Lines Matching refs:code

84 conditional checks.  The kernel entry code interrupt, exception, and NMI
86 in the context of Spectre v1, as kernel code can speculatively run with
95 indirect branches can be influenced by an attacker, causing gadget code
103 branches in the victim to gadget code by poisoning the branch target
105 poisoning could be done by indirect branching into existing code,
109 this could cause privileged code's indirect branch to jump to a gadget
110 code with the same offset.
130 steer its indirect branch speculations to gadget code, and measure the
162    is invalid, but bound checks are bypassed in the code branch taken
166    For kernel code that has been identified where data pointers could
206    target buffer on indirect jump and jump to gadget code in speculative
218    to prevent jumping to gadget code during speculative execution.
224    There may be gadget code in firmware which could be exploited with
227    is turned on before the kernel invokes any firmware code.
240    code to derive invalid data pointers accessing privileged memory in
281    where such kernel code has been identified, nospec accessor macros
286    the kernel to jump to gadget code in the speculative execution paths.
307    accessed by gadget code in the victim's speculation paths.
462    For the Spectre variant 1, vulnerable kernel code (as determined
463    by code audit or scanning tools) is annotated on a case by case
468    Copy-from-user code has an LFENCE barrier to prevent the access_ok()
522    before invoking any firmware code to prevent Spectre variant 2 exploits
565    mitigated on a case by case basis in VM exit paths. Vulnerable code
616    execute externally supplied untrusted code, then the mitigations can