| /linux-6.15/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/ |
| H A D | spectre.rst | 6 Spectre is a class of side channel attacks that exploit branch prediction
60 Spectre variant 1 attacks take advantage of speculative execution of
61 conditional branches, while Spectre variant 2 attacks use speculative
79 over the network, see :ref:`[12] <spec_ref12>`. However such attacks
237 Spectre variant 1 attacks generally require passing parameters
278 For Spectre variant 1 attacks, rogue guests can pass parameters
284 For Spectre variant 2 attacks, rogue guests can :ref:`poison
309 Spectre variant 2 attacks can be launched from a rogue guest by
507 BHI attacks.
527 attacks on the kernel generally more difficult.
[all …]
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| H A D | core-scheduling.rst | 17 Threads of the same core. MDS and L1TF are examples of such attacks. The only
18 full mitigation of cross-HT attacks is to disable Hyper Threading (HT). Core
20 attacks. It allows HT to be turned on safely by ensuring that only tasks in a
185 Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between the siblings
189 sibling. Such attacks are possible for any combination of sibling CPU modes
200 other (by tagging separately), then the guest to guest attacks would go away.
201 Or it could be a system admin policy which considers guest to guest attacks as
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| H A D | mds.rst | 58 Hyper-Thread attacks are possible.
69 guest OSes can obviously mount attacks as well.
73 consequence the attacks are purely sampling based, but as demonstrated with
79 It's unclear whether attacks through Web-Browsers are possible at
153 other variants cannot be protected against cross Hyper-Thread attacks.
289 guest to guest attacks are prevented.
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| H A D | tsx_async_abort.rst | 59 Hyper-Thread attacks are possible.
165 CPU is not vulnerable to cross-thread TAA attacks.
207 buffers. Cross-thread attacks are still
209 tsx=on tsx_async_abort=full,nosmt As above, cross-thread attacks on SMT
258 If the microcode is available and the TSX is disabled on the host, attacks
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| H A D | rsb.rst | 34 At a high level, there are two classes of RSB attacks: RSB poisoning
85 * On context switch, user->kernel attacks are prevented by SMEP. User
109 * On VMEXIT, guest->host attacks are mitigated by eIBRS (and PBRSB
164 * On context switch, user->user underflow attacks are mitigated by the
183 However, note that eIBRS and IBRS do not mitigate intra-mode attacks.
230 …n depends on whether the prev and/or next task is protected from Spectre attacks. It typically re…
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| H A D | gather_data_sampling.rst | 17 attacks. GDS is a purely sampling-based attack.
24 Because the buffers are shared between Hyper-Threads cross Hyper-Thread attacks
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| H A D | indirect-target-selection.rst | 95 attacks. And it also mitigates RETs that are vulnerable to ITS.
126 attacks from guest to host are considered.
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| H A D | l1tf.rst | 55 opportunity for side channel attacks to unprivileged malicious code,
75 encoded in the address bits of the PTE, thus making attacks more
83 A system with an up to date kernel is protected against attacks from
161 The kernel is unconditionally protected against L1TF attacks from malicious
599 guest, e.g. spam-bots or attacks on the local network.
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| /linux-6.15/arch/arm/crypto/ |
| H A D | Kconfig | 164 This implementation may be vulnerable to cache timing attacks,
167 such attacks very difficult.
190 to be invulnerable to cache timing attacks. However, since the bit
193 attacks will still be used as a fallback method; specifically CBC
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| /linux-6.15/Documentation/security/ |
| H A D | self-protection.rst | 43 When all of kernel memory is writable, it becomes trivial for attacks
102 attacks to operate entirely in kernel memory.
233 boot-time (``CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE``), attacks needing kernel code will be
259 structures, attacks must either be tuned to known kernel builds or expose
268 attacks, it is important to defend against exposure of both kernel memory
305 attacks that rely on the old contents of memory. E.g., clear stack on a
307 free. This frustrates many uninitialized variable attacks, stack content
308 exposures, heap content exposures, and use-after-free attacks.
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| H A D | snp-tdx-threat-model.rst | 122 kernel attacks include the vulnerabilities CVE-2019-19524, CVE-2022-0435
162 attacks by adding security features like guest data confidentiality and
186 host Denial of Service (DoS) attacks against CoCo guests are beyond the
229 * - CoCo guest data attacks
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| H A D | landlock.rst | 37 * To avoid multiple kinds of side-channel attacks (e.g. leak of security
38 policies, CPU-based attacks), Landlock rules shall not be able to
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| /linux-6.15/Documentation/arch/x86/ |
| H A D | pti.rst | 11 countermeasure against attacks on the shared user/kernel address
14 To mitigate this class of attacks, we create an independent set of
27 This approach helps to ensure that side-channel attacks leveraging
65 Protection against side-channel attacks is important. But,
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| H A D | mds.rst | 9 Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) is a family of side channel attacks
90 This does not protect against cross Hyper-Thread attacks except for MSBDS
183 protected against cross Hyper-Thread attacks because the Fill Buffer and
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| /linux-6.15/Documentation/translations/zh_CN/security/tpm/ |
| H A D | tpm-security.rst | 149 .. _基于TPM的Linux磁盘加密: https://www.secura.com/blog/tpm-sniffing-attacks-against-non-bitlocker-targets
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| /linux-6.15/Documentation/security/tpm/ |
| H A D | tpm-security.rst | 8 packet alteration attacks (called passive and active interposer attack
17 close to the CPU, which are subject to different attacks, but right at
26 a couple of seconds on any system or laptop. Recently attacks were
214 …PM based Linux disk encryption: https://www.secura.com/blog/tpm-sniffing-attacks-against-non-bitlo…
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| /linux-6.15/security/integrity/evm/ |
| H A D | Kconfig | 13 integrity attacks.
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| /linux-6.15/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/arm/ |
| H A D | atmel-sysregs.txt | 52 voltage, temperature, frequency and mechanical attacks on the chip. It also
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| /linux-6.15/Documentation/userspace-api/ |
| H A D | spec_ctrl.rst | 102 (Mitigate Spectre V2 style attacks against user processes)
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| /linux-6.15/Documentation/security/keys/ |
| H A D | ecryptfs.rst | 28 In order to avoid known-plaintext attacks, the datablob obtained through
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| /linux-6.15/Documentation/process/ |
| H A D | code-of-conduct.rst | 33 * Trolling, insulting/derogatory comments, and personal or political attacks
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| /linux-6.15/Documentation/filesystems/ |
| H A D | ubifs-authentication.rst | 15 contents and file names. This prevents attacks where an attacker is able to
20 At the current state, UBIFS encryption however does not prevent attacks where
29 which makes such kinds of attacks more complicated, but not impossible.
219 attacks where file contents are swapped.
235 UBIFS authentication does not cover attacks where an attacker is able to
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| /linux-6.15/arch/powerpc/crypto/ |
| H A D | Kconfig | 73 timining attacks. Nevertheless it might be not as secure as other
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| /linux-6.15/Documentation/block/ |
| H A D | inline-encryption.rst | 320 types of attacks (to the extent possible), including:
322 - Cold boot attacks, where an attacker with physical access to a system suddenly
326 - Online attacks where the attacker is able to read kernel memory without fully
332 - Online attacks where the attacker fully compromises the system, but their data
338 designed to protect users' data from the above attacks (to the extent possible),
341 Note that it is impossible to **fully** protect users' data from these attacks.
342 Even in the attacks where the attacker "just" gets read access to kernel memory,
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| /linux-6.15/arch/arm/mm/ |
| H A D | Kconfig | 855 bool "Harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks" if EXPERT
859 Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors rely
862 Such attacks can be partially mitigated against by clearing
867 the branch predictor against aliasing attacks and may rely on
874 bool "Harden Spectre style attacks against branch history" if EXPERT
878 Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors can
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