Changes in Makefile

7ccbe076 - lsm: Only build lsm_audit.c if CONFIG_SECURITY and CONFIG_AUDIT are set

Fri, 22 Nov 2024 14:33:31 +0000

lsm: Only build lsm_audit.c if CONFIG_SECURITY and CONFIG_AUDIT are setWhen CONFIG_AUDIT is set, its CONFIG_NET dependency is also set, and thedev_get_by_index and init_net symbols (used by dump_common_audit_data)are found by the linker. dump_common_audit_data() should then failed tobuild when CONFIG_NET is not set. However, because the compiler issmart, it knows that audit_log_start() always return NULL when!CONFIG_AUDIT, and it doesn't build the body of common_lsm_audit(). Asa side effect, dump_common_audit_data() is not built and the linkerdoesn't error out because of missing symbols.Let's only build lsm_audit.o when CONFIG_SECURITY and CONFIG_AUDIT areboth set, which is checked with the new CONFIG_HAS_SECURITY_AUDIT.ipv4_skb_to_auditdata() and ipv6_skb_to_auditdata() are only used bySmack if CONFIG_AUDIT is set, so they don't need fake implementations.Because common_lsm_audit() is used in multiple places withoutCONFIG_AUDIT checks, add a fake implementation.Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241122143353.59367-2-mic@digikod.netCc: Casey Schaufler Cc: James Morris Cc: Paul Moore Cc: Serge E. Hallyn Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün Signed-off-by: Paul Moore List of files: /linux-6.15/security/Makefile

03115077 - lsm: add IPE lsm

Sat, 03 Aug 2024 06:08:15 +0000

lsm: add IPE lsmIntegrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) is an LSM that provides ancomplimentary approach to Mandatory Access Control than existing LSMstoday.Existing LSMs have centered around the concept of access to a resourceshould be controlled by the current user's credentials. IPE's approach,is that access to a resource should be controlled by the system's trustof a current resource.The basis of this approach is defining a global policy to specify whichresource can be trusted.Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers Signed-off-by: Fan Wu [PM: subject line tweak]Signed-off-by: Paul Moore List of files: /linux-6.15/security/Makefile

a04a1198 - LSM: syscalls for current process attributes

Tue, 12 Sep 2023 20:56:49 +0000

LSM: syscalls for current process attributesCreate a system call lsm_get_self_attr() to provide the securitymodule maintained attributes of the current process.Create a system call lsm_set_self_attr() to set a securitymodule maintained attribute of the current process.Historically these attributes have been exposed to user space viaentries in procfs under /proc/self/attr.The attribute value is provided in a lsm_ctx structure. The structureidentifies the size of the attribute, and the attribute value. The formatof the attribute value is defined by the security module. A flags fieldis included for LSM specific information. It is currently unused and mustbe 0. The total size of the data, including the lsm_ctx structure and anypadding, is maintained as well.struct lsm_ctx { __u64 id; __u64 flags; __u64 len; __u64 ctx_len; __u8 ctx[];};Two new LSM hooks are used to interface with the LSMs.security_getselfattr() collects the lsm_ctx values from theLSMs that support the hook, accounting for space requirements.security_setselfattr() identifies which LSM the attribute isintended for and passes it along.Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn Reviewed-by: John Johansen Signed-off-by: Paul Moore List of files: /linux-6.15/security/Makefile

e052826f - security: remove unneeded subdir-$(CONFIG_...)

Fri, 28 May 2021 18:01:40 +0000

security: remove unneeded subdir-$(CONFIG_...)All of these are unneeded. The directories to descend are specifiedby obj-$(CONFIG_...).Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada List of files: /linux-6.15/security/Makefile

90945448 - landlock: Add object management

Thu, 22 Apr 2021 15:41:11 +0000

landlock: Add object managementA Landlock object enables to identify a kernel object (e.g. an inode).A Landlock rule is a set of access rights allowed on an object. Rulesare grouped in rulesets that may be tied to a set of processes (i.e.subjects) to enforce a scoped access-control (i.e. a domain).Because Landlock's goal is to empower any process (especiallyunprivileged ones) to sandbox themselves, we cannot rely on asystem-wide object identification such as file extended attributes.Indeed, we need innocuous, composable and modular access-controls.The main challenge with these constraints is to identify kernel objectswhile this identification is useful (i.e. when a security policy makesuse of this object). But this identification data should be freed onceno policy is using it. This ephemeral tagging should not and may not bewritten in the filesystem. We then need to manage the lifetime of arule according to the lifetime of its objects. To avoid a global lock,this implementation make use of RCU and counters to safely referenceobjects.A following commit uses this generic object management for inodes.Cc: James Morris Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün Reviewed-by: Jann Horn Acked-by: Serge Hallyn Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-2-mic@digikod.netSigned-off-by: James Morris List of files: /linux-6.15/security/Makefile

eec8fd02 - device_cgroup: Cleanup cgroup eBPF device filter code

Fri, 03 Apr 2020 17:55:28 +0000

device_cgroup: Cleanup cgroup eBPF device filter codeOriginal cgroup v2 eBPF code for filtering device access made itpossible to compile with CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE=n and still use the eBPFfiltering. Changecommit 4b7d4d453fc4 ("device_cgroup: Export devcgroup_check_permission")reverted this, making it required to set it to y.Since the device filtering (and all the docs) for cgroup v2 is no longera "device controller" like it was in v1, someone might compile theirkernel with CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE=n. Then (for linux 5.5+) the eBPFfilter will not be invoked, and all processes will be allowed accessto all devices, no matter what the eBPF filter says.Signed-off-by: Odin Ugedal Acked-by: Roman Gushchin Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo List of files: /linux-6.15/security/Makefile

520b7aa0 - bpf: lsm: Initialize the BPF LSM hooks

Sun, 29 Mar 2020 00:43:53 +0000

bpf: lsm: Initialize the BPF LSM hooks* The hooks are initialized using the definitions in include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h.* The LSM can be enabled / disabled with CONFIG_BPF_LSM.Signed-off-by: KP Singh Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman Reviewed-by: Florent Revest Acked-by: Kees Cook Acked-by: James Morris Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200329004356.27286-6-kpsingh@chromium.org List of files: /linux-6.15/security/Makefile

b2104ac0 - security: only build lsm_audit if CONFIG_SECURITY=y

Tue, 10 Dec 2019 16:55:41 +0000

security: only build lsm_audit if CONFIG_SECURITY=yThe lsm_audit code is only required when CONFIG_SECURITY is enabled.It does not have a build dependency on CONFIG_AUDIT since audit.hprovides trivial static inlines for audit_log*() when CONFIG_AUDITis disabled. Hence, the Makefile should only add lsm_audit to theobj lists based on CONFIG_SECURITY, not CONFIG_AUDIT.Fixes: 59438b46471a ("security,lockdown,selinux: implement SELinux lockdown")Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley Signed-off-by: Paul Moore List of files: /linux-6.15/security/Makefile

000d388e - security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM

Tue, 20 Aug 2019 00:17:39 +0000

security: Add a static lockdown policy LSMWhile existing LSMs can be extended to handle lockdown policy,distributions generally want to be able to apply a straightforwardstatic policy. This patch adds a simple LSM that can be configured toreject either integrity or all lockdown queries, and can be configuredat runtime (through securityfs), boot time (via a kernel parameter) orbuild time (via a kconfig option). Based on initial code by DavidHowells.Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Cc: David Howells Signed-off-by: James Morris List of files: /linux-6.15/security/Makefile

aeca4e2c - LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls

Wed, 16 Jan 2019 15:46:06 +0000

LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid callsSafeSetID gates the setid family of syscalls to restrict UID/GIDtransitions from a given UID/GID to only those approved by asystem-wide whitelist. These restrictions also prohibit the givenUIDs/GIDs from obtaining auxiliary privileges associated withCAP_SET{U/G}ID, such as allowing a user to set up user namespace UIDmappings. For now, only gating the set*uid family of syscalls issupported, with support for set*gid coming in a future patch set.Signed-off-by: Micah Morton Acked-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: James Morris List of files: /linux-6.15/security/Makefile

b2441318 - License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license

Wed, 01 Nov 2017 14:07:57 +0000

License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no licenseMany source files in the tree are missing licensing information, whichmakes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.By default all files without license information are under the defaultlicense of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally bindingshorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart andPhilippe Ombredanne.How this work was done:Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset ofthe use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up caseswhere non-standard license headers were used, and references to licensehad to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied toa file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of theoutput of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDXtag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared thebase worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 filesassessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scannerresults in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was notimmediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines).All documentation files were explicitly excluded.The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX licenseidentifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time.In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on thespreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to thesource files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmationby lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base fromFOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scannersdisagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. TheWindriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, sothey are related.Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheetsfor the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in thefiles he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checksin about 15000 files.In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to havecopy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect thecorrect identifier.Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manualinspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patchversion early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correctThis produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. Thisworksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for thedifferent types of files to be modified.These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script toparse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in theformat that the file expected. This script was further refined by Gregbased on the output to detect more types of files automatically and todistinguish between header and source .c files (which need differentcomment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files togenerate the patches.Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman List of files: /linux-6.15/security/Makefile

9b091556 - LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions

Wed, 20 Apr 2016 22:46:28 +0000

LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictionsThis LSM enforces that kernel-loaded files (modules, firmware, etc)must all come from the same filesystem, with the expectation thatsuch a filesystem is backed by a read-only device such as dm-verityor CDROM. This allows systems that have a verified and/or unchangeablefilesystem to enforce module and firmware loading restrictions withoutneeding to sign the files individually.Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Acked-by: Serge Hallyn Signed-off-by: James Morris List of files: /linux-6.15/security/Makefile

b1d9e6b0 - LSM: Switch to lists of hooks

Sat, 02 May 2015 22:11:42 +0000

LSM: Switch to lists of hooksInstead of using a vector of security operationswith explicit, special case stacking of the capabilityand yama hooks use lists of hooks with capability andyama hooks included as appropriate.The security_operations structure is no longer required.Instead, there is a union of the function pointers thatallows all the hooks lists to use a common mechanism forlist management while retaining typing. Each modulesupplies an array describing the hooks it provides insteadof a sparsely populated security_operations structure.The description includes the element that gets put onthe hook list, avoiding the issues surrounding individualelement allocation.The method for registering security modules is changed toreflect the information available. The method for removinga module, currently only used by SELinux, has also changed.It should be generic now, however if there are potentialrace conditions based on ordering of hook removal that needsto be addressed by the calling module.The security hooks are called from the lists and the firstfailure is returned.Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler Acked-by: John Johansen Acked-by: Kees Cook Acked-by: Paul Moore Acked-by: Stephen Smalley Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa Signed-off-by: James Morris List of files: /linux-6.15/security/Makefile

e0c2de2b - security: cleanup Makefiles to use standard syntax for specifying sub-directories

Sat, 15 Feb 2014 21:49:30 +0000

security: cleanup Makefiles to use standard syntax for specifying sub-directoriesThe Makefiles in security/ uses a non-standard way tospecify sub-directories for building.Fix it up so the normal (and documented) approach is used.Signed-off-by: Sam Ravnborg Cc: Michal Marek Signed-off-by: James Morris List of files: /linux-6.15/security/Makefile

a3c9e45d - security: remove erroneous comment about capabilities.o link ordering

Tue, 10 Sep 2013 13:51:50 +0000

security: remove erroneous comment about capabilities.o link orderingBack when we had half ass LSM stacking we had to link capabilities.oafter bigger LSMs so that on initialization the bigger LSM wouldregister first and the capabilities module would be the one stacked asthe 'seconday'. Somewhere around 6f0f0fd496333777d53 (back in 2008) wefinally removed the last of the kinda module stacking code but thiscomment in the makefile still lives today.Reported-by: Valdis Kletnieks Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Signed-off-by: James Morris List of files: /linux-6.15/security/Makefile

2d514487 - security: Yama LSM

Wed, 21 Dec 2011 20:17:04 +0000

security: Yama LSMThis adds the Yama Linux Security Module to collect DAC securityimprovements (specifically just ptrace restrictions for now) that haveexisted in various forms over the years and have been carried outside themainline kernel by other Linux distributions like Openwall and grsecurity.Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Acked-by: John Johansen Signed-off-by: James Morris List of files: /linux-6.15/security/Makefile

f381c272 - integrity: move ima inode integrity data management

Wed, 09 Mar 2011 19:13:22 +0000

integrity: move ima inode integrity data managementMove the inode integrity data(iint) management up to the integrity directoryin order to share the iint among the different integrity models.Changelog:- don't define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE- rename several globally visible 'ima_' prefixed functions, structs, locks, etc to 'integrity_'- replace '20' with SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE- reflect location change in appropriate Kconfig and Makefiles- remove unnecessary initialization of iint_initialized to 0- rebased on current ima_iint.c- define integrity_iint_store/lock as staticThere should be no other functional changes.Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Acked-by: Serge Hallyn List of files: /linux-6.15/security/Makefile

f9ad1af5 - AppArmor: Enable configuring and building of the AppArmor security module

Thu, 29 Jul 2010 21:48:08 +0000

AppArmor: Enable configuring and building of the AppArmor security moduleKconfig and Makefiles to enable configuration and building of AppArmor.Signed-off-by: John Johansen Signed-off-by: James Morris List of files: /linux-6.15/security/Makefile

6e141546 - NOMMU: Optimise away the {dac_,}mmap_min_addr tests

Tue, 15 Dec 2009 19:27:45 +0000

NOMMU: Optimise away the {dac_,}mmap_min_addr testsIn NOMMU mode clamp dac_mmap_min_addr to zero to cause the tests on it to beskipped by the compiler. We do this as the minimum mmap address doesn't makeany sense in NOMMU mode.mmap_min_addr and round_hint_to_min() can be discarded entirely in NOMMU mode.Signed-off-by: David Howells Acked-by: Eric Paris Signed-off-by: James Morris List of files: /linux-6.15/security/Makefile

3e1c2515 - security: remove root_plug

Tue, 20 Oct 2009 04:48:33 +0000

security: remove root_plug Remove the root_plug example LSM code. It's unmaintained and increasingly broken in various ways. Made at the 2009 Kernel Summit in Tokyo! Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: James Morris List of files: /linux-6.15/security/Makefile