1 /*-
2 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause
3 *
4 * Copyright (c) 2014-2019 Netflix Inc.
5 *
6 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
7 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
8 * are met:
9 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
10 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
11 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
12 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
13 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
14 *
15 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
16 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
17 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
18 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
19 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
20 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
21 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
22 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
23 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
24 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
25 * SUCH DAMAGE.
26 */
27
28 #include <sys/cdefs.h>
29 #include "opt_inet.h"
30 #include "opt_inet6.h"
31 #include "opt_kern_tls.h"
32 #include "opt_ratelimit.h"
33 #include "opt_rss.h"
34
35 #include <sys/param.h>
36 #include <sys/kernel.h>
37 #include <sys/domainset.h>
38 #include <sys/endian.h>
39 #include <sys/ktls.h>
40 #include <sys/lock.h>
41 #include <sys/mbuf.h>
42 #include <sys/mutex.h>
43 #include <sys/rmlock.h>
44 #include <sys/proc.h>
45 #include <sys/protosw.h>
46 #include <sys/refcount.h>
47 #include <sys/smp.h>
48 #include <sys/socket.h>
49 #include <sys/socketvar.h>
50 #include <sys/sysctl.h>
51 #include <sys/taskqueue.h>
52 #include <sys/kthread.h>
53 #include <sys/uio.h>
54 #include <sys/vmmeter.h>
55 #if defined(__aarch64__) || defined(__amd64__) || defined(__i386__)
56 #include <machine/pcb.h>
57 #endif
58 #include <machine/vmparam.h>
59 #include <net/if.h>
60 #include <net/if_var.h>
61 #ifdef RSS
62 #include <net/netisr.h>
63 #include <net/rss_config.h>
64 #endif
65 #include <net/route.h>
66 #include <net/route/nhop.h>
67 #include <netinet/in.h>
68 #include <netinet/in_pcb.h>
69 #include <netinet/tcp_var.h>
70 #ifdef TCP_OFFLOAD
71 #include <netinet/tcp_offload.h>
72 #endif
73 #include <opencrypto/cryptodev.h>
74 #include <opencrypto/ktls.h>
75 #include <vm/vm.h>
76 #include <vm/vm_pageout.h>
77 #include <vm/vm_page.h>
78 #include <vm/vm_pagequeue.h>
79
80 struct ktls_wq {
81 struct mtx mtx;
82 STAILQ_HEAD(, mbuf) m_head;
83 STAILQ_HEAD(, socket) so_head;
84 bool running;
85 int lastallocfail;
86 } __aligned(CACHE_LINE_SIZE);
87
88 struct ktls_reclaim_thread {
89 uint64_t wakeups;
90 uint64_t reclaims;
91 struct thread *td;
92 int running;
93 };
94
95 struct ktls_domain_info {
96 int count;
97 int cpu[MAXCPU];
98 struct ktls_reclaim_thread reclaim_td;
99 };
100
101 struct ktls_domain_info ktls_domains[MAXMEMDOM];
102 static struct ktls_wq *ktls_wq;
103 static struct proc *ktls_proc;
104 static uma_zone_t ktls_session_zone;
105 static uma_zone_t ktls_buffer_zone;
106 static uint16_t ktls_cpuid_lookup[MAXCPU];
107 static int ktls_init_state;
108 static struct sx ktls_init_lock;
109 SX_SYSINIT(ktls_init_lock, &ktls_init_lock, "ktls init");
110
111 SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_ipc, OID_AUTO, tls, CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, 0,
112 "Kernel TLS offload");
113 SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, stats, CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, 0,
114 "Kernel TLS offload stats");
115
116 #ifdef RSS
117 static int ktls_bind_threads = 1;
118 #else
119 static int ktls_bind_threads;
120 #endif
121 SYSCTL_INT(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, bind_threads, CTLFLAG_RDTUN,
122 &ktls_bind_threads, 0,
123 "Bind crypto threads to cores (1) or cores and domains (2) at boot");
124
125 static u_int ktls_maxlen = 16384;
126 SYSCTL_UINT(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, maxlen, CTLFLAG_RDTUN,
127 &ktls_maxlen, 0, "Maximum TLS record size");
128
129 static int ktls_number_threads;
130 SYSCTL_INT(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, threads, CTLFLAG_RD,
131 &ktls_number_threads, 0,
132 "Number of TLS threads in thread-pool");
133
134 unsigned int ktls_ifnet_max_rexmit_pct = 2;
135 SYSCTL_UINT(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, ifnet_max_rexmit_pct, CTLFLAG_RWTUN,
136 &ktls_ifnet_max_rexmit_pct, 2,
137 "Max percent bytes retransmitted before ifnet TLS is disabled");
138
139 static bool ktls_offload_enable;
140 SYSCTL_BOOL(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, enable, CTLFLAG_RWTUN,
141 &ktls_offload_enable, 0,
142 "Enable support for kernel TLS offload");
143
144 static bool ktls_cbc_enable = true;
145 SYSCTL_BOOL(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, cbc_enable, CTLFLAG_RWTUN,
146 &ktls_cbc_enable, 1,
147 "Enable support of AES-CBC crypto for kernel TLS");
148
149 static bool ktls_sw_buffer_cache = true;
150 SYSCTL_BOOL(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, sw_buffer_cache, CTLFLAG_RDTUN,
151 &ktls_sw_buffer_cache, 1,
152 "Enable caching of output buffers for SW encryption");
153
154 static int ktls_max_reclaim = 1024;
155 SYSCTL_INT(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, max_reclaim, CTLFLAG_RWTUN,
156 &ktls_max_reclaim, 128,
157 "Max number of 16k buffers to reclaim in thread context");
158
159 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_tasks_active);
160 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, tasks_active, CTLFLAG_RD,
161 &ktls_tasks_active, "Number of active tasks");
162
163 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_cnt_tx_pending);
164 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, sw_tx_pending, CTLFLAG_RD,
165 &ktls_cnt_tx_pending,
166 "Number of TLS 1.0 records waiting for earlier TLS records");
167
168 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_cnt_tx_queued);
169 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, sw_tx_inqueue, CTLFLAG_RD,
170 &ktls_cnt_tx_queued,
171 "Number of TLS records in queue to tasks for SW encryption");
172
173 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_cnt_rx_queued);
174 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, sw_rx_inqueue, CTLFLAG_RD,
175 &ktls_cnt_rx_queued,
176 "Number of TLS sockets in queue to tasks for SW decryption");
177
178 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_offload_total);
179 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, offload_total,
180 CTLFLAG_RD, &ktls_offload_total,
181 "Total successful TLS setups (parameters set)");
182
183 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_offload_enable_calls);
184 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, enable_calls,
185 CTLFLAG_RD, &ktls_offload_enable_calls,
186 "Total number of TLS enable calls made");
187
188 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_offload_active);
189 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, active, CTLFLAG_RD,
190 &ktls_offload_active, "Total Active TLS sessions");
191
192 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_offload_corrupted_records);
193 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, corrupted_records, CTLFLAG_RD,
194 &ktls_offload_corrupted_records, "Total corrupted TLS records received");
195
196 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_offload_failed_crypto);
197 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, failed_crypto, CTLFLAG_RD,
198 &ktls_offload_failed_crypto, "Total TLS crypto failures");
199
200 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_switch_to_ifnet);
201 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, switch_to_ifnet, CTLFLAG_RD,
202 &ktls_switch_to_ifnet, "TLS sessions switched from SW to ifnet");
203
204 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_switch_to_sw);
205 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, switch_to_sw, CTLFLAG_RD,
206 &ktls_switch_to_sw, "TLS sessions switched from ifnet to SW");
207
208 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_switch_failed);
209 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, switch_failed, CTLFLAG_RD,
210 &ktls_switch_failed, "TLS sessions unable to switch between SW and ifnet");
211
212 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_disable_fail);
213 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, ifnet_disable_failed, CTLFLAG_RD,
214 &ktls_ifnet_disable_fail, "TLS sessions unable to switch to SW from ifnet");
215
216 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_disable_ok);
217 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, ifnet_disable_ok, CTLFLAG_RD,
218 &ktls_ifnet_disable_ok, "TLS sessions able to switch to SW from ifnet");
219
220 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_destroy_task);
221 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, destroy_task, CTLFLAG_RD,
222 &ktls_destroy_task,
223 "Number of times ktls session was destroyed via taskqueue");
224
225 SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, sw, CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, 0,
226 "Software TLS session stats");
227 SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, ifnet, CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, 0,
228 "Hardware (ifnet) TLS session stats");
229 #ifdef TCP_OFFLOAD
230 SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, toe, CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, 0,
231 "TOE TLS session stats");
232 #endif
233
234 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_sw_cbc);
235 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_sw, OID_AUTO, cbc, CTLFLAG_RD, &ktls_sw_cbc,
236 "Active number of software TLS sessions using AES-CBC");
237
238 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_sw_gcm);
239 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_sw, OID_AUTO, gcm, CTLFLAG_RD, &ktls_sw_gcm,
240 "Active number of software TLS sessions using AES-GCM");
241
242 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_sw_chacha20);
243 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_sw, OID_AUTO, chacha20, CTLFLAG_RD,
244 &ktls_sw_chacha20,
245 "Active number of software TLS sessions using Chacha20-Poly1305");
246
247 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_cbc);
248 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_ifnet, OID_AUTO, cbc, CTLFLAG_RD,
249 &ktls_ifnet_cbc,
250 "Active number of ifnet TLS sessions using AES-CBC");
251
252 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_gcm);
253 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_ifnet, OID_AUTO, gcm, CTLFLAG_RD,
254 &ktls_ifnet_gcm,
255 "Active number of ifnet TLS sessions using AES-GCM");
256
257 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_chacha20);
258 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_ifnet, OID_AUTO, chacha20, CTLFLAG_RD,
259 &ktls_ifnet_chacha20,
260 "Active number of ifnet TLS sessions using Chacha20-Poly1305");
261
262 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_reset);
263 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_ifnet, OID_AUTO, reset, CTLFLAG_RD,
264 &ktls_ifnet_reset, "TLS sessions updated to a new ifnet send tag");
265
266 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_reset_dropped);
267 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_ifnet, OID_AUTO, reset_dropped, CTLFLAG_RD,
268 &ktls_ifnet_reset_dropped,
269 "TLS sessions dropped after failing to update ifnet send tag");
270
271 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_reset_failed);
272 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_ifnet, OID_AUTO, reset_failed, CTLFLAG_RD,
273 &ktls_ifnet_reset_failed,
274 "TLS sessions that failed to allocate a new ifnet send tag");
275
276 static int ktls_ifnet_permitted;
277 SYSCTL_UINT(_kern_ipc_tls_ifnet, OID_AUTO, permitted, CTLFLAG_RWTUN,
278 &ktls_ifnet_permitted, 1,
279 "Whether to permit hardware (ifnet) TLS sessions");
280
281 #ifdef TCP_OFFLOAD
282 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_toe_cbc);
283 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_toe, OID_AUTO, cbc, CTLFLAG_RD,
284 &ktls_toe_cbc,
285 "Active number of TOE TLS sessions using AES-CBC");
286
287 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_toe_gcm);
288 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_toe, OID_AUTO, gcm, CTLFLAG_RD,
289 &ktls_toe_gcm,
290 "Active number of TOE TLS sessions using AES-GCM");
291
292 static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_toe_chacha20);
293 SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_toe, OID_AUTO, chacha20, CTLFLAG_RD,
294 &ktls_toe_chacha20,
295 "Active number of TOE TLS sessions using Chacha20-Poly1305");
296 #endif
297
298 static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_KTLS, "ktls", "Kernel TLS");
299
300 static void ktls_reset_receive_tag(void *context, int pending);
301 static void ktls_reset_send_tag(void *context, int pending);
302 static void ktls_work_thread(void *ctx);
303 static void ktls_reclaim_thread(void *ctx);
304
305 static u_int
ktls_get_cpu(struct socket * so)306 ktls_get_cpu(struct socket *so)
307 {
308 struct inpcb *inp;
309 #ifdef NUMA
310 struct ktls_domain_info *di;
311 #endif
312 u_int cpuid;
313
314 inp = sotoinpcb(so);
315 #ifdef RSS
316 cpuid = rss_hash2cpuid(inp->inp_flowid, inp->inp_flowtype);
317 if (cpuid != NETISR_CPUID_NONE)
318 return (cpuid);
319 #endif
320 /*
321 * Just use the flowid to shard connections in a repeatable
322 * fashion. Note that TLS 1.0 sessions rely on the
323 * serialization provided by having the same connection use
324 * the same queue.
325 */
326 #ifdef NUMA
327 if (ktls_bind_threads > 1 && inp->inp_numa_domain != M_NODOM) {
328 di = &ktls_domains[inp->inp_numa_domain];
329 cpuid = di->cpu[inp->inp_flowid % di->count];
330 } else
331 #endif
332 cpuid = ktls_cpuid_lookup[inp->inp_flowid % ktls_number_threads];
333 return (cpuid);
334 }
335
336 static int
ktls_buffer_import(void * arg,void ** store,int count,int domain,int flags)337 ktls_buffer_import(void *arg, void **store, int count, int domain, int flags)
338 {
339 vm_page_t m;
340 int i, req;
341
342 KASSERT((ktls_maxlen & PAGE_MASK) == 0,
343 ("%s: ktls max length %d is not page size-aligned",
344 __func__, ktls_maxlen));
345
346 req = VM_ALLOC_WIRED | VM_ALLOC_NODUMP | malloc2vm_flags(flags);
347 for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
348 m = vm_page_alloc_noobj_contig_domain(domain, req,
349 atop(ktls_maxlen), 0, ~0ul, PAGE_SIZE, 0,
350 VM_MEMATTR_DEFAULT);
351 if (m == NULL)
352 break;
353 store[i] = (void *)PHYS_TO_DMAP(VM_PAGE_TO_PHYS(m));
354 }
355 return (i);
356 }
357
358 static void
ktls_buffer_release(void * arg __unused,void ** store,int count)359 ktls_buffer_release(void *arg __unused, void **store, int count)
360 {
361 vm_page_t m;
362 int i, j;
363
364 for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
365 m = PHYS_TO_VM_PAGE(DMAP_TO_PHYS((vm_offset_t)store[i]));
366 for (j = 0; j < atop(ktls_maxlen); j++) {
367 (void)vm_page_unwire_noq(m + j);
368 vm_page_free(m + j);
369 }
370 }
371 }
372
373 static void
ktls_free_mext_contig(struct mbuf * m)374 ktls_free_mext_contig(struct mbuf *m)
375 {
376 M_ASSERTEXTPG(m);
377 uma_zfree(ktls_buffer_zone, (void *)PHYS_TO_DMAP(m->m_epg_pa[0]));
378 }
379
380 static int
ktls_init(void)381 ktls_init(void)
382 {
383 struct thread *td;
384 struct pcpu *pc;
385 int count, domain, error, i;
386
387 ktls_wq = malloc(sizeof(*ktls_wq) * (mp_maxid + 1), M_KTLS,
388 M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
389
390 ktls_session_zone = uma_zcreate("ktls_session",
391 sizeof(struct ktls_session),
392 NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
393 UMA_ALIGN_CACHE, 0);
394
395 if (ktls_sw_buffer_cache) {
396 ktls_buffer_zone = uma_zcache_create("ktls_buffers",
397 roundup2(ktls_maxlen, PAGE_SIZE), NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
398 ktls_buffer_import, ktls_buffer_release, NULL,
399 UMA_ZONE_FIRSTTOUCH);
400 }
401
402 /*
403 * Initialize the workqueues to run the TLS work. We create a
404 * work queue for each CPU.
405 */
406 CPU_FOREACH(i) {
407 STAILQ_INIT(&ktls_wq[i].m_head);
408 STAILQ_INIT(&ktls_wq[i].so_head);
409 mtx_init(&ktls_wq[i].mtx, "ktls work queue", NULL, MTX_DEF);
410 if (ktls_bind_threads > 1) {
411 pc = pcpu_find(i);
412 domain = pc->pc_domain;
413 count = ktls_domains[domain].count;
414 ktls_domains[domain].cpu[count] = i;
415 ktls_domains[domain].count++;
416 }
417 ktls_cpuid_lookup[ktls_number_threads] = i;
418 ktls_number_threads++;
419 }
420
421 /*
422 * If we somehow have an empty domain, fall back to choosing
423 * among all KTLS threads.
424 */
425 if (ktls_bind_threads > 1) {
426 for (i = 0; i < vm_ndomains; i++) {
427 if (ktls_domains[i].count == 0) {
428 ktls_bind_threads = 1;
429 break;
430 }
431 }
432 }
433
434 /* Start kthreads for each workqueue. */
435 CPU_FOREACH(i) {
436 error = kproc_kthread_add(ktls_work_thread, &ktls_wq[i],
437 &ktls_proc, &td, 0, 0, "KTLS", "thr_%d", i);
438 if (error) {
439 printf("Can't add KTLS thread %d error %d\n", i, error);
440 return (error);
441 }
442 }
443
444 /*
445 * Start an allocation thread per-domain to perform blocking allocations
446 * of 16k physically contiguous TLS crypto destination buffers.
447 */
448 if (ktls_sw_buffer_cache) {
449 for (domain = 0; domain < vm_ndomains; domain++) {
450 if (VM_DOMAIN_EMPTY(domain))
451 continue;
452 if (CPU_EMPTY(&cpuset_domain[domain]))
453 continue;
454 error = kproc_kthread_add(ktls_reclaim_thread,
455 &ktls_domains[domain], &ktls_proc,
456 &ktls_domains[domain].reclaim_td.td,
457 0, 0, "KTLS", "reclaim_%d", domain);
458 if (error) {
459 printf("Can't add KTLS reclaim thread %d error %d\n",
460 domain, error);
461 return (error);
462 }
463 }
464 }
465
466 if (bootverbose)
467 printf("KTLS: Initialized %d threads\n", ktls_number_threads);
468 return (0);
469 }
470
471 static int
ktls_start_kthreads(void)472 ktls_start_kthreads(void)
473 {
474 int error, state;
475
476 start:
477 state = atomic_load_acq_int(&ktls_init_state);
478 if (__predict_true(state > 0))
479 return (0);
480 if (state < 0)
481 return (ENXIO);
482
483 sx_xlock(&ktls_init_lock);
484 if (ktls_init_state != 0) {
485 sx_xunlock(&ktls_init_lock);
486 goto start;
487 }
488
489 error = ktls_init();
490 if (error == 0)
491 state = 1;
492 else
493 state = -1;
494 atomic_store_rel_int(&ktls_init_state, state);
495 sx_xunlock(&ktls_init_lock);
496 return (error);
497 }
498
499 static int
ktls_create_session(struct socket * so,struct tls_enable * en,struct ktls_session ** tlsp,int direction)500 ktls_create_session(struct socket *so, struct tls_enable *en,
501 struct ktls_session **tlsp, int direction)
502 {
503 struct ktls_session *tls;
504 int error;
505
506 /* Only TLS 1.0 - 1.3 are supported. */
507 if (en->tls_vmajor != TLS_MAJOR_VER_ONE)
508 return (EINVAL);
509 if (en->tls_vminor < TLS_MINOR_VER_ZERO ||
510 en->tls_vminor > TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE)
511 return (EINVAL);
512
513 if (en->auth_key_len < 0 || en->auth_key_len > TLS_MAX_PARAM_SIZE)
514 return (EINVAL);
515 if (en->cipher_key_len < 0 || en->cipher_key_len > TLS_MAX_PARAM_SIZE)
516 return (EINVAL);
517 if (en->iv_len < 0 || en->iv_len > sizeof(tls->params.iv))
518 return (EINVAL);
519
520 /* All supported algorithms require a cipher key. */
521 if (en->cipher_key_len == 0)
522 return (EINVAL);
523
524 /* No flags are currently supported. */
525 if (en->flags != 0)
526 return (EINVAL);
527
528 /* Common checks for supported algorithms. */
529 switch (en->cipher_algorithm) {
530 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
531 /*
532 * auth_algorithm isn't used, but permit GMAC values
533 * for compatibility.
534 */
535 switch (en->auth_algorithm) {
536 case 0:
537 #ifdef COMPAT_FREEBSD12
538 /* XXX: Really 13.0-current COMPAT. */
539 case CRYPTO_AES_128_NIST_GMAC:
540 case CRYPTO_AES_192_NIST_GMAC:
541 case CRYPTO_AES_256_NIST_GMAC:
542 #endif
543 break;
544 default:
545 return (EINVAL);
546 }
547 if (en->auth_key_len != 0)
548 return (EINVAL);
549 switch (en->tls_vminor) {
550 case TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO:
551 if (en->iv_len != TLS_AEAD_GCM_LEN)
552 return (EINVAL);
553 break;
554 case TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE:
555 if (en->iv_len != TLS_1_3_GCM_IV_LEN)
556 return (EINVAL);
557 break;
558 default:
559 return (EINVAL);
560 }
561 break;
562 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
563 switch (en->auth_algorithm) {
564 case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC:
565 break;
566 case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
567 case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
568 if (en->tls_vminor != TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO)
569 return (EINVAL);
570 break;
571 default:
572 return (EINVAL);
573 }
574 if (en->auth_key_len == 0)
575 return (EINVAL);
576
577 /*
578 * TLS 1.0 requires an implicit IV. TLS 1.1 and 1.2
579 * use explicit IVs.
580 */
581 switch (en->tls_vminor) {
582 case TLS_MINOR_VER_ZERO:
583 if (en->iv_len != TLS_CBC_IMPLICIT_IV_LEN)
584 return (EINVAL);
585 break;
586 case TLS_MINOR_VER_ONE:
587 case TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO:
588 /* Ignore any supplied IV. */
589 en->iv_len = 0;
590 break;
591 default:
592 return (EINVAL);
593 }
594 break;
595 case CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
596 if (en->auth_algorithm != 0 || en->auth_key_len != 0)
597 return (EINVAL);
598 if (en->tls_vminor != TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO &&
599 en->tls_vminor != TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE)
600 return (EINVAL);
601 if (en->iv_len != TLS_CHACHA20_IV_LEN)
602 return (EINVAL);
603 break;
604 default:
605 return (EINVAL);
606 }
607
608 error = ktls_start_kthreads();
609 if (error != 0)
610 return (error);
611
612 tls = uma_zalloc(ktls_session_zone, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
613
614 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_active, 1);
615
616 refcount_init(&tls->refcount, 1);
617 if (direction == KTLS_RX) {
618 TASK_INIT(&tls->reset_tag_task, 0, ktls_reset_receive_tag, tls);
619 } else {
620 TASK_INIT(&tls->reset_tag_task, 0, ktls_reset_send_tag, tls);
621 tls->inp = so->so_pcb;
622 in_pcbref(tls->inp);
623 tls->tx = true;
624 }
625
626 tls->wq_index = ktls_get_cpu(so);
627
628 tls->params.cipher_algorithm = en->cipher_algorithm;
629 tls->params.auth_algorithm = en->auth_algorithm;
630 tls->params.tls_vmajor = en->tls_vmajor;
631 tls->params.tls_vminor = en->tls_vminor;
632 tls->params.flags = en->flags;
633 tls->params.max_frame_len = min(TLS_MAX_MSG_SIZE_V10_2, ktls_maxlen);
634
635 /* Set the header and trailer lengths. */
636 tls->params.tls_hlen = sizeof(struct tls_record_layer);
637 switch (en->cipher_algorithm) {
638 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
639 /*
640 * TLS 1.2 uses a 4 byte implicit IV with an explicit 8 byte
641 * nonce. TLS 1.3 uses a 12 byte implicit IV.
642 */
643 if (en->tls_vminor < TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE)
644 tls->params.tls_hlen += sizeof(uint64_t);
645 tls->params.tls_tlen = AES_GMAC_HASH_LEN;
646 tls->params.tls_bs = 1;
647 break;
648 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
649 switch (en->auth_algorithm) {
650 case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC:
651 if (en->tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_ZERO) {
652 /* Implicit IV, no nonce. */
653 tls->sequential_records = true;
654 tls->next_seqno = be64dec(en->rec_seq);
655 STAILQ_INIT(&tls->pending_records);
656 } else {
657 tls->params.tls_hlen += AES_BLOCK_LEN;
658 }
659 tls->params.tls_tlen = AES_BLOCK_LEN +
660 SHA1_HASH_LEN;
661 break;
662 case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
663 tls->params.tls_hlen += AES_BLOCK_LEN;
664 tls->params.tls_tlen = AES_BLOCK_LEN +
665 SHA2_256_HASH_LEN;
666 break;
667 case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
668 tls->params.tls_hlen += AES_BLOCK_LEN;
669 tls->params.tls_tlen = AES_BLOCK_LEN +
670 SHA2_384_HASH_LEN;
671 break;
672 default:
673 panic("invalid hmac");
674 }
675 tls->params.tls_bs = AES_BLOCK_LEN;
676 break;
677 case CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
678 /*
679 * Chacha20 uses a 12 byte implicit IV.
680 */
681 tls->params.tls_tlen = POLY1305_HASH_LEN;
682 tls->params.tls_bs = 1;
683 break;
684 default:
685 panic("invalid cipher");
686 }
687
688 /*
689 * TLS 1.3 includes optional padding which we do not support,
690 * and also puts the "real" record type at the end of the
691 * encrypted data.
692 */
693 if (en->tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE)
694 tls->params.tls_tlen += sizeof(uint8_t);
695
696 KASSERT(tls->params.tls_hlen <= MBUF_PEXT_HDR_LEN,
697 ("TLS header length too long: %d", tls->params.tls_hlen));
698 KASSERT(tls->params.tls_tlen <= MBUF_PEXT_TRAIL_LEN,
699 ("TLS trailer length too long: %d", tls->params.tls_tlen));
700
701 if (en->auth_key_len != 0) {
702 tls->params.auth_key_len = en->auth_key_len;
703 tls->params.auth_key = malloc(en->auth_key_len, M_KTLS,
704 M_WAITOK);
705 error = copyin(en->auth_key, tls->params.auth_key,
706 en->auth_key_len);
707 if (error)
708 goto out;
709 }
710
711 tls->params.cipher_key_len = en->cipher_key_len;
712 tls->params.cipher_key = malloc(en->cipher_key_len, M_KTLS, M_WAITOK);
713 error = copyin(en->cipher_key, tls->params.cipher_key,
714 en->cipher_key_len);
715 if (error)
716 goto out;
717
718 /*
719 * This holds the implicit portion of the nonce for AEAD
720 * ciphers and the initial implicit IV for TLS 1.0. The
721 * explicit portions of the IV are generated in ktls_frame().
722 */
723 if (en->iv_len != 0) {
724 tls->params.iv_len = en->iv_len;
725 error = copyin(en->iv, tls->params.iv, en->iv_len);
726 if (error)
727 goto out;
728
729 /*
730 * For TLS 1.2 with GCM, generate an 8-byte nonce as a
731 * counter to generate unique explicit IVs.
732 *
733 * Store this counter in the last 8 bytes of the IV
734 * array so that it is 8-byte aligned.
735 */
736 if (en->cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16 &&
737 en->tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO)
738 arc4rand(tls->params.iv + 8, sizeof(uint64_t), 0);
739 }
740
741 *tlsp = tls;
742 return (0);
743
744 out:
745 ktls_free(tls);
746 return (error);
747 }
748
749 static struct ktls_session *
ktls_clone_session(struct ktls_session * tls,int direction)750 ktls_clone_session(struct ktls_session *tls, int direction)
751 {
752 struct ktls_session *tls_new;
753
754 tls_new = uma_zalloc(ktls_session_zone, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
755
756 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_active, 1);
757
758 refcount_init(&tls_new->refcount, 1);
759 if (direction == KTLS_RX) {
760 TASK_INIT(&tls_new->reset_tag_task, 0, ktls_reset_receive_tag,
761 tls_new);
762 } else {
763 TASK_INIT(&tls_new->reset_tag_task, 0, ktls_reset_send_tag,
764 tls_new);
765 tls_new->inp = tls->inp;
766 tls_new->tx = true;
767 in_pcbref(tls_new->inp);
768 }
769
770 /* Copy fields from existing session. */
771 tls_new->params = tls->params;
772 tls_new->wq_index = tls->wq_index;
773
774 /* Deep copy keys. */
775 if (tls_new->params.auth_key != NULL) {
776 tls_new->params.auth_key = malloc(tls->params.auth_key_len,
777 M_KTLS, M_WAITOK);
778 memcpy(tls_new->params.auth_key, tls->params.auth_key,
779 tls->params.auth_key_len);
780 }
781
782 tls_new->params.cipher_key = malloc(tls->params.cipher_key_len, M_KTLS,
783 M_WAITOK);
784 memcpy(tls_new->params.cipher_key, tls->params.cipher_key,
785 tls->params.cipher_key_len);
786
787 return (tls_new);
788 }
789
790 #ifdef TCP_OFFLOAD
791 static int
ktls_try_toe(struct socket * so,struct ktls_session * tls,int direction)792 ktls_try_toe(struct socket *so, struct ktls_session *tls, int direction)
793 {
794 struct inpcb *inp;
795 struct tcpcb *tp;
796 int error;
797
798 inp = so->so_pcb;
799 INP_WLOCK(inp);
800 if (inp->inp_flags & INP_DROPPED) {
801 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
802 return (ECONNRESET);
803 }
804 if (inp->inp_socket == NULL) {
805 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
806 return (ECONNRESET);
807 }
808 tp = intotcpcb(inp);
809 if (!(tp->t_flags & TF_TOE)) {
810 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
811 return (EOPNOTSUPP);
812 }
813
814 error = tcp_offload_alloc_tls_session(tp, tls, direction);
815 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
816 if (error == 0) {
817 tls->mode = TCP_TLS_MODE_TOE;
818 switch (tls->params.cipher_algorithm) {
819 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
820 counter_u64_add(ktls_toe_cbc, 1);
821 break;
822 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
823 counter_u64_add(ktls_toe_gcm, 1);
824 break;
825 case CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
826 counter_u64_add(ktls_toe_chacha20, 1);
827 break;
828 }
829 }
830 return (error);
831 }
832 #endif
833
834 /*
835 * Common code used when first enabling ifnet TLS on a connection or
836 * when allocating a new ifnet TLS session due to a routing change.
837 * This function allocates a new TLS send tag on whatever interface
838 * the connection is currently routed over.
839 */
840 static int
ktls_alloc_snd_tag(struct inpcb * inp,struct ktls_session * tls,bool force,struct m_snd_tag ** mstp)841 ktls_alloc_snd_tag(struct inpcb *inp, struct ktls_session *tls, bool force,
842 struct m_snd_tag **mstp)
843 {
844 union if_snd_tag_alloc_params params;
845 struct ifnet *ifp;
846 struct nhop_object *nh;
847 struct tcpcb *tp;
848 int error;
849
850 INP_RLOCK(inp);
851 if (inp->inp_flags & INP_DROPPED) {
852 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
853 return (ECONNRESET);
854 }
855 if (inp->inp_socket == NULL) {
856 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
857 return (ECONNRESET);
858 }
859 tp = intotcpcb(inp);
860
861 /*
862 * Check administrative controls on ifnet TLS to determine if
863 * ifnet TLS should be denied.
864 *
865 * - Always permit 'force' requests.
866 * - ktls_ifnet_permitted == 0: always deny.
867 */
868 if (!force && ktls_ifnet_permitted == 0) {
869 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
870 return (ENXIO);
871 }
872
873 /*
874 * XXX: Use the cached route in the inpcb to find the
875 * interface. This should perhaps instead use
876 * rtalloc1_fib(dst, 0, 0, fibnum). Since KTLS is only
877 * enabled after a connection has completed key negotiation in
878 * userland, the cached route will be present in practice.
879 */
880 nh = inp->inp_route.ro_nh;
881 if (nh == NULL) {
882 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
883 return (ENXIO);
884 }
885 ifp = nh->nh_ifp;
886 if_ref(ifp);
887
888 /*
889 * Allocate a TLS + ratelimit tag if the connection has an
890 * existing pacing rate.
891 */
892 if (tp->t_pacing_rate != -1 &&
893 (if_getcapenable(ifp) & IFCAP_TXTLS_RTLMT) != 0) {
894 params.hdr.type = IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS_RATE_LIMIT;
895 params.tls_rate_limit.inp = inp;
896 params.tls_rate_limit.tls = tls;
897 params.tls_rate_limit.max_rate = tp->t_pacing_rate;
898 } else {
899 params.hdr.type = IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS;
900 params.tls.inp = inp;
901 params.tls.tls = tls;
902 }
903 params.hdr.flowid = inp->inp_flowid;
904 params.hdr.flowtype = inp->inp_flowtype;
905 params.hdr.numa_domain = inp->inp_numa_domain;
906 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
907
908 if ((if_getcapenable(ifp) & IFCAP_MEXTPG) == 0) {
909 error = EOPNOTSUPP;
910 goto out;
911 }
912 if (inp->inp_vflag & INP_IPV6) {
913 if ((if_getcapenable(ifp) & IFCAP_TXTLS6) == 0) {
914 error = EOPNOTSUPP;
915 goto out;
916 }
917 } else {
918 if ((if_getcapenable(ifp) & IFCAP_TXTLS4) == 0) {
919 error = EOPNOTSUPP;
920 goto out;
921 }
922 }
923 error = m_snd_tag_alloc(ifp, ¶ms, mstp);
924 out:
925 if_rele(ifp);
926 return (error);
927 }
928
929 /*
930 * Allocate an initial TLS receive tag for doing HW decryption of TLS
931 * data.
932 *
933 * This function allocates a new TLS receive tag on whatever interface
934 * the connection is currently routed over. If the connection ends up
935 * using a different interface for receive this will get fixed up via
936 * ktls_input_ifp_mismatch as future packets arrive.
937 */
938 static int
ktls_alloc_rcv_tag(struct inpcb * inp,struct ktls_session * tls,struct m_snd_tag ** mstp)939 ktls_alloc_rcv_tag(struct inpcb *inp, struct ktls_session *tls,
940 struct m_snd_tag **mstp)
941 {
942 union if_snd_tag_alloc_params params;
943 struct ifnet *ifp;
944 struct nhop_object *nh;
945 int error;
946
947 if (!ktls_ocf_recrypt_supported(tls))
948 return (ENXIO);
949
950 INP_RLOCK(inp);
951 if (inp->inp_flags & INP_DROPPED) {
952 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
953 return (ECONNRESET);
954 }
955 if (inp->inp_socket == NULL) {
956 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
957 return (ECONNRESET);
958 }
959
960 /*
961 * Check administrative controls on ifnet TLS to determine if
962 * ifnet TLS should be denied.
963 */
964 if (ktls_ifnet_permitted == 0) {
965 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
966 return (ENXIO);
967 }
968
969 /*
970 * XXX: As with ktls_alloc_snd_tag, use the cached route in
971 * the inpcb to find the interface.
972 */
973 nh = inp->inp_route.ro_nh;
974 if (nh == NULL) {
975 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
976 return (ENXIO);
977 }
978 ifp = nh->nh_ifp;
979 if_ref(ifp);
980 tls->rx_ifp = ifp;
981
982 params.hdr.type = IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS_RX;
983 params.hdr.flowid = inp->inp_flowid;
984 params.hdr.flowtype = inp->inp_flowtype;
985 params.hdr.numa_domain = inp->inp_numa_domain;
986 params.tls_rx.inp = inp;
987 params.tls_rx.tls = tls;
988 params.tls_rx.vlan_id = 0;
989
990 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
991
992 if (inp->inp_vflag & INP_IPV6) {
993 if ((if_getcapenable2(ifp) & IFCAP2_BIT(IFCAP2_RXTLS6)) == 0) {
994 error = EOPNOTSUPP;
995 goto out;
996 }
997 } else {
998 if ((if_getcapenable2(ifp) & IFCAP2_BIT(IFCAP2_RXTLS4)) == 0) {
999 error = EOPNOTSUPP;
1000 goto out;
1001 }
1002 }
1003 error = m_snd_tag_alloc(ifp, ¶ms, mstp);
1004
1005 /*
1006 * If this connection is over a vlan, vlan_snd_tag_alloc
1007 * rewrites vlan_id with the saved interface. Save the VLAN
1008 * ID for use in ktls_reset_receive_tag which allocates new
1009 * receive tags directly from the leaf interface bypassing
1010 * if_vlan.
1011 */
1012 if (error == 0)
1013 tls->rx_vlan_id = params.tls_rx.vlan_id;
1014 out:
1015 return (error);
1016 }
1017
1018 static int
ktls_try_ifnet(struct socket * so,struct ktls_session * tls,int direction,bool force)1019 ktls_try_ifnet(struct socket *so, struct ktls_session *tls, int direction,
1020 bool force)
1021 {
1022 struct m_snd_tag *mst;
1023 int error;
1024
1025 switch (direction) {
1026 case KTLS_TX:
1027 error = ktls_alloc_snd_tag(so->so_pcb, tls, force, &mst);
1028 if (__predict_false(error != 0))
1029 goto done;
1030 break;
1031 case KTLS_RX:
1032 KASSERT(!force, ("%s: forced receive tag", __func__));
1033 error = ktls_alloc_rcv_tag(so->so_pcb, tls, &mst);
1034 if (__predict_false(error != 0))
1035 goto done;
1036 break;
1037 default:
1038 __assert_unreachable();
1039 }
1040
1041 tls->mode = TCP_TLS_MODE_IFNET;
1042 tls->snd_tag = mst;
1043
1044 switch (tls->params.cipher_algorithm) {
1045 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
1046 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_cbc, 1);
1047 break;
1048 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
1049 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_gcm, 1);
1050 break;
1051 case CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
1052 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_chacha20, 1);
1053 break;
1054 default:
1055 break;
1056 }
1057 done:
1058 return (error);
1059 }
1060
1061 static void
ktls_use_sw(struct ktls_session * tls)1062 ktls_use_sw(struct ktls_session *tls)
1063 {
1064 tls->mode = TCP_TLS_MODE_SW;
1065 switch (tls->params.cipher_algorithm) {
1066 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
1067 counter_u64_add(ktls_sw_cbc, 1);
1068 break;
1069 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
1070 counter_u64_add(ktls_sw_gcm, 1);
1071 break;
1072 case CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
1073 counter_u64_add(ktls_sw_chacha20, 1);
1074 break;
1075 }
1076 }
1077
1078 static int
ktls_try_sw(struct ktls_session * tls,int direction)1079 ktls_try_sw(struct ktls_session *tls, int direction)
1080 {
1081 int error;
1082
1083 error = ktls_ocf_try(tls, direction);
1084 if (error)
1085 return (error);
1086 ktls_use_sw(tls);
1087 return (0);
1088 }
1089
1090 /*
1091 * KTLS RX stores data in the socket buffer as a list of TLS records,
1092 * where each record is stored as a control message containg the TLS
1093 * header followed by data mbufs containing the decrypted data. This
1094 * is different from KTLS TX which always uses an mb_ext_pgs mbuf for
1095 * both encrypted and decrypted data. TLS records decrypted by a NIC
1096 * should be queued to the socket buffer as records, but encrypted
1097 * data which needs to be decrypted by software arrives as a stream of
1098 * regular mbufs which need to be converted. In addition, there may
1099 * already be pending encrypted data in the socket buffer when KTLS RX
1100 * is enabled.
1101 *
1102 * To manage not-yet-decrypted data for KTLS RX, the following scheme
1103 * is used:
1104 *
1105 * - A single chain of NOTREADY mbufs is hung off of sb_mtls.
1106 *
1107 * - ktls_check_rx checks this chain of mbufs reading the TLS header
1108 * from the first mbuf. Once all of the data for that TLS record is
1109 * queued, the socket is queued to a worker thread.
1110 *
1111 * - The worker thread calls ktls_decrypt to decrypt TLS records in
1112 * the TLS chain. Each TLS record is detached from the TLS chain,
1113 * decrypted, and inserted into the regular socket buffer chain as
1114 * record starting with a control message holding the TLS header and
1115 * a chain of mbufs holding the encrypted data.
1116 */
1117
1118 static void
sb_mark_notready(struct sockbuf * sb)1119 sb_mark_notready(struct sockbuf *sb)
1120 {
1121 struct mbuf *m;
1122
1123 m = sb->sb_mb;
1124 sb->sb_mtls = m;
1125 sb->sb_mb = NULL;
1126 sb->sb_mbtail = NULL;
1127 sb->sb_lastrecord = NULL;
1128 for (; m != NULL; m = m->m_next) {
1129 KASSERT(m->m_nextpkt == NULL, ("%s: m_nextpkt != NULL",
1130 __func__));
1131 KASSERT((m->m_flags & M_NOTAVAIL) == 0, ("%s: mbuf not avail",
1132 __func__));
1133 KASSERT(sb->sb_acc >= m->m_len, ("%s: sb_acc < m->m_len",
1134 __func__));
1135 m->m_flags |= M_NOTREADY;
1136 sb->sb_acc -= m->m_len;
1137 sb->sb_tlscc += m->m_len;
1138 sb->sb_mtlstail = m;
1139 }
1140 KASSERT(sb->sb_acc == 0 && sb->sb_tlscc == sb->sb_ccc,
1141 ("%s: acc %u tlscc %u ccc %u", __func__, sb->sb_acc, sb->sb_tlscc,
1142 sb->sb_ccc));
1143 }
1144
1145 /*
1146 * Return information about the pending TLS data in a socket
1147 * buffer. On return, 'seqno' is set to the sequence number
1148 * of the next TLS record to be received, 'resid' is set to
1149 * the amount of bytes still needed for the last pending
1150 * record. The function returns 'false' if the last pending
1151 * record contains a partial TLS header. In that case, 'resid'
1152 * is the number of bytes needed to complete the TLS header.
1153 */
1154 bool
ktls_pending_rx_info(struct sockbuf * sb,uint64_t * seqnop,size_t * residp)1155 ktls_pending_rx_info(struct sockbuf *sb, uint64_t *seqnop, size_t *residp)
1156 {
1157 struct tls_record_layer hdr;
1158 struct mbuf *m;
1159 uint64_t seqno;
1160 size_t resid;
1161 u_int offset, record_len;
1162
1163 SOCKBUF_LOCK_ASSERT(sb);
1164 MPASS(sb->sb_flags & SB_TLS_RX);
1165 seqno = sb->sb_tls_seqno;
1166 resid = sb->sb_tlscc;
1167 m = sb->sb_mtls;
1168 offset = 0;
1169
1170 if (resid == 0) {
1171 *seqnop = seqno;
1172 *residp = 0;
1173 return (true);
1174 }
1175
1176 for (;;) {
1177 seqno++;
1178
1179 if (resid < sizeof(hdr)) {
1180 *seqnop = seqno;
1181 *residp = sizeof(hdr) - resid;
1182 return (false);
1183 }
1184
1185 m_copydata(m, offset, sizeof(hdr), (void *)&hdr);
1186
1187 record_len = sizeof(hdr) + ntohs(hdr.tls_length);
1188 if (resid <= record_len) {
1189 *seqnop = seqno;
1190 *residp = record_len - resid;
1191 return (true);
1192 }
1193 resid -= record_len;
1194
1195 while (record_len != 0) {
1196 if (m->m_len - offset > record_len) {
1197 offset += record_len;
1198 break;
1199 }
1200
1201 record_len -= (m->m_len - offset);
1202 offset = 0;
1203 m = m->m_next;
1204 }
1205 }
1206 }
1207
1208 int
ktls_enable_rx(struct socket * so,struct tls_enable * en)1209 ktls_enable_rx(struct socket *so, struct tls_enable *en)
1210 {
1211 struct ktls_session *tls;
1212 int error;
1213
1214 if (!ktls_offload_enable)
1215 return (ENOTSUP);
1216
1217 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_enable_calls, 1);
1218
1219 /*
1220 * This should always be true since only the TCP socket option
1221 * invokes this function.
1222 */
1223 if (so->so_proto->pr_protocol != IPPROTO_TCP)
1224 return (EINVAL);
1225
1226 /*
1227 * XXX: Don't overwrite existing sessions. We should permit
1228 * this to support rekeying in the future.
1229 */
1230 if (so->so_rcv.sb_tls_info != NULL)
1231 return (EALREADY);
1232
1233 if (en->cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_CBC && !ktls_cbc_enable)
1234 return (ENOTSUP);
1235
1236 error = ktls_create_session(so, en, &tls, KTLS_RX);
1237 if (error)
1238 return (error);
1239
1240 error = ktls_ocf_try(tls, KTLS_RX);
1241 if (error) {
1242 ktls_free(tls);
1243 return (error);
1244 }
1245
1246 /*
1247 * Serialize with soreceive_generic() and make sure that we're not
1248 * operating on a listening socket.
1249 */
1250 error = SOCK_IO_RECV_LOCK(so, SBL_WAIT);
1251 if (error) {
1252 ktls_free(tls);
1253 return (error);
1254 }
1255
1256 /* Mark the socket as using TLS offload. */
1257 SOCK_RECVBUF_LOCK(so);
1258 if (__predict_false(so->so_rcv.sb_tls_info != NULL)) {
1259 SOCK_RECVBUF_UNLOCK(so);
1260 SOCK_IO_RECV_UNLOCK(so);
1261 ktls_free(tls);
1262 return (EALREADY);
1263 }
1264 so->so_rcv.sb_tls_seqno = be64dec(en->rec_seq);
1265 so->so_rcv.sb_tls_info = tls;
1266 so->so_rcv.sb_flags |= SB_TLS_RX;
1267
1268 /* Mark existing data as not ready until it can be decrypted. */
1269 sb_mark_notready(&so->so_rcv);
1270 ktls_check_rx(&so->so_rcv);
1271 SOCK_RECVBUF_UNLOCK(so);
1272 SOCK_IO_RECV_UNLOCK(so);
1273
1274 /* Prefer TOE -> ifnet TLS -> software TLS. */
1275 #ifdef TCP_OFFLOAD
1276 error = ktls_try_toe(so, tls, KTLS_RX);
1277 if (error)
1278 #endif
1279 error = ktls_try_ifnet(so, tls, KTLS_RX, false);
1280 if (error)
1281 ktls_use_sw(tls);
1282
1283 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_total, 1);
1284
1285 return (0);
1286 }
1287
1288 int
ktls_enable_tx(struct socket * so,struct tls_enable * en)1289 ktls_enable_tx(struct socket *so, struct tls_enable *en)
1290 {
1291 struct ktls_session *tls;
1292 struct inpcb *inp;
1293 struct tcpcb *tp;
1294 int error;
1295
1296 if (!ktls_offload_enable)
1297 return (ENOTSUP);
1298
1299 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_enable_calls, 1);
1300
1301 /*
1302 * This should always be true since only the TCP socket option
1303 * invokes this function.
1304 */
1305 if (so->so_proto->pr_protocol != IPPROTO_TCP)
1306 return (EINVAL);
1307
1308 /*
1309 * XXX: Don't overwrite existing sessions. We should permit
1310 * this to support rekeying in the future.
1311 */
1312 if (so->so_snd.sb_tls_info != NULL)
1313 return (EALREADY);
1314
1315 if (en->cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_CBC && !ktls_cbc_enable)
1316 return (ENOTSUP);
1317
1318 /* TLS requires ext pgs */
1319 if (mb_use_ext_pgs == 0)
1320 return (ENXIO);
1321
1322 error = ktls_create_session(so, en, &tls, KTLS_TX);
1323 if (error)
1324 return (error);
1325
1326 /* Prefer TOE -> ifnet TLS -> software TLS. */
1327 #ifdef TCP_OFFLOAD
1328 error = ktls_try_toe(so, tls, KTLS_TX);
1329 if (error)
1330 #endif
1331 error = ktls_try_ifnet(so, tls, KTLS_TX, false);
1332 if (error)
1333 error = ktls_try_sw(tls, KTLS_TX);
1334
1335 if (error) {
1336 ktls_free(tls);
1337 return (error);
1338 }
1339
1340 /*
1341 * Serialize with sosend_generic() and make sure that we're not
1342 * operating on a listening socket.
1343 */
1344 error = SOCK_IO_SEND_LOCK(so, SBL_WAIT);
1345 if (error) {
1346 ktls_free(tls);
1347 return (error);
1348 }
1349
1350 /*
1351 * Write lock the INP when setting sb_tls_info so that
1352 * routines in tcp_ratelimit.c can read sb_tls_info while
1353 * holding the INP lock.
1354 */
1355 inp = so->so_pcb;
1356 INP_WLOCK(inp);
1357 SOCK_SENDBUF_LOCK(so);
1358 if (__predict_false(so->so_snd.sb_tls_info != NULL)) {
1359 SOCK_SENDBUF_UNLOCK(so);
1360 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
1361 SOCK_IO_SEND_UNLOCK(so);
1362 ktls_free(tls);
1363 return (EALREADY);
1364 }
1365 so->so_snd.sb_tls_seqno = be64dec(en->rec_seq);
1366 so->so_snd.sb_tls_info = tls;
1367 if (tls->mode != TCP_TLS_MODE_SW) {
1368 tp = intotcpcb(inp);
1369 MPASS(tp->t_nic_ktls_xmit == 0);
1370 tp->t_nic_ktls_xmit = 1;
1371 if (tp->t_fb->tfb_hwtls_change != NULL)
1372 (*tp->t_fb->tfb_hwtls_change)(tp, 1);
1373 }
1374 SOCK_SENDBUF_UNLOCK(so);
1375 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
1376 SOCK_IO_SEND_UNLOCK(so);
1377
1378 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_total, 1);
1379
1380 return (0);
1381 }
1382
1383 int
ktls_get_rx_mode(struct socket * so,int * modep)1384 ktls_get_rx_mode(struct socket *so, int *modep)
1385 {
1386 struct ktls_session *tls;
1387 struct inpcb *inp __diagused;
1388
1389 if (SOLISTENING(so))
1390 return (EINVAL);
1391 inp = so->so_pcb;
1392 INP_WLOCK_ASSERT(inp);
1393 SOCK_RECVBUF_LOCK(so);
1394 tls = so->so_rcv.sb_tls_info;
1395 if (tls == NULL)
1396 *modep = TCP_TLS_MODE_NONE;
1397 else
1398 *modep = tls->mode;
1399 SOCK_RECVBUF_UNLOCK(so);
1400 return (0);
1401 }
1402
1403 /*
1404 * ktls_get_rx_sequence - get the next TCP- and TLS- sequence number.
1405 *
1406 * This function gets information about the next TCP- and TLS-
1407 * sequence number to be processed by the TLS receive worker
1408 * thread. The information is extracted from the given "inpcb"
1409 * structure. The values are stored in host endian format at the two
1410 * given output pointer locations. The TCP sequence number points to
1411 * the beginning of the TLS header.
1412 *
1413 * This function returns zero on success, else a non-zero error code
1414 * is returned.
1415 */
1416 int
ktls_get_rx_sequence(struct inpcb * inp,uint32_t * tcpseq,uint64_t * tlsseq)1417 ktls_get_rx_sequence(struct inpcb *inp, uint32_t *tcpseq, uint64_t *tlsseq)
1418 {
1419 struct socket *so;
1420 struct tcpcb *tp;
1421
1422 INP_RLOCK(inp);
1423 so = inp->inp_socket;
1424 if (__predict_false(so == NULL)) {
1425 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
1426 return (EINVAL);
1427 }
1428 if (inp->inp_flags & INP_DROPPED) {
1429 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
1430 return (ECONNRESET);
1431 }
1432
1433 tp = intotcpcb(inp);
1434 MPASS(tp != NULL);
1435
1436 SOCKBUF_LOCK(&so->so_rcv);
1437 *tcpseq = tp->rcv_nxt - so->so_rcv.sb_tlscc;
1438 *tlsseq = so->so_rcv.sb_tls_seqno;
1439 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_rcv);
1440
1441 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
1442
1443 return (0);
1444 }
1445
1446 int
ktls_get_tx_mode(struct socket * so,int * modep)1447 ktls_get_tx_mode(struct socket *so, int *modep)
1448 {
1449 struct ktls_session *tls;
1450 struct inpcb *inp __diagused;
1451
1452 if (SOLISTENING(so))
1453 return (EINVAL);
1454 inp = so->so_pcb;
1455 INP_WLOCK_ASSERT(inp);
1456 SOCK_SENDBUF_LOCK(so);
1457 tls = so->so_snd.sb_tls_info;
1458 if (tls == NULL)
1459 *modep = TCP_TLS_MODE_NONE;
1460 else
1461 *modep = tls->mode;
1462 SOCK_SENDBUF_UNLOCK(so);
1463 return (0);
1464 }
1465
1466 /*
1467 * Switch between SW and ifnet TLS sessions as requested.
1468 */
1469 int
ktls_set_tx_mode(struct socket * so,int mode)1470 ktls_set_tx_mode(struct socket *so, int mode)
1471 {
1472 struct ktls_session *tls, *tls_new;
1473 struct inpcb *inp;
1474 struct tcpcb *tp;
1475 int error;
1476
1477 if (SOLISTENING(so))
1478 return (EINVAL);
1479 switch (mode) {
1480 case TCP_TLS_MODE_SW:
1481 case TCP_TLS_MODE_IFNET:
1482 break;
1483 default:
1484 return (EINVAL);
1485 }
1486
1487 inp = so->so_pcb;
1488 INP_WLOCK_ASSERT(inp);
1489 tp = intotcpcb(inp);
1490
1491 if (mode == TCP_TLS_MODE_IFNET) {
1492 /* Don't allow enabling ifnet ktls multiple times */
1493 if (tp->t_nic_ktls_xmit)
1494 return (EALREADY);
1495
1496 /*
1497 * Don't enable ifnet ktls if we disabled it due to an
1498 * excessive retransmission rate
1499 */
1500 if (tp->t_nic_ktls_xmit_dis)
1501 return (ENXIO);
1502 }
1503
1504 SOCKBUF_LOCK(&so->so_snd);
1505 tls = so->so_snd.sb_tls_info;
1506 if (tls == NULL) {
1507 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_snd);
1508 return (0);
1509 }
1510
1511 if (tls->mode == mode) {
1512 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_snd);
1513 return (0);
1514 }
1515
1516 tls = ktls_hold(tls);
1517 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_snd);
1518 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
1519
1520 tls_new = ktls_clone_session(tls, KTLS_TX);
1521
1522 if (mode == TCP_TLS_MODE_IFNET)
1523 error = ktls_try_ifnet(so, tls_new, KTLS_TX, true);
1524 else
1525 error = ktls_try_sw(tls_new, KTLS_TX);
1526 if (error) {
1527 counter_u64_add(ktls_switch_failed, 1);
1528 ktls_free(tls_new);
1529 ktls_free(tls);
1530 INP_WLOCK(inp);
1531 return (error);
1532 }
1533
1534 error = SOCK_IO_SEND_LOCK(so, SBL_WAIT);
1535 if (error) {
1536 counter_u64_add(ktls_switch_failed, 1);
1537 ktls_free(tls_new);
1538 ktls_free(tls);
1539 INP_WLOCK(inp);
1540 return (error);
1541 }
1542
1543 /*
1544 * If we raced with another session change, keep the existing
1545 * session.
1546 */
1547 if (tls != so->so_snd.sb_tls_info) {
1548 counter_u64_add(ktls_switch_failed, 1);
1549 SOCK_IO_SEND_UNLOCK(so);
1550 ktls_free(tls_new);
1551 ktls_free(tls);
1552 INP_WLOCK(inp);
1553 return (EBUSY);
1554 }
1555
1556 INP_WLOCK(inp);
1557 SOCKBUF_LOCK(&so->so_snd);
1558 so->so_snd.sb_tls_info = tls_new;
1559 if (tls_new->mode != TCP_TLS_MODE_SW) {
1560 MPASS(tp->t_nic_ktls_xmit == 0);
1561 tp->t_nic_ktls_xmit = 1;
1562 if (tp->t_fb->tfb_hwtls_change != NULL)
1563 (*tp->t_fb->tfb_hwtls_change)(tp, 1);
1564 }
1565 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_snd);
1566 SOCK_IO_SEND_UNLOCK(so);
1567
1568 /*
1569 * Drop two references on 'tls'. The first is for the
1570 * ktls_hold() above. The second drops the reference from the
1571 * socket buffer.
1572 */
1573 KASSERT(tls->refcount >= 2, ("too few references on old session"));
1574 ktls_free(tls);
1575 ktls_free(tls);
1576
1577 if (mode == TCP_TLS_MODE_IFNET)
1578 counter_u64_add(ktls_switch_to_ifnet, 1);
1579 else
1580 counter_u64_add(ktls_switch_to_sw, 1);
1581
1582 return (0);
1583 }
1584
1585 /*
1586 * Try to allocate a new TLS receive tag. This task is scheduled when
1587 * sbappend_ktls_rx detects an input path change. If a new tag is
1588 * allocated, replace the tag in the TLS session. If a new tag cannot
1589 * be allocated, let the session fall back to software decryption.
1590 */
1591 static void
ktls_reset_receive_tag(void * context,int pending)1592 ktls_reset_receive_tag(void *context, int pending)
1593 {
1594 union if_snd_tag_alloc_params params;
1595 struct ktls_session *tls;
1596 struct m_snd_tag *mst;
1597 struct inpcb *inp;
1598 struct ifnet *ifp;
1599 struct socket *so;
1600 int error;
1601
1602 MPASS(pending == 1);
1603
1604 tls = context;
1605 so = tls->so;
1606 inp = so->so_pcb;
1607 ifp = NULL;
1608
1609 INP_RLOCK(inp);
1610 if (inp->inp_flags & INP_DROPPED) {
1611 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
1612 goto out;
1613 }
1614
1615 SOCKBUF_LOCK(&so->so_rcv);
1616 mst = tls->snd_tag;
1617 tls->snd_tag = NULL;
1618 if (mst != NULL)
1619 m_snd_tag_rele(mst);
1620
1621 ifp = tls->rx_ifp;
1622 if_ref(ifp);
1623 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_rcv);
1624
1625 params.hdr.type = IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS_RX;
1626 params.hdr.flowid = inp->inp_flowid;
1627 params.hdr.flowtype = inp->inp_flowtype;
1628 params.hdr.numa_domain = inp->inp_numa_domain;
1629 params.tls_rx.inp = inp;
1630 params.tls_rx.tls = tls;
1631 params.tls_rx.vlan_id = tls->rx_vlan_id;
1632 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
1633
1634 if (inp->inp_vflag & INP_IPV6) {
1635 if ((if_getcapenable2(ifp) & IFCAP2_RXTLS6) == 0)
1636 goto out;
1637 } else {
1638 if ((if_getcapenable2(ifp) & IFCAP2_RXTLS4) == 0)
1639 goto out;
1640 }
1641
1642 error = m_snd_tag_alloc(ifp, ¶ms, &mst);
1643 if (error == 0) {
1644 SOCKBUF_LOCK(&so->so_rcv);
1645 tls->snd_tag = mst;
1646 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_rcv);
1647
1648 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_reset, 1);
1649 } else {
1650 /*
1651 * Just fall back to software decryption if a tag
1652 * cannot be allocated leaving the connection intact.
1653 * If a future input path change switches to another
1654 * interface this connection will resume ifnet TLS.
1655 */
1656 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_reset_failed, 1);
1657 }
1658
1659 out:
1660 mtx_pool_lock(mtxpool_sleep, tls);
1661 tls->reset_pending = false;
1662 mtx_pool_unlock(mtxpool_sleep, tls);
1663
1664 if (ifp != NULL)
1665 if_rele(ifp);
1666 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet);
1667 sorele(so);
1668 CURVNET_RESTORE();
1669 ktls_free(tls);
1670 }
1671
1672 /*
1673 * Try to allocate a new TLS send tag. This task is scheduled when
1674 * ip_output detects a route change while trying to transmit a packet
1675 * holding a TLS record. If a new tag is allocated, replace the tag
1676 * in the TLS session. Subsequent packets on the connection will use
1677 * the new tag. If a new tag cannot be allocated, drop the
1678 * connection.
1679 */
1680 static void
ktls_reset_send_tag(void * context,int pending)1681 ktls_reset_send_tag(void *context, int pending)
1682 {
1683 struct epoch_tracker et;
1684 struct ktls_session *tls;
1685 struct m_snd_tag *old, *new;
1686 struct inpcb *inp;
1687 struct tcpcb *tp;
1688 int error;
1689
1690 MPASS(pending == 1);
1691
1692 tls = context;
1693 inp = tls->inp;
1694
1695 /*
1696 * Free the old tag first before allocating a new one.
1697 * ip[6]_output_send() will treat a NULL send tag the same as
1698 * an ifp mismatch and drop packets until a new tag is
1699 * allocated.
1700 *
1701 * Write-lock the INP when changing tls->snd_tag since
1702 * ip[6]_output_send() holds a read-lock when reading the
1703 * pointer.
1704 */
1705 INP_WLOCK(inp);
1706 old = tls->snd_tag;
1707 tls->snd_tag = NULL;
1708 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
1709 if (old != NULL)
1710 m_snd_tag_rele(old);
1711
1712 error = ktls_alloc_snd_tag(inp, tls, true, &new);
1713
1714 if (error == 0) {
1715 INP_WLOCK(inp);
1716 tls->snd_tag = new;
1717 mtx_pool_lock(mtxpool_sleep, tls);
1718 tls->reset_pending = false;
1719 mtx_pool_unlock(mtxpool_sleep, tls);
1720 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
1721
1722 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_reset, 1);
1723
1724 /*
1725 * XXX: Should we kick tcp_output explicitly now that
1726 * the send tag is fixed or just rely on timers?
1727 */
1728 } else {
1729 NET_EPOCH_ENTER(et);
1730 INP_WLOCK(inp);
1731 if (!(inp->inp_flags & INP_DROPPED)) {
1732 tp = intotcpcb(inp);
1733 CURVNET_SET(inp->inp_vnet);
1734 tp = tcp_drop(tp, ECONNABORTED);
1735 CURVNET_RESTORE();
1736 if (tp != NULL) {
1737 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_reset_dropped, 1);
1738 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
1739 }
1740 } else
1741 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
1742 NET_EPOCH_EXIT(et);
1743
1744 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_reset_failed, 1);
1745
1746 /*
1747 * Leave reset_pending true to avoid future tasks while
1748 * the socket goes away.
1749 */
1750 }
1751
1752 ktls_free(tls);
1753 }
1754
1755 void
ktls_input_ifp_mismatch(struct sockbuf * sb,struct ifnet * ifp)1756 ktls_input_ifp_mismatch(struct sockbuf *sb, struct ifnet *ifp)
1757 {
1758 struct ktls_session *tls;
1759 struct socket *so;
1760
1761 SOCKBUF_LOCK_ASSERT(sb);
1762 KASSERT(sb->sb_flags & SB_TLS_RX, ("%s: sockbuf %p isn't TLS RX",
1763 __func__, sb));
1764 so = __containerof(sb, struct socket, so_rcv);
1765
1766 tls = sb->sb_tls_info;
1767 if_rele(tls->rx_ifp);
1768 if_ref(ifp);
1769 tls->rx_ifp = ifp;
1770
1771 /*
1772 * See if we should schedule a task to update the receive tag for
1773 * this session.
1774 */
1775 mtx_pool_lock(mtxpool_sleep, tls);
1776 if (!tls->reset_pending) {
1777 (void) ktls_hold(tls);
1778 soref(so);
1779 tls->so = so;
1780 tls->reset_pending = true;
1781 taskqueue_enqueue(taskqueue_thread, &tls->reset_tag_task);
1782 }
1783 mtx_pool_unlock(mtxpool_sleep, tls);
1784 }
1785
1786 int
ktls_output_eagain(struct inpcb * inp,struct ktls_session * tls)1787 ktls_output_eagain(struct inpcb *inp, struct ktls_session *tls)
1788 {
1789
1790 if (inp == NULL)
1791 return (ENOBUFS);
1792
1793 INP_LOCK_ASSERT(inp);
1794
1795 /*
1796 * See if we should schedule a task to update the send tag for
1797 * this session.
1798 */
1799 mtx_pool_lock(mtxpool_sleep, tls);
1800 if (!tls->reset_pending) {
1801 (void) ktls_hold(tls);
1802 tls->reset_pending = true;
1803 taskqueue_enqueue(taskqueue_thread, &tls->reset_tag_task);
1804 }
1805 mtx_pool_unlock(mtxpool_sleep, tls);
1806 return (ENOBUFS);
1807 }
1808
1809 #ifdef RATELIMIT
1810 int
ktls_modify_txrtlmt(struct ktls_session * tls,uint64_t max_pacing_rate)1811 ktls_modify_txrtlmt(struct ktls_session *tls, uint64_t max_pacing_rate)
1812 {
1813 union if_snd_tag_modify_params params = {
1814 .rate_limit.max_rate = max_pacing_rate,
1815 .rate_limit.flags = M_NOWAIT,
1816 };
1817 struct m_snd_tag *mst;
1818
1819 /* Can't get to the inp, but it should be locked. */
1820 /* INP_LOCK_ASSERT(inp); */
1821
1822 MPASS(tls->mode == TCP_TLS_MODE_IFNET);
1823
1824 if (tls->snd_tag == NULL) {
1825 /*
1826 * Resetting send tag, ignore this change. The
1827 * pending reset may or may not see this updated rate
1828 * in the tcpcb. If it doesn't, we will just lose
1829 * this rate change.
1830 */
1831 return (0);
1832 }
1833
1834 mst = tls->snd_tag;
1835
1836 MPASS(mst != NULL);
1837 MPASS(mst->sw->type == IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS_RATE_LIMIT);
1838
1839 return (mst->sw->snd_tag_modify(mst, ¶ms));
1840 }
1841 #endif
1842
1843 static void
ktls_destroy_help(void * context,int pending __unused)1844 ktls_destroy_help(void *context, int pending __unused)
1845 {
1846 ktls_destroy(context);
1847 }
1848
1849 void
ktls_destroy(struct ktls_session * tls)1850 ktls_destroy(struct ktls_session *tls)
1851 {
1852 struct inpcb *inp;
1853 struct tcpcb *tp;
1854 bool wlocked;
1855
1856 MPASS(tls->refcount == 0);
1857
1858 inp = tls->inp;
1859 if (tls->tx) {
1860 wlocked = INP_WLOCKED(inp);
1861 if (!wlocked && !INP_TRY_WLOCK(inp)) {
1862 /*
1863 * rwlocks read locks are anonymous, and there
1864 * is no way to know if our current thread
1865 * holds an rlock on the inp. As a rough
1866 * estimate, check to see if the thread holds
1867 * *any* rlocks at all. If it does not, then we
1868 * know that we don't hold the inp rlock, and
1869 * can safely take the wlock
1870 */
1871 if (curthread->td_rw_rlocks == 0) {
1872 INP_WLOCK(inp);
1873 } else {
1874 /*
1875 * We might hold the rlock, so let's
1876 * do the destroy in a taskqueue
1877 * context to avoid a potential
1878 * deadlock. This should be very
1879 * rare.
1880 */
1881 counter_u64_add(ktls_destroy_task, 1);
1882 TASK_INIT(&tls->destroy_task, 0,
1883 ktls_destroy_help, tls);
1884 (void)taskqueue_enqueue(taskqueue_thread,
1885 &tls->destroy_task);
1886 return;
1887 }
1888 }
1889 }
1890
1891 if (tls->sequential_records) {
1892 struct mbuf *m, *n;
1893 int page_count;
1894
1895 STAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(m, &tls->pending_records, m_epg_stailq, n) {
1896 page_count = m->m_epg_enc_cnt;
1897 while (page_count > 0) {
1898 KASSERT(page_count >= m->m_epg_nrdy,
1899 ("%s: too few pages", __func__));
1900 page_count -= m->m_epg_nrdy;
1901 m = m_free(m);
1902 }
1903 }
1904 }
1905
1906 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_active, -1);
1907 switch (tls->mode) {
1908 case TCP_TLS_MODE_SW:
1909 switch (tls->params.cipher_algorithm) {
1910 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
1911 counter_u64_add(ktls_sw_cbc, -1);
1912 break;
1913 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
1914 counter_u64_add(ktls_sw_gcm, -1);
1915 break;
1916 case CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
1917 counter_u64_add(ktls_sw_chacha20, -1);
1918 break;
1919 }
1920 break;
1921 case TCP_TLS_MODE_IFNET:
1922 switch (tls->params.cipher_algorithm) {
1923 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
1924 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_cbc, -1);
1925 break;
1926 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
1927 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_gcm, -1);
1928 break;
1929 case CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
1930 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_chacha20, -1);
1931 break;
1932 }
1933 if (tls->snd_tag != NULL)
1934 m_snd_tag_rele(tls->snd_tag);
1935 if (tls->rx_ifp != NULL)
1936 if_rele(tls->rx_ifp);
1937 if (tls->tx) {
1938 INP_WLOCK_ASSERT(inp);
1939 tp = intotcpcb(inp);
1940 MPASS(tp->t_nic_ktls_xmit == 1);
1941 tp->t_nic_ktls_xmit = 0;
1942 }
1943 break;
1944 #ifdef TCP_OFFLOAD
1945 case TCP_TLS_MODE_TOE:
1946 switch (tls->params.cipher_algorithm) {
1947 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
1948 counter_u64_add(ktls_toe_cbc, -1);
1949 break;
1950 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
1951 counter_u64_add(ktls_toe_gcm, -1);
1952 break;
1953 case CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
1954 counter_u64_add(ktls_toe_chacha20, -1);
1955 break;
1956 }
1957 break;
1958 #endif
1959 }
1960 if (tls->ocf_session != NULL)
1961 ktls_ocf_free(tls);
1962 if (tls->params.auth_key != NULL) {
1963 zfree(tls->params.auth_key, M_KTLS);
1964 tls->params.auth_key = NULL;
1965 tls->params.auth_key_len = 0;
1966 }
1967 if (tls->params.cipher_key != NULL) {
1968 zfree(tls->params.cipher_key, M_KTLS);
1969 tls->params.cipher_key = NULL;
1970 tls->params.cipher_key_len = 0;
1971 }
1972 if (tls->tx) {
1973 INP_WLOCK_ASSERT(inp);
1974 if (!in_pcbrele_wlocked(inp) && !wlocked)
1975 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
1976 }
1977 explicit_bzero(tls->params.iv, sizeof(tls->params.iv));
1978
1979 uma_zfree(ktls_session_zone, tls);
1980 }
1981
1982 void
ktls_seq(struct sockbuf * sb,struct mbuf * m)1983 ktls_seq(struct sockbuf *sb, struct mbuf *m)
1984 {
1985
1986 for (; m != NULL; m = m->m_next) {
1987 KASSERT((m->m_flags & M_EXTPG) != 0,
1988 ("ktls_seq: mapped mbuf %p", m));
1989
1990 m->m_epg_seqno = sb->sb_tls_seqno;
1991 sb->sb_tls_seqno++;
1992 }
1993 }
1994
1995 /*
1996 * Add TLS framing (headers and trailers) to a chain of mbufs. Each
1997 * mbuf in the chain must be an unmapped mbuf. The payload of the
1998 * mbuf must be populated with the payload of each TLS record.
1999 *
2000 * The record_type argument specifies the TLS record type used when
2001 * populating the TLS header.
2002 *
2003 * The enq_count argument on return is set to the number of pages of
2004 * payload data for this entire chain that need to be encrypted via SW
2005 * encryption. The returned value should be passed to ktls_enqueue
2006 * when scheduling encryption of this chain of mbufs. To handle the
2007 * special case of empty fragments for TLS 1.0 sessions, an empty
2008 * fragment counts as one page.
2009 */
2010 void
ktls_frame(struct mbuf * top,struct ktls_session * tls,int * enq_cnt,uint8_t record_type)2011 ktls_frame(struct mbuf *top, struct ktls_session *tls, int *enq_cnt,
2012 uint8_t record_type)
2013 {
2014 struct tls_record_layer *tlshdr;
2015 struct mbuf *m;
2016 uint64_t *noncep;
2017 uint16_t tls_len;
2018 int maxlen __diagused;
2019
2020 maxlen = tls->params.max_frame_len;
2021 *enq_cnt = 0;
2022 for (m = top; m != NULL; m = m->m_next) {
2023 /*
2024 * All mbufs in the chain should be TLS records whose
2025 * payload does not exceed the maximum frame length.
2026 *
2027 * Empty TLS 1.0 records are permitted when using CBC.
2028 */
2029 KASSERT(m->m_len <= maxlen && m->m_len >= 0 &&
2030 (m->m_len > 0 || ktls_permit_empty_frames(tls)),
2031 ("ktls_frame: m %p len %d", m, m->m_len));
2032
2033 /*
2034 * TLS frames require unmapped mbufs to store session
2035 * info.
2036 */
2037 KASSERT((m->m_flags & M_EXTPG) != 0,
2038 ("ktls_frame: mapped mbuf %p (top = %p)", m, top));
2039
2040 tls_len = m->m_len;
2041
2042 /* Save a reference to the session. */
2043 m->m_epg_tls = ktls_hold(tls);
2044
2045 m->m_epg_hdrlen = tls->params.tls_hlen;
2046 m->m_epg_trllen = tls->params.tls_tlen;
2047 if (tls->params.cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_CBC) {
2048 int bs, delta;
2049
2050 /*
2051 * AES-CBC pads messages to a multiple of the
2052 * block size. Note that the padding is
2053 * applied after the digest and the encryption
2054 * is done on the "plaintext || mac || padding".
2055 * At least one byte of padding is always
2056 * present.
2057 *
2058 * Compute the final trailer length assuming
2059 * at most one block of padding.
2060 * tls->params.tls_tlen is the maximum
2061 * possible trailer length (padding + digest).
2062 * delta holds the number of excess padding
2063 * bytes if the maximum were used. Those
2064 * extra bytes are removed.
2065 */
2066 bs = tls->params.tls_bs;
2067 delta = (tls_len + tls->params.tls_tlen) & (bs - 1);
2068 m->m_epg_trllen -= delta;
2069 }
2070 m->m_len += m->m_epg_hdrlen + m->m_epg_trllen;
2071
2072 /* Populate the TLS header. */
2073 tlshdr = (void *)m->m_epg_hdr;
2074 tlshdr->tls_vmajor = tls->params.tls_vmajor;
2075
2076 /*
2077 * TLS 1.3 masquarades as TLS 1.2 with a record type
2078 * of TLS_RLTYPE_APP.
2079 */
2080 if (tls->params.tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE &&
2081 tls->params.tls_vmajor == TLS_MAJOR_VER_ONE) {
2082 tlshdr->tls_vminor = TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO;
2083 tlshdr->tls_type = TLS_RLTYPE_APP;
2084 /* save the real record type for later */
2085 m->m_epg_record_type = record_type;
2086 m->m_epg_trail[0] = record_type;
2087 } else {
2088 tlshdr->tls_vminor = tls->params.tls_vminor;
2089 tlshdr->tls_type = record_type;
2090 }
2091 tlshdr->tls_length = htons(m->m_len - sizeof(*tlshdr));
2092
2093 /*
2094 * Store nonces / explicit IVs after the end of the
2095 * TLS header.
2096 *
2097 * For GCM with TLS 1.2, an 8 byte nonce is copied
2098 * from the end of the IV. The nonce is then
2099 * incremented for use by the next record.
2100 *
2101 * For CBC, a random nonce is inserted for TLS 1.1+.
2102 */
2103 if (tls->params.cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16 &&
2104 tls->params.tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO) {
2105 noncep = (uint64_t *)(tls->params.iv + 8);
2106 be64enc(tlshdr + 1, *noncep);
2107 (*noncep)++;
2108 } else if (tls->params.cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_CBC &&
2109 tls->params.tls_vminor >= TLS_MINOR_VER_ONE)
2110 arc4rand(tlshdr + 1, AES_BLOCK_LEN, 0);
2111
2112 /*
2113 * When using SW encryption, mark the mbuf not ready.
2114 * It will be marked ready via sbready() after the
2115 * record has been encrypted.
2116 *
2117 * When using ifnet TLS, unencrypted TLS records are
2118 * sent down the stack to the NIC.
2119 */
2120 if (tls->mode == TCP_TLS_MODE_SW) {
2121 m->m_flags |= M_NOTREADY;
2122 if (__predict_false(tls_len == 0)) {
2123 /* TLS 1.0 empty fragment. */
2124 m->m_epg_nrdy = 1;
2125 } else
2126 m->m_epg_nrdy = m->m_epg_npgs;
2127 *enq_cnt += m->m_epg_nrdy;
2128 }
2129 }
2130 }
2131
2132 bool
ktls_permit_empty_frames(struct ktls_session * tls)2133 ktls_permit_empty_frames(struct ktls_session *tls)
2134 {
2135 return (tls->params.cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_CBC &&
2136 tls->params.tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_ZERO);
2137 }
2138
2139 void
ktls_check_rx(struct sockbuf * sb)2140 ktls_check_rx(struct sockbuf *sb)
2141 {
2142 struct tls_record_layer hdr;
2143 struct ktls_wq *wq;
2144 struct socket *so;
2145 bool running;
2146
2147 SOCKBUF_LOCK_ASSERT(sb);
2148 KASSERT(sb->sb_flags & SB_TLS_RX, ("%s: sockbuf %p isn't TLS RX",
2149 __func__, sb));
2150 so = __containerof(sb, struct socket, so_rcv);
2151
2152 if (sb->sb_flags & SB_TLS_RX_RUNNING)
2153 return;
2154
2155 /* Is there enough queued for a TLS header? */
2156 if (sb->sb_tlscc < sizeof(hdr)) {
2157 if ((sb->sb_state & SBS_CANTRCVMORE) != 0 && sb->sb_tlscc != 0)
2158 so->so_error = EMSGSIZE;
2159 return;
2160 }
2161
2162 m_copydata(sb->sb_mtls, 0, sizeof(hdr), (void *)&hdr);
2163
2164 /* Is the entire record queued? */
2165 if (sb->sb_tlscc < sizeof(hdr) + ntohs(hdr.tls_length)) {
2166 if ((sb->sb_state & SBS_CANTRCVMORE) != 0)
2167 so->so_error = EMSGSIZE;
2168 return;
2169 }
2170
2171 sb->sb_flags |= SB_TLS_RX_RUNNING;
2172
2173 soref(so);
2174 wq = &ktls_wq[so->so_rcv.sb_tls_info->wq_index];
2175 mtx_lock(&wq->mtx);
2176 STAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&wq->so_head, so, so_ktls_rx_list);
2177 running = wq->running;
2178 mtx_unlock(&wq->mtx);
2179 if (!running)
2180 wakeup(wq);
2181 counter_u64_add(ktls_cnt_rx_queued, 1);
2182 }
2183
2184 static struct mbuf *
ktls_detach_record(struct sockbuf * sb,int len)2185 ktls_detach_record(struct sockbuf *sb, int len)
2186 {
2187 struct mbuf *m, *n, *top;
2188 int remain;
2189
2190 SOCKBUF_LOCK_ASSERT(sb);
2191 MPASS(len <= sb->sb_tlscc);
2192
2193 /*
2194 * If TLS chain is the exact size of the record,
2195 * just grab the whole record.
2196 */
2197 top = sb->sb_mtls;
2198 if (sb->sb_tlscc == len) {
2199 sb->sb_mtls = NULL;
2200 sb->sb_mtlstail = NULL;
2201 goto out;
2202 }
2203
2204 /*
2205 * While it would be nice to use m_split() here, we need
2206 * to know exactly what m_split() allocates to update the
2207 * accounting, so do it inline instead.
2208 */
2209 remain = len;
2210 for (m = top; remain > m->m_len; m = m->m_next)
2211 remain -= m->m_len;
2212
2213 /* Easy case: don't have to split 'm'. */
2214 if (remain == m->m_len) {
2215 sb->sb_mtls = m->m_next;
2216 if (sb->sb_mtls == NULL)
2217 sb->sb_mtlstail = NULL;
2218 m->m_next = NULL;
2219 goto out;
2220 }
2221
2222 /*
2223 * Need to allocate an mbuf to hold the remainder of 'm'. Try
2224 * with M_NOWAIT first.
2225 */
2226 n = m_get(M_NOWAIT, MT_DATA);
2227 if (n == NULL) {
2228 /*
2229 * Use M_WAITOK with socket buffer unlocked. If
2230 * 'sb_mtls' changes while the lock is dropped, return
2231 * NULL to force the caller to retry.
2232 */
2233 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(sb);
2234
2235 n = m_get(M_WAITOK, MT_DATA);
2236
2237 SOCKBUF_LOCK(sb);
2238 if (sb->sb_mtls != top) {
2239 m_free(n);
2240 return (NULL);
2241 }
2242 }
2243 n->m_flags |= (m->m_flags & (M_NOTREADY | M_DECRYPTED));
2244
2245 /* Store remainder in 'n'. */
2246 n->m_len = m->m_len - remain;
2247 if (m->m_flags & M_EXT) {
2248 n->m_data = m->m_data + remain;
2249 mb_dupcl(n, m);
2250 } else {
2251 bcopy(mtod(m, caddr_t) + remain, mtod(n, caddr_t), n->m_len);
2252 }
2253
2254 /* Trim 'm' and update accounting. */
2255 m->m_len -= n->m_len;
2256 sb->sb_tlscc -= n->m_len;
2257 sb->sb_ccc -= n->m_len;
2258
2259 /* Account for 'n'. */
2260 sballoc_ktls_rx(sb, n);
2261
2262 /* Insert 'n' into the TLS chain. */
2263 sb->sb_mtls = n;
2264 n->m_next = m->m_next;
2265 if (sb->sb_mtlstail == m)
2266 sb->sb_mtlstail = n;
2267
2268 /* Detach the record from the TLS chain. */
2269 m->m_next = NULL;
2270
2271 out:
2272 MPASS(m_length(top, NULL) == len);
2273 for (m = top; m != NULL; m = m->m_next)
2274 sbfree_ktls_rx(sb, m);
2275 sb->sb_tlsdcc = len;
2276 sb->sb_ccc += len;
2277 SBCHECK(sb);
2278 return (top);
2279 }
2280
2281 /*
2282 * Determine the length of the trailing zero padding and find the real
2283 * record type in the byte before the padding.
2284 *
2285 * Walking the mbuf chain backwards is clumsy, so another option would
2286 * be to scan forwards remembering the last non-zero byte before the
2287 * trailer. However, it would be expensive to scan the entire record.
2288 * Instead, find the last non-zero byte of each mbuf in the chain
2289 * keeping track of the relative offset of that nonzero byte.
2290 *
2291 * trail_len is the size of the MAC/tag on input and is set to the
2292 * size of the full trailer including padding and the record type on
2293 * return.
2294 */
2295 static int
tls13_find_record_type(struct ktls_session * tls,struct mbuf * m,int tls_len,int * trailer_len,uint8_t * record_typep)2296 tls13_find_record_type(struct ktls_session *tls, struct mbuf *m, int tls_len,
2297 int *trailer_len, uint8_t *record_typep)
2298 {
2299 char *cp;
2300 u_int digest_start, last_offset, m_len, offset;
2301 uint8_t record_type;
2302
2303 digest_start = tls_len - *trailer_len;
2304 last_offset = 0;
2305 offset = 0;
2306 for (; m != NULL && offset < digest_start;
2307 offset += m->m_len, m = m->m_next) {
2308 /* Don't look for padding in the tag. */
2309 m_len = min(digest_start - offset, m->m_len);
2310 cp = mtod(m, char *);
2311
2312 /* Find last non-zero byte in this mbuf. */
2313 while (m_len > 0 && cp[m_len - 1] == 0)
2314 m_len--;
2315 if (m_len > 0) {
2316 record_type = cp[m_len - 1];
2317 last_offset = offset + m_len;
2318 }
2319 }
2320 if (last_offset < tls->params.tls_hlen)
2321 return (EBADMSG);
2322
2323 *record_typep = record_type;
2324 *trailer_len = tls_len - last_offset + 1;
2325 return (0);
2326 }
2327
2328 /*
2329 * Check if a mbuf chain is fully decrypted at the given offset and
2330 * length. Returns KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_DECRYPTED if all data is
2331 * decrypted. KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_MIXED if there is a mix of encrypted
2332 * and decrypted data. Else KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_ENCRYPTED if all data
2333 * is encrypted.
2334 */
2335 ktls_mbuf_crypto_st_t
ktls_mbuf_crypto_state(struct mbuf * mb,int offset,int len)2336 ktls_mbuf_crypto_state(struct mbuf *mb, int offset, int len)
2337 {
2338 int m_flags_ored = 0;
2339 int m_flags_anded = -1;
2340
2341 for (; mb != NULL; mb = mb->m_next) {
2342 if (offset < mb->m_len)
2343 break;
2344 offset -= mb->m_len;
2345 }
2346 offset += len;
2347
2348 for (; mb != NULL; mb = mb->m_next) {
2349 m_flags_ored |= mb->m_flags;
2350 m_flags_anded &= mb->m_flags;
2351
2352 if (offset <= mb->m_len)
2353 break;
2354 offset -= mb->m_len;
2355 }
2356 MPASS(mb != NULL || offset == 0);
2357
2358 if ((m_flags_ored ^ m_flags_anded) & M_DECRYPTED)
2359 return (KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_MIXED);
2360 else
2361 return ((m_flags_ored & M_DECRYPTED) ?
2362 KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_DECRYPTED :
2363 KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_ENCRYPTED);
2364 }
2365
2366 /*
2367 * ktls_resync_ifnet - get HW TLS RX back on track after packet loss
2368 */
2369 static int
ktls_resync_ifnet(struct socket * so,uint32_t tls_len,uint64_t tls_rcd_num)2370 ktls_resync_ifnet(struct socket *so, uint32_t tls_len, uint64_t tls_rcd_num)
2371 {
2372 union if_snd_tag_modify_params params;
2373 struct m_snd_tag *mst;
2374 struct inpcb *inp;
2375 struct tcpcb *tp;
2376
2377 mst = so->so_rcv.sb_tls_info->snd_tag;
2378 if (__predict_false(mst == NULL))
2379 return (EINVAL);
2380
2381 inp = sotoinpcb(so);
2382 if (__predict_false(inp == NULL))
2383 return (EINVAL);
2384
2385 INP_RLOCK(inp);
2386 if (inp->inp_flags & INP_DROPPED) {
2387 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
2388 return (ECONNRESET);
2389 }
2390
2391 tp = intotcpcb(inp);
2392 MPASS(tp != NULL);
2393
2394 /* Get the TCP sequence number of the next valid TLS header. */
2395 SOCKBUF_LOCK(&so->so_rcv);
2396 params.tls_rx.tls_hdr_tcp_sn =
2397 tp->rcv_nxt - so->so_rcv.sb_tlscc - tls_len;
2398 params.tls_rx.tls_rec_length = tls_len;
2399 params.tls_rx.tls_seq_number = tls_rcd_num;
2400 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_rcv);
2401
2402 INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
2403
2404 MPASS(mst->sw->type == IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS_RX);
2405 return (mst->sw->snd_tag_modify(mst, ¶ms));
2406 }
2407
2408 static void
ktls_drop(struct socket * so,int error)2409 ktls_drop(struct socket *so, int error)
2410 {
2411 struct epoch_tracker et;
2412 struct inpcb *inp = sotoinpcb(so);
2413 struct tcpcb *tp;
2414
2415 NET_EPOCH_ENTER(et);
2416 INP_WLOCK(inp);
2417 if (!(inp->inp_flags & INP_DROPPED)) {
2418 tp = intotcpcb(inp);
2419 CURVNET_SET(inp->inp_vnet);
2420 tp = tcp_drop(tp, error);
2421 CURVNET_RESTORE();
2422 if (tp != NULL)
2423 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
2424 } else {
2425 so->so_error = error;
2426 SOCK_RECVBUF_LOCK(so);
2427 sorwakeup_locked(so);
2428 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
2429 }
2430 NET_EPOCH_EXIT(et);
2431 }
2432
2433 static void
ktls_decrypt(struct socket * so)2434 ktls_decrypt(struct socket *so)
2435 {
2436 char tls_header[MBUF_PEXT_HDR_LEN];
2437 struct ktls_session *tls;
2438 struct sockbuf *sb;
2439 struct tls_record_layer *hdr;
2440 struct tls_get_record tgr;
2441 struct mbuf *control, *data, *m;
2442 ktls_mbuf_crypto_st_t state;
2443 uint64_t seqno;
2444 int error, remain, tls_len, trail_len;
2445 bool tls13;
2446 uint8_t vminor, record_type;
2447
2448 hdr = (struct tls_record_layer *)tls_header;
2449 sb = &so->so_rcv;
2450 SOCKBUF_LOCK(sb);
2451 KASSERT(sb->sb_flags & SB_TLS_RX_RUNNING,
2452 ("%s: socket %p not running", __func__, so));
2453
2454 tls = sb->sb_tls_info;
2455 MPASS(tls != NULL);
2456
2457 tls13 = (tls->params.tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE);
2458 if (tls13)
2459 vminor = TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO;
2460 else
2461 vminor = tls->params.tls_vminor;
2462 for (;;) {
2463 /* Is there enough queued for a TLS header? */
2464 if (sb->sb_tlscc < tls->params.tls_hlen)
2465 break;
2466
2467 m_copydata(sb->sb_mtls, 0, tls->params.tls_hlen, tls_header);
2468 tls_len = sizeof(*hdr) + ntohs(hdr->tls_length);
2469
2470 if (hdr->tls_vmajor != tls->params.tls_vmajor ||
2471 hdr->tls_vminor != vminor)
2472 error = EINVAL;
2473 else if (tls13 && hdr->tls_type != TLS_RLTYPE_APP)
2474 error = EINVAL;
2475 else if (tls_len < tls->params.tls_hlen || tls_len >
2476 tls->params.tls_hlen + TLS_MAX_MSG_SIZE_V10_2 +
2477 tls->params.tls_tlen)
2478 error = EMSGSIZE;
2479 else
2480 error = 0;
2481 if (__predict_false(error != 0)) {
2482 /*
2483 * We have a corrupted record and are likely
2484 * out of sync. The connection isn't
2485 * recoverable at this point, so abort it.
2486 */
2487 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(sb);
2488 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_corrupted_records, 1);
2489
2490 ktls_drop(so, error);
2491 goto deref;
2492 }
2493
2494 /* Is the entire record queued? */
2495 if (sb->sb_tlscc < tls_len)
2496 break;
2497
2498 /*
2499 * Split out the portion of the mbuf chain containing
2500 * this TLS record.
2501 */
2502 data = ktls_detach_record(sb, tls_len);
2503 if (data == NULL)
2504 continue;
2505 MPASS(sb->sb_tlsdcc == tls_len);
2506
2507 seqno = sb->sb_tls_seqno;
2508 sb->sb_tls_seqno++;
2509 SBCHECK(sb);
2510 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(sb);
2511
2512 /* get crypto state for this TLS record */
2513 state = ktls_mbuf_crypto_state(data, 0, tls_len);
2514
2515 switch (state) {
2516 case KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_MIXED:
2517 error = ktls_ocf_recrypt(tls, hdr, data, seqno);
2518 if (error)
2519 break;
2520 /* FALLTHROUGH */
2521 case KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_ENCRYPTED:
2522 error = ktls_ocf_decrypt(tls, hdr, data, seqno,
2523 &trail_len);
2524 if (__predict_true(error == 0)) {
2525 if (tls13) {
2526 error = tls13_find_record_type(tls, data,
2527 tls_len, &trail_len, &record_type);
2528 } else {
2529 record_type = hdr->tls_type;
2530 }
2531 }
2532 break;
2533 case KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_DECRYPTED:
2534 /*
2535 * NIC TLS is only supported for AEAD
2536 * ciphersuites which used a fixed sized
2537 * trailer.
2538 */
2539 if (tls13) {
2540 trail_len = tls->params.tls_tlen - 1;
2541 error = tls13_find_record_type(tls, data,
2542 tls_len, &trail_len, &record_type);
2543 } else {
2544 trail_len = tls->params.tls_tlen;
2545 error = 0;
2546 record_type = hdr->tls_type;
2547 }
2548 break;
2549 default:
2550 error = EINVAL;
2551 break;
2552 }
2553 if (error) {
2554 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_failed_crypto, 1);
2555
2556 SOCKBUF_LOCK(sb);
2557 if (sb->sb_tlsdcc == 0) {
2558 /*
2559 * sbcut/drop/flush discarded these
2560 * mbufs.
2561 */
2562 m_freem(data);
2563 break;
2564 }
2565
2566 /*
2567 * Drop this TLS record's data, but keep
2568 * decrypting subsequent records.
2569 */
2570 sb->sb_ccc -= tls_len;
2571 sb->sb_tlsdcc = 0;
2572
2573 if (error != EMSGSIZE)
2574 error = EBADMSG;
2575 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet);
2576 so->so_error = error;
2577 sorwakeup_locked(so);
2578 CURVNET_RESTORE();
2579
2580 m_freem(data);
2581
2582 SOCKBUF_LOCK(sb);
2583 continue;
2584 }
2585
2586 /* Allocate the control mbuf. */
2587 memset(&tgr, 0, sizeof(tgr));
2588 tgr.tls_type = record_type;
2589 tgr.tls_vmajor = hdr->tls_vmajor;
2590 tgr.tls_vminor = hdr->tls_vminor;
2591 tgr.tls_length = htobe16(tls_len - tls->params.tls_hlen -
2592 trail_len);
2593 control = sbcreatecontrol(&tgr, sizeof(tgr),
2594 TLS_GET_RECORD, IPPROTO_TCP, M_WAITOK);
2595
2596 SOCKBUF_LOCK(sb);
2597 if (sb->sb_tlsdcc == 0) {
2598 /* sbcut/drop/flush discarded these mbufs. */
2599 MPASS(sb->sb_tlscc == 0);
2600 m_freem(data);
2601 m_freem(control);
2602 break;
2603 }
2604
2605 /*
2606 * Clear the 'dcc' accounting in preparation for
2607 * adding the decrypted record.
2608 */
2609 sb->sb_ccc -= tls_len;
2610 sb->sb_tlsdcc = 0;
2611 SBCHECK(sb);
2612
2613 /* If there is no payload, drop all of the data. */
2614 if (tgr.tls_length == htobe16(0)) {
2615 m_freem(data);
2616 data = NULL;
2617 } else {
2618 /* Trim header. */
2619 remain = tls->params.tls_hlen;
2620 while (remain > 0) {
2621 if (data->m_len > remain) {
2622 data->m_data += remain;
2623 data->m_len -= remain;
2624 break;
2625 }
2626 remain -= data->m_len;
2627 data = m_free(data);
2628 }
2629
2630 /* Trim trailer and clear M_NOTREADY. */
2631 remain = be16toh(tgr.tls_length);
2632 m = data;
2633 for (m = data; remain > m->m_len; m = m->m_next) {
2634 m->m_flags &= ~(M_NOTREADY | M_DECRYPTED);
2635 remain -= m->m_len;
2636 }
2637 m->m_len = remain;
2638 m_freem(m->m_next);
2639 m->m_next = NULL;
2640 m->m_flags &= ~(M_NOTREADY | M_DECRYPTED);
2641
2642 /* Set EOR on the final mbuf. */
2643 m->m_flags |= M_EOR;
2644 }
2645
2646 sbappendcontrol_locked(sb, data, control, 0);
2647
2648 if (__predict_false(state != KTLS_MBUF_CRYPTO_ST_DECRYPTED)) {
2649 sb->sb_flags |= SB_TLS_RX_RESYNC;
2650 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(sb);
2651 ktls_resync_ifnet(so, tls_len, seqno);
2652 SOCKBUF_LOCK(sb);
2653 } else if (__predict_false(sb->sb_flags & SB_TLS_RX_RESYNC)) {
2654 sb->sb_flags &= ~SB_TLS_RX_RESYNC;
2655 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(sb);
2656 ktls_resync_ifnet(so, 0, seqno);
2657 SOCKBUF_LOCK(sb);
2658 }
2659 }
2660
2661 sb->sb_flags &= ~SB_TLS_RX_RUNNING;
2662
2663 if ((sb->sb_state & SBS_CANTRCVMORE) != 0 && sb->sb_tlscc > 0)
2664 so->so_error = EMSGSIZE;
2665
2666 sorwakeup_locked(so);
2667
2668 deref:
2669 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK_ASSERT(sb);
2670
2671 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet);
2672 sorele(so);
2673 CURVNET_RESTORE();
2674 }
2675
2676 void
ktls_enqueue_to_free(struct mbuf * m)2677 ktls_enqueue_to_free(struct mbuf *m)
2678 {
2679 struct ktls_wq *wq;
2680 bool running;
2681
2682 /* Mark it for freeing. */
2683 m->m_epg_flags |= EPG_FLAG_2FREE;
2684 wq = &ktls_wq[m->m_epg_tls->wq_index];
2685 mtx_lock(&wq->mtx);
2686 STAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&wq->m_head, m, m_epg_stailq);
2687 running = wq->running;
2688 mtx_unlock(&wq->mtx);
2689 if (!running)
2690 wakeup(wq);
2691 }
2692
2693 static void *
ktls_buffer_alloc(struct ktls_wq * wq,struct mbuf * m)2694 ktls_buffer_alloc(struct ktls_wq *wq, struct mbuf *m)
2695 {
2696 void *buf;
2697 int domain, running;
2698
2699 if (m->m_epg_npgs <= 2)
2700 return (NULL);
2701 if (ktls_buffer_zone == NULL)
2702 return (NULL);
2703 if ((u_int)(ticks - wq->lastallocfail) < hz) {
2704 /*
2705 * Rate-limit allocation attempts after a failure.
2706 * ktls_buffer_import() will acquire a per-domain mutex to check
2707 * the free page queues and may fail consistently if memory is
2708 * fragmented.
2709 */
2710 return (NULL);
2711 }
2712 buf = uma_zalloc(ktls_buffer_zone, M_NOWAIT | M_NORECLAIM);
2713 if (buf == NULL) {
2714 domain = PCPU_GET(domain);
2715 wq->lastallocfail = ticks;
2716
2717 /*
2718 * Note that this check is "racy", but the races are
2719 * harmless, and are either a spurious wakeup if
2720 * multiple threads fail allocations before the alloc
2721 * thread wakes, or waiting an extra second in case we
2722 * see an old value of running == true.
2723 */
2724 if (!VM_DOMAIN_EMPTY(domain)) {
2725 running = atomic_load_int(&ktls_domains[domain].reclaim_td.running);
2726 if (!running)
2727 wakeup(&ktls_domains[domain].reclaim_td);
2728 }
2729 }
2730 return (buf);
2731 }
2732
2733 static int
ktls_encrypt_record(struct ktls_wq * wq,struct mbuf * m,struct ktls_session * tls,struct ktls_ocf_encrypt_state * state)2734 ktls_encrypt_record(struct ktls_wq *wq, struct mbuf *m,
2735 struct ktls_session *tls, struct ktls_ocf_encrypt_state *state)
2736 {
2737 vm_page_t pg;
2738 int error, i, len, off;
2739
2740 KASSERT((m->m_flags & (M_EXTPG | M_NOTREADY)) == (M_EXTPG | M_NOTREADY),
2741 ("%p not unready & nomap mbuf\n", m));
2742 KASSERT(ptoa(m->m_epg_npgs) <= ktls_maxlen,
2743 ("page count %d larger than maximum frame length %d", m->m_epg_npgs,
2744 ktls_maxlen));
2745
2746 /* Anonymous mbufs are encrypted in place. */
2747 if ((m->m_epg_flags & EPG_FLAG_ANON) != 0)
2748 return (ktls_ocf_encrypt(state, tls, m, NULL, 0));
2749
2750 /*
2751 * For file-backed mbufs (from sendfile), anonymous wired
2752 * pages are allocated and used as the encryption destination.
2753 */
2754 if ((state->cbuf = ktls_buffer_alloc(wq, m)) != NULL) {
2755 len = ptoa(m->m_epg_npgs - 1) + m->m_epg_last_len -
2756 m->m_epg_1st_off;
2757 state->dst_iov[0].iov_base = (char *)state->cbuf +
2758 m->m_epg_1st_off;
2759 state->dst_iov[0].iov_len = len;
2760 state->parray[0] = DMAP_TO_PHYS((vm_offset_t)state->cbuf);
2761 i = 1;
2762 } else {
2763 off = m->m_epg_1st_off;
2764 for (i = 0; i < m->m_epg_npgs; i++, off = 0) {
2765 pg = vm_page_alloc_noobj(VM_ALLOC_NODUMP |
2766 VM_ALLOC_WIRED | VM_ALLOC_WAITOK);
2767 len = m_epg_pagelen(m, i, off);
2768 state->parray[i] = VM_PAGE_TO_PHYS(pg);
2769 state->dst_iov[i].iov_base =
2770 (char *)PHYS_TO_DMAP(state->parray[i]) + off;
2771 state->dst_iov[i].iov_len = len;
2772 }
2773 }
2774 KASSERT(i + 1 <= nitems(state->dst_iov), ("dst_iov is too small"));
2775 state->dst_iov[i].iov_base = m->m_epg_trail;
2776 state->dst_iov[i].iov_len = m->m_epg_trllen;
2777
2778 error = ktls_ocf_encrypt(state, tls, m, state->dst_iov, i + 1);
2779
2780 if (__predict_false(error != 0)) {
2781 /* Free the anonymous pages. */
2782 if (state->cbuf != NULL)
2783 uma_zfree(ktls_buffer_zone, state->cbuf);
2784 else {
2785 for (i = 0; i < m->m_epg_npgs; i++) {
2786 pg = PHYS_TO_VM_PAGE(state->parray[i]);
2787 (void)vm_page_unwire_noq(pg);
2788 vm_page_free(pg);
2789 }
2790 }
2791 }
2792 return (error);
2793 }
2794
2795 /* Number of TLS records in a batch passed to ktls_enqueue(). */
2796 static u_int
ktls_batched_records(struct mbuf * m)2797 ktls_batched_records(struct mbuf *m)
2798 {
2799 int page_count, records;
2800
2801 records = 0;
2802 page_count = m->m_epg_enc_cnt;
2803 while (page_count > 0) {
2804 records++;
2805 page_count -= m->m_epg_nrdy;
2806 m = m->m_next;
2807 }
2808 KASSERT(page_count == 0, ("%s: mismatched page count", __func__));
2809 return (records);
2810 }
2811
2812 void
ktls_enqueue(struct mbuf * m,struct socket * so,int page_count)2813 ktls_enqueue(struct mbuf *m, struct socket *so, int page_count)
2814 {
2815 struct ktls_session *tls;
2816 struct ktls_wq *wq;
2817 int queued;
2818 bool running;
2819
2820 KASSERT(((m->m_flags & (M_EXTPG | M_NOTREADY)) ==
2821 (M_EXTPG | M_NOTREADY)),
2822 ("ktls_enqueue: %p not unready & nomap mbuf\n", m));
2823 KASSERT(page_count != 0, ("enqueueing TLS mbuf with zero page count"));
2824
2825 KASSERT(m->m_epg_tls->mode == TCP_TLS_MODE_SW, ("!SW TLS mbuf"));
2826
2827 m->m_epg_enc_cnt = page_count;
2828
2829 /*
2830 * Save a pointer to the socket. The caller is responsible
2831 * for taking an additional reference via soref().
2832 */
2833 m->m_epg_so = so;
2834
2835 queued = 1;
2836 tls = m->m_epg_tls;
2837 wq = &ktls_wq[tls->wq_index];
2838 mtx_lock(&wq->mtx);
2839 if (__predict_false(tls->sequential_records)) {
2840 /*
2841 * For TLS 1.0, records must be encrypted
2842 * sequentially. For a given connection, all records
2843 * queued to the associated work queue are processed
2844 * sequentially. However, sendfile(2) might complete
2845 * I/O requests spanning multiple TLS records out of
2846 * order. Here we ensure TLS records are enqueued to
2847 * the work queue in FIFO order.
2848 *
2849 * tls->next_seqno holds the sequence number of the
2850 * next TLS record that should be enqueued to the work
2851 * queue. If this next record is not tls->next_seqno,
2852 * it must be a future record, so insert it, sorted by
2853 * TLS sequence number, into tls->pending_records and
2854 * return.
2855 *
2856 * If this TLS record matches tls->next_seqno, place
2857 * it in the work queue and then check
2858 * tls->pending_records to see if any
2859 * previously-queued records are now ready for
2860 * encryption.
2861 */
2862 if (m->m_epg_seqno != tls->next_seqno) {
2863 struct mbuf *n, *p;
2864
2865 p = NULL;
2866 STAILQ_FOREACH(n, &tls->pending_records, m_epg_stailq) {
2867 if (n->m_epg_seqno > m->m_epg_seqno)
2868 break;
2869 p = n;
2870 }
2871 if (n == NULL)
2872 STAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tls->pending_records, m,
2873 m_epg_stailq);
2874 else if (p == NULL)
2875 STAILQ_INSERT_HEAD(&tls->pending_records, m,
2876 m_epg_stailq);
2877 else
2878 STAILQ_INSERT_AFTER(&tls->pending_records, p, m,
2879 m_epg_stailq);
2880 mtx_unlock(&wq->mtx);
2881 counter_u64_add(ktls_cnt_tx_pending, 1);
2882 return;
2883 }
2884
2885 tls->next_seqno += ktls_batched_records(m);
2886 STAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&wq->m_head, m, m_epg_stailq);
2887
2888 while (!STAILQ_EMPTY(&tls->pending_records)) {
2889 struct mbuf *n;
2890
2891 n = STAILQ_FIRST(&tls->pending_records);
2892 if (n->m_epg_seqno != tls->next_seqno)
2893 break;
2894
2895 queued++;
2896 STAILQ_REMOVE_HEAD(&tls->pending_records, m_epg_stailq);
2897 tls->next_seqno += ktls_batched_records(n);
2898 STAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&wq->m_head, n, m_epg_stailq);
2899 }
2900 counter_u64_add(ktls_cnt_tx_pending, -(queued - 1));
2901 } else
2902 STAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&wq->m_head, m, m_epg_stailq);
2903
2904 running = wq->running;
2905 mtx_unlock(&wq->mtx);
2906 if (!running)
2907 wakeup(wq);
2908 counter_u64_add(ktls_cnt_tx_queued, queued);
2909 }
2910
2911 /*
2912 * Once a file-backed mbuf (from sendfile) has been encrypted, free
2913 * the pages from the file and replace them with the anonymous pages
2914 * allocated in ktls_encrypt_record().
2915 */
2916 static void
ktls_finish_nonanon(struct mbuf * m,struct ktls_ocf_encrypt_state * state)2917 ktls_finish_nonanon(struct mbuf *m, struct ktls_ocf_encrypt_state *state)
2918 {
2919 int i;
2920
2921 MPASS((m->m_epg_flags & EPG_FLAG_ANON) == 0);
2922
2923 /* Free the old pages. */
2924 m->m_ext.ext_free(m);
2925
2926 /* Replace them with the new pages. */
2927 if (state->cbuf != NULL) {
2928 for (i = 0; i < m->m_epg_npgs; i++)
2929 m->m_epg_pa[i] = state->parray[0] + ptoa(i);
2930
2931 /* Contig pages should go back to the cache. */
2932 m->m_ext.ext_free = ktls_free_mext_contig;
2933 } else {
2934 for (i = 0; i < m->m_epg_npgs; i++)
2935 m->m_epg_pa[i] = state->parray[i];
2936
2937 /* Use the basic free routine. */
2938 m->m_ext.ext_free = mb_free_mext_pgs;
2939 }
2940
2941 /* Pages are now writable. */
2942 m->m_epg_flags |= EPG_FLAG_ANON;
2943 }
2944
2945 static __noinline void
ktls_encrypt(struct ktls_wq * wq,struct mbuf * top)2946 ktls_encrypt(struct ktls_wq *wq, struct mbuf *top)
2947 {
2948 struct ktls_ocf_encrypt_state state;
2949 struct ktls_session *tls;
2950 struct socket *so;
2951 struct mbuf *m;
2952 int error, npages, total_pages;
2953
2954 so = top->m_epg_so;
2955 tls = top->m_epg_tls;
2956 KASSERT(tls != NULL, ("tls = NULL, top = %p\n", top));
2957 KASSERT(so != NULL, ("so = NULL, top = %p\n", top));
2958 #ifdef INVARIANTS
2959 top->m_epg_so = NULL;
2960 #endif
2961 total_pages = top->m_epg_enc_cnt;
2962 npages = 0;
2963
2964 /*
2965 * Encrypt the TLS records in the chain of mbufs starting with
2966 * 'top'. 'total_pages' gives us a total count of pages and is
2967 * used to know when we have finished encrypting the TLS
2968 * records originally queued with 'top'.
2969 *
2970 * NB: These mbufs are queued in the socket buffer and
2971 * 'm_next' is traversing the mbufs in the socket buffer. The
2972 * socket buffer lock is not held while traversing this chain.
2973 * Since the mbufs are all marked M_NOTREADY their 'm_next'
2974 * pointers should be stable. However, the 'm_next' of the
2975 * last mbuf encrypted is not necessarily NULL. It can point
2976 * to other mbufs appended while 'top' was on the TLS work
2977 * queue.
2978 *
2979 * Each mbuf holds an entire TLS record.
2980 */
2981 error = 0;
2982 for (m = top; npages != total_pages; m = m->m_next) {
2983 KASSERT(m->m_epg_tls == tls,
2984 ("different TLS sessions in a single mbuf chain: %p vs %p",
2985 tls, m->m_epg_tls));
2986 KASSERT(npages + m->m_epg_npgs <= total_pages,
2987 ("page count mismatch: top %p, total_pages %d, m %p", top,
2988 total_pages, m));
2989
2990 error = ktls_encrypt_record(wq, m, tls, &state);
2991 if (error) {
2992 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_failed_crypto, 1);
2993 break;
2994 }
2995
2996 if ((m->m_epg_flags & EPG_FLAG_ANON) == 0)
2997 ktls_finish_nonanon(m, &state);
2998
2999 npages += m->m_epg_nrdy;
3000
3001 /*
3002 * Drop a reference to the session now that it is no
3003 * longer needed. Existing code depends on encrypted
3004 * records having no associated session vs
3005 * yet-to-be-encrypted records having an associated
3006 * session.
3007 */
3008 m->m_epg_tls = NULL;
3009 ktls_free(tls);
3010 }
3011
3012 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet);
3013 if (error == 0) {
3014 (void)so->so_proto->pr_ready(so, top, npages);
3015 } else {
3016 ktls_drop(so, EIO);
3017 mb_free_notready(top, total_pages);
3018 }
3019
3020 sorele(so);
3021 CURVNET_RESTORE();
3022 }
3023
3024 void
ktls_encrypt_cb(struct ktls_ocf_encrypt_state * state,int error)3025 ktls_encrypt_cb(struct ktls_ocf_encrypt_state *state, int error)
3026 {
3027 struct ktls_session *tls;
3028 struct socket *so;
3029 struct mbuf *m;
3030 int npages;
3031
3032 m = state->m;
3033
3034 if ((m->m_epg_flags & EPG_FLAG_ANON) == 0)
3035 ktls_finish_nonanon(m, state);
3036
3037 so = state->so;
3038 free(state, M_KTLS);
3039
3040 /*
3041 * Drop a reference to the session now that it is no longer
3042 * needed. Existing code depends on encrypted records having
3043 * no associated session vs yet-to-be-encrypted records having
3044 * an associated session.
3045 */
3046 tls = m->m_epg_tls;
3047 m->m_epg_tls = NULL;
3048 ktls_free(tls);
3049
3050 if (error != 0)
3051 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_failed_crypto, 1);
3052
3053 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet);
3054 npages = m->m_epg_nrdy;
3055
3056 if (error == 0) {
3057 (void)so->so_proto->pr_ready(so, m, npages);
3058 } else {
3059 ktls_drop(so, EIO);
3060 mb_free_notready(m, npages);
3061 }
3062
3063 sorele(so);
3064 CURVNET_RESTORE();
3065 }
3066
3067 /*
3068 * Similar to ktls_encrypt, but used with asynchronous OCF backends
3069 * (coprocessors) where encryption does not use host CPU resources and
3070 * it can be beneficial to queue more requests than CPUs.
3071 */
3072 static __noinline void
ktls_encrypt_async(struct ktls_wq * wq,struct mbuf * top)3073 ktls_encrypt_async(struct ktls_wq *wq, struct mbuf *top)
3074 {
3075 struct ktls_ocf_encrypt_state *state;
3076 struct ktls_session *tls;
3077 struct socket *so;
3078 struct mbuf *m, *n;
3079 int error, mpages, npages, total_pages;
3080
3081 so = top->m_epg_so;
3082 tls = top->m_epg_tls;
3083 KASSERT(tls != NULL, ("tls = NULL, top = %p\n", top));
3084 KASSERT(so != NULL, ("so = NULL, top = %p\n", top));
3085 #ifdef INVARIANTS
3086 top->m_epg_so = NULL;
3087 #endif
3088 total_pages = top->m_epg_enc_cnt;
3089 npages = 0;
3090
3091 error = 0;
3092 for (m = top; npages != total_pages; m = n) {
3093 KASSERT(m->m_epg_tls == tls,
3094 ("different TLS sessions in a single mbuf chain: %p vs %p",
3095 tls, m->m_epg_tls));
3096 KASSERT(npages + m->m_epg_npgs <= total_pages,
3097 ("page count mismatch: top %p, total_pages %d, m %p", top,
3098 total_pages, m));
3099
3100 state = malloc(sizeof(*state), M_KTLS, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
3101 soref(so);
3102 state->so = so;
3103 state->m = m;
3104
3105 mpages = m->m_epg_nrdy;
3106 n = m->m_next;
3107
3108 error = ktls_encrypt_record(wq, m, tls, state);
3109 if (error) {
3110 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_failed_crypto, 1);
3111 free(state, M_KTLS);
3112 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet);
3113 sorele(so);
3114 CURVNET_RESTORE();
3115 break;
3116 }
3117
3118 npages += mpages;
3119 }
3120
3121 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet);
3122 if (error != 0) {
3123 ktls_drop(so, EIO);
3124 mb_free_notready(m, total_pages - npages);
3125 }
3126
3127 sorele(so);
3128 CURVNET_RESTORE();
3129 }
3130
3131 static int
ktls_bind_domain(int domain)3132 ktls_bind_domain(int domain)
3133 {
3134 int error;
3135
3136 error = cpuset_setthread(curthread->td_tid, &cpuset_domain[domain]);
3137 if (error != 0)
3138 return (error);
3139 curthread->td_domain.dr_policy = DOMAINSET_PREF(domain);
3140 return (0);
3141 }
3142
3143 static void
ktls_reclaim_thread(void * ctx)3144 ktls_reclaim_thread(void *ctx)
3145 {
3146 struct ktls_domain_info *ktls_domain = ctx;
3147 struct ktls_reclaim_thread *sc = &ktls_domain->reclaim_td;
3148 struct sysctl_oid *oid;
3149 char name[80];
3150 int error, domain;
3151
3152 domain = ktls_domain - ktls_domains;
3153 if (bootverbose)
3154 printf("Starting KTLS reclaim thread for domain %d\n", domain);
3155 error = ktls_bind_domain(domain);
3156 if (error)
3157 printf("Unable to bind KTLS reclaim thread for domain %d: error %d\n",
3158 domain, error);
3159 snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "domain%d", domain);
3160 oid = SYSCTL_ADD_NODE(NULL, SYSCTL_STATIC_CHILDREN(_kern_ipc_tls), OID_AUTO,
3161 name, CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, NULL, "");
3162 SYSCTL_ADD_U64(NULL, SYSCTL_CHILDREN(oid), OID_AUTO, "reclaims",
3163 CTLFLAG_RD, &sc->reclaims, 0, "buffers reclaimed");
3164 SYSCTL_ADD_U64(NULL, SYSCTL_CHILDREN(oid), OID_AUTO, "wakeups",
3165 CTLFLAG_RD, &sc->wakeups, 0, "thread wakeups");
3166 SYSCTL_ADD_INT(NULL, SYSCTL_CHILDREN(oid), OID_AUTO, "running",
3167 CTLFLAG_RD, &sc->running, 0, "thread running");
3168
3169 for (;;) {
3170 atomic_store_int(&sc->running, 0);
3171 tsleep(sc, PZERO | PNOLOCK, "-", 0);
3172 atomic_store_int(&sc->running, 1);
3173 sc->wakeups++;
3174 /*
3175 * Below we attempt to reclaim ktls_max_reclaim
3176 * buffers using vm_page_reclaim_contig_domain_ext().
3177 * We do this here, as this function can take several
3178 * seconds to scan all of memory and it does not
3179 * matter if this thread pauses for a while. If we
3180 * block a ktls worker thread, we risk developing
3181 * backlogs of buffers to be encrypted, leading to
3182 * surges of traffic and potential NIC output drops.
3183 */
3184 if (!vm_page_reclaim_contig_domain_ext(domain, VM_ALLOC_NORMAL,
3185 atop(ktls_maxlen), 0, ~0ul, PAGE_SIZE, 0, ktls_max_reclaim)) {
3186 vm_wait_domain(domain);
3187 } else {
3188 sc->reclaims += ktls_max_reclaim;
3189 }
3190 }
3191 }
3192
3193 static void
ktls_work_thread(void * ctx)3194 ktls_work_thread(void *ctx)
3195 {
3196 struct ktls_wq *wq = ctx;
3197 struct mbuf *m, *n;
3198 struct socket *so, *son;
3199 STAILQ_HEAD(, mbuf) local_m_head;
3200 STAILQ_HEAD(, socket) local_so_head;
3201 int cpu;
3202
3203 cpu = wq - ktls_wq;
3204 if (bootverbose)
3205 printf("Starting KTLS worker thread for CPU %d\n", cpu);
3206
3207 /*
3208 * Bind to a core. If ktls_bind_threads is > 1, then
3209 * we bind to the NUMA domain instead.
3210 */
3211 if (ktls_bind_threads) {
3212 int error;
3213
3214 if (ktls_bind_threads > 1) {
3215 struct pcpu *pc = pcpu_find(cpu);
3216
3217 error = ktls_bind_domain(pc->pc_domain);
3218 } else {
3219 cpuset_t mask;
3220
3221 CPU_SETOF(cpu, &mask);
3222 error = cpuset_setthread(curthread->td_tid, &mask);
3223 }
3224 if (error)
3225 printf("Unable to bind KTLS worker thread for CPU %d: error %d\n",
3226 cpu, error);
3227 }
3228 #if defined(__aarch64__) || defined(__amd64__) || defined(__i386__)
3229 fpu_kern_thread(0);
3230 #endif
3231 for (;;) {
3232 mtx_lock(&wq->mtx);
3233 while (STAILQ_EMPTY(&wq->m_head) &&
3234 STAILQ_EMPTY(&wq->so_head)) {
3235 wq->running = false;
3236 mtx_sleep(wq, &wq->mtx, 0, "-", 0);
3237 wq->running = true;
3238 }
3239
3240 STAILQ_INIT(&local_m_head);
3241 STAILQ_CONCAT(&local_m_head, &wq->m_head);
3242 STAILQ_INIT(&local_so_head);
3243 STAILQ_CONCAT(&local_so_head, &wq->so_head);
3244 mtx_unlock(&wq->mtx);
3245
3246 STAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(m, &local_m_head, m_epg_stailq, n) {
3247 if (m->m_epg_flags & EPG_FLAG_2FREE) {
3248 ktls_free(m->m_epg_tls);
3249 m_free_raw(m);
3250 } else {
3251 if (m->m_epg_tls->sync_dispatch)
3252 ktls_encrypt(wq, m);
3253 else
3254 ktls_encrypt_async(wq, m);
3255 counter_u64_add(ktls_cnt_tx_queued, -1);
3256 }
3257 }
3258
3259 STAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(so, &local_so_head, so_ktls_rx_list, son) {
3260 ktls_decrypt(so);
3261 counter_u64_add(ktls_cnt_rx_queued, -1);
3262 }
3263 }
3264 }
3265
3266 static void
ktls_disable_ifnet_help(void * context,int pending __unused)3267 ktls_disable_ifnet_help(void *context, int pending __unused)
3268 {
3269 struct ktls_session *tls;
3270 struct inpcb *inp;
3271 struct tcpcb *tp;
3272 struct socket *so;
3273 int err;
3274
3275 tls = context;
3276 inp = tls->inp;
3277 if (inp == NULL)
3278 return;
3279 INP_WLOCK(inp);
3280 so = inp->inp_socket;
3281 MPASS(so != NULL);
3282 if (inp->inp_flags & INP_DROPPED) {
3283 goto out;
3284 }
3285
3286 if (so->so_snd.sb_tls_info != NULL)
3287 err = ktls_set_tx_mode(so, TCP_TLS_MODE_SW);
3288 else
3289 err = ENXIO;
3290 if (err == 0) {
3291 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_disable_ok, 1);
3292 /* ktls_set_tx_mode() drops inp wlock, so recheck flags */
3293 if ((inp->inp_flags & INP_DROPPED) == 0 &&
3294 (tp = intotcpcb(inp)) != NULL &&
3295 tp->t_fb->tfb_hwtls_change != NULL)
3296 (*tp->t_fb->tfb_hwtls_change)(tp, 0);
3297 } else {
3298 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_disable_fail, 1);
3299 }
3300
3301 out:
3302 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet);
3303 sorele(so);
3304 CURVNET_RESTORE();
3305 INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
3306 ktls_free(tls);
3307 }
3308
3309 /*
3310 * Called when re-transmits are becoming a substantial portion of the
3311 * sends on this connection. When this happens, we transition the
3312 * connection to software TLS. This is needed because most inline TLS
3313 * NICs keep crypto state only for in-order transmits. This means
3314 * that to handle a TCP rexmit (which is out-of-order), the NIC must
3315 * re-DMA the entire TLS record up to and including the current
3316 * segment. This means that when re-transmitting the last ~1448 byte
3317 * segment of a 16KB TLS record, we could wind up re-DMA'ing an order
3318 * of magnitude more data than we are sending. This can cause the
3319 * PCIe link to saturate well before the network, which can cause
3320 * output drops, and a general loss of capacity.
3321 */
3322 void
ktls_disable_ifnet(void * arg)3323 ktls_disable_ifnet(void *arg)
3324 {
3325 struct tcpcb *tp;
3326 struct inpcb *inp;
3327 struct socket *so;
3328 struct ktls_session *tls;
3329
3330 tp = arg;
3331 inp = tptoinpcb(tp);
3332 INP_WLOCK_ASSERT(inp);
3333 so = inp->inp_socket;
3334 SOCK_LOCK(so);
3335 tls = so->so_snd.sb_tls_info;
3336 if (tp->t_nic_ktls_xmit_dis == 1) {
3337 SOCK_UNLOCK(so);
3338 return;
3339 }
3340
3341 /*
3342 * note that t_nic_ktls_xmit_dis is never cleared; disabling
3343 * ifnet can only be done once per connection, so we never want
3344 * to do it again
3345 */
3346
3347 (void)ktls_hold(tls);
3348 soref(so);
3349 tp->t_nic_ktls_xmit_dis = 1;
3350 SOCK_UNLOCK(so);
3351 TASK_INIT(&tls->disable_ifnet_task, 0, ktls_disable_ifnet_help, tls);
3352 (void)taskqueue_enqueue(taskqueue_thread, &tls->disable_ifnet_task);
3353 }
3354