| /linux-6.15/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/ |
| H A D | mds.rst | 1 MDS - Microarchitectural Data Sampling
23 Whether a processor is affected or not can be read out from the MDS
26 Not all processors are affected by all variants of MDS, but the mitigation
33 The following CVE entries are related to the MDS vulnerability:
60 Deeper technical information is available in the MDS specific x86
87 MDS system information
173 invoked explicit when the host MDS mitigation is enabled.
186 L1TF MDS VMX-L1FLUSH Host MDS MDS-State
247 for the MDS vulnerability, CPU buffer clearing on exit to
256 off Disables MDS mitigations completely.
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| H A D | processor_mmio_stale_data.rst | 16 are similar to those used to mitigate Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) or
131 enumerate MDS_NO (meaning they are affected by MDS) but that do
152 Like MDS, all variants of Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities have the
160 Kernel reuses the MDS function to invoke the buffer clearing:
164 On MDS affected CPUs, the kernel already invokes CPU buffer clear on
168 For CPUs not affected by MDS or TAA, mitigation is needed only for the attacker
177 Same mitigation as MDS when affected by MDS/TAA, otherwise no mitigation
188 Same mitigation as MDS when processor is also affected by MDS/TAA, otherwise
190 MDS/TAA, guest without MMIO access cannot extract secrets using Processor MMIO
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| H A D | tsx_async_abort.rst | 16 (bit 5) is 0 in the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR, the existing MDS mitigations
75 As for MDS, the attacker has no control over the memory addresses that can
158 systems which are MDS-affected and deploy MDS mitigation,
169 processors that are affected by both TAA and MDS, specifying just
184 not vulnerable to MDS, i.e., have MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO=1
232 0 1 0 MDS and TAA mitigated via VERW
233 1 1 0 MDS fixed, TAA vulnerable if TSX enabled
236 1 X 1 MDS fixed, TAA can be mitigated by
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| H A D | special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst | 6 SRBDS is a hardware vulnerability that allows MDS
15 to MDS attacks.
59 executed on another core or sibling thread using MDS techniques.
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| H A D | core-scheduling.rst | 17 Threads of the same core. MDS and L1TF are examples of such attacks. The only
183 1. For MDS
185 Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between the siblings
199 For both MDS and L1TF, if the guest vCPU is configured to not trust each
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| H A D | reg-file-data-sampling.rst | 35 information using the VERW instruction. Like MDS, RFDS deploys the same
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| /linux-6.15/Documentation/arch/x86/ |
| H A D | tsx_async_abort.rst | 12 Intel processors similar to Microachitectural Data Sampling (MDS). In this
17 the same uarch data structures as in MDS, with same scope of exposure i.e.
29 b) Clear CPU buffers - similar to MDS, clearing the CPU buffers mitigates this
69 …0 0 0 HW default Yes Same as MDS Same as MDS
84 … 0 0 0 HW default Yes Same as MDS Same as MDS
87 … 0 1 1 Enabled Yes None Same as MDS
99 …0 0 0 HW default Yes Same as MDS Same as MDS
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| H A D | mds.rst | 1 Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) mitigation
9 Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) is a family of side channel attacks
52 needed for exploiting MDS requires:
182 and not by any other MDS variant. The other MDS variants cannot be
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| /linux-6.15/Documentation/admin-guide/nfs/ |
| H A D | pnfs-scsi-server.rst | 7 With pNFS SCSI layouts, the NFS server acts as Metadata Server (MDS) for pNFS,
15 addition to the MDS. As of now the file system needs to sit directly on the
16 exported LUN, striping or concatenation of LUNs on the MDS and clients
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| H A D | pnfs-block-server.rst | 6 case the NFS server acts as Metadata Server (MDS) for pNFS, which in addition
14 to the clients in addition to the MDS. As of now the file system needs to
16 volumes on the MDS and clients is not supported yet.
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| /linux-6.15/arch/powerpc/platforms/85xx/ |
| H A D | Kconfig | 44 bool "Freescale MPC8568 MDS / MPC8569 MDS / P1021 MDS"
50 This option enables support for the MPC8568 MDS, MPC8569 MDS and P1021 MDS boards
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| /linux-6.15/Documentation/filesystems/ |
| H A D | ceph.rst | 63 for internal usage by the MDS.
64 * They can not exceed 240 characters in size. This is because the MDS makes
207 After reconnect, file locks become stale because the MDS loses track
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| /linux-6.15/arch/powerpc/boot/dts/fsl/ |
| H A D | p1021mds.dts | 3 * P1021 MDS Device Tree Source
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| H A D | mpc8568mds.dts | 3 * MPC8568E MDS Device Tree Source
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| H A D | mpc8569mds.dts | 3 * MPC8569E MDS Device Tree Source
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| /linux-6.15/Documentation/admin-guide/ |
| H A D | kernel-parameters.txt | 3469 Sampling (MDS) vulnerability.
3480 This parameter controls the MDS mitigation. The
3484 full,nosmt - Enable MDS mitigation and disable
3773 the same CPU buffers as affected by MDS and TAA.
3774 Therefore, similar to MDS and TAA, the mitigation
3787 On MDS or TAA affected machines,
3789 MDS or TAA mitigation as these vulnerabilities are
6813 Certain CPUs are vulnerable to an MDS-like
7476 not vulnerable to MDS, i.e., have
7493 Similar to Micro-architectural Data Sampling (MDS)
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| /linux-6.15/arch/x86/ |
| H A D | Kconfig | 2614 bool "Mitigate Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) hardware bug"
2618 Enable mitigation for Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS). MDS is
2698 Sampling (MDS) techniques to infer values returned from special
2701 using MDS techniques.
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| /linux-6.15/arch/powerpc/xmon/ |
| H A D | ppc-opc.c | 2487 #define MDS(op, xop, rc) (OP (op) | ((((unsigned long)(xop)) & 0xf) << 1) | ((rc) & 1)) macro
2488 #define MDS_MASK MDS (0x3f, 0xf, 1)
4648 {"rotld", MDS(30,8,0), MDSMB_MASK, PPC64, PPCVLE, {RA, RS, RB}},
4649 {"rldcl", MDS(30,8,0), MDS_MASK, PPC64, PPCVLE, {RA, RS, RB, MB6}},
4650 {"rotld.", MDS(30,8,1), MDSMB_MASK, PPC64, PPCVLE, {RA, RS, RB}},
4651 {"rldcl.", MDS(30,8,1), MDS_MASK, PPC64, PPCVLE, {RA, RS, RB, MB6}},
4653 {"rldcr", MDS(30,9,0), MDS_MASK, PPC64, PPCVLE, {RA, RS, RB, ME6}},
4654 {"rldcr.", MDS(30,9,1), MDS_MASK, PPC64, PPCVLE, {RA, RS, RB, ME6}},
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