<?xml version="1.0"?>
<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="/rss.xsl.xml"?>
<rss version="2.0" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">
<channel>
    <title>Changes in Kconfig</title>
    <description></description>
    <language>en</language>
    <copyright>Copyright 2015</copyright>
    <generator>Java</generator><item>
        <title>6f594f5a - selinux: improve debug configuration</title>
        <link>http://172.16.0.5:8080/history/linux-6.15/security/selinux/Kconfig#6f594f5a</link>
        <description>selinux: improve debug configurationIf the SELinux debug configuration is enabled define the macro DEBUGsuch that pr_debug() calls are always enabled, regardless ofCONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG, since those message are the main reason for thisconfiguration in the first place.Mention example usage in case CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG is enabled in thehelp section of the configuration.Signed-off-by: Christian G&#246;ttsche &lt;cgzones@googlemail.com&gt;Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;

            List of files:
            /linux-6.15/security/selinux/Kconfig</description>
        <pubDate>Fri, 18 Aug 2023 15:12:14 +0000</pubDate>
        <dc:creator>Christian G&#246;ttsche &lt;cgzones@googlemail.com&gt;</dc:creator>
    </item>
<item>
        <title>55a0e738 - selinux: introduce SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG configuration</title>
        <link>http://172.16.0.5:8080/history/linux-6.15/security/selinux/Kconfig#55a0e738</link>
        <description>selinux: introduce SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG configurationThe policy database code contains several debug output statementsrelated to hashtable utilization.  Those are guarded by the macroDEBUG_HASHES, which is neither documented nor set anywhere.Introduce a new Kconfig configuration guarding this and potentialother future debugging related code.  Disable the setting by default.Suggested-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;Signed-off-by: Christian G&#246;ttsche &lt;cgzones@googlemail.com&gt;[PM: fixed line lengths in the help text]Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;

            List of files:
            /linux-6.15/security/selinux/Kconfig</description>
        <pubDate>Tue, 18 Jul 2023 18:49:19 +0000</pubDate>
        <dc:creator>Christian G&#246;ttsche &lt;cgzones@googlemail.com&gt;</dc:creator>
    </item>
<item>
        <title>90aa4f5e - selinux: de-brand SELinux</title>
        <link>http://172.16.0.5:8080/history/linux-6.15/security/selinux/Kconfig#90aa4f5e</link>
        <description>selinux: de-brand SELinuxChange &quot;NSA SELinux&quot; to just &quot;SELinux&quot; in Kconfig help text andcomments. While NSA was the original primary developer and continues tohelp maintain SELinux, SELinux has long since transitioned to a widecommunity of developers and maintainers. SELinux has been part of themainline Linux kernel for nearly 20 years now [1] and has receivedcontributions from many individuals and organizations.[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Pine.LNX.4.44.0308082228470.1852-100000@home.osdl.org/Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;

            List of files:
            /linux-6.15/security/selinux/Kconfig</description>
        <pubDate>Tue, 18 Jul 2023 17:13:35 +0000</pubDate>
        <dc:creator>Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;</dc:creator>
    </item>
<item>
        <title>f22f9aaf - selinux: remove the runtime disable functionality</title>
        <link>http://172.16.0.5:8080/history/linux-6.15/security/selinux/Kconfig#f22f9aaf</link>
        <description>selinux: remove the runtime disable functionalityAfter working with the larger SELinux-based distros for severalyears, we&apos;re finally at a place where we can disable the SELinuxruntime disable functionality.  The existing kernel deprecationnotice explains the functionality and why we want to remove it:  The selinuxfs &quot;disable&quot; node allows SELinux to be disabled at  runtime prior to a policy being loaded into the kernel.  If  disabled via this mechanism, SELinux will remain disabled until  the system is rebooted.  The preferred method of disabling SELinux is via the &quot;selinux=0&quot;  boot parameter, but the selinuxfs &quot;disable&quot; node was created to  make it easier for systems with primitive bootloaders that did not  allow for easy modification of the kernel command line.  Unfortunately, allowing for SELinux to be disabled at runtime makes  it difficult to secure the kernel&apos;s LSM hooks using the  &quot;__ro_after_init&quot; feature.It is that last sentence, mentioning the &apos;__ro_after_init&apos; hardening,which is the real motivation for this change, and if you look at thediffstat you&apos;ll see that the impact of this patch reaches across allthe different LSMs, helping prevent tampering at the LSM hook level.From a SELinux perspective, it is important to note that if youcontinue to disable SELinux via &quot;/etc/selinux/config&quot; it may appearthat SELinux is disabled, but it is simply in an uninitialized state.If you load a policy with `load_policy -i`, you will see SELinuxcome alive just as if you had loaded the policy during early-boot.It is also worth noting that the &quot;/sys/fs/selinux/disable&quot; file isalways writable now, regardless of the Kconfig settings, but writingto the file has no effect on the system, other than to display anerror on the console if a non-zero/true value is written.Finally, in the several years where we have been working ondeprecating this functionality, there has only been one instance ofsomeone mentioning any user visible breakage.  In this particularcase it was an individual&apos;s kernel test system, and the workarounddocumented in the deprecation notice (&quot;selinux=0&quot; on the kernelcommand line) resolved the issue without problem.Acked-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;

            List of files:
            /linux-6.15/security/selinux/Kconfig</description>
        <pubDate>Fri, 17 Mar 2023 16:43:07 +0000</pubDate>
        <dc:creator>Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;</dc:creator>
    </item>
<item>
        <title>a7e4676e - selinux: remove the &apos;checkreqprot&apos; functionality</title>
        <link>http://172.16.0.5:8080/history/linux-6.15/security/selinux/Kconfig#a7e4676e</link>
        <description>selinux: remove the &apos;checkreqprot&apos; functionalityWe originally promised that the SELinux &apos;checkreqprot&apos; functionalitywould be removed no sooner than June 2021, and now that it is March2023 it seems like it is a good time to do the final removal.  Thedeprecation notice in the kernel provides plenty of detail on why&apos;checkreqprot&apos; is not desirable, with the key point repeated below:  This was a compatibility mechanism for legacy userspace and  for the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC personality flag.  However, if set to  1, it weakens security by allowing mappings to be made executable  without authorization by policy.  The default value of checkreqprot  at boot was changed starting in Linux v4.4 to 0 (i.e. check the  actual protection), and Android and Linux distributions have been  explicitly writing a &quot;0&quot; to /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot during  initialization for some time.Along with the official deprecation notice, we have been discussingthis on-list and directly with several of the larger SELinux-baseddistros and everyone is happy to see this feature finally removed.In an attempt to catch all of the smaller, and DIY, Linux systemswe have been writing a deprecation notice URL into the kernel log,along with a growing ssleep() penalty, when admins enabledcheckreqprot at runtime or via the kernel command line.  We haveyet to have anyone come to us and raise an objection to thedeprecation or planned removal.It is worth noting that while this patch removes the checkreqprotfunctionality, it leaves the user visible interfaces (kernel commandline and selinuxfs file) intact, just inert.  This should helpprevent breakages with existing userspace tools that correctly, butunnecessarily, disable checkreqprot at boot or runtime.  Adminsthat attempt to enable checkreqprot will be met with a removalmessage in the kernel log.Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;

            List of files:
            /linux-6.15/security/selinux/Kconfig</description>
        <pubDate>Thu, 16 Mar 2023 15:43:08 +0000</pubDate>
        <dc:creator>Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;</dc:creator>
    </item>
<item>
        <title>e9c38f9f - Documentation,selinux: deprecate setting checkreqprot to 1</title>
        <link>http://172.16.0.5:8080/history/linux-6.15/security/selinux/Kconfig#e9c38f9f</link>
        <description>Documentation,selinux: deprecate setting checkreqprot to 1Deprecate setting the SELinux checkreqprot tunable to 1 via kernelparameter or /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot.  Setting it to 0 is leftintact for compatibility since Android and some Linux distributionsdo so for security and treat an inability to set it as a fatal error.Eventually setting it to 0 will become a no-op and the kernel willstop using checkreqprot&apos;s value internally altogether.checkreqprot was originally introduced as a compatibility mechanismfor legacy userspace and the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC personality flag.However, if set to 1, it weakens security by allowing mappings to bemade executable without authorization by policy.  The default valuefor the SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE config option was changedfrom 1 to 0 in commit 2a35d196c160e3 (&quot;selinux: changeCONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE default&quot;) and both Androidand Linux distributions began explicitly setting/sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot to 0 some time ago.Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;

            List of files:
            /linux-6.15/security/selinux/Kconfig</description>
        <pubDate>Wed, 08 Jan 2020 16:24:47 +0000</pubDate>
        <dc:creator>Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;</dc:creator>
    </item>
<item>
        <title>d41415eb - Documentation,selinux: fix references to old selinuxfs mount point</title>
        <link>http://172.16.0.5:8080/history/linux-6.15/security/selinux/Kconfig#d41415eb</link>
        <description>Documentation,selinux: fix references to old selinuxfs mount pointselinuxfs was originally mounted on /selinux, and various docs andkconfig help texts referred to nodes under it.  In Linux 3.0,/sys/fs/selinux was introduced as the preferred mount point for selinuxfs.Fix all the old references to /selinux/ to /sys/fs/selinux/.While we are there, update the description of the selinux boot parameterto reflect the fact that the default value is always 1 sincecommit be6ec88f41ba94 (&quot;selinux: Remove SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE&quot;)and drop discussion of runtime disable since it is deprecated.Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;

            List of files:
            /linux-6.15/security/selinux/Kconfig</description>
        <pubDate>Tue, 07 Jan 2020 16:35:04 +0000</pubDate>
        <dc:creator>Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;</dc:creator>
    </item>
<item>
        <title>89b223bf - selinux: deprecate disabling SELinux and runtime</title>
        <link>http://172.16.0.5:8080/history/linux-6.15/security/selinux/Kconfig#89b223bf</link>
        <description>selinux: deprecate disabling SELinux and runtimeDeprecate the CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE functionality.  Thecode was originally developed to make it easier for Linuxdistributions to support architectures where adding parameters to thekernel command line was difficult.  Unfortunately, supporting runtimedisable meant we had to make some security trade-offs when it came tothe LSM hooks, as documented in the Kconfig help text:  NOTE: selecting this option will disable the &apos;__ro_after_init&apos;  kernel hardening feature for security hooks.   Please consider  using the selinux=0 boot parameter instead of enabling this  option.Fortunately it looks as if that the original motivation for theruntime disable functionality is gone, and Fedora/RHEL appears to bethe only major distribution enabling this capability at build timeso we are now taking steps to remove it entirely from the kernel.The first step is to mark the functionality as deprecated and printan error when it is used (what this patch is doing).  As Fedora/RHELmakes progress in transitioning the distribution away from runtimedisable, we will introduce follow-up patches over several kernelreleases which will block for increasing periods of time when theruntime disable is used.  Finally we will remove the option entirelyonce we believe all users have moved to the kernel cmdline approach.Acked-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;Acked-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;

            List of files:
            /linux-6.15/security/selinux/Kconfig</description>
        <pubDate>Thu, 19 Dec 2019 02:45:08 +0000</pubDate>
        <dc:creator>Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;</dc:creator>
    </item>
<item>
        <title>d97bd23c - selinux: cache the SID -&gt; context string translation</title>
        <link>http://172.16.0.5:8080/history/linux-6.15/security/selinux/Kconfig#d97bd23c</link>
        <description>selinux: cache the SID -&gt; context string translationTranslating a context struct to string can be quite slow, especially ifthe context has a lot of category bits set. This can cause quitenoticeable performance impact in situations where the translation needsto be done repeatedly. A common example is a UNIX datagram socket withthe SO_PASSSEC option enabled, which is used e.g. by systemd-journaldwhen receiving log messages via datagram socket. This scenario can bereproduced with:    cat /dev/urandom | base64 | logger &amp;    timeout 30s perf record -p $(pidof systemd-journald) -a -g    kill %1    perf report -g none --pretty raw | grep security_secid_to_secctxBefore the caching introduced by this patch, computing the contextstring (security_secid_to_secctx() function) takes up ~65% ofsystemd-journald&apos;s CPU time (assuming a context with 1024 categoriesset and Fedora x86_64 release kernel configs). After this patch(assuming near-perfect cache hit ratio) this overhead is reduced to just~2%.This patch addresses the issue by caching a certain number (compile-timeconfigurable) of recently used context strings to speed up repeatedtranslations of the same context, while using only a small amount ofmemory.The cache is integrated into the existing sidtab table by adding a fieldto each entry, which when not NULL contains an RCU-protected pointer toa cache entry containing the cached string. The cache entries are keptin a linked list sorted according to how recently they were used. On acache miss when the cache is full, the least recently used entry isremoved to make space for the new entry.The patch migrates security_sid_to_context_core() to use the cache (alsoa few other functions where it was possible without too much fuss, butthese mostly use the translation for logging in case of error, which israre).Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1733259Cc: Michal Sekletar &lt;msekleta@redhat.com&gt;Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;Tested-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@kernel.org&gt;[PM: lots of merge fixups due to collisions with other sidtab patches]Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;

            List of files:
            /linux-6.15/security/selinux/Kconfig</description>
        <pubDate>Tue, 26 Nov 2019 13:57:00 +0000</pubDate>
        <dc:creator>Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;</dc:creator>
    </item>
<item>
        <title>66f8e2f0 - selinux: sidtab reverse lookup hash table</title>
        <link>http://172.16.0.5:8080/history/linux-6.15/security/selinux/Kconfig#66f8e2f0</link>
        <description>selinux: sidtab reverse lookup hash tableThis replaces the reverse table lookup and reverse cache with ahashtable which improves cache-miss reverse-lookup times fromO(n) to O(1)* and maintains the same performance as a reversecache hit.This reduces the time needed to add a new sidtab entry from ~500usto 5us on a Pixel 3 when there are ~10,000 sidtab entries.The implementation uses the kernel&apos;s generic hashtable API,It uses the context&apos;s string represtation as the hash source,and the kernels generic string hashing algorithm full_name_hash()to reduce the string to a 32 bit value.This change also maintains the improvement introduced incommit ee1a84fdfeed (&quot;selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improveperformance&quot;) which removed the need to keep the current sidtablocked during policy reload. It does however introduce periodiclocking of the target sidtab while converting the hashtable. Sidtabentries are never modified or removed, so the context struct storedin the sid_to_context tree can also be used for the context_to_sidhashtable to reduce memory usage.This bug was reported by:- On the selinux bug tracker.  BUG: kernel softlockup due to too many SIDs/contexts #37  https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/37- Jovana Knezevic on Android&apos;s bugtracker.  Bug: 140252993  &quot;During multi-user performance testing, we create and remove users  many times. selinux_android_restorecon_pkgdir goes from 1ms to over  20ms after about 200 user creations and removals. Accumulated over  ~280 packages, that adds a significant time to user creation,  making perf benchmarks unreliable.&quot;* Hashtable lookup is only O(1) when n &lt; the number of buckets.Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep &lt;jeffv@google.com&gt;Reported-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;Reported-by: Jovana Knezevic &lt;jovanak@google.com&gt;Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;Tested-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;[PM: subj tweak, removed changelog from patch description]Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;

            List of files:
            /linux-6.15/security/selinux/Kconfig</description>
        <pubDate>Fri, 22 Nov 2019 09:33:06 +0000</pubDate>
        <dc:creator>Jeff Vander Stoep &lt;jeffv@google.com&gt;</dc:creator>
    </item>
<item>
        <title>ec8f24b7 - treewide: Add SPDX license identifier - Makefile/Kconfig</title>
        <link>http://172.16.0.5:8080/history/linux-6.15/security/selinux/Kconfig#ec8f24b7</link>
        <description>treewide: Add SPDX license identifier - Makefile/KconfigAdd SPDX license identifiers to all Make/Kconfig files which: - Have no license information of any formThese files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDXlicense identifier is:  GPL-2.0-onlySigned-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

            List of files:
            /linux-6.15/security/selinux/Kconfig</description>
        <pubDate>Sun, 19 May 2019 12:07:45 +0000</pubDate>
        <dc:creator>Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;</dc:creator>
    </item>
<item>
        <title>be6ec88f - selinux: Remove SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE</title>
        <link>http://172.16.0.5:8080/history/linux-6.15/security/selinux/Kconfig#be6ec88f</link>
        <description>selinux: Remove SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUEIn preparation for removing CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY, this removes thesoon-to-be redundant SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE. Since explicitordering via CONFIG_LSM or &quot;lsm=&quot; will define whether an LSM is enabled ornot, this CONFIG will become effectively ignored, so remove it. However,in order to stay backward-compatible with &quot;security=selinux&quot;, the enablevariable defaults to true.Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;

            List of files:
            /linux-6.15/security/selinux/Kconfig</description>
        <pubDate>Tue, 02 Oct 2018 00:08:57 +0000</pubDate>
        <dc:creator>Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;</dc:creator>
    </item>
<item>
        <title>dd0859dc - security: introduce CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS</title>
        <link>http://172.16.0.5:8080/history/linux-6.15/security/selinux/Kconfig#dd0859dc</link>
        <description>security: introduce CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKSSubsequent patches will add RO hardening to LSM hooks, however, SELinuxstill needs to be able to perform runtime disablement after init to handlearchitectures where init-time disablement via boot parameters is not feasible.Introduce a new kernel configuration parameter CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS,and a helper macro __lsm_ro_after_init, to handle this case.Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;Acked-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;

            List of files:
            /linux-6.15/security/selinux/Kconfig</description>
        <pubDate>Tue, 14 Feb 2017 13:17:24 +0000</pubDate>
        <dc:creator>James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;</dc:creator>
    </item>
<item>
        <title>348a0db9 - selinux: drop SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX</title>
        <link>http://172.16.0.5:8080/history/linux-6.15/security/selinux/Kconfig#348a0db9</link>
        <description>selinux: drop SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAXRemove the SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX Kconfig optionPer: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux/wiki/Kernel-TodoThis was only needed on Fedora 3 and 4 and just causes issues now,so drop it.The MAX and MIN should just be whatever the kernel can support.Signed-off-by: William Roberts &lt;william.c.roberts@intel.com&gt;Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;

            List of files:
            /linux-6.15/security/selinux/Kconfig</description>
        <pubDate>Mon, 15 Aug 2016 19:42:12 +0000</pubDate>
        <dc:creator>William Roberts &lt;william.c.roberts@intel.com&gt;</dc:creator>
    </item>
<item>
        <title>2a35d196 - selinux: change CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE default</title>
        <link>http://172.16.0.5:8080/history/linux-6.15/security/selinux/Kconfig#2a35d196</link>
        <description>selinux: change CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE defaultChange the SELinux checkreqprot default value to 0 so that SELinuxperforms access control checking on the actual memory protectionsused by the kernel and not those requested by the application.Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;pmoore@redhat.com&gt;

            List of files:
            /linux-6.15/security/selinux/Kconfig</description>
        <pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2015 21:44:25 +0000</pubDate>
        <dc:creator>Paul Moore &lt;pmoore@redhat.com&gt;</dc:creator>
    </item>
<item>
        <title>277d342f - selinux: Deprecate and schedule the removal of the the compat_net functionality</title>
        <link>http://172.16.0.5:8080/history/linux-6.15/security/selinux/Kconfig#277d342f</link>
        <description>selinux: Deprecate and schedule the removal of the the compat_net functionalityThis patch is the first step towards removing the old &quot;compat_net&quot; code fromthe kernel.  Secmark, the &quot;compat_net&quot; replacement was first introduced in2.6.18 (September 2006) and the major Linux distributions with SELinux supporthave transitioned to Secmark so it is time to start deprecating the &quot;compat_net&quot;mechanism.  Testing a patched version of 2.6.28-rc6 with the initial release ofFedora Core 5 did not show any problems when running in enforcing mode.This patch adds an entry to the feature-removal-schedule.txt file and removesthe SECURITY_SELINUX_ENABLE_SECMARK_DEFAULT configuration option, forcingSecmark on by default although it can still be disabled at runtime.  The patchalso makes the Secmark permission checks &quot;dynamic&quot; in the sense that they areonly executed when Secmark is configured; this should help prevent problemswith older distributions that have not yet migrated to Secmark.Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul.moore@hp.com&gt;Acked-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;

            List of files:
            /linux-6.15/security/selinux/Kconfig</description>
        <pubDate>Wed, 31 Dec 2008 17:54:11 +0000</pubDate>
        <dc:creator>Paul Moore &lt;paul.moore@hp.com&gt;</dc:creator>
    </item>
<item>
        <title>f058925b - Update selinux info in MAINTAINERS and Kconfig help text</title>
        <link>http://172.16.0.5:8080/history/linux-6.15/security/selinux/Kconfig#f058925b</link>
        <description>Update selinux info in MAINTAINERS and Kconfig help textUpdate the SELinux entry in MAINTAINERS and drop the obsolete informationfrom the selinux Kconfig help text.Signed-off-by:  Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;

            List of files:
            /linux-6.15/security/selinux/Kconfig</description>
        <pubDate>Thu, 11 Sep 2008 13:20:26 +0000</pubDate>
        <dc:creator>Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;</dc:creator>
    </item>
<item>
        <title>64dbf074 - selinux: introduce permissive types</title>
        <link>http://172.16.0.5:8080/history/linux-6.15/security/selinux/Kconfig#64dbf074</link>
        <description>selinux: introduce permissive typesIntroduce the concept of a permissive type.  A new ebitmap is introduced tothe policy database which indicates if a given type has the permissive bitset or not.  This bit is tested for the scontext of any denial.  The bit ismeaningless on types which only appear as the target of a decision and neverthe source.  A domain running with a permissive type will be allowed toperform any action similarly to when the system is globally set permissive.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;

            List of files:
            /linux-6.15/security/selinux/Kconfig</description>
        <pubDate>Mon, 31 Mar 2008 01:17:33 +0000</pubDate>
        <dc:creator>Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;</dc:creator>
    </item>
<item>
        <title>3bb56b25 - SELinux: Add a capabilities bitmap to SELinux policy version 22</title>
        <link>http://172.16.0.5:8080/history/linux-6.15/security/selinux/Kconfig#3bb56b25</link>
        <description>SELinux: Add a capabilities bitmap to SELinux policy version 22Add a new policy capabilities bitmap to SELinux policy version 22.  This bitmapwill enable the security server to query the policy to determine which featuresit supports.Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul.moore@hp.com&gt;Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;

            List of files:
            /linux-6.15/security/selinux/Kconfig</description>
        <pubDate>Tue, 29 Jan 2008 13:38:19 +0000</pubDate>
        <dc:creator>Paul Moore &lt;paul.moore@hp.com&gt;</dc:creator>
    </item>
<item>
        <title>3dde6ad8 - Fix trivial typos in Kconfig* files</title>
        <link>http://172.16.0.5:8080/history/linux-6.15/security/selinux/Kconfig#3dde6ad8</link>
        <description>Fix trivial typos in Kconfig* filesFix several typos in help text in Kconfig* files.Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dave@jikos.cz&gt;Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk &lt;bunk@stusta.de&gt;

            List of files:
            /linux-6.15/security/selinux/Kconfig</description>
        <pubDate>Wed, 09 May 2007 05:12:20 +0000</pubDate>
        <dc:creator>David Sterba &lt;dave@jikos.cz&gt;</dc:creator>
    </item>
</channel>
</rss>
