Changes in sysfs-driver-pciback

54a19b4d - docs: ABI: cleanup several ABI documents

Fri, 30 Oct 2020 07:40:50 +0000

docs: ABI: cleanup several ABI documentsThere are some ABI documents that, while they don't generateany warnings, they have issues when parsed by get_abi.pl scripton its output result.Address them, in order to provide a clean output.Reviewed-by: Tom Rix # for fpga-managerReviewed-By: Kajol Jain # for sysfs-bus-event_source-devices-hv_gpci and sysfs-bus-event_source-devices-hv_24x7Acked-by: Jonathan Cameron #for IIOAcked-by: Oded Gabbay # for HabanalabsAcked-by: Vaibhav Jain # for sysfs-bus-papr-pmemAcked-by: Cezary Rojewski # for catptAcked-by: Suzuki K Poulose Acked-by: Ilya Dryomov # for rbdAcked-by: Jonathan Corbet Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/5bc78e5b68ed1e9e39135173857cb2e753be868f.1604042072.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman List of files: /linux-6.15/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-driver-pciback

476878e4 - xen-pciback: optionally allow interrupt enable flag writes

Wed, 15 Jan 2020 01:46:29 +0000

xen-pciback: optionally allow interrupt enable flag writesQEMU running in a stubdom needs to be able to set INTX_DISABLE, and theMSI(-X) enable flags in the PCI config space. This adds an attribute'allow_interrupt_control' which when set for a PCI device allows writesto this flag(s). The toolstack will need to set this for stubdoms.When enabled, guest (stubdomain) will be allowed to set relevant enableflags, but only one at a time - i.e. it refuses to enable more than oneof INTx, MSI, MSI-X at a time.This functionality is needed only for config space access done by devicemodel (stubdomain) serving a HVM with the actual PCI device. It is notnecessary and unsafe to enable direct access to those bits for PV domainwith the device attached. For PV domains, there are separate protocolmessages (XEN_PCI_OP_{enable,disable}_{msi,msix}) for this purpose.Those ops in addition to setting enable bits, also configure MSI(-X) indom0 kernel - which is undesirable for PCI passthrough to HVM guests.This should not introduce any new security issues since a maliciousguest (or stubdom) can already generate MSIs through other ways, see[1] page 8. Additionally, when qemu runs in dom0, it already have directaccess to those bits.This is the second iteration of this feature. First was proposed as adirect Xen interface through a new hypercall, but ultimately it wasrejected by the maintainer, because of mixing pciback and hypercalls forPCI config space access isn't a good design. Full discussion at [2].[1]: https://invisiblethingslab.com/resources/2011/Software%20Attacks%20on%20Intel%20VT-d.pdf[2]: https://xen.markmail.org/thread/smpgpws4umdzizze[part of the commit message and sysfs handling]Signed-off-by: Simon Gaiser [the rest]Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné [boris: A few small changes suggested by Roger, some formatting changes]Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky List of files: /linux-6.15/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-driver-pciback

8b63c998 - xen-pciback: Document the 'quirks' sysfs file

Mon, 14 Jul 2014 16:18:51 +0000

xen-pciback: Document the 'quirks' sysfs fileSigned-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk Signed-off-by: David Vrabel List of files: /linux-6.15/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-driver-pciback