match caller reference state when it exits.
16110 				 */
16111 				err = check_reference_leak(env);
16112 				if (err)
16113 					return err;
16114 
16115 				if (state->curframe) {
16116 					/* exit from nested function */
16117 					err = prepare_func_exit(env, &env->insn_idx);
16118 					if (err)
16119 						return err;
16120 					do_print_state = true;
16121 					continue;
16122 				}
16123 
16124 				err = check_return_code(env);
16125 				if (err)
16126 					return err;
16127 process_bpf_exit:
16128 				mark_verifier_state_scratched(env);
16129 				update_branch_counts(env, env->cur_state);
16130 				err = pop_stack(env, &prev_insn_idx,
16131 						&env->insn_idx, pop_log);
16132 				if (err < 0) {
16133 					if (err != -ENOENT)
16134 						return err;
16135 					break;
16136 				} else {
16137 					do_print_state = true;
16138 					continue;
16139 				}
16140 			} else {
16141 				err = check_cond_jmp_op(env, insn, &env->insn_idx);
16142 				if (err)
16143 					return err;
16144 			}
16145 		} else if (class == BPF_LD) {
16146 			u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code);
16147 
16148 			if (mode == BPF_ABS || mode == BPF_IND) {
16149 				err = check_ld_abs(env, insn);
16150 				if (err)
16151 					return err;
16152 
16153 			} else if (mode == BPF_IMM) {
16154 				err = check_ld_imm(env, insn);
16155 				if (err)
16156 					return err;
16157 
16158 				env->insn_idx++;
16159 				sanitize_mark_insn_seen(env);
16160 			} else {
16161 				verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD mode\n");
16162 				return -EINVAL;
16163 			}
16164 		} else {
16165 			verbose(env, "unknown insn class %d\n", class);
16166 			return -EINVAL;
16167 		}
16168 
16169 		env->insn_idx++;
16170 	}
16171 
16172 	return 0;
16173 }
16174 
16175 static int find_btf_percpu_datasec(struct btf *btf)
16176 {
16177 	const struct btf_type *t;
16178 	const char *tname;
16179 	int i, n;
16180 
16181 	/*
16182 	 * Both vmlinux and module each have their own ".data..percpu"
16183 	 * DATASECs in BTF. So for module's case, we need to skip vmlinux BTF
16184 	 * types to look at only module's own BTF types.
16185 	 */
16186 	n = btf_nr_types(btf);
16187 	if (btf_is_module(btf))
16188 		i = btf_nr_types(btf_vmlinux);
16189 	else
16190 		i = 1;
16191 
16192 	for(; i < n; i++) {
16193 		t = btf_type_by_id(btf, i);
16194 		if (BTF_INFO_KIND(t->info) != BTF_KIND_DATASEC)
16195 			continue;
16196 
16197 		tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off);
16198 		if (!strcmp(tname, ".data..percpu"))
16199 			return i;
16200 	}
16201 
16202 	return -ENOENT;
16203 }
16204 
16205 /* replace pseudo btf_id with kernel symbol address */
16206 static int check_pseudo_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
16207 			       struct bpf_insn *insn,
16208 			       struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux)
16209 {
16210 	const struct btf_var_secinfo *vsi;
16211 	const struct btf_type *datasec;
16212 	struct btf_mod_pair *btf_mod;
16213 	const struct btf_type *t;
16214 	const char *sym_name;
16215 	bool percpu = false;
16216 	u32 type, id = insn->imm;
16217 	struct btf *btf;
16218 	s32 datasec_id;
16219 	u64 addr;
16220 	int i, btf_fd, err;
16221 
16222 	btf_fd = insn[1].imm;
16223 	if (btf_fd) {
16224 		btf = btf_get_by_fd(btf_fd);
16225 		if (IS_ERR(btf)) {
16226 			verbose(env, "invalid module BTF object FD specified.\n");
16227 			return -EINVAL;
16228 		}
16229 	} else {
16230 		if (!btf_vmlinux) {
16231 			verbose(env, "kernel is missing BTF, make sure CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF=y is specified in Kconfig.\n");
16232 			return -EINVAL;
16233 		}
16234 		btf = btf_vmlinux;
16235 		btf_get(btf);
16236 	}
16237 
16238 	t = btf_type_by_id(btf, id);
16239 	if (!t) {
16240 		verbose(env, "ldimm64 insn specifies invalid btf_id %d.\n", id);
16241 		err = -ENOENT;
16242 		goto err_put;
16243 	}
16244 
16245 	if (!btf_type_is_var(t) && !btf_type_is_func(t)) {
16246 		verbose(env, "pseudo btf_id %d in ldimm64 isn't KIND_VAR or KIND_FUNC\n", id);
16247 		err = -EINVAL;
16248 		goto err_put;
16249 	}
16250 
16251 	sym_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off);
16252 	addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(sym_name);
16253 	if (!addr) {
16254 		verbose(env, "ldimm64 failed to find the address for kernel symbol '%s'.\n",
16255 			sym_name);
16256 		err = -ENOENT;
16257 		goto err_put;
16258 	}
16259 	insn[0].imm = (u32)addr;
16260 	insn[1].imm = addr >> 32;
16261 
16262 	if (btf_type_is_func(t)) {
16263 		aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY;
16264 		aux->btf_var.mem_size = 0;
16265 		goto check_btf;
16266 	}
16267 
16268 	datasec_id = find_btf_percpu_datasec(btf);
16269 	if (datasec_id > 0) {
16270 		datasec = btf_type_by_id(btf, datasec_id);
16271 		for_each_vsi(i, datasec, vsi) {
16272 			if (vsi->type == id) {
16273 				percpu = true;
16274 				break;
16275 			}
16276 		}
16277 	}
16278 
16279 	type = t->type;
16280 	t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, type, NULL);
16281 	if (percpu) {
16282 		aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU;
16283 		aux->btf_var.btf = btf;
16284 		aux->btf_var.btf_id = type;
16285 	} else if (!btf_type_is_struct(t)) {
16286 		const struct btf_type *ret;
16287 		const char *tname;
16288 		u32 tsize;
16289 
16290 		/* resolve the type size of ksym. */
16291 		ret = btf_resolve_size(btf, t, &tsize);
16292 		if (IS_ERR(ret)) {
16293 			tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off);
16294 			verbose(env, "ldimm64 unable to resolve the size of type '%s': %ld\n",
16295 				tname, PTR_ERR(ret));
16296 			err = -EINVAL;
16297 			goto err_put;
16298 		}
16299 		aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY;
16300 		aux->btf_var.mem_size = tsize;
16301 	} else {
16302 		aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID;
16303 		aux->btf_var.btf = btf;
16304 		aux->btf_var.btf_id = type;
16305 	}
16306 check_btf:
16307 	/* check whether we recorded this BTF (and maybe module) already */
16308 	for (i = 0; i < env->used_btf_cnt; i++) {
16309 		if (env->used_btfs[i].btf == btf) {
16310 			btf_put(btf);
16311 			return 0;
16312 		}
16313 	}
16314 
16315 	if (env->used_btf_cnt >= MAX_USED_BTFS) {
16316 		err = -E2BIG;
16317 		goto err_put;
16318 	}
16319 
16320 	btf_mod = &env->used_btfs[env->used_btf_cnt];
16321 	btf_mod->btf = btf;
16322 	btf_mod->module = NULL;
16323 
16324 	/* if we reference variables from kernel module, bump its refcount */
16325 	if (btf_is_module(btf)) {
16326 		btf_mod->module = btf_try_get_module(btf);
16327 		if (!btf_mod->module) {
16328 			err = -ENXIO;
16329 			goto err_put;
16330 		}
16331 	}
16332 
16333 	env->used_btf_cnt++;
16334 
16335 	return 0;
16336 err_put:
16337 	btf_put(btf);
16338 	return err;
16339 }
16340 
16341 static bool is_tracing_prog_type(enum bpf_prog_type type)
16342 {
16343 	switch (type) {
16344 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE:
16345 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT:
16346 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT:
16347 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT:
16348 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT_WRITABLE:
16349 		return true;
16350 	default:
16351 		return false;
16352 	}
16353 }
16354 
16355 static int check_map_prog_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
16356 					struct bpf_map *map,
16357 					struct bpf_prog *prog)
16358 
16359 {
16360 	enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(prog);
16361 
16362 	if (btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_LIST_HEAD) ||
16363 	    btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_RB_ROOT)) {
16364 		if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type)) {
16365 			verbose(env, "tracing progs cannot use bpf_{list_head,rb_root} yet\n");
16366 			return -EINVAL;
16367 		}
16368 	}
16369 
16370 	if (btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_SPIN_LOCK)) {
16371 		if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) {
16372 			verbose(env, "socket filter progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n");
16373 			return -EINVAL;
16374 		}
16375 
16376 		if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type)) {
16377 			verbose(env, "tracing progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n");
16378 			return -EINVAL;
16379 		}
16380 
16381 		if (prog->aux->sleepable) {
16382 			verbose(env, "sleepable progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n");
16383 			return -EINVAL;
16384 		}
16385 	}
16386 
16387 	if (btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_TIMER)) {
16388 		if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type)) {
16389 			verbose(env, "tracing progs cannot use bpf_timer yet\n");
16390 			return -EINVAL;
16391 		}
16392 	}
16393 
16394 	if ((bpf_prog_is_offloaded(prog->aux) || bpf_map_is_offloaded(map)) &&
16395 	    !bpf_offload_prog_map_match(prog, map)) {
16396 		verbose(env, "offload device mismatch between prog and map\n");
16397 		return -EINVAL;
16398 	}
16399 
16400 	if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) {
16401 		verbose(env, "bpf_struct_ops map cannot be used in prog\n");
16402 		return -EINVAL;
16403 	}
16404 
16405 	if (prog->aux->sleepable)
16406 		switch (map->map_type) {
16407 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH:
16408 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_HASH:
16409 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY:
16410 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH:
16411 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY:
16412 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_PERCPU_HASH:
16413 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS:
16414 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS:
16415 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF:
16416 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF:
16417 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE:
16418 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE:
16419 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE:
16420 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE:
16421 			break;
16422 		default:
16423 			verbose(env,
16424 				"Sleepable programs can only use array, hash, ringbuf and local storage maps\n");
16425 			return -EINVAL;
16426 		}
16427 
16428 	return 0;
16429 }
16430 
16431 static bool bpf_map_is_cgroup_storage(struct bpf_map *map)
16432 {
16433 	return (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE ||
16434 		map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE);
16435 }
16436 
16437 /* find and rewrite pseudo imm in ld_imm64 instructions:
16438  *
16439  * 1. if it accesses map FD, replace it with actual map pointer.
16440  * 2. if it accesses btf_id of a VAR, replace it with pointer to the var.
16441  *
16442  * NOTE: btf_vmlinux is required for converting pseudo btf_id.
16443  */
16444 static int resolve_pseudo_ldimm64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
16445 {
16446 	struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
16447 	int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
16448 	int i, j, err;
16449 
16450 	err = bpf_prog_calc_tag(env->prog);
16451 	if (err)
16452 		return err;
16453 
16454 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
16455 		if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX &&
16456 		    (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0)) {
16457 			verbose(env, "BPF_LDX uses reserved fields\n");
16458 			return -EINVAL;
16459 		}
16460 
16461 		if (insn[0].code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) {
16462 			struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux;
16463 			struct bpf_map *map;
16464 			struct fd f;
16465 			u64 addr;
16466 			u32 fd;
16467 
16468 			if (i == insn_cnt - 1 || insn[1].code != 0 ||
16469 			    insn[1].dst_reg != 0 || insn[1].src_reg != 0 ||
16470 			    insn[1].off != 0) {
16471 				verbose(env, "invalid bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
16472 				return -EINVAL;
16473 			}
16474 
16475 			if (insn[0].src_reg == 0)
16476 				/* valid generic load 64-bit imm */
16477 				goto next_insn;
16478 
16479 			if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_BTF_ID) {
16480 				aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i];
16481 				err = check_pseudo_btf_id(env, insn, aux);
16482 				if (err)
16483 					return err;
16484 				goto next_insn;
16485 			}
16486 
16487 			if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) {
16488 				aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i];
16489 				aux->ptr_type = PTR_TO_FUNC;
16490 				goto next_insn;
16491 			}
16492 
16493 			/* In final convert_pseudo_ld_imm64() step, this is
16494 			 * converted into regular 64-bit imm load insn.
16495 			 */
16496 			switch (insn[0].src_reg) {
16497 			case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE:
16498 			case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE:
16499 				break;
16500 			case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD:
16501 			case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX:
16502 				if (insn[1].imm == 0)
16503 					break;
16504 				fallthrough;
16505 			default:
16506 				verbose(env, "unrecognized bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
16507 				return -EINVAL;
16508 			}
16509 
16510 			switch (insn[0].src_reg) {
16511 			case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE:
16512 			case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX:
16513 				if (bpfptr_is_null(env->fd_array)) {
16514 					verbose(env, "fd_idx without fd_array is invalid\n");
16515 					return -EPROTO;
16516 				}
16517 				if (copy_from_bpfptr_offset(&fd, env->fd_array,
16518 							    insn[0].imm * sizeof(fd),
16519 							    sizeof(fd)))
16520 					return -EFAULT;
16521 				break;
16522 			default:
16523 				fd = insn[0].imm;
16524 				break;
16525 			}
16526 
16527 			f = fdget(fd);
16528 			map = __bpf_map_get(f);
16529 			if (IS_ERR(map)) {
16530 				verbose(env, "fd %d is not pointing to valid bpf_map\n",
16531 					insn[0].imm);
16532 				return PTR_ERR(map);
16533 			}
16534 
16535 			err = check_map_prog_compatibility(env, map, env->prog);
16536 			if (err) {
16537 				fdput(f);
16538 				return err;
16539 			}
16540 
16541 			aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i];
16542 			if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD ||
16543 			    insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX) {
16544 				addr = (unsigned long)map;
16545 			} else {
16546 				u32 off = insn[1].imm;
16547 
16548 				if (off >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) {
16549 					verbose(env, "direct value offset of %u is not allowed\n", off);
16550 					fdput(f);
16551 					return -EINVAL;
16552 				}
16553 
16554 				if (!map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) {
16555 					verbose(env, "no direct value access support for this map type\n");
16556 					fdput(f);
16557 					return -EINVAL;
16558 				}
16559 
16560 				err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &addr, off);
16561 				if (err) {
16562 					verbose(env, "invalid access to map value pointer, value_size=%u off=%u\n",
16563 						map->value_size, off);
16564 					fdput(f);
16565 					return err;
16566 				}
16567 
16568 				aux->map_off = off;
16569 				addr += off;
16570 			}
16571 
16572 			insn[0].imm = (u32)addr;
16573 			insn[1].imm = addr >> 32;
16574 
16575 			/* check whether we recorded this map already */
16576 			for (j = 0; j < env->used_map_cnt; j++) {
16577 				if (env->used_maps[j] == map) {
16578 					aux->map_index = j;
16579 					fdput(f);
16580 					goto next_insn;
16581 				}
16582 			}
16583 
16584 			if (env->used_map_cnt >= MAX_USED_MAPS) {
16585 				fdput(f);
16586 				return -E2BIG;
16587 			}
16588 
16589 			/* hold the map. If the program is rejected by verifier,
16590 			 * the map will be released by release_maps() or it
16591 			 * will be used by the valid program until it's unloaded
16592 			 * and all maps are released in free_used_maps()
16593 			 */
16594 			bpf_map_inc(map);
16595 
16596 			aux->map_index = env->used_map_cnt;
16597 			env->used_maps[env->used_map_cnt++] = map;
16598 
16599 			if (bpf_map_is_cgroup_storage(map) &&
16600 			    bpf_cgroup_storage_assign(env->prog->aux, map)) {
16601 				verbose(env, "only one cgroup storage of each type is allowed\n");
16602 				fdput(f);
16603 				return -EBUSY;
16604 			}
16605 
16606 			fdput(f);
16607 next_insn:
16608 			insn++;
16609 			i++;
16610 			continue;
16611 		}
16612 
16613 		/* Basic sanity check before we invest more work here. */
16614 		if (!bpf_opcode_in_insntable(insn->code)) {
16615 			verbose(env, "unknown opcode %02x\n", insn->code);
16616 			return -EINVAL;
16617 		}
16618 	}
16619 
16620 	/* now all pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions load valid
16621 	 * 'struct bpf_map *' into a register instead of user map_fd.
16622 	 * These pointers will be used later by verifier to validate map access.
16623 	 */
16624 	return 0;
16625 }
16626 
16627 /* drop refcnt of maps used by the rejected program */
16628 static void release_maps(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
16629 {
16630 	__bpf_free_used_maps(env->prog->aux, env->used_maps,
16631 			     env->used_map_cnt);
16632 }
16633 
16634 /* drop refcnt of maps used by the rejected program */
16635 static void release_btfs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
16636 {
16637 	__bpf_free_used_btfs(env->prog->aux, env->used_btfs,
16638 			     env->used_btf_cnt);
16639 }
16640 
16641 /* convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic BPF_LD_IMM64 */
16642 static void convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
16643 {
16644 	struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
16645 	int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
16646 	int i;
16647 
16648 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
16649 		if (insn->code != (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW))
16650 			continue;
16651 		if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC)
16652 			continue;
16653 		insn->src_reg = 0;
16654 	}
16655 }
16656 
16657 /* single env->prog->insni[off] instruction was replaced with the range
16658  * insni[off, off + cnt).  Adjust corresponding insn_aux_data by copying
16659  * [0, off) and [off, end) to new locations, so the patched range stays zero
16660  */
16661 static void adjust_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
16662 				 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *new_data,
16663 				 struct bpf_prog *new_prog, u32 off, u32 cnt)
16664 {
16665 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *old_data = env->insn_aux_data;
16666 	struct bpf_insn *insn = new_prog->insnsi;
16667 	u32 old_seen = old_data[off].seen;
16668 	u32 prog_len;
16669 	int i;
16670 
16671 	/* aux info at OFF always needs adjustment, no matter fast path
16672 	 * (cnt == 1) is taken or not. There is no guarantee INSN at OFF is the
16673 	 * original insn at old prog.
16674 	 */
16675 	old_data[off].zext_dst = insn_has_def32(env, insn + off + cnt - 1);
16676 
16677 	if (cnt == 1)
16678 		return;
16679 	prog_len = new_prog->len;
16680 
16681 	memcpy(new_data, old_data, sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * off);
16682 	memcpy(new_data + off + cnt - 1, old_data + off,
16683 	       sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * (prog_len - off - cnt + 1));
16684 	for (i = off; i < off + cnt - 1; i++) {
16685 		/* Expand insni[off]'s seen count to the patched range. */
16686 		new_data[i].seen = old_seen;
16687 		new_data[i].zext_dst = insn_has_def32(env, insn + i);
16688 	}
16689 	env->insn_aux_data = new_data;
16690 	vfree(old_data);
16691 }
16692 
16693 static void adjust_subprog_starts(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 len)
16694 {
16695 	int i;
16696 
16697 	if (len == 1)
16698 		return;
16699 	/* NOTE: fake 'exit' subprog should be updated as well. */
16700 	for (i = 0; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
16701 		if (env->subprog_info[i].start <= off)
16702 			continue;
16703 		env->subprog_info[i].start += len - 1;
16704 	}
16705 }
16706 
16707 static void adjust_poke_descs(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 off, u32 len)
16708 {
16709 	struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *tab = prog->aux->poke_tab;
16710 	int i, sz = prog->aux->size_poke_tab;
16711 	struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *desc;
16712 
16713 	for (i = 0; i < sz; i++) {
16714 		desc = &tab[i];
16715 		if (desc->insn_idx <= off)
16716 			continue;
16717 		desc->insn_idx += len - 1;
16718 	}
16719 }
16720 
16721 static struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off,
16722 					    const struct bpf_insn *patch, u32 len)
16723 {
16724 	struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
16725 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *new_data = NULL;
16726 
16727 	if (len > 1) {
16728 		new_data = vzalloc(array_size(env->prog->len + len - 1,
16729 					      sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data)));
16730 		if (!new_data)
16731 			return NULL;
16732 	}
16733 
16734 	new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_single(env->prog, off, patch, len);
16735 	if (IS_ERR(new_prog)) {
16736 		if (PTR_ERR(new_prog) == -ERANGE)
16737 			verbose(env,
16738 				"insn %d cannot be patched due to 16-bit range\n",
16739 				env->insn_aux_data[off].orig_idx);
16740 		vfree(new_data);
16741 		return NULL;
16742 	}
16743 	adjust_insn_aux_data(env, new_data, new_prog, off, len);
16744 	adjust_subprog_starts(env, off, len);
16745 	adjust_poke_descs(new_prog, off, len);
16746 	return new_prog;
16747 }
16748 
16749 static int adjust_subprog_starts_after_remove(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
16750 					      u32 off, u32 cnt)
16751 {
16752 	int i, j;
16753 
16754 	/* find first prog starting at or after off (first to remove) */
16755 	for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++)
16756 		if (env->subprog_info[i].start >= off)
16757 			break;
16758 	/* find first prog starting at or after off + cnt (first to stay) */
16759 	for (j = i; j < env->subprog_cnt; j++)
16760 		if (env->subprog_info[j].start >= off + cnt)
16761 			break;
16762 	/* if j doesn't start exactly at off + cnt, we are just removing
16763 	 * the front of previous prog
16764 	 */
16765 	if (env->subprog_info[j].start != off + cnt)
16766 		j--;
16767 
16768 	if (j > i) {
16769 		struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux;
16770 		int move;
16771 
16772 		/* move fake 'exit' subprog as well */
16773 		move = env->subprog_cnt + 1 - j;
16774 
16775 		memmove(env->subprog_info + i,
16776 			env->subprog_info + j,
16777 			sizeof(*env->subprog_info) * move);
16778 		env->subprog_cnt -= j - i;
16779 
16780 		/* remove func_info */
16781 		if (aux->func_info) {
16782 			move = aux->func_info_cnt - j;
16783 
16784 			memmove(aux->func_info + i,
16785 				aux->func_info + j,
16786 				sizeof(*aux->func_info) * move);
16787 			aux->func_info_cnt -= j - i;
16788 			/* func_info->insn_off is set after all code rewrites,
16789 			 * in adjust_btf_func() - no need to adjust
16790 			 */
16791 		}
16792 	} else {
16793 		/* convert i from "first prog to remove" to "first to adjust" */
16794 		if (env->subprog_info[i].start == off)
16795 			i++;
16796 	}
16797 
16798 	/* update fake 'exit' subprog as well */
16799 	for (; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++)
16800 		env->subprog_info[i].start -= cnt;
16801 
16802 	return 0;
16803 }
16804 
16805 static int bpf_adj_linfo_after_remove(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off,
16806 				      u32 cnt)
16807 {
16808 	struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
16809 	u32 i, l_off, l_cnt, nr_linfo;
16810 	struct bpf_line_info *linfo;
16811 
16812 	nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo;
16813 	if (!nr_linfo)
16814 		return 0;
16815 
16816 	linfo = prog->aux->linfo;
16817 
16818 	/* find first line info to remove, count lines to be removed */
16819 	for (i = 0; i < nr_linfo; i++)
16820 		if (linfo[i].insn_off >= off)
16821 			break;
16822 
16823 	l_off = i;
16824 	l_cnt = 0;
16825 	for (; i < nr_linfo; i++)
16826 		if (linfo[i].insn_off < off + cnt)
16827 			l_cnt++;
16828 		else
16829 			break;
16830 
16831 	/* First live insn doesn't match first live linfo, it needs to "inherit"
16832 	 * last removed linfo.  prog is already modified, so prog->len == off
16833 	 * means no live instructions after (tail of the program was removed).
16834 	 */
16835 	if (prog->len != off && l_cnt &&
16836 	    (i == nr_linfo || linfo[i].insn_off != off + cnt)) {
16837 		l_cnt--;
16838 		linfo[--i].insn_off = off + cnt;
16839 	}
16840 
16841 	/* remove the line info which refer to the removed instructions */
16842 	if (l_cnt) {
16843 		memmove(linfo + l_off, linfo + i,
16844 			sizeof(*linfo) * (nr_linfo - i));
16845 
16846 		prog->aux->nr_linfo -= l_cnt;
16847 		nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo;
16848 	}
16849 
16850 	/* pull all linfo[i].insn_off >= off + cnt in by cnt */
16851 	for (i = l_off; i < nr_linfo; i++)
16852 		linfo[i].insn_off -= cnt;
16853 
16854 	/* fix up all subprogs (incl. 'exit') which start >= off */
16855 	for (i = 0; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++)
16856 		if (env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx > l_off) {
16857 			/* program may have started in the removed region but
16858 			 * may not be fully removed
16859 			 */
16860 			if (env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx >= l_off + l_cnt)
16861 				env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx -= l_cnt;
16862 			else
16863 				env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx = l_off;
16864 		}
16865 
16866 	return 0;
16867 }
16868 
16869 static int verifier_remove_insns(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 cnt)
16870 {
16871 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data;
16872 	unsigned int orig_prog_len = env->prog->len;
16873 	int err;
16874 
16875 	if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux))
16876 		bpf_prog_offload_remove_insns(env, off, cnt);
16877 
16878 	err = bpf_remove_insns(env->prog, off, cnt);
16879 	if (err)
16880 		return err;
16881 
16882 	err = adjust_subprog_starts_after_remove(env, off, cnt);
16883 	if (err)
16884 		return err;
16885 
16886 	err = bpf_adj_linfo_after_remove(env, off, cnt);
16887 	if (err)
16888 		return err;
16889 
16890 	memmove(aux_data + off,	aux_data + off + cnt,
16891 		sizeof(*aux_data) * (orig_prog_len - off - cnt));
16892 
16893 	return 0;
16894 }
16895 
16896 /* The verifier does more data flow analysis than llvm and will not
16897  * explore branches that are dead at run time. Malicious programs can
16898  * have dead code too. Therefore replace all dead at-run-time code
16899  * with 'ja -1'.
16900  *
16901  * Just nops are not optimal, e.g. if they would sit at the end of the
16902  * program and through another bug we would manage to jump there, then
16903  * we'd execute beyond program memory otherwise. Returning exception
16904  * code also wouldn't work since we can have subprogs where the dead
16905  * code could be located.
16906  */
16907 static void sanitize_dead_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
16908 {
16909 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data;
16910 	struct bpf_insn trap = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, -1);
16911 	struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
16912 	const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
16913 	int i;
16914 
16915 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) {
16916 		if (aux_data[i].seen)
16917 			continue;
16918 		memcpy(insn + i, &trap, sizeof(trap));
16919 		aux_data[i].zext_dst = false;
16920 	}
16921 }
16922 
16923 static bool insn_is_cond_jump(u8 code)
16924 {
16925 	u8 op;
16926 
16927 	if (BPF_CLASS(code) == BPF_JMP32)
16928 		return true;
16929 
16930 	if (BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP)
16931 		return false;
16932 
16933 	op = BPF_OP(code);
16934 	return op != BPF_JA && op != BPF_EXIT && op != BPF_CALL;
16935 }
16936 
16937 static void opt_hard_wire_dead_code_branches(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
16938 {
16939 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data;
16940 	struct bpf_insn ja = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0);
16941 	struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
16942 	const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
16943 	int i;
16944 
16945 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
16946 		if (!insn_is_cond_jump(insn->code))
16947 			continue;
16948 
16949 		if (!aux_data[i + 1].seen)
16950 			ja.off = insn->off;
16951 		else if (!aux_data[i + 1 + insn->off].seen)
16952 			ja.off = 0;
16953 		else
16954 			continue;
16955 
16956 		if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux))
16957 			bpf_prog_offload_replace_insn(env, i, &ja);
16958 
16959 		memcpy(insn, &ja, sizeof(ja));
16960 	}
16961 }
16962 
16963 static int opt_remove_dead_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
16964 {
16965 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data;
16966 	int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
16967 	int i, err;
16968 
16969 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) {
16970 		int j;
16971 
16972 		j = 0;
16973 		while (i + j < insn_cnt && !aux_data[i + j].seen)
16974 			j++;
16975 		if (!j)
16976 			continue;
16977 
16978 		err = verifier_remove_insns(env, i, j);
16979 		if (err)
16980 			return err;
16981 		insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
16982 	}
16983 
16984 	return 0;
16985 }
16986 
16987 static int opt_remove_nops(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
16988 {
16989 	const struct bpf_insn ja = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0);
16990 	struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
16991 	int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
16992 	int i, err;
16993 
16994 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) {
16995 		if (memcmp(&insn[i], &ja, sizeof(ja)))
16996 			continue;
16997 
16998 		err = verifier_remove_insns(env, i, 1);
16999 		if (err)
17000 			return err;
17001 		insn_cnt--;
17002 		i--;
17003 	}
17004 
17005 	return 0;
17006 }
17007 
17008 static int opt_subreg_zext_lo32_rnd_hi32(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
17009 					 const union bpf_attr *attr)
17010 {
17011 	struct bpf_insn *patch, zext_patch[2], rnd_hi32_patch[4];
17012 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = env->insn_aux_data;
17013 	int i, patch_len, delta = 0, len = env->prog->len;
17014 	struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
17015 	struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
17016 	bool rnd_hi32;
17017 
17018 	rnd_hi32 = attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_TEST_RND_HI32;
17019 	zext_patch[1] = BPF_ZEXT_REG(0);
17020 	rnd_hi32_patch[1] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_AX, 0);
17021 	rnd_hi32_patch[2] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_AX, 32);
17022 	rnd_hi32_patch[3] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, 0, BPF_REG_AX);
17023 	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
17024 		int adj_idx = i + delta;
17025 		struct bpf_insn insn;
17026 		int load_reg;
17027 
17028 		insn = insns[adj_idx];
17029 		load_reg = insn_def_regno(&insn);
17030 		if (!aux[adj_idx].zext_dst) {
17031 			u8 code, class;
17032 			u32 imm_rnd;
17033 
17034 			if (!rnd_hi32)
17035 				continue;
17036 
17037 			code = insn.code;
17038 			class = BPF_CLASS(code);
17039 			if (load_reg == -1)
17040 				continue;
17041 
17042 			/* NOTE: arg "reg" (the fourth one) is only used for
17043 			 *       BPF_STX + SRC_OP, so it is safe to pass NULL
17044 			 *       here.
17045 			 */
17046 			if (is_reg64(env, &insn, load_reg, NULL, DST_OP)) {
17047 				if (class == BPF_LD &&
17048 				    BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_IMM)
17049 					i++;
17050 				continue;
17051 			}
17052 
17053 			/* ctx load could be transformed into wider load. */
17054 			if (class == BPF_LDX &&
17055 			    aux[adj_idx].ptr_type == PTR_TO_CTX)
17056 				continue;
17057 
17058 			imm_rnd = get_random_u32();
17059 			rnd_hi32_patch[0] = insn;
17060 			rnd_hi32_patch[1].imm = imm_rnd;
17061 			rnd_hi32_patch[3].dst_reg = load_reg;
17062 			patch = rnd_hi32_patch;
17063 			patch_len = 4;
17064 			goto apply_patch_buffer;
17065 		}
17066 
17067 		/* Add in an zero-extend instruction if a) the JIT has requested
17068 		 * it or b) it's a CMPXCHG.
17069 		 *
17070 		 * The latter is because: BPF_CMPXCHG always loads a value into
17071 		 * R0, therefore always zero-extends. However some archs'
17072 		 * equivalent instruction only does this load when the
17073 		 * comparison is successful. This detail of CMPXCHG is
17074 		 * orthogonal to the general zero-extension behaviour of the
17075 		 * CPU, so it's treated independently of bpf_jit_needs_zext.
17076 		 */
17077 		if (!bpf_jit_needs_zext() && !is_cmpxchg_insn(&insn))
17078 			continue;
17079 
17080 		/* Zero-extension is done by the caller. */
17081 		if (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(&insn))
17082 			continue;
17083 
17084 		if (WARN_ON(load_reg == -1)) {
17085 			verbose(env, "verifier bug. zext_dst is set, but no reg is defined\n");
17086 			return -EFAULT;
17087 		}
17088 
17089 		zext_patch[0] = insn;
17090 		zext_patch[1].dst_reg = load_reg;
17091 		zext_patch[1].src_reg = load_reg;
17092 		patch = zext_patch;
17093 		patch_len = 2;
17094 apply_patch_buffer:
17095 		new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, adj_idx, patch, patch_len);
17096 		if (!new_prog)
17097 			return -ENOMEM;
17098 		env->prog = new_prog;
17099 		insns = new_prog->insnsi;
17100 		aux = env->insn_aux_data;
17101 		delta += patch_len - 1;
17102 	}
17103 
17104 	return 0;
17105 }
17106 
17107 /* convert load instructions that access fields of a context type into a
17108  * sequence of instructions that access fields of the underlying structure:
17109  *     struct __sk_buff    -> struct sk_buff
17110  *     struct bpf_sock_ops -> struct sock
17111  */
17112 static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
17113 {
17114 	const struct bpf_verifier_ops *ops = env->ops;
17115 	int i, cnt, size, ctx_field_size, delta = 0;
17116 	const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
17117 	struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16], *insn;
17118 	u32 target_size, size_default, off;
17119 	struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
17120 	enum bpf_access_type type;
17121 	bool is_narrower_load;
17122 
17123 	if (ops->gen_prologue || env->seen_direct_write) {
17124 		if (!ops->gen_prologue) {
17125 			verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
17126 			return -EINVAL;
17127 		}
17128 		cnt = ops->gen_prologue(insn_buf, env->seen_direct_write,
17129 					env->prog);
17130 		if (cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) {
17131 			verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
17132 			return -EINVAL;
17133 		} else if (cnt) {
17134 			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, 0, insn_buf, cnt);
17135 			if (!new_prog)
17136 				return -ENOMEM;
17137 
17138 			env->prog = new_prog;
17139 			delta += cnt - 1;
17140 		}
17141 	}
17142 
17143 	if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux))
17144 		return 0;
17145 
17146 	insn = env->prog->insnsi + delta;
17147 
17148 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
17149 		bpf_convert_ctx_access_t convert_ctx_access;
17150 
17151 		if (insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) ||
17152 		    insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) ||
17153 		    insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) ||
17154 		    insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW)) {
17155 			type = BPF_READ;
17156 		} else if (insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) ||
17157 			   insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) ||
17158 			   insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) ||
17159 			   insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW) ||
17160 			   insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) ||
17161 			   insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) ||
17162 			   insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) ||
17163 			   insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW)) {
17164 			type = BPF_WRITE;
17165 		} else {
17166 			continue;
17167 		}
17168 
17169 		if (type == BPF_WRITE &&
17170 		    env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].sanitize_stack_spill) {
17171 			struct bpf_insn patch[] = {
17172 				*insn,
17173 				BPF_ST_NOSPEC(),
17174 			};
17175 
17176 			cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(patch);
17177 			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, patch, cnt);
17178 			if (!new_prog)
17179 				return -ENOMEM;
17180 
17181 			delta    += cnt - 1;
17182 			env->prog = new_prog;
17183 			insn      = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
17184 			continue;
17185 		}
17186 
17187 		switch ((int)env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ptr_type) {
17188 		case PTR_TO_CTX:
17189 			if (!ops->convert_ctx_access)
17190 				continue;
17191 			convert_ctx_access = ops->convert_ctx_access;
17192 			break;
17193 		case PTR_TO_SOCKET:
17194 		case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON:
17195 			convert_ctx_access = bpf_sock_convert_ctx_access;
17196 			break;
17197 		case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
17198 			convert_ctx_access = bpf_tcp_sock_convert_ctx_access;
17199 			break;
17200 		case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK:
17201 			convert_ctx_access = bpf_xdp_sock_convert_ctx_access;
17202 			break;
17203 		case PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
17204 		case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED:
17205 		/* PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC always has a valid lifetime, unlike
17206 		 * PTR_TO_BTF_ID, and an active ref_obj_id, but the same cannot
17207 		 * be said once it is marked PTR_UNTRUSTED, hence we must handle
17208 		 * any faults for loads into such types. BPF_WRITE is disallowed
17209 		 * for this case.
17210 		 */
17211 		case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_UNTRUSTED:
17212 			if (type == BPF_READ) {
17213 				insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEM |
17214 					BPF_SIZE((insn)->code);
17215 				env->prog->aux->num_exentries++;
17216 			}
17217 			continue;
17218 		default:
17219 			continue;
17220 		}
17221 
17222 		ctx_field_size = env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ctx_field_size;
17223 		size = BPF_LDST_BYTES(insn);
17224 
17225 		/* If the read access is a narrower load of the field,
17226 		 * convert to a 4/8-byte load, to minimum program type specific
17227 		 * convert_ctx_access changes. If conversion is successful,
17228 		 * we will apply proper mask to the result.
17229 		 */
17230 		is_narrower_load = size < ctx_field_size;
17231 		size_default = bpf_ctx_off_adjust_machine(ctx_field_size);
17232 		off = insn->off;
17233 		if (is_narrower_load) {
17234 			u8 size_code;
17235 
17236 			if (type == BPF_WRITE) {
17237 				verbose(env, "bpf verifier narrow ctx access misconfigured\n");
17238 				return -EINVAL;
17239 			}
17240 
17241 			size_code = BPF_H;
17242 			if (ctx_field_size == 4)
17243 				size_code = BPF_W;
17244 			else if (ctx_field_size == 8)
17245 				size_code = BPF_DW;
17246 
17247 			insn->off = off & ~(size_default - 1);
17248 			insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | size_code;
17249 		}
17250 
17251 		target_size = 0;
17252 		cnt = convert_ctx_access(type, insn, insn_buf, env->prog,
17253 					 &target_size);
17254 		if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf) ||
17255 		    (ctx_field_size && !target_size)) {
17256 			verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
17257 			return -EINVAL;
17258 		}
17259 
17260 		if (is_narrower_load && size < target_size) {
17261 			u8 shift = bpf_ctx_narrow_access_offset(
17262 				off, size, size_default) * 8;
17263 			if (shift && cnt + 1 >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) {
17264 				verbose(env, "bpf verifier narrow ctx load misconfigured\n");
17265 				return -EINVAL;
17266 			}
17267 			if (ctx_field_size <= 4) {
17268 				if (shift)
17269 					insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_RSH,
17270 									insn->dst_reg,
17271 									shift);
17272 				insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg,
17273 								(1 << size * 8) - 1);
17274 			} else {
17275 				if (shift)
17276 					insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH,
17277 									insn->dst_reg,
17278 									shift);
17279 				insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg,
17280 								(1ULL << size * 8) - 1);
17281 			}
17282 		}
17283 
17284 		new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
17285 		if (!new_prog)
17286 			return -ENOMEM;
17287 
17288 		delta += cnt - 1;
17289 
17290 		/* keep walking new program and skip insns we just inserted */
17291 		env->prog = new_prog;
17292 		insn      = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
17293 	}
17294 
17295 	return 0;
17296 }
17297 
17298 static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
17299 {
17300 	struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog, **func, *tmp;
17301 	int i, j, subprog_start, subprog_end = 0, len, subprog;
17302 	struct bpf_map *map_ptr;
17303 	struct bpf_insn *insn;
17304 	void *old_bpf_func;
17305 	int err, num_exentries;
17306 
17307 	if (env->subprog_cnt <= 1)
17308 		return 0;
17309 
17310 	for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) {
17311 		if (!bpf_pseudo_func(insn) && !bpf_pseudo_call(insn))
17312 			continue;
17313 
17314 		/* Upon error here we cannot fall back to interpreter but
17315 		 * need a hard reject of the program. Thus -EFAULT is
17316 		 * propagated in any case.
17317 		 */
17318 		subprog = find_subprog(env, i + insn->imm + 1);
17319 		if (subprog < 0) {
17320 			WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n",
17321 				  i + insn->imm + 1);
17322 			return -EFAULT;
17323 		}
17324 		/* temporarily remember subprog id inside insn instead of
17325 		 * aux_data, since next loop will split up all insns into funcs
17326 		 */
17327 		insn->off = subprog;
17328 		/* remember original imm in case JIT fails and fallback
17329 		 * to interpreter will be needed
17330 		 */
17331 		env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm = insn->imm;
17332 		/* point imm to __bpf_call_base+1 from JITs point of view */
17333 		insn->imm = 1;
17334 		if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn))
17335 			/* jit (e.g. x86_64) may emit fewer instructions
17336 			 * if it learns a u32 imm is the same as a u64 imm.
17337 			 * Force a non zero here.
17338 			 */
17339 			insn[1].imm = 1;
17340 	}
17341 
17342 	err = bpf_prog_alloc_jited_linfo(prog);
17343 	if (err)
17344 		goto out_undo_insn;
17345 
17346 	err = -ENOMEM;
17347 	func = kcalloc(env->subprog_cnt, sizeof(prog), GFP_KERNEL);
17348 	if (!func)
17349 		goto out_undo_insn;
17350 
17351 	for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
17352 		subprog_start = subprog_end;
17353 		subprog_end = env->subprog_info[i + 1].start;
17354 
17355 		len = subprog_end - subprog_start;
17356 		/* bpf_prog_run() doesn't call subprogs directly,
17357 		 * hence main prog stats include the runtime of subprogs.
17358 		 * subprogs don't have IDs and not reachable via prog_get_next_id
17359 		 * func[i]->stats will never be accessed and stays NULL
17360 		 */
17361 		func[i] = bpf_prog_alloc_no_stats(bpf_prog_size(len), GFP_USER);
17362 		if (!func[i])
17363 			goto out_free;
17364 		memcpy(func[i]->insnsi, &prog->insnsi[subprog_start],
17365 		       len * sizeof(struct bpf_insn));
17366 		func[i]->type = prog->type;
17367 		func[i]->len = len;
17368 		if (bpf_prog_calc_tag(func[i]))
17369 			goto out_free;
17370 		func[i]->is_func = 1;
17371 		func[i]->aux->func_idx = i;
17372 		/* Below members will be freed only at prog->aux */
17373 		func[i]->aux->btf = prog->aux->btf;
17374 		func[i]->aux->func_info = prog->aux->func_info;
17375 		func[i]->aux->func_info_cnt = prog->aux->func_info_cnt;
17376 		func[i]->aux->poke_tab = prog->aux->poke_tab;
17377 		func[i]->aux->size_poke_tab = prog->aux->size_poke_tab;
17378 
17379 		for (j = 0; j < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; j++) {
17380 			struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *poke;
17381 
17382 			poke = &prog->aux->poke_tab[j];
17383 			if (poke->insn_idx < subprog_end &&
17384 			    poke->insn_idx >= subprog_start)
17385 				poke->aux = func[i]->aux;
17386 		}
17387 
17388 		func[i]->aux->name[0] = 'F';
17389 		func[i]->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth;
17390 		func[i]->jit_requested = 1;
17391 		func[i]->blinding_requested = prog->blinding_requested;
17392 		func[i]->aux->kfunc_tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab;
17393 		func[i]->aux->kfunc_btf_tab = prog->aux->kfunc_btf_tab;
17394 		func[i]->aux->linfo = prog->aux->linfo;
17395 		func[i]->aux->nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo;
17396 		func[i]->aux->jited_linfo = prog->aux->jited_linfo;
17397 		func[i]->aux->linfo_idx = env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx;
17398 		num_exentries = 0;
17399 		insn = func[i]->insnsi;
17400 		for (j = 0; j < func[i]->len; j++, insn++) {
17401 			if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX &&
17402 			    BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEM)
17403 				num_exentries++;
17404 		}
17405 		func[i]->aux->num_exentries = num_exentries;
17406 		func[i]->aux->tail_call_reachable = env->subprog_info[i].tail_call_reachable;
17407 		func[i] = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]);
17408 		if (!func[i]->jited) {
17409 			err = -ENOTSUPP;
17410 			goto out_free;
17411 		}
17412 		cond_resched();
17413 	}
17414 
17415 	/* at this point all bpf functions were successfully JITed
17416 	 * now populate all bpf_calls with correct addresses and
17417 	 * run last pass of JIT
17418 	 */
17419 	for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
17420 		insn = func[i]->insnsi;
17421 		for (j = 0; j < func[i]->len; j++, insn++) {
17422 			if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) {
17423 				subprog = insn->off;
17424 				insn[0].imm = (u32)(long)func[subprog]->bpf_func;
17425 				insn[1].imm = ((u64)(long)func[subprog]->bpf_func) >> 32;
17426 				continue;
17427 			}
17428 			if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn))
17429 				continue;
17430 			subprog = insn->off;
17431 			insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(func[subprog]->bpf_func);
17432 		}
17433 
17434 		/* we use the aux data to keep a list of the start addresses
17435 		 * of the JITed images for each function in the program
17436 		 *
17437 		 * for some architectures, such as powerpc64, the imm field
17438 		 * might not be large enough to hold the offset of the start
17439 		 * address of the callee's JITed image from __bpf_call_base
17440 		 *
17441 		 * in such cases, we can lookup the start address of a callee
17442 		 * by using its subprog id, available from the off field of
17443 		 * the call instruction, as an index for this list
17444 		 */
17445 		func[i]->aux->func = func;
17446 		func[i]->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt;
17447 	}
17448 	for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
17449 		old_bpf_func = func[i]->bpf_func;
17450 		tmp = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]);
17451 		if (tmp != func[i] || func[i]->bpf_func != old_bpf_func) {
17452 			verbose(env, "JIT doesn't support bpf-to-bpf calls\n");
17453 			err = -ENOTSUPP;
17454 			goto out_free;
17455 		}
17456 		cond_resched();
17457 	}
17458 
17459 	/* finally lock prog and jit images for all functions and
17460 	 * populate kallsysm
17461 	 */
17462 	for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
17463 		bpf_prog_lock_ro(func[i]);
17464 		bpf_prog_kallsyms_add(func[i]);
17465 	}
17466 
17467 	/* Last step: make now unused interpreter insns from main
17468 	 * prog consistent for later dump requests, so they can
17469 	 * later look the same as if they were interpreted only.
17470 	 */
17471 	for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) {
17472 		if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) {
17473 			insn[0].imm = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm;
17474 			insn[1].imm = insn->off;
17475 			insn->off = 0;
17476 			continue;
17477 		}
17478 		if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn))
17479 			continue;
17480 		insn->off = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm;
17481 		subprog = find_subprog(env, i + insn->off + 1);
17482 		insn->imm = subprog;
17483 	}
17484 
17485 	prog->jited = 1;
17486 	prog->bpf_func = func[0]->bpf_func;
17487 	prog->jited_len = func[0]->jited_len;
17488 	prog->aux->func = func;
17489 	prog->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt;
17490 	bpf_prog_jit_attempt_done(prog);
17491 	return 0;
17492 out_free:
17493 	/* We failed JIT'ing, so at this point we need to unregister poke
17494 	 * descriptors from subprogs, so that kernel is not attempting to
17495 	 * patch it anymore as we're freeing the subprog JIT memory.
17496 	 */
17497 	for (i = 0; i < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; i++) {
17498 		map_ptr = prog->aux->poke_tab[i].tail_call.map;
17499 		map_ptr->ops->map_poke_untrack(map_ptr, prog->aux);
17500 	}
17501 	/* At this point we're guaranteed that poke descriptors are not
17502 	 * live anymore. We can just unlink its descriptor table as it's
17503 	 * released with the main prog.
17504 	 */
17505 	for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
17506 		if (!func[i])
17507 			continue;
17508 		func[i]->aux->poke_tab = NULL;
17509 		bpf_jit_free(func[i]);
17510 	}
17511 	kfree(func);
17512 out_undo_insn:
17513 	/* cleanup main prog to be interpreted */
17514 	prog->jit_requested = 0;
17515 	prog->blinding_requested = 0;
17516 	for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) {
17517 		if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn))
17518 			continue;
17519 		insn->off = 0;
17520 		insn->imm = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm;
17521 	}
17522 	bpf_prog_jit_attempt_done(prog);
17523 	return err;
17524 }
17525 
17526 static int fixup_call_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
17527 {
17528 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON
17529 	struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
17530 	struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi;
17531 	bool has_kfunc_call = bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call(prog);
17532 	int i, depth;
17533 #endif
17534 	int err = 0;
17535 
17536 	if (env->prog->jit_requested &&
17537 	    !bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) {
17538 		err = jit_subprogs(env);
17539 		if (err == 0)
17540 			return 0;
17541 		if (err == -EFAULT)
17542 			return err;
17543 	}
17544 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON
17545 	if (has_kfunc_call) {
17546 		verbose(env, "calling kernel functions are not allowed in non-JITed programs\n");
17547 		return -EINVAL;
17548 	}
17549 	if (env->subprog_cnt > 1 && env->prog->aux->tail_call_reachable) {
17550 		/* When JIT fails the progs with bpf2bpf calls and tail_calls
17551 		 * have to be rejected, since interpreter doesn't support them yet.
17552 		 */
17553 		verbose(env, "tail_calls are not allowed in non-JITed programs with bpf-to-bpf calls\n");
17554 		return -EINVAL;
17555 	}
17556 	for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) {
17557 		if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) {
17558 			/* When JIT fails the progs with callback calls
17559 			 * have to be rejected, since interpreter doesn't support them yet.
17560 			 */
17561 			verbose(env, "callbacks are not allowed in non-JITed programs\n");
17562 			return -EINVAL;
17563 		}
17564 
17565 		if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn))
17566 			continue;
17567 		depth = get_callee_stack_depth(env, insn, i);
17568 		if (depth < 0)
17569 			return depth;
17570 		bpf_patch_call_args(insn, depth);
17571 	}
17572 	err = 0;
17573 #endif
17574 	return err;
17575 }
17576 
17577 /* replace a generic kfunc with a specialized version if necessary */
17578 static void specialize_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
17579 			     u32 func_id, u16 offset, unsigned long *addr)
17580 {
17581 	struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
17582 	bool seen_direct_write;
17583 	void *xdp_kfunc;
17584 	bool is_rdonly;
17585 
17586 	if (bpf_dev_bound_kfunc_id(func_id)) {
17587 		xdp_kfunc = bpf_dev_bound_resolve_kfunc(prog, func_id);
17588 		if (xdp_kfunc) {
17589 			*addr = (unsigned long)xdp_kfunc;
17590 			return;
17591 		}
17592 		/* fallback to default kfunc when not supported by netdev */
17593 	}
17594 
17595 	if (offset)
17596 		return;
17597 
17598 	if (func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_from_skb]) {
17599 		seen_direct_write = env->seen_direct_write;
17600 		is_rdonly = !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, BPF_WRITE);
17601 
17602 		if (is_rdonly)
17603 			*addr = (unsigned long)bpf_dynptr_from_skb_rdonly;
17604 
17605 		/* restore env->seen_direct_write to its original value, since
17606 		 * may_access_direct_pkt_data mutates it
17607 		 */
17608 		env->seen_direct_write = seen_direct_write;
17609 	}
17610 }
17611 
17612 static void __fixup_collection_insert_kfunc(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux,
17613 					    u16 struct_meta_reg,
17614 					    u16 node_offset_reg,
17615 					    struct bpf_insn *insn,
17616 					    struct bpf_insn *insn_buf,
17617 					    int *cnt)
17618 {
17619 	struct btf_struct_meta *kptr_struct_meta = insn_aux->kptr_struct_meta;
17620 	struct bpf_insn addr[2] = { BPF_LD_IMM64(struct_meta_reg, (long)kptr_struct_meta) };
17621 
17622 	insn_buf[0] = addr[0];
17623 	insn_buf[1] = addr[1];
17624 	insn_buf[2] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(node_offset_reg, insn_aux->insert_off);
17625 	insn_buf[3] = *insn;
17626 	*cnt = 4;
17627 }
17628 
17629 static int fixup_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
17630 			    struct bpf_insn *insn_buf, int insn_idx, int *cnt)
17631 {
17632 	const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc;
17633 
17634 	if (!insn->imm) {
17635 		verbose(env, "invalid kernel function call not eliminated in verifier pass\n");
17636 		return -EINVAL;
17637 	}
17638 
17639 	*cnt = 0;
17640 
17641 	/* insn->imm has the btf func_id. Replace it with an offset relative to
17642 	 * __bpf_call_base, unless the JIT needs to call functions that are
17643 	 * further than 32 bits away (bpf_jit_supports_far_kfunc_call()).
17644 	 */
17645 	desc = find_kfunc_desc(env->prog, insn->imm, insn->off);
17646 	if (!desc) {
17647 		verbose(env, "verifier internal error: kernel function descriptor not found for func_id %u\n",
17648 			insn->imm);
17649 		return -EFAULT;
17650 	}
17651 
17652 	if (!bpf_jit_supports_far_kfunc_call())
17653 		insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(desc->addr);
17654 	if (insn->off)
17655 		return 0;
17656 	if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_new_impl]) {
17657 		struct btf_struct_meta *kptr_struct_meta = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].kptr_struct_meta;
17658 		struct bpf_insn addr[2] = { BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_2, (long)kptr_struct_meta) };
17659 		u64 obj_new_size = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].obj_new_size;
17660 
17661 		insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_1, obj_new_size);
17662 		insn_buf[1] = addr[0];
17663 		insn_buf[2] = addr[1];
17664 		insn_buf[3] = *insn;
17665 		*cnt = 4;
17666 	} else if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl] ||
17667 		   desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl]) {
17668 		struct btf_struct_meta *kptr_struct_meta = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].kptr_struct_meta;
17669 		struct bpf_insn addr[2] = { BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_2, (long)kptr_struct_meta) };
17670 
17671 		insn_buf[0] = addr[0];
17672 		insn_buf[1] = addr[1];
17673 		insn_buf[2] = *insn;
17674 		*cnt = 3;
17675 	} else if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_back_impl] ||
17676 		   desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_front_impl] ||
17677 		   desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]) {
17678 		int struct_meta_reg = BPF_REG_3;
17679 		int node_offset_reg = BPF_REG_4;
17680 
17681 		/* rbtree_add has extra 'less' arg, so args-to-fixup are in diff regs */
17682 		if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]) {
17683 			struct_meta_reg = BPF_REG_4;
17684 			node_offset_reg = BPF_REG_5;
17685 		}
17686 
17687 		__fixup_collection_insert_kfunc(&env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx], struct_meta_reg,
17688 						node_offset_reg, insn, insn_buf, cnt);
17689 	} else if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx] ||
17690 		   desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rdonly_cast]) {
17691 		insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1);
17692 		*cnt = 1;
17693 	}
17694 	return 0;
17695 }
17696 
17697 /* Do various post-verification rewrites in a single program pass.
17698  * These rewrites simplify JIT and interpreter implementations.
17699  */
17700 static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
17701 {
17702 	struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
17703 	enum bpf_attach_type eatype = prog->expected_attach_type;
17704 	enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(prog);
17705 	struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi;
17706 	const struct bpf_func_proto *fn;
17707 	const int insn_cnt = prog->len;
17708 	const struct bpf_map_ops *ops;
17709 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux;
17710 	struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16];
17711 	struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
17712 	struct bpf_map *map_ptr;
17713 	int i, ret, cnt, delta = 0;
17714 
17715 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
17716 		/* Make divide-by-zero exceptions impossible. */
17717 		if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOD | BPF_X) ||
17718 		    insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_DIV | BPF_X) ||
17719 		    insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_MOD | BPF_X) ||
17720 		    insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_DIV | BPF_X)) {
17721 			bool is64 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64;
17722 			bool isdiv = BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_DIV;
17723 			struct bpf_insn *patchlet;
17724 			struct bpf_insn chk_and_div[] = {
17725 				/* [R,W]x div 0 -> 0 */
17726 				BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) |
17727 					     BPF_JNE | BPF_K, insn->src_reg,
17728 					     0, 2, 0),
17729 				BPF_ALU32_REG(BPF_XOR, insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg),
17730 				BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1),
17731 				*insn,
17732 			};
17733 			struct bpf_insn chk_and_mod[] = {
17734 				/* [R,W]x mod 0 -> [R,W]x */
17735 				BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) |
17736 					     BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, insn->src_reg,
17737 					     0, 1 + (is64 ? 0 : 1), 0),
17738 				*insn,
17739 				BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1),
17740 				BPF_MOV32_REG(insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg),
17741 			};
17742 
17743 			patchlet = isdiv ? chk_and_div : chk_and_mod;
17744 			cnt = isdiv ? ARRAY_SIZE(chk_and_div) :
17745 				      ARRAY_SIZE(chk_and_mod) - (is64 ? 2 : 0);
17746 
17747 			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, patchlet, cnt);
17748 			if (!new_prog)
17749 				return -ENOMEM;
17750 
17751 			delta    += cnt - 1;
17752 			env->prog = prog = new_prog;
17753 			insn      = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
17754 			continue;
17755 		}
17756 
17757 		/* Implement LD_ABS and LD_IND with a rewrite, if supported by the program type. */
17758 		if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LD &&
17759 		    (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS ||
17760 		     BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND)) {
17761 			cnt = env->ops->gen_ld_abs(insn, insn_buf);
17762 			if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) {
17763 				verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
17764 				return -EINVAL;
17765 			}
17766 
17767 			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
17768 			if (!new_prog)
17769 				return -ENOMEM;
17770 
17771 			delta    += cnt - 1;
17772 			env->prog = prog = new_prog;
17773 			insn      = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
17774 			continue;
17775 		}
17776 
17777 		/* Rewrite pointer arithmetic to mitigate speculation attacks. */
17778 		if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ADD | BPF_X) ||
17779 		    insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_SUB | BPF_X)) {
17780 			const u8 code_add = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ADD | BPF_X;
17781 			const u8 code_sub = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_SUB | BPF_X;
17782 			struct bpf_insn *patch = &insn_buf[0];
17783 			bool issrc, isneg, isimm;
17784 			u32 off_reg;
17785 
17786 			aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta];
17787 			if (!aux->alu_state ||
17788 			    aux->alu_state == BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER)
17789 				continue;
17790 
17791 			isneg = aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE;
17792 			issrc = (aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_SANITIZE) ==
17793 				BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC;
17794 			isimm = aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_IMMEDIATE;
17795 
17796 			off_reg = issrc ? insn->src_reg : insn->dst_reg;
17797 			if (isimm) {
17798 				*patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, aux->alu_limit);
17799 			} else {
17800 				if (isneg)
17801 					*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1);
17802 				*patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, aux->alu_limit);
17803 				*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg);
17804 				*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg);
17805 				*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_NEG, BPF_REG_AX, 0);
17806 				*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ARSH, BPF_REG_AX, 63);
17807 				*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg);
17808 			}
17809 			if (!issrc)
17810 				*patch++ = BPF_MOV64_REG(insn->dst_reg, insn->src_reg);
17811 			insn->src_reg = BPF_REG_AX;
17812 			if (isneg)
17813 				insn->code = insn->code == code_add ?
17814 					     code_sub : code_add;
17815 			*patch++ = *insn;
17816 			if (issrc && isneg && !isimm)
17817 				*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1);
17818 			cnt = patch - insn_buf;
17819 
17820 			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
17821 			if (!new_prog)
17822 				return -ENOMEM;
17823 
17824 			delta    += cnt - 1;
17825 			env->prog = prog = new_prog;
17826 			insn      = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
17827 			continue;
17828 		}
17829 
17830 		if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL))
17831 			continue;
17832 		if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
17833 			continue;
17834 		if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) {
17835 			ret = fixup_kfunc_call(env, insn, insn_buf, i + delta, &cnt);
17836 			if (ret)
17837 				return ret;
17838 			if (cnt == 0)
17839 				continue;
17840 
17841 			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
17842 			if (!new_prog)
17843 				return -ENOMEM;
17844 
17845 			delta	 += cnt - 1;
17846 			env->prog = prog = new_prog;
17847 			insn	  = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
17848 			continue;
17849 		}
17850 
17851 		if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm)
17852 			prog->dst_needed = 1;
17853 		if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32)
17854 			bpf_user_rnd_init_once();
17855 		if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_override_return)
17856 			prog->kprobe_override = 1;
17857 		if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) {
17858 			/* If we tail call into other programs, we
17859 			 * cannot make any assumptions since they can
17860 			 * be replaced dynamically during runtime in
17861 			 * the program array.
17862 			 */
17863 			prog->cb_access = 1;
17864 			if (!allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(env))
17865 				prog->aux->stack_depth = MAX_BPF_STACK;
17866 			prog->aux->max_pkt_offset = MAX_PACKET_OFF;
17867 
17868 			/* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode to avoid
17869 			 * conditional branch in the interpreter for every normal
17870 			 * call and to prevent accidental JITing by JIT compiler
17871 			 * that doesn't support bpf_tail_call yet
17872 			 */
17873 			insn->imm = 0;
17874 			insn->code = BPF_JMP | BPF_TAIL_CALL;
17875 
17876 			aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta];
17877 			if (env->bpf_capable && !prog->blinding_requested &&
17878 			    prog->jit_requested &&
17879 			    !bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux) &&
17880 			    !bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux) &&
17881 			    !bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux)) {
17882 				struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor desc = {
17883 					.reason = BPF_POKE_REASON_TAIL_CALL,
17884 					.tail_call.map = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state),
17885 					.tail_call.key = bpf_map_key_immediate(aux),
17886 					.insn_idx = i + delta,
17887 				};
17888 
17889 				ret = bpf_jit_add_poke_descriptor(prog, &desc);
17890 				if (ret < 0) {
17891 					verbose(env, "adding tail call poke descriptor failed\n");
17892 					return ret;
17893 				}
17894 
17895 				insn->imm = ret + 1;
17896 				continue;
17897 			}
17898 
17899 			if (!bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux))
17900 				continue;
17901 
17902 			/* instead of changing every JIT dealing with tail_call
17903 			 * emit two extra insns:
17904 			 * if (index >= max_entries) goto out;
17905 			 * index &= array->index_mask;
17906 			 * to avoid out-of-bounds cpu speculation
17907 			 */
17908 			if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux)) {
17909 				verbose(env, "tail_call abusing map_ptr\n");
17910 				return -EINVAL;
17911 			}
17912 
17913 			map_ptr = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state);
17914 			insn_buf[0] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_3,
17915 						  map_ptr->max_entries, 2);
17916 			insn_buf[1] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_3,
17917 						    container_of(map_ptr,
17918 								 struct bpf_array,
17919 								 map)->index_mask);
17920 			insn_buf[2] = *insn;
17921 			cnt = 3;
17922 			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
17923 			if (!new_prog)
17924 				return -ENOMEM;
17925 
17926 			delta    += cnt - 1;
17927 			env->prog = prog = new_prog;
17928 			insn      = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
17929 			continue;
17930 		}
17931 
17932 		if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback) {
17933 			/* The verifier will process callback_fn as many times as necessary
17934 			 * with different maps and the register states prepared by
17935 			 * set_timer_callback_state will be accurate.
17936 			 *
17937 			 * The following use case is valid:
17938 			 *   map1 is shared by prog1, prog2, prog3.
17939 			 *   prog1 calls bpf_timer_init for some map1 elements
17940 			 *   prog2 calls bpf_timer_set_callback for some map1 elements.
17941 			 *     Those that were not bpf_timer_init-ed will return -EINVAL.
17942 			 *   prog3 calls bpf_timer_start for some map1 elements.
17943 			 *     Those that were not both bpf_timer_init-ed and
17944 			 *     bpf_timer_set_callback-ed will return -EINVAL.
17945 			 */
17946 			struct bpf_insn ld_addrs[2] = {
17947 				BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_3, (long)prog->aux),
17948 			};
17949 
17950 			insn_buf[0] = ld_addrs[0];
17951 			insn_buf[1] = ld_addrs[1];
17952 			insn_buf[2] = *insn;
17953 			cnt = 3;
17954 
17955 			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
17956 			if (!new_prog)
17957 				return -ENOMEM;
17958 
17959 			delta    += cnt - 1;
17960 			env->prog = prog = new_prog;
17961 			insn      = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
17962 			goto patch_call_imm;
17963 		}
17964 
17965 		if (is_storage_get_function(insn->imm)) {
17966 			if (!env->prog->aux->sleepable ||
17967 			    env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].storage_get_func_atomic)
17968 				insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_5, (__force __s32)GFP_ATOMIC);
17969 			else
17970 				insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_5, (__force __s32)GFP_KERNEL);
17971 			insn_buf[1] = *insn;
17972 			cnt = 2;
17973 
17974 			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
17975 			if (!new_prog)
17976 				return -ENOMEM;
17977 
17978 			delta += cnt - 1;
17979 			env->prog = prog = new_prog;
17980 			insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
17981 			goto patch_call_imm;
17982 		}
17983 
17984 		/* BPF_EMIT_CALL() assumptions in some of the map_gen_lookup
17985 		 * and other inlining handlers are currently limited to 64 bit
17986 		 * only.
17987 		 */
17988 		if (prog->jit_requested && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 &&
17989 		    (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem ||
17990 		     insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem ||
17991 		     insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem ||
17992 		     insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem   ||
17993 		     insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem    ||
17994 		     insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem   ||
17995 		     insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_redirect_map    ||
17996 		     insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem ||
17997 		     insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem)) {
17998 			aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta];
17999 			if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux))
18000 				goto patch_call_imm;
18001 
18002 			map_ptr = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state);
18003 			ops = map_ptr->ops;
18004 			if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem &&
18005 			    ops->map_gen_lookup) {
18006 				cnt = ops->map_gen_lookup(map_ptr, insn_buf);
18007 				if (cnt == -EOPNOTSUPP)
18008 					goto patch_map_ops_generic;
18009 				if (cnt <= 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) {
18010 					verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
18011 					return -EINVAL;
18012 				}
18013 
18014 				new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta,
18015 							       insn_buf, cnt);
18016 				if (!new_prog)
18017 					return -ENOMEM;
18018 
18019 				delta    += cnt - 1;
18020 				env->prog = prog = new_prog;
18021 				insn      = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
18022 				continue;
18023 			}
18024 
18025 			BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_lookup_elem,
18026 				     (void *(*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key))NULL));
18027 			BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_delete_elem,
18028 				     (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key))NULL));
18029 			BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_update_elem,
18030 				     (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value,
18031 					      u64 flags))NULL));
18032 			BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_push_elem,
18033 				     (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value,
18034 					      u64 flags))NULL));
18035 			BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_pop_elem,
18036 				     (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value))NULL));
18037 			BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_peek_elem,
18038 				     (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value))NULL));
18039 			BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_redirect,
18040 				     (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, u64 index, u64 flags))NULL));
18041 			BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_for_each_callback,
18042 				     (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map,
18043 					      bpf_callback_t callback_fn,
18044 					      void *callback_ctx,
18045 					      u64 flags))NULL));
18046 			BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_lookup_percpu_elem,
18047 				     (void *(*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, u32 cpu))NULL));
18048 
18049 patch_map_ops_generic:
18050 			switch (insn->imm) {
18051 			case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem:
18052 				insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_lookup_elem);
18053 				continue;
18054 			case BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem:
18055 				insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_update_elem);
18056 				continue;
18057 			case BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem:
18058 				insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_delete_elem);
18059 				continue;
18060 			case BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem:
18061 				insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_push_elem);
18062 				continue;
18063 			case BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem:
18064 				insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_pop_elem);
18065 				continue;
18066 			case BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem:
18067 				insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_peek_elem);
18068 				continue;
18069 			case BPF_FUNC_redirect_map:
18070 				insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_redirect);
18071 				continue;
18072 			case BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem:
18073 				insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_for_each_callback);
18074 				continue;
18075 			case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem:
18076 				insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_lookup_percpu_elem);
18077 				continue;
18078 			}
18079 
18080 			goto patch_call_imm;
18081 		}
18082 
18083 		/* Implement bpf_jiffies64 inline. */
18084 		if (prog->jit_requested && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 &&
18085 		    insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_jiffies64) {
18086 			struct bpf_insn ld_jiffies_addr[2] = {
18087 				BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_0,
18088 					     (unsigned long)&jiffies),
18089 			};
18090 
18091 			insn_buf[0] = ld_jiffies_addr[0];
18092 			insn_buf[1] = ld_jiffies_addr[1];
18093 			insn_buf[2] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0,
18094 						  BPF_REG_0, 0);
18095 			cnt = 3;
18096 
18097 			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf,
18098 						       cnt);
18099 			if (!new_prog)
18100 				return -ENOMEM;
18101 
18102 			delta    += cnt - 1;
18103 			env->prog = prog = new_prog;
18104 			insn      = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
18105 			continue;
18106 		}
18107 
18108 		/* Implement bpf_get_func_arg inline. */
18109 		if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING &&
18110 		    insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_arg) {
18111 			/* Load nr_args from ctx - 8 */
18112 			insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -8);
18113 			insn_buf[1] = BPF_JMP32_REG(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_0, 6);
18114 			insn_buf[2] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_2, 3);
18115 			insn_buf[3] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1);
18116 			insn_buf[4] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2, 0);
18117 			insn_buf[5] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, 0);
18118 			insn_buf[6] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0);
18119 			insn_buf[7] = BPF_JMP_A(1);
18120 			insn_buf[8] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, -EINVAL);
18121 			cnt = 9;
18122 
18123 			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
18124 			if (!new_prog)
18125 				return -ENOMEM;
18126 
18127 			delta    += cnt - 1;
18128 			env->prog = prog = new_prog;
18129 			insn      = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
18130 			continue;
18131 		}
18132 
18133 		/* Implement bpf_get_func_ret inline. */
18134 		if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING &&
18135 		    insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_ret) {
18136 			if (eatype == BPF_TRACE_FEXIT ||
18137 			    eatype == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) {
18138 				/* Load nr_args from ctx - 8 */
18139 				insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -8);
18140 				insn_buf[1] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_0, 3);
18141 				insn_buf[2] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1);
18142 				insn_buf[3] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, 0);
18143 				insn_buf[4] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, 0);
18144 				insn_buf[5] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0);
18145 				cnt = 6;
18146 			} else {
18147 				insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, -EOPNOTSUPP);
18148 				cnt = 1;
18149 			}
18150 
18151 			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
18152 			if (!new_prog)
18153 				return -ENOMEM;
18154 
18155 			delta    += cnt - 1;
18156 			env->prog = prog = new_prog;
18157 			insn      = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
18158 			continue;
18159 		}
18160 
18161 		/* Implement get_func_arg_cnt inline. */
18162 		if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING &&
18163 		    insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_arg_cnt) {
18164 			/* Load nr_args from ctx - 8 */
18165 			insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -8);
18166 
18167 			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, 1);
18168 			if (!new_prog)
18169 				return -ENOMEM;
18170 
18171 			env->prog = prog = new_prog;
18172 			insn      = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
18173 			continue;
18174 		}
18175 
18176 		/* Implement bpf_get_func_ip inline. */
18177 		if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING &&
18178 		    insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_ip) {
18179 			/* Load IP address from ctx - 16 */
18180 			insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -16);
18181 
18182 			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, 1);
18183 			if (!new_prog)
18184 				return -ENOMEM;
18185 
18186 			env->prog = prog = new_prog;
18187 			insn      = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
18188 			continue;
18189 		}
18190 
18191 patch_call_imm:
18192 		fn = env->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm, env->prog);
18193 		/* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed
18194 		 * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions
18195 		 */
18196 		if (!fn->func) {
18197 			verbose(env,
18198 				"kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n",
18199 				func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm);
18200 			return -EFAULT;
18201 		}
18202 		insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base;
18203 	}
18204 
18205 	/* Since poke tab is now finalized, publish aux to tracker. */
18206 	for (i = 0; i < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; i++) {
18207 		map_ptr = prog->aux->poke_tab[i].tail_call.map;
18208 		if (!map_ptr->ops->map_poke_track ||
18209 		    !map_ptr->ops->map_poke_untrack ||
18210 		    !map_ptr->ops->map_poke_run) {
18211 			verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
18212 			return -EINVAL;
18213 		}
18214 
18215 		ret = map_ptr->ops->map_poke_track(map_ptr, prog->aux);
18216 		if (ret < 0) {
18217 			verbose(env, "tracking tail call prog failed\n");
18218 			return ret;
18219 		}
18220 	}
18221 
18222 	sort_kfunc_descs_by_imm_off(env->prog);
18223 
18224 	return 0;
18225 }
18226 
18227 static struct bpf_prog *inline_bpf_loop(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
18228 					int position,
18229 					s32 stack_base,
18230 					u32 callback_subprogno,
18231 					u32 *cnt)
18232 {
18233 	s32 r6_offset = stack_base + 0 * BPF_REG_SIZE;
18234 	s32 r7_offset = stack_base + 1 * BPF_REG_SIZE;
18235 	s32 r8_offset = stack_base + 2 * BPF_REG_SIZE;
18236 	int reg_loop_max = BPF_REG_6;
18237 	int reg_loop_cnt = BPF_REG_7;
18238 	int reg_loop_ctx = BPF_REG_8;
18239 
18240 	struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
18241 	u32 callback_start;
18242 	u32 call_insn_offset;
18243 	s32 callback_offset;
18244 
18245 	/* This represents an inlined version of bpf_iter.c:bpf_loop,
18246 	 * be careful to modify this code in sync.
18247 	 */
18248 	struct bpf_insn insn_buf[] = {
18249 		/* Return error and jump to the end of the patch if
18250 		 * expected number of iterations is too big.
18251 		 */
18252 		BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JLE, BPF_REG_1, BPF_MAX_LOOPS, 2),
18253 		BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_0, -E2BIG),
18254 		BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 16),
18255 		/* spill R6, R7, R8 to use these as loop vars */
18256 		BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_6, r6_offset),
18257 		BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_7, r7_offset),
18258 		BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_8, r8_offset),
18259 		/* initialize loop vars */
18260 		BPF_MOV64_REG(reg_loop_max, BPF_REG_1),
18261 		BPF_MOV32_IMM(reg_loop_cnt, 0),
18262 		BPF_MOV64_REG(reg_loop_ctx, BPF_REG_3),
18263 		/* loop header,
18264 		 * if reg_loop_cnt >= reg_loop_max skip the loop body
18265 		 */
18266 		BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGE, reg_loop_cnt, reg_loop_max, 5),
18267 		/* callback call,
18268 		 * correct callback offset would be set after patching
18269 		 */
18270 		BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, reg_loop_cnt),
18271 		BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, reg_loop_ctx),
18272 		BPF_CALL_REL(0),
18273 		/* increment loop counter */
18274 		BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, reg_loop_cnt, 1),
18275 		/* jump to loop header if callback returned 0 */
18276 		BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, -6),
18277 		/* return value of bpf_loop,
18278 		 * set R0 to the number of iterations
18279 		 */
18280 		BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, reg_loop_cnt),
18281 		/* restore original values of R6, R7, R8 */
18282 		BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_10, r6_offset),
18283 		BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_10, r7_offset),
18284 		BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_10, r8_offset),
18285 	};
18286 
18287 	*cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf);
18288 	new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, position, insn_buf, *cnt);
18289 	if (!new_prog)
18290 		return new_prog;
18291 
18292 	/* callback start is known only after patching */
18293 	callback_start = env->subprog_info[callback_subprogno].start;
18294 	/* Note: insn_buf[12] is an offset of BPF_CALL_REL instruction */
18295 	call_insn_offset = position + 12;
18296 	callback_offset = callback_start - call_insn_offset - 1;
18297 	new_prog->insnsi[call_insn_offset].imm = callback_offset;
18298 
18299 	return new_prog;
18300 }
18301 
18302 static bool is_bpf_loop_call(struct bpf_insn *insn)
18303 {
18304 	return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) &&
18305 		insn->src_reg == 0 &&
18306 		insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_loop;
18307 }
18308 
18309 /* For all sub-programs in the program (including main) check
18310  * insn_aux_data to see if there are bpf_loop calls that require
18311  * inlining. If such calls are found the calls are replaced with a
18312  * sequence of instructions produced by `inline_bpf_loop` function and
18313  * subprog stack_depth is increased by the size of 3 registers.
18314  * This stack space is used to spill values of the R6, R7, R8.  These
18315  * registers are used to store the loop bound, counter and context
18316  * variables.
18317  */
18318 static int optimize_bpf_loop(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
18319 {
18320 	struct bpf_subprog_info *subprogs = env->subprog_info;
18321 	int i, cur_subprog = 0, cnt, delta = 0;
18322 	struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
18323 	int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
18324 	u16 stack_depth = subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth;
18325 	u16 stack_depth_roundup = round_up(stack_depth, 8) - stack_depth;
18326 	u16 stack_depth_extra = 0;
18327 
18328 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
18329 		struct bpf_loop_inline_state *inline_state =
18330 			&env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].loop_inline_state;
18331 
18332 		if (is_bpf_loop_call(insn) && inline_state->fit_for_inline) {
18333 			struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
18334 
18335 			stack_depth_extra = BPF_REG_SIZE * 3 + stack_depth_roundup;
18336 			new_prog = inline_bpf_loop(env,
18337 						   i + delta,
18338 						   -(stack_depth + stack_depth_extra),
18339 						   inline_state->callback_subprogno,
18340 						   &cnt);
18341 			if (!new_prog)
18342 				return -ENOMEM;
18343 
18344 			delta     += cnt - 1;
18345 			env->prog  = new_prog;
18346 			insn       = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
18347 		}
18348 
18349 		if (subprogs[cur_subprog + 1].start == i + delta + 1) {
18350 			subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth += stack_depth_extra;
18351 			cur_subprog++;
18352 			stack_depth = subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth;
18353 			stack_depth_roundup = round_up(stack_depth, 8) - stack_depth;
18354 			stack_depth_extra = 0;
18355 		}
18356 	}
18357 
18358 	env->prog->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[0].stack_depth;
18359 
18360 	return 0;
18361 }
18362 
18363 static void free_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
18364 {
18365 	struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl, *sln;
18366 	int i;
18367 
18368 	sl = env->free_list;
18369 	while (sl) {
18370 		sln = sl->next;
18371 		free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false);
18372 		kfree(sl);
18373 		sl = sln;
18374 	}
18375 	env->free_list = NULL;
18376 
18377 	if (!env->explored_states)
18378 		return;
18379 
18380 	for (i = 0; i < state_htab_size(env); i++) {
18381 		sl = env->explored_states[i];
18382 
18383 		while (sl) {
18384 			sln = sl->next;
18385 			free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false);
18386 			kfree(sl);
18387 			sl = sln;
18388 		}
18389 		env->explored_states[i] = NULL;
18390 	}
18391 }
18392 
18393 static int do_check_common(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog)
18394 {
18395 	bool pop_log = !(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2);
18396 	struct bpf_verifier_state *state;
18397 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs;
18398 	int ret, i;
18399 
18400 	env->prev_linfo = NULL;
18401 	env->pass_cnt++;
18402 
18403 	state = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state), GFP_KERNEL);
18404 	if (!state)
18405 		return -ENOMEM;
18406 	state->curframe = 0;
18407 	state->speculative = false;
18408 	state->branches = 1;
18409 	state->frame[0] = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_func_state), GFP_KERNEL);
18410 	if (!state->frame[0]) {
18411 		kfree(state);
18412 		return -ENOMEM;
18413 	}
18414 	env->cur_state = state;
18415 	init_func_state(env, state->frame[0],
18416 			BPF_MAIN_FUNC /* callsite */,
18417 			0 /* frameno */,
18418 			subprog);
18419 	state->first_insn_idx = env->subprog_info[subprog].start;
18420 	state->last_insn_idx = -1;
18421 
18422 	regs = state->frame[state->curframe]->regs;
18423 	if (subprog || env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) {
18424 		ret = btf_prepare_func_args(env, subprog, regs);
18425 		if (ret)
18426 			goto out;
18427 		for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) {
18428 			if (regs[i].type == PTR_TO_CTX)
18429 				mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, i);
18430 			else if (regs[i].type == SCALAR_VALUE)
18431 				mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, i);
18432 			else if (base_type(regs[i].type) == PTR_TO_MEM) {
18433 				const u32 mem_size = regs[i].mem_size;
18434 
18435 				mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, i);
18436 				regs[i].mem_size = mem_size;
18437 				regs[i].id = ++env->id_gen;
18438 			}
18439 		}
18440 	} else {
18441 		/* 1st arg to a function */
18442 		regs[BPF_REG_1].type = PTR_TO_CTX;
18443 		mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_1);
18444 		ret = btf_check_subprog_arg_match(env, subprog, regs);
18445 		if (ret == -EFAULT)
18446 			/* unlikely verifier bug. abort.
18447 			 * ret == 0 and ret < 0 are sadly acceptable for
18448 			 * main() function due to backward compatibility.
18449 			 * Like socket filter program may be written as:
18450 			 * int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx)
18451 			 * and never dereference that ctx in the program.
18452 			 * 'struct pt_regs' is a type mismatch for socket
18453 			 * filter that should be using 'struct __sk_buff'.
18454 			 */
18455 			goto out;
18456 	}
18457 
18458 	ret = do_check(env);
18459 out:
18460 	/* check for NULL is necessary, since cur_state can be freed inside
18461 	 * do_check() under memory pressure.
18462 	 */
18463 	if (env->cur_state) {
18464 		free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true);
18465 		env->cur_state = NULL;
18466 	}
18467 	while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false));
18468 	if (!ret && pop_log)
18469 		bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, 0);
18470 	free_states(env);
18471 	return ret;
18472 }
18473 
18474 /* Verify all global functions in a BPF program one by one based on their BTF.
18475  * All global functions must pass verification. Otherwise the whole program is rejected.
18476  * Consider:
18477  * int bar(int);
18478  * int foo(int f)
18479  * {
18480  *    return bar(f);
18481  * }
18482  * int bar(int b)
18483  * {
18484  *    ...
18485  * }
18486  * foo() will be verified first for R1=any_scalar_value. During verification it
18487  * will be assumed that bar() already verified successfully and call to bar()
18488  * from foo() will be checked for type match only. Later bar() will be verified
18489  * independently to check that it's safe for R1=any_scalar_value.
18490  */
18491 static int do_check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
18492 {
18493 	struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux;
18494 	int i, ret;
18495 
18496 	if (!aux->func_info)
18497 		return 0;
18498 
18499 	for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
18500 		if (aux->func_info_aux[i].linkage != BTF_FUNC_GLOBAL)
18501 			continue;
18502 		env->insn_idx = env->subprog_info[i].start;
18503 		WARN_ON_ONCE(env->insn_idx == 0);
18504 		ret = do_check_common(env, i);
18505 		if (ret) {
18506 			return ret;
18507 		} else if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) {
18508 			verbose(env,
18509 				"Func#%d is safe for any args that match its prototype\n",
18510 				i);
18511 		}
18512 	}
18513 	return 0;
18514 }
18515 
18516 static int do_check_main(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
18517 {
18518 	int ret;
18519 
18520 	env->insn_idx = 0;
18521 	ret = do_check_common(env, 0);
18522 	if (!ret)
18523 		env->prog->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[0].stack_depth;
18524 	return ret;
18525 }
18526 
18527 
18528 static void print_verification_stats(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
18529 {
18530 	int i;
18531 
18532 	if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_STATS) {
18533 		verbose(env, "verification time %lld usec\n",
18534 			div_u64(env->verification_time, 1000));
18535 		verbose(env, "stack depth ");
18536 		for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
18537 			u32 depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth;
18538 
18539 			verbose(env, "%d", depth);
18540 			if (i + 1 < env->subprog_cnt)
18541 				verbose(env, "+");
18542 		}
18543 		verbose(env, "\n");
18544 	}
18545 	verbose(env, "processed %d insns (limit %d) max_states_per_insn %d "
18546 		"total_states %d peak_states %d mark_read %d\n",
18547 		env->insn_processed, BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS,
18548 		env->max_states_per_insn, env->total_states,
18549 		env->peak_states, env->longest_mark_read_walk);
18550 }
18551 
18552 static int check_struct_ops_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
18553 {
18554 	const struct btf_type *t, *func_proto;
18555 	const struct bpf_struct_ops *st_ops;
18556 	const struct btf_member *member;
18557 	struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
18558 	u32 btf_id, member_idx;
18559 	const char *mname;
18560 
18561 	if (!prog->gpl_compatible) {
18562 		verbose(env, "struct ops programs must have a GPL compatible license\n");
18563 		return -EINVAL;
18564 	}
18565 
18566 	btf_id = prog->aux->attach_btf_id;
18567 	st_ops = bpf_struct_ops_find(btf_id);
18568 	if (!st_ops) {
18569 		verbose(env, "attach_btf_id %u is not a supported struct\n",
18570 			btf_id);
18571 		return -ENOTSUPP;
18572 	}
18573 
18574 	t = st_ops->type;
18575 	member_idx = prog->expected_attach_type;
18576 	if (member_idx >= btf_type_vlen(t)) {
18577 		verbose(env, "attach to invalid member idx %u of struct %s\n",
18578 			member_idx, st_ops->name);
18579 		return -EINVAL;
18580 	}
18581 
18582 	member = &btf_type_member(t)[member_idx];
18583 	mname = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, member->name_off);
18584 	func_proto = btf_type_resolve_func_ptr(btf_vmlinux, member->type,
18585 					       NULL);
18586 	if (!func_proto) {
18587 		verbose(env, "attach to invalid member %s(@idx %u) of struct %s\n",
18588 			mname, member_idx, st_ops->name);
18589 		return -EINVAL;
18590 	}
18591 
18592 	if (st_ops->check_member) {
18593 		int err = st_ops->check_member(t, member, prog);
18594 
18595 		if (err) {
18596 			verbose(env, "attach to unsupported member %s of struct %s\n",
18597 				mname, st_ops->name);
18598 			return err;
18599 		}
18600 	}
18601 
18602 	prog->aux->attach_func_proto = func_proto;
18603 	prog->aux->attach_func_name = mname;
18604 	env->ops = st_ops->verifier_ops;
18605 
18606 	return 0;
18607 }
18608 #define SECURITY_PREFIX "security_"
18609 
18610 static int check_attach_modify_return(unsigned long addr, const char *func_name)
18611 {
18612 	if (within_error_injection_list(addr) ||
18613 	    !strncmp(SECURITY_PREFIX, func_name, sizeof(SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1))
18614 		return 0;
18615 
18616 	return -EINVAL;
18617 }
18618 
18619 /* list of non-sleepable functions that are otherwise on
18620  * ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION list
18621  */
18622 BTF_SET_START(btf_non_sleepable_error_inject)
18623 /* Three functions below can be called from sleepable and non-sleepable context.
18624  * Assume non-sleepable from bpf safety point of view.
18625  */
18626 BTF_ID(func, __filemap_add_folio)
18627 BTF_ID(func, should_fail_alloc_page)
18628 BTF_ID(func, should_failslab)
18629 BTF_SET_END(btf_non_sleepable_error_inject)
18630 
18631 static int check_non_sleepable_error_inject(u32 btf_id)
18632 {
18633 	return btf_id_set_contains(&btf_non_sleepable_error_inject, btf_id);
18634 }
18635 
18636 int bpf_check_attach_target(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
18637 			    const struct bpf_prog *prog,
18638 			    const struct bpf_prog *tgt_prog,
18639 			    u32 btf_id,
18640 			    struct bpf_attach_target_info *tgt_info)
18641 {
18642 	bool prog_extension = prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT;
18643 	const char prefix[] = "btf_trace_";
18644 	int ret = 0, subprog = -1, i;
18645 	const struct btf_type *t;
18646 	bool conservative = true;
18647 	const char *tname;
18648 	struct btf *btf;
18649 	long addr = 0;
18650 	struct module *mod = NULL;
18651 
18652 	if (!btf_id) {
18653 		bpf_log(log, "Tracing programs must provide btf_id\n");
18654 		return -EINVAL;
18655 	}
18656 	btf = tgt_prog ? tgt_prog->aux->btf : prog->aux->attach_btf;
18657 	if (!btf) {
18658 		bpf_log(log,
18659 			"FENTRY/FEXIT program can only be attached to another program annotated with BTF\n");
18660 		return -EINVAL;
18661 	}
18662 	t = btf_type_by_id(btf, btf_id);
18663 	if (!t) {
18664 		bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is invalid\n", btf_id);
18665 		return -EINVAL;
18666 	}
18667 	tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off);
18668 	if (!tname) {
18669 		bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u doesn't have a name\n", btf_id);
18670 		return -EINVAL;
18671 	}
18672 	if (tgt_prog) {
18673 		struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = tgt_prog->aux;
18674 
18675 		if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(prog->aux) &&
18676 		    !bpf_prog_dev_bound_match(prog, tgt_prog)) {
18677 			bpf_log(log, "Target program bound device mismatch");
18678 			return -EINVAL;
18679 		}
18680 
18681 		for (i = 0; i < aux->func_info_cnt; i++)
18682 			if (aux->func_info[i].type_id == btf_id) {
18683 				subprog = i;
18684 				break;
18685 			}
18686 		if (subprog == -1) {
18687 			bpf_log(log, "Subprog %s doesn't exist\n", tname);
18688 			return -EINVAL;
18689 		}
18690 		conservative = aux->func_info_aux[subprog].unreliable;
18691 		if (prog_extension) {
18692 			if (conservative) {
18693 				bpf_log(log,
18694 					"Cannot replace static functions\n");
18695 				return -EINVAL;
18696 			}
18697 			if (!prog->jit_requested) {
18698 				bpf_log(log,
18699 					"Extension programs should be JITed\n");
18700 				return -EINVAL;
18701 			}
18702 		}
18703 		if (!tgt_prog->jited) {
18704 			bpf_log(log, "Can attach to only JITed progs\n");
18705 			return -EINVAL;
18706 		}
18707 		if (tgt_prog->type == prog->type) {
18708 			/* Cannot fentry/fexit another fentry/fexit program.
18709 			 * Cannot attach program extension to another extension.
18710 			 * It's ok to attach fentry/fexit to extension program.
18711 			 */
18712 			bpf_log(log, "Cannot recursively attach\n");
18713 			return -EINVAL;
18714 		}
18715 		if (tgt_prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING &&
18716 		    prog_extension &&
18717 		    (tgt_prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FENTRY ||
18718 		     tgt_prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FEXIT)) {
18719 			/* Program extensions can extend all program types
18720 			 * except fentry/fexit. The reason is the following.
18721 			 * The fentry/fexit programs are used for performance
18722 			 * analysis, stats and can be attached to any program
18723 			 * type except themselves. When extension program is
18724 			 * replacing XDP function it is necessary to allow
18725 			 * performance analysis of all functions. Both original
18726 			 * XDP program and its program extension. Hence
18727 			 * attaching fentry/fexit to BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT is
18728 			 * allowed. If extending of fentry/fexit was allowed it
18729 			 * would be possible to create long call chain
18730 			 * fentry->extension->fentry->extension beyond
18731 			 * reasonable stack size. Hence extending fentry is not
18732 			 * allowed.
18733 			 */
18734 			bpf_log(log, "Cannot extend fentry/fexit\n");
18735 			return -EINVAL;
18736 		}
18737 	} else {
18738 		if (prog_extension) {
18739 			bpf_log(log, "Cannot replace kernel functions\n");
18740 			return -EINVAL;
18741 		}
18742 	}
18743 
18744 	switch (prog->expected_attach_type) {
18745 	case BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP:
18746 		if (tgt_prog) {
18747 			bpf_log(log,
18748 				"Only FENTRY/FEXIT progs are attachable to another BPF prog\n");
18749 			return -EINVAL;
18750 		}
18751 		if (!btf_type_is_typedef(t)) {
18752 			bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a typedef\n",
18753 				btf_id);
18754 			return -EINVAL;
18755 		}
18756 		if (strncmp(prefix, tname, sizeof(prefix) - 1)) {
18757 			bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u points to wrong type name %s\n",
18758 				btf_id, tname);
18759 			return -EINVAL;
18760 		}
18761 		tname += sizeof(prefix) - 1;
18762 		t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type);
18763 		if (!btf_type_is_ptr(t))
18764 			/* should never happen in valid vmlinux build */
18765 			return -EINVAL;
18766 		t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type);
18767 		if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t))
18768 			/* should never happen in valid vmlinux build */
18769 			return -EINVAL;
18770 
18771 		break;
18772 	case BPF_TRACE_ITER:
18773 		if (!btf_type_is_func(t)) {
18774 			bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a function\n",
18775 				btf_id);
18776 			return -EINVAL;
18777 		}
18778 		t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type);
18779 		if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t))
18780 			return -EINVAL;
18781 		ret = btf_distill_func_proto(log, btf, t, tname, &tgt_info->fmodel);
18782 		if (ret)
18783 			return ret;
18784 		break;
18785 	default:
18786 		if (!prog_extension)
18787 			return -EINVAL;
18788 		fallthrough;
18789 	case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN:
18790 	case BPF_LSM_MAC:
18791 	case BPF_LSM_CGROUP:
18792 	case BPF_TRACE_FENTRY:
18793 	case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT:
18794 		if (!btf_type_is_func(t)) {
18795 			bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a function\n",
18796 				btf_id);
18797 			return -EINVAL;
18798 		}
18799 		if (prog_extension &&
18800 		    btf_check_type_match(log, prog, btf, t))
18801 			return -EINVAL;
18802 		t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type);
18803 		if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t))
18804 			return -EINVAL;
18805 
18806 		if ((prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type || prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type) &&
18807 		    (!tgt_prog || prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type != tgt_prog->type ||
18808 		     prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type != tgt_prog->expected_attach_type))
18809 			return -EINVAL;
18810 
18811 		if (tgt_prog && conservative)
18812 			t = NULL;
18813 
18814 		ret = btf_distill_func_proto(log, btf, t, tname, &tgt_info->fmodel);
18815 		if (ret < 0)
18816 			return ret;
18817 
18818 		if (tgt_prog) {
18819 			if (subprog == 0)
18820 				addr = (long) tgt_prog->bpf_func;
18821 			else
18822 				addr = (long) tgt_prog->aux->func[subprog]->bpf_func;
18823 		} else {
18824 			if (btf_is_module(btf)) {
18825 				mod = btf_try_get_module(btf);
18826 				if (mod)
18827 					addr = find_kallsyms_symbol_value(mod, tname);
18828 				else
18829 					addr = 0;
18830 			} else {
18831 				addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(tname);
18832 			}
18833 			if (!addr) {
18834 				module_put(mod);
18835 				bpf_log(log,
18836 					"The address of function %s cannot be found\n",
18837 					tname);
18838 				return -ENOENT;
18839 			}
18840 		}
18841 
18842 		if (prog->aux->sleepable) {
18843 			ret = -EINVAL;
18844 			switch (prog->type) {
18845 			case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING:
18846 
18847 				/* fentry/fexit/fmod_ret progs can be sleepable if they are
18848 				 * attached to ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION and are not in denylist.
18849 				 */
18850 				if (!check_non_sleepable_error_inject(btf_id) &&
18851 				    within_error_injection_list(addr))
18852 					ret = 0;
18853 				/* fentry/fexit/fmod_ret progs can also be sleepable if they are
18854 				 * in the fmodret id set with the KF_SLEEPABLE flag.
18855 				 */
18856 				else {
18857 					u32 *flags = btf_kfunc_is_modify_return(btf, btf_id);
18858 
18859 					if (flags && (*flags & KF_SLEEPABLE))
18860 						ret = 0;
18861 				}
18862 				break;
18863 			case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM:
18864 				/* LSM progs check that they are attached to bpf_lsm_*() funcs.
18865 				 * Only some of them are sleepable.
18866 				 */
18867 				if (bpf_lsm_is_sleepable_hook(btf_id))
18868 					ret = 0;
18869 				break;
18870 			default:
18871 				break;
18872 			}
18873 			if (ret) {
18874 				module_put(mod);
18875 				bpf_log(log, "%s is not sleepable\n", tname);
18876 				return ret;
18877 			}
18878 		} else if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) {
18879 			if (tgt_prog) {
18880 				module_put(mod);
18881 				bpf_log(log, "can't modify return codes of BPF programs\n");
18882 				return -EINVAL;
18883 			}
18884 			ret = -EINVAL;
18885 			if (btf_kfunc_is_modify_return(btf, btf_id) ||
18886 			    !check_attach_modify_return(addr, tname))
18887 				ret = 0;
18888 			if (ret) {
18889 				module_put(mod);
18890 				bpf_log(log, "%s() is not modifiable\n", tname);
18891 				return ret;
18892 			}
18893 		}
18894 
18895 		break;
18896 	}
18897 	tgt_info->tgt_addr = addr;
18898 	tgt_info->tgt_name = tname;
18899 	tgt_info->tgt_type = t;
18900 	tgt_info->tgt_mod = mod;
18901 	return 0;
18902 }
18903 
18904 BTF_SET_START(btf_id_deny)
18905 BTF_ID_UNUSED
18906 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
18907 BTF_ID(func, migrate_disable)
18908 BTF_ID(func, migrate_enable)
18909 #endif
18910 #if !defined CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU && !defined CONFIG_TINY_RCU
18911 BTF_ID(func, rcu_read_unlock_strict)
18912 #endif
18913 #if defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT) || defined(CONFIG_TRACE_PREEMPT_TOGGLE)
18914 BTF_ID(func, preempt_count_add)
18915 BTF_ID(func, preempt_count_sub)
18916 #endif
18917 #ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU
18918 BTF_ID(func, __rcu_read_lock)
18919 BTF_ID(func, __rcu_read_unlock)
18920 #endif
18921 BTF_SET_END(btf_id_deny)
18922 
18923 static bool can_be_sleepable(struct bpf_prog *prog)
18924 {
18925 	if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING) {
18926 		switch (prog->expected_attach_type) {
18927 		case BPF_TRACE_FENTRY:
18928 		case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT:
18929 		case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN:
18930 		case BPF_TRACE_ITER:
18931 			return true;
18932 		default:
18933 			return false;
18934 		}
18935 	}
18936 	return prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM ||
18937 	       prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE /* only for uprobes */ ||
18938 	       prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS;
18939 }
18940 
18941 static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
18942 {
18943 	struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
18944 	struct bpf_prog *tgt_prog = prog->aux->dst_prog;
18945 	struct bpf_attach_target_info tgt_info = {};
18946 	u32 btf_id = prog->aux->attach_btf_id;
18947 	struct bpf_trampoline *tr;
18948 	int ret;
18949 	u64 key;
18950 
18951 	if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_SYSCALL) {
18952 		if (prog->aux->sleepable)
18953 			/* attach_btf_id checked to be zero already */
18954 			return 0;
18955 		verbose(env, "Syscall programs can only be sleepable\n");
18956 		return -EINVAL;
18957 	}
18958 
18959 	if (prog->aux->sleepable && !can_be_sleepable(prog)) {
18960 		verbose(env, "Only fentry/fexit/fmod_ret, lsm, iter, uprobe, and struct_ops programs can be sleepable\n");
18961 		return -EINVAL;
18962 	}
18963 
18964 	if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS)
18965 		return check_struct_ops_btf_id(env);
18966 
18967 	if (prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING &&
18968 	    prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM &&
18969 	    prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT)
18970 		return 0;
18971 
18972 	ret = bpf_check_attach_target(&env->log, prog, tgt_prog, btf_id, &tgt_info);
18973 	if (ret)
18974 		return ret;
18975 
18976 	if (tgt_prog && prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) {
18977 		/* to make freplace equivalent to their targets, they need to
18978 		 * inherit env->ops and expected_attach_type for the rest of the
18979 		 * verification
18980 		 */
18981 		env->ops = bpf_verifier_ops[tgt_prog->type];
18982 		prog->expected_attach_type = tgt_prog->expected_attach_type;
18983 	}
18984 
18985 	/* store info about the attachment target that will be used later */
18986 	prog->aux->attach_func_proto = tgt_info.tgt_type;
18987 	prog->aux->attach_func_name = tgt_info.tgt_name;
18988 	prog->aux->mod = tgt_info.tgt_mod;
18989 
18990 	if (tgt_prog) {
18991 		prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type = tgt_prog->type;
18992 		prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type = tgt_prog->expected_attach_type;
18993 	}
18994 
18995 	if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP) {
18996 		prog->aux->attach_btf_trace = true;
18997 		return 0;
18998 	} else if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_ITER) {
18999 		if (!bpf_iter_prog_supported(prog))
19000 			return -EINVAL;
19001 		return 0;
19002 	}
19003 
19004 	if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) {
19005 		ret = bpf_lsm_verify_prog(&env->log, prog);
19006 		if (ret < 0)
19007 			return ret;
19008 	} else if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING &&
19009 		   btf_id_set_contains(&btf_id_deny, btf_id)) {
19010 		return -EINVAL;
19011 	}
19012 
19013 	key = bpf_trampoline_compute_key(tgt_prog, prog->aux->attach_btf, btf_id);
19014 	tr = bpf_trampoline_get(key, &tgt_info);
19015 	if (!tr)
19016 		return -ENOMEM;
19017 
19018 	prog->aux->dst_trampoline = tr;
19019 	return 0;
19020 }
19021 
19022 struct btf *bpf_get_btf_vmlinux(void)
19023 {
19024 	if (!btf_vmlinux && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF)) {
19025 		mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
19026 		if (!btf_vmlinux)
19027 			btf_vmlinux = btf_parse_vmlinux();
19028 		mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
19029 	}
19030 	return btf_vmlinux;
19031 }
19032 
19033 int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr, __u32 uattr_size)
19034 {
19035 	u64 start_time = ktime_get_ns();
19036 	struct bpf_verifier_env *env;
19037 	int i, len, ret = -EINVAL, err;
19038 	u32 log_true_size;
19039 	bool is_priv;
19040 
19041 	/* no program is valid */
19042 	if (ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_verifier_ops) == 0)
19043 		return -EINVAL;
19044 
19045 	/* 'struct bpf_verifier_env' can be global, but since it's not small,
19046 	 * allocate/free it every time bpf_check() is called
19047 	 */
19048 	env = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_env), GFP_KERNEL);
19049 	if (!env)
19050 		return -ENOMEM;
19051 
19052 	env->bt.env = env;
19053 
19054 	len = (*prog)->len;
19055 	env->insn_aux_data =
19056 		vzalloc(array_size(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data), len));
19057 	ret = -ENOMEM;
19058 	if (!env->insn_aux_data)
19059 		goto err_free_env;
19060 	for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
19061 		env->insn_aux_data[i].orig_idx = i;
19062 	env->prog = *prog;
19063 	env->ops = bpf_verifier_ops[env->prog->type];
19064 	env->fd_array = make_bpfptr(attr->fd_array, uattr.is_kernel);
19065 	is_priv = bpf_capable();
19066 
19067 	bpf_get_btf_vmlinux();
19068 
19069 	/* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */
19070 	if (!is_priv)
19071 		mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
19072 
19073 	/* user could have requested verbose verifier output
19074 	 * and supplied buffer to store the verification trace
19075 	 */
19076 	ret = bpf_vlog_init(&env->log, attr->log_level,
19077 			    (char __user *) (unsigned long) attr->log_buf,
19078 			    attr->log_size);
19079 	if (ret)
19080 		goto err_unlock;
19081 
19082 	mark_verifier_state_clean(env);
19083 
19084 	if (IS_ERR(btf_vmlinux)) {
19085 		/* Either gcc or pahole or kernel are broken. */
19086 		verbose(env, "in-kernel BTF is malformed\n");
19087 		ret = PTR_ERR(btf_vmlinux);
19088 		goto skip_full_check;
19089 	}
19090 
19091 	env->strict_alignment = !!(attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT);
19092 	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS))
19093 		env->strict_alignment = true;
19094 	if (attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_ANY_ALIGNMENT)
19095 		env->strict_alignment = false;
19096 
19097 	env->allow_ptr_leaks = bpf_allow_ptr_leaks();
19098 	env->allow_uninit_stack = bpf_allow_uninit_stack();
19099 	env->bypass_spec_v1 = bpf_bypass_spec_v1();
19100 	env->bypass_spec_v4 = bpf_bypass_spec_v4();
19101 	env->bpf_capable = bpf_capable();
19102 
19103 	if (is_priv)
19104 		env->test_state_freq = attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ;
19105 
19106 	env->explored_states = kvcalloc(state_htab_size(env),
19107 				       sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list *),
19108 				       GFP_USER);
19109 	ret = -ENOMEM;
19110 	if (!env->explored_states)
19111 		goto skip_full_check;
19112 
19113 	ret = add_subprog_and_kfunc(env);
19114 	if (ret < 0)
19115 		goto skip_full_check;
19116 
19117 	ret = check_subprogs(env);
19118 	if (ret < 0)
19119 		goto skip_full_check;
19120 
19121 	ret = check_btf_info(env, attr, uattr);
19122 	if (ret < 0)
19123 		goto skip_full_check;
19124 
19125 	ret = check_attach_btf_id(env);
19126 	if (ret)
19127 		goto skip_full_check;
19128 
19129 	ret = resolve_pseudo_ldimm64(env);
19130 	if (ret < 0)
19131 		goto skip_full_check;
19132 
19133 	if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) {
19134 		ret = bpf_prog_offload_verifier_prep(env->prog);
19135 		if (ret)
19136 			goto skip_full_check;
19137 	}
19138 
19139 	ret = check_cfg(env);
19140 	if (ret < 0)
19141 		goto skip_full_check;
19142 
19143 	ret = do_check_subprogs(env);
19144 	ret = ret ?: do_check_main(env);
19145 
19146 	if (ret == 0 && bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux))
19147 		ret = bpf_prog_offload_finalize(env);
19148 
19149 skip_full_check:
19150 	kvfree(env->explored_states);
19151 
19152 	if (ret == 0)
19153 		ret = check_max_stack_depth(env);
19154 
19155 	/* instruction rewrites happen after this point */
19156 	if (ret == 0)
19157 		ret = optimize_bpf_loop(env);
19158 
19159 	if (is_priv) {
19160 		if (ret == 0)
19161 			opt_hard_wire_dead_code_branches(env);
19162 		if (ret == 0)
19163 			ret = opt_remove_dead_code(env);
19164 		if (ret == 0)
19165 			ret = opt_remove_nops(env);
19166 	} else {
19167 		if (ret == 0)
19168 			sanitize_dead_code(env);
19169 	}
19170 
19171 	if (ret == 0)
19172 		/* program is valid, convert *(u32*)(ctx + off) accesses */
19173 		ret = convert_ctx_accesses(env);
19174 
19175 	if (ret == 0)
19176 		ret = do_misc_fixups(env);
19177 
19178 	/* do 32-bit optimization after insn patching has done so those patched
19179 	 * insns could be handled correctly.
19180 	 */
19181 	if (ret == 0 && !bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) {
19182 		ret = opt_subreg_zext_lo32_rnd_hi32(env, attr);
19183 		env->prog->aux->verifier_zext = bpf_jit_needs_zext() ? !ret
19184 								     : false;
19185 	}
19186 
19187 	if (ret == 0)
19188 		ret = fixup_call_args(env);
19189 
19190 	env->verification_time = ktime_get_ns() - start_time;
19191 	print_verification_stats(env);
19192 	env->prog->aux->verified_insns = env->insn_processed;
19193 
19194 	/* preserve original error even if log finalization is successful */
19195 	err = bpf_vlog_finalize(&env->log, &log_true_size);
19196 	if (err)
19197 		ret = err;
19198 
19199 	if (uattr_size >= offsetofend(union bpf_attr, log_true_size) &&
19200 	    copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr, offsetof(union bpf_attr, log_true_size),
19201 				  &log_true_size, sizeof(log_true_size))) {
19202 		ret = -EFAULT;
19203 		goto err_release_maps;
19204 	}
19205 
19206 	if (ret)
19207 		goto err_release_maps;
19208 
19209 	if (env->used_map_cnt) {
19210 		/* if program passed verifier, update used_maps in bpf_prog_info */
19211 		env->prog->aux->used_maps = kmalloc_array(env->used_map_cnt,
19212 							  sizeof(env->used_maps[0]),
19213 							  GFP_KERNEL);
19214 
19215 		if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps) {
19216 			ret = -ENOMEM;
19217 			goto err_release_maps;
19218 		}
19219 
19220 		memcpy(env->prog->aux->used_maps, env->used_maps,
19221 		       sizeof(env->used_maps[0]) * env->used_map_cnt);
19222 		env->prog->aux->used_map_cnt = env->used_map_cnt;
19223 	}
19224 	if (env->used_btf_cnt) {
19225 		/* if program passed verifier, update used_btfs in bpf_prog_aux */
19226 		env->prog->aux->used_btfs = kmalloc_array(env->used_btf_cnt,
19227 							  sizeof(env->used_btfs[0]),
19228 							  GFP_KERNEL);
19229 		if (!env->prog->aux->used_btfs) {
19230 			ret = -ENOMEM;
19231 			goto err_release_maps;
19232 		}
19233 
19234 		memcpy(env->prog->aux->used_btfs, env->used_btfs,
19235 		       sizeof(env->used_btfs[0]) * env->used_btf_cnt);
19236 		env->prog->aux->used_btf_cnt = env->used_btf_cnt;
19237 	}
19238 	if (env->used_map_cnt || env->used_btf_cnt) {
19239 		/* program is valid. Convert pseudo bpf_ld_imm64 into generic
19240 		 * bpf_ld_imm64 instructions
19241 		 */
19242 		convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(env);
19243 	}
19244 
19245 	adjust_btf_func(env);
19246 
19247 err_release_maps:
19248 	if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps)
19249 		/* if we didn't copy map pointers into bpf_prog_info, release
19250 		 * them now. Otherwise free_used_maps() will release them.
19251 		 */
19252 		release_maps(env);
19253 	if (!env->prog->aux->used_btfs)
19254 		release_btfs(env);
19255 
19256 	/* extension progs temporarily inherit the attach_type of their targets
19257 	   for verification purposes, so set it back to zero before returning
19258 	 */
19259 	if (env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT)
19260 		env->prog->expected_attach_type = 0;
19261 
19262 	*prog = env->prog;
19263 err_unlock:
19264 	if (!is_priv)
19265 		mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
19266 	vfree(env->insn_aux_data);
19267 err_free_env:
19268 	kfree(env);
19269 	return ret;
19270 }
19271